What is the state of readiness of our troops - 3

As muckraking continues in the media with the Army Chief General VK Singh as the centre piece, one thing is clear. All is not well the way manage our defence services and run the defence ministry; and it is affecting national security preparedness.

What is the way out? I am reproducing here a pithy article from TR Ramaswami, a retired bureaucrat, who has come out with a workable solution, courtesy Economic Times 

But who is blocking the change? Sheela Bhatt writing in www.rediff.com contends it is the bureaucracy which wants to preserve their hold and are loath to allow any change. If you are interested read her article "Babus now oppose General Singh's vision for MoD" available at URL:

http://www.rediff.com/news/special/babus-now-oppose-general-singhs-vision-for-mod/20120405.htm

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Defence sector needs to be streamlined and reformed to stay relevant in a changing India

T R Ramaswami, Apr 5, 2012

The leaky-weaky-snafu-cum-imbroglio in the defence sector has provoked very interesting reactions and suggestions. Historically, armies have been around millenniums before the words 'democracy', 'parliament' and 'civil service' came about.

Can India do an operation like the US did in Abbottabad?

 

By Col R Hariharan

Can Indian security forces carry out a special operation like the US SEALS did in Abbottabad?

The US SEALS struck within the backyard of Pak military establishment but in 40 minutes killed the most wanted terrorist of the decade Osama bin Laden. As the TV and other media had a field day covering the operation and its aftermath, the inevitable question why can't India carryout an operation like that to catch any of the 20-odd India's most wanted terrorists hiding in Pakistan was raised.

In answering it we must be realistic; we should not even contemplate such overseas special operations unless we fulfil three basic parameters for their success: strong national leadership with decision making ability as demonstrated by President Obama, realtime intelligence about the target before, during and after the operations, and technical support system including air lift and communication for special forces. I fear at present we do not fulfil any of these three basic parameters.

Nuclear capability of India and China: an analysis

By Col. R. Hariharan

A comparison of nuclear capability of India and China cannot be made in isolation. It has to be derived in the backdrop of their strategic vision, global ambitions and political and social ethos that condition their perceptions. Their strategic vision dictates the development of their nuclear capability (including nuclear policy, concepts, weapons capability and delivery systems) appropriate to the geo-strategic environment.

Strategic setting

Ever since the global economic downturn started around 2008, China’s economic clout had been increasing. And the Obama administration soon after it came to power made special efforts to woo China to seek help in stemming its own economic decline. Apparently China’s global ambitions were strengthened by this. So it was not surprising that it showed reluctance to play ball with Obama administration’s efforts to turn it into a partner in international affairs.

However, one of the important reasons for Chinese reluctance is the suspicion about the U.S. intentions in Asia, where the U.S. had been developing strategic convergence in its relations with India. This was made clear in China’s Defence White Paper 2008 that spoke of ‘increasing US military presence in Asia-Pacific.’ China is wary of a US sponsored creation of an anti-Chinese axis extending from India to Japan. Though this was not referred to by General Ma Xiaotian, the Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the PLA, while speaking at the Shangri La Dialogue 2010 he said “we believe that maintaining security in the Asia-Pacific region serves China's interest, and it is also China's responsibility.” Apparently, the Chinese Navy’s increasingly assertive posture in South China Sea is only an affirmation of this policy.

This power assertion has strong strategic connotations to its ASEAN neighbours in particular as China is likely to be embedded in their security architecture inn the coming years as indicated by Professor Zhuang Jian Zhong, Standing Vice Director, Center for National Strategic Studies, Shanghai Jiaotong University, at the Shangri La Dialogue 2010.

After the Indo-US civilian nuclear bill became a reality, US-India economic relations were poised to grow fast. However, this did not happen as Obama administration had its own hangups on India. However, US-India relations have recently been warming up for the first time after President Obama came to power. The reality is that this has come about only after the impasse in the US-China relations. Now US-India economic relations are poised to grow rapidly only because Indian economy, less dependant upon export market than China, is clocking a steady 8 % growth.

Moreover, even if the US pulls out of Afghanistan, it would perhaps like to retain Pakistan a strategic ally in the region. The Army is likely to continue to decide Pakistan’s strategic posture in the coming years. Perhaps this is the underlying reason for the $ 10 billion U.S. assistance to the Pakistan army. It should not be forgotten that Pakistan, a close ally of China, achieved its nuclear capability aided and abetted by China. These considerations are likely to influence the US form encouraging India to play a major strategic role in Afghanistan and beyond in the west. With such considerations, in the US foreign relations horizon China would continue to occupy a larger space than India in the coming years, regardless the ups and downs of US-China relations.

India dominates South Asian region physically and economically. Soft power of Indian culture spills over the region as well. During the cold war era, it had built strong relationship with Soviet Union, which still has a large residual content in Russia, particularly as a supplier of defence equipment and weaponry. India’s geographic location enables it to be a dominant power in the Indian Ocean region. So it is not surprising that China had been cultivating India’s smaller neighbours who have latent fear of Indian domination. China’s close relation with Pakistan is well known. Nepal and Sri Lanka are increasingly coming under Chinese influence. Except for Pakistan, present emphasis of China’s relationship-building with other neighbours of India appears to have more political and economic than military content.

Nuclear setting

Given India’s comparatively smaller economic and military clout, unlike China, India appears to nurse only regional ambitions. Unlike China, which signed the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a recognised nuclear weapons state, though India did not sign NPT, its nuclear capability got recognition only after it tested nuclear weapons in 1998. So India has fundamental limitations in augmenting its nuclear weapons capability although it is said to have enriched Uranium stockpile to produce another 30 warheads. India’s nuclear arsenal is estimated between 40 and 80 warheads. This is less than the number of warheads Pakistan has and probably one fifth of China’s holdings. Moreover, with limited nuclear tests carried out, questions about their operational performance have been raised.

But the main limitation of India lies in is weak nuclear delivery capability. India at present has only short and intermediate range ballistic missiles. Its naval missile development is aimed at refining its intermediate range capability only. Its first-ever nuclear submarine INS Arihant, now undergoing sea trials, is likely to become operational in 2012, if it keeps to its schedule. Thus at present it has no operational ballistic missile submarine. Its submarine fleet is aging and due to stilted naval procurement programme its fleet is likely to be reduced to half according to one estimate. So India’s nuclear weapon delivery at present is limited to nuclear-capable aircraft and surface ships of the navy only. At present this restricts the reach of India’s nuclear capability to South Asia and Tibet.

After its nuclear tests in 1998, India adopted a "no first use policy." But according to its nuclear policy even though there will be no first-use of nuclear weapons by India, "nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage." But how far these words can be given form remains to be seen. With India’s limited missile capability, second strike capability will have to be based upon its air force and surface ships. Thus India will continue to be vulnerable nuclear missile strikes beyond the intermediate range.

Only in 2003, India established the Strategic Nuclear Command. This join services organisation is responsible for holding all of India’s nuclear weapons, missiles and other assets. It has also executive responsibility for enforcing nuclear policy. However, it is the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) under the Prime Minister that will authorise response to any nuclear strike. Quick decision making under pressure had never been the strong point of CCS. Whether it can do so in real time to order a retaliatory nuclear strike is a moot question.

India’s key weakness is not only in strategic decision making process but tardy implementation of decisions. India has failed to use time as an irreplaceable resource. Thus the state controlled defence research and development programmes regularly fail to keep up their schedules. Defence procurement had become a hotbed of corruption and the bureaucratic procedure appears to be more focused on stemming corruption than on timely procurement of weapon systems. This has not improved despite the complaints of service chiefs; this has considerably weakened the modernisation of armed forces.

On the other hand, China has developed a clearly articulated long term vision for improving its strategic capability in conformity with its global ambitions. It has developed its large scale weapons research, development and manufacturing capability. It has become a major weapon producer and this gives it a powerful clout to favourably spread its influence.

China adopted No First Use nuclear policy well before India in 1964, with the affirmation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons “at any time or under any circumstances.” Though China has reaffirmed its NFU policy in 2009, China’s credibility to do so is low. For instance, there were reports that China had considered nuclear strikes against the Soviet Union in the event of a conventional Soviet attack. It has capability to deliver nuclear weapons from air craft, surface ships and submarines as well as missiles.

Its military modernisation programme is well on the way with focused development to improve its missile and naval capability while turning the huge PLA into a modern force with better mobility and fire power.

China is reported to hold the lowest number of nuclear warheads among the five nuclear weapons states. Though exact number of China’s nuclear arsenal is not known, the figure of around 130 nuclear warheads deployed in missiles and aircraft as given by the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists is probably correct. Probably 70 more are in storage. China has a variety of indigenously developed ICBMs including DF -5 ICBM which has a range of about 15000 Km has been in service since 1980. About 80 warheads are deployed in the ballistic missiles of DF-3, DF-4, DF-5 and DF-21. Of these China is estimated to have 25 DF-5 missiles. Under the military modernization programme, China is improving the missile portability, and performance capability. It has the potential to develop multiple warhead carrying capability in some of the missiles as well.

Though the PLA navy is ranked as the third largest in the world, it had only a defensive capability limited to its coastal region with only brown water capability. However as a result of modernisation efforts, it has now attained green water capability. That would mean it has offensive capability limited to about a thousand miles from its shores. It continues to suffer from weaknesses command C4 systems.

In keeping with increased strategic priorities Chinese navy is in the process of transforming into a blue water navy, though it is still a long way to go. It has developed Type 094 ballistic submarines armed with JL 2 SLBMs with a range of 8000 Km; this would make the western hemisphere within its range. It has developed a large submarine base in Hainan which has been cause of concern to the U.S. and India.

Since the last decade, Chinese naval presence in international waters has been on the rise. It has carried out joint exercises with over a dozen countries including India and Pakistan. In its first international foray, it is operating a flotilla on anti piracy duties in Gulf of Aden. Probably in during the coming decade we will be seeing large scale power assertion of Chinese navy in Indian Ocean region.

Chinese has been instrumental in contributing to the development of Pakistan’s nuclear and missile capabilities, flouting international agreements. The two countries have close strategic links. This could result in the further growth of Pakistan’s nuclear capability in the future. The recent Chinese announcement to give two more nuclear power stations to Pakistan ostensibly under a 1991 contract is a case in point. Though the Bush administration had objected to it earlier, the US appears to have chosen to ignore it now due to political expediency dictated by its Pak-Af posture. Thus China enjoys enormous advantage with its proxy presence in Pakistan.

Conclusion

China enjoys definite advantage over India in three key aspects of exercising nuclear capability: decision making process weapons systems, and delivery options. However, Chinese capability is mostly based on its ICBM systems operating from both land and sea. Its green water capability is being augmented with the development of 094 ballistic submarines armed with SLBMs. This could overcome its limitations in blue water operations. Thus China’s nuclear capability is in tandem with its global ambitions.

Comparatively, India’s nuclear capability is circumscribed by the limits of its regional ambitions. This situation is unlikely to change unless India improves its ability to handle strategic security challenges. To give form to it, better nuclear weapons and missile capabilities are essential. In particular, it has to develop a strong anti-missile capability. India has a long way to go in doing so. India’s strength would depend upon building a win-win relationship with China; at the same time India has to develop closer strategic relations with the US without sacrificing its regional interests. Indo-Russian relations, a little stagnant at present, also need to be nurtured. More than all this it has to speed up modernisation of armed forces. In the coming years, Indian Ocean region is likely to become the scene of power assertion. This would imply the need for making Indian navy a powerful entity so that India does not lose its strategic advantage in the region.
Courtesy: South Asia Analysis Group July 12, 2010
URL: http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers40%5Cpaper3920.html

Recommended Reading

1. ‘Frankensteinistan foretold by Dhiren Barot’ describes how lone Jihadist of Hindu origin and subsequent neo-convert to Islam Dhiren Barot (currently languishing in a British Jail for having planned attacks on New York city) saw Pakistan state’s role in Jihadi terrorism way back in 1999.
URL http://offstumped.wordpress.com/2010/05/29/frankensteinistan-foretold-by-dhiren-barot/

2. ‘Why India must swing’ by Nitin Pai explains why despite an alignment of interests, India must not always side with the United States. It must swing.
URL http://in.news.yahoo.com/columnist/nitin_pai/2/why-india-must-swing

3. ‘Sen. Tom Coburn: America’s Fiscal Defense Crisis’ U.S. Senator Tom Coburn analyses the woes of U.S. armed forces; most of the problems are faced by Indian armed forces also.
URL: http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/Sen-Tom-Coburn-Americas-Fiscal-Defense-Crisis-06412/

Recommended Reading

I heartily recommend the following articles for insights on China's geopolitics and strategy as it grows into a challenger of the U.S. supremacy; many points are relevant to India's strategic security:

1.The Geography of Chinese Power by Robert Kaplan
URL: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66205/robert-d-kaplan/the-geography-of-chinese-power

2.How the Chinese dragon is gobbling up the Sri Lankan lion by Policy Research Group
URL: http://transcurrents.com/tc/2010/05/how_the_chinese_dragon_is_gobb.html

3.Q&A With Robert Kaplan on China, May 7, 2010
URL:http://www.foreignaffairs.com/discussions/interviews/qa-with-robert-kaplan-on-china

STRATEGIC SNIPPETS: India

Hat-trick for missile technologists, armed forces: India’s defence researchers had a successful week end when the nuclear capable Agni-I medium range missile(700 km) missile and two ship-based Dhanush and Prithvi-II missiles were successfully test fired. Agni-I is a 14-metre tall single stage, solid-propelled missile capable of carrying a payload of 1,000 kg. The 8.5-metre-tall Prithvi-II is a surface-to-surface missile while the 11-metre long Dhanush is a ship-to-surface and ship-to-ship system. Both are single-stage, liquid propelled missiles capable of carrying a 500-kg payload. Both missiles are under production and have been inducted into the Army, the Air Force and the Navy. Read the full story in the Hindu of March 29, 2010 at URL http://www.hindu.com/2010/03/29/stories/2010032961901100.htm

Commerce Ministry suggests 100% FDI in defence: The Ministry of Commerce has sent a note to the cabinet secretariat suggesting that global defence companies be allowed to set-up manufacturing units with 100% FDI . But will the Ministry of Defence agree? See The Hindu Marh 25 news item at http://www.hindu.com/2010/03/25/stories/2010032561000100.htm

Arjun wins against the Russian T-90: In this analytical piece defence analyst Ajai Shukla tells of the superior performance Indian designed T-90 tanks in trials carried out along with Russian T-90, which appears to the Ministry of Defence. See his March 25 hlog at http://ajaishukla.blogspot.com

The cost of Antony’s halo: In this critical piece in Business Standard of February 23, 2010 Ajai Shukla explains how defence minister AK Antony’s excessive obsession with corruption in defence procurement is costing the nation thousands of crores of rupees, delays procurement of essential weapons and puts the nation’s security at peril. See the full article at URL: http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/ajai-shuklacostantony%5Cs-halo/386534/

Igniting the ‘COLD START’ doctrine

Despite strategies on paper, our capability to face battle on two fronts is far from being achieved.

ARE we ready for a 21st-century war? The Army chief, General Deepak Kapoor’s reported comment on the revision of India’s “cold start” military doctrine to achieve the capability to take on China and Pakistan on two fronts at the same time might tempt us to answer in the affirmative to the above question.

But, as a nation of dreamers, our record in translating ideas into action has not been a happy one. Our well-crafted plans often remain just fine print on paper. Even in matters of national security, we have been lagging in giving life to our strategic concepts.

The Cold Start Doctrine was drawn up in 2004 when the bitter experience of Kargil was fresh in military planners’ minds. The war had laid bare our weaknesses in fighting wars in which terrorism and conventional operations are seamlessly interwoven. It also drove home the real possibility of a confrontation with Pakistan turning into a nuclear one.

The Doctrine focused on multiple offensive strikes against Pakistan, using battle groups of mechanized forces. The Doctrine was designed to cut down mobilization time after the hiccups during Op Parakrama in the wake of the terrorist attack on Parliament.

For any offensive doctrine to succeed, close air support, greater density of mechanized forces, heavier artillery firepower and high mobility are key elements. Most important, a forward-thinking political leadership with the mental strength to give a green signal is the fundamental requirement for pro-active offensive strategy.
Since 2004, the Army and Air Force have carried out a number of joint exercises with troops to test the doctrine. Similar joint exercises with the Navy have also been held. So the three services were on the ball in implementing the Cold Start strategy.

Sadly, the political leadership appeared to be cold to the Cold Start. Either it is not conscious of the key role it has to play in making a success of the doctrine or it is indifferent to the strategic requirements. It is difficult to understand Defence Minister AK Antony’s readiness to apologetically proclaim India’s peaceful intentions instead of chastizing the Pakistani Army for belligerently commenting on the two-front strategy. It was left to Pakistani columnist Ayaz Amir to do that. He said, “If an Indian Army chief were not to envisage the possibility of a two-front war, and mull over the means of waging it, he would deserve to be sacked.”

The Minister’s response brings home the truth that the leadership’s political priorities would always outweigh national security considerations. If the government had been serious about its role as per the 2004 doctrine, the three services would not be having huge backlogs today in their basic tools of trade. They are in bad shape for no fault of their making. In the words of veteran journalist Shekhar Gupta, “The larger state of our armed forces has begun to resemble 1962.”

The complacency seems to be all-pervasive. It is typical of the national attitude to security that it was left to the Comptroller and Auditor General to critically comment about the battle-worthiness of the armed forces!

Though as many as 12 well known defence manufacturers have been blacklisted for corrupt practices, not more than a handful at home have been indicted. Therein hangs a sordid tale of defence procurement. This is taking a toll of our combat readiness more than any strategic plans of adversaries.

The Army is still in the quest for tanks. Its missiles are not even of late 20th-Century vintage. Since 1987, new guns for the artillery have not been procured. Both the projects to manufacture 155 mm ammunition as well as buying 155 mm guns are in limbo. As a result, by 2008 the Army had to make do with just 400 plus Bofors guns as against its long-term plan for 3,600 artillery guns by 2025.We seem to be endlessly short listing weapons for procurement and not going beyond that. Then there is the manpower shortage with nearly 25 per cent deficiency in officers.

In spite of all the hype about the increasing Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean, the Navy is not in happy shape. More than half of India’s submarines are not battle-ready. The CAG says 63 per cent of the submarine fleet would be ready for phase-out by 2012. The radars are too old and too few to provide any credible defence against an air attack. Submarine procurement and production are facing perpetual hiccups. And overall naval strength is at an alarming low of 135 ships!

The Air Force fares no better; from a 45-squadron force it is down to 32 squadrons. It is deficient of 136 fighters. The IAF’s radar acquisition plans have not been cleared due to repeated delays in the tendering process and objections by the CVC on the purchase of Israeli radars has led to a lowering of air defence capabilities. The Air Force’s story of woes seems endless.

The last straw was the report by a group of 13 scientists about the failure of the fusion test (H-bomb) during the Pokhran-II nuclear tests of 1998, contrary to official claims. This has cast grave doubts about our nuclear bomb capabilities. Even the service chiefs have expressed their concern on this.

Defence research and public sector responsible for manufacture of weapons and ammunition have been holy cows of successive governments. It is high time these cows are tethered and milked for accountability and productivity.

The two-front strategy is to handle an emerging strategic scene in which China is increasing its strategic reach in our neighbourhood in Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Myanmar. And the Pakistani Army is being modernized with American cash with obscurantism having come to stay.

The two-front doctrine is the strategic expression of India’s aspirations as a regional power graduating to a global power status. It envisages short and swift operations. As analyst Subhash Kapila says, “With a nuclear overhang with both Pakistan and China, the Indian military operations to neutralize the Chinese and Pakistani threats has to be fast-paced, facilitated by a high degree of synergy” between the Army, Navy and Air Force. That is why the Army chief has emphasized technology-oriented inputs of C4I2 (this is military acronym for command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, and information technology) for activating the new doctrine.

Twenty-first Century military technology has compressed to minuscule proportions our reaction time in readiness for war. In a nuclear setting, even to survive, nations have much more to do in much less time. We have already wasted too much time; as a result, our two-front strategy is starting with its feet hobbled by outdated mindsets and methodologies, and indifferent political leadership.

But the silver lining is the increasing public awareness on these issues thanks to the media reach and hype. Our battles are here and now with ourselves to give the wherewithal to the armed forces to deliver what they promise.

German philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer said, “All truth passes through three stages. First, it is ridiculed. Second, it is violently opposed. Third, it is accepted as self-evident.” It is time we accepted the truth and got ready.
Couresy: GFiles magazine, February 2010, Vol 3, Issue 11
URL http://gfilesindia.com/title.aspx?title_id=80

INDIAN ARMY NEW WAR DOCTRINE ANALYSED

By Dr. Subhash Kapila

Introductory Observations

The Indian Army’s enunciation of a New War doctrine was long overdue in the light of India's embattled security environment. The last Indian war doctrine ‘The COLD START War Doctrine" which was a Pakistan-specific war doctrine was formulated nearly five years back. India’s two major adversaries, namely Pakistan and China, have in the last five years lapsed into stronger adversarial postures. A strategic review of India’s military postures and plans was certainly called for at this juncture.

Pakistan today stands externally and internally besieged with distinct possibilities of disintegration and Talibanization and its nuclear weapons falling into the hands of Taliban and Al Qaeda. A Pakistan Army so besieged could be tempted to military adventurism against India to divert Pakistani public’s domestic discontent.

China on the Northern peripheries of India has indulged in military suppression of discontent in Tibet and Xingjian. In relation to Tibet, China has many India-centric fears, hence the growing adversarial stances on India’s borders with Tibet. On a larger plane, China along with its military proxy i.e. Pakistan is intent on keeping India confined within South Asia confines. Hence, the growing adversarial stances of China towards India. In case of both Pakistan and China, the growing strategic cooperation and military-to-military contacts of India with the United States has generated further strategic disquiet.

Contextually therefore, the Indian Army is well within its rights to formulate plans, doctrines and weapon and equipment acquisition plans to meet the enhanced threat profiles from Pakistan and China.

In the last five years, the powers that matter in the global strategic calculus have viewed India as a regional power and a global power in the making; consequently, there are expectations that India should ready itself for a greater strategic reach and out-of area-shouldering of strategic responsibilities.

The Indian Army Chief, General Deepak Kapoor’s enunciation of the major thrust areas of India's New War Doctrine in end-December 2009 needs to be viewed in the context outlined above.

In terms of reactions, there was a marked paranoia at the official levels in Pakistan. Pakistan Foreign Ministry’s reactions were crude and flustered. Pakistan’s military hierarchy ridiculed India's New War Doctrine as delusionary.

Reactions in China were critical and these stand reflected in an earlier SAAG Paper on this Website. In both cases the reactions from Pakistan and China were predictable.

Pakistan Army’s reactions can be attributed to a growing feeling of loss that the military balance in South Asia in slipping away in India's favor and the recognition that US- India strategic cooperation is getting too proximate for Pakistan’s comfort. Further, the uncertainty whether China would go the extra mile in favor of Pakistan in any future India – Pakistan conflict..

It is patently wrong therefore to assert that the New War Doctrine is a manifestation of India's growing proclivity towards military adventurism. India's record is otherwise.

In the estimation of this Author. India's New War Doctrine carries within it more political and strategic signals and implications than military implications.

Accordingly, this Paper’s analysis is set- out in the following order:

• India's New Army War Doctrine: The Major Thrust Areas
• India's New Army War Doctrine: The Political Significance
• India's New War Doctrine: New Strategic Directions
• India's New Army War Doctrine: Indian Political Leadership’s Sustained Focus Required on Implementation.
  

India's New Army War Doctrine: The Major Thrust Areas

Re-arranging the order of the major thrust areas of the New War Doctrine from the order of the Indian Army Chief, these emerge as under:

• Two-Front War Doctrine: This will be the mainstay of India's New War Doctrine, based on the reality that India should expect and be prepared to effectively meet simultaneous threats from China on the Northern borders and Pakistan on the Western borders.
• India Strategic Reach and Out-of Areas Operations Capabilities: The New War Doctrine would incorporate enhancement of India's capabilities. Both are related to India's aspirations as a regional power and a global power.
• Tri-Service Operational Synergy: This is a logical top priority focus of India's New War Doctrine. It is analyzed that the New War Doctrine envisages short and shift military operations. With a nuclear overhang with both Pakistan and China, the Indian military operations to neutralize the Chinese and Pakistani threats has to be fast paced facilitated by a high degree of synergy between the Indian Army, Indian Navy and the Indian Air Force.
• Asymmetric Warfare and Sub-Conventional Threats: Focus on Operational Capabilities to Neutralize Such Threats: Emphasis seems to have been laid in the Doctrine because both Pakistan and China can be expected to use these instruments as force multipliers. India focus on intense fast-paced operations can be slowed down by such threats both in forward areas and rear areas.
• Military Technological Dominance Over Adversaries: This encompasses the entire spectrum of Network-Centric warfare, Information Warfare, Cyber Warfare all integrated to facilitate speedy decision making and exploitation of fleeting tactical opportunities.
  

Of the five major priority thrusts in the New War Doctrine, the first two are the most significant, the last three thrust areas form an essential part of doctrines of all modern war-fighting.

The New War Doctrine’s enunciation of a “Two-Front War Doctrine” and enhancement of “Strategic Reach and “Out of Area Operations Capabilities” carry immense political and strategic significance in terms of India future strategic directions.

India's New Army War Doctrine: The Political Significance

Whether intended or not, to a strategic analyst, the contextual security environment, the timing of the announcement of the New War Doctrine, and giving it prominence in the public domain, indicate that India and the Indian Army wish to send out some political messages. Therefore India's New War Doctrine announcement has a political significance attendant on it.

The political significance of the New War Doctrine has to be viewed at two levels. The first level pertains to India's political relations with China and Pakistan. The second level pertains to India's strategic preparedness and a closer integration between the Indian Army and the internal security agencies to combat the asymmetric threats.

Politically, in relation to China and Pakistan, India's message is that while India would go out of the way to improve relations with them, but in India's security planning and preparations, China and Pakistan figure as major threat perceptions, and therefore political and strategic prudence demands that India is prepared for all eventualities.

The Indian Army was always formulating contingency plans for simultaneous attacks by China and Pakistan from 1962 onwards. Inclusion of this as top priority in the New Army War Doctrine is politically significant.

The second level pertains to India’s strategic preparedness and a closer integration between the Indian Army and the internal security agencies to meet the asymmetric threats. By placing a ‘Two Front War Strategy’ as top priority of the New War Doctrine there will be henceforth an unambiguous political and military focus on initiating strategic readiness for the same at all levels.

In relation to the Asymmetric Threats, its inclusion as a priority focus would help in initiation of political measures to integrate the internal security mechanisms to bring about integration and synergy with the Indian Army plans to meet such threats.

India's New War Doctrine: New Strategic Directions

The emphasis in the Doctrine or “India’s Strategic Reach and Out-of-Area Operations Capabilities” marks a new direction in India's strategic outlook and strategic preparations.

Significantly it heralds that India is no longer willing to accept being strategically confined to within South Asia limits as China desires and Pakistan as its proxy gives shape to their aims. India's seems to be sending out two significant messages through the public emphasis on this component in the New Army War Doctrine. These are:

• India's political leadership is getting ready to shoulder extended strategic commitments and that they have shed their inhibitions and apologetic approaches towards exercise of military power.
• India is preparing its Armed Forces in enhancing their strategic reach and create military readiness for out-of-area operations to protect India's geo-political interests.
• Preparations and planning for such strategic roles are already underway. Acquisition of amphibious war ship from USA, air-refueling tankers and the possible purchase of strategic airlift planes are some of the indicators.
  

India's New Army War Doctrine: Indian Political Leadership’s Sustained Focus Required on Implementation.

India's political leadership has evidently given its approval to Indian Army’s New War Doctrine and its major priorities that have been incorporated. The Indian Army undoubtedly would pursue the fast-track successful implementation of this Doctrine.

However there are areas in India's administrative structures which are not in Indian Army control and which have a critical bearing on Indian Army’s New War Doctrine. The political leadership at the apex level will have to step in strongly and impart a sustained focus in terms of monitoring and oversight.

Major areas that would require top priority focus are:

• Indian’s ICBMs are speedily inducted in our missile arsenal.
• Indian Navy’s ship acquisition plans are put on fast track.
• Deficiency of 126 combat fighter planes is made up by 2012 latest, by dividing the order between Russia. France and USA. These countries should lease out assets from their own Air Forces till such time their production lines roll-out India's orders.
• Construction of strategic road network and military roads in border areas be directly be monitored by Prime Minister Office.
• India's strategic reserves of fuel, logistics needs, and reserves of weapons, spare parts and accessories are made up and optimum levels be maintained to sustain the requirements of the New War Doctrine.
• The success of the New War Doctrine would essentially depend upon an integrated provision of timely strategic and military intelligence by all national intelligence agencies. The Government has to initiate effective steps in this direction.
  

The Indian Army and the Indian Armed Forces will not let down the country in gearing themselves to put into effect Indian Army New War Doctrine. By the same token Indian’s political leadership should not let down the Indian Army by allowing preparations to this end lapse into somnolence by bureaucratic tangles and lethargy.

Concluding Observations

Indian Army’s New War Doctrine ordinarily should have not generated so much interest, as periodic strategic reviews of doctrine are a common feature of all major armies.

However, in case of India's strategic outlook and its war doctrine, the global and regional interest is that much more as India moves up the strategic ladder.

Indian Army’s New War Doctrine has appeared in the public domain in its barest outlines. Yet even within that restricted framewor,. India has given ample notice of its strategic directions and doctrinal priorities.

The message for the China-Pakistan strategic nexus is clear. And that is, that India is preparing itself adequately to meet their simultaneous threats effectively. Defensive timidity is no longer going to be the Indian hallmark to meet the threats posed. India will poise itself for offensive-defense which is distinct from military adventurism.

The message for the international community is that India is gradually gearing itself to shoulder regional and extended strategic responsibilities befitting the stature of an aspiring global power. Such gearing-up is not aimed at military adventurism but to ready itself to shoulder strategic responsibilities as a responsible stake-holder in regional and global affairs.

(The author is an International Relations and Strategic Affairs analyst. He is the Consultant, Strategic Affairs with South Asia Analysis Group. Email: drsubhashkapila.007@gmail.com)
Courtesy: http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers37%5Cpaper3606.html

India Takes a Small Strategic Step

India took a small strategic step when it successfully launched Dhanush the 350 km range ship based anti-surface missile from INS Subhadra in the Bay of Bengal on Sunday, December 14. This should come as some consolation after the failure of its nuclear-capable IRBM (Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile) Agni-III in May and November 2009 test firings. Navy carried out the test firing as part of a user training exercise.

The media quoted official sources of the Defence Research & Development Organisation (DRDO) to claim the missile successfully hit the target with pin-point accuracy after covering 350 km. Two naval ships anchored near the target tracked the splash of the missile which followed a pre-designated trajectory. . The media also said radar systems of the Integrated Test Range (ITR), located along the Orissa coast, monitored the missile’s entire trajectory. The missile took eight minutes and 40 seconds to hit the target.

Dhanush is the naval version of Prithvi. The single-stage 10-metre long liquid propellent missile weighs six tones and carries 500 kg warhead.

In March 2009, India had for the third time successfully tested the ballistic missile defence shield being developed by the DRDO. A ballistic missile defence system is highly automated and comprises of radars that can detect missiles in flight, interceptors that can take out the looming threat, and control systems that coordinate the whole operation. In the test in March, the ‘enemy’ missile (fired from a naval ship 150 km from Orissa coast to simulate Pak Ghauri missile) was quickly picked up on radar and the two-stage Prithvi Air Defence missile successfully intercepted and destroyed the intruding warhead.

Defence research scientists have also been successful in developing Pinaka Multi Barrel Rocket system and BrahMos, a supersonic cruise missile for the Navy, in collaboration with Russians. While Pinaka has already been introduced in the army, DRDO hopes BrahMos to deliver 240 missiles in the next two years. Although it was developed as an anti-ship missile, DRDO claims it can also be launched from air and land.

However, DRDO’s successes do not cover up some of its multiple problems. The most notable of them has been its inability to develop an engine for the indigenous Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA). The Kaveri engine under development for two decades drew bitter criticism as it was underpowered. According to defence columnist Ajai Shukla, in its place, two alternatives were short-listed: the Eurojet EJ200, and the General Electric F-414 engines.

However, the Ministry of Defence appears to have chaged its mind and decided to go for co-development. The DRDO’s Gas Turbine and Research Establishment (GTRE), which has a design partnership with French engine-maker, Snecma, has been asked to design a more powerful successor to Kaveri. The Business Standard had quoted Minister of State for Defence, Dr Pallam Raju’s rationale for this decision. He said: “It is important for India to have indigenous capabilities in engine design. And having invested so many man-hours of work into the design of the Kaveri engine, it would be a national waste to fritter away or dilute those capabilities…. (Snecma) is willing to co-develop an engine with us; they are willing to go beyond just transfer of technology. It is a value-added offer that gives us better technology than what we would get from ToT from Eurojet or GE.”

But that was in 2008. The DRDO is notorious for its delays and well known for its non-adherence to time schedules. So presumably Tejas continues to be where it was: in the realms of development.
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers36%5Cpaper3546.html

Investigating Kargil - Indian Style

Vice Admiral Taj M Khattak(retired), former Vice Chief of Staff, Pakistan Navy has written an interesting and insightful article "Investigating Kargil" on General Musharraff's misadventure in Kargil that caused almost a nuclear confrontation between Pakistan and India ten years ago. In that piece published in the www.thenews.com.pk on July 2, he has stressed the need for investigating the Kargil fiasco when the actors who directed and organised it are alive. So true.

In June 2004 I wrote an article "Learning from Kargil" (reproduced below) on the lack of follow up action on the K Subrahmanyam Committee report that investigated Kargil war. I had raised a few issues in the article which would impact on the nation's strategic security. In particular there are three issues K Subrahmanyam Committee had raised on which I still have strong doubts about any progress at all. Now that we have a government that has set about with a little more determination than the earlier one, will it enlighten the public on the progress? Will the under-worked parliament get to tackle such gut issues rather than waste time on frivolous 'walk-outs'? The three issues are:

1. Inadequate coordination at the ground level among Army intelligence and other agencies.

2. The nuclear posture adopted by successive Prime Ministers thus put the Indian Army at a disadvantage vis-à-vis its Pakistani counterpart. While the former was in the dark about India's nuclear capability, the latter as the custodian of Pakistani nuclear weaponry was fully aware of its own capability.

3. It is necessary to evolve a long-term strategy to reduce the involvement of the Army in counterinsurgency and devise more cost-effective means of dealing with the problem.

LEARNING FROM KARGIL: A Soldier's View
By Col R. Hariharan(retd.) June 12, 2004
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers11%5Cpaper1025.html

Never learn to do anything: if you don’t learn, you will always find someone else to do it for you. – Mark Twain

A new Lok Sabha was in session; but its old cacophony had not changed. Members have shouted their slogans, showed their loyalties to their icons by jumping and thumping, collected their entitlements and that’s it. Parliament’s inaugural session has ended. Has it achieved anything? The American English word “zilch” sums it up. But among the few foils that came in handy in the sad and sordid drama of Indian politics was Kargil and who goofed it up. The newspapers say the Kargil issue was brought up as a counter to the opposition’s vociferous objection to a few criminals accused of mundane crimes like rape, kidnapping and plotting to murder and elected as M.P.s becoming ministers. It is sad to see a possible security lapse in Kargil being equated with the issue of some smart, but criminally inclined fellows getting elected and ending up as ministers with full police protection!

Everyone, including the cynical but docile public, knows from past experience how this charade will be gone through. There will be a lot of finger pointing and talks of our jawans and Army being second to none; but nothing will come out of it. After all it is five years since K Subrahmanyam Committee on Kargil presented its reports. Now, we find the Defence Minister is keen to follow up and ensure its findings are implemented. Five years is a long time for the troops serving in these troubled areas. They and their families (including me) would like to know how this issue did not figure all these years in the scheme of things of parties currently ruling the country (many of them were members of the outgoing government also!)

Its five years since hundreds like young Lt Saurabh Kalia died in the Kargil War. Many more are still dying in these frontiers unsung, unheard with only their families to mourn. As an old soldier who fought the wars in 1965, 1971 and lastly in Sri Lanka as part of the IPKF, I wonder now whether the few thousands of my comrades who died for this country (and continue to do so, on and off) for notions of patriotism, loyalty and Izzat had done so in vain. The sheer callousness of our people in power shocks me.

Take for instance the case of 22 Border Security Force jawans and their families including women and children killed by militants in a mine blast in J and K. The State Chief Minister had no time to send even a condolence message. Was it because his party was busy probing for human rights violations in the fight against armed insurgents who are waging war on lawful government? Every time a jawan salutes him will he remember him for all the good he is going to do?

There is a tendency by bureaucrats, including those of the Armed Forces, to use the Official Secrets Act as a convenient cloak to cover all inefficiency, incompetence and deficiencies in the planning and handling of vital issues of national security and defence. I think the best memorial for those who died in Kargil would be not to allow another Kargil to happen. Even if it happens, the soldiers should go to war there confidently that they would not go like their predecessors did – taken by surprise, handled by ineptness, and lastly killed by sheer lack of timely decision making. It is time the Parliament debated the issues of defence seriously on matters more urgent than the number of orderlies Army officers use.. A whole list of issues is there in K Subrahmanyam Committee’s Report that needs to be followed up (and not to score political brownie points). These points need to be accounted for to the public at large as part of good governance. Here are some (findings of the Report given in italics):


* Inadequate border surveillance: Has the surveillance been beefed up in J and K, as the Committee found the intruders avoided detection because our Winter Air Surveillance Operations (WASO) by helicopters was of negligible effect? Israel was supposed to supply special surveillance helicopters for use in this sector. As in the new dispensation Israel appears to have become a bad word in South Block, has an alternate source been found? Or are still the files are being “processed”?

* The report states that there was inadequate coordination at the ground level among Army intelligence and other agencies. Has it improved now? If so, how.

* Holding of special (glacial) clothing for extreme cold climates was inadequate. Can we now say this problem has been overcome?

* Though the new light rifle (5.56 mm INSA) has been inducted into service, most troops are yet to be equipped with light rifles. Adequate attention has not been paid to lightening the load on infantry soldiers deployed at high altitudes. In broader terms, increasing the firepower and combat efficiency of infantrymen has also suffered, as has the modernisation process as a whole. This needs to be speedily rectified. (This light rifle was introduced when I left the Army 13 years back. It’s a big joke that combat troops in high altitudes are still saddled with old rifles! I am not too optimistic things will change on this count). Can we hope for improvement?

* Nuclear weapons programme: For reasons of security, none of these Prime Ministers took anyone other than Chairmen of the Atomic Energy Commission (not all), and the Scientific Adviser to the Defence Minister into confidence. The Chiefs of Staff, senior Cabinet Ministers and senior civil servants were kept out of the loop. The nuclear posture adopted by successive Prime Ministers thus put the Indian Army at a disadvantage vis-à-vis its Pakistani counterpart. While the former was in the dark about India's nuclear capability, the latter as the custodian of Pakistani nuclear weaponry was fully aware of its own capability. Three former Indian Chiefs of Army Staff expressed unhappiness about this asymmetric situation. Are the Service Chiefs still in the dark about their own nuclear capabilities? (I remember Johnson’s “Ignorance is bliss when it is folly to be wise” in this context). Is this major issue going to be brushed aside as “directly not pertaining to Kargil War”?

* Comprehensive manpower policy: Pakistan has ruthlessly employed terrorism in Punjab, J& K and the Northeast to involve the Indian Army in Counterinsurgency operations and neutralise its conventional superiority. Having partially achieved this objective, it has also persuaded itself that nuclear blackmail against India has succeeded on three occasions. A coherent counterstrategy to deal with Pakistan's terrorist-nuclear blackmail and the conventional threat has to be thought through. The Committee believes that a comprehensive manpower policy is required to deal with this problem. In the present international security environment, proxy war…. it is necessary to evolve a long-term strategy to reduce the involvement of the Army in counterinsurgency and devise more cost-effective means of dealing with the problem. Has any thought been given to sort out the role of Army and evolution of a long-tem strategy for counter-insurgency? Or is it going to be deferred to the next government?

I saw a report saying that each parliament member costs the exchequer Rs 22 lacs. If they deliver the goods I don’t mind that expenditure at all. After all India is shining, (though the shine has been successfully tarnished a bit now) and why shouldn’t the parliament? But if the money is to become an investment, we would like them to be really people’s representatives. We want them to sit debate and improve the situation, lest the ghosts of those dead heroes of Kargil haunt us forever.
This is my learning from Kargil.

Soft underbelly of India’s internal security

There are a series of disturbing bits of news flowing in just one week’s media reports that expose the soft underbelly of India’s internal security (own comments are given in italics):

• Saleem Abbasi, an Algerian wanted for his involvement in the blast at Houari Boumediene airport in Algiers on August 26, 1992 was arrested by airport security after Chennai airport immigration authorities spotted him on his arrival from Kualalumpur on June 17th night at Chennai airport. The immigration authorities had no prior knowledge that he was a wanted criminal but a Interpol Red Corner alert in his name resulted in the arrest. The Algerian, travelling on a Qatari passport, was on his way to catch a flight to Bangalore to attend a meeting with the Karnataka Planning Board Deputy Chairman DH Shankaramurthy to discuss Rs 130-crore investment in a solar energy project in Karnataka. Newspapers inform that Abbasi was a globe trotter who has not been caught all these years. So much for global war on terror! It will be interesting to know how many times Abbasi had visited India and where all he has invested and who are his contacts here. But if our past experience is any guide, Abbasi would be set free because India has no extradition treaty with Algeria and he had not committed any offence in India (at least not in public knowledge).

• According to media reports the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) in a raid seized nine firearms (some of them unlicensed) and VHF radio communication sets from the house of Dr Padamsinh Patil, MP and a leader of the Nationalist Congress Party, in Mumbai on June 18th. Dr Patil is accused of plotting the murder of his cousin and political rival Pavanraja Nimbalkar in 2006. His son however claimed that only four weapons, including a pistol, a revolver, a 12 bore gun and a rifle, were seized and all of them were licensed. The radio sets were authorised to be installed in the NCP leader’s residence when he was a cabinet minister for irrigation. However, when he relinquished office they were not returned to the government but shifted to his new home, which was illegal. (He relinquished office when social crusader Anna Hazare levelled corruption charges against him.) According to Dr Patil’s lawyer, the radio sets were shifted “inadvertently”; he claimed that some of the radiosets were in a packed condition and not used at all.

• Interrogators of Mohammed Madani, a suspected Lashkar-e-Tayyabba (LeT) terrorist, arrested in Delhi on June 4th , told a Delhi court that Madni had revealed to the police interrogators that the LeT was acting in coordination with CPI(Maoists) in Jharkand.

• For a second day battle was “raging” on June 19th in Lalgarh in West Bengal between the Maoists and the paramilitary forces of the state and Centre. The West Bengal government is at last trying to re-establish government control after Maoist rampage in Lalgarh in which the local leader of the ruling CPM party was killed and the police station was attacked. Union Home MinisterP Chidambaram questioned why the West Bengal government had not banned the CPI(Maoists) when other states had already outlawed it. He also said the Naxals were entrenched in the adjoining districts of Bankura and Purulia also and it was difficult to say how many were there. Earlier, in an interview in a forest adjoining Lalgarh, Maoist leader Mullajhola Koteshwar Rao alias Kishanji “calmly admitted both the murder of Badal Ahir, a member of the Pingboni local committee and the plot to assassinate West Bengal chief minister Buddhadeb Bhattacharjee. We wanted to kill the chief minstier because the people wanted him to die,” Kishanjee claimed. “We failed. But in future if people give out the same verdict, we will re-plot his assassination” he threatened according to the news report. The media reported that Kishanji might have escaped the police dragnet in Lalgarh area. Naturally he would flee because instead of taking concerted action, the state government and Centre are finger pointing at each othe,r playing the blame game for their inaction against the Naxalites takeover of parts of West Bengal.

Is there a connection between all the above reports (actually I have given only a few of them)? Yes; there is. The bottom line we have a uncoordinated, poorly planned and highly politicised internal security system that is being executed by de-motivated paramilitary and police forces. That is why nobody takes the rule of law seriously, because one has to search for it.

It is no mystery why government in Delhi or elsewhere is not taking seriously the Naxalite threat which is there in nearly 160 districts of the country. Because, they are reluctant. Only Chhattisgarh had taken concerted action against them and it had been facing the flak from Left intellectuals and even the Centre!

So what are we waiting? For another 26/11 to happen I suppose. Then we can have yet another episode of media circus and political mudslinging, appoint a commission to inquire into the new born 26/11 and proceed to suppress the inquiry report from public dissemination. The Maharashtra government has just done it.

India: Military Snippets-4

Pinaka' tested successfully

Media reports Balasore, August 13, 2008: Army and defence scientists jointly carried out sample trials of ‘Pinaka’ multi-barrel rocket launcher (MBRL) weapon system being developed by India on August 13 at the Proof Experimental Establishment (PXE) Chandipur-on-sea, about 15 km from Balasore in Orissa state. According to a defence official, the objective of the trials was “to assess its stability in flight as well as accuracy and consistency."

'Pinaka' had already undergone several tests since 1995. 'Pinaka' is an area weapon system to supplement the existing artillery fire power at ranges beyond 30 km. Its advantages are quick response time and high rate of fire. The unguided rocket system 40 km, 'Pinaka' can fire salvo of 12 rockets in 44 seconds. One salvo each (12 rockets) from the battery of six launchers can neutralise at a time a target area of 3.9 sq km.

The system's capability to incorporate several types of warheads makes it deadly with ability to destroy solid structures and bunkers.

Muslim soldier's entry into Puri temple creates flutter

Media report, 13 Aug 2008, Puri: The entry of a a Muslim soldier who came with an army brigadier into the Jagannath temple, a 12th century shrine, which is off-limits to non-Hindus caused a flutter in this temple town in Orissa. Some priests there raised an alarm after they saw the soldier's name badge.

Havildar M A Rashid said "I had absolutely no idea about the rule. Nobody stopped me at the temple gate." Rashid is employed at the Army Air Defence College at Golabandha in Gopalpur, accompanied Brig. Prakash. The brigadier defended his bodyguard's unintentional mistake.

The visit of Rashid was certainly unintentional and it is better to ignore it. But at the same time Army should understand and act appropriately respecting local sentiments. Unfortunately we do not understand why men in uniform accompany officers on their private jaunts.

Defence Minister Orders probe into Congo charges

Media reports; 14 Aug 2008, New Delhi: Indian defence minister A K Antony quickly ordered a thorough and time-bound investigation into the UN allegations of sexual exploitation and child abuse by Indian soldiers in Congo. He was responding to UN secretary-general Ban Ki-moon who asked for disciplinary action to the “maximum degree permitted by Indian law” against those found to be involved in the case. A UN statement had said that its internal investigation had found prima facie evidence that Indian soldiers "may" have engaged in sexual exploitation and child abuse while serving in Congo during 2007-2008.

It had alleged that as many as 100 Indian soldiers could be involved in having sex with minor Congolese girls in exchange for food or small sums of money in North Kivu Province in Congo.

This is not the first time allegations of such aberrations have been made about peace-keeping troops deployed in UN mission (MONUC) in Congo. Such allegations have been made against armies of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh of MONUC and Sri Lanka while serving in Haiti. The alleged offences range from gold smuggling to arms trading, and of course exploitation of girls.

The Army’s reaction in July 2008 to this report is interesting. It had brushed aside allegations against Indian soldiers regarding gold smuggling and arms trading as a malicious campaign to "undermine the credibility" of its soldiers deployed in Congo It said all allegations against its soldiers ranging from gold smuggling and arms trading to even sexual exploitation had been found 'false and baseless'.

Only one incident of 'aberrant behaviour' by in the peace-keeping mission in Congo came to light during the probe conducted into the allegations by UN’s Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS).

The army said disciplinary action had been initiated against the three Indian soldiers — a Lt-Colonel, a subedar and a havaldar — after their involvement was contained in the UNOIOS report. This it said was in keeping with its 'zero tolerance' policy against any acts of omission or commission which violates 'the code of professional ethics'. The facts of the case in question are that an Indian soldier was 'lured' into purchasing a small quantity of counterfeit gold dust for around $480 by a local trader in the North Kivu province of Congo.

Investigations have revealed the soldier, on becoming aware of having being cheated, along with his JCO and his immediate superior officer, detained the trader to recover the money. Subsequently, the trader, an anti-social element, returned the money," said media reports quoting an officer…The three soldiers were recalled to India. After detailed investigations, headed by a Lt-General, and disciplinary action initiated against the three under the Army Act.

But Ban Ki Moon’s statement has made all the difference. The OIOS report has alleged that Indian peacekeepers were involved in a child prostitution racket being run near a base camp at Masisi. The Army had ordered an "internal inquiry" by Brigadier Inderjeet Narayan, commander of the North Kivu brigade after its vice-chief Lt-Gen Milan Naidu visited Congo in May.

India has the largest presence in the 16,475-strong MONUC with 4372 soldiers. This is followed by Pakistan with 3,551 soldiers. At present, India has 8,896 soldiers deployed in six UN missions.

Generally Indian soldiers have a very good record as peace keepers of the UN. In a few occasions the UN command set up which had not been the ideal to handle troops coming from different societies with armies in various stages of development. Soldiers from certain western nations have also faced problems the world over with allegations of rape, graft, unnecessary use of force not to mention the abuses like we've seen in Iraqi prisons for example.

Indian Army Act is highly restrictive regarding the individual rights of its citizens serving as its soldiers. So it has to ensure that false allegations are not foisted upon the soldiers who have no recourse to judicial remedies a common citizen enjoys. However, army should be aware that 21st century demands greater public accountability particularly from the armed forces. It has to act fairly and swiftly to ensure it does not tolerate acts of indiscipline from it soldiers, particularly when serving with international set ups.

And not only should it act but it should be known to others that it acts. Moreover, the UN working itself has been under a cloud over allegations of corruption and embezzlement for sometime now. So the UN service has to be handled with kid glove. And the army response need not be defensive but factual, without breast-beating about ‘conspiracies to tarnish its image.’

That can come through only when its credibility in responding to allegations is swift and transparent. We are confident Indian army is conscious of this and do so as it had done in J and K.

India: Military Snippets - 1

1. India successfully test fires third generation anti tank missile

On two successive days on August 6 and 7, Indian missile scientists successfully test fired the third generation hit-to-kill anti-tank missile, Nag, at Pokhran test range in Rajasthan, India. Media reports say on the first day the weapon system damaged the target, a stationary tank four km away. According to the Nag project director S.S. Mishra the missile achieved the maximum range and was on the target. The test-firing was preceded in the last few days by pre-launch transportation trials in the desert terrain "with full combat load"...

On the second day the third generation missile was successfully test fired on a "moving target.".Launched from the dedicated missile carrier, Namica, the fire-and-forget missile hit the specially-designed target, which was moving on rails at an intermediate range of two km.

2. Breaking the glass ceiling in the armed forces

A New Delhi report of August 6 says that the three secrvices of the Armed Forces have given in principle approval for the induction of women as permanent commissioned officers in non-combat streams. The Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) is expected to formally approve the proposal within the next month. According to media reports women granted permanent commission in all three forces are likely to be in position by 2013. So far women officers were given only short service commission. Short service officers cannot aspire for promotion to senior ranks. Grant of permanent commission will be a major shift in the staffing of Indian armed forces which are male dominated, with women holding senior positions only in the Army Medical Corps ann the Military Nursing Service. Perhaps the huge deficiencies in the officer cadre of the army induced the change over in policy on this aspect.

The Indian Air Force chief, Air Chief Marshal Fali Homi Major, is reported to have said on August 7 that there could come a time in future when women could fly the IAF fighter aircraft. He was replying a reporter in New Delhi whether women could ever be fighter pilots in the IAF. The IAF chief quipped, "It may happen in future, why not. The women in IAF are doing a good job.". But the he added that there was no proposal as of now to induct women as fighter pilots. "No proposal is under consideration right now. We will have to give a lot of thought on it"...So the ceiling might be cracking but the lid is on the cookie jars.

3. IAF sets up aerospace control base

The Indian Air Force chief Air Chief Marshal F.H. Major announced on August 8 that the IAF had set up a "dedicated space sub-branch" to coordinate all its activities on aerospace. The air chief said that the IAF had embarked on "a series of progressive steps to integrate assets in space into its operational plans". This was to synergise the capability that space provides along with the traditional systems in the IAF. "Military application (in space) is only beginning to find a foothold in this country," he added