Pakistan's army: Divided it stands

[Recently I read a provocative analysis by Pervez Hoodbhoy on what is happening in Pakistan and how Pakistan army has contributed to the present state of disorder there. I am sharing it here with the readers. It presents a scary picture because an unstable Pakistan is a potential danger not only for India but South Asia as a whole.] 

By Pervez Hoodbhoy, 12 August 2011 

[Why is the Army getting weaker? The problem is not the lack of materiel – guns, bombs, men, and money. These have relatively easy fixes. Instead it is the military’s diminished moral power and authority, absence of charismatic leadership, and visibly evident accumulation of property and wealth. More than anything else, the Army has sought to please both the Americans as well as their enemies] 

Pakistan bleeds from a thousand cuts. If things had gone according to plan it is India that should have been hurting now, not Pakistan. The army’s 25 years-old low-cost, high-impact strategy of covert warfare would have liberated Kashmir and secured Afghanistan from Indian influence.

India-China Relations: Getting out of the Gridlock

By Col R Hariharan (Retd.)

 

Coming to terms with each other

During the last three decades the global security environment has drastically changed, ushering in greater cooperation and convergence among nations.  Both China and India have taken advantage of the significant changes in world economic order following the liberalisation of global trade. This process has been helped by rapid advances in information technology and networked communication. China had a head start of a decade and a half over India in revamping its economy and clocked double digit growth during this period. China’s domestic saving rate of over 50 percent has enabled it to develop extensive infrastructure. These advantages have helped it emerge as global manufacturing hub. However, its economy is largely dependent upon exports.

India despite waking up to a late start is also on the high growth path. Though not as spectacular as China, Indian economy is also growing at a steady rate of above eight percent. India has emerged as world leader in IT based services. Blessed with a large English knowing population, it has become a source of managerial and engineering talent for multi national companies. Indian entrepreneurs are investing globally more than ever before; they have acquired more overseas enterprises than the Chinese. Despite poor infrastructure, its manufacturing industry is clawing its way to be on par with more advanced economies of the world. Unlike China, its economy is dependent more upon domestic consumption than exports.  In short, Indian economy has become too big for China to ignore, just as India finds China.

Setting aside the contentious issues of long gestation for routine consideration, both China and India countries have been pragmatic in trying to build better political, economic and trade relations. China-India trade, though weighted heavily in favour of China, which was at $ 38.2 billion in 2007, is estimated to have reached $ 32 billion million mark in the first six months of 2010! After Prime Minister Dr Man Mohan Singh visited Beijing and met with Chinese Wen Jiabao in January 2008, the two countries came out with a vision statement titled “a shared vision for the 21^st century.”  Like all vision statements it painted a rosy future of shared perceptions and projections. Its progress had been slow and measured with both countries opting for safe options rather than looking for out of the box ideas.

Managing the global financial crisis

Both China and India appear to have managed cope up with the global financial crisis struck it in their own fashion, despite differences in their political systems and processes. However, the export dependent Chinese manufacturing economy suffered more though Indian service industry dependent upon the U.S. and European markets also faltered.

Though a number of Western analysts are sceptical of China’s economic recovery, the International Monetary Fund’s July 2010 review is more kind. It said, “China was hit hard by the global financial crisis. However, the authorities’ quick, determined, and effective policy response has helped mitigate the impact on the economy and ensured that China has led the global recovery.” [1]

Despite millions of job losses due to fall in exports, China clocked 6.1 per cent growth in the first quarter of 2009 to achieve a growth of over 9 per cent at the end of the year. It is targeting a growth of 10.5 per cent this year. The IMF further added: “China’s recovery had significant positive spillovers to the region and the global economy, initially through increased demand for commodities—contributing to an upswing in global commodity prices—and later through higher imports of capital goods. The balance of payments saw a dramatic shift with the current account falling quickly as exports slowed and imports surged. Despite the lower current account, reserve accumulation has continued to be rapid.”

Not only that; China with a foreign exchange reserve of around $2 trillion took full advantage of the U.S. fiscal crisis to create a space for itself in the  international power equation. The West has come to look to China for stabilizing their sagging economies. The impact of these moves is evident in the subtle changes in the way the U.S. and the West had been looking at China. The U.S. started downplaying its perennial complaints about human rights abuses in China. It has recognised the role China can play in keeping the military regime in Myanmar in leash.

United Kingdom had already gone a step further. Even as early as October 29, 2008 British foreign secretary David Miliband had apologized to China for not having renounced those actions British actions in the past, including the Simla Accord (1913) and thus the McMahon Line, describing them an anachronism and colonial legacy.[2] The British “apology” used as a political expediency has probably knocked down the fundamental basis of India’s stand on the Sino-Indian border dispute.

The global financial downturn has underlined two things. Firstly, China has to maintain its world leadership status in manufacturing and that would imply meeting the increasing demand for raw material and energy resources. It has to open up new markets for Chinese products while keeping the competitive economies of Asia and America at bay. Though this might be viewed as an exercise in international trade, it has to be driven by international relations backed by strategic defence capability. Secondly, China appears to have understood the all encompassing nature of strategic security and economic security as one of its key drivers. This appears to have been missed out by other major powers including the U.S. 

Strategic perceptions

China’s present strategy appears to focus on managing the external environment to ensure conditions conducive to its economic development. China’s manufacturing industry has increasingly huge appetite for petroleum and raw material inputs sourced from all over the world including Africa and Latin America. Chinese goods are finding their way the world over. China’s international relations appear to be mainly focused on retaining its status as a global economic power with the PLA safeguarding such interests. It has shown little hesitation in dealing with ‘rogue regime’ like Sudan and Myanmar to serve its purpose.

As China looks increasingly to outside world for its growth and prosperity, and for an increasing role in the global power structure, its vulnerability increases. So from a nation drawing its strength land based forces, China is working to increasing its maritime capability.  Protecting the ‘sea lines of communication’ (SLOC), improving port infrastructure in Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Pakistan etc. along the SLOC and keeping the seas free of piracy in choke points are all important for China’s maritime security. To fulfil these obligations, we can expect Chinese naval presence in international waters to increase in the coming years.

A second aspect is the Chinese perception of threats to national unity and internal stability. China’s Defence White Paper 2008 makes a pointed reference to “Separatist forces working for "Taiwan independence," "East Turkistan independence" and "Tibet independence" pose threats to China's unity and security.[3] China’s promotion of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) started with special focus on terrorist threat originating in the Central Asian and Afghan regions has relevance to this perception. Significantly the White Paper also talks of damages caused by increasing non-traditional security threats like terrorism, natural disasters, economic insecurity, and information insecurity showing a clear understanding strategic security threats in the modern context.

In consonance with these perceptions, the Pentagon Report 2010 “Military and Security Development Involving the People’s Republic of China” identifies three components of PLA mission.[4] These are providing guarantee of strength for the CCP to consolidate its rule, provide security guarantee for safeguarding the period of opportunity for national development and providing powerful strategic support. The PLA modernisation which is going for a decade now has to be understood in this context.

China continues to be wary of US intentions in the Asia-Pacific region including in South Asia. Beijing’s Defence White Paper 2008 had described the ‘increasing US military presence in Asia-Pacific’ as China’s ‘security concern.’[5] China’s opposition to the US-led ‘exclusive bilateral alliances in Asia – Pacific region, all left over by the cold war’ was highlighted by Lt. Gen Ma Xiaotian the Chinese delegate to the Shangrila 2009 Dialogue.[6] The Pentagon Report 2010 “Military and Security Development Involving the People’s Republic of China” presented to the U.S. Congress has expressed its concern on this count, particularly with reference to development of China’s navy, missile and nuclear capabilities. So India’s growing strategic convergence with the U.S. and the signing of Indo-US civilian nuclear agreement has increased Chinese suspicions of India.

Frozen attitudes  

Based on its historical experience, China is highly sensitive to its territorial integrity. It considers it as a “unitary whole and inviolable.” It will not tolerate foreign intrusions into China, creation of concessions, or any coercive seizure of territory from Chinese control (e.g., Hong Kong and Taiwan). As analyst Dean Cheng puts it “In the South Asian context, from the perspective of the CCCP leadership, Tibet, like Taiwan, is part of China, and any threat to Chinese control is wholly unacceptable.”[7]

China is not prepared to accept borders that were demarcated in the past by foreign powers. In order to “correct” border issues, China had used force to strengthen its stance both against the Soviet Union (1969) and India (1962). Now that China is economically and militarily stronger than ever before, it has the capability and leadership to do it again if the need arises. Whether China would indulge in this luxury when it is trying to assert its international status as a responsible power would probably be dictated by the global environment.

India’s military defeat in 1962, when the Chinese Premier Chou En-Lai decided to “teach a lesson to India,” has left a legacy of suspicion and distrust on all things Chinese. In a way the 1962 war was a culmination of India’s failure to read the Chinese correctly and take timely action in the years preceding the war. As veteran leader of freedom struggle JB Kripalani said even before the war, India had lost “12,000 square miles of our territory without striking a single blow.”[8]  He was referring to the Aksai Chin area in Eastern Ladakh through which the Chinese had built a road linking Tibet with Xingjian in 1957-58. And India took note of Chinese intrusion only in 1959!

Though the 1962 Sino-Indian war was smaller in scale than India’s later day wars with Pakistan, it had far reaching effects in both countries. It was a big loss of face for India, which was a founder leader of the Non Aligned Movement in the seventies. But probably more lasting damage was done to India’s self confidence in dealing with China on an equal footing. Even after nearly five decades of the 1962 war, many in India consider the Chinese not trustworthy and nurture deep animosity.

On the other hand, the war reinforced Chinese suspicions of India’s intentions in Tibet. No doubt this was coloured due to the continued presence of Dalai Lama and a large number of Tibetan refugees in India, who aspire for freedom. The resounding success in the war probably encouraged China to believe that India could be browbeaten with an aggressive stance.

As the Dalai Lama is aging, the issue of his succession remains a potential source of internal unrest in Tibet. Its effect could make it an explosive issue among the Tibetan refugees in India. This is an issue in which India can do little, unless both the Dalai Lama and China want it. The future is unclear and only time can tell how the Tibetan issue will pan out.

 

Shaping of India policy

China considers India as the most important nation in South Asia. India has the largest population next only to China. Indian economy is growing at a fast pace and Indian goods and services dominate South Asian markets. Indian armed forces are undergoing modernisation. India has developed its own medium and short range missiles and its air force has acquired Russian made Sukhoi30MK I combat aircraft which is superior to the ones supplied to China. Indian navy is also getting an aircraft carrier from Russia. India is building its own nuclear submarine which is facilitated by its experience with nuclear submarine leased from Russia.

Ever since the Chinese occupation of Tibet in 1950, the contentious issues of un-demarcated India-Tibet border and its claims in Aksai Chin and South Tibet (Arunachal Pradesh) have become strategically important for China for reasons of both stability and internal security.

According the Pentagon Report 2010, to improve the PLA capability in the region the liquid fuelled CSS-3 IRBMs (intermediate range ballistic missiles) have been replaced with more advanced solid fuelled CSS-5 MRBMs (medium range ballistic missiles) and developing infrastructure in a big way. The Report also states that China was investing in road development along the Sino-Indian border “primarily to facilitate development in Western China; improved roads would also support PLA border defence operations.” It also speaks about possible contingency plan to induct airborne troops in this region.

The strategic sensitivity of Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh claimed by the Chinese has grown since 1962 for controlling the restive populations of Xingjian and Tibet and integrate them. As Pakistan and Nepal could influence the sensitive underbelly of these regions building strategic relations is imperative for China. For developing a major Chinese conventional or unconventional threat against India their geographical location can be handy.

China has leveraged Pakistan’s animosity to India to its advantage to build multifaceted relationship with Pakistan. Over the years it has been the main supplier of weapons systems and air and naval combat craft. Pakistan is one of the few countries where China is co-producing K8 trainer aircraft and JF17 fighter aircraft. China has also supplied Pakistan with M-11 SRBM (short range ballistic missiles). It was also involved in helping Pakistan develop technology to produce nuclear weapons. This bonding is growing and ultimately. The development of road, rail and gas pipeline infrastructure between China and Pakistan through the Gilgit-Baltistan region as well as port facilities in Gwadar have a large strategic context for both China and Pakistan. While China’s remote Xingjian gains direct access to the major sea routes, the rail and road communications would provide for better development of the region. It will also enable China to strength its strategic presence in this troubled region.  

Nepal’s social, cultural and economic activity had been dominated by India for centuries. However, the Chinese shadow has been growing over the country for sometime now. The rise of Maoists in Nepal’s power structure gives China greater ability to influence government policy. There is a sizeable segment in Nepal which would like to wean away the country from overwhelming Indian influence. Greater interaction and trade and commerce with China would find support from this segment.

Even otherwise, the Nepalese government would welcome improved infrastructure link with Tibet.  Prime Minister Madhav Kumar Nepal had requested China to extend the Beijing-Lhasa railway line to Kathmandu at a Chinese cultural festival in Kathmandu on October 10, 2009. He said: "The economic ties between Nepal and China could be taken to a new height if the railway line that has reached up to Lhasa from mainland China could be extended up to Kathmandu, and economic infrastructure could be developed on the Himalayan transit points between Nepal and China."[9] While Nepal would benefit by the railway link, it will have far reaching strategic significance for India. In any future Indian confrontation with China it would help faster build up of Chinese forces against, particularly when China completes the construction a network of six railway lines in Tibet by 2020.

Periodic tensions and growing uneasiness

Despite the increasing political and trade links, India China relations continue to be shaken up by periodic turbulence. There are a number of reasons for this.

India has generally been playing down China’s periodic needling in a bid to keep its fall out within manageable proportions so that functional relations are not damaged. As a result, India has given the impression of a passive partner in its interactions with China. It has taken little action to erase this popular impression.

This has only reinforced the general belief that India has given up on the issue of Chinese occupation of the Aksai Chin region accepting it as a fact of life. Even the issue of finding an alignment acceptable to both countries to delineate the 4,057 km border has made little progress despite 13 rounds of talks. So in times of turbulence these hardy perennial issues always surface among the people.

In February 2009 barely a year after the joint vision statement, there was an escalation of tension between the two countries. The Chinese objected to the visit of Indian Prime Minister Dr Man Mohan Singh to Arunachal Pradesh. The Chinese Foreign Ministry conveyed similar objections when President Pratibha Patil visited Tawang in early April. India played down these aberrations, and dealt with the issue at the government level.

However, the Chinese did not allow their objections to be dismissed as another instance of Chinese ambivalence in handling of foreign relations.[10] The Chinese started issuing visas stapled to passports in the case of Indian citizens of Kashmir origin. The issue came to a head when China refused to issue a visit to a serving officer of the army - Lt General Jamwal who had commanded troops in Kashmir. New Delhi has reacted strongly an issued a demarche to Beijing. India is also reported to have reciprocated by refusing visas to Chinese PLA officers including one who was to attend a course at the National Defence College in India. For the time being, India had suspended other military interactions with China.

The situation got further heated up when Selig S. Harrison in an article in the New York Times of August 27, 2010 said “…reports from a variety of foreign intelligence sources, Pakistani journalists and Pakistani human rights workers reveal two important new developments in Gilgit-Baltistan: a simmering rebellion against Pakistani rule and the influx of an estimated 7,000 to 11,000 soldiers of the People’s Liberation Army.”[11] B Raman commenting on the report said: Selig’s wake-up call should not have been a surprise to intelligence sources and policy-makers in India and the US. They were aware of the high level of involvement of the PLA of China and its nuclear establishment in the construction and maintenance of high-altitude roads in Gilgit-Baltistan. The PLA was interested in infrastructure development and maintenance in Gilgit-Baltistan because of its strategic importance for possible use by the PLA in the event of another military conflict with India. China’s nuclear establishment was interested because it wanted to use the PLA-constructed Karakoram Highway as an overland route for the movement of missiles and spare parts to Pakistan.”[12] 

Apparently alarmed at the increasing collaboration between China and Pakistan, Prime Minister Dr Man Mohan Singh in one of his rare public comments on China cautioned the nation about the changing attitude of China. He told the Times of India, “China would like to have a foothold in South Asia and we have to reflect on this reality, we have to be aware of this. There is a new assertiveness among the Chinese. It is difficult to tell which way it will go. So it's important to be prepared” The news report said the Prime Minister also cautioned that China could use India's “soft underbelly” of Kashmir, a region disputed with Pakistan, “to keep India in low level equilibrium.”[13]

Getting out of the gridlock

China has achieved big power status conferred by its booming economy and military strength. In keeping with this, it will continue to expand its presence in South Asia just as it had already done with ASEAN countries. A significant feature of China’s trade relations is it does not allow contentious and unsettled political issues with other nations to interfere in developing trading relations with them.  Japan and Taiwan are two good examples of this policy. China is doing the same in India where it has emerged as the largest trading partner.

As Dr Man Mohan Singh had said the world is large enough for India and China to “cooperate and compete”. However, South Asia is India’s area of influence and dominance. So when China makes forays into South Asia it will increasingly compete with India in gaining political, social and economic influence in South Asian countries. As China’s strategic security perceptions are closely interwoven with economic and energy security, all Chinese moves will have a strategic content.  

In the case of Pakistan it has already built close strategic relations. It has invested in Afghanistan in copper mining and it is also involved in infrastructure projects there. As already discussed China is increasing its infrastructure and political links with Nepal. China is also in the process of building closer relations with Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. It has given liberal loans and assistance to develop land and port infrastructure in the two countries. Both Bangladesh and Sri Lanka governments and armed forces have developed fraternal relations over the years. China will attempt to build even closer relations with these two countries when the PLA navy graduates into blue water league in the coming decade and make their presence in strength in the Indian Ocean region.

We have to get out of the shrill rhetoric that flows from populist perceptions of China. India has to recognise the realities of Chinese presence in South Asia. To manage this development, our strategic foreign policy formulation on China has to be holistic and not piecemeal. At present our national leadership and security watchdogs do not appear to be ready to embark upon such a visionary approach. Thus as a nation we are reconciled to pedestrian strategies. So it is not surprising our China policy comes alive only in the form of reactive responses rather than strategic initiatives. If strategic initiatives are in existence, their visibility is low and their articulation is not audible. 

 

Former Indian Ambassador to China Salman Haider’s remark “We are stuck in an unproductive course” aptly sums up the mental gridlock in which we find ourselves while dealing with China.[14] How long are we going to continue with endless talks at the level of bureaucracy? People who have had career long exposure to China like R Swaminathan have stressed the need to look for out of the box ideas to resolve at least the issues which are manageable by both sides - the boundary question and Chinese claims on Indian territory.[15] We have enough expertise to give form to such solutions. But political leadership has to get out of the mental block on China to make a break through. Ultimately it all boils down to visionary national leadership. Do we have it? That is the moot point.   

(Col. R Hariharan, a retired Military Intelligence officer is associated with the South Asia Analysis Group, and the Chennai Centre for China Studies. E-mail:colhari@yahoo.com Website: www.colhariharan.org)

Written on October 6, 2010 for www.cnfworldfocus.org 

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NOTES

[1] http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2010/pn10100.htm  

[2] Times of India, January 9, 2010  http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/UK-stand-on-McMahon-Line-bolstering-Beijings-  claims/articleshow/5426009.cms

[3] China’s National Defense in 2008, Beijing January 2009 http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/2008DefenseWhitePaper_Jan2009.pdf 

[4] Department of Defense,  http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2010_CMPR_Final.pdf

[5] China’s National Defense in 2008, Beijing January 2009

[6] Shangrila Dialogue 2009: 2nd Plenary Session 30 May 2009

[7] China’s view of South Asia and Indian Ocean, 31 August, 2010 http://www.heritage.org/Research/Lecture/China-s-View-of-South-Asia-and-the-Indian-Ocean  

[8] Lok Sabha Debates 11 April 1961                                                                               

[9] Quoted by B Raman, China: India’s Strategic Strangulation South Asia Analysis Group Paper no. 4069 dated  28 September, 2010 www.southasiaanalysis.org

[10] This is one of the frequent themes of analysts who look for differences within the leadership or between the foreign minis try and the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) in foreign policy decision making.

[11] http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/27/op...20china&st=cse

[12] South Asia Analysis Group paper No. 4042 September 15, 2009 “

[13] Reuters, 7 September 2010

[14] DNA, 10 September 2010 http://www.dnaindia.com/

[15] SAAG Paper no. 2569  29-Jan.-2008 Indian Prime Minister’s Visit to China – Jan. 2008 www.southasiaanalysis.org

The Role of Force in Strategic Affairs

[Text of speech by Mr Shivshankar Menon, National Security Advisor, at National Defence College, New Delhi on October 21,2010.]

I am deeply honoured to have been asked to deliver the keynote address before the seminar on “The Role of Force in Strategic Affairs” to celebrate the golden jubilee of this prestigious institution. The NDC has made outstanding contributions to the spread of strategic thought and the integration of civil and military thinking in India. You have today assembled a galaxy of experts and authorities to discuss this important question. We await your deliberations with great expectations.

Rather than trying to anticipate what your seminar will throw up, I thought I would look at two issues that you will probably consider in much more detail. Is there in an Indian doctrine for the use of force in statecraft? And, how have recent changes in the world and strategic affairs affected the role of force in today’s world?

Is there an Indian doctrine for the use of force in statecraft? This is not a question that one normally expects to ask about a power that is a declared nuclear weapon state with the world’s second largest standing army. But India achieved independence in a unique manner; through a freedom movement dedicated to truth and non-violence, and has displayed both ambiguity and opposition to classical power politics. In the circumstances posing the question is understandable and legitimate.

To answer the question let us look at traditional Indian attitudes to force and the lessons India draws from its own history, and at Indian practice since independence in 1947.

Attitudes to Force and Lessons from History

While India may have achieved independence after a non-violent struggle, it was a struggle that Gandhiji described as non-violence of the strong.

As far back as 1928 Gandhiji wrote, “If there was a national government, whilst I should not take any direct part in any war, I can conceive of occasions when it would be my duty to vote for the military training of those who wish to take it.... It is not possible to make a person or society non-violent by compulsion.”

During the Partition riots at his prayer meeting on 26 September 1947 Gandhiji said that he had always been an opponent of all warfare, but that if there was no other way of securing justice war would be the only alternative left to the government.

Faced with the tribal raiders sent by Pakistan into Kashmir in October 1947, Gandhiji said that it was right for the Union Government to save the fair city by rushing troops to Srinagar. He added that he would rather that the defenders be wiped out to the last man in clearing Kashmir’s soil of the raiders rather than submit.

In saying so, Gandhiji was entirely in keeping with a long Indian tradition which has regarded the use of force as legitimate in certain circumstances, namely, if there is no alternative way of securing justice. This is in essence a doctrine for the defensive use of force, when all other avenues are exhausted.

Our two greatest epics, the Mahabharata and Ramayana are about wars, and treat rivalries as natural and normal. And the two classical expositions on the use of force, the Geeta and Bhishma’s death bed lecture on statecraft in the Mahabharata’s Shantiparva are extended explanations of a unique point of view.

The clearest description of the uses of force in statecraft is in the Arthashastra by Chanakya, which deals with both internal and external uses of force.

The lesson that comes through very clearly in both the major Indian epics, which deal with wars of necessity, is also apparent in Kautilya, the original realist, and in Ashoka, the convert to idealism. Ashoka and Kautilya were both products of a highly evolved and intricate tradition of statecraft which must have preceded them for centuries. A simple reading of the Arthashastra suffices to prove how evolved Indian strategic culture was as early as the third century before Christ, and how the use of force was limited both by practical and moral considerations. This was not a doctrine of “God on our side”, (though that helped, as Krishna proved in the Mahabharata). Nor is it about just wars. In the Indian tradition the use of force is legitimate not just if it is in a good cause and its results will be good. Instead, this was a doctrine that saw force as necessary in certain circumstances, to obtain justice, when all other means are exhausted, and which also recognised that force was not always the most effective or efficient means to this end.

The other lesson that Indian thinkers have consistently drawn from history is of the perils of weakness. The colonial narrative of India’s history, stressing “outside” invasions and rulers had as its corollary the conviction that India must avoid weakness at all costs lest that history be repeated. The Indian quest after 1947 for strategic autonomy and for autonomy in the decision to use or threaten force has a long tradition behind it.

What I am trying to say is that Indian strategic culture has an indigenous construct on the role of force in statecraft, modified by our experience in the last two centuries. War and peace are continuing themes in Indian strategic culture. While not celebrating war the culture treats defensive war as acceptable when good fights evil to secure justice. Indian strategic culture has been comfortable with this contradiction. While Gandhiji shunned the use of force and opposed violence in politics he was politically steely and unyielding, and accepted violence as unavoidable and justified in certain circumstances.

As a result of this acceptance of contradictions, Indian strategic culture supports ethical views that dovetail easily with international norms of conduct, whether legal or on human rights. It is a culture that tends instinctively to pluralism, tolerance of different views and positions, and a reliance on argumentation, diplomacy and law before recourse to the use of force. It is therefore no surprise that it seeks a rule based international order to limit the anarchy among states that is sometimes evident.

This aspect of Indian strategic culture is common to what Kanti Bajpai described as the three streams of Indian strategic culture, namely, “Nehruvians”, neo-liberals and hyper-realists. They might differ on the best means but not on India’s strategic goals . To summarise Bajpai, all three streams agree on the centrality of the sovereign state in international relations and recognise no higher authority; see interests, power and violence as the staples of international relations that states cannot ignore; and think that power comprises both military and economic capabilities at a minimum. Beyond this they differ.

Interestingly all three streams, “Nehruvians”, neoliberals and hyperrealists, believe that nuclear weapons are essential for India’s security in a world that has shown no signs of moving to their abolition and elimination.

In other words, there is substantial agreement on values, on goals and even on means in our policies, despite marked and rapid changes in the external environment in which we have operated. That is why the core traits of our foreign and defence policies have persisted since independence, irrespective of the parties in power.

The Indian Practice since 1947

Let us look at this aspect of Indian strategic culture in action, in other words at Indian practice and policy since independence.

• The defence budget has only exceeded 3% of GDP in one year of the last sixty-three.

• There have been clear limits on the use of force internally. The use of military force for internal security functions has been severely circumscribed, limited to those cases where there is a strong correlation to inimical forces abroad such as Nagaland and J&K.

• The armed forces of the Union have only been used defensively against external aggression in the sixty-three years of the Republic.

• India has never sent troops abroad except for UNPKO or at the express request of the legitimate government of the country concerned. This was true in the Maldives in 1987, in Sri Lanka in 1987 and in Bangladesh in 1971.

• India has also never retained territory taken by force in the wars that she has fought. This is so even for some Indian territory taken back from Pakistan in the Indian state of J&K which was returned to Pakistani control after the 1965 and 1971 wars.

India as a NWS

The Indian nuclear doctrine also reflects this strategic culture, with its emphasis on minimal deterrence, no first use against non-nuclear weapon states and its direct linkage to nuclear disarmament. We have made it clear that while we need nuclear weapons for our own security, it is our goal to work for a world free of nuclear weapons, and that we are ready to undertake the necessary obligations to achieve that goal in a time-bound programme agreed to and implemented by all nuclear weapon and other states.

In sum, there is an Indian way, an Indian view and an Indian practice in the use and role of force. We do not claim that it is better or worse than any other way that other nations adopt. It is a result of our own history and experience, and we feel it best suited to our goals and situation. And it too is evolving, both consciously and unconsciously, as is the world around us. It is time now to consciously build our own concepts and strategic thinking, adapted to today’s realities and India’s environment, including on the role of force.

Force in Today’s World

The other issue that you will be considering is how changes in the world and in strategic affairs have affected the role of force.

It seems to me that the changes we see in world politics and the effects of technology are the two factors that have most affected the strategic calculus of those in the international system who might seek to use force for political purposes.

Consider the global political situation first.

With global and regional balances of power characterised by unequal distributions of power; the interdependence between major powers created by globalisation; the state losing its monopoly of violence in contested hegemonies both internally and externally; and the diversity of values espoused by states, world politics today is in an unprecedented state of flux. It does, however seem that the cost to the major powers of using force in their dealings with each other could prevent the emergence of direct conflict between them.

The effects of technology are harder to describe and predict. In the early fifties, there were those who hoped that the unprecedented power of the atom bomb had made war unthinkable and therefore abolished it! Unfortunately, we now know better. In fact we have seen technology place increasingly lethal power in the hands of non-state actors. Terrorism is technologically enabled and knows no boundaries today, even drawing on support from within state systems. After several centuries, once again the state is not the sole or always the predominant factor in the international system. In some cases, it is businesses and individuals who now determine our technological future and it is these units that a successful policy must now increasingly deal with.

We have also seen technology create new domains for contestation, such as cyber space, where the speed of manoeuvre, premium on offense, and the nature of the battle-space make us rethink traditional concepts of deterrence. As technology has expanded the spectrum, the line between conventional and non-conventional warfare has blurred. The definition of force, the classic marker of power, has now expanded, thus changing the utility of force as traditionally configured.

As we enter a world of multiple powers, with rapidly shifting balances, change alone is certain. Unfortunately, force is the hedge chosen by several powers against heightened uncertainty in the international system. The balance is shifting between force and the other instruments of statecraft. We therefore need to develop a new and different statecraft.

If change alone is certain, and if the utility of force in statecraft is itself changing in fundamental ways, it is all the more necessary that we return to the values in which the use of force must be embedded. Ultimately it is not just the logic of politics or technology but the values and purposes of the state and society that determine the choices that we make of the uses and nature of force.

What India seeks is a new security architecture, an open, balanced and inclusive architecture, to correspond to the new situation that is emerging. The security challenges of the twenty-first century are radically different from those of the twentieth. Nuclear confrontation or war between major powers is not as likely as the threat from derivatives of nuclear deterrence, namely, terrorism and nuclear proliferation, which are being used to subvert the emergence of a plural, secular and democratic international order in the twenty-first century. The challenges of a globalised world cannot be handled by twentieth century military alliances or containment strategies.

Conclusion

So in effect my argument is that in India’s experience the use of force must be governed and circumscribed by the values of state and society. I have also tried to suggest that there may be value in studying the Indian way, the Indian view and Indian practice in the use and role of force in state-craft.

It also seems from recent experience that the utility of force, as traditionally configured and conceived, is of limited value in protecting a society or achieving some policy goals. But one can hardly jump to conclusions about the futility of force when limited war under nuclear conditions remains possible, and when adversaries need to be deterred. This debate will continue.

I wish you success in continuing the debate and in your deliberations.

URL: http://mea.gov.in/mystart.php?id=190016584

Bad days for Armed Forces

Col R Hariharan

Britain has just announced massive cuts in the armed forces. Britain spends $ 38 billion dollars a year on defence; does it need such a luxury when Rule Britannia has been reduced to history books? This is the moot point the nation is trying to answer. The woes of the British military, which once ensured "the Empire on which the sun never sets," appear endless. A Ministry of Defence’s survey of 10,500 Army, Royal Navy and Royal Air Force personnel carried out in 2009 was revealing. Most of them were suffering from low morale and major concerns over the military equipment they used on the frontline in Afghanistan.

Gen Richard Dannat, Chief of General Staff, went public about the state of his troops fighting in Afghanistan. He spoke of poor pay and acute shortages of essential equipment including helicopters for soldiers in operation. Prime Minister Gordon Brown did not take it kindly; his government denied the outspoken General the appointment of the Chief of Defence Staff. The latest job cuts in defence particularly in the Royal Airforce are not going to go down well. And the Royal Navy's legendary aircraft carriers will be starving without aircraft.

But it is not only in Britain the armed forces are going to be unhappy. In general, these are not happy days for armies in the Western world. Already British and French armies are smaller than ever before. Their influence on national policy making is waning as the scope and content of national security is growing well beyond physical security. The process is not uniform and varies with historical military traditions and ethos of different nations.

On one extreme we have Turkey, a later day convert to democracy where the army had been the self appointed of guardian of secularism. In the past, whenever its primacy was threatened, the army came down hard on civilian rulers. But Ankara is fast changing now. A referendum held in September has voted for constitutional reforms to curtail the powers of the military. The package of reforms put up by the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) aims at making the armed forces more accountable to civil courts. This is happening in spite of the army’s well founded suspicion that the AKP is a fellow traveller of Islamic fundamentalists.

At the other end we have countries like Sweden and Norway with armies populated large by short-term compulsory service cadres with only a sprinkling of career soldiers. In the West, as memories of the Cold War fade, most of the armies are leading a hand to mouth existence. As an analyst said the military is now seen in Europe more as an employment programme to keep the number of jobless down, than to maintain military power.While a unified EU force may still be distant dream, many member states are cutting down their force levels.

Involvement of European armies in the conflict in Afghanistan has exposed serious shortages in weaponry and equipment. Many of the ISAF armies found problems of replacement and maintenance dogging them. For instance though both Britain and France claim their armies are technically on par with the U.S., true strength of armies comes from their power to hold on to their dominance on ground and protect it from threats in land, air and sea. And this is what they lack. Strapped military budgets are blunting their sharp edges. French military pride fostered from the days of Napoleon’s Grand Armèe seems to be wearing thin as it has become expensive to maintain a well equipped, fighting fit army. To overcome the problems of funding, President Sarkozy had proposed a unified European military or a well equipped intervention force. British military chiefs were also exploring closer links with the French.

Frederick the Great said “Diplomacy without arms is like music without instruments.” In the coming years Europe would probably be playing its muted diplomatic tunes with only chamber orchestras of armies.

The story was no better with the Russian armed forces till President Putin pulled them out of the morass of low esteem and shortages. In the U.S., the role of military that went up during President George W Bush’s tenure is now being pruned by his successor Barack Obama. In keeping with election promise to pull back troops from Afghanistan, Obama’s national strategic policy 2010 talks of giving diplomacy, rather than the military, a larger role in the U.S.’s global power projection. The President substantiated this by sacking General McChrystal, commander of the U.S. forces in Afghanistan, when the General made public his differences with Washington’s war strategy.

In South Asia most of the countries have used their armies as tools for sustaining governments characterised by poor governance and political corruption. These armies with their colonial baggage had been useful in crushing extremism and insurgencies. The Indian National Congress came to power after its non-violent struggle for freedom under Gandhiji’s leadership succeeded. This has probably coloured the early Indian perception on the role of the army as watchdog of the rulers rather than guardian of national security.

Perhaps, there was also a suspicion about former colonial army’s readiness to function under an elected civilian government. This is probably what prompted Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru to write a letter to General Lockhart, commander in chief, two days before India became independent. He wrote: “In any policy that is to be pursued, in the Army or otherwise, the views of the Government of India and the policy they lay down must prevail. If any person is unable to lay down that policy, he has no place in the Indian Army or in the Indian structure of Government.” While the armed forces have been following this dictum, successive governments failed to lay down policies not only on national security but also on a host of issues related to security forces and their competency.

The progressive downgrading of armed forces officers in the bureaucratic barometer of order of precedence reflects this mindset. The roller coaster downslide has now put the army chief is on par with the chairman of the Union Public Service Commission. This is more than symbolic.

Even in defence policy making. India is perhaps one country where service chiefs are only on listening watch. This is in spite of using the armed forces continuously for six decades in both external and internal wars of many hues. Even now India’s National Security Council (modelled on its U.S counterpart) presided over by the Prime Minister has besides the National Security Advisor, the ministers of Defence, External Affairs, Home, and Finance of the Union government and the Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission as members. Contrast this with President Obama’s National Security Council which has the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a statutory attendee.

So it is not surprising that even issues concerning the combat readiness of the armed forces stagnate for want of timely decision making. It has become routine to recast the recommendations of successive pay commissions (with only civil bureaucrats as members) on armed forces pay and allowances after the service chiefs complain about them. Veterans have been treated shabbily and we see them taking to the streets, returning their medals and burning their artificial limbs to remind the government of unfulfilled promises.

Recently the Supreme Court which sought an independent pay tribunal exclusively for the armed forces, flew into a rage over the “insensitive bureaucracy” at the Centre that was throwing a spanner into the proposal, citing financial constraints. A Bench of Justices Markandey Katju and TS Thakur said,“Sitting somewhere in a plush office in Delhi and finding faults in each proposal is easy. This Defence Secretary must be sent for 10 days to these high altitudes… At least see the conditions in which these people serve.” As the media reports said the judges were critical of the bureaucracy’s apathy towards the armed forces. The Bench noted, “If this was a proposal for the bureaucrats, it would soon be implemented. We don’t expect the bureaucracy to support this proposal…We need to deal with them (armed forces) separately as a distinct class.”

In spite of all this, the armed forces strive hard to meet the near impossible expectations of the rulers and people. People forget that soldiers come from the same society in which corruption, absence of rule of law and human rights violations have become endemic. Twelve months of military training alone cannot completely change the mindset of soldiers coming from rural societies steeped in caste prejudices and politics and human rights violations. Unless there is social change we cannot expect the armed forces to be insulated forever from the pernicious influences.

Added to this is the problem of employing army in counter insurgency operations. In such situations armed forces have become the whipping boys for national maladies mostly because it is convenient. Those who criticise the army of high handedness forget that since 1990 as many as 1,473 of 1,511 cases of human rights violation or abuse levelled against security forces personnel have been proved false after investigation. Traditionally military leaders maintain a low profile unlike politicians or the intellectual class. If the service chiefs comment on vital issues affecting their professional competency or national security, the bureaucracy and politicians get restive and media frowns.

Take the case of New Delhi’s the latest discovery that Armed Forces Special Powers Act, and not inept governance or bankrupt policies, was at the root of the unrest in Srinagar valley. So the government seriously considered the repeal of the Act in parts of unrest in Kashmir to improve the situation. But appears to have taken a more sensible approach to it. But the sad thing is not one political leader of the ruling class had the moral courage to condemn terrorists and political leaders inciting the riotous mobs to carry out intifida – a form of indirect warfare. In the remaining cases 104 personnel were punished. It is easy for policy makers to forget that between 1988 and the first seven months of 2010, 5962 security personnel have lost their lives in Kashmir. But how can the soldiers forget?

So it is no wonder that Indian armed forces are no more a popular career option. I suppose politicians can take consolation that this is the trend world over. With the technology boom triggering growth, better class of people are reluctant to bear the hardship of serving in the Indian army deployed in difficult areas. Huge shortages in officers are affecting the operational capability and overload the officer class which is always expected to "do or die" regardless of problems. This sums up India's military prepardness as we read everyday of new threats in many dimensions developing in South Asian environment.

(The writer is a retired Military Intelligence specialist on South Asia, and associated with the South Asia Analysis Group and the Chennai Centre for China Studies.)

Military with no weapons

Ashok K Mehta

Over the next five years, India will spend $ 50 billion on arms purchases, including the daring joint development and production of the fifth generation fighters with Russia. This would suggest that Russia might no longer be in the race for the 126 Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft as defence acquisition involves political balancing. Still 70 per cent of all our equipment and dependency will remain Russian. As Finance Minister, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had promised that once the economy grew, funds for defence modernisation would increase incrementally. That’s what is likely to happen after a two-decade drought in military modernisation.

Given the track record, defence acquisition will be further degraded by the overkill in probity and the Byzantine procedures. On August 25 this year, heads of five defence companies from the US, the UK Germany, France and Canada wrote to Defence Minister AK Antony for better structured and more supplier-friendly defence procurement policy.

The real questions are whether the buying spree will enhance self-reliance, improve deterrence and strengthen India's clout in international affairs. So far, at least, India has underutilised its military capability for a variety of domestic political and cultural reasons, not the least, the lack of strategic thinking.

A new book, Arming Without Aiming: India's Military Modernisation by Stephen Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta of the Brookings Institution has done some excellent mind-reading of Indian policy planning failures to develop military capabilities commensurate with its rising power and also exposed the warts in planning.

It is not surprising that despite terrorist attacks on Parliament and in Mumbai and several lesser strikes across the country over the last two decades, India has not crafted a suitable response to cross-border terrorism. The international community is astonished at the amazing levels of tolerance and military restraint shown by New Delhi — making a virtue of necessity, its strategic restraint and patience. The authors say that India’s rise is welcome (except in Pakistan) as it is not seen as an assertive power.

Is strategic restraint, the term coined by Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh during Operation Parakram, an euphemism for lack of appropriate military capabilities? Twice in that year, India came close to crossing the start line but held back, according to insiders, as neither the Air Force nor the Army was deemed fit or ready for punitive operations. It is the duty of Governments to keep the armed forces in a state of operational preparedness with relevant equipment and technologies. So it may not just be the culture of military restraint but equally the lack of defence planning.

The authors argue that India’s defence acquisition process is ‘amazingly convoluted’ and coupled with its preference to acquire technology and build weapons itself has led to deep problems. The preference is also to add and expand existing structures than engage in reform. This is true as since independence there has been no defence review and the armed forces have continued to operate in a political vacuum virtually decoupled from decision-making. This has resulted in erratic and spasmodic defence modernisation unrelated to developing challenges and their priorities but contingent upon availability of funds.

Commenting on the book, Ashley Tellis of Carnegie Endowment has noted that India’s defence policy was in crisis as there is ‘internal sclerosis’ in India’s internal defence thinking. Despite the Group of Ministers report after Kargil, key reforms like appointing a Chief of Defence Staff, remain in abeyance and integration is only lip-serviced. To this self-explanatory charge can be added that funds for modernisation cannot be utilised in full due to avoidable road blocks. Tellis notes Another profundity from Tellis is that while the Indian state has the money, it does not have the capacity to spend it efficiently.“how civil-military relations restrain military modernisation and this is not accidental but deliberate”.

Every year, an average of Rs5,000 to Rs 8,000 crore is returned to the Finance Ministry months before the end of the fiscal which helps to balance the Government's books. Tongue in cheek every year, the Finance Minister ends his ritual two-line statement on defence allocation with the caveat that “more money will be provided if required”. This is followed by thumping applause!

But no amount of military modernisation will help unless there is new strategic thinking and political will to shape the environment to India’s advantage. For a rising power, a strong military is an asset if it is employed gainfully to promote political and diplomatic objectives. Cohen says: “We don't think that new hardware and weapons will make that much of a difference as diplomacy and new strategic thinking are important.” The challenge for New Delhi is transforming the strategic environment.

Interestingly, the book contains a chapter on Defence Modernisation and Internal Threat. This probably is the most relevant contribution to India’s severe domestic problems ranging from insurgencies in Jammu & Kashmir and the North-East to the Maoist threat which Prime Minister Manmohan Singh first flagged in 2004 and has since repeatedly called the most serious internal security threat facing the country. Unfortunately, we continue to look outwards without addressing cogently, the threats from within, being fixated with Pakistan.

India’s defence budget has shot up astonishingly from nearly Rs50,000 crore in 1999 to Rs1,50,000 crore in 2010 and is growing exponentially at nearly 10 per cent but still remains far below two per cent of the GDP against the prescribed three per cent. Nearly 40 per cent of the budget goes towards military modernisation and maintenance.

Given the recommendations in the book, India must revisit its defence policy, implement outstanding defence reforms, including scrapping the laughable system of Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee, and appointing a Chief of Defence Staff. Despite India’s, in Tellis’s words, “strong cultural impulses towards restraint” the dominant short-term military requirement is creating a credible response to a terrorist strike from Pakistan short of full-scale war. One hopes that Home Minister P Chidambaram’s threat of a ‘swift and decisive response’ transfers into visible military capability embodied as a deterrent.

Diplomacy and deterrence will work best when the military is encouraged in new thinking through useful strategic and political guidance. This must become a two-way street with a free flow of ideas and innovations. Arming Without Aiming is certainly not what the Army teaches its soldiers. It is ek goli ek dushman.
Courtesy: Daily Pioneer, October 13, 2010

Is Afghanistan heading for partition?

Is Afghanistan heading for partition, as President Karzai tries to mend fences with the Taliban and the Americans want to wind up their longest ever foreign military campaign? It would appear so. If it happens it will have far reaching strategic implications for South Asian security, particularly for India and Pakistan. Another round of civil war between the Pashto dominant and Pakistan supported Taliban and the other minority tribals is also likely putting the clock back on Afghanistan's perilous experiment with Western democratic practice.

Actually, it was former US ambassador to India Robert D Blackwill set the ball rolling with his article 'A de facto partition for Afghanistan' after which a series of analytical articles on the topic have appeared. A selection of such articles is given below:

Ethnic divide threatens Afghanistan by Laura King
In Los Angeles Times, July 17, 20019
URL http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-afghan-ethnic-tension-20100717,0,7025054,print.story

Needed: A new political order in the Hindu-Kush region: Time has come to accept the de facto partition of Afghanistan by Brahma Chellaney
In The Sunday Guardian, July 18, 2010
URL http://chellaney.spaces.live.com/blog/cns!4913C7C8A2EA4A30!1227.entry

End of the game by K Subhrahmanyam
In Indian Express, July 13, 2010
URL http://www.indianexpress.com/news/end-of-the-game/645627/0

A de facto partition for Afghanistan by Robert D. Blackwill
July7,2010
URL http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0710/39432.html

Nuclear capability of India and China: an analysis

By Col. R. Hariharan

A comparison of nuclear capability of India and China cannot be made in isolation. It has to be derived in the backdrop of their strategic vision, global ambitions and political and social ethos that condition their perceptions. Their strategic vision dictates the development of their nuclear capability (including nuclear policy, concepts, weapons capability and delivery systems) appropriate to the geo-strategic environment.

Strategic setting

Ever since the global economic downturn started around 2008, China’s economic clout had been increasing. And the Obama administration soon after it came to power made special efforts to woo China to seek help in stemming its own economic decline. Apparently China’s global ambitions were strengthened by this. So it was not surprising that it showed reluctance to play ball with Obama administration’s efforts to turn it into a partner in international affairs.

However, one of the important reasons for Chinese reluctance is the suspicion about the U.S. intentions in Asia, where the U.S. had been developing strategic convergence in its relations with India. This was made clear in China’s Defence White Paper 2008 that spoke of ‘increasing US military presence in Asia-Pacific.’ China is wary of a US sponsored creation of an anti-Chinese axis extending from India to Japan. Though this was not referred to by General Ma Xiaotian, the Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the PLA, while speaking at the Shangri La Dialogue 2010 he said “we believe that maintaining security in the Asia-Pacific region serves China's interest, and it is also China's responsibility.” Apparently, the Chinese Navy’s increasingly assertive posture in South China Sea is only an affirmation of this policy.

This power assertion has strong strategic connotations to its ASEAN neighbours in particular as China is likely to be embedded in their security architecture inn the coming years as indicated by Professor Zhuang Jian Zhong, Standing Vice Director, Center for National Strategic Studies, Shanghai Jiaotong University, at the Shangri La Dialogue 2010.

After the Indo-US civilian nuclear bill became a reality, US-India economic relations were poised to grow fast. However, this did not happen as Obama administration had its own hangups on India. However, US-India relations have recently been warming up for the first time after President Obama came to power. The reality is that this has come about only after the impasse in the US-China relations. Now US-India economic relations are poised to grow rapidly only because Indian economy, less dependant upon export market than China, is clocking a steady 8 % growth.

Moreover, even if the US pulls out of Afghanistan, it would perhaps like to retain Pakistan a strategic ally in the region. The Army is likely to continue to decide Pakistan’s strategic posture in the coming years. Perhaps this is the underlying reason for the $ 10 billion U.S. assistance to the Pakistan army. It should not be forgotten that Pakistan, a close ally of China, achieved its nuclear capability aided and abetted by China. These considerations are likely to influence the US form encouraging India to play a major strategic role in Afghanistan and beyond in the west. With such considerations, in the US foreign relations horizon China would continue to occupy a larger space than India in the coming years, regardless the ups and downs of US-China relations.

India dominates South Asian region physically and economically. Soft power of Indian culture spills over the region as well. During the cold war era, it had built strong relationship with Soviet Union, which still has a large residual content in Russia, particularly as a supplier of defence equipment and weaponry. India’s geographic location enables it to be a dominant power in the Indian Ocean region. So it is not surprising that China had been cultivating India’s smaller neighbours who have latent fear of Indian domination. China’s close relation with Pakistan is well known. Nepal and Sri Lanka are increasingly coming under Chinese influence. Except for Pakistan, present emphasis of China’s relationship-building with other neighbours of India appears to have more political and economic than military content.

Nuclear setting

Given India’s comparatively smaller economic and military clout, unlike China, India appears to nurse only regional ambitions. Unlike China, which signed the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a recognised nuclear weapons state, though India did not sign NPT, its nuclear capability got recognition only after it tested nuclear weapons in 1998. So India has fundamental limitations in augmenting its nuclear weapons capability although it is said to have enriched Uranium stockpile to produce another 30 warheads. India’s nuclear arsenal is estimated between 40 and 80 warheads. This is less than the number of warheads Pakistan has and probably one fifth of China’s holdings. Moreover, with limited nuclear tests carried out, questions about their operational performance have been raised.

But the main limitation of India lies in is weak nuclear delivery capability. India at present has only short and intermediate range ballistic missiles. Its naval missile development is aimed at refining its intermediate range capability only. Its first-ever nuclear submarine INS Arihant, now undergoing sea trials, is likely to become operational in 2012, if it keeps to its schedule. Thus at present it has no operational ballistic missile submarine. Its submarine fleet is aging and due to stilted naval procurement programme its fleet is likely to be reduced to half according to one estimate. So India’s nuclear weapon delivery at present is limited to nuclear-capable aircraft and surface ships of the navy only. At present this restricts the reach of India’s nuclear capability to South Asia and Tibet.

After its nuclear tests in 1998, India adopted a "no first use policy." But according to its nuclear policy even though there will be no first-use of nuclear weapons by India, "nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage." But how far these words can be given form remains to be seen. With India’s limited missile capability, second strike capability will have to be based upon its air force and surface ships. Thus India will continue to be vulnerable nuclear missile strikes beyond the intermediate range.

Only in 2003, India established the Strategic Nuclear Command. This join services organisation is responsible for holding all of India’s nuclear weapons, missiles and other assets. It has also executive responsibility for enforcing nuclear policy. However, it is the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) under the Prime Minister that will authorise response to any nuclear strike. Quick decision making under pressure had never been the strong point of CCS. Whether it can do so in real time to order a retaliatory nuclear strike is a moot question.

India’s key weakness is not only in strategic decision making process but tardy implementation of decisions. India has failed to use time as an irreplaceable resource. Thus the state controlled defence research and development programmes regularly fail to keep up their schedules. Defence procurement had become a hotbed of corruption and the bureaucratic procedure appears to be more focused on stemming corruption than on timely procurement of weapon systems. This has not improved despite the complaints of service chiefs; this has considerably weakened the modernisation of armed forces.

On the other hand, China has developed a clearly articulated long term vision for improving its strategic capability in conformity with its global ambitions. It has developed its large scale weapons research, development and manufacturing capability. It has become a major weapon producer and this gives it a powerful clout to favourably spread its influence.

China adopted No First Use nuclear policy well before India in 1964, with the affirmation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons “at any time or under any circumstances.” Though China has reaffirmed its NFU policy in 2009, China’s credibility to do so is low. For instance, there were reports that China had considered nuclear strikes against the Soviet Union in the event of a conventional Soviet attack. It has capability to deliver nuclear weapons from air craft, surface ships and submarines as well as missiles.

Its military modernisation programme is well on the way with focused development to improve its missile and naval capability while turning the huge PLA into a modern force with better mobility and fire power.

China is reported to hold the lowest number of nuclear warheads among the five nuclear weapons states. Though exact number of China’s nuclear arsenal is not known, the figure of around 130 nuclear warheads deployed in missiles and aircraft as given by the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists is probably correct. Probably 70 more are in storage. China has a variety of indigenously developed ICBMs including DF -5 ICBM which has a range of about 15000 Km has been in service since 1980. About 80 warheads are deployed in the ballistic missiles of DF-3, DF-4, DF-5 and DF-21. Of these China is estimated to have 25 DF-5 missiles. Under the military modernization programme, China is improving the missile portability, and performance capability. It has the potential to develop multiple warhead carrying capability in some of the missiles as well.

Though the PLA navy is ranked as the third largest in the world, it had only a defensive capability limited to its coastal region with only brown water capability. However as a result of modernisation efforts, it has now attained green water capability. That would mean it has offensive capability limited to about a thousand miles from its shores. It continues to suffer from weaknesses command C4 systems.

In keeping with increased strategic priorities Chinese navy is in the process of transforming into a blue water navy, though it is still a long way to go. It has developed Type 094 ballistic submarines armed with JL 2 SLBMs with a range of 8000 Km; this would make the western hemisphere within its range. It has developed a large submarine base in Hainan which has been cause of concern to the U.S. and India.

Since the last decade, Chinese naval presence in international waters has been on the rise. It has carried out joint exercises with over a dozen countries including India and Pakistan. In its first international foray, it is operating a flotilla on anti piracy duties in Gulf of Aden. Probably in during the coming decade we will be seeing large scale power assertion of Chinese navy in Indian Ocean region.

Chinese has been instrumental in contributing to the development of Pakistan’s nuclear and missile capabilities, flouting international agreements. The two countries have close strategic links. This could result in the further growth of Pakistan’s nuclear capability in the future. The recent Chinese announcement to give two more nuclear power stations to Pakistan ostensibly under a 1991 contract is a case in point. Though the Bush administration had objected to it earlier, the US appears to have chosen to ignore it now due to political expediency dictated by its Pak-Af posture. Thus China enjoys enormous advantage with its proxy presence in Pakistan.

Conclusion

China enjoys definite advantage over India in three key aspects of exercising nuclear capability: decision making process weapons systems, and delivery options. However, Chinese capability is mostly based on its ICBM systems operating from both land and sea. Its green water capability is being augmented with the development of 094 ballistic submarines armed with SLBMs. This could overcome its limitations in blue water operations. Thus China’s nuclear capability is in tandem with its global ambitions.

Comparatively, India’s nuclear capability is circumscribed by the limits of its regional ambitions. This situation is unlikely to change unless India improves its ability to handle strategic security challenges. To give form to it, better nuclear weapons and missile capabilities are essential. In particular, it has to develop a strong anti-missile capability. India has a long way to go in doing so. India’s strength would depend upon building a win-win relationship with China; at the same time India has to develop closer strategic relations with the US without sacrificing its regional interests. Indo-Russian relations, a little stagnant at present, also need to be nurtured. More than all this it has to speed up modernisation of armed forces. In the coming years, Indian Ocean region is likely to become the scene of power assertion. This would imply the need for making Indian navy a powerful entity so that India does not lose its strategic advantage in the region.
Courtesy: South Asia Analysis Group July 12, 2010
URL: http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers40%5Cpaper3920.html