PLA: Implementing the CCP Mandate

Col. R. Hariharan

This paper was presented by Col Hariharan at the Third Annual Conference on “Inside China 2013: New Leadership, Social Changes and Economic Challenges,” jointly organised at New Delhi by the C3S, India International Centre, New Delhi, Institute of Policy and Conflict Studies (IPCS), New Delhi, Department of East Asia Studies, Delhi University, and Centre for East Asia Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, on September 6, 2013 at New Delhi.

INTRODUCTION

The long process of China’s Peoples’ Liberation Army (PLA) modernisation going on since 1978 is conditioned by three things: Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s mandate, national leadership’s guidance, and the dynamics of strategic environment in which the PLA is expected to operate. 

The 18th National Congress of the CCP held in November 2012 brought in fifth generation leaders in a thorough makeover of the national leadership. Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang brought in to the politburo standing committee replaced Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao as President and Premier respectively in March 2013. Thus in the next decade or so the PLA modernization process will be guided by the 18th Congress deliberations, under the new leadership according to the strategic environment visualized by them. [1] 

After deliberating on issues, the 18th CCP Congress Work Report identified the broad contours of PLA’s strategic modernization as:

“Building strong national defense and powerful armed forces that are commensurate with China’s international standing and meet the needs of its security and development interests is a strategic task of China’s modernization drive.

“We should attach great importance to maritime, space and cyberspace security. We should make active planning for the use of military forces in peacetime, expand and intensify military preparedness, and enhance the capability to accomplish a wide range of military tasks, the most important of which is to win local war in an information age.”[2]

Translated in military terms, the Congress visualized PLA modernization as a continuous process in keeping with the strategic needs of China to enhance its global power projection. Its stress on maritime, space and cyberspace security are closely linked to informatization process already underway to bring PLA on par with modern armies of the West, particularly the U.S. The digitization process of PLA will go hand in hand as part of the “four modernizations” – the strategic direction provided by Deng Xiaoping for his holistic development vision in the fields of agriculture, industry, national defence, and science and technology. This enables the PLA modernization process to take advantage of the gains of national development.

PLA’s peace time employment envisaged by the Congress would be to further improve its competence in military operations other than warfare (MOOTW) that will include disaster relief as well assistance to the Peoples’ Armed Police (PAP) to handle internal unrest and counter terrorism tasks whenever required. Continued participation of PLA in UN peace keeping operations and anti-piracy missions would be in keeping with China’s growing international influence and desire to increase its international profile as a responsible global power.

PLA and the new leadership

President Xi Jinping in his first address made to the nation on March 17, 2013 as head of state spoke of the Chinese dream. He said “We must make persistent efforts, press ahead with indomitable will, continue to push forward the great cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics, and strive to achieve the Chinese dream of great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. “To realise the Chinese road, we must spread the Chinese spirit, which combines the spirit of the nation with patriotism as the core and the spirit of the time with reform and innovation as the core,” he added. 

Since becoming President, Xi had been travelling far and wide throughout the country from Shenzhen “Special Economic Zone” of in the south where China’s economic revolution started to arid Gansu in the North one of the poorest provinces. He has been visiting military training institutions, PLA establishments and naval ships to spread his Chinese dream. Evidently Xi’s Chinese dream will have reform and innovation as ingredients in both economic and strategic security content.

The idea is reflected in retired PLA Colonel Liu Mingfu’s book The China Dream: Great Power Thinking and Strategic Posture in the Post-America Era in 2010. He says “Since the 19th Century, China has been lagging on the world stage….President Xi’s dream is of a stronger nation with a strong military.”[3]

Even before Xi became President in March 2013, as general secretary of the Central Committee of the CCP he had “vowed to unswervingly fight against corruption and keep power reined within the cage of regulations” while addressing a plenary meeting of the CCP’s Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) on January 22, 2013. He “ordered enhanced restraint and supervision on the use of power.” He stressed, “Power should be restricted by the cage of regulations.”

According to a Global Times report, he asked “efforts to strengthen national anti-corruption legislation and relevant intra-Party regulations to ensure national organs exercise their power within the boundary of laws”.[4] According to the report Xi said “the CPC’s resolve and distinct attitude on handling serious rule-breaking among some of its cadres, including high-ranking officials, showed it is “absolutely no empty talk” that one will be severely punished for law or Party discipline violations no matter how high a person’s official ranking is.”

On June 18, 2013 Xi called for a ‘mass line’ for co-jointing the interests of the Party with the people in a year-long campaign for a “thorough cleanup” of undesirable work styles such as formalism, bureaucratism, hedonism, and extravagance. (Top leaders of the CCP launched the ‘mass line’ from the second half of the year to cement Party-people ties.).Xi also stressed the CCP members should be critical and self-critical in the spirit of rectifying improper work styles and the campaign should focus on self-purification, self-renewal and self-progression. This jargon reminiscent of Maoist days clearly indicates the Party’s and Xi’s desire to improve the Party members’ ideological commitment, discipline, eradicate corruption and improve their contact with the people.

As a creature of the Party it is impacting the PLA also. This evident from a circular issued by the PLA General Political Department said Xi’s speech showed that the CCP was “consciously adaptable to changing times and can maintain its advanced nature and purity.” Xi’s speech should be studied and combined with the spirit of the CCP’s 18th National Congress, adding that “the minds and actions of the armed forces” should be unified with decisions made by the central leadership”, it added. [5]

According to a Xinhua report of July 22, 2013 President Xi called for unswerving efforts to strengthen relations between military officers and common soldiers through a campaign inside the military. The campaign, which was initiated in April, requires senior PLA officers and the armed police to live and train as common soldiers for at least 15 days in grassroots units every one to five years, depending on their rank. Xi said the campaign will help promote military traditions, improve its work style, strengthen ties between officers and soldiers and reinforce the “construction” of grassroots military units. It also said the PLA General Political Department had issued orders for military officers to solve problems of soldiers and grassroots military units during the campaign. Officers must reflect on their responsibilities and problems through the campaign and make their work more scientific and efficient. The campaign will be part of the implementation of the “mass line,” the Party guideline under which officials and members of the Party are required to “prioritize the interests of the people and continue to represent them and work on their behalf,” it added.

Clearly President Xi’s aim is to prevent development of elitism among Party leaders and military officers lest they lose touch with ordinary people. In this context Xi Jinping’s observations on PLA-Party relationship and PLA soldiers’ professionalism during a visit to the Beijing Military Region headquarters on July 29, 2013 are of interest. According to Xinhua he said, “We must make sure that troops obey the command of the Party and are absolutely loyal and reliable”….Officials and soldiers “especially those medium-level and senior officials” should be educated on consciously sticking to political belief, stance and discipline. He further stated, “They should maintain high-level unity with CPC Central Committee and the Central Military Commission any time and under any circumstances, and resolutely obey their command.” Currently and in the near future an important task in the regard is to strengthen efforts of promoting the goal of building a strong military, Xi said. Combat capability was the only and fundamental measure of the troops, urging accelerated steps to enhance the military’s strength based on information technology. [6]

To summarize, President Xi Jinping’s aim appears to be to ensure the PLA modernization process, which is bringing a lot of graduates and technical people with specialized roles into armed forces, does not encourage Bonapartist tendencies but sustain PLA’s total commitment to the Party.

Visualization of PLA’s role

China’s Defence White Paper 2013 visualizes the nature of China’s national defence policy and PLA’s strategic role as: “China unswervingly pursues an independent foreign policy of peace and a national defence policy that is defensive in nature…. China will never seek hegemony or behave in a hegemonic manner, nor will it engage in military expansion… China’s armed forces provide a security guarantee and strategic support for national development, and make due contributions to the maintenance of world peace and regional stability” [7].

Its stress on the defensive nature of China’s national defence policy and avowal “never to seek hegemony” are only a reiteration of its views of the past. However, it has become necessary now on two counts. China’s loud power assertion of territorial claims in South China Sea and its never-ending territorial pin pricks along its unsettled border with India have increased international perception of China as a bully out to destabilize Asia-Pacific region and South Asia. This has led to the U.S. increasing its strategic readiness in China’s neighbourhood with more powerful neighbours like Japan, India and Vietnam realigning their strategic equations with each other.

DS Rajan in his paper on PLA modernization sees this as China’s military strategy undergoing “a fresh elaboration of operational tasks for the PLA.” [8] According to him the four demands being made now on the military are:

• To conduct ‘Historical Missions in the New Period of the New Century’ involving non-combat operations such as peacekeeping and disaster relief, as President Hu Jintao, said in 2004. This is in keeping with China’s growing global interests and desire to be seen as a global power. 
• To protect the country’s ‘core interests.’ These include maintaining fundamental and state security, safeguarding national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and ensuring continued stable development of economy and society.
• To build new type of combat capability to win local wars in conditions of informatization and strengthen the composite development of mechanization and informatization, with the latter as leading force.’ This implies integrating C4ISR systems in mechanized forces command, control, deployment and operations and integrating air and naval support.
• To ‘build strong army that is capable of winning wars and strengthening combat readiness.’

STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF MODERNISATION

The ongoing process of evolution of PLA as a modern fighting force started in 1977 after ten traumatic years of Cultural Revolution played havoc with PLA’s cohesiveness. PLA’s strategic modernization falls in four convenient time zones: [9]

1. Period of implosion (1966-76): During this period of Cultural Revolution played havoc with the cohesiveness and operational capabilities of PLA. Military training came to a grinding halt and most of the training establishments were closed down. As a result of political preoccupation, PLA’s command and control structure broke down with specialists and officers denounced as ‘bourgeois. 
2.  Period of introspection and recovery (1977-85): The failure of the PLA in 1979 Vietnam War shook up the leadership leading to introspection on revamping PLA. Military influence on Party was brought down. PLA representation on the politburo and military membership in the Central Committee were progressively brought down to lay stress on professionalism. PLA training institutions were reorganized and the value of defence education was recognized. National Defence University was formed by merging the PLA Military Academy, the PLA Political Academy and the PLA Logistics Academy to promote ‘jointness’ in the PLA. The first simulated combat exercise was held in 1985.
3. Period of strategic rethinking (1985-95): After PLA formations were restructured creating group armies. Training system was further revamped to complement simulated combat exercises. Recruit training was improved. The Gulf and Kosovo wars introduced to PLA the emerging informatized battlefields of the future. In 1995 President Jiang Zemin conceptualized the focus on “two transformations” – fighting and winning local wars under “informatized” conditions, and becoming a force based on quality instead of quantity. To achieve this both the government and the PLA began “to cultivate a new generation of officers capable and competent.” 
4.  Period of strategic change (1995 onwards): Chinese leadership realized the imperatives of hi-tech environment in warfare after U.S. invasion of Iraq and war on terror in Afghanistan. It realized embracing informatized and digitized environment would enable PLA take a leap forward in modernization without waiting for full mechanization. To improve the quality of officers, recruitment of college graduates became the norm. Training of PLA personnel in civilian institutions was also introduced to speed up informatization and digitization to suit 21st century warfare needs.

PLA’s strategic challenges and response

China considers the U.S. as key contender in its power projection. Considering this, the PLA would be keenly analyzing some of the tasks visualized by the U.S. from time to time. The U.S.’s strategic realignments and developments in tactical doctrines and integrated warfare systems would be of special interest to the PLA. 

Of course, China has publicized its rapid advances in science and technology which have speeded up PLA’s modernization process. Of strategic interest are the following developments: [10]

• Rapid progress has been made in reconnaissance and surveillance capability using unarmed aerial vehicles (UAVs) and satellite resources with the positioning of China’s16 Beidou satellites. They now cover the entire area across China and the Asia-Pacific and we can expect South Asia also to come under its coverage as more countries are opting for Beidou communication satellites. Trefor Moss writing in the Diplomat has reported that the China’s maritime agency – the State Oceanic Administration(SOA) – was setting up 11 UAV bases (one in each coastal province) to be ready by 2015.[11]

• Up gradation of PLA Navy (PLAN) fleet strength with more submarine and surface platforms and better anti-aircraft and anti-ship systems in place is progressing well. The Navy’s fleet operation outside the South China Sea is taking its baby steps. While the newly inducted Liaoning aircraft carrier is trying out landing of fighter jets, we can expect a carrier based PLAN fleet streaming in Indian Ocean in the coming years.

•  PLAN had been operating anti-piracy operational task forces since 2008 in Gulf of Aden. Though China had been projecting it as part of the international effort to fight piracy, these operations have refined PLAN’s fleet operational capability in international waters. PLAN ships have also been exposed to an entirely new experience of operating in coordination with ships of Indian Navy and Japanese Self Defence Force on anti-piracy duties in the area.

• According to the U.S. Department of Defense “The road-mobile, solid-propellant CSS-10 Mod 1 and CSS-10 Mod 2 (DF-31 and DF-31A) intercontinental-range ballistic missiles have entered service. The CSS-10 Mod 2, with a range in excess of 11,200 km, can reach most locations within the continental United States. China may also be developing a new road-mobile ICBM, possibly capable of carrying a multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV).”[12]

• Although PLAAF flight tested J-20, its first stealth aircraft in 2011, the U.S. Department of Defense assesses “China’s first fifth generation fighter is not expected to enter service prior to 2018, and China faces numerous challenges to achieving full operational capability, including developing high-performance jet engines.”[13]

• Similarly PLAAF which is refining its joint warfare capability, is said to be facing problems in providing accurate ground support using C4I systems as precision guided munitions (PGM) for accurate air strike is yet to be developed.

PLA training exercises 2012-13

PLA training exercises during 2012-13 provide an indication of how it is preparing to meet the strategic challenges. These exercises have been growing in complexity and size over the years. Of special interest are the trans-military region (MR) exercises by PLA along with PLAAF that have been undertaken since 2008. Jinan MR has emerged as central to these exercises indicating its role as strategic reserve. These exercises have shown China’s ability to move large forces using rail and civilian infrastructure and logistics over long distances.

According to a U.S. War College report of 2012, “These exercises have allowed the PLA to experiment with operational techniques in areas such as command and control for joint operations, operations in a complex electromagnetic environment, the formation of combined arms battalion task forces, and logistics support. Thus, trans-MR exercises contribute not only to PLA capabilities but also to China’s overall deterrence posture and are important signifiers of overall PLA development and modernization exercises”[14]

China-Russia joint military exercises 2013

China in response to the changes in the international security environment in its neighbourhood has been carrying out war games with Russia. It carried out two joint military exercises with Russia in 2013, namely the “China-Russia Maritime Joint Exercise 2013” and the “Peace Mission 2013.”

Peace Mission 2013 was held in Chelyabinsk in Urals in Russia from July 27 to August 15, 2013 with battalion sized combat groups from Shenyan Military Area Command and Russia’s Central Military Area Command participated in the exercise. JH-A fighter bombers of PLAAF and Su-24 fighters of Russian air force participated in the exercise. The objective of the exercise was ostensibly to jointly train and exercise in planning and carrying out counter terrorism operations. But considering the battalion combat group training supported by armour and air force, probably the objective was to refine BCT operations jointly with air force in a C4I environment. It is significant as the PLA took part in training in another country and transported its troops over large distances.

The Sino-Russian maritime joint exercise termed as China’s “largest ever joint naval exercise” was carried out in the Sea of Japan in the second week of July 2013. with the participation of 18 surface ships including four guided missile destroyers, two missile frigates, a supply ship and three-ship born helicopters, and a submarine. According to Xinhua, Major General Yang Junfei, the Chinese fleet’s commander, said: “This is our strongest line-up ever in a joint naval drill.” China was sending “seven ships, three helicopters and one special warfare unit”, he added. The exercise was to simulate “recapturing ships seized by pirates, as well as search-and-rescue operations and a number of air defence, anti-submarine and anti-ship exercises,” Xinhua reported. Two commando units also took part in the exercise.

Apart from its relevance of this joint exercise to the growing Chinese confrontation with Japan and Philippines in South China Sea, these exercises are sure to enhance the fleet operation, assault landing and joint operation techniques of PLAN.

Peoples’ Armed Police (PAP) exercises

Considering the growing counter terrorism requirements in its western borders, the PAP has increased its training on counterterrorism, riot control, border control, and natural disaster response operations. They are now better trained and equipped than before. The PAP training appears to be focusing on operating in integration with other ground forces in informatization setting. This will enhance PAP’s capacity during wartime as they provide light infantry support to the PLA and be ready to respond to civil unrest that may accompany an external threat in Xinjiang and Tibet.

CONCLUSION

The CCP under the new leadership of Xi Jinping is striving to tighten the Party discipline, fight corruption and improve the linkages between the Party and the people. PLA as the sword arm of the Party will also being impacted by these measures. His approach to the PLA appears to be to ensure the modernization process which is bringing a lot of graduates and technical people with specialized roles conforms to its total commitment to the Party.

As a continuous process, PLA modernization is progressing well to take on expanding roles and missions in keeping with China’s increasing global influence and power. Having completed the restructuring of forces and increased their fire power and mobility, PLA’s stress on informatization and digitization will be to improve its BCT capabilities with air support, increase its strategic mobility, and firepower using missiles on land air and sea. This will be in keeping with China’s increasing power assertion in its neighbourhood and enlarging ambitions to be recognized as a global power.

Some of the areas of development to watch would be PGM, fifth generation fighters, conventional missiles anti-ship cruise missiles, counter-space weapons, and military cyberspace capabilities. These would enhance PLA’s to take on anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) missions.

The PLA’s sophisticated training and exercises involving land forces, navy, and air force have enhanced its capability to carryout long-range conventional strike and regional power projection. The rapid modernisation of PLAN with greater operational exposure is enhancing China’s ability to project its power beyond the Near Seas. In the coming years the commissioning of China’s first aircraft carrier Liaoning with integrated air defence and submarine capabilities would further extend its power projection capabilities.

[Col R Hariharan is a retired MI officer specialising in South Asia and its neighbourhood. He is associated with the Chennai Centre for China Studies and South Asia Analysis Group. Email:colhari@yahoo.com Blog: www.colhariharan.org].

Courtesy: Chennai Centre for China studies Paper No.1191 dated September 14, 2013 http://www.c3sindia.org/china-internal/3705

Notes

[1] Xinhua report, November 15, 2012 http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/special
[2] www.news.xinhuanet.com 17 November 2012
[3] BBC June 5, 2013 http://www.bbc.co.uk/world-asia-china-22726375
[4] Global Times, ‘Xi Jinping vows power within the cage of regulations.’ http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/757583.shtml
[5] Quoted from South Asia Security Trends, July 2013 issue, www.security-risks.com
[6] South Asia Security Trends, July 2013 issue, www.security-risks.com
[7] China’s Defence White Paper, April 2013 quoted by DS Rajan from “The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces, Information Office of the State Council, People’s Republic of China, 16 April 2013 in “China: Enigmatic military modernization programme” C3S Paper No. 1148, May 9, 2013 www.c3scindia.org
[8] As above
[9] Adapted from DS Rajan’s C3S paper quoted above and Kemphausen and others ed., The People in the PLA: Recruitment, Training, and Education in China’s Military, a study of the PLA human infrastructure by Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, 2008.
[10] Extracted from Forecast of U.S. Army Tasks 2013, U.S. Department of Defense.
[11] Trefor Moss, Here come…China’s Drones, The Diplomat, March 2, 2013 http://thediplomat.com/2013/03/02/here-comes-chinas-drones
[12] The 2013 China Report submitted by the U.S. Department of Defense to the U.S. Congress.
[13] As above
[14] Kemphausen and others ed., Learning by Training: The PLA training at home abroad, by Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, 2012.

MERGING OF THIS BLOGSITE

I thank all the readers of this blogsite who have been a source of strength for me to write.
However, for reasons of better administration I am merging this blog with my other blog HARIHARAN'S INTELLIGENCE BLOG available at www.colhariharan.org

I seek your continued support and critical comments on issues I raise in my blogs which will now be available only in HARIHARAN'S INTELLIGENCE BLOG.

Col R Hariharan (Retd.)

Migration of this website

This website is being merged with the my intelligence blog at www.colhariharan.org.
All visitors are requested to view my writings in www.colhariharan.org now onwards. I thank the members who had patronised this site; they may like to join the other website www.colhariharan.org

Col R Hariharan

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China's Impact on India-Nepal Relations

By Col R Hariharan

The increasingly loud and belligerent assertion of China’s claims in South China has become a matter of strategic concern for many nations for diverse reasons. It comes at a time when nations with diverse interest in the Southeast Asia from the India to Vietnam to Japan and the U.S. are already concerned about China’s growing strategic strength. Even other nations of the ASEAN group, who do not vocalise their concerns over this development for reasons of real politick, are equally uncomfortable though China is fully established as a trading partner among them.  The recent U.S.-Australian agreement to station U.S. Marines in bases in Australia is directly related to this concern.

For India, it sends clear message of China’s sensitivity to India’s efforts at upgrading its relations in Southeast Asia. Read in the light of escalating strategic collaboration between China and Pakistan including the involvement of PLA troops in the construction of strategic road links in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir, and build up of PLA force levels in Tibet with better strategic access to Indian borders, the possibility of Chinese belligerence  shifting to India’s Himalayan frontiers has increased.

What is the 'Real Axis of Evil'?

The phrase ‘Axis of Evil’ coined in the wake of rise of Al Qaeda, means many things to many people. But what is the real ‘Axis of Evil’ that India should be worried about?

Well-known counter-terrorism expert B Raman’s examines this core concern while discussing the issue of terrorism in the context of India-Pakistan relations in his mail interview with Jahanzeb Aslam  published in Newsweek Pakistan. His comment “India is fully capable of dealing with Pakistan and has no concerns. What we are worried about is the increasing strategic threat from the developing Sino-Pakistani axis….This developing axis is the real axis of evil.” is noteworthy. Excerpts of the interview titled “The Real Axis of Evil”  is reproduced here for your reading. 

Excerpts:

What has India’s role been in the U.S.-led war on terror?

India’s primary role is exchange of intelligence, knowledge, experience and capabilities, and mutual assistance in legal matters with interested countries, including the U.S.

Is Myanmar-China relation entering a tricky phase?

  By Col. R. Hariharan 

Myanmar’s recent decision to suspend the construction of the Chinese-aided Irrawaddy Myitsone hydroelectric dam project in Kachin State comes as a pleasant surprise, whatever be the reasons behind the Myanmar decision. 

However, the moot point is, whether the three-decade old relationship carefully nurtured by both sides is entering a new tricky phase? 

China’s immediate reaction to the announcement by the Myanmar President Thein Sein was tinged with irritability in the midst of polite bureaucratic wordings.   It would indicate China was not probably consulted before Myanmar President went public with the decision.  This is clearly a case of proverbial Chinese loss of face. 

India-China Relations: Getting out of the Gridlock

By Col R Hariharan (Retd.)

 

Coming to terms with each other

During the last three decades the global security environment has drastically changed, ushering in greater cooperation and convergence among nations.  Both China and India have taken advantage of the significant changes in world economic order following the liberalisation of global trade. This process has been helped by rapid advances in information technology and networked communication. China had a head start of a decade and a half over India in revamping its economy and clocked double digit growth during this period. China’s domestic saving rate of over 50 percent has enabled it to develop extensive infrastructure. These advantages have helped it emerge as global manufacturing hub. However, its economy is largely dependent upon exports.

India despite waking up to a late start is also on the high growth path. Though not as spectacular as China, Indian economy is also growing at a steady rate of above eight percent. India has emerged as world leader in IT based services. Blessed with a large English knowing population, it has become a source of managerial and engineering talent for multi national companies. Indian entrepreneurs are investing globally more than ever before; they have acquired more overseas enterprises than the Chinese. Despite poor infrastructure, its manufacturing industry is clawing its way to be on par with more advanced economies of the world. Unlike China, its economy is dependent more upon domestic consumption than exports.  In short, Indian economy has become too big for China to ignore, just as India finds China.

Setting aside the contentious issues of long gestation for routine consideration, both China and India countries have been pragmatic in trying to build better political, economic and trade relations. China-India trade, though weighted heavily in favour of China, which was at $ 38.2 billion in 2007, is estimated to have reached $ 32 billion million mark in the first six months of 2010! After Prime Minister Dr Man Mohan Singh visited Beijing and met with Chinese Wen Jiabao in January 2008, the two countries came out with a vision statement titled “a shared vision for the 21^st century.”  Like all vision statements it painted a rosy future of shared perceptions and projections. Its progress had been slow and measured with both countries opting for safe options rather than looking for out of the box ideas.

Managing the global financial crisis

Both China and India appear to have managed cope up with the global financial crisis struck it in their own fashion, despite differences in their political systems and processes. However, the export dependent Chinese manufacturing economy suffered more though Indian service industry dependent upon the U.S. and European markets also faltered.

Though a number of Western analysts are sceptical of China’s economic recovery, the International Monetary Fund’s July 2010 review is more kind. It said, “China was hit hard by the global financial crisis. However, the authorities’ quick, determined, and effective policy response has helped mitigate the impact on the economy and ensured that China has led the global recovery.” [1]

Despite millions of job losses due to fall in exports, China clocked 6.1 per cent growth in the first quarter of 2009 to achieve a growth of over 9 per cent at the end of the year. It is targeting a growth of 10.5 per cent this year. The IMF further added: “China’s recovery had significant positive spillovers to the region and the global economy, initially through increased demand for commodities—contributing to an upswing in global commodity prices—and later through higher imports of capital goods. The balance of payments saw a dramatic shift with the current account falling quickly as exports slowed and imports surged. Despite the lower current account, reserve accumulation has continued to be rapid.”

Not only that; China with a foreign exchange reserve of around $2 trillion took full advantage of the U.S. fiscal crisis to create a space for itself in the  international power equation. The West has come to look to China for stabilizing their sagging economies. The impact of these moves is evident in the subtle changes in the way the U.S. and the West had been looking at China. The U.S. started downplaying its perennial complaints about human rights abuses in China. It has recognised the role China can play in keeping the military regime in Myanmar in leash.

United Kingdom had already gone a step further. Even as early as October 29, 2008 British foreign secretary David Miliband had apologized to China for not having renounced those actions British actions in the past, including the Simla Accord (1913) and thus the McMahon Line, describing them an anachronism and colonial legacy.[2] The British “apology” used as a political expediency has probably knocked down the fundamental basis of India’s stand on the Sino-Indian border dispute.

The global financial downturn has underlined two things. Firstly, China has to maintain its world leadership status in manufacturing and that would imply meeting the increasing demand for raw material and energy resources. It has to open up new markets for Chinese products while keeping the competitive economies of Asia and America at bay. Though this might be viewed as an exercise in international trade, it has to be driven by international relations backed by strategic defence capability. Secondly, China appears to have understood the all encompassing nature of strategic security and economic security as one of its key drivers. This appears to have been missed out by other major powers including the U.S. 

Strategic perceptions

China’s present strategy appears to focus on managing the external environment to ensure conditions conducive to its economic development. China’s manufacturing industry has increasingly huge appetite for petroleum and raw material inputs sourced from all over the world including Africa and Latin America. Chinese goods are finding their way the world over. China’s international relations appear to be mainly focused on retaining its status as a global economic power with the PLA safeguarding such interests. It has shown little hesitation in dealing with ‘rogue regime’ like Sudan and Myanmar to serve its purpose.

As China looks increasingly to outside world for its growth and prosperity, and for an increasing role in the global power structure, its vulnerability increases. So from a nation drawing its strength land based forces, China is working to increasing its maritime capability.  Protecting the ‘sea lines of communication’ (SLOC), improving port infrastructure in Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Pakistan etc. along the SLOC and keeping the seas free of piracy in choke points are all important for China’s maritime security. To fulfil these obligations, we can expect Chinese naval presence in international waters to increase in the coming years.

A second aspect is the Chinese perception of threats to national unity and internal stability. China’s Defence White Paper 2008 makes a pointed reference to “Separatist forces working for "Taiwan independence," "East Turkistan independence" and "Tibet independence" pose threats to China's unity and security.[3] China’s promotion of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) started with special focus on terrorist threat originating in the Central Asian and Afghan regions has relevance to this perception. Significantly the White Paper also talks of damages caused by increasing non-traditional security threats like terrorism, natural disasters, economic insecurity, and information insecurity showing a clear understanding strategic security threats in the modern context.

In consonance with these perceptions, the Pentagon Report 2010 “Military and Security Development Involving the People’s Republic of China” identifies three components of PLA mission.[4] These are providing guarantee of strength for the CCP to consolidate its rule, provide security guarantee for safeguarding the period of opportunity for national development and providing powerful strategic support. The PLA modernisation which is going for a decade now has to be understood in this context.

China continues to be wary of US intentions in the Asia-Pacific region including in South Asia. Beijing’s Defence White Paper 2008 had described the ‘increasing US military presence in Asia-Pacific’ as China’s ‘security concern.’[5] China’s opposition to the US-led ‘exclusive bilateral alliances in Asia – Pacific region, all left over by the cold war’ was highlighted by Lt. Gen Ma Xiaotian the Chinese delegate to the Shangrila 2009 Dialogue.[6] The Pentagon Report 2010 “Military and Security Development Involving the People’s Republic of China” presented to the U.S. Congress has expressed its concern on this count, particularly with reference to development of China’s navy, missile and nuclear capabilities. So India’s growing strategic convergence with the U.S. and the signing of Indo-US civilian nuclear agreement has increased Chinese suspicions of India.

Frozen attitudes  

Based on its historical experience, China is highly sensitive to its territorial integrity. It considers it as a “unitary whole and inviolable.” It will not tolerate foreign intrusions into China, creation of concessions, or any coercive seizure of territory from Chinese control (e.g., Hong Kong and Taiwan). As analyst Dean Cheng puts it “In the South Asian context, from the perspective of the CCCP leadership, Tibet, like Taiwan, is part of China, and any threat to Chinese control is wholly unacceptable.”[7]

China is not prepared to accept borders that were demarcated in the past by foreign powers. In order to “correct” border issues, China had used force to strengthen its stance both against the Soviet Union (1969) and India (1962). Now that China is economically and militarily stronger than ever before, it has the capability and leadership to do it again if the need arises. Whether China would indulge in this luxury when it is trying to assert its international status as a responsible power would probably be dictated by the global environment.

India’s military defeat in 1962, when the Chinese Premier Chou En-Lai decided to “teach a lesson to India,” has left a legacy of suspicion and distrust on all things Chinese. In a way the 1962 war was a culmination of India’s failure to read the Chinese correctly and take timely action in the years preceding the war. As veteran leader of freedom struggle JB Kripalani said even before the war, India had lost “12,000 square miles of our territory without striking a single blow.”[8]  He was referring to the Aksai Chin area in Eastern Ladakh through which the Chinese had built a road linking Tibet with Xingjian in 1957-58. And India took note of Chinese intrusion only in 1959!

Though the 1962 Sino-Indian war was smaller in scale than India’s later day wars with Pakistan, it had far reaching effects in both countries. It was a big loss of face for India, which was a founder leader of the Non Aligned Movement in the seventies. But probably more lasting damage was done to India’s self confidence in dealing with China on an equal footing. Even after nearly five decades of the 1962 war, many in India consider the Chinese not trustworthy and nurture deep animosity.

On the other hand, the war reinforced Chinese suspicions of India’s intentions in Tibet. No doubt this was coloured due to the continued presence of Dalai Lama and a large number of Tibetan refugees in India, who aspire for freedom. The resounding success in the war probably encouraged China to believe that India could be browbeaten with an aggressive stance.

As the Dalai Lama is aging, the issue of his succession remains a potential source of internal unrest in Tibet. Its effect could make it an explosive issue among the Tibetan refugees in India. This is an issue in which India can do little, unless both the Dalai Lama and China want it. The future is unclear and only time can tell how the Tibetan issue will pan out.

 

Shaping of India policy

China considers India as the most important nation in South Asia. India has the largest population next only to China. Indian economy is growing at a fast pace and Indian goods and services dominate South Asian markets. Indian armed forces are undergoing modernisation. India has developed its own medium and short range missiles and its air force has acquired Russian made Sukhoi30MK I combat aircraft which is superior to the ones supplied to China. Indian navy is also getting an aircraft carrier from Russia. India is building its own nuclear submarine which is facilitated by its experience with nuclear submarine leased from Russia.

Ever since the Chinese occupation of Tibet in 1950, the contentious issues of un-demarcated India-Tibet border and its claims in Aksai Chin and South Tibet (Arunachal Pradesh) have become strategically important for China for reasons of both stability and internal security.

According the Pentagon Report 2010, to improve the PLA capability in the region the liquid fuelled CSS-3 IRBMs (intermediate range ballistic missiles) have been replaced with more advanced solid fuelled CSS-5 MRBMs (medium range ballistic missiles) and developing infrastructure in a big way. The Report also states that China was investing in road development along the Sino-Indian border “primarily to facilitate development in Western China; improved roads would also support PLA border defence operations.” It also speaks about possible contingency plan to induct airborne troops in this region.

The strategic sensitivity of Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh claimed by the Chinese has grown since 1962 for controlling the restive populations of Xingjian and Tibet and integrate them. As Pakistan and Nepal could influence the sensitive underbelly of these regions building strategic relations is imperative for China. For developing a major Chinese conventional or unconventional threat against India their geographical location can be handy.

China has leveraged Pakistan’s animosity to India to its advantage to build multifaceted relationship with Pakistan. Over the years it has been the main supplier of weapons systems and air and naval combat craft. Pakistan is one of the few countries where China is co-producing K8 trainer aircraft and JF17 fighter aircraft. China has also supplied Pakistan with M-11 SRBM (short range ballistic missiles). It was also involved in helping Pakistan develop technology to produce nuclear weapons. This bonding is growing and ultimately. The development of road, rail and gas pipeline infrastructure between China and Pakistan through the Gilgit-Baltistan region as well as port facilities in Gwadar have a large strategic context for both China and Pakistan. While China’s remote Xingjian gains direct access to the major sea routes, the rail and road communications would provide for better development of the region. It will also enable China to strength its strategic presence in this troubled region.  

Nepal’s social, cultural and economic activity had been dominated by India for centuries. However, the Chinese shadow has been growing over the country for sometime now. The rise of Maoists in Nepal’s power structure gives China greater ability to influence government policy. There is a sizeable segment in Nepal which would like to wean away the country from overwhelming Indian influence. Greater interaction and trade and commerce with China would find support from this segment.

Even otherwise, the Nepalese government would welcome improved infrastructure link with Tibet.  Prime Minister Madhav Kumar Nepal had requested China to extend the Beijing-Lhasa railway line to Kathmandu at a Chinese cultural festival in Kathmandu on October 10, 2009. He said: "The economic ties between Nepal and China could be taken to a new height if the railway line that has reached up to Lhasa from mainland China could be extended up to Kathmandu, and economic infrastructure could be developed on the Himalayan transit points between Nepal and China."[9] While Nepal would benefit by the railway link, it will have far reaching strategic significance for India. In any future Indian confrontation with China it would help faster build up of Chinese forces against, particularly when China completes the construction a network of six railway lines in Tibet by 2020.

Periodic tensions and growing uneasiness

Despite the increasing political and trade links, India China relations continue to be shaken up by periodic turbulence. There are a number of reasons for this.

India has generally been playing down China’s periodic needling in a bid to keep its fall out within manageable proportions so that functional relations are not damaged. As a result, India has given the impression of a passive partner in its interactions with China. It has taken little action to erase this popular impression.

This has only reinforced the general belief that India has given up on the issue of Chinese occupation of the Aksai Chin region accepting it as a fact of life. Even the issue of finding an alignment acceptable to both countries to delineate the 4,057 km border has made little progress despite 13 rounds of talks. So in times of turbulence these hardy perennial issues always surface among the people.

In February 2009 barely a year after the joint vision statement, there was an escalation of tension between the two countries. The Chinese objected to the visit of Indian Prime Minister Dr Man Mohan Singh to Arunachal Pradesh. The Chinese Foreign Ministry conveyed similar objections when President Pratibha Patil visited Tawang in early April. India played down these aberrations, and dealt with the issue at the government level.

However, the Chinese did not allow their objections to be dismissed as another instance of Chinese ambivalence in handling of foreign relations.[10] The Chinese started issuing visas stapled to passports in the case of Indian citizens of Kashmir origin. The issue came to a head when China refused to issue a visit to a serving officer of the army - Lt General Jamwal who had commanded troops in Kashmir. New Delhi has reacted strongly an issued a demarche to Beijing. India is also reported to have reciprocated by refusing visas to Chinese PLA officers including one who was to attend a course at the National Defence College in India. For the time being, India had suspended other military interactions with China.

The situation got further heated up when Selig S. Harrison in an article in the New York Times of August 27, 2010 said “…reports from a variety of foreign intelligence sources, Pakistani journalists and Pakistani human rights workers reveal two important new developments in Gilgit-Baltistan: a simmering rebellion against Pakistani rule and the influx of an estimated 7,000 to 11,000 soldiers of the People’s Liberation Army.”[11] B Raman commenting on the report said: Selig’s wake-up call should not have been a surprise to intelligence sources and policy-makers in India and the US. They were aware of the high level of involvement of the PLA of China and its nuclear establishment in the construction and maintenance of high-altitude roads in Gilgit-Baltistan. The PLA was interested in infrastructure development and maintenance in Gilgit-Baltistan because of its strategic importance for possible use by the PLA in the event of another military conflict with India. China’s nuclear establishment was interested because it wanted to use the PLA-constructed Karakoram Highway as an overland route for the movement of missiles and spare parts to Pakistan.”[12] 

Apparently alarmed at the increasing collaboration between China and Pakistan, Prime Minister Dr Man Mohan Singh in one of his rare public comments on China cautioned the nation about the changing attitude of China. He told the Times of India, “China would like to have a foothold in South Asia and we have to reflect on this reality, we have to be aware of this. There is a new assertiveness among the Chinese. It is difficult to tell which way it will go. So it's important to be prepared” The news report said the Prime Minister also cautioned that China could use India's “soft underbelly” of Kashmir, a region disputed with Pakistan, “to keep India in low level equilibrium.”[13]

Getting out of the gridlock

China has achieved big power status conferred by its booming economy and military strength. In keeping with this, it will continue to expand its presence in South Asia just as it had already done with ASEAN countries. A significant feature of China’s trade relations is it does not allow contentious and unsettled political issues with other nations to interfere in developing trading relations with them.  Japan and Taiwan are two good examples of this policy. China is doing the same in India where it has emerged as the largest trading partner.

As Dr Man Mohan Singh had said the world is large enough for India and China to “cooperate and compete”. However, South Asia is India’s area of influence and dominance. So when China makes forays into South Asia it will increasingly compete with India in gaining political, social and economic influence in South Asian countries. As China’s strategic security perceptions are closely interwoven with economic and energy security, all Chinese moves will have a strategic content.  

In the case of Pakistan it has already built close strategic relations. It has invested in Afghanistan in copper mining and it is also involved in infrastructure projects there. As already discussed China is increasing its infrastructure and political links with Nepal. China is also in the process of building closer relations with Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. It has given liberal loans and assistance to develop land and port infrastructure in the two countries. Both Bangladesh and Sri Lanka governments and armed forces have developed fraternal relations over the years. China will attempt to build even closer relations with these two countries when the PLA navy graduates into blue water league in the coming decade and make their presence in strength in the Indian Ocean region.

We have to get out of the shrill rhetoric that flows from populist perceptions of China. India has to recognise the realities of Chinese presence in South Asia. To manage this development, our strategic foreign policy formulation on China has to be holistic and not piecemeal. At present our national leadership and security watchdogs do not appear to be ready to embark upon such a visionary approach. Thus as a nation we are reconciled to pedestrian strategies. So it is not surprising our China policy comes alive only in the form of reactive responses rather than strategic initiatives. If strategic initiatives are in existence, their visibility is low and their articulation is not audible. 

 

Former Indian Ambassador to China Salman Haider’s remark “We are stuck in an unproductive course” aptly sums up the mental gridlock in which we find ourselves while dealing with China.[14] How long are we going to continue with endless talks at the level of bureaucracy? People who have had career long exposure to China like R Swaminathan have stressed the need to look for out of the box ideas to resolve at least the issues which are manageable by both sides - the boundary question and Chinese claims on Indian territory.[15] We have enough expertise to give form to such solutions. But political leadership has to get out of the mental block on China to make a break through. Ultimately it all boils down to visionary national leadership. Do we have it? That is the moot point.   

(Col. R Hariharan, a retired Military Intelligence officer is associated with the South Asia Analysis Group, and the Chennai Centre for China Studies. E-mail:colhari@yahoo.com Website: www.colhariharan.org)

Written on October 6, 2010 for www.cnfworldfocus.org 

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NOTES

[1] http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2010/pn10100.htm  

[2] Times of India, January 9, 2010  http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/UK-stand-on-McMahon-Line-bolstering-Beijings-  claims/articleshow/5426009.cms

[3] China’s National Defense in 2008, Beijing January 2009 http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/2008DefenseWhitePaper_Jan2009.pdf 

[4] Department of Defense,  http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2010_CMPR_Final.pdf

[5] China’s National Defense in 2008, Beijing January 2009

[6] Shangrila Dialogue 2009: 2nd Plenary Session 30 May 2009

[7] China’s view of South Asia and Indian Ocean, 31 August, 2010 http://www.heritage.org/Research/Lecture/China-s-View-of-South-Asia-and-the-Indian-Ocean  

[8] Lok Sabha Debates 11 April 1961                                                                               

[9] Quoted by B Raman, China: India’s Strategic Strangulation South Asia Analysis Group Paper no. 4069 dated  28 September, 2010 www.southasiaanalysis.org

[10] This is one of the frequent themes of analysts who look for differences within the leadership or between the foreign minis try and the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) in foreign policy decision making.

[11] http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/27/op...20china&st=cse

[12] South Asia Analysis Group paper No. 4042 September 15, 2009 “

[13] Reuters, 7 September 2010

[14] DNA, 10 September 2010 http://www.dnaindia.com/

[15] SAAG Paper no. 2569  29-Jan.-2008 Indian Prime Minister’s Visit to China – Jan. 2008 www.southasiaanalysis.org