PLA: Implementing the CCP Mandate

Col. R. Hariharan

This paper was presented by Col Hariharan at the Third Annual Conference on “Inside China 2013: New Leadership, Social Changes and Economic Challenges,” jointly organised at New Delhi by the C3S, India International Centre, New Delhi, Institute of Policy and Conflict Studies (IPCS), New Delhi, Department of East Asia Studies, Delhi University, and Centre for East Asia Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, on September 6, 2013 at New Delhi.

INTRODUCTION

The long process of China’s Peoples’ Liberation Army (PLA) modernisation going on since 1978 is conditioned by three things: Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s mandate, national leadership’s guidance, and the dynamics of strategic environment in which the PLA is expected to operate. 

The 18th National Congress of the CCP held in November 2012 brought in fifth generation leaders in a thorough makeover of the national leadership. Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang brought in to the politburo standing committee replaced Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao as President and Premier respectively in March 2013. Thus in the next decade or so the PLA modernization process will be guided by the 18th Congress deliberations, under the new leadership according to the strategic environment visualized by them. [1] 

After deliberating on issues, the 18th CCP Congress Work Report identified the broad contours of PLA’s strategic modernization as:

“Building strong national defense and powerful armed forces that are commensurate with China’s international standing and meet the needs of its security and development interests is a strategic task of China’s modernization drive.

“We should attach great importance to maritime, space and cyberspace security. We should make active planning for the use of military forces in peacetime, expand and intensify military preparedness, and enhance the capability to accomplish a wide range of military tasks, the most important of which is to win local war in an information age.”[2]

Translated in military terms, the Congress visualized PLA modernization as a continuous process in keeping with the strategic needs of China to enhance its global power projection. Its stress on maritime, space and cyberspace security are closely linked to informatization process already underway to bring PLA on par with modern armies of the West, particularly the U.S. The digitization process of PLA will go hand in hand as part of the “four modernizations” – the strategic direction provided by Deng Xiaoping for his holistic development vision in the fields of agriculture, industry, national defence, and science and technology. This enables the PLA modernization process to take advantage of the gains of national development.

PLA’s peace time employment envisaged by the Congress would be to further improve its competence in military operations other than warfare (MOOTW) that will include disaster relief as well assistance to the Peoples’ Armed Police (PAP) to handle internal unrest and counter terrorism tasks whenever required. Continued participation of PLA in UN peace keeping operations and anti-piracy missions would be in keeping with China’s growing international influence and desire to increase its international profile as a responsible global power.

PLA and the new leadership

President Xi Jinping in his first address made to the nation on March 17, 2013 as head of state spoke of the Chinese dream. He said “We must make persistent efforts, press ahead with indomitable will, continue to push forward the great cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics, and strive to achieve the Chinese dream of great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. “To realise the Chinese road, we must spread the Chinese spirit, which combines the spirit of the nation with patriotism as the core and the spirit of the time with reform and innovation as the core,” he added. 

Since becoming President, Xi had been travelling far and wide throughout the country from Shenzhen “Special Economic Zone” of in the south where China’s economic revolution started to arid Gansu in the North one of the poorest provinces. He has been visiting military training institutions, PLA establishments and naval ships to spread his Chinese dream. Evidently Xi’s Chinese dream will have reform and innovation as ingredients in both economic and strategic security content.

The idea is reflected in retired PLA Colonel Liu Mingfu’s book The China Dream: Great Power Thinking and Strategic Posture in the Post-America Era in 2010. He says “Since the 19th Century, China has been lagging on the world stage….President Xi’s dream is of a stronger nation with a strong military.”[3]

Even before Xi became President in March 2013, as general secretary of the Central Committee of the CCP he had “vowed to unswervingly fight against corruption and keep power reined within the cage of regulations” while addressing a plenary meeting of the CCP’s Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) on January 22, 2013. He “ordered enhanced restraint and supervision on the use of power.” He stressed, “Power should be restricted by the cage of regulations.”

According to a Global Times report, he asked “efforts to strengthen national anti-corruption legislation and relevant intra-Party regulations to ensure national organs exercise their power within the boundary of laws”.[4] According to the report Xi said “the CPC’s resolve and distinct attitude on handling serious rule-breaking among some of its cadres, including high-ranking officials, showed it is “absolutely no empty talk” that one will be severely punished for law or Party discipline violations no matter how high a person’s official ranking is.”

On June 18, 2013 Xi called for a ‘mass line’ for co-jointing the interests of the Party with the people in a year-long campaign for a “thorough cleanup” of undesirable work styles such as formalism, bureaucratism, hedonism, and extravagance. (Top leaders of the CCP launched the ‘mass line’ from the second half of the year to cement Party-people ties.).Xi also stressed the CCP members should be critical and self-critical in the spirit of rectifying improper work styles and the campaign should focus on self-purification, self-renewal and self-progression. This jargon reminiscent of Maoist days clearly indicates the Party’s and Xi’s desire to improve the Party members’ ideological commitment, discipline, eradicate corruption and improve their contact with the people.

As a creature of the Party it is impacting the PLA also. This evident from a circular issued by the PLA General Political Department said Xi’s speech showed that the CCP was “consciously adaptable to changing times and can maintain its advanced nature and purity.” Xi’s speech should be studied and combined with the spirit of the CCP’s 18th National Congress, adding that “the minds and actions of the armed forces” should be unified with decisions made by the central leadership”, it added. [5]

According to a Xinhua report of July 22, 2013 President Xi called for unswerving efforts to strengthen relations between military officers and common soldiers through a campaign inside the military. The campaign, which was initiated in April, requires senior PLA officers and the armed police to live and train as common soldiers for at least 15 days in grassroots units every one to five years, depending on their rank. Xi said the campaign will help promote military traditions, improve its work style, strengthen ties between officers and soldiers and reinforce the “construction” of grassroots military units. It also said the PLA General Political Department had issued orders for military officers to solve problems of soldiers and grassroots military units during the campaign. Officers must reflect on their responsibilities and problems through the campaign and make their work more scientific and efficient. The campaign will be part of the implementation of the “mass line,” the Party guideline under which officials and members of the Party are required to “prioritize the interests of the people and continue to represent them and work on their behalf,” it added.

Clearly President Xi’s aim is to prevent development of elitism among Party leaders and military officers lest they lose touch with ordinary people. In this context Xi Jinping’s observations on PLA-Party relationship and PLA soldiers’ professionalism during a visit to the Beijing Military Region headquarters on July 29, 2013 are of interest. According to Xinhua he said, “We must make sure that troops obey the command of the Party and are absolutely loyal and reliable”….Officials and soldiers “especially those medium-level and senior officials” should be educated on consciously sticking to political belief, stance and discipline. He further stated, “They should maintain high-level unity with CPC Central Committee and the Central Military Commission any time and under any circumstances, and resolutely obey their command.” Currently and in the near future an important task in the regard is to strengthen efforts of promoting the goal of building a strong military, Xi said. Combat capability was the only and fundamental measure of the troops, urging accelerated steps to enhance the military’s strength based on information technology. [6]

To summarize, President Xi Jinping’s aim appears to be to ensure the PLA modernization process, which is bringing a lot of graduates and technical people with specialized roles into armed forces, does not encourage Bonapartist tendencies but sustain PLA’s total commitment to the Party.

Visualization of PLA’s role

China’s Defence White Paper 2013 visualizes the nature of China’s national defence policy and PLA’s strategic role as: “China unswervingly pursues an independent foreign policy of peace and a national defence policy that is defensive in nature…. China will never seek hegemony or behave in a hegemonic manner, nor will it engage in military expansion… China’s armed forces provide a security guarantee and strategic support for national development, and make due contributions to the maintenance of world peace and regional stability” [7].

Its stress on the defensive nature of China’s national defence policy and avowal “never to seek hegemony” are only a reiteration of its views of the past. However, it has become necessary now on two counts. China’s loud power assertion of territorial claims in South China Sea and its never-ending territorial pin pricks along its unsettled border with India have increased international perception of China as a bully out to destabilize Asia-Pacific region and South Asia. This has led to the U.S. increasing its strategic readiness in China’s neighbourhood with more powerful neighbours like Japan, India and Vietnam realigning their strategic equations with each other.

DS Rajan in his paper on PLA modernization sees this as China’s military strategy undergoing “a fresh elaboration of operational tasks for the PLA.” [8] According to him the four demands being made now on the military are:

• To conduct ‘Historical Missions in the New Period of the New Century’ involving non-combat operations such as peacekeeping and disaster relief, as President Hu Jintao, said in 2004. This is in keeping with China’s growing global interests and desire to be seen as a global power. 
• To protect the country’s ‘core interests.’ These include maintaining fundamental and state security, safeguarding national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and ensuring continued stable development of economy and society.
• To build new type of combat capability to win local wars in conditions of informatization and strengthen the composite development of mechanization and informatization, with the latter as leading force.’ This implies integrating C4ISR systems in mechanized forces command, control, deployment and operations and integrating air and naval support.
• To ‘build strong army that is capable of winning wars and strengthening combat readiness.’

STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF MODERNISATION

The ongoing process of evolution of PLA as a modern fighting force started in 1977 after ten traumatic years of Cultural Revolution played havoc with PLA’s cohesiveness. PLA’s strategic modernization falls in four convenient time zones: [9]

1. Period of implosion (1966-76): During this period of Cultural Revolution played havoc with the cohesiveness and operational capabilities of PLA. Military training came to a grinding halt and most of the training establishments were closed down. As a result of political preoccupation, PLA’s command and control structure broke down with specialists and officers denounced as ‘bourgeois. 
2.  Period of introspection and recovery (1977-85): The failure of the PLA in 1979 Vietnam War shook up the leadership leading to introspection on revamping PLA. Military influence on Party was brought down. PLA representation on the politburo and military membership in the Central Committee were progressively brought down to lay stress on professionalism. PLA training institutions were reorganized and the value of defence education was recognized. National Defence University was formed by merging the PLA Military Academy, the PLA Political Academy and the PLA Logistics Academy to promote ‘jointness’ in the PLA. The first simulated combat exercise was held in 1985.
3. Period of strategic rethinking (1985-95): After PLA formations were restructured creating group armies. Training system was further revamped to complement simulated combat exercises. Recruit training was improved. The Gulf and Kosovo wars introduced to PLA the emerging informatized battlefields of the future. In 1995 President Jiang Zemin conceptualized the focus on “two transformations” – fighting and winning local wars under “informatized” conditions, and becoming a force based on quality instead of quantity. To achieve this both the government and the PLA began “to cultivate a new generation of officers capable and competent.” 
4.  Period of strategic change (1995 onwards): Chinese leadership realized the imperatives of hi-tech environment in warfare after U.S. invasion of Iraq and war on terror in Afghanistan. It realized embracing informatized and digitized environment would enable PLA take a leap forward in modernization without waiting for full mechanization. To improve the quality of officers, recruitment of college graduates became the norm. Training of PLA personnel in civilian institutions was also introduced to speed up informatization and digitization to suit 21st century warfare needs.

PLA’s strategic challenges and response

China considers the U.S. as key contender in its power projection. Considering this, the PLA would be keenly analyzing some of the tasks visualized by the U.S. from time to time. The U.S.’s strategic realignments and developments in tactical doctrines and integrated warfare systems would be of special interest to the PLA. 

Of course, China has publicized its rapid advances in science and technology which have speeded up PLA’s modernization process. Of strategic interest are the following developments: [10]

• Rapid progress has been made in reconnaissance and surveillance capability using unarmed aerial vehicles (UAVs) and satellite resources with the positioning of China’s16 Beidou satellites. They now cover the entire area across China and the Asia-Pacific and we can expect South Asia also to come under its coverage as more countries are opting for Beidou communication satellites. Trefor Moss writing in the Diplomat has reported that the China’s maritime agency – the State Oceanic Administration(SOA) – was setting up 11 UAV bases (one in each coastal province) to be ready by 2015.[11]

• Up gradation of PLA Navy (PLAN) fleet strength with more submarine and surface platforms and better anti-aircraft and anti-ship systems in place is progressing well. The Navy’s fleet operation outside the South China Sea is taking its baby steps. While the newly inducted Liaoning aircraft carrier is trying out landing of fighter jets, we can expect a carrier based PLAN fleet streaming in Indian Ocean in the coming years.

•  PLAN had been operating anti-piracy operational task forces since 2008 in Gulf of Aden. Though China had been projecting it as part of the international effort to fight piracy, these operations have refined PLAN’s fleet operational capability in international waters. PLAN ships have also been exposed to an entirely new experience of operating in coordination with ships of Indian Navy and Japanese Self Defence Force on anti-piracy duties in the area.

• According to the U.S. Department of Defense “The road-mobile, solid-propellant CSS-10 Mod 1 and CSS-10 Mod 2 (DF-31 and DF-31A) intercontinental-range ballistic missiles have entered service. The CSS-10 Mod 2, with a range in excess of 11,200 km, can reach most locations within the continental United States. China may also be developing a new road-mobile ICBM, possibly capable of carrying a multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV).”[12]

• Although PLAAF flight tested J-20, its first stealth aircraft in 2011, the U.S. Department of Defense assesses “China’s first fifth generation fighter is not expected to enter service prior to 2018, and China faces numerous challenges to achieving full operational capability, including developing high-performance jet engines.”[13]

• Similarly PLAAF which is refining its joint warfare capability, is said to be facing problems in providing accurate ground support using C4I systems as precision guided munitions (PGM) for accurate air strike is yet to be developed.

PLA training exercises 2012-13

PLA training exercises during 2012-13 provide an indication of how it is preparing to meet the strategic challenges. These exercises have been growing in complexity and size over the years. Of special interest are the trans-military region (MR) exercises by PLA along with PLAAF that have been undertaken since 2008. Jinan MR has emerged as central to these exercises indicating its role as strategic reserve. These exercises have shown China’s ability to move large forces using rail and civilian infrastructure and logistics over long distances.

According to a U.S. War College report of 2012, “These exercises have allowed the PLA to experiment with operational techniques in areas such as command and control for joint operations, operations in a complex electromagnetic environment, the formation of combined arms battalion task forces, and logistics support. Thus, trans-MR exercises contribute not only to PLA capabilities but also to China’s overall deterrence posture and are important signifiers of overall PLA development and modernization exercises”[14]

China-Russia joint military exercises 2013

China in response to the changes in the international security environment in its neighbourhood has been carrying out war games with Russia. It carried out two joint military exercises with Russia in 2013, namely the “China-Russia Maritime Joint Exercise 2013” and the “Peace Mission 2013.”

Peace Mission 2013 was held in Chelyabinsk in Urals in Russia from July 27 to August 15, 2013 with battalion sized combat groups from Shenyan Military Area Command and Russia’s Central Military Area Command participated in the exercise. JH-A fighter bombers of PLAAF and Su-24 fighters of Russian air force participated in the exercise. The objective of the exercise was ostensibly to jointly train and exercise in planning and carrying out counter terrorism operations. But considering the battalion combat group training supported by armour and air force, probably the objective was to refine BCT operations jointly with air force in a C4I environment. It is significant as the PLA took part in training in another country and transported its troops over large distances.

The Sino-Russian maritime joint exercise termed as China’s “largest ever joint naval exercise” was carried out in the Sea of Japan in the second week of July 2013. with the participation of 18 surface ships including four guided missile destroyers, two missile frigates, a supply ship and three-ship born helicopters, and a submarine. According to Xinhua, Major General Yang Junfei, the Chinese fleet’s commander, said: “This is our strongest line-up ever in a joint naval drill.” China was sending “seven ships, three helicopters and one special warfare unit”, he added. The exercise was to simulate “recapturing ships seized by pirates, as well as search-and-rescue operations and a number of air defence, anti-submarine and anti-ship exercises,” Xinhua reported. Two commando units also took part in the exercise.

Apart from its relevance of this joint exercise to the growing Chinese confrontation with Japan and Philippines in South China Sea, these exercises are sure to enhance the fleet operation, assault landing and joint operation techniques of PLAN.

Peoples’ Armed Police (PAP) exercises

Considering the growing counter terrorism requirements in its western borders, the PAP has increased its training on counterterrorism, riot control, border control, and natural disaster response operations. They are now better trained and equipped than before. The PAP training appears to be focusing on operating in integration with other ground forces in informatization setting. This will enhance PAP’s capacity during wartime as they provide light infantry support to the PLA and be ready to respond to civil unrest that may accompany an external threat in Xinjiang and Tibet.

CONCLUSION

The CCP under the new leadership of Xi Jinping is striving to tighten the Party discipline, fight corruption and improve the linkages between the Party and the people. PLA as the sword arm of the Party will also being impacted by these measures. His approach to the PLA appears to be to ensure the modernization process which is bringing a lot of graduates and technical people with specialized roles conforms to its total commitment to the Party.

As a continuous process, PLA modernization is progressing well to take on expanding roles and missions in keeping with China’s increasing global influence and power. Having completed the restructuring of forces and increased their fire power and mobility, PLA’s stress on informatization and digitization will be to improve its BCT capabilities with air support, increase its strategic mobility, and firepower using missiles on land air and sea. This will be in keeping with China’s increasing power assertion in its neighbourhood and enlarging ambitions to be recognized as a global power.

Some of the areas of development to watch would be PGM, fifth generation fighters, conventional missiles anti-ship cruise missiles, counter-space weapons, and military cyberspace capabilities. These would enhance PLA’s to take on anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) missions.

The PLA’s sophisticated training and exercises involving land forces, navy, and air force have enhanced its capability to carryout long-range conventional strike and regional power projection. The rapid modernisation of PLAN with greater operational exposure is enhancing China’s ability to project its power beyond the Near Seas. In the coming years the commissioning of China’s first aircraft carrier Liaoning with integrated air defence and submarine capabilities would further extend its power projection capabilities.

[Col R Hariharan is a retired MI officer specialising in South Asia and its neighbourhood. He is associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies and South Asia Analysis Group. Email:colhari@yahoo.com Blog: www.colhariharan.org].

Courtesy: Chennai Centre for China studies Paper No.1191 dated September 14, 2013 http://www.c3sindia.org/china-internal/3705

Notes

[1] Xinhua report, November 15, 2012 http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/special
[2] www.news.xinhuanet.com 17 November 2012
[3] BBC June 5, 2013 http://www.bbc.co.uk/world-asia-china-22726375
[4] Global Times, ‘Xi Jinping vows power within the cage of regulations.’ http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/757583.shtml
[5] Quoted from South Asia Security Trends, July 2013 issue, www.security-risks.com
[6] South Asia Security Trends, July 2013 issue, www.security-risks.com
[7] China’s Defence White Paper, April 2013 quoted by DS Rajan from “The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces, Information Office of the State Council, People’s Republic of China, 16 April 2013 in “China: Enigmatic military modernization programme” C3S Paper No. 1148, May 9, 2013 www.c3scindia.org
[8] As above
[9] Adapted from DS Rajan’s C3S paper quoted above and Kemphausen and others ed., The People in the PLA: Recruitment, Training, and Education in China’s Military, a study of the PLA human infrastructure by Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, 2008.
[10] Extracted from Forecast of U.S. Army Tasks 2013, U.S. Department of Defense.
[11] Trefor Moss, Here come…China’s Drones, The Diplomat, March 2, 2013 http://thediplomat.com/2013/03/02/here-comes-chinas-drones
[12] The 2013 China Report submitted by the U.S. Department of Defense to the U.S. Congress.
[13] As above
[14] Kemphausen and others ed., Learning by Training: The PLA training at home abroad, by Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, 2012.

Migration of this website

This website is being merged with the my intelligence blog at www.colhariharan.org.
All visitors are requested to view my writings in www.colhariharan.org now onwards. I thank the members who had patronised this site; they may like to join the other website www.colhariharan.org

Col R Hariharan

What is the state of readiness of our troops - 5

TV and to a lesser extent print media are increasingly becoming arbiters of many issues of national interest in the real time. As the vie with each other to increase their TRP ratings, truth and objectivity in reporting and analysing events have been pushed back. Their conduct in covering the recent events relating following the Army Chief General VK Singh "episode" has been remarkably murky. Writing about General VK Singh's conduct had been full of innuendoes and sneering contempt.

The worst was the Indian Express front page news story full of snide comments, hinting at the "curious'" (bashfully not uttering the C word) purpose in two army units moving "towards" New Delhi on the day the Army Chief's case in Supreme Court came up for judgment. This had shocked even the worst critics of army and the Army Chief. Many media men have taken the newspaper to task for such unabashed sensationalism. I am reproducing below an hard hitting article by Nitin Gokhale, veteran defence analyst and news editor of NDTV, on the media's conduct in the whole affair for your reading.

The Soldier, the State and the Media

Nitin Gokhale, April 6, 2012

In my three decades of reporting on the Indian military, I have never felt more uneasy about the military-media interface as I have in the past three months.

What is the state of readiness of our troops -4

Continuing the series of articles on the subject, are agents of arms dealers the real culprits for the glitches in our defence procurement? Contrary to many analysts, I hold the view the legitimate agents provide a valuable interface to understand the needs of the user and identify the right sources for procurement. They should be paid a legitimate commission like any other agents in the commercial world. As they are legitimate, transaction will be above board and accountable. They will be paying income and service taxes and their accounts will be open for inspection at any time. This will bring transparency in the transaction.

In 1986, Government of India removed agents as the middle men and decided to directly deal with arms manufacturers. The species of honest middlemen was kept out and under the table wheeler-dealers tookover. And immediately thereafter the Bofors scam hit the national headlines. There seem to be no stopping of scams.

I am reproducing an article, courtesy DNA India, "Confessions of a former arms dealer" written by a former naval officer in support of my argument. The article shows how a legitimate agent can provide valuable service to the armed forces. When we reform the system (WHEN?  is the 64 dollar question), this aspect should also be paid attention.

Confessions of a former arms dealer

Benoy Bhushan, April 4, 2012

What is the state of readiness of our troops - 3

As muckraking continues in the media with the Army Chief General VK Singh as the centre piece, one thing is clear. All is not well the way manage our defence services and run the defence ministry; and it is affecting national security preparedness.

What is the way out? I am reproducing here a pithy article from TR Ramaswami, a retired bureaucrat, who has come out with a workable solution, courtesy Economic Times 

But who is blocking the change? Sheela Bhatt writing in www.rediff.com contends it is the bureaucracy which wants to preserve their hold and are loath to allow any change. If you are interested read her article "Babus now oppose General Singh's vision for MoD" available at URL:

http://www.rediff.com/news/special/babus-now-oppose-general-singhs-vision-for-mod/20120405.htm

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Defence sector needs to be streamlined and reformed to stay relevant in a changing India

T R Ramaswami, Apr 5, 2012

The leaky-weaky-snafu-cum-imbroglio in the defence sector has provoked very interesting reactions and suggestions. Historically, armies have been around millenniums before the words 'democracy', 'parliament' and 'civil service' came about.

Storm Signals on National Security

by Col.  R. Hariharan 

“Army chief’s letter bomb” screamed TV anchors when leaked contents of a letter from the Army Chief of Army Staff General VK Singh addressed to the Prime Minister reached the media. In his letter he had made ten points to show that the army’s fighting capability. The Army Chief listed ten points which have rendered the army ineffective to face threats to national security. All of them related the lack of timely procurements of armaments and ammunition to the troops. 

The reaction to this national security fiasco in parliament was typical. Many members including the Right and Left, spent more time on the danger posed to national security by the leak, than its damaging contents. Some members like the Rashtriya Janata Dal leader Lallu Prasad Yadav, who was no paragon of probity, wanted the Army Chief to be sacked summarily for leaking the letter, without even bothering to find out who did it. His cohorts from UP and Bihar of the Samajwadi Party and Janata Dal (U) echoed the same sentiments.

Daughter Desh Ki

By Shahana

It was a rainy midnight in July in an exhausted little city called Poona. I was fast asleep when all of a sudden I heard someone breathe very heavily, almost choking with utter shock and bewilderment. I woke up with a start only to see Maa staring at the television wide-eyed and terrified.

There it was —NDTV on full volume with Barkha Dutt reporting some flood, scandal, or some such thing which at that point did not matter. Maa pointed at the ticker, which was rolling the same news over and over, as if to make sure it was drilled deep into my cerebrum that the commanding officer of 22 Rashtriya Rifles has been shot in a terrorist encounter in the valley of Sopore. I stared in utter disbelief. One only knew people or knew of people who met with circumstances such as these, but knowing that this time it was my father at the receiving end of the bullet was just the one thing I could not fathom.

Military losing its shine - Time to recast short service commission

Lt Gen Harwant Singh

In a developing economy, rapid industrialization and a country well on the road to prosperity, preference for government jobs tends to decline. This has not happened in India so far due to a number of reasons. One, government jobs offer unmatched security of employment, two, seniority overrides merit, three, mediocrity prospers, promotions are plentiful and finally, there is much rent to be collected with minimum risk. Government employees have still not shed the colonial era hang-ups of being masters and not public servants: ego and false notions of status persists.  

Sri Lanka: FAQs on Channel 4 videos on war crimes - Part 2

Transcurrents.com had carried my earlier blog on Channel 4 videsos

(http://transcurrents.com/news-views/archives/2202#comment-8859). It evoked large scale response from readers. While some of them were the familiar India-bashing type, one of the reader asked a few interesting questions which reflected the suspicions about India's role in Sri Lanka prevalents among sections of Sri Lankans. I chose one to answer that had the most interesting questions. I am giving below my answers to this reader  which are carried in www.transcurrents.com  under the heading "Sri Lanka did not bother to listen to international friends who helped it win the war - Col R Hariharan"

(http://transcurrents.com/news-views/archives/2339  for your reading. 

Since Jazz has raised some interesting questions. I am normally accustomed to abusive language, which Sri Lankans seem to be fond of while discussing India. However, as he has politely worded his questions, I am answering them:

1. Do you believe that military forces around the world conduct ‘clean’ wars? If so, please be kind enough to mention those forces. Do you honestly believe that any kind of ‘war’ can be ‘clean’ in present day context?

Army watches as Siachen dialogue resumes

[Indian and Pakistani defence secretaries are meeting today to resume the dialogue on Siachen glacier, one of the contentious border issues between the two countries. But how many of us know how the Siachen came into Indian possession? Yes, it was with the blood and sweat of our troops operating at inhospitable heights of over 21,000 feet. Will it be traded off as a 'goodwill gesture' for some dubious promises from Pakistan? For thos of us who took part in the 1965 and 1971 wars where in the end we made such trade offs, it is a troubling question. I am reproducing Ajai Shukla's blog on the story of capture of the highest post in Siachen and the grit of the soldiers who did that. It symbolises one of the greatest moments of our army. - R HARIHARAN]  

By Ajai Shukla, 30th May 11

On a moonless night in Siachen, in May 1987, Second Lieutenant Rajiv Pande’s thirteen-man patrol silently climbed towards Quaid Post, a 21,153-feet high pinnacle near the crucial Bilafond La pass that was held by 17 Pakistani soldiers. Quaid had to be captured and Pande was fixing ropes on the near-vertical, 1500-feet ice wall just below the post, to assist a larger follow-on force in making a physical assault. As the jawans fixed the ropes, gasping for breath in that oxygen-depleted altitude, the Pakistani sentries just a few hundred feet above heard them. Gunfire rang out killing nine Indian soldiers, including Pande. But the four survivors could tell their unit, 8 Jammu & Kashmir Light Infantry (8 JAK LI), that the ropes were fixed.

Capturing Quaid post was vital being the only Pakistani post that dominated key Indian positions at Bilafond La. Realising its importance, Pakistan named it after Qaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah. The post, commanded by Subedar Ataullah Mohammed, was held by commandoes from the elite Special Services Group.

Promoting crisis within the military

An ongoing spat between the MoD and Army HQ is keeping key positions empty. A codified army promotion policy will put an end to such face-offs by Ajai Shukla Business Standard, 5th Apr 11 South Block is being roiled by a face-off between military and the ministry of defence (MoD), which co-exist at the best of times in mutual loathing. Since September, the MoD has blocked the routine promotion of army officers to the senior-most levels of command. Today, the commanders of several army divisions and corps – combat formations that are headed by major generals and lieutenant generals, respectively – are serving extended tenures since nobody is being promoted to relieve them. The Indian Army’s elite 1 Corps, which strikes deep into enemy territory in war, currently has no commander. Two major general posts in the crucial Military Operations Directorate and one in Military Intelligence Directorate are lying vacant.

Time Armed Forces cleaned up their act

The Rediff News last week carried an article titled "The worrying rot in Indian armed forces" by Ajai Shukla which takes a hard look at the deteriorating standards of armed forces leadership in recent years. All armed forces officers and men, both serving and retired, should take a hard look at the article.

There is an urgent need to make the traditional 'holy cows of army' - the generals at the top - more accountable. I totally agree with the views of attributed to General Afsar Karim in the article. The functioning and accountability of two army welfare organisations the AWWA (Army Wives Welfare Organisation) and the AWHO (Army Welfare Housing Organisation) have come under strong criticism in recent years from serving and retired servicemen. They have refused to share their basic information under the cloak they are not a government body but independent societies.

Armed forces have a culture of not airing their dirty linen in public. So servicemen and veterans generally keep mum despite knowing the truth. I think it is time we moved away from the 18th century mindset. It is essential we start introspecting on the reasons for the rot that is setting in within the armed forces. The increasing cases of corruption, 
insubordination, cronyism, violation of laws, and scams in defence procurement need to be ruthlessly handled regardless of the rank of the culprits. Otherwise the quality of leadership will be irrepairably damaged and armed forces will be reduced to the level of a paramilitary or police. And they would lose the esteem they enjoy among the public forever.

Ajai Shukla's hardhitting article of December 14 is reproduced here, courtesy Rediffnews.

The worrying rot in Indian armed forces

On April 27, 2007, while a dazed United States military was being battered by the resurgent insurgency in Iraq, a mid-ranking US Army officer, Lieutenant Colonel Paul Yingling, published a brutally frank assessment of the failures in American generalship that had led to the bloodying of the world's most powerful military machine.

Writing in the Armed Forces Journal, a private magazine focused on defence, Yingling urged the US Congress to fix accountability for the debacle in Iraq, lamenting that, "As matters stand now, a private who loses a rifle suffers far greater consequences than a general who loses a war."

Yingling's article raced across army chat rooms, combat bases in Iraq and Afghanistan, and military seminar halls. Hard-hitting, incisive, and loaded with statements like, "The intellectual and moral failures common to America's general officer corps in Vietnam and Iraq constitute a crisis in American generalship," the analysis pushed America's senior military leadership towards acknowledging, confronting and acting to fix the problem.
India's armed forces, alas, have neither a Paul Yingling nor a culture of interrogating and addressing serious internal problems.

With revelation after damaging revelation -- including financial misappropriation, sexual misconduct, fake encounters and influence-peddling -- placing troubling question marks over the internal health of India's best-respected institution, not a single serving officer has thrown out a Yingling-style challenge.

Rot at the top?
This silence has endured even through the recent revelations about the improper allocation of multi-crore apartments in Mumbai's tony Colaba area to a bevy of generals and admirals.

The Adarsh Housing Society affair, which has riveted the country's attention, is not just about the apparent abandonment of ethics by three service chiefs and five officers of three-star rank.

Worse, it is about the alleged subversion of army postings to keep Major General Tej Kishen Kaul in Mumbai so that he could keep the file moving while a succession of key military commanders in Mumbai and Pune were handed out flats, allegedly in exchange for their silence.
"Corruption exists mainly within the senior ranks," avers Major General Afsir Karim, a retired paratrooper with a reputation for probity.

"Bad apples manage to get into the organisation after all, the (military's) selection system has no psychological check for integrity. As the officers rise and start getting opportunities to make money, they surround themselves with a coterie of staff officers and subordinates who are quickly subverted the corrupt pull each other up within the system. And from them the rot spreads to other parts of the military."

Echoing this assessment is a former army commander, well-known for his honesty, who ran afoul of his boss after instituting an inquiry into evidently corrupt purchases of equipment.

He describes the insidious disillusionment of idealistic young officers who gradually realise that the values that were catechised during their training are hardly reflected in day-to-day unit life.

In their training academies, officer cadets are indoctrinated with Field Marshal Chetwode's motto: "The safety, honour and welfare of your country come first, always and every time. The honour, welfare and comfort of the men you command come next. Your own ease, comfort and safety come last, always and every time."
On being commissioned into their units, however, these young lieutenants often encounter a different reality.

An increasing number of units in peace stations focus less on training than on "career-enhancing" activities like officers' mess parties and ladies' club functions, which commanding officers believe would please their bosses or, even better, their bosses' wives.

Meanwhile, youngsters who are posted to the field, or to counter-insurgency operations, come up against a pressure-cooker insistence on success at all costs; after all, the promotions of bosses all the way up the line hinge on operational accomplishment.

With so much at stake, fake encounters and false reports are desperate options for creating an illusory world of success.

'Five-star' culture
Old-school generals say that this new environment of flexible morals and professional dishonesty has inevitably spilled over into the handling of money. Traditionally indifferent, even disdainful, towards money, senior officers are now developing a yen for what the military has always disparaged as the "five-star culture".
"The military had a culture of its own and never felt the need to imitate civilian lifestyles," says General Karim.

"You met civilians, even socialised with them, but you always came back to your mess life. Today, many senior officers want a lifestyle that cannot be supported by military pay and allowances."

Rising alongside the appetite for money, has been the opportunity to gather it illegally.

"The money that an officer handles rises exponentially as he is promoted up the chain," explains a former army commander who prefers to remain unnamed.

"With defence budgets boosted by a growing economy, each of the six field army commanders oversees budgets today that are in the hundreds of crores.
Take the example of the Udhampur-headquartered Northern Command, where the commander, a lieutenant general, controls an annual budget of Rs 2,500-2,700 crore.

Large chunks of this are spent at his sole discretion, including "special financial powers" for Rs 100 crore, and another Rs 15-16 crore for obtaining intelligence about militants.

"I could simply order my staff to give me Rs 20 lakh to pay a political source for important intelligence," says the former army commander. "I wouldn't need to provide proof that I had handed over the money to anyone. I could justify the expenditure simply by stating that I needed a political perspective."

Such opportunities for corruption abound. Northern Command's budget for rations is about Rs 700 crore per year, with another Rs 100 crore allocated for hiring civil transport.

The budget for operational works, constructing bunkers, lighting and temporary housing, is over Rs 250 crore.

And, inexplicably, Northern Command has retained with itself -- despite several attempts to transfer this responsibility to New Delhi -- the job of buying rations for troops deployed on the Siachen Glacier, an annual expenditure of some Rs 40 crore.
Other formations handle smaller budgets. But all these contracts come loaded with the potential to explode into public scandals.

Lieutenant General R K Nanavatty, who headed Northern Command at the start of this decade and was feared and respected for his unwavering rectitude, says that he could see the current crisis coming: "I have always said that the biggest danger for our army was the gradual degradation of moral values. I could see morality eroding and this worried me because trust is the basis of military functioning."

Time for action
A key concern among soldiers, serving and retired, has been the military's lame defence in the face of credible allegations of wrongdoing like those around the Sukhna land scam and the Adarsh scam.

Many believe that frankly acknowledging the problem and taking exemplary action against corruption would protect, perhaps even enhance, the military's public image.
"Why should we wait for the civilian agencies to prove criminal guilt?" asks former army deputy chief, Lieutenant General G D Singh, widely respected for his integrity.

"We have our own code of conduct, which does not rest on court orders or judgements. When an officer is clearly corrupt, we should ostracise him from our community; none of his peers should even speak to him; he should be treated as a pariah."

Considering that officers who were commissioned in the mid-1970s are generals, admirals and air marshals today, it is a paradox that the military often blames the changed background of those who now join as officers for the decline in values and standards.

Far more likely, say the more discerning observers, is the "osmosis of values" that stems from increased interaction -- across all ranks -- with society in general. This takes place in many ways: cantonments, earlier located well outside towns and cities, are now almost indistinguishable from the rapidly expanding civilian colonies that have surrounded them.

The army's growing counter-insurgency commitments bring soldiers into close contact with civilians, and with the institutions of governance.
Meanwhile, the growing reach and intensity of the electronic media beams the civilian world into the remotest military outposts.

Most officers today are keenly aware of the world outside the barracks and are deeply cynical about the declining mores of civilian institutions.

Officers, and even soldiers, ask: With the political class, the bureaucracy, the judiciary, the police and even the media deeply compromised, how can they point a finger at the military, an institution synonymous with honour and sacrifice? But underlying that question is a more troubling one: With corruption everywhere, is it possible for the military to remain unaffected?

The current army chief, General V K Singh, publicly declared while assuming office last April that restoring the army's "internal health" would be his focus. The general has his task cut out for him.