By Col R Hariharan
[This is a paraphrased version of my comments made on the ND TV-Hindu on March 21, 2010.]
Question: Customs officials at the Chennai Port are reported to have recovered detailed maps and plans of vital defence establishments [A total of 54 items such as blueprints of the Naval Dry Dock, Visakhapatnam, Air Force Academy, Hyderabad and a road map of Muzaffarpur and Meerut] in the unaccompanied personal baggage of a retired army officer sent for shipment to the U.S. Can a retired officer be in personal possession of government documents? Can he be prosecuted for violation of Official Secrets Act as these documents are said to relate to sensitive defence establishments like Air Force Academy and Vizag Naval Dock Yard?
Own comment: I am not aware of the complete details of the case except for what is reported in media. There are three issues involved in this.
Firstly, no government servant - serving or retired - can be in possession of official documents [of course, unless they relate to him]. This regulation applies not only to officers of security forces but all government servants. And such possession of documents classified as RESTRICTED, CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET or TOP SECRET will be in violation of Official Secrets Act.
Secondly, according to the media report the officer is said to be 78 years old. Considering that a service officer retires around 54-55 years, the documents in his possession would be pretty old - at least by 23-24 years. Are these documents still classified as secret or have they been downgraded to unclassified since then? This aspect has to be examined before deciding whether the act is a violation of Official Secrets Act. We should remember that this is an era when images of vital installations are available on the Internet. Sometime back, news papers carried the Google satellite image of Kahuta atomic establishment in Pakistan! So we have to view the issue in current perspective.
Third issue relates to enforcement of Official Secrets Act. We are not properly enforcing the Act. [Classified documents are not declassified or destroyed even when they are obsolete.] I remember in the Army Headquarters as late as 1980 there was a reconnaissance report of Iraq written by Lord Wavell as a Major in 1916-18 [when Iraq was called Mesopotamia!]. It was classified TOP SECRET! So before jumping to any conclusions these issues will have to be examined in depth as it involves the character of a retired officer. I am sure the Defence Intelligence authorities will be going into these details before deciding on further action. I should add that personal possession of any official document – classified or otherwise – is a violation of government orders.
Showing posts with label Military intelligence. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Military intelligence. Show all posts
Sunday, March 21, 2010
Saturday, January 23, 2010
Changing The Indian Intelligence Culture
[Vice President Hamid Ansari has recently spoken about the need for accountability and parliamentary oversight for Indian intelligence agencies.I have reproduced here the analysis of the Vice President's speech by seasoned expert on the subject B Raman written in his own inimitable style. As an old MI hand, my comments relating to Military Intellgence in the overall scheme of accountability of intelligence agencies would follow. - R Hariharan]
By B. Raman
In his R.N.Kao Memorial lecture delivered at the headquarters of the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW) on January 19, 2010, Vice-President Hamid Ansari has done well in raising in public issues such as accountability and parliamentary oversight to which the Indian intelligence community is still a stranger.
2. The concept of an accountable and competent intelligence community, which uses the need for secrecy only for protecting its operations and not for covering up its inadequacies and irregularities, has been accepted and implemented by the intelligence agencies of many democracies----parliamentary as well as Presidential types--- of the world during the last three decades. Nobody in those countries has since argued that these concepts have come in the way of the effectiveness of the intelligence process and hence should be re-considered. The overall consensus is that these changes have proved beneficial and hence should be continued and, if necessary, further refined.
3. In India too, these issues have been raised from time to time since the State of Emergency imposed by Indira Gandhi in 1975-77, but follow-up action has been avoided either because of resistance from sections of the intelligence community or because of the reluctance of the political leadership to introduce any changes which might dilute the scope for political misuse of the intelligence machinery for partisan purposes or both.
4. Accountability of intelligence agencies demands, firstly, that they should have a legal existence and, secondly, that they should have a formal charter of their functions and responsibilities. Forty-two years after its formation in 1968, the R&AW still does not have a legal existence. It was set up by a brief executive order issued on behalf of Indira Gandhi in September 1968. Till today, this order has not been accorded parliamentary sanctity by having necessary legislation authorising its creation passed by the Parliament. No Government, which has held office since 1968, has considered it necessary to have an Act passed by the Parliament providing legal legitimacy to the R&AW. No one has raised the question as to how the various Governments have been incurring expenditure on the R&AW year after year without having its creation approved by the Parliament.
5. In the 1980s, when Indira Gandhi was the Prime Minister, a law was enacted by the Parliament banning strikes in the intelligence agencies. To my knowledge, that is the only Act of the Indian Parliament in which there is a reference to the R&AW by name. When that law was passed, nobody in the Parliament thought it fit to ask: What is this R&AW about? When was it created? Who created it? Has its creation been approved by the Parliament?
6. It goes to the credit of A.K.Verma, who headed the R&AW from 1987 to 90 that he took the initiative in drawing the attention of the Governments of Rajiv Gandhi and V.P.Singh to the fact that the R&AW had been functioning without a legal cover and a formal charter. He wanted the Government of the day to do something about it, but nothing was done.
7. The fact that the Intelligence Bureau, which was created by the British before 1947, and the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), which came into existence after 1947, had been functioning without formal charters of their functions and responsibilities, was highlighted by the L.P.Singh Committee, which was set up by the Morarji Desai Government to enquire into the functioning of these two organisations during the State of Emergency. It not only stressed the need for formal charters to prevent their future misuse, but also prepared for the consideration of the Government detailed model charters for adoption. No action was taken on its recommendations by the Indira Gandhi Government which came back to power in 1980 or its successors. The report was consigned to the Archives---seen, but not read and implemented.
8. Shri Atal Behari Vajpayee and Shri Lal Krishna Advani were among those who were in the forefront of those who criticised----- during the election campaign of 1977---- the alleged misuse of the intelligence agencies by the Indira Gandhi Government during the Emergency. When Shri Vajpayee became the Prime Minister and Shri Advani the Home Minister in 1998, one naturally expected them to take the initiative in taking the L.P.Singh Committee report out of the Archives and implement it. The expectations were belied.
9. The Task Force for the revamping of the intelligence apparatus set up by the Vajpayee Government in 2000, which was headed by Shri G.C. Saxena, former head of the R&AW, recommended the acceptance by the Government of the principle of formal charters for the intelligence agencies. To give greater meat to its recommendations, it wanted to have a look at the detailed charters for the IB and the CBI proposed by the L.P.Singh Committee. The Home Ministry, then headed by Shri Advani, avoided making available to the Task Force the entire report of the L.P.Singh Committee. However, the Task Force's recommendation for formal charters was accepted and implemented by the Vajpayee Government. One does not know whether the recommendations of the L.P.Singh Committee were taken into consideration while drafting the charters.
10. The credit for first raising the idea of a parliamentary oversight on the intelligence community should go to Shri Jaswant Singh, who was the Chairman of the Estimates Committee of the Rajya Sabha when Shri V.P.Singh was the Prime Minister. Shri V.P.Singh saw merit in the idea and wanted it to be examined. There was no opposition to the idea from the intelligence professionals then in service including this writer, but when Shri V.P.Singh developed differences with the BJP, he did not pursue it.
11. Since then, none of the political parties has shown interest in making the intelligence agencies accountable for their performance and integrity and in making their professional performance subject to an independent assessment. Secrecy is an important operational principle for an intelligence agency. Unless an intelligence agency is able to ensure the secrecy of its operations, no source or agent will stick his neck out to work for it. Its capability for collecting technical intelligence will also be affected.
12. But secrecy should not be allowed to be used as an excuse for covering inefficiencies in performance and irregularities in functioning and financial management. Irregularities do occur in matters such as the personnel policy and diversion of the resources sanctioned by the Government for operational objectives for non-operational purposes. The public and the Parliament have a right to know to what extent the agencies have been producing results and what are the areas of their non-performance. The Parliament has a right to know what kind of financial controls are in place, who exercises those controls and to what extent they are effective. The Parliament has similarly a right to check whether the principle of secrecy in recruitment is being misused to pack the organisations with unsuitable persons, taken not for their qualifications, but for their connections.
13. It is possible to introduce some of these checks and balances in the functioning of our intelligence community without damaging their operational secrecy. There is reluctance from the political class because it sees the agencies as instruments for partisan exploitation and not for defending national interests. There is reluctance from sections of the intelligence officers themselves because they think that unchecked secrecy gives them an aura of power and influence which they do not want to lose.
14. Ansaris may come and Ansaris may go, but the intelligence agencies will go on functioning in the same manner with the complicity of the political class unless there is sustained public pressure on the political class and the agencies to change the culture of our agencies. I am not very optimistic because I do not see on the horizon any political leader who is genuinely convinced of the need for a change.
15. Every country gets the intelligence community it deserves. We will continue to have the community which we have deserved unless Shri Ansari's call is followed up.
Courtesy: South Asia Analysis Group Paper no. 3616 dated 20-Jan-2010
URL: http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers37%5Cpaper3616.html
By B. Raman
In his R.N.Kao Memorial lecture delivered at the headquarters of the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW) on January 19, 2010, Vice-President Hamid Ansari has done well in raising in public issues such as accountability and parliamentary oversight to which the Indian intelligence community is still a stranger.
2. The concept of an accountable and competent intelligence community, which uses the need for secrecy only for protecting its operations and not for covering up its inadequacies and irregularities, has been accepted and implemented by the intelligence agencies of many democracies----parliamentary as well as Presidential types--- of the world during the last three decades. Nobody in those countries has since argued that these concepts have come in the way of the effectiveness of the intelligence process and hence should be re-considered. The overall consensus is that these changes have proved beneficial and hence should be continued and, if necessary, further refined.
3. In India too, these issues have been raised from time to time since the State of Emergency imposed by Indira Gandhi in 1975-77, but follow-up action has been avoided either because of resistance from sections of the intelligence community or because of the reluctance of the political leadership to introduce any changes which might dilute the scope for political misuse of the intelligence machinery for partisan purposes or both.
4. Accountability of intelligence agencies demands, firstly, that they should have a legal existence and, secondly, that they should have a formal charter of their functions and responsibilities. Forty-two years after its formation in 1968, the R&AW still does not have a legal existence. It was set up by a brief executive order issued on behalf of Indira Gandhi in September 1968. Till today, this order has not been accorded parliamentary sanctity by having necessary legislation authorising its creation passed by the Parliament. No Government, which has held office since 1968, has considered it necessary to have an Act passed by the Parliament providing legal legitimacy to the R&AW. No one has raised the question as to how the various Governments have been incurring expenditure on the R&AW year after year without having its creation approved by the Parliament.
5. In the 1980s, when Indira Gandhi was the Prime Minister, a law was enacted by the Parliament banning strikes in the intelligence agencies. To my knowledge, that is the only Act of the Indian Parliament in which there is a reference to the R&AW by name. When that law was passed, nobody in the Parliament thought it fit to ask: What is this R&AW about? When was it created? Who created it? Has its creation been approved by the Parliament?
6. It goes to the credit of A.K.Verma, who headed the R&AW from 1987 to 90 that he took the initiative in drawing the attention of the Governments of Rajiv Gandhi and V.P.Singh to the fact that the R&AW had been functioning without a legal cover and a formal charter. He wanted the Government of the day to do something about it, but nothing was done.
7. The fact that the Intelligence Bureau, which was created by the British before 1947, and the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), which came into existence after 1947, had been functioning without formal charters of their functions and responsibilities, was highlighted by the L.P.Singh Committee, which was set up by the Morarji Desai Government to enquire into the functioning of these two organisations during the State of Emergency. It not only stressed the need for formal charters to prevent their future misuse, but also prepared for the consideration of the Government detailed model charters for adoption. No action was taken on its recommendations by the Indira Gandhi Government which came back to power in 1980 or its successors. The report was consigned to the Archives---seen, but not read and implemented.
8. Shri Atal Behari Vajpayee and Shri Lal Krishna Advani were among those who were in the forefront of those who criticised----- during the election campaign of 1977---- the alleged misuse of the intelligence agencies by the Indira Gandhi Government during the Emergency. When Shri Vajpayee became the Prime Minister and Shri Advani the Home Minister in 1998, one naturally expected them to take the initiative in taking the L.P.Singh Committee report out of the Archives and implement it. The expectations were belied.
9. The Task Force for the revamping of the intelligence apparatus set up by the Vajpayee Government in 2000, which was headed by Shri G.C. Saxena, former head of the R&AW, recommended the acceptance by the Government of the principle of formal charters for the intelligence agencies. To give greater meat to its recommendations, it wanted to have a look at the detailed charters for the IB and the CBI proposed by the L.P.Singh Committee. The Home Ministry, then headed by Shri Advani, avoided making available to the Task Force the entire report of the L.P.Singh Committee. However, the Task Force's recommendation for formal charters was accepted and implemented by the Vajpayee Government. One does not know whether the recommendations of the L.P.Singh Committee were taken into consideration while drafting the charters.
10. The credit for first raising the idea of a parliamentary oversight on the intelligence community should go to Shri Jaswant Singh, who was the Chairman of the Estimates Committee of the Rajya Sabha when Shri V.P.Singh was the Prime Minister. Shri V.P.Singh saw merit in the idea and wanted it to be examined. There was no opposition to the idea from the intelligence professionals then in service including this writer, but when Shri V.P.Singh developed differences with the BJP, he did not pursue it.
11. Since then, none of the political parties has shown interest in making the intelligence agencies accountable for their performance and integrity and in making their professional performance subject to an independent assessment. Secrecy is an important operational principle for an intelligence agency. Unless an intelligence agency is able to ensure the secrecy of its operations, no source or agent will stick his neck out to work for it. Its capability for collecting technical intelligence will also be affected.
12. But secrecy should not be allowed to be used as an excuse for covering inefficiencies in performance and irregularities in functioning and financial management. Irregularities do occur in matters such as the personnel policy and diversion of the resources sanctioned by the Government for operational objectives for non-operational purposes. The public and the Parliament have a right to know to what extent the agencies have been producing results and what are the areas of their non-performance. The Parliament has a right to know what kind of financial controls are in place, who exercises those controls and to what extent they are effective. The Parliament has similarly a right to check whether the principle of secrecy in recruitment is being misused to pack the organisations with unsuitable persons, taken not for their qualifications, but for their connections.
13. It is possible to introduce some of these checks and balances in the functioning of our intelligence community without damaging their operational secrecy. There is reluctance from the political class because it sees the agencies as instruments for partisan exploitation and not for defending national interests. There is reluctance from sections of the intelligence officers themselves because they think that unchecked secrecy gives them an aura of power and influence which they do not want to lose.
14. Ansaris may come and Ansaris may go, but the intelligence agencies will go on functioning in the same manner with the complicity of the political class unless there is sustained public pressure on the political class and the agencies to change the culture of our agencies. I am not very optimistic because I do not see on the horizon any political leader who is genuinely convinced of the need for a change.
15. Every country gets the intelligence community it deserves. We will continue to have the community which we have deserved unless Shri Ansari's call is followed up.
Courtesy: South Asia Analysis Group Paper no. 3616 dated 20-Jan-2010
URL: http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers37%5Cpaper3616.html
Sunday, October 25, 2009
A Chief Minister who was an intelligence man
In the context of the ongoing war of words between China and India, it is interesting to note that Dorjee Khandu, the new chief minister of Arunachal Pradesh had served in the Intelligence Corps of the Army for more than seven years. [Although the Intelligence Corps is a small one, I have not come across him during my long years of service.] The news report says that he had received a gold medal for his meritorious intelligence services during the Bangladesh War.
The 54-year old chief minister belongs to the Monpa tribe, who live in Kameng Division of Arunachal Pradesh in which Tawang District is located. Monpas are a pastoral people who follow Tibetan Buddhism. They consider the Dalai Lama as their spiritual leader. In the heat created by China’s loud objections to the proposed visit of the Dalai Lama to the Tawang monastery because they consider it a part of “Southern Tibet” it is good to have a chief minister hailing from the region. This is in marked contrast to the status of Monpa tribesmen who also live in Tibetan region across the Mc Mahon Line in Tawan area.
The chief minister was reported to have taken keen interest in social activity of villagers of Tawang district. Due to his enthusiastic efforts, cultural and co-operative societies were established in Tawang. He also served them as the chairman.His interest in cultural activity is evident from the fact that he led the cultural troupe from Arunachal Pradesh to perform at the New Delhi Asian Games. He was also awarded the silver medal.
Dorjee Khandu was elected unopposed to the first Arunachal Legislative Assembly from Thingbu-Mukto constituency in 1990. Five years later he was re-elected to the Assembly from the same constituency. In 1996, he was made the Minister of State for Cooperation and later went on to become a Cabinet Minister for Animal Husbandry, Veterinary and Dairy Development. During his tenure as Minister for Power in 1998, a number of small and medium sized hydel power projects were sanctioned.
Today Khandu is one of the richest politicians of the state. His declared asset is more than Rs 200 million.
It is good we have a chief minister in one of the frontline states who has military knowledge at a critical time in India-China relations. We wish him luck in his new appointment.
The 54-year old chief minister belongs to the Monpa tribe, who live in Kameng Division of Arunachal Pradesh in which Tawang District is located. Monpas are a pastoral people who follow Tibetan Buddhism. They consider the Dalai Lama as their spiritual leader. In the heat created by China’s loud objections to the proposed visit of the Dalai Lama to the Tawang monastery because they consider it a part of “Southern Tibet” it is good to have a chief minister hailing from the region. This is in marked contrast to the status of Monpa tribesmen who also live in Tibetan region across the Mc Mahon Line in Tawan area.
The chief minister was reported to have taken keen interest in social activity of villagers of Tawang district. Due to his enthusiastic efforts, cultural and co-operative societies were established in Tawang. He also served them as the chairman.His interest in cultural activity is evident from the fact that he led the cultural troupe from Arunachal Pradesh to perform at the New Delhi Asian Games. He was also awarded the silver medal.
Dorjee Khandu was elected unopposed to the first Arunachal Legislative Assembly from Thingbu-Mukto constituency in 1990. Five years later he was re-elected to the Assembly from the same constituency. In 1996, he was made the Minister of State for Cooperation and later went on to become a Cabinet Minister for Animal Husbandry, Veterinary and Dairy Development. During his tenure as Minister for Power in 1998, a number of small and medium sized hydel power projects were sanctioned.
Today Khandu is one of the richest politicians of the state. His declared asset is more than Rs 200 million.
It is good we have a chief minister in one of the frontline states who has military knowledge at a critical time in India-China relations. We wish him luck in his new appointment.
Monday, August 10, 2009
Defeat of the LTTE and the Future of Tamil Militancy
[This article written on July 13, 2009 and published in the journal "World Focus" Volume XXX Number 7 - July 2009 is reproduced here -sans footnotes - kind courtesy World Focus, who hold the copyright.]
Col R Hariharan
INTRODUCTION
The death of Velupillai Prabhakaran, the charismatic founder-leader of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), along with almost the entire first and second line leadership in the last lap of the Eelam War IV in May 2009 represents a milestone in the history of Tamil militancy in Sri Lanka.
Sri Lanka’s war against Tamil extremism in all its forms had been going on for the last three decades. Out of the 38 insurgent groups that came into being in this period barring the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), the Sinhala Marxist insurgency, all others were of Tamil origin fighting against what they perceived as Sinhala oppression. Almost all Tamil groups considered the carving out of an independent Tamil nation – the Tamil Eelam – out of Sri Lanka’s traditional Tamil inhabited areas as the only path of redemption for Tamils to preserve their language, culture and identity.
Only the LTTE had managed to survive the military onslaught of Sri Lanka state against Tamil insurgent groups from 1983 on wards till 2009. It had also weathered the active Indian political and military intervention in Sri Lanka between 1983 and 1990. In its bid to emerge as the sole standard bearer of the cause of Tamil Eelam, the LTTE did not hesitate to eliminate thousands of militants and leaders of rival Tamil groups. In his bid to emerge as the unchallenged leader of Tamils, Prabhakaran eliminated important Tamil political leaders including Appapillai Amirthalingam and Dr Nilan Thiruchelvam of the Tamil United Liberation to emerge as the only viable Tamil organisation with political and military clout.
Sri Lanka Security Forces (SLSF) could not achieve decisive results against the LTTE in the three rounds of war from 1983 to 2002. However, in their victorious Eelam War IV, the SLSF had killed as many as 15,000 LTTE cadres and destroyed or captured millions of rupees worth military and civil assets of the insurgent group. In addition to this the SLSF is holding 9000 cadres in captivity.
It is going to be extremely difficult for the LTTE to stage a comeback as a viable force in the near future. The financial, material and political support from sections of the 800,000-strong Sri Lanka Tamil expatriates had been an important factor in the LTTE’s growth and sustenance all these years. With their support the LTTE had built a strong logistic support network abroad to sustain the organisation in Sri Lanka in both peace and war. This support network, though disrupted, is by and large in tact, though leaderless at the moment.
The SLSF which had built the armed forces to about 200,000 to fight the war is acutely aware of the possibility of the LTTE staging a comeback in the near future. In order to prevent such an eventuality, the Army Commander General Sarath Fonseka plans to build a strong force of 300,000. And he proposes to ensure continued presence of the security forces in the Tamil predominant north and east to nip any resurgence of Tamil militancy in the bud.
The exit of the LTTE from the Sri Lanka scene as a power centre has raised a question mark over not only the future of Tamil militancy, but also the durability of the Tamil struggle for an independent state of Tamil Eelam. The possibility of LTTE’s revival and the future of Tamil militancy are closely interlinked issues.
Revival of Tamil militancy requires a few favourable factors: strong motivation for the Tamil Eelam cause, a committed leadership, an environment that provides for the growth of militancy, and external support. These have to be sustained in the face of Sri Lanka state’s response to its resurgence, and coordinated action of international community which is now united in its action against organisations listed terrorist bodies.
THE CAUSE
The cause of an independent Tamil Eelam state had provided the motive force Tamil youth to take up arms. It was the culmination of Tamil minority’s political quest to protect their identity, culture, and integrity of areas considered as its homeland. This process took at least two decades of traverse through the establishment of Tamil identity and another two decades for its transformation into Tamil nationalism.
Sri Lanka despite sharing a lot of cultural, religious and ethnic traditions with the Indian subcontinent has slightly different socio-political history. Unlike India, there had been no major caste, communal or ethnic conflicts in Sri Lanka (then known as Ceylon) during the British colonial days barring the anti Muslim riots of 1911. The broad division of identities of Sri Lanka’s Sinhala speaking, largely Buddhist majority, Tamil speaking Hindu and Christian communities identified as Tamils, and Muslims (mostly Tamil speaking and referred to as Moors) came about with the introduction of universal franchise in Sri Lanka (then known as Ceylon) in 1931.
While Indian polity fought the British and struggled to gain independence, Sri Lanka gained independence in 1948 without any serious struggle. In the words of Dr Devanesan Nesiah, “Unlike other South Asian leaders, those of pre-independence Sri Lanka remained in good standing with the colonial rulers.” While India’s struggle for independence fostered a national identity despite the differences within the community, Sri Lanka did not undergo this process of melding its divided identities into a single Sri Lankan national identity at the time of independence.
During the British colonial rule, Tamils had played a dominant role in Sri Lanka. Unlike the Sinhalas, Tamils adapted to English education and became useful to the colonial administration. The progressive alienation of the Tamil minority population from Sri Lanka’s national mainstream started only after the country attained independence in 1948.
From then onwards, the assertion of Tamil identity had been a factor in national politics. However, the process of transformation of Tamil identity and its crystallization into Tamil nationalism took nearly two decades from 1956 onwards. In this period resurgent Sinhala nationalism made its appearance as a political force with the Sinhala majority asserting its distinct linguistic, religious and ethnic identity as true national identity.
Four watershed events pushed the Tamils from uniting in their struggle against the Sinhala state and taking up arms to fight it. These were the introduction of 'Sinhala only' policy making it the national language, adoption of a new Constitution of 1972, the 1977 parliamentary elections and the 1980 anti Tamil pogrom.
The introduction of Sinhala as the sole national language and the state sponsorship of Buddhism and its symbols did not enhance the feeling of nationhood among the Tamils and other minorities.
The 1972 Constitution gave a Sinhala character to Sri Lanka triggering minorities’ fear of marginalisation under the new dispensation. This made the Tamils to change their earlier demand for balanced representation into a demand for a Federal State. The state driven by its new found Sinhala nationalism, did not politically respond to meet the minority demands.
This caused disillusionment among moderate Tamil 'Federal' leaders like Dr Chelvanayagam. They began to talk aloud about the creation of an independent state of Tamil Eelam in 1975.[6] By 1976 Tamil demand for Federalism gave way for creation of an independent Tamil Eelam. The overwhelming success of the TULF, a political omnibus of many shades of Tamil opinion, in the 1977 elections with a demand for an independent 'Tamil Eelam' gave it credence. The state showed singular lack of sensitivity to the strong Tamil sentiments and responded with brute force against political agitations on the issue. As Tamil politicians were rendered helpless against the highhandedness of the government, small extremist groups of Tamils started indulging in minor acts of militancy.
The ethnic estrangement, growing with its historical grievances, nurtured by Sinhala and Tamil political vested interests grew. It became a conflict after the LTTE militants led by Prabhakaran killed 13 soldiers in an ambush of two military vehicles at Tirunelveli in Jaffna on July 23, 1983. The public outrage in the rest of Sri Lanka at the killing of the Sinhala soldiers was used by Sinhala politicians to let loose a pogrom against Tamil population in Colombo and other places. The government failed to take any action even as a few thousand Tamils were killed and their properties destroyed.
Overnight the Tamil struggle gained global sympathy when thousands of Tamil refugees fled the country. Nearly 100,000 of them sought refuge in Tamil Nadu, in South India, which has traditional links with Sri Lanka Tamils. The pogrom in Sri Lanka created such a terror that over the years 700,000 Tamils are estimated to have immigrated to other countries The widespread public anger in Tamil Nadu grew as more and more Tamil refugees from Sri Lanka arrived there. Tamil insurgent groups fleeing the island were welcomed to the shores of Tamil Nadu. They were given arms and shelter.
Then onwards the Tamil issue became a critical one in Indian political scene as well. Inevitably India actively intervened in Sri Lanka from 1983 to 1990 politically, diplomatically and militarily to bring about ethnic peace. Indian efforts at mediation also crystallised the critical demands of Tamil nationalism at the Thimphu conference convened in July 1985 to reconcile the differences between the Sri Lanka government and the Tamils.
A united delegation of Tamil militant groups and politicians summed up the Tamil demands in the ‘Thimphu Declaration.’ The four Tamils demands were: recognition of Sri Lanka Tamils as a nation, recognition of the existence of an identified homeland for the Tamils of Sri Lanka, recognition of the right of self determination of the Tamil nation, and recognition of the right to citizenship and the fundamental rights of all Tamils of Sri Lanka.
At the initiative of Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, Sri Lanka President JR Jayawardane showed his readiness to build bridges with India and the two countries signed the India-Sri Lanka Agreement (ISLA) in 1987. As per the Agreement, Sri Lanka State agreed to devolve limited autonomy to a united northeast province - the traditional Tamil region considered as their homeland, provided India helped to end Tamil militancy and disarm the militants. The demand for right to citizenship for all Tamils was also accepted. Thus barring the demand for recognition of Tamils as a nation, the Agreement met all the demands of Tamils made in the Thimpu.
The 13th amendment of Sri Lanka constitution enacted in 1988 has given a limited amount of autonomy to the provincial councils including the Tamil-predominant northern and eastern provinces. The 14th amendment has given Tamil the status of national language, though it may not be on par with Sinhala. Thus the Tamil demands which articulated the cause of Tamil Eelam stand partly dissipated.
The post 1983 events – wars and peace efforts – and the abortive Indian direct military intervention from 1987 to 1990 have changed not only the demographics of Sri Lanka but the mindset of the next generation of Sinhalas and Tamils as well. It is more than two decades since Black July, and a whole new generation of Tamils has been brought up overseas in diverse surroundings – many of them in different countries with different languages and cultures.
Many of the Tamils have moved out of traditional areas of habitation into many parts of Central and Southern Sri Lanka and settled in the midst of Sinhala population due to the unending insurgency wars of LTTE in the north and east during the last two decades. The moot point is whether the cause of Tamil Eelam for the Tamils at home and abroad still holds the same attraction as in 1983?
THE ENVIRONMENT
South Asian environment
The international environment in the 80s and early 90s was the golden era of insurgency movements. The Cold War confrontation found the use of non-state actors a convenient handle to slow bleed the opponent. Soviet Union helped a pro Communist regime to seize power in Afghanistan after monarchy was toppled, much to the discomfort of the U.S. The Americans found a willing ally in Pakistan to support Islamist insurgents fight the communist regime in Afghanistan. The spill over of this confrontation into South Asia was limited to the introduction of Cold War power play with Pakistan and India drawn on opposite sides. Pakistan and to a certain extent China had been providing support and sanctuary to insurgents movements from India’s northeast.
Given this background, India was wary of increasing in American influence in its neighbourhood particularly after the strategic convergence of the U.S. and Pakistan in Afghanistan. So India found a strategic reason to keep Sri Lanka free from the increasing U.S. influence in the region.
The 1980 anti-Tamil pogrom created a strong wave of political sympathy for Tamils in India, particularly in Tamil Nadu. Prime Minister Mrs Indira Gandhi was sympathetic to the Tamil struggle for equity, though she did not support the idea of an independent Tamil Eelam. She also offered covert support to Tamil militants. When Sri Lanka President JR Jaywardane tried to gain the support of the U.S. and Pakistan to counter Indian pressure, India intervened actively from 1983 to 90 both politically and militarily. The ISLA was the outcome of this phase of India-Sri Lanka relations. India had to pull out its troops rather ignominiously in 1990 when Sri Lanka President Premadasa and Prabhakaran colluded to send them out of the island.
Since India's last active intervention in Sri Lanka, global power equation has changed. India and the U.S. enjoy a close relationship due to the convergence of their strategic security interests in the Indian Ocean region and Sri Lanka. India's trading interests are now global as its economy is galloping at a fast clip. These changes have created subtle shifts in India's perceptions. Now India's security perceptions of Sri Lanka are no more local. They are now global as Sri Lanka is viewed as the vanguard of India in the South, dominating the Indian Ocean.
As the biggest regional power in South Asia, India has the ability to alter the balance of power in Sri Lanka just as it did in 1987-90. India is the only country capable of underwriting any long-term solution to Sri Lanka's problem. However, this will be constrained by internal political considerations discussed earlier, and tie down its freedom of action in Sri Lanka.
India was the first country to ban the LTTE as a terrorist organisation. It had been consistent in taking action against any LTTE activity in its soil. So India had no hesitation in supplying non-lethal weapons and extending intelligence support to Sri Lanka in its conflict with the LTTE. Unlike the 80s India-Sri Lanka relations are multifaceted involving trade, commerce, economic relations and international cooperation. India has large investments in Sri Lanka and both countries have entered into a Free Trade Agreement and India-Sri Lanka trade is likely to clock $ 4 billion. Indian political and material support for the Tamil cause had been an important for growth of Tamil militancy during 1983-87. India is unlikely to extend that kind of support now for the revival of Tamil militancy.
The global war on terror orchestrated by the U.S. after the 9/11 Al Qaeda terrorist attacks in the U.S have changed international perceptions on insurgency movements using terror tactics. As the LTTE has been included in the U.S. list of foreign terrorist organisations, it has become quite easy and legitimate for Sri Lanka to draw upon the support of the U.S. for its war against the LTTE. This support is likely to continue in case Tamil militancy revives.
A number of international protocols in shipping, money transfer and movement of people have been introduced to curb terrorists from using international networks. The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) announced by the U.S. President Bush in 2003 has paved the way for greater international cooperation and action to prevent proliferation of weapons to or from nation states and non-state actors. Though the PSI is accepted only by 11 countries, 49 other nations have agreed to adhere to PSI principles. The PSI protocols provide for interdiction of WMD shipments in international waters.
Despite their differences over the poor human rights record of Sri Lanka, the European Union understands the compulsions which had forced Sri Lanka to wage war against the LTTE, banned as a terrorist organisation in among its member countries. So the EU is also unlikely to permit the LTTE or any other Tamil militant organisational activity on their soil.
The Sri Lanka Tamil expatriates had been a major source of support for Tamil militancy particularly the LTTE. The LTTE had established a strong global supply and logistic support network to keep its war machines going. This organization helped in sustaining the insurgency operations in three ways: financial support, international lobbying and public relations, and procurement of arms and military equipment. LTTE representatives at key centers located in Canada, Norway, U.K., Australia, France, Denmark, Switzerland, Thailand, USA, and South Africa coordinate the worldwide network. It has created a lot of hidden assets overseas and runs a number of front organisations of Tamils.
The LTTE is a banned organisation in 32 countries including Canada, the European Union, India, Malaysia and U.S.A. Though not banned, its activities are curbed in few other countries. Even during the Eelam War IV (2006-09) the governments in most of these countries had come down heavily on LTTE activists. They had also cooperated with the Sri Lanka government and with each other in busting the LTTE’s fund collection and arms procurement activities and made a number of arrests. Given these constraints revival of the LTTE or promotion of any other Tamil militant group is not going to be easy.
Internal environment
Initially, during their political struggle the Federal party leaders and subsequently the TULF were able to forge unity among Tamil speaking people including Muslims for the cause of Tamil identity. However, the increasing awareness of eastern Muslims and the differences over the perception of an independent Tamil Eelam paved the way for Muslims going their own way. The LTTE’s anti-Muslim policies including the eviction of nearly 100,000 Muslims from the north as well its massacre of Muslims a number of times in the east have alienated Muslims from supporting Tamil militants, perhaps forever, though they speak Tamil and have similar problems as a minority.
There are subtle differences in culture and perception between the Tamil populations living in north and east. From 1976 onwards the Tamils of north and east were united in their political stand and support to militancy. This was further strengthened with the signing of the India-Sri Lanka Agreement 1987 which saw the formation of a united north-eastern province. However, the LTTE’s opposition to the ISLA divided Tamil polity and militancy. It left the LTTE as the only armed militant group as the other militant groups had surrendered their weapons in terms of ISLA. The LTTE’s war against the Indian troops further divided the Tamils.
After the exit of Indian troops in 1990, the LTTE started the process of consolidation with the snuffing out other Tamil groups and marginalising Tamil political leaders. The rise of the LTTE made anti-LTTE Tamil groups to seek the protection of the Sri Lanka government. As a result the Thimphu declaration remains largely a political propaganda tool with the divided and weakened Tamil polity.
The better educated northern ‘Jaffna’ Tamils, living in a majority Tamil ambience have been spearheading the Tamil Cause as leaders; on the other hand the easterners, who share the province with nearly equal strength of Sinhalas and Muslims, have been providing the foot soldiers for Tamil militancy. However, this equation was destroyed when Karuna, the LTTE leader of Batticaloa broke away from the parent body in 2002, alleging the exploitation of easterners within the LTTE.
This had destroyed the homogeneity within the militant ranks. This had been one of the major reasons for the defeat of the LTTE in the Eelam War IV. Now new political alignments have emerged among eastern Tamils. Karuna’s position was strengthened when the Supreme Court set aside in 2006 the merger of northern and eastern provinces as one united entity. After the defeat of the LTTE, a Tamil chief minister is in office in the east. Karuna is now a minister in the Rajapaksa regime and has become a vocal supporter of a united Sri Lanka.
Sinhala’s lack of sensitivity to the Tamil aspirations had been an important trigger for the Tamils to unite in their fight against the government. However, after India’s massive intervention and the introduction of 13th amendment giving limited autonomy to Tamils, there had been generally a growing awareness of the Tamil problem among Sinhala intelligentsia. It is significant that during the three years of Eelam War IV there had been very few acts of retaliatory Sinhala public anger against Tamil population in their midst despite a number of LTTE bombs attacks that killed a few hundred civilians.
Though the government had been slow in enforcing many of its policies like the introduction Tamil in the government and recruitment of Tamils in police etc., it has made a beginning and over a period of time these efforts are likely to make some headway. Cumulatively, the Sinhala chauvinist image of the 80s has been improved; this is unlikely to go unnoticed by Tamils.
Given these changes in the environment, it is doubtful whether the cause of Tamil Eelam will evoke the same enthusiastic response as in 1983, particularly after the total defeat of the LTTE in the latest Eelam War after sacrificing atleast 30,000 cadres in the wars. There is a general weariness of the war among Tamils in Sri Lanka. Even though sections of Tamil Diaspora might be enthusiastic about supporting another war against the Sri Lanka state, the foot soldiers for it had to be found among Sri Lankan Tamils in the country.
LEADERSHIP
While many Tamil militant organizations emerged in the early 90s, only the LTTE had kept the Tamil armed struggle alive. This was solely due to its leader Prabhakaran’s single minded orientation to the goal of fighting for an independent Tamil Eelam. He introduced a number of innovations in tactical warfare fully using the real time advantage given by modern technology innovations. He showed remarkable ability motivate his followers to die for the cause. It manifested in the form of Black Tiger suicide warriors. Their tactics were used imaginatively by Sea Tigers to launch attacks in the high seas against the navy. The LTTE also refined the use propaganda as force multiplier and built up a global support network among the Tamil Diaspora that came in handy to prosecute the war. No doubt he had a number of flaws including his inability to understand political strategy and cleverly use it for furthering military objectives. He was anti intellectual and did not believe in collective leadership. He had a ruthless streak in his personality that clouded balanced judgement.
Any leader now trying to revive the LTTE or start a new Tamil militant movement has to live up to the larger than life image of Prabhakaran created in public mind. Otherwise he will not be able to motivate his followers and build up the organization. Secondly, Prabhakaran’s strength of conviction enabled him to build one of the strongest insurgent organisation in the world in a span of two decades. So any leader undertaking the task now will have to sustain his conviction for at least one to two decades.
Though he understood tactical operations better, Prabhakaran’s major shortcoming had been his inability to respond to political demands with finesse. The chances of success of any potential leader to revive militancy will increase only if he is politically savvy.
It is not only the potential of the leader that is important. It was largely the environment that shaped Prabhakaran’s mind to become a committed leader to his cause and build a strong organization. And both the internal and international environments have become more unfriendly than ever before to the idea of secession.
So a charismatic and responsive leader to revive Tamil militancy is like to emerge only when the environment turns extremely repressive and hostile to Tamil population at large. With greater awareness among the population and India acting as a subtle but continuous pressure point on Sri Lanka on the issue of devolution of equitable rights to Tamils, such “pressure cooker” situation is unlikely to develop. Thus even in a decadal time frame, the opportunity for emergence of such a leader may never come through.
CONCLUSION
The defeat of the LTTE in the just concluded Eelam War IV represents a major setback for the cause of an independent Tamil Eelam. The LTTE under V Prabhakaran had built one of the strongest insurgency organizations in the world with military capability in land, air and sea.
In spite of building such a powerful organization, supported by a global network of Tamil Diaspora to further its capability, the LTTE failed due to a number of reasons. The local and international environments that enabled the LTTE insurgency to thrive have changed since 1983. A new generation of Tamil youth driven from their homes in the north and east due to prolonged war has been exposed to different cultures and environment. It is doubtful whether they could be motivated to take up arms once again for the cause of Tamil Eelam.
India as a powerful neighbour with a large Tamil population can wield a strong influence in Sri Lanka including the future of Tamil militancy. India as a regional power is unlikely to allow easy passage for the rise of Tamil militancy afresh for reasons of strategic security. The changed international environment with low tolerance limits for the activities of non-state actors will make it difficult for the use of overseas soil for the growth of Tamil militancy. International protocols introduced to curb terrorism have come in handy to curb LTTE’s international activity. These are likely to inhibit the revival or resurgence of Tamil militancy.
However, Tamil militancy can stage a comeback if there is a strong support from another nation for its own reasons. Even then to flourish in Sri Lanka, it will require a strong anti-Tamil regime to create an environment of hostility to Sinhalas. With a powerful Sri Lanka army in place, even if the environment is suitable for militancy it will require strong and motivated leadership with committed followers who can sustain their presence for at least a decade.
Under the circumstances, Tamil militancy is likely to be restricted to acts of sabotage, occasional shoot outs and acts of assassinations by small bands. As and when Tamil population joins the mainstream of Sri Lanka through enlightened national leadership, such small group activities also might become extinct. And it would be up to Sri Lanka leadership to decide on how quickly and how comfortably they can give the feeling security and trust back to the Tamil population.
Copyright: World Focus (www.cnfworldfocus.org)
Col R Hariharan
INTRODUCTION
The death of Velupillai Prabhakaran, the charismatic founder-leader of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), along with almost the entire first and second line leadership in the last lap of the Eelam War IV in May 2009 represents a milestone in the history of Tamil militancy in Sri Lanka.
Sri Lanka’s war against Tamil extremism in all its forms had been going on for the last three decades. Out of the 38 insurgent groups that came into being in this period barring the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), the Sinhala Marxist insurgency, all others were of Tamil origin fighting against what they perceived as Sinhala oppression. Almost all Tamil groups considered the carving out of an independent Tamil nation – the Tamil Eelam – out of Sri Lanka’s traditional Tamil inhabited areas as the only path of redemption for Tamils to preserve their language, culture and identity.
Only the LTTE had managed to survive the military onslaught of Sri Lanka state against Tamil insurgent groups from 1983 on wards till 2009. It had also weathered the active Indian political and military intervention in Sri Lanka between 1983 and 1990. In its bid to emerge as the sole standard bearer of the cause of Tamil Eelam, the LTTE did not hesitate to eliminate thousands of militants and leaders of rival Tamil groups. In his bid to emerge as the unchallenged leader of Tamils, Prabhakaran eliminated important Tamil political leaders including Appapillai Amirthalingam and Dr Nilan Thiruchelvam of the Tamil United Liberation to emerge as the only viable Tamil organisation with political and military clout.
Sri Lanka Security Forces (SLSF) could not achieve decisive results against the LTTE in the three rounds of war from 1983 to 2002. However, in their victorious Eelam War IV, the SLSF had killed as many as 15,000 LTTE cadres and destroyed or captured millions of rupees worth military and civil assets of the insurgent group. In addition to this the SLSF is holding 9000 cadres in captivity.
It is going to be extremely difficult for the LTTE to stage a comeback as a viable force in the near future. The financial, material and political support from sections of the 800,000-strong Sri Lanka Tamil expatriates had been an important factor in the LTTE’s growth and sustenance all these years. With their support the LTTE had built a strong logistic support network abroad to sustain the organisation in Sri Lanka in both peace and war. This support network, though disrupted, is by and large in tact, though leaderless at the moment.
The SLSF which had built the armed forces to about 200,000 to fight the war is acutely aware of the possibility of the LTTE staging a comeback in the near future. In order to prevent such an eventuality, the Army Commander General Sarath Fonseka plans to build a strong force of 300,000. And he proposes to ensure continued presence of the security forces in the Tamil predominant north and east to nip any resurgence of Tamil militancy in the bud.
The exit of the LTTE from the Sri Lanka scene as a power centre has raised a question mark over not only the future of Tamil militancy, but also the durability of the Tamil struggle for an independent state of Tamil Eelam. The possibility of LTTE’s revival and the future of Tamil militancy are closely interlinked issues.
Revival of Tamil militancy requires a few favourable factors: strong motivation for the Tamil Eelam cause, a committed leadership, an environment that provides for the growth of militancy, and external support. These have to be sustained in the face of Sri Lanka state’s response to its resurgence, and coordinated action of international community which is now united in its action against organisations listed terrorist bodies.
THE CAUSE
The cause of an independent Tamil Eelam state had provided the motive force Tamil youth to take up arms. It was the culmination of Tamil minority’s political quest to protect their identity, culture, and integrity of areas considered as its homeland. This process took at least two decades of traverse through the establishment of Tamil identity and another two decades for its transformation into Tamil nationalism.
Sri Lanka despite sharing a lot of cultural, religious and ethnic traditions with the Indian subcontinent has slightly different socio-political history. Unlike India, there had been no major caste, communal or ethnic conflicts in Sri Lanka (then known as Ceylon) during the British colonial days barring the anti Muslim riots of 1911. The broad division of identities of Sri Lanka’s Sinhala speaking, largely Buddhist majority, Tamil speaking Hindu and Christian communities identified as Tamils, and Muslims (mostly Tamil speaking and referred to as Moors) came about with the introduction of universal franchise in Sri Lanka (then known as Ceylon) in 1931.
While Indian polity fought the British and struggled to gain independence, Sri Lanka gained independence in 1948 without any serious struggle. In the words of Dr Devanesan Nesiah, “Unlike other South Asian leaders, those of pre-independence Sri Lanka remained in good standing with the colonial rulers.” While India’s struggle for independence fostered a national identity despite the differences within the community, Sri Lanka did not undergo this process of melding its divided identities into a single Sri Lankan national identity at the time of independence.
During the British colonial rule, Tamils had played a dominant role in Sri Lanka. Unlike the Sinhalas, Tamils adapted to English education and became useful to the colonial administration. The progressive alienation of the Tamil minority population from Sri Lanka’s national mainstream started only after the country attained independence in 1948.
From then onwards, the assertion of Tamil identity had been a factor in national politics. However, the process of transformation of Tamil identity and its crystallization into Tamil nationalism took nearly two decades from 1956 onwards. In this period resurgent Sinhala nationalism made its appearance as a political force with the Sinhala majority asserting its distinct linguistic, religious and ethnic identity as true national identity.
Four watershed events pushed the Tamils from uniting in their struggle against the Sinhala state and taking up arms to fight it. These were the introduction of 'Sinhala only' policy making it the national language, adoption of a new Constitution of 1972, the 1977 parliamentary elections and the 1980 anti Tamil pogrom.
The introduction of Sinhala as the sole national language and the state sponsorship of Buddhism and its symbols did not enhance the feeling of nationhood among the Tamils and other minorities.
The 1972 Constitution gave a Sinhala character to Sri Lanka triggering minorities’ fear of marginalisation under the new dispensation. This made the Tamils to change their earlier demand for balanced representation into a demand for a Federal State. The state driven by its new found Sinhala nationalism, did not politically respond to meet the minority demands.
This caused disillusionment among moderate Tamil 'Federal' leaders like Dr Chelvanayagam. They began to talk aloud about the creation of an independent state of Tamil Eelam in 1975.[6] By 1976 Tamil demand for Federalism gave way for creation of an independent Tamil Eelam. The overwhelming success of the TULF, a political omnibus of many shades of Tamil opinion, in the 1977 elections with a demand for an independent 'Tamil Eelam' gave it credence. The state showed singular lack of sensitivity to the strong Tamil sentiments and responded with brute force against political agitations on the issue. As Tamil politicians were rendered helpless against the highhandedness of the government, small extremist groups of Tamils started indulging in minor acts of militancy.
The ethnic estrangement, growing with its historical grievances, nurtured by Sinhala and Tamil political vested interests grew. It became a conflict after the LTTE militants led by Prabhakaran killed 13 soldiers in an ambush of two military vehicles at Tirunelveli in Jaffna on July 23, 1983. The public outrage in the rest of Sri Lanka at the killing of the Sinhala soldiers was used by Sinhala politicians to let loose a pogrom against Tamil population in Colombo and other places. The government failed to take any action even as a few thousand Tamils were killed and their properties destroyed.
Overnight the Tamil struggle gained global sympathy when thousands of Tamil refugees fled the country. Nearly 100,000 of them sought refuge in Tamil Nadu, in South India, which has traditional links with Sri Lanka Tamils. The pogrom in Sri Lanka created such a terror that over the years 700,000 Tamils are estimated to have immigrated to other countries The widespread public anger in Tamil Nadu grew as more and more Tamil refugees from Sri Lanka arrived there. Tamil insurgent groups fleeing the island were welcomed to the shores of Tamil Nadu. They were given arms and shelter.
Then onwards the Tamil issue became a critical one in Indian political scene as well. Inevitably India actively intervened in Sri Lanka from 1983 to 1990 politically, diplomatically and militarily to bring about ethnic peace. Indian efforts at mediation also crystallised the critical demands of Tamil nationalism at the Thimphu conference convened in July 1985 to reconcile the differences between the Sri Lanka government and the Tamils.
A united delegation of Tamil militant groups and politicians summed up the Tamil demands in the ‘Thimphu Declaration.’ The four Tamils demands were: recognition of Sri Lanka Tamils as a nation, recognition of the existence of an identified homeland for the Tamils of Sri Lanka, recognition of the right of self determination of the Tamil nation, and recognition of the right to citizenship and the fundamental rights of all Tamils of Sri Lanka.
At the initiative of Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, Sri Lanka President JR Jayawardane showed his readiness to build bridges with India and the two countries signed the India-Sri Lanka Agreement (ISLA) in 1987. As per the Agreement, Sri Lanka State agreed to devolve limited autonomy to a united northeast province - the traditional Tamil region considered as their homeland, provided India helped to end Tamil militancy and disarm the militants. The demand for right to citizenship for all Tamils was also accepted. Thus barring the demand for recognition of Tamils as a nation, the Agreement met all the demands of Tamils made in the Thimpu.
The 13th amendment of Sri Lanka constitution enacted in 1988 has given a limited amount of autonomy to the provincial councils including the Tamil-predominant northern and eastern provinces. The 14th amendment has given Tamil the status of national language, though it may not be on par with Sinhala. Thus the Tamil demands which articulated the cause of Tamil Eelam stand partly dissipated.
The post 1983 events – wars and peace efforts – and the abortive Indian direct military intervention from 1987 to 1990 have changed not only the demographics of Sri Lanka but the mindset of the next generation of Sinhalas and Tamils as well. It is more than two decades since Black July, and a whole new generation of Tamils has been brought up overseas in diverse surroundings – many of them in different countries with different languages and cultures.
Many of the Tamils have moved out of traditional areas of habitation into many parts of Central and Southern Sri Lanka and settled in the midst of Sinhala population due to the unending insurgency wars of LTTE in the north and east during the last two decades. The moot point is whether the cause of Tamil Eelam for the Tamils at home and abroad still holds the same attraction as in 1983?
THE ENVIRONMENT
South Asian environment
The international environment in the 80s and early 90s was the golden era of insurgency movements. The Cold War confrontation found the use of non-state actors a convenient handle to slow bleed the opponent. Soviet Union helped a pro Communist regime to seize power in Afghanistan after monarchy was toppled, much to the discomfort of the U.S. The Americans found a willing ally in Pakistan to support Islamist insurgents fight the communist regime in Afghanistan. The spill over of this confrontation into South Asia was limited to the introduction of Cold War power play with Pakistan and India drawn on opposite sides. Pakistan and to a certain extent China had been providing support and sanctuary to insurgents movements from India’s northeast.
Given this background, India was wary of increasing in American influence in its neighbourhood particularly after the strategic convergence of the U.S. and Pakistan in Afghanistan. So India found a strategic reason to keep Sri Lanka free from the increasing U.S. influence in the region.
The 1980 anti-Tamil pogrom created a strong wave of political sympathy for Tamils in India, particularly in Tamil Nadu. Prime Minister Mrs Indira Gandhi was sympathetic to the Tamil struggle for equity, though she did not support the idea of an independent Tamil Eelam. She also offered covert support to Tamil militants. When Sri Lanka President JR Jaywardane tried to gain the support of the U.S. and Pakistan to counter Indian pressure, India intervened actively from 1983 to 90 both politically and militarily. The ISLA was the outcome of this phase of India-Sri Lanka relations. India had to pull out its troops rather ignominiously in 1990 when Sri Lanka President Premadasa and Prabhakaran colluded to send them out of the island.
Since India's last active intervention in Sri Lanka, global power equation has changed. India and the U.S. enjoy a close relationship due to the convergence of their strategic security interests in the Indian Ocean region and Sri Lanka. India's trading interests are now global as its economy is galloping at a fast clip. These changes have created subtle shifts in India's perceptions. Now India's security perceptions of Sri Lanka are no more local. They are now global as Sri Lanka is viewed as the vanguard of India in the South, dominating the Indian Ocean.
As the biggest regional power in South Asia, India has the ability to alter the balance of power in Sri Lanka just as it did in 1987-90. India is the only country capable of underwriting any long-term solution to Sri Lanka's problem. However, this will be constrained by internal political considerations discussed earlier, and tie down its freedom of action in Sri Lanka.
India was the first country to ban the LTTE as a terrorist organisation. It had been consistent in taking action against any LTTE activity in its soil. So India had no hesitation in supplying non-lethal weapons and extending intelligence support to Sri Lanka in its conflict with the LTTE. Unlike the 80s India-Sri Lanka relations are multifaceted involving trade, commerce, economic relations and international cooperation. India has large investments in Sri Lanka and both countries have entered into a Free Trade Agreement and India-Sri Lanka trade is likely to clock $ 4 billion. Indian political and material support for the Tamil cause had been an important for growth of Tamil militancy during 1983-87. India is unlikely to extend that kind of support now for the revival of Tamil militancy.
The global war on terror orchestrated by the U.S. after the 9/11 Al Qaeda terrorist attacks in the U.S have changed international perceptions on insurgency movements using terror tactics. As the LTTE has been included in the U.S. list of foreign terrorist organisations, it has become quite easy and legitimate for Sri Lanka to draw upon the support of the U.S. for its war against the LTTE. This support is likely to continue in case Tamil militancy revives.
A number of international protocols in shipping, money transfer and movement of people have been introduced to curb terrorists from using international networks. The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) announced by the U.S. President Bush in 2003 has paved the way for greater international cooperation and action to prevent proliferation of weapons to or from nation states and non-state actors. Though the PSI is accepted only by 11 countries, 49 other nations have agreed to adhere to PSI principles. The PSI protocols provide for interdiction of WMD shipments in international waters.
Despite their differences over the poor human rights record of Sri Lanka, the European Union understands the compulsions which had forced Sri Lanka to wage war against the LTTE, banned as a terrorist organisation in among its member countries. So the EU is also unlikely to permit the LTTE or any other Tamil militant organisational activity on their soil.
The Sri Lanka Tamil expatriates had been a major source of support for Tamil militancy particularly the LTTE. The LTTE had established a strong global supply and logistic support network to keep its war machines going. This organization helped in sustaining the insurgency operations in three ways: financial support, international lobbying and public relations, and procurement of arms and military equipment. LTTE representatives at key centers located in Canada, Norway, U.K., Australia, France, Denmark, Switzerland, Thailand, USA, and South Africa coordinate the worldwide network. It has created a lot of hidden assets overseas and runs a number of front organisations of Tamils.
The LTTE is a banned organisation in 32 countries including Canada, the European Union, India, Malaysia and U.S.A. Though not banned, its activities are curbed in few other countries. Even during the Eelam War IV (2006-09) the governments in most of these countries had come down heavily on LTTE activists. They had also cooperated with the Sri Lanka government and with each other in busting the LTTE’s fund collection and arms procurement activities and made a number of arrests. Given these constraints revival of the LTTE or promotion of any other Tamil militant group is not going to be easy.
Internal environment
Initially, during their political struggle the Federal party leaders and subsequently the TULF were able to forge unity among Tamil speaking people including Muslims for the cause of Tamil identity. However, the increasing awareness of eastern Muslims and the differences over the perception of an independent Tamil Eelam paved the way for Muslims going their own way. The LTTE’s anti-Muslim policies including the eviction of nearly 100,000 Muslims from the north as well its massacre of Muslims a number of times in the east have alienated Muslims from supporting Tamil militants, perhaps forever, though they speak Tamil and have similar problems as a minority.
There are subtle differences in culture and perception between the Tamil populations living in north and east. From 1976 onwards the Tamils of north and east were united in their political stand and support to militancy. This was further strengthened with the signing of the India-Sri Lanka Agreement 1987 which saw the formation of a united north-eastern province. However, the LTTE’s opposition to the ISLA divided Tamil polity and militancy. It left the LTTE as the only armed militant group as the other militant groups had surrendered their weapons in terms of ISLA. The LTTE’s war against the Indian troops further divided the Tamils.
After the exit of Indian troops in 1990, the LTTE started the process of consolidation with the snuffing out other Tamil groups and marginalising Tamil political leaders. The rise of the LTTE made anti-LTTE Tamil groups to seek the protection of the Sri Lanka government. As a result the Thimphu declaration remains largely a political propaganda tool with the divided and weakened Tamil polity.
The better educated northern ‘Jaffna’ Tamils, living in a majority Tamil ambience have been spearheading the Tamil Cause as leaders; on the other hand the easterners, who share the province with nearly equal strength of Sinhalas and Muslims, have been providing the foot soldiers for Tamil militancy. However, this equation was destroyed when Karuna, the LTTE leader of Batticaloa broke away from the parent body in 2002, alleging the exploitation of easterners within the LTTE.
This had destroyed the homogeneity within the militant ranks. This had been one of the major reasons for the defeat of the LTTE in the Eelam War IV. Now new political alignments have emerged among eastern Tamils. Karuna’s position was strengthened when the Supreme Court set aside in 2006 the merger of northern and eastern provinces as one united entity. After the defeat of the LTTE, a Tamil chief minister is in office in the east. Karuna is now a minister in the Rajapaksa regime and has become a vocal supporter of a united Sri Lanka.
Sinhala’s lack of sensitivity to the Tamil aspirations had been an important trigger for the Tamils to unite in their fight against the government. However, after India’s massive intervention and the introduction of 13th amendment giving limited autonomy to Tamils, there had been generally a growing awareness of the Tamil problem among Sinhala intelligentsia. It is significant that during the three years of Eelam War IV there had been very few acts of retaliatory Sinhala public anger against Tamil population in their midst despite a number of LTTE bombs attacks that killed a few hundred civilians.
Though the government had been slow in enforcing many of its policies like the introduction Tamil in the government and recruitment of Tamils in police etc., it has made a beginning and over a period of time these efforts are likely to make some headway. Cumulatively, the Sinhala chauvinist image of the 80s has been improved; this is unlikely to go unnoticed by Tamils.
Given these changes in the environment, it is doubtful whether the cause of Tamil Eelam will evoke the same enthusiastic response as in 1983, particularly after the total defeat of the LTTE in the latest Eelam War after sacrificing atleast 30,000 cadres in the wars. There is a general weariness of the war among Tamils in Sri Lanka. Even though sections of Tamil Diaspora might be enthusiastic about supporting another war against the Sri Lanka state, the foot soldiers for it had to be found among Sri Lankan Tamils in the country.
LEADERSHIP
While many Tamil militant organizations emerged in the early 90s, only the LTTE had kept the Tamil armed struggle alive. This was solely due to its leader Prabhakaran’s single minded orientation to the goal of fighting for an independent Tamil Eelam. He introduced a number of innovations in tactical warfare fully using the real time advantage given by modern technology innovations. He showed remarkable ability motivate his followers to die for the cause. It manifested in the form of Black Tiger suicide warriors. Their tactics were used imaginatively by Sea Tigers to launch attacks in the high seas against the navy. The LTTE also refined the use propaganda as force multiplier and built up a global support network among the Tamil Diaspora that came in handy to prosecute the war. No doubt he had a number of flaws including his inability to understand political strategy and cleverly use it for furthering military objectives. He was anti intellectual and did not believe in collective leadership. He had a ruthless streak in his personality that clouded balanced judgement.
Any leader now trying to revive the LTTE or start a new Tamil militant movement has to live up to the larger than life image of Prabhakaran created in public mind. Otherwise he will not be able to motivate his followers and build up the organization. Secondly, Prabhakaran’s strength of conviction enabled him to build one of the strongest insurgent organisation in the world in a span of two decades. So any leader undertaking the task now will have to sustain his conviction for at least one to two decades.
Though he understood tactical operations better, Prabhakaran’s major shortcoming had been his inability to respond to political demands with finesse. The chances of success of any potential leader to revive militancy will increase only if he is politically savvy.
It is not only the potential of the leader that is important. It was largely the environment that shaped Prabhakaran’s mind to become a committed leader to his cause and build a strong organization. And both the internal and international environments have become more unfriendly than ever before to the idea of secession.
So a charismatic and responsive leader to revive Tamil militancy is like to emerge only when the environment turns extremely repressive and hostile to Tamil population at large. With greater awareness among the population and India acting as a subtle but continuous pressure point on Sri Lanka on the issue of devolution of equitable rights to Tamils, such “pressure cooker” situation is unlikely to develop. Thus even in a decadal time frame, the opportunity for emergence of such a leader may never come through.
CONCLUSION
The defeat of the LTTE in the just concluded Eelam War IV represents a major setback for the cause of an independent Tamil Eelam. The LTTE under V Prabhakaran had built one of the strongest insurgency organizations in the world with military capability in land, air and sea.
In spite of building such a powerful organization, supported by a global network of Tamil Diaspora to further its capability, the LTTE failed due to a number of reasons. The local and international environments that enabled the LTTE insurgency to thrive have changed since 1983. A new generation of Tamil youth driven from their homes in the north and east due to prolonged war has been exposed to different cultures and environment. It is doubtful whether they could be motivated to take up arms once again for the cause of Tamil Eelam.
India as a powerful neighbour with a large Tamil population can wield a strong influence in Sri Lanka including the future of Tamil militancy. India as a regional power is unlikely to allow easy passage for the rise of Tamil militancy afresh for reasons of strategic security. The changed international environment with low tolerance limits for the activities of non-state actors will make it difficult for the use of overseas soil for the growth of Tamil militancy. International protocols introduced to curb terrorism have come in handy to curb LTTE’s international activity. These are likely to inhibit the revival or resurgence of Tamil militancy.
However, Tamil militancy can stage a comeback if there is a strong support from another nation for its own reasons. Even then to flourish in Sri Lanka, it will require a strong anti-Tamil regime to create an environment of hostility to Sinhalas. With a powerful Sri Lanka army in place, even if the environment is suitable for militancy it will require strong and motivated leadership with committed followers who can sustain their presence for at least a decade.
Under the circumstances, Tamil militancy is likely to be restricted to acts of sabotage, occasional shoot outs and acts of assassinations by small bands. As and when Tamil population joins the mainstream of Sri Lanka through enlightened national leadership, such small group activities also might become extinct. And it would be up to Sri Lanka leadership to decide on how quickly and how comfortably they can give the feeling security and trust back to the Tamil population.
Copyright: World Focus (www.cnfworldfocus.org)
Saturday, August 8, 2009
Sri Lanka Perspectives – July 2009
[This assessment of Sri Lanka for the month of July 2009 was written on July 31, 2009 for www.security-risks.com publication SOUTH ASIA SECURITY TRENDS. Courtesy: www.security-risks.com.]
After weathering sustained international pressure over humanitarian issues after the war generated at the UN last month, President Mahinda Rajapaksa appeared to be focusing on strengthening his political base at home. He gave a number of freewheeling interviews to the media covering wide ranging issues. Among them two interviews – one in The Hindu and the other in the Time magazine - addressed issues of interest to India and international community respectively. When read with the political developments, the interviews indicated the following trends:
1. The President intends to go for presidential poll early next year although his term ends only in 2012. Ostensibly he would like to get a mandate from the people before he takes up political reforms for implementing the 13th amendment dealing with decentralisation of powers to the provinces (with some ‘add on’). Though the 13th amendment forms part of the Sri Lanka constitution it had not been implemented in full. The President probably wants to strengthen his own base as two coalition partners the right wing Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) and the leftist Wimal Weerawansa led Jathika Nidahas Peramuna (JNP) had voiced their opposition to the implementation of the 13th Amendment. His success in the presidential poll would also help his party the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) to sweep the parliamentary poll due next year.
2. The repatriation of displaced people of Vanni back to their villages might not be completed by the target date in November 2009. The President attributed three reasons for this: de-mining of villages work is not over, LTTE cadres continue to be weeded out from the camps and their weapons cache are being unearthed, and infrastructure for their normal life is not yet ready. President Rajapaksa would like to do this on his own terms and not at the behest of the West which would be interpreted locally as a weakness.
3. Sri Lanka army would be recruiting additional 200,000 soldiers, to prevent the LTTE from staging a comeback after displaced people return to their villages in Vanni. This is probably an important reason for delaying their return to villages. Tamil soldiers are also being recruited. Unless this was done the President probably apprehends the LTTE to assert once again and extort funds from Vanni people for its resurgence.
4. The President is unlikely to seriously take up the wide ranging reforms proposed by the All Parties Committee for evolving a consensus on devolution under Tissa Vitarana constituted in 2006. Instead he has now convened a meeting of the Committee on Development & Reconciliation (CDR), at which leaders and representatives of 22 political parties including not only the JHU and the JNP, but also the United National Party (UNP), the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) and even the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) participated. Significantly the objective of the CDR is to build a consensus among political parties for development and reconciliation. This move is likely to be interpreted by the Tamils as reluctance of the government to devolve powers to minorities promised earlier. The implementation of 13th amendment with some modification is likely to be the only government move towards devolution. This would also materialise after the Presidential poll.
The President’s election moves appear to have caught the opposition UNP and the JVP parties off guard. In a scramble to ensure its own distinct political stature, the UNP has taken a major initiative to realign its perspectives on economic policy and the issue of federalism as a solution to bring ethnic reconciliation. The party conclave abandoned federalism which had formed the bedrock of the peace process promoted by the UNP in 2002. The JVP has come out strongly against the implementation of 13th amendment; instead it has proposed its own set of reforms. Collectively these political developments are likely to further increase the feeling of distrust and insecurity among Tamils.
Local elections in the North
The local elections for Jaffna and Vavuniya municipalities gathered momentum. There were allegations of intimidation of other parties by cadres of the Eelam Peoples Democratic Party (EPDP) led by Minister Douglas Devananda. The campaign in the Vavuniya Urban Council took a bloody turn when two prominent citizens – one a school principal and the other a well known businessmen were shot dead by unknown persons. There might be more blood shed before the election is held on August 8, 2009. Although the Elections Department has said it would set up polling booths in IDP camps if there were sufficient number of eligible voters, the response to registration so far had been marginal.
International affairs
The International Monetary Fund approved a $2.6 billion loan to Sri Lanka on July 25.The U.S., Britain and France had abstained in the voting to voice their concern about human-rights violations and doubts about Sri Lanka's commitment to change. According to the IMF a clear majority of members particularly Asian countries backed the loan.
The IMF said the loan was intended "to restore fiscal and external viability and address the significant reconstruction needs of the conflict-affected areas, thereby laying the basis for future higher economic growth." The sanctioning of the loan despite opposition from the West would strengthen the public image of President Rajapaksa.
LTTE’s succession pains
Efforts were made during the month at reconciling the two contending factions within the LTTE to control the organisation. On the one side was Kumaran Pathmanathan (KP), the international representative of the LTTE while on the other the faction led by Sivaparan alias Nediyavan, who was assistant to the late LTTE political wing leader Tamilchelvan, known for his opposition to KP. According to columnist DBS Jeyaraj, finally Nediyavan had agreed to accept KP’s leadership.
The agreement envisaged the restructuring of overseas LTTE as a single organization with different departments or secretariats. KP would be “Thalamai Seyalar” (Chief Secretary or Secretary – General) and be in overall charge. There would be various secretariats in charge of specific functions like human rights, resettlement, rehabilitation, reconstruction, peace building, development, negotiations, political action, policymaking, public relations, media relations, resource management etc.
Nediyavan would be in charge of the Department of Diaspora Affairs. He would be responsible for administration of the various LTTE branches and institutions of the Tamil Diaspora. He would function under KP’s overall LTTE leadership and acknowledge him as head. However it is not clear whether these changes have been accepted by the Tamil Nadu pro- LTTE political leaders Vaiko and Nedumaran. They had earlier refused to recognize KP as the leader as they insisted that Prabhakaran was still alive.
It is significant that there had been no move to marshal the remnants of LTTE scattered within Sri Lanka. Apparently, this would be taken up later as at present KP’s statements focuses mostly on political and rehabilitation aspects to seek understanding and help from international community, particularly India. Any talk of taking up arms once again could jeopardize KP’s moves to get the help of international community and this could affect consolidation of LTTE’s overseas assets.
Copyright: www.security-risks.com
After weathering sustained international pressure over humanitarian issues after the war generated at the UN last month, President Mahinda Rajapaksa appeared to be focusing on strengthening his political base at home. He gave a number of freewheeling interviews to the media covering wide ranging issues. Among them two interviews – one in The Hindu and the other in the Time magazine - addressed issues of interest to India and international community respectively. When read with the political developments, the interviews indicated the following trends:
1. The President intends to go for presidential poll early next year although his term ends only in 2012. Ostensibly he would like to get a mandate from the people before he takes up political reforms for implementing the 13th amendment dealing with decentralisation of powers to the provinces (with some ‘add on’). Though the 13th amendment forms part of the Sri Lanka constitution it had not been implemented in full. The President probably wants to strengthen his own base as two coalition partners the right wing Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) and the leftist Wimal Weerawansa led Jathika Nidahas Peramuna (JNP) had voiced their opposition to the implementation of the 13th Amendment. His success in the presidential poll would also help his party the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) to sweep the parliamentary poll due next year.
2. The repatriation of displaced people of Vanni back to their villages might not be completed by the target date in November 2009. The President attributed three reasons for this: de-mining of villages work is not over, LTTE cadres continue to be weeded out from the camps and their weapons cache are being unearthed, and infrastructure for their normal life is not yet ready. President Rajapaksa would like to do this on his own terms and not at the behest of the West which would be interpreted locally as a weakness.
3. Sri Lanka army would be recruiting additional 200,000 soldiers, to prevent the LTTE from staging a comeback after displaced people return to their villages in Vanni. This is probably an important reason for delaying their return to villages. Tamil soldiers are also being recruited. Unless this was done the President probably apprehends the LTTE to assert once again and extort funds from Vanni people for its resurgence.
4. The President is unlikely to seriously take up the wide ranging reforms proposed by the All Parties Committee for evolving a consensus on devolution under Tissa Vitarana constituted in 2006. Instead he has now convened a meeting of the Committee on Development & Reconciliation (CDR), at which leaders and representatives of 22 political parties including not only the JHU and the JNP, but also the United National Party (UNP), the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) and even the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) participated. Significantly the objective of the CDR is to build a consensus among political parties for development and reconciliation. This move is likely to be interpreted by the Tamils as reluctance of the government to devolve powers to minorities promised earlier. The implementation of 13th amendment with some modification is likely to be the only government move towards devolution. This would also materialise after the Presidential poll.
The President’s election moves appear to have caught the opposition UNP and the JVP parties off guard. In a scramble to ensure its own distinct political stature, the UNP has taken a major initiative to realign its perspectives on economic policy and the issue of federalism as a solution to bring ethnic reconciliation. The party conclave abandoned federalism which had formed the bedrock of the peace process promoted by the UNP in 2002. The JVP has come out strongly against the implementation of 13th amendment; instead it has proposed its own set of reforms. Collectively these political developments are likely to further increase the feeling of distrust and insecurity among Tamils.
Local elections in the North
The local elections for Jaffna and Vavuniya municipalities gathered momentum. There were allegations of intimidation of other parties by cadres of the Eelam Peoples Democratic Party (EPDP) led by Minister Douglas Devananda. The campaign in the Vavuniya Urban Council took a bloody turn when two prominent citizens – one a school principal and the other a well known businessmen were shot dead by unknown persons. There might be more blood shed before the election is held on August 8, 2009. Although the Elections Department has said it would set up polling booths in IDP camps if there were sufficient number of eligible voters, the response to registration so far had been marginal.
International affairs
The International Monetary Fund approved a $2.6 billion loan to Sri Lanka on July 25.The U.S., Britain and France had abstained in the voting to voice their concern about human-rights violations and doubts about Sri Lanka's commitment to change. According to the IMF a clear majority of members particularly Asian countries backed the loan.
The IMF said the loan was intended "to restore fiscal and external viability and address the significant reconstruction needs of the conflict-affected areas, thereby laying the basis for future higher economic growth." The sanctioning of the loan despite opposition from the West would strengthen the public image of President Rajapaksa.
LTTE’s succession pains
Efforts were made during the month at reconciling the two contending factions within the LTTE to control the organisation. On the one side was Kumaran Pathmanathan (KP), the international representative of the LTTE while on the other the faction led by Sivaparan alias Nediyavan, who was assistant to the late LTTE political wing leader Tamilchelvan, known for his opposition to KP. According to columnist DBS Jeyaraj, finally Nediyavan had agreed to accept KP’s leadership.
The agreement envisaged the restructuring of overseas LTTE as a single organization with different departments or secretariats. KP would be “Thalamai Seyalar” (Chief Secretary or Secretary – General) and be in overall charge. There would be various secretariats in charge of specific functions like human rights, resettlement, rehabilitation, reconstruction, peace building, development, negotiations, political action, policymaking, public relations, media relations, resource management etc.
Nediyavan would be in charge of the Department of Diaspora Affairs. He would be responsible for administration of the various LTTE branches and institutions of the Tamil Diaspora. He would function under KP’s overall LTTE leadership and acknowledge him as head. However it is not clear whether these changes have been accepted by the Tamil Nadu pro- LTTE political leaders Vaiko and Nedumaran. They had earlier refused to recognize KP as the leader as they insisted that Prabhakaran was still alive.
It is significant that there had been no move to marshal the remnants of LTTE scattered within Sri Lanka. Apparently, this would be taken up later as at present KP’s statements focuses mostly on political and rehabilitation aspects to seek understanding and help from international community, particularly India. Any talk of taking up arms once again could jeopardize KP’s moves to get the help of international community and this could affect consolidation of LTTE’s overseas assets.
Copyright: www.security-risks.com
Wednesday, July 15, 2009
Sri Lanka Perspectives – June 2009
[The Sri Lanka Perspectives for June 2009, an assessment on developments in Sri Lanka during the month of June 2009, was written on June 30, 2009 and published in the SOUTH ASIA SECURITY TRENDS, Vol 3 No 6 July 2009 issue. It is published courtesy www.security-risks.com]
The IDP issue
After the “final victory” over the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) culminating in the death of its leader Prabhakaran in May, during the month of June the focus of Sri Lanka shifted to prevent the resurgence of Tamil insurgents, rather than restoring normalcy in the north. Nearly 300,000 people of Vanni area displaced by the war continue to be held in camps run by the army, ostensibly to complete the process of screening them for LTTE elements as well as clearance of landmines in the region.
Described by some UN representatives as “internment camps,” the five holding camps have continued to draw adverse criticism from international community and INGOs on various counts of living conditions, health, denial of freedom of movement etc. The government of Sri Lanka has not been taken kindly to the cricism. It has tightened the visa regime for visits by overseas politicians and representatives of NGOs. There appears to be some confusion within Sri Lanka government between the defence ministry and the foreign ministry in the handling of overseas criticism. This was highlighted when Canadian opposition leader Bob Rae, and a vocal critic of the way Sri Lanka had been handling humanitarian and human rights issues, was refused entryon landing in Colombo by military intelligence although the Sri Lanka embassy in Ottawa had issued him a visa. Government sources said Bob Rae was considered a security risk because of his pro-LTTE sentiments. Canadian government and press have strongly criticised Sri Lanka’s seemingly ham handed action in this affair.
France, U.S. and U.K. have come out with strong statements on the need for restoration of normal life in the war affected areas. The U.S. has also emphasised the need for implementing the 13th amendment of the Sri Lanka constitution giving limited autonomy to the provincial councils. The U.S. State Department has also issued a travel advisory cautioning U.S. travellers to Sri Lanka with veiled criticism of the conditions in Sri Lanka. It stated: “American citizens of Sri Lankan origin may be subject to additional scrutiny upon arrival and while in the country. In some cases, foreigners of Sri Lankan origin may be detained without their embassy being notified. The activities of journalists, researchers, aid workers, and volunteers receive particular attention.”
The continued failure of Sri Lanka government to address the issue of Vanni Tamils has also had its repercussions in India, particularly in Tamil Nadu. Sri Lanka Government sent a high power delegation led by Senior Presidential Advisor and MP Basil Rajapaksa, Defence Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa and Presidential Secretary Lalith Weerathunga to India to specially discuss with Indian foreign minister SM Krishna issues related to the resettlement of the displaced civilians in the North. They said, after discussion, that Indiahad agreed to provide eight de-mining teams process to clear the affected areas so that resettlement could be done within a six month period.However, it is doubtful whether the resettlement would be completed in this short period.
An aid ship “Captain Ali”, carrying a load of relief materials meant for displaced civilians, which was not allowed to enter Sri Lankan territorial waters by the Government authorities had anchored off Chennai seeking Indian intervention. During their meeting in New Delhi, the Sri Lankans were reported to have agreed to India’s suggestion to allow the ship “Captain Ali” to off-load the relief material. It now transpires that these items will be routed to Sri Lanka by the Red Cross in both the countries.
However, it is clear that India had not been happy with Sri Lanka’s actions on relief and resettlement of Tamils in Vanni. Union Home Minister P Chidambaram expressed dissatisfaction over the issue. Specifically, he said that though India had allocated Rs 500 crores for their rehabilitation, Sri Lanka had not come up with the rehabilitation plan. He also asked Sri Lanka to allow INGOs like the Red Cross to carry out the relief work and to permit the media to enter IDP camps.
The issue of Vanni civilians languishing in camps has also provided the much needed rallying point for the LTTE supporters among Tamil expatriates to muster public support. Even otherwise all most all Tamil expatriates are feeling aggrieved at the lack of international collective action against Sri Lanka on this count. And their continued agitation particularly in the UK has kept the issue of Tamil Eelam in the limelight. UK has drawn a lot of flak in Colombo for allowing such demonstrations.
It has whipped up anti-western sentiments in Sri Lanka among the Sinhala nationalist and chauvinist political parties resulting in the hardening of Sri Lanka government attitude also towards nations “meddling” in its affairs. The Obama administration’s nomination of Ms. Patricia Butenis, senior U.S. Foreign Service Officer and currently the deputy chief of mission in Iraq, to be its next ambassador to Sri Lanka has also come under close public scrutiny. This has also resulted in paranoia about activities of critical media, NGO activists, foreign media representatives, and even workers of UN agencies.
A direct consequence of these developments was the delay in release of International Monetary Fund’s loan of $ 1.9 billion to Colombo due to political pressure from the U.S., U.K. and other Western nations unhappy with Sri Lanka’s handling of the final stages of the war in which thousands of civilians were killed. Sri Lanka’s trade minister G.L. Peiris has accused IMF of getting embroiled in “controversial political issues as part of the criteria governing their judgment in respect of particular transactions.”
Sri Lanka government is taking a few measures to restore normalcy in the north. It has opened the A9 highway to Jaffna for commercial goods traffic. The proposed local body elections for the Jaffna and Vavuniya municipal councils are to be held on August 8, 2009. The ruling United Peoples Freedom Alliance (UPFA) campaign in Jaffna is managed by Social Services and Social Welfare Minister Douglas Devananda. 174 candidates from six political parties and two independent groups are in the fray for 29 seats in the Jaffna Municipal Council. For the 15 seats in the Vavuniya Urban Council 135 candidates from six political parties and three independent groups are contesting. The elections will be a testing ground for the nascent Tamil political leadership.
Changes in military command and control
The passing of the Chief of Defence Staff Act in Sri Lanka parliament has formalised the appointment of CDS which had been in existence before. The post of CDS was created (though not formalized) in 1999 in the place of the civilian post of chief of the Joint Operations Bureau.
With this, the CDS as the co-ordinating head of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Police, emerges as a powerful figure in the hierarchy. With General Sarath Fonseka tipped to take over as the new CDS with clearly defined powers working under the defence secretary, plans for strengthening the military would be implemented faster.
The creation of the CDS would also probably facilitate in getting through the controversial future role of the expanded 300,000 strong army in the north where normal life is not restored yet. It will also help the implementation of army’s expansion plans better and faster. Plans are already underway for expansion of the navy, which is expected to play a major role in protecting Sri Lanka’s extended exclusive economic zone in the Indian Ocean.
Revival of the LTTE
The Tamil expatriates who still believe in the creation of a Tamil Eelam state, smarting under the defeat of the LTTE, have got together and announced a slew of measures to form the Provisional Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam (PTGTE) for progressing the cause. Though it appears to be broad based in its concept, its birth after the LTTE has ceased to be a power centre makes it clear that it would claim to be a successor to the LTTE. However, the decision to form PTGE taken without consulting the pro-LTTE Tamil National Alliance (TNA) which is rooted in Sri Lanka politics has raised doubts about the future viability of PTGE. It has also placed TNA in a dilemma.
However, it provides a rallying point for pro-LTTE elements to muster their strength and strengthens the hands of Kumaran Pathmanathan (KP), the overseas representative of the LTTE who had been trying to take over the leadership of the organization. The new name would also overcome the legal hurdle of publicly espousing the LTTE in 32 nations including India, Canada, USA and the EU where the organisation is banned as a terrorist group. However, PTGE has to prove itself as a viable entity; till that happens it will have little credibility both within and outside Sri Lanka. And its effort to establish itself is not going to be a smooth process with competing interests trying to take over the leadership mantle of the LTTE.
June 30, 2009
The IDP issue
After the “final victory” over the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) culminating in the death of its leader Prabhakaran in May, during the month of June the focus of Sri Lanka shifted to prevent the resurgence of Tamil insurgents, rather than restoring normalcy in the north. Nearly 300,000 people of Vanni area displaced by the war continue to be held in camps run by the army, ostensibly to complete the process of screening them for LTTE elements as well as clearance of landmines in the region.
Described by some UN representatives as “internment camps,” the five holding camps have continued to draw adverse criticism from international community and INGOs on various counts of living conditions, health, denial of freedom of movement etc. The government of Sri Lanka has not been taken kindly to the cricism. It has tightened the visa regime for visits by overseas politicians and representatives of NGOs. There appears to be some confusion within Sri Lanka government between the defence ministry and the foreign ministry in the handling of overseas criticism. This was highlighted when Canadian opposition leader Bob Rae, and a vocal critic of the way Sri Lanka had been handling humanitarian and human rights issues, was refused entryon landing in Colombo by military intelligence although the Sri Lanka embassy in Ottawa had issued him a visa. Government sources said Bob Rae was considered a security risk because of his pro-LTTE sentiments. Canadian government and press have strongly criticised Sri Lanka’s seemingly ham handed action in this affair.
France, U.S. and U.K. have come out with strong statements on the need for restoration of normal life in the war affected areas. The U.S. has also emphasised the need for implementing the 13th amendment of the Sri Lanka constitution giving limited autonomy to the provincial councils. The U.S. State Department has also issued a travel advisory cautioning U.S. travellers to Sri Lanka with veiled criticism of the conditions in Sri Lanka. It stated: “American citizens of Sri Lankan origin may be subject to additional scrutiny upon arrival and while in the country. In some cases, foreigners of Sri Lankan origin may be detained without their embassy being notified. The activities of journalists, researchers, aid workers, and volunteers receive particular attention.”
The continued failure of Sri Lanka government to address the issue of Vanni Tamils has also had its repercussions in India, particularly in Tamil Nadu. Sri Lanka Government sent a high power delegation led by Senior Presidential Advisor and MP Basil Rajapaksa, Defence Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa and Presidential Secretary Lalith Weerathunga to India to specially discuss with Indian foreign minister SM Krishna issues related to the resettlement of the displaced civilians in the North. They said, after discussion, that Indiahad agreed to provide eight de-mining teams process to clear the affected areas so that resettlement could be done within a six month period.However, it is doubtful whether the resettlement would be completed in this short period.
An aid ship “Captain Ali”, carrying a load of relief materials meant for displaced civilians, which was not allowed to enter Sri Lankan territorial waters by the Government authorities had anchored off Chennai seeking Indian intervention. During their meeting in New Delhi, the Sri Lankans were reported to have agreed to India’s suggestion to allow the ship “Captain Ali” to off-load the relief material. It now transpires that these items will be routed to Sri Lanka by the Red Cross in both the countries.
However, it is clear that India had not been happy with Sri Lanka’s actions on relief and resettlement of Tamils in Vanni. Union Home Minister P Chidambaram expressed dissatisfaction over the issue. Specifically, he said that though India had allocated Rs 500 crores for their rehabilitation, Sri Lanka had not come up with the rehabilitation plan. He also asked Sri Lanka to allow INGOs like the Red Cross to carry out the relief work and to permit the media to enter IDP camps.
The issue of Vanni civilians languishing in camps has also provided the much needed rallying point for the LTTE supporters among Tamil expatriates to muster public support. Even otherwise all most all Tamil expatriates are feeling aggrieved at the lack of international collective action against Sri Lanka on this count. And their continued agitation particularly in the UK has kept the issue of Tamil Eelam in the limelight. UK has drawn a lot of flak in Colombo for allowing such demonstrations.
It has whipped up anti-western sentiments in Sri Lanka among the Sinhala nationalist and chauvinist political parties resulting in the hardening of Sri Lanka government attitude also towards nations “meddling” in its affairs. The Obama administration’s nomination of Ms. Patricia Butenis, senior U.S. Foreign Service Officer and currently the deputy chief of mission in Iraq, to be its next ambassador to Sri Lanka has also come under close public scrutiny. This has also resulted in paranoia about activities of critical media, NGO activists, foreign media representatives, and even workers of UN agencies.
A direct consequence of these developments was the delay in release of International Monetary Fund’s loan of $ 1.9 billion to Colombo due to political pressure from the U.S., U.K. and other Western nations unhappy with Sri Lanka’s handling of the final stages of the war in which thousands of civilians were killed. Sri Lanka’s trade minister G.L. Peiris has accused IMF of getting embroiled in “controversial political issues as part of the criteria governing their judgment in respect of particular transactions.”
Sri Lanka government is taking a few measures to restore normalcy in the north. It has opened the A9 highway to Jaffna for commercial goods traffic. The proposed local body elections for the Jaffna and Vavuniya municipal councils are to be held on August 8, 2009. The ruling United Peoples Freedom Alliance (UPFA) campaign in Jaffna is managed by Social Services and Social Welfare Minister Douglas Devananda. 174 candidates from six political parties and two independent groups are in the fray for 29 seats in the Jaffna Municipal Council. For the 15 seats in the Vavuniya Urban Council 135 candidates from six political parties and three independent groups are contesting. The elections will be a testing ground for the nascent Tamil political leadership.
Changes in military command and control
The passing of the Chief of Defence Staff Act in Sri Lanka parliament has formalised the appointment of CDS which had been in existence before. The post of CDS was created (though not formalized) in 1999 in the place of the civilian post of chief of the Joint Operations Bureau.
With this, the CDS as the co-ordinating head of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Police, emerges as a powerful figure in the hierarchy. With General Sarath Fonseka tipped to take over as the new CDS with clearly defined powers working under the defence secretary, plans for strengthening the military would be implemented faster.
The creation of the CDS would also probably facilitate in getting through the controversial future role of the expanded 300,000 strong army in the north where normal life is not restored yet. It will also help the implementation of army’s expansion plans better and faster. Plans are already underway for expansion of the navy, which is expected to play a major role in protecting Sri Lanka’s extended exclusive economic zone in the Indian Ocean.
Revival of the LTTE
The Tamil expatriates who still believe in the creation of a Tamil Eelam state, smarting under the defeat of the LTTE, have got together and announced a slew of measures to form the Provisional Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam (PTGTE) for progressing the cause. Though it appears to be broad based in its concept, its birth after the LTTE has ceased to be a power centre makes it clear that it would claim to be a successor to the LTTE. However, the decision to form PTGE taken without consulting the pro-LTTE Tamil National Alliance (TNA) which is rooted in Sri Lanka politics has raised doubts about the future viability of PTGE. It has also placed TNA in a dilemma.
However, it provides a rallying point for pro-LTTE elements to muster their strength and strengthens the hands of Kumaran Pathmanathan (KP), the overseas representative of the LTTE who had been trying to take over the leadership of the organization. The new name would also overcome the legal hurdle of publicly espousing the LTTE in 32 nations including India, Canada, USA and the EU where the organisation is banned as a terrorist group. However, PTGE has to prove itself as a viable entity; till that happens it will have little credibility both within and outside Sri Lanka. And its effort to establish itself is not going to be a smooth process with competing interests trying to take over the leadership mantle of the LTTE.
June 30, 2009
Tuesday, July 7, 2009
Friendly Neighbourhood Terrorism
The Lalgarh operation against Maoist extremism in West Bengal exposed the weaknesses of our fight against non state actors. The ruling CPM coalition in West Bengal did not want to 'ban' the ultra Left Maoists, but expected the Union government to send paramilitary forces to fight them. But more disturbing is the growing nexus of corrupt politicians-bureaucrats and criminal gangs in diluting state action against trans-border crimes including gun running and human trafficking. This is abetting extremists gaining access to weapons. In addition to this, for a number of years Indian insurgents have been operating from hideouts and bases in India's neighbourhood - notoriously Pakistan, Bangladesh and Myanmar - often with the connivance of the government of the country. Here is my article 'Spreding Out of Control' on the subject for your reading. It was published in GFiles magazine, July 2009 issue. Copyright: GFiles magazine
SPREADING OUT OF CONTROL
Local militancy going global in our neighbourhood has a deadly impact on national security
by COL R HARIHARAN GFiles, Vol 3 Issue 4 July 2009
TWO former chiefs of Bangladesh’s espionage agency – the National Security Intelligence (NSI) – Major General Rezakul Haider Chowdhury and Brigadier General Abdur Rahim, were recently arrested in Dhaka in the infamous arms smuggling case of Chittagong on April 2, 2004. They are being prosecuted for landing a shipload of Chinese arms in Chittagong destined for the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), which is based in Bangladesh and waging an insurgency war in Assam.
It was not a small smuggling operation. According to the Bangladeshi media, police recovered from the 10- truckload consignment a wide range of sophisticated firearms, including 27,020 grenades, 840 rocket launchers, 300 accessories of rocket launchers, 2000 grenade-launching tubes, 6392 magazines and 1,140,520 bullets. The Aga Rahman Yousuf Group, a Dubaibased business conglomerate, had sent the arms and ammunitions from China to Bangladesh for ULFA’s use.
This is one of many instances of local militancy and insurgencies going global in India’s neighbourhood with a deadly impact on India’s national security. Their symbiotic growth with a host of other criminal activities ranging from trafficking in weapons, drugs, and women and children to smuggling, forgery, and money laundering. They have also corrupted the law enforcing agencies and helped the growth of the political- criminal nexus. South Asia is geographically located between two of the biggest sources of the illegal drug trade in opium and heroin – Afghanistan in the west and Myanmar in the east. Drug trafficking generates a number of other criminal activities, including money laundering, illegal arms trade, and human trafficking. The drug trade is a huge money spinner and it is not accidental that a number of insurgency movements have close links with the drug trade in Afghanistan, Myanmar, and Pakistan.
Traditionally, the growth of militancy and other forms of extremist insurgency is attributed to socio-economic reasons, lack of proper governance and rule of law, religious fundamentalism, or aberrations of caste, creed, and linguistic differences. While these factors do provide a fertile ground for growth of militancy, the easy availability of illegal arms encourages escalation of political conflicts into extremism.
So South Asia has also become the heartland of the illegal trade in light weapons. Thanks to technological advances, they are no more light in their performance. The generally accepted 1977 UN definition of light weapons includes: MANPADS (man-portable air defence systems), ATGWs (anti-tank guided weapons), heavy machine guns (including anti-aircraft guns), antimaterial rifles, recoilless rifles and guns, grenade launchers, unguided anti-tank rocket launchers, and mortars. The disturbing aspect is that all these weapons of modern armies have been in use among terrorist and militant groups operating in South Asia.
Formidable network of terror
EVEN without taking into account Afghanistan, which has been the focus of the US-led global war on terror since 2001, three South Asian countries – India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka – have so far given birth to 249 anti-state entities that took up arms to achieve their goals, according to South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) data. Fortunately, only 91 of them, including 15 transnational ones, are functional today.
India has the largest number of terrorist and extremist organizations – 69 (including four transnational ones) still operating in its midst. Pakistan, the unrecognized homeland of Jihadi terrorism, has 22 extremist organizations (11 domestic and 11 transnational ones). It is in a gridlock with terrorists, fighting for its survival as a democratic nation.
Sri Lanka produced 37 insurgent bodies of various hues when the Tamil minority’s political quest for equal rights failed to produce results. However, recently the Sri Lanka military succeeded in crushing the only surviving Tamil insurgent group – the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The only Sinhala insurgent group, the Janatha Vimukti Peramuna (JVP) turned into a Left-leaning political party two decades ago, after much bloodshed. And the country now hopes to have some respite from active insurgency.
Though Bangladesh has only five extremist organizations of the extreme leftist and Islamic fundamentalist varieties, they have continued to be a powerful destabilizing factor in the country’s politics. Nepal had been more fortunate. Its only insurgent body – the Nepal Communist Party (Maoist) – managed to convert itself into a political party after the end of monarchy. It has not given up arms yet and that can spell potential trouble for Nepal’s nascent democracy.
Bhutan and the Maldives, having no major extremist entity in their midst, are the most fortunate.
The growth of terrorism in India has been encouraged by the availability of sanctuaries for terrorists and insurgents in Pakistan, Bangladesh and Myanmar. (India had also offered sanctuary to Sri Lanka Tamil extremists for nearly a decade in the 1990s). Unfortunately, both Pakistan and Bangladesh have been using Indian insurgent groups in their midst to indirectly assert their power against India. In the case of Myanmar, the military regime had not been able to curb Indian insurgents operating from its soil due to their links with local insurgency groups.
Unless these countries deny sanctuary to Indian insurgent groups, India’s counterinsurgency operations will be only partially successful.
Given this setting, under the garb of protection, flaunting of weapons has become a status symbol in many of our states. As a corollary, indiscriminate issue of weapon licences has armed entire communities in many parts of India. The increasing social tolerance of the gun culture is symbolized by the replacement of the traditional soft image of Bollywood heroes with guntoting honchos sporting six packs.
It is not surprising that small arms are increasingly used to gain coercive power in public life. Poor governance and weaknesses in the criminal justice system have increased the clout of power brokers supported by armed gangs. Unfortunately, with criminals gaining more political influence, the gun culture has become a part of political life not only in India but other South Asian states as well. This has vitiated the effectiveness of existing gun control laws.
Between 1994 and 2008, about 60,000 people lost their lives in armed violence in India. Small arms were used to cause most of these deaths. These shocking figures give an idea of the price the nation is paying due to uncontrolled spread of illegal arms and the ever-increasing fire power of militancy.
So any grand strategy to curb insurgency and terrorism should address the larger social issues relating to the gun culture and easy access to illegal weapons. Existing laws on gun control need updating and enforcement needs to be tightened even for licensed guns. The growing nexus between politician bureaucrat- criminal gangs is the hothouse for insurgents to gain access to weapons. Unless this is broken through effective governance, lasting success in curbing terrorism and insurgency cannot be achieved.
Courtesy:http://gfilesindia.com/title.aspx?title_id=13
SPREADING OUT OF CONTROL
Local militancy going global in our neighbourhood has a deadly impact on national security
by COL R HARIHARAN GFiles, Vol 3 Issue 4 July 2009
TWO former chiefs of Bangladesh’s espionage agency – the National Security Intelligence (NSI) – Major General Rezakul Haider Chowdhury and Brigadier General Abdur Rahim, were recently arrested in Dhaka in the infamous arms smuggling case of Chittagong on April 2, 2004. They are being prosecuted for landing a shipload of Chinese arms in Chittagong destined for the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), which is based in Bangladesh and waging an insurgency war in Assam.
It was not a small smuggling operation. According to the Bangladeshi media, police recovered from the 10- truckload consignment a wide range of sophisticated firearms, including 27,020 grenades, 840 rocket launchers, 300 accessories of rocket launchers, 2000 grenade-launching tubes, 6392 magazines and 1,140,520 bullets. The Aga Rahman Yousuf Group, a Dubaibased business conglomerate, had sent the arms and ammunitions from China to Bangladesh for ULFA’s use.
This is one of many instances of local militancy and insurgencies going global in India’s neighbourhood with a deadly impact on India’s national security. Their symbiotic growth with a host of other criminal activities ranging from trafficking in weapons, drugs, and women and children to smuggling, forgery, and money laundering. They have also corrupted the law enforcing agencies and helped the growth of the political- criminal nexus. South Asia is geographically located between two of the biggest sources of the illegal drug trade in opium and heroin – Afghanistan in the west and Myanmar in the east. Drug trafficking generates a number of other criminal activities, including money laundering, illegal arms trade, and human trafficking. The drug trade is a huge money spinner and it is not accidental that a number of insurgency movements have close links with the drug trade in Afghanistan, Myanmar, and Pakistan.
Traditionally, the growth of militancy and other forms of extremist insurgency is attributed to socio-economic reasons, lack of proper governance and rule of law, religious fundamentalism, or aberrations of caste, creed, and linguistic differences. While these factors do provide a fertile ground for growth of militancy, the easy availability of illegal arms encourages escalation of political conflicts into extremism.
So South Asia has also become the heartland of the illegal trade in light weapons. Thanks to technological advances, they are no more light in their performance. The generally accepted 1977 UN definition of light weapons includes: MANPADS (man-portable air defence systems), ATGWs (anti-tank guided weapons), heavy machine guns (including anti-aircraft guns), antimaterial rifles, recoilless rifles and guns, grenade launchers, unguided anti-tank rocket launchers, and mortars. The disturbing aspect is that all these weapons of modern armies have been in use among terrorist and militant groups operating in South Asia.
Formidable network of terror
EVEN without taking into account Afghanistan, which has been the focus of the US-led global war on terror since 2001, three South Asian countries – India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka – have so far given birth to 249 anti-state entities that took up arms to achieve their goals, according to South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) data. Fortunately, only 91 of them, including 15 transnational ones, are functional today.
India has the largest number of terrorist and extremist organizations – 69 (including four transnational ones) still operating in its midst. Pakistan, the unrecognized homeland of Jihadi terrorism, has 22 extremist organizations (11 domestic and 11 transnational ones). It is in a gridlock with terrorists, fighting for its survival as a democratic nation.
Sri Lanka produced 37 insurgent bodies of various hues when the Tamil minority’s political quest for equal rights failed to produce results. However, recently the Sri Lanka military succeeded in crushing the only surviving Tamil insurgent group – the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The only Sinhala insurgent group, the Janatha Vimukti Peramuna (JVP) turned into a Left-leaning political party two decades ago, after much bloodshed. And the country now hopes to have some respite from active insurgency.
Though Bangladesh has only five extremist organizations of the extreme leftist and Islamic fundamentalist varieties, they have continued to be a powerful destabilizing factor in the country’s politics. Nepal had been more fortunate. Its only insurgent body – the Nepal Communist Party (Maoist) – managed to convert itself into a political party after the end of monarchy. It has not given up arms yet and that can spell potential trouble for Nepal’s nascent democracy.
Bhutan and the Maldives, having no major extremist entity in their midst, are the most fortunate.
The growth of terrorism in India has been encouraged by the availability of sanctuaries for terrorists and insurgents in Pakistan, Bangladesh and Myanmar. (India had also offered sanctuary to Sri Lanka Tamil extremists for nearly a decade in the 1990s). Unfortunately, both Pakistan and Bangladesh have been using Indian insurgent groups in their midst to indirectly assert their power against India. In the case of Myanmar, the military regime had not been able to curb Indian insurgents operating from its soil due to their links with local insurgency groups.
Unless these countries deny sanctuary to Indian insurgent groups, India’s counterinsurgency operations will be only partially successful.
Given this setting, under the garb of protection, flaunting of weapons has become a status symbol in many of our states. As a corollary, indiscriminate issue of weapon licences has armed entire communities in many parts of India. The increasing social tolerance of the gun culture is symbolized by the replacement of the traditional soft image of Bollywood heroes with guntoting honchos sporting six packs.
It is not surprising that small arms are increasingly used to gain coercive power in public life. Poor governance and weaknesses in the criminal justice system have increased the clout of power brokers supported by armed gangs. Unfortunately, with criminals gaining more political influence, the gun culture has become a part of political life not only in India but other South Asian states as well. This has vitiated the effectiveness of existing gun control laws.
Between 1994 and 2008, about 60,000 people lost their lives in armed violence in India. Small arms were used to cause most of these deaths. These shocking figures give an idea of the price the nation is paying due to uncontrolled spread of illegal arms and the ever-increasing fire power of militancy.
So any grand strategy to curb insurgency and terrorism should address the larger social issues relating to the gun culture and easy access to illegal weapons. Existing laws on gun control need updating and enforcement needs to be tightened even for licensed guns. The growing nexus between politician bureaucrat- criminal gangs is the hothouse for insurgents to gain access to weapons. Unless this is broken through effective governance, lasting success in curbing terrorism and insurgency cannot be achieved.
Courtesy:http://gfilesindia.com/title.aspx?title_id=13
Friday, June 19, 2009
Soft underbelly of India’s internal security
There are a series of disturbing bits of news flowing in just one week’s media reports that expose the soft underbelly of India’s internal security (own comments are given in italics):
• Saleem Abbasi, an Algerian wanted for his involvement in the blast at Houari Boumediene airport in Algiers on August 26, 1992 was arrested by airport security after Chennai airport immigration authorities spotted him on his arrival from Kualalumpur on June 17th night at Chennai airport. The immigration authorities had no prior knowledge that he was a wanted criminal but a Interpol Red Corner alert in his name resulted in the arrest. The Algerian, travelling on a Qatari passport, was on his way to catch a flight to Bangalore to attend a meeting with the Karnataka Planning Board Deputy Chairman DH Shankaramurthy to discuss Rs 130-crore investment in a solar energy project in Karnataka. Newspapers inform that Abbasi was a globe trotter who has not been caught all these years. So much for global war on terror! It will be interesting to know how many times Abbasi had visited India and where all he has invested and who are his contacts here. But if our past experience is any guide, Abbasi would be set free because India has no extradition treaty with Algeria and he had not committed any offence in India (at least not in public knowledge).
• According to media reports the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) in a raid seized nine firearms (some of them unlicensed) and VHF radio communication sets from the house of Dr Padamsinh Patil, MP and a leader of the Nationalist Congress Party, in Mumbai on June 18th. Dr Patil is accused of plotting the murder of his cousin and political rival Pavanraja Nimbalkar in 2006. His son however claimed that only four weapons, including a pistol, a revolver, a 12 bore gun and a rifle, were seized and all of them were licensed. The radio sets were authorised to be installed in the NCP leader’s residence when he was a cabinet minister for irrigation. However, when he relinquished office they were not returned to the government but shifted to his new home, which was illegal. (He relinquished office when social crusader Anna Hazare levelled corruption charges against him.) According to Dr Patil’s lawyer, the radio sets were shifted “inadvertently”; he claimed that some of the radiosets were in a packed condition and not used at all.
• Interrogators of Mohammed Madani, a suspected Lashkar-e-Tayyabba (LeT) terrorist, arrested in Delhi on June 4th , told a Delhi court that Madni had revealed to the police interrogators that the LeT was acting in coordination with CPI(Maoists) in Jharkand.
• For a second day battle was “raging” on June 19th in Lalgarh in West Bengal between the Maoists and the paramilitary forces of the state and Centre. The West Bengal government is at last trying to re-establish government control after Maoist rampage in Lalgarh in which the local leader of the ruling CPM party was killed and the police station was attacked. Union Home MinisterP Chidambaram questioned why the West Bengal government had not banned the CPI(Maoists) when other states had already outlawed it. He also said the Naxals were entrenched in the adjoining districts of Bankura and Purulia also and it was difficult to say how many were there. Earlier, in an interview in a forest adjoining Lalgarh, Maoist leader Mullajhola Koteshwar Rao alias Kishanji “calmly admitted both the murder of Badal Ahir, a member of the Pingboni local committee and the plot to assassinate West Bengal chief minister Buddhadeb Bhattacharjee. We wanted to kill the chief minstier because the people wanted him to die,” Kishanjee claimed. “We failed. But in future if people give out the same verdict, we will re-plot his assassination” he threatened according to the news report. The media reported that Kishanji might have escaped the police dragnet in Lalgarh area. Naturally he would flee because instead of taking concerted action, the state government and Centre are finger pointing at each othe,r playing the blame game for their inaction against the Naxalites takeover of parts of West Bengal.
Is there a connection between all the above reports (actually I have given only a few of them)? Yes; there is. The bottom line we have a uncoordinated, poorly planned and highly politicised internal security system that is being executed by de-motivated paramilitary and police forces. That is why nobody takes the rule of law seriously, because one has to search for it.
It is no mystery why government in Delhi or elsewhere is not taking seriously the Naxalite threat which is there in nearly 160 districts of the country. Because, they are reluctant. Only Chhattisgarh had taken concerted action against them and it had been facing the flak from Left intellectuals and even the Centre!
So what are we waiting? For another 26/11 to happen I suppose. Then we can have yet another episode of media circus and political mudslinging, appoint a commission to inquire into the new born 26/11 and proceed to suppress the inquiry report from public dissemination. The Maharashtra government has just done it.
• Saleem Abbasi, an Algerian wanted for his involvement in the blast at Houari Boumediene airport in Algiers on August 26, 1992 was arrested by airport security after Chennai airport immigration authorities spotted him on his arrival from Kualalumpur on June 17th night at Chennai airport. The immigration authorities had no prior knowledge that he was a wanted criminal but a Interpol Red Corner alert in his name resulted in the arrest. The Algerian, travelling on a Qatari passport, was on his way to catch a flight to Bangalore to attend a meeting with the Karnataka Planning Board Deputy Chairman DH Shankaramurthy to discuss Rs 130-crore investment in a solar energy project in Karnataka. Newspapers inform that Abbasi was a globe trotter who has not been caught all these years. So much for global war on terror! It will be interesting to know how many times Abbasi had visited India and where all he has invested and who are his contacts here. But if our past experience is any guide, Abbasi would be set free because India has no extradition treaty with Algeria and he had not committed any offence in India (at least not in public knowledge).
• According to media reports the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) in a raid seized nine firearms (some of them unlicensed) and VHF radio communication sets from the house of Dr Padamsinh Patil, MP and a leader of the Nationalist Congress Party, in Mumbai on June 18th. Dr Patil is accused of plotting the murder of his cousin and political rival Pavanraja Nimbalkar in 2006. His son however claimed that only four weapons, including a pistol, a revolver, a 12 bore gun and a rifle, were seized and all of them were licensed. The radio sets were authorised to be installed in the NCP leader’s residence when he was a cabinet minister for irrigation. However, when he relinquished office they were not returned to the government but shifted to his new home, which was illegal. (He relinquished office when social crusader Anna Hazare levelled corruption charges against him.) According to Dr Patil’s lawyer, the radio sets were shifted “inadvertently”; he claimed that some of the radiosets were in a packed condition and not used at all.
• Interrogators of Mohammed Madani, a suspected Lashkar-e-Tayyabba (LeT) terrorist, arrested in Delhi on June 4th , told a Delhi court that Madni had revealed to the police interrogators that the LeT was acting in coordination with CPI(Maoists) in Jharkand.
• For a second day battle was “raging” on June 19th in Lalgarh in West Bengal between the Maoists and the paramilitary forces of the state and Centre. The West Bengal government is at last trying to re-establish government control after Maoist rampage in Lalgarh in which the local leader of the ruling CPM party was killed and the police station was attacked. Union Home MinisterP Chidambaram questioned why the West Bengal government had not banned the CPI(Maoists) when other states had already outlawed it. He also said the Naxals were entrenched in the adjoining districts of Bankura and Purulia also and it was difficult to say how many were there. Earlier, in an interview in a forest adjoining Lalgarh, Maoist leader Mullajhola Koteshwar Rao alias Kishanji “calmly admitted both the murder of Badal Ahir, a member of the Pingboni local committee and the plot to assassinate West Bengal chief minister Buddhadeb Bhattacharjee. We wanted to kill the chief minstier because the people wanted him to die,” Kishanjee claimed. “We failed. But in future if people give out the same verdict, we will re-plot his assassination” he threatened according to the news report. The media reported that Kishanji might have escaped the police dragnet in Lalgarh area. Naturally he would flee because instead of taking concerted action, the state government and Centre are finger pointing at each othe,r playing the blame game for their inaction against the Naxalites takeover of parts of West Bengal.
Is there a connection between all the above reports (actually I have given only a few of them)? Yes; there is. The bottom line we have a uncoordinated, poorly planned and highly politicised internal security system that is being executed by de-motivated paramilitary and police forces. That is why nobody takes the rule of law seriously, because one has to search for it.
It is no mystery why government in Delhi or elsewhere is not taking seriously the Naxalite threat which is there in nearly 160 districts of the country. Because, they are reluctant. Only Chhattisgarh had taken concerted action against them and it had been facing the flak from Left intellectuals and even the Centre!
So what are we waiting? For another 26/11 to happen I suppose. Then we can have yet another episode of media circus and political mudslinging, appoint a commission to inquire into the new born 26/11 and proceed to suppress the inquiry report from public dissemination. The Maharashtra government has just done it.
Thursday, June 11, 2009
Are we ready for the changing global strategic environment?
The U.S.economic meltdown, with its tectonic effects worldwide, is causing some readjustments in the global strategic environment. Chief among them is likely to be the U.S.-China relations. At the same time, Barack Obama, the new occupant of the White House, is trying out an entirely new approach to issues relating to South Asia. So time has come for India to take a hard look at some of them that affect her national security; these include Af-Pak situation, China's increasing profile in South Asia, giving form to the Indo-U.S.strategic relations, and of course a whole lot of nuclear issues. My article "How safe are we? And how safe do we feel?" published in the latest issue of GFiles some of these discussing these aspects is reproduced here, courtesy GFiles, for your reading. It may not be reproduced in any form without the permission of www.gfilesindia.com, who hold the copyright of the article.
GFiles, Vol 3, Issue 3 June 2009
How safe are we? And how safe do we feel?
There is a need to draw up new assessments because the international environment will undergo major changes in the near term
Col R Hariharan
Though the people have voted once again to choose Congress party led coalition to power for a second term in New Delhi, Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh’s government had not covered itself with glory in handling national security issues in its earlier term in office. The record of Atal Bihari Vajapayee-led Bharatiya Janata Party coalition government earlier was equally inept. However, both the prime ministers had responded to security issues when forced to do so. Dr Manmohan Singh stood fast to ensure the safe passage of the Indo-US Nuclear Agreement despite the Leftists threat to pull the rug under the feet of his government. Similarly, Vajapayee’s response to the dangerous Pakistani military adventure in Kargil was equally strong.
The reason for India’s “traditional” knee jerk response is simple - lack of systems thinking in handling of national security issues, abetted by the absence of a national vision. The political and policy dispensations have not been able to evolve a mutually reinforcing approach to security and foreign policy issues. The country has shown a singular lack of will to face issues squarely and dispassionately to ensure a stable security environment in India’s neighbourhood. As a result India has been losing strategic ground even in South Asia, despite its unique geo-strategic advantages.
The national security agenda is generally perceived as limited to ensuring territorial integrity and safeguarding the nation from external and internal threat. Political parties appear to forget that they have a responsibility to foster a feeling of security and trust in the government among the citizens. In other words, the national security has to be people orientated and not merely restricted to military or political diplomacy. This was amply demonstrated in the general feeling of insecurity and lack of trust in the government after the 26/11 terrorist attacks in Mumbai. Some of the informed citizens cynically expressed their doubts of the Indian style of democracy ever responding to calls of national security.
Now that the Congress-led alliance has got a strong mandate from the people, it should redraw the national security agenda. Ideally the agenda should address issues relating to policy, structural and operational aspects.
The first task would be to restore public confidence in the government. That can come only when the government is clear about what it should do. As there are external determinants of national security dynamics, a long term vision is required to be drawn up. The other policy components would be the accountability of advisory, policy making and executive authorities, and working in a time bound manner with clear benchmarks. Then only the operational structure would respond effectively to real time needs.
There is a need to draw up a fresh threat assessment as the global strategic environment is set to undergo some changes in the near term. And these are likely affect the power equation in South Asia, particularly in respect of Pakistan, China, India’s neighbouring countries and the Indian Ocean. The environment is going to be increasingly complex involving economic, fiscal, technology, diplomatic, and political issues. Each one of these issues has the potential to affect internal security threats as well. So, policy making on national security will have to be integrated, inclusive and proactive.
U.S. President Barack Obama, in keeping with his electoral promise, has introduced a few changes in the U.S. approach to the war on terror in Afghanistan and the U.S. involvement in Iraq. A more nuanced approach is likely to come into play in the U.S. handling Iran, North Korea, and even Myanmar - countries dubbed earlier as axis of evil.
The compulsions of the U.S. economic meltdown have adversely impacted the largely export-oriented manufacturing economy of China. This has set both the countries on path of convergence of their economic interests. The close win-win economic relations being built between the U.S. and China could colour, if not distort, the U.S.’s traditional stand on some of the contentious issues between the two countries. Thus we can expect their fall out in India’s neighbourhood also, offering better opportunities for growth of Chinese influence in this region.
As a result of this, some of the China related issues could come increasingly under Indian security scanner in the next few years. These include: increase in Chinese profile in Nepal under the Maoist regime, increasing global acceptance of Myanmar as a domain of China’s strategic interest sidelining India’s security interests, and the increasing strategic presence of China in Sri Lanka and Indian Ocean. Under adverse conditions, the future of Tibetan refugees in India and their struggle for autonomy could also become a contentious issue between India and China.
The much heralded U.S. war on terror in Afghanistan is in disarray with increasing spread of Taliban control over Pakistan territory contiguous to the Afghan border. In fact the democratically elected government of Pakistan is locked in a battle of survival to stop the Taliban forces threatening to take over the country. President Obama’s U.S. prescription for Afghanistan has identified Pakistan as a key player in the war against the Taliban. This has resulted in Pakistan gaining a position of primacy following the extension of the Afghan operational theatre to include Pak territory also.
The U.S. is set to expand its footprint inside Pakistan with the extension of financial and military assistance to strengthen Pakistan armed forces to fight the Taliban. The Pentagon has asked the U.S.Congress to allocate $400 million this year as the first instalment for a new "Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund" to meet specific Pakistani military training and equipment needs as part of a five-year programme. In the past, Pakistan army had always used such U.S. largesse to build its conventional military capability against India, because it views India as its primary threat. Thus whatever is the U.S. intention, Pakistan armed forces are likely to emerge stronger in the coming years; and that would change the dynamics of India’s threat perception relating to Pakistan.
The increasing risk of Taliban forces gaining access to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons has added yet another dangerous dimension to the security scene in Pakistan. The repeated assurances from Pakistan government discounting such a possibility have found few as many suspect the limbs of the government including the armed forces and intelligence are embedded with pro-Taliban elements. It is imperative that Indian policy makers handle this issue with circumspection as the U.S. could use it to get India militarily involved into the strategic mess against the Taliban in the Af-Pak region.
The previous U.S President George W. Bush had laid the foundation for building a strategic alliance with India. Dr Manmohan Singh’s government had claimed the signing of the Indo-US Civil Nuclear Agreement as an important achievement of this new found relationship. However, as the new dispensation in Washington is a strong votary of NPT regime the nuclear agreement runs the risk of being sidelined. The statement of the U.S. assistant secretary of state, Rose Gottemoeller, at the 2010 the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) review conference in New York recently affirming "universal adherence of the NPT itself, including by India, Israel, Pakistan and North Korea, remains a fundamental objective of the United States," has serious connotations for India.
At the same time, there are disturbing reports from Pakistan about the rapid progress in building two large plutonium production reactors that could lead to qualitative and quantitative increase in Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. Americans have apparently chosen to ignore this development in public, probably due to political, diplomatic and military pressures. India needs to be on watch to handle such realpolitik situation when the non-proliferation card comes into play.
On the operational front, our biggest weakness is in timely procurement of defence needs. Unless we invest in strategic military assets well in time, we would lose ground in our own neighbourhood. And stodgy defence procurement had been the biggest road block faced by the security forces in building their strategic capability. There is an urgent need to unclog the channels of procurement that are incapacitating our strategic capability. Otherwise we will be inviting increasing Chinese presence in our neighbourhood. China is rapidly building its naval and missile capabilities. Coupled with its increasing economic clout, Indian Ocean and its peripheral countries are likely to become the scene of China’s heightened power assertion.
By rejecting politicians who traded their caste, communal and criminal proclivities instead of meeting the needs of the people, voters have shown that they were not going to be swayed by rhetoric and politicking. They want results on the ground. So it would be politically prudent for the new government in New Delhi to seriously address long pending national security issues. National interest should be the sole criterion in handling India’s security and foreign policy dispensations. And implementing a new time bound security agenda integrated with foreign policy objectives would be the first step in making it a reality.
Courtesy: GFiles
GFiles, Vol 3, Issue 3 June 2009
How safe are we? And how safe do we feel?
There is a need to draw up new assessments because the international environment will undergo major changes in the near term
Col R Hariharan
Though the people have voted once again to choose Congress party led coalition to power for a second term in New Delhi, Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh’s government had not covered itself with glory in handling national security issues in its earlier term in office. The record of Atal Bihari Vajapayee-led Bharatiya Janata Party coalition government earlier was equally inept. However, both the prime ministers had responded to security issues when forced to do so. Dr Manmohan Singh stood fast to ensure the safe passage of the Indo-US Nuclear Agreement despite the Leftists threat to pull the rug under the feet of his government. Similarly, Vajapayee’s response to the dangerous Pakistani military adventure in Kargil was equally strong.
The reason for India’s “traditional” knee jerk response is simple - lack of systems thinking in handling of national security issues, abetted by the absence of a national vision. The political and policy dispensations have not been able to evolve a mutually reinforcing approach to security and foreign policy issues. The country has shown a singular lack of will to face issues squarely and dispassionately to ensure a stable security environment in India’s neighbourhood. As a result India has been losing strategic ground even in South Asia, despite its unique geo-strategic advantages.
The national security agenda is generally perceived as limited to ensuring territorial integrity and safeguarding the nation from external and internal threat. Political parties appear to forget that they have a responsibility to foster a feeling of security and trust in the government among the citizens. In other words, the national security has to be people orientated and not merely restricted to military or political diplomacy. This was amply demonstrated in the general feeling of insecurity and lack of trust in the government after the 26/11 terrorist attacks in Mumbai. Some of the informed citizens cynically expressed their doubts of the Indian style of democracy ever responding to calls of national security.
Now that the Congress-led alliance has got a strong mandate from the people, it should redraw the national security agenda. Ideally the agenda should address issues relating to policy, structural and operational aspects.
The first task would be to restore public confidence in the government. That can come only when the government is clear about what it should do. As there are external determinants of national security dynamics, a long term vision is required to be drawn up. The other policy components would be the accountability of advisory, policy making and executive authorities, and working in a time bound manner with clear benchmarks. Then only the operational structure would respond effectively to real time needs.
There is a need to draw up a fresh threat assessment as the global strategic environment is set to undergo some changes in the near term. And these are likely affect the power equation in South Asia, particularly in respect of Pakistan, China, India’s neighbouring countries and the Indian Ocean. The environment is going to be increasingly complex involving economic, fiscal, technology, diplomatic, and political issues. Each one of these issues has the potential to affect internal security threats as well. So, policy making on national security will have to be integrated, inclusive and proactive.
U.S. President Barack Obama, in keeping with his electoral promise, has introduced a few changes in the U.S. approach to the war on terror in Afghanistan and the U.S. involvement in Iraq. A more nuanced approach is likely to come into play in the U.S. handling Iran, North Korea, and even Myanmar - countries dubbed earlier as axis of evil.
The compulsions of the U.S. economic meltdown have adversely impacted the largely export-oriented manufacturing economy of China. This has set both the countries on path of convergence of their economic interests. The close win-win economic relations being built between the U.S. and China could colour, if not distort, the U.S.’s traditional stand on some of the contentious issues between the two countries. Thus we can expect their fall out in India’s neighbourhood also, offering better opportunities for growth of Chinese influence in this region.
As a result of this, some of the China related issues could come increasingly under Indian security scanner in the next few years. These include: increase in Chinese profile in Nepal under the Maoist regime, increasing global acceptance of Myanmar as a domain of China’s strategic interest sidelining India’s security interests, and the increasing strategic presence of China in Sri Lanka and Indian Ocean. Under adverse conditions, the future of Tibetan refugees in India and their struggle for autonomy could also become a contentious issue between India and China.
The much heralded U.S. war on terror in Afghanistan is in disarray with increasing spread of Taliban control over Pakistan territory contiguous to the Afghan border. In fact the democratically elected government of Pakistan is locked in a battle of survival to stop the Taliban forces threatening to take over the country. President Obama’s U.S. prescription for Afghanistan has identified Pakistan as a key player in the war against the Taliban. This has resulted in Pakistan gaining a position of primacy following the extension of the Afghan operational theatre to include Pak territory also.
The U.S. is set to expand its footprint inside Pakistan with the extension of financial and military assistance to strengthen Pakistan armed forces to fight the Taliban. The Pentagon has asked the U.S.Congress to allocate $400 million this year as the first instalment for a new "Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund" to meet specific Pakistani military training and equipment needs as part of a five-year programme. In the past, Pakistan army had always used such U.S. largesse to build its conventional military capability against India, because it views India as its primary threat. Thus whatever is the U.S. intention, Pakistan armed forces are likely to emerge stronger in the coming years; and that would change the dynamics of India’s threat perception relating to Pakistan.
The increasing risk of Taliban forces gaining access to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons has added yet another dangerous dimension to the security scene in Pakistan. The repeated assurances from Pakistan government discounting such a possibility have found few as many suspect the limbs of the government including the armed forces and intelligence are embedded with pro-Taliban elements. It is imperative that Indian policy makers handle this issue with circumspection as the U.S. could use it to get India militarily involved into the strategic mess against the Taliban in the Af-Pak region.
The previous U.S President George W. Bush had laid the foundation for building a strategic alliance with India. Dr Manmohan Singh’s government had claimed the signing of the Indo-US Civil Nuclear Agreement as an important achievement of this new found relationship. However, as the new dispensation in Washington is a strong votary of NPT regime the nuclear agreement runs the risk of being sidelined. The statement of the U.S. assistant secretary of state, Rose Gottemoeller, at the 2010 the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) review conference in New York recently affirming "universal adherence of the NPT itself, including by India, Israel, Pakistan and North Korea, remains a fundamental objective of the United States," has serious connotations for India.
At the same time, there are disturbing reports from Pakistan about the rapid progress in building two large plutonium production reactors that could lead to qualitative and quantitative increase in Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. Americans have apparently chosen to ignore this development in public, probably due to political, diplomatic and military pressures. India needs to be on watch to handle such realpolitik situation when the non-proliferation card comes into play.
On the operational front, our biggest weakness is in timely procurement of defence needs. Unless we invest in strategic military assets well in time, we would lose ground in our own neighbourhood. And stodgy defence procurement had been the biggest road block faced by the security forces in building their strategic capability. There is an urgent need to unclog the channels of procurement that are incapacitating our strategic capability. Otherwise we will be inviting increasing Chinese presence in our neighbourhood. China is rapidly building its naval and missile capabilities. Coupled with its increasing economic clout, Indian Ocean and its peripheral countries are likely to become the scene of China’s heightened power assertion.
By rejecting politicians who traded their caste, communal and criminal proclivities instead of meeting the needs of the people, voters have shown that they were not going to be swayed by rhetoric and politicking. They want results on the ground. So it would be politically prudent for the new government in New Delhi to seriously address long pending national security issues. National interest should be the sole criterion in handling India’s security and foreign policy dispensations. And implementing a new time bound security agenda integrated with foreign policy objectives would be the first step in making it a reality.
Courtesy: GFiles
Tuesday, June 9, 2009
Media Bytes on Sri Lanka - June 9, 2009
[Here are my answers to some of the recent questions relating to Sri Lanka from media representatives.]
1. Are you surprised at the decimation of the LTTE? Was it coming for them?
No; it comes as no surprise. In the last three years of operation, the LTTE never regained military initiative. They could not launch a sizeable counter offensive. The army was bent upon causing maximum casualties; and the liquidation and decimation of [LTTE] leadership in the end was the only surprise. It looked so pointless for the leadership to stay to die.
2. What caused the downfall of the LTTE- militarily and politically
This is too big an issue to answer in one or two sentences. Prabhakaran made many strategic blunders; I have summarised them here:
* Handling of Karuna: Karuna’s complaints were handled with disdain. No effort was made to patch up with him. Instead killer squads were sent. This resulted in his breakaway from the LTTE. East was the main source of recruits for the LTTE; this source dried up after Karuna’s departure with detrimental results on LTTE’s military capability during war
* Boycott of Presidential Poll 2005:LTTE imposed the boycott in areas under its control and prevented Tamils from voting. This resulted in the defeat of Ranil Wickremesinghe, who sponsored the peace process 2002 and election of his rival Mahinda Rajapaksa as President with a wafer thin majority, mainly through Southern Sinhala votes. Prabhakaran did not take seriously Rajapaksa’s repeated avowal to eliminate the LTTE, made during the electoral campaign.
* Ignoring International Reaction: Prabhakaran failed to read the changing global attitude to terrorist methods after 9/11 terror attacks and measures taken to control transnational terrorism. His repeated violations of ceasefire terms, particularly the killing of Sri Lanka Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar, in utter disregard to international opinion on such acts, resulted in 32 countries banning the organisation. Similarly the attack on Army Commander damaged LTTE’s international credibility further and provided legitimacy for Sri Lanka to go to war that led to the defeat of LTTE.
* Mending Relations with India: After gaining the status of sole arbiter of the Tamil cause in the peace process, the LTTE failed to mend its relations with India. Thanks to Prabhakaran’s egoistic reasoning the fund of goodwill for the Tamil cause existing in India was never tapped to pressurise Sri Lanka to arrive at a political solution. Instead it was the successive Sri Lanka presidents who cultivated New Delhi to their advantage.
* Failure to Objectively Assess the Security Forces: Riding the crest of success in 2002, Prabhakaran was probably lulled into the self believe that the LTTE was invincible. Perhaps this was the reason that prevented him from objectively assessing the strategic impact of the emerging convergence of Sri Lanka’s political and military goals after President Rajapaksa took over. The international support and cooperation to Sri Lanka, particularly in improving the military’s capability were used as material for LTTE propaganda than assessing their impact on the fighting prowess of the security forces. This led to gross underestimation of the ability of the security forces to relentlessly pursue their offensive against the LTTE.
* Inability to provide a strategic military response: After the loss of its territory in the eastern province, the LTTE had no proactive strategy in the north. It was the security forces that held the military initiative all along. The LTTE failed to pick up the gauntlet and achieve a strategic surprise during the three-year long campaign, as it did in the Eelam War III when it captured the Elephant Pass, despite the overwhelming Sri Lankan superiority in fire power and strength there.
* Trapping civilians in the war zone: The LTTE moved all the civilians from captured areas to areas under its control as the security forces advanced. This was a reactive defence strategy and affected the mobility of cadres, pinning them down to static defences. This questionable strategy neither prevented the security forces from using their heavy weapons and air force nor vindicated the LTTE’s use of civilians as human shields. It generated only adverse publicity.
3. How much role does Prabhakaran has in this downfall?
No LTTE action is possible without Prabhakaran's clearance. So everything that happened to the LTTE was his own making.
4. How did the Sri Lanka government get sudden spurt in their military strength and political resolve as to end the crisis in two years?
It was not sudden spurt; in the presidential poll held in 2005 Rajapaksa had announced that if he was elected he would cancel the peace process and ceasefire agreement and eliminate LTTE. The war started in 2006. In the three years the armed forces were systematically improved and strengthened. The President provided the political leadership and Gen Fonseka did a professional job of leading army to victory. It was deliberate and not left to chance.
5. What role should India have played in this war? How should it now behave in Sri Lanka and handle Tamil problem?
India played a limited role in training naval and army personnel and supplying non-lethal weapons. Your question on India's future Lanka policy is yet to be answered by the new Govt of India itself. It has to decide on its strategic compulsions and act.
6. Can the Kashmir problem be compared with the Tamil issue of Lanka?
No; they are as different as chalk is from cheese.
7. What would be the future of the LTTE and the Tamil cause, in your opinion, post war?
Rajapaksa will dictate the terms of Tamil devolution. As the Tamils have no worthwhile leadership, either politically or militarily, as the LTTE may take years to get back into shape. It is going to be a tough time for Tamils unless Rajapaksa is benevolent and large hearted. This is what Prabhakaran's failed mission has achieved.
1. Are you surprised at the decimation of the LTTE? Was it coming for them?
No; it comes as no surprise. In the last three years of operation, the LTTE never regained military initiative. They could not launch a sizeable counter offensive. The army was bent upon causing maximum casualties; and the liquidation and decimation of [LTTE] leadership in the end was the only surprise. It looked so pointless for the leadership to stay to die.
2. What caused the downfall of the LTTE- militarily and politically
This is too big an issue to answer in one or two sentences. Prabhakaran made many strategic blunders; I have summarised them here:
* Handling of Karuna: Karuna’s complaints were handled with disdain. No effort was made to patch up with him. Instead killer squads were sent. This resulted in his breakaway from the LTTE. East was the main source of recruits for the LTTE; this source dried up after Karuna’s departure with detrimental results on LTTE’s military capability during war
* Boycott of Presidential Poll 2005:LTTE imposed the boycott in areas under its control and prevented Tamils from voting. This resulted in the defeat of Ranil Wickremesinghe, who sponsored the peace process 2002 and election of his rival Mahinda Rajapaksa as President with a wafer thin majority, mainly through Southern Sinhala votes. Prabhakaran did not take seriously Rajapaksa’s repeated avowal to eliminate the LTTE, made during the electoral campaign.
* Ignoring International Reaction: Prabhakaran failed to read the changing global attitude to terrorist methods after 9/11 terror attacks and measures taken to control transnational terrorism. His repeated violations of ceasefire terms, particularly the killing of Sri Lanka Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar, in utter disregard to international opinion on such acts, resulted in 32 countries banning the organisation. Similarly the attack on Army Commander damaged LTTE’s international credibility further and provided legitimacy for Sri Lanka to go to war that led to the defeat of LTTE.
* Mending Relations with India: After gaining the status of sole arbiter of the Tamil cause in the peace process, the LTTE failed to mend its relations with India. Thanks to Prabhakaran’s egoistic reasoning the fund of goodwill for the Tamil cause existing in India was never tapped to pressurise Sri Lanka to arrive at a political solution. Instead it was the successive Sri Lanka presidents who cultivated New Delhi to their advantage.
* Failure to Objectively Assess the Security Forces: Riding the crest of success in 2002, Prabhakaran was probably lulled into the self believe that the LTTE was invincible. Perhaps this was the reason that prevented him from objectively assessing the strategic impact of the emerging convergence of Sri Lanka’s political and military goals after President Rajapaksa took over. The international support and cooperation to Sri Lanka, particularly in improving the military’s capability were used as material for LTTE propaganda than assessing their impact on the fighting prowess of the security forces. This led to gross underestimation of the ability of the security forces to relentlessly pursue their offensive against the LTTE.
* Inability to provide a strategic military response: After the loss of its territory in the eastern province, the LTTE had no proactive strategy in the north. It was the security forces that held the military initiative all along. The LTTE failed to pick up the gauntlet and achieve a strategic surprise during the three-year long campaign, as it did in the Eelam War III when it captured the Elephant Pass, despite the overwhelming Sri Lankan superiority in fire power and strength there.
* Trapping civilians in the war zone: The LTTE moved all the civilians from captured areas to areas under its control as the security forces advanced. This was a reactive defence strategy and affected the mobility of cadres, pinning them down to static defences. This questionable strategy neither prevented the security forces from using their heavy weapons and air force nor vindicated the LTTE’s use of civilians as human shields. It generated only adverse publicity.
3. How much role does Prabhakaran has in this downfall?
No LTTE action is possible without Prabhakaran's clearance. So everything that happened to the LTTE was his own making.
4. How did the Sri Lanka government get sudden spurt in their military strength and political resolve as to end the crisis in two years?
It was not sudden spurt; in the presidential poll held in 2005 Rajapaksa had announced that if he was elected he would cancel the peace process and ceasefire agreement and eliminate LTTE. The war started in 2006. In the three years the armed forces were systematically improved and strengthened. The President provided the political leadership and Gen Fonseka did a professional job of leading army to victory. It was deliberate and not left to chance.
5. What role should India have played in this war? How should it now behave in Sri Lanka and handle Tamil problem?
India played a limited role in training naval and army personnel and supplying non-lethal weapons. Your question on India's future Lanka policy is yet to be answered by the new Govt of India itself. It has to decide on its strategic compulsions and act.
6. Can the Kashmir problem be compared with the Tamil issue of Lanka?
No; they are as different as chalk is from cheese.
7. What would be the future of the LTTE and the Tamil cause, in your opinion, post war?
Rajapaksa will dictate the terms of Tamil devolution. As the Tamils have no worthwhile leadership, either politically or militarily, as the LTTE may take years to get back into shape. It is going to be a tough time for Tamils unless Rajapaksa is benevolent and large hearted. This is what Prabhakaran's failed mission has achieved.
Media bytes on Chinese influence in Sri Lanka
[Here are my answers to some of the questions raised by media representatives on the growing influence of China in Sri Lanka noticed during the recent war in Sri Lanka.]
1.How important was China's support ( arms and diplomacy) for Sri Lanka to defeat the Tigers militarily? Would Sri Lanka have been able to achieve the victory on this timescale without China's help?
On both counts - diplomacy and arms supply - China has rendered invaluable help to Sri Lanka in its war effort against the Tamil Tigers.There are three reasons for this.
a. Chinese arms are readily available at cheaper prices in the global arms market. Sri Lanka had been using Chinese weapons for some time and its troops are familiar in the use of Chinese weaponry. These are important aspects during war situations.[It is good to remember that India was not able to meet Sri Lanka's military requirements due to political reasons. Even otherwise, Chinese weapons are preferred by many countries on the basis of price and ready availability. China is geared for global weapons export market; India is not.]
b. China has no inhibitions about supplying arms, unlike India which has internal political compulsions that affect arms supply to Sri Lanka.
c. Diplomatically, China as a permanent member of the UN Security Council can help Sri Lanka in warding off international criticism. This was evident when the West wanted UN SC to take up the issue of HR violations in Sri Lanka. China has not hesitated to use its veto powers in such cases. And as China has behaved similarly in case of Darfur, and Burma nobody has high moral expectations from it than say a country like India.
2. Why was China so keen to offer that support?
Strategically China perhaps wants to cultivate Sri Lanka as a friendly cockpit for its Indian Ocean defence as China's vital shipping lanes are dominated by Sri Lanka. Moreover, Sri Lanka by its geographic location is the southern vanguard of India's strategic defence. As India is the major competing power in the South Asian region,China would like to strengthen its presence in India's neighbourhood. She has been doing it in Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh and Burma. Even Maldives is now coming under increasing Chinese attention.
3. Is there a connection with the construction of Hambantota?
Of course[there is]; but to be fair to Sri Lanka, I learn they offered it to India first and as India did not sound enthusiastic, Chinese jumped in.
3. China has consistently maintained that Hambantota and Gwadar are commercial enterprises only. How far do you believe this to be the case and, even if they only that are now, what is stop them being used for other purposes later if the political climate changed?
As of now they are commercial enterprises. But there is nothing commercial in their strategic significance in times of war. For instance Gwadar is being linked through a land link/oil pipeline from China to gain direct access to Arabian Sea. And in war time these infrastructure assets will become military/naval assets.Only the concurrence of the host nation for China to use it in times of war will probably be required. If the compulsions are powerful, China may override such concurrence also.
4. To this extent, how much of a worry is it for India that China is investing in these ports?
While India should not 'worry' on each specific Chinese action, it should be concerned about any factor potentially destabilising to its strategic security, introduced in its area of influence. And Hambantota in Sri Lanka is one such case. Unfortunately, our political decision making process on strategic issues is often influenced more by concerns other than national strategic security. India can develop Trincomalee on eastern coast of Sri Lanka as major commercial pub for Indian Ocean traffic. This would balance Chinese influence. But we seem to be lethargic in acting on such issues and we will pay the price when the time comes.
1.How important was China's support ( arms and diplomacy) for Sri Lanka to defeat the Tigers militarily? Would Sri Lanka have been able to achieve the victory on this timescale without China's help?
On both counts - diplomacy and arms supply - China has rendered invaluable help to Sri Lanka in its war effort against the Tamil Tigers.There are three reasons for this.
a. Chinese arms are readily available at cheaper prices in the global arms market. Sri Lanka had been using Chinese weapons for some time and its troops are familiar in the use of Chinese weaponry. These are important aspects during war situations.[It is good to remember that India was not able to meet Sri Lanka's military requirements due to political reasons. Even otherwise, Chinese weapons are preferred by many countries on the basis of price and ready availability. China is geared for global weapons export market; India is not.]
b. China has no inhibitions about supplying arms, unlike India which has internal political compulsions that affect arms supply to Sri Lanka.
c. Diplomatically, China as a permanent member of the UN Security Council can help Sri Lanka in warding off international criticism. This was evident when the West wanted UN SC to take up the issue of HR violations in Sri Lanka. China has not hesitated to use its veto powers in such cases. And as China has behaved similarly in case of Darfur, and Burma nobody has high moral expectations from it than say a country like India.
2. Why was China so keen to offer that support?
Strategically China perhaps wants to cultivate Sri Lanka as a friendly cockpit for its Indian Ocean defence as China's vital shipping lanes are dominated by Sri Lanka. Moreover, Sri Lanka by its geographic location is the southern vanguard of India's strategic defence. As India is the major competing power in the South Asian region,China would like to strengthen its presence in India's neighbourhood. She has been doing it in Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh and Burma. Even Maldives is now coming under increasing Chinese attention.
3. Is there a connection with the construction of Hambantota?
Of course[there is]; but to be fair to Sri Lanka, I learn they offered it to India first and as India did not sound enthusiastic, Chinese jumped in.
3. China has consistently maintained that Hambantota and Gwadar are commercial enterprises only. How far do you believe this to be the case and, even if they only that are now, what is stop them being used for other purposes later if the political climate changed?
As of now they are commercial enterprises. But there is nothing commercial in their strategic significance in times of war. For instance Gwadar is being linked through a land link/oil pipeline from China to gain direct access to Arabian Sea. And in war time these infrastructure assets will become military/naval assets.Only the concurrence of the host nation for China to use it in times of war will probably be required. If the compulsions are powerful, China may override such concurrence also.
4. To this extent, how much of a worry is it for India that China is investing in these ports?
While India should not 'worry' on each specific Chinese action, it should be concerned about any factor potentially destabilising to its strategic security, introduced in its area of influence. And Hambantota in Sri Lanka is one such case. Unfortunately, our political decision making process on strategic issues is often influenced more by concerns other than national strategic security. India can develop Trincomalee on eastern coast of Sri Lanka as major commercial pub for Indian Ocean traffic. This would balance Chinese influence. But we seem to be lethargic in acting on such issues and we will pay the price when the time comes.
Friday, June 5, 2009
Sri Lanka After the War – Part II
[This article is in continuation of the SAAG Paper No 3224 ‘Sri Lanka after the war –Part I’ published on 2 June 2009. Extracts of this article were included in a presentation the author had made at a panel discussion on “Sri Lanka after LTTE reverses” organised by the Centre for Asian Studies, Chennai and the Dept. of Political Science, Madras University, Chennai on May 26, 2009.]
Tamil politics of the North and East
Tamil speaking politicians are there in almost all parties including the two major political parties of Sri Lanka. Though most of the Tamil politicians talk of equitable rights for Tamils, they have never managed to make a united pitch for Tamil rights in recent times. That is how successive governments have continued to drag their feet on the issue of devolution of powers to Tamils. In this context, the emerging north-eastern Tamil political spectrum becomes important in the post war scene. They may be broadly divided into three types:
• Former anti-LTTE militant entities who became political parties (i.e., Eelam Peoples Democratic Party). They had always supported the war against the LTTE as it related to their survival. They also had been reminding now and then about the unfinished devolution agenda of Tamil minorities. They actively participated in Rajapaksa’s war against the LTTE and would strongly oppose its entry into politics. They are pragmatists who understand the limitations of Indian support and have depended more upon the ruling party in Sri Lanka. Their stars will be on the rise in the coming years and President Rajapaksa is likely to increasingly use them to ensure the LTTE does not stage a comeback under the cloak of democracy.
• The Tamil National Alliance, a collection of splintered Tamil parties, who had accepted Prabhakaran’s leadership. They won handsomely in the last parliamentary elections with the LTTE’s benevolent support. They have abundant political talent that was never put to good use for fear of offending Thalaivar Prabhakaran. The government and the people of Sri Lanka generally view them as the political front of LTTE. To some extent this is true; though TNA members were always eloquent on propagating the Tamil cause within the parliament, they neither took any political initiative on their own nor could influence LTTE policies (i.e., boycott of presidential poll) that affected the future of Tamils. Though they criticise India often for not baling out Tamils from their problems, they keep their old links in India alive. After the elimination of LTTE as a power centre their credibility and influence in India is as suspect as it is in Sri Lanka. Their influence on politics will probably be minimal in the coming years and different component party leaders are likely to find ways to survive on their own. Some of their supporters might return to their parent party from which they broke away over the issue of support to the LTTE.
• Then there are former LTTE cadres like the Batticaloa LTTE leader Karuna (Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan, now an MP, minister and vice president of the SLFP) and Pillaiyan (Sivanesathurai Chandrakanthan, chief minister of Eastern Provincial Council) who have stood by President Rajapaksa during the war. Former LTTE cadres, cleared after screening, are likely to gravitate to them in the coming months. They can form a strong political base for Karuna and Pillaiyan, though there might be a scramble between the two on this count. As easterners both the leaders have some limitations in motivating them.
There are two national developments that could affect the future of Tamil politics. All political parties have been split in their support to President Rajapaksa. And the military victory is edging out the opposition from their legitimate political space. Much would depend upon how Tamil leaders these two politically turbulent issues.
Though LTTE would never be allowed to contest as a political party, pro-LTTE sections of the public particularly in the north could be an important factor to swing election results. Similarly, at least some element of Tamil expatriates who had supported the LTTE are also likely to be roped in to support political activity in the coming months. The proposed local body elections in the north would perhaps act as a barometer to indicate the effect of these pulls and pressures.
India-Tamil Nadu-Sri Lanka triangular relations
The strong support for the Congress led coalition in the recent general elections in India is likely to be used to vindicate India’s ambivalent Sri Lanka policy. The success of the Congress - Dravida Munnetra Kazagham (DMK) combine only reinforces the assessment that the Sri Lanka Tamil issue is not a “vote-catching” issue in Tamil Nadu, despite widespread sympathy for their plight. So by and large Indian policy is likely to continue to be reactive rather than proactive.
Given this setting, India-Sri Lanka relations are likely to improve. President Rajapaksa is likely to play the China card effectively to garner maximum advantage. And this might be reflected in favourable trade and investment policies towards Sri Lanka.
However, the Tamil Nadu assembly elections will be due in two years. The DMK, if it goes under new leadership to contest the polls, will have a tough time to regain its mandate. And the failure of India’s Sri Lanka policy could be resurrected once again as an election issue. So the DMK will continue to maintain pressure on Sri Lanka on the twin issues of devolution and rehabilitation of Tamil population in Sri Lanka. So India is likely to press for speedy implementation of the 13th amendment (the only tangible thing at present) and provide large scale support for the rehabilitation kitty.
On the strategic security front, increased Chinese and Pakistani influence will continue to be a matter of concern for India. However, India appears to have taken it in the stride as part of the growing reach of Chinese influence in the Indian Ocean region. Ideally, India should up the development of Trincomalee port as a counterpoise to Hambantota where China is building a port complex. However, India might drag its feet on this issue and probably wait to gauge the impact of possible Sino-US economic convergence on South Asian security.
International perspectives
During the course of the war, Sri Lanka has demonstrated the limitations of international influence in its decision making process. President Rajapaksa has cleverly used the inherent differences among the permanent members of the UN Security Council to deflect criticism of Sri Lanka for its poor human rights and humanitarian record. Sri Lanka’s crude handling of the dissenting media at home, restrictions on NGOs, and delaying of visas for entry of foreign media men and NGOs, have kindled the ire of international community (i.e., EU and the US) by the casual way Sri Lanka treated their objections on human rights and human rights issues. Western nations have strong human rights lobbies and some of them like Britain and Canada have in addition large Sri Lanka Tamil expatriate and immigrant population.
President Rajapaksa managed to ward off a Western effort to condemn Sri Lanka in the UN Human Rights Council for its gross humanitarian violations during the war, when it met in Geneva on April 26. On the contrary, he managed with the help of India, China, Pakistan, Russia, Cuba and other countries, to get the majority votes in the UNHRC to pass Sri Lanka’s resolution congratulating the country for defeating terrorism. Emboldened by this success, Sri Lanka is likely to harden its stand on allowing international watchdogs to probe its human rights record.
It could work against Sri Lanka’s interests as human rights lobbies in the EU and the US are working for strong action, including economic sanctions, against the country. This could affect the renewal of the EU’s duty free GSP plus tariff concessions extended to Sri Lanka (already on one year extension), as well as delay the approval of IMF loan of $1.9 billion dollars.
Despite economic aid from China, India and Iran, SriLanka will need large scale economic assistance to get back on its feet as the war has rendered large populations unproductive and inflation had been galloping. So we can expect the country to come to terms with the West, particularly the US, to find some face saving method on the human rights question. Ultimately President Rajapaksa is likely to implement the 13th amendment to satisfy international community including India to improve Sri Lanka’s international image.
Sri Lanka-UK relations have been strained for sometime for a number of reasons. The UK has a large Tamil expatriate population and politically it would like to soft pedal the Sri Lanka objections over questionable anti Sri Lanka activity of the expatriates. This had been the major source of irritation for Sri Lanka. The kid glove treatment of the massive anti-Sri Lanka demonstrations of expatriate population taken over by LTTE acolytes are case in point. Given its complexity, it is doubtful whether the relations between the two countries would mend in the near future.
Future portends
A few trends are emerging in the aftermath of the war that could affect Sri Lanka’s future. Their impact would depend upon how the President handles these issues to take the country forward.
• Rise of monolithic power: With the opposition weakened as never before, the rise of monolithic power with its attendant weaknesses of lack of accountability, absence of rule of law, increase in bureaucratic power and crushing of dissent are likely to stay for sometime. Coupled with the heady mixture of Sinhala chauvinism it could become an explosive mixture for ethnic amity.
• Military as a power centre: As discussed earlier, rise of militarism and emergence of military as a power centre is a distinct possibility. With a large army continuing to control a major chunk of minority population, minorities will continue to feel insecure. This will be detrimental to restoring normal life in the war affected areas.
• Dissipation of Tamil influence: In the absence of a strong united Tamil lobby to parley with the government, the Tamils might have to be satisfied with what the President offers as devolution package, as and when he chooses to do so. Inevitably, it is likely to be tied to the next parliamentary poll.
• Indian influence: India is likely to play a progressively diminishing role in Sri Lanka politics. However, its economic footprint will probably enlarge.
• Strategic implications for the region: The LTTE might find it difficult to re-emerge as a powerful force in Sri Lanka. This will strengthen Sri Lanka’s ability to handle its internal problems better. At the same time Sri Lanka is likely to be courted by the major powers – China, and the US - for stabilising their strategic influence in the Indian Ocean region. Sri Lanka has a far more important place in India’s overall strategic security map than the two major powers. So development of strategic relations between India and Sri Lanka is going to become a crucial issue.
www.southasiaanalysis.org
Tamil politics of the North and East
Tamil speaking politicians are there in almost all parties including the two major political parties of Sri Lanka. Though most of the Tamil politicians talk of equitable rights for Tamils, they have never managed to make a united pitch for Tamil rights in recent times. That is how successive governments have continued to drag their feet on the issue of devolution of powers to Tamils. In this context, the emerging north-eastern Tamil political spectrum becomes important in the post war scene. They may be broadly divided into three types:
• Former anti-LTTE militant entities who became political parties (i.e., Eelam Peoples Democratic Party). They had always supported the war against the LTTE as it related to their survival. They also had been reminding now and then about the unfinished devolution agenda of Tamil minorities. They actively participated in Rajapaksa’s war against the LTTE and would strongly oppose its entry into politics. They are pragmatists who understand the limitations of Indian support and have depended more upon the ruling party in Sri Lanka. Their stars will be on the rise in the coming years and President Rajapaksa is likely to increasingly use them to ensure the LTTE does not stage a comeback under the cloak of democracy.
• The Tamil National Alliance, a collection of splintered Tamil parties, who had accepted Prabhakaran’s leadership. They won handsomely in the last parliamentary elections with the LTTE’s benevolent support. They have abundant political talent that was never put to good use for fear of offending Thalaivar Prabhakaran. The government and the people of Sri Lanka generally view them as the political front of LTTE. To some extent this is true; though TNA members were always eloquent on propagating the Tamil cause within the parliament, they neither took any political initiative on their own nor could influence LTTE policies (i.e., boycott of presidential poll) that affected the future of Tamils. Though they criticise India often for not baling out Tamils from their problems, they keep their old links in India alive. After the elimination of LTTE as a power centre their credibility and influence in India is as suspect as it is in Sri Lanka. Their influence on politics will probably be minimal in the coming years and different component party leaders are likely to find ways to survive on their own. Some of their supporters might return to their parent party from which they broke away over the issue of support to the LTTE.
• Then there are former LTTE cadres like the Batticaloa LTTE leader Karuna (Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan, now an MP, minister and vice president of the SLFP) and Pillaiyan (Sivanesathurai Chandrakanthan, chief minister of Eastern Provincial Council) who have stood by President Rajapaksa during the war. Former LTTE cadres, cleared after screening, are likely to gravitate to them in the coming months. They can form a strong political base for Karuna and Pillaiyan, though there might be a scramble between the two on this count. As easterners both the leaders have some limitations in motivating them.
There are two national developments that could affect the future of Tamil politics. All political parties have been split in their support to President Rajapaksa. And the military victory is edging out the opposition from their legitimate political space. Much would depend upon how Tamil leaders these two politically turbulent issues.
Though LTTE would never be allowed to contest as a political party, pro-LTTE sections of the public particularly in the north could be an important factor to swing election results. Similarly, at least some element of Tamil expatriates who had supported the LTTE are also likely to be roped in to support political activity in the coming months. The proposed local body elections in the north would perhaps act as a barometer to indicate the effect of these pulls and pressures.
India-Tamil Nadu-Sri Lanka triangular relations
The strong support for the Congress led coalition in the recent general elections in India is likely to be used to vindicate India’s ambivalent Sri Lanka policy. The success of the Congress - Dravida Munnetra Kazagham (DMK) combine only reinforces the assessment that the Sri Lanka Tamil issue is not a “vote-catching” issue in Tamil Nadu, despite widespread sympathy for their plight. So by and large Indian policy is likely to continue to be reactive rather than proactive.
Given this setting, India-Sri Lanka relations are likely to improve. President Rajapaksa is likely to play the China card effectively to garner maximum advantage. And this might be reflected in favourable trade and investment policies towards Sri Lanka.
However, the Tamil Nadu assembly elections will be due in two years. The DMK, if it goes under new leadership to contest the polls, will have a tough time to regain its mandate. And the failure of India’s Sri Lanka policy could be resurrected once again as an election issue. So the DMK will continue to maintain pressure on Sri Lanka on the twin issues of devolution and rehabilitation of Tamil population in Sri Lanka. So India is likely to press for speedy implementation of the 13th amendment (the only tangible thing at present) and provide large scale support for the rehabilitation kitty.
On the strategic security front, increased Chinese and Pakistani influence will continue to be a matter of concern for India. However, India appears to have taken it in the stride as part of the growing reach of Chinese influence in the Indian Ocean region. Ideally, India should up the development of Trincomalee port as a counterpoise to Hambantota where China is building a port complex. However, India might drag its feet on this issue and probably wait to gauge the impact of possible Sino-US economic convergence on South Asian security.
International perspectives
During the course of the war, Sri Lanka has demonstrated the limitations of international influence in its decision making process. President Rajapaksa has cleverly used the inherent differences among the permanent members of the UN Security Council to deflect criticism of Sri Lanka for its poor human rights and humanitarian record. Sri Lanka’s crude handling of the dissenting media at home, restrictions on NGOs, and delaying of visas for entry of foreign media men and NGOs, have kindled the ire of international community (i.e., EU and the US) by the casual way Sri Lanka treated their objections on human rights and human rights issues. Western nations have strong human rights lobbies and some of them like Britain and Canada have in addition large Sri Lanka Tamil expatriate and immigrant population.
President Rajapaksa managed to ward off a Western effort to condemn Sri Lanka in the UN Human Rights Council for its gross humanitarian violations during the war, when it met in Geneva on April 26. On the contrary, he managed with the help of India, China, Pakistan, Russia, Cuba and other countries, to get the majority votes in the UNHRC to pass Sri Lanka’s resolution congratulating the country for defeating terrorism. Emboldened by this success, Sri Lanka is likely to harden its stand on allowing international watchdogs to probe its human rights record.
It could work against Sri Lanka’s interests as human rights lobbies in the EU and the US are working for strong action, including economic sanctions, against the country. This could affect the renewal of the EU’s duty free GSP plus tariff concessions extended to Sri Lanka (already on one year extension), as well as delay the approval of IMF loan of $1.9 billion dollars.
Despite economic aid from China, India and Iran, SriLanka will need large scale economic assistance to get back on its feet as the war has rendered large populations unproductive and inflation had been galloping. So we can expect the country to come to terms with the West, particularly the US, to find some face saving method on the human rights question. Ultimately President Rajapaksa is likely to implement the 13th amendment to satisfy international community including India to improve Sri Lanka’s international image.
Sri Lanka-UK relations have been strained for sometime for a number of reasons. The UK has a large Tamil expatriate population and politically it would like to soft pedal the Sri Lanka objections over questionable anti Sri Lanka activity of the expatriates. This had been the major source of irritation for Sri Lanka. The kid glove treatment of the massive anti-Sri Lanka demonstrations of expatriate population taken over by LTTE acolytes are case in point. Given its complexity, it is doubtful whether the relations between the two countries would mend in the near future.
Future portends
A few trends are emerging in the aftermath of the war that could affect Sri Lanka’s future. Their impact would depend upon how the President handles these issues to take the country forward.
• Rise of monolithic power: With the opposition weakened as never before, the rise of monolithic power with its attendant weaknesses of lack of accountability, absence of rule of law, increase in bureaucratic power and crushing of dissent are likely to stay for sometime. Coupled with the heady mixture of Sinhala chauvinism it could become an explosive mixture for ethnic amity.
• Military as a power centre: As discussed earlier, rise of militarism and emergence of military as a power centre is a distinct possibility. With a large army continuing to control a major chunk of minority population, minorities will continue to feel insecure. This will be detrimental to restoring normal life in the war affected areas.
• Dissipation of Tamil influence: In the absence of a strong united Tamil lobby to parley with the government, the Tamils might have to be satisfied with what the President offers as devolution package, as and when he chooses to do so. Inevitably, it is likely to be tied to the next parliamentary poll.
• Indian influence: India is likely to play a progressively diminishing role in Sri Lanka politics. However, its economic footprint will probably enlarge.
• Strategic implications for the region: The LTTE might find it difficult to re-emerge as a powerful force in Sri Lanka. This will strengthen Sri Lanka’s ability to handle its internal problems better. At the same time Sri Lanka is likely to be courted by the major powers – China, and the US - for stabilising their strategic influence in the Indian Ocean region. Sri Lanka has a far more important place in India’s overall strategic security map than the two major powers. So development of strategic relations between India and Sri Lanka is going to become a crucial issue.
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