Chennai Centre for China Studies - An appeal

The Chennai Centre for China Studies (CCCS), a premier think tank based in Chennai, India, exclusively devoted to covering developments in China, invites voluntary donations from all Indian nationals including the NRIs, in order to help its further progress and consolidation.

 The CCCS researchers include eminent analysts in India and its managing committee comprises former top civil servants, academicians and  military specialists  who remained involved in China-related work for a long time. Access to Chinese language material for research is a specialty of the CCCS. Its website www.c3sindia.org is popular and being viewed throughout the world.

So far, the CCCS has been managing its working, out of self-generated funds and limited contributions from well-wishers. To enhance its capabilities further, it now needs additional financial support and wishes to appeal for donations from the interested Indian nationals, both at home and abroad.

 Following are details which may be required in connection with remitting money to the CCCS:

Account name: Chennai Centre for China Studies
Account No.: 0475 0100 0030 228
Bank: Indian Overseas Bank
Branch Address: Tower Branch, AC-56,5th Avenue,Anna Nagar(West), Chennai- 600 040
Branch Code:  0475
IFS Code:  IOBA0000475
Swift Code: IOBAINBB001

2. The prospective donors may choose any suitable banking money transfer channel for remittance to the above mentioned bank in Chennai, India. Alternately, they may wish to send a crossed cheque direct to the CCCS by courier/air post to the office address given below.

3. The CCCS is yet to be granted exemption under 80G of Indian Income Tax act; as such, the donors may not be eligible for any tax benefit. 

The CCCS will be happy to respond if there is need for further information. 
 

Our Contact Address:

Director, Chennai Centre for China Studies (CCCS),
 2 Apoorva Apartments,
7 Maharani Chinnamma Road, Venus colony,
Alwarpet, Chennai- 600 018
Tel: 044-42113140
fax : 044-42113150

Combating terrorism: three years after 26/11

By Col. R. Hariharan 

How is India’s war on terror going on three years after 26-11 Mumbai attacks?  Like the proverbial curate’s eggs it is good in parts, while bad otherwise. 

But overall, it would be realistic to call it “limping.” In a nutshell, at the Central level the progress is somewhat better while at the state level it is uneven and tardy. At the operational level halting progress has been made in structural mechanisms and in force levels. Leadership drive and commitment to fight terrorism demonstrated in the U.S. after 9/11 attack is missing here. Even well-thought out plans continue to be hobbled by the deadweight of political priorities and considerations, rather than real time needs of counter terrorism.

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh speaking at the annual conference of the State police chiefs and Inspectors-General of Police at New Delhi on September 15, 2011 gave an overview of the progress India has so far made in combating terror. He said, "The security environment in the country continues to be uncertain. The recent terrorist attacks in Mumbai and Delhi are grim reminders of the grave challenges posed by terrorism to our national security. Over the last one year, Left wing extremism has also claimed the lives of many innocent persons and police personnel." It is doubtful whether the situation has actually improved since he made the statement. 

What is the 'Real Axis of Evil'?

The phrase ‘Axis of Evil’ coined in the wake of rise of Al Qaeda, means many things to many people. But what is the real ‘Axis of Evil’ that India should be worried about?

Well-known counter-terrorism expert B Raman’s examines this core concern while discussing the issue of terrorism in the context of India-Pakistan relations in his mail interview with Jahanzeb Aslam  published in Newsweek Pakistan. His comment “India is fully capable of dealing with Pakistan and has no concerns. What we are worried about is the increasing strategic threat from the developing Sino-Pakistani axis….This developing axis is the real axis of evil.” is noteworthy. Excerpts of the interview titled “The Real Axis of Evil”  is reproduced here for your reading. 

Excerpts:

What has India’s role been in the U.S.-led war on terror?

India’s primary role is exchange of intelligence, knowledge, experience and capabilities, and mutual assistance in legal matters with interested countries, including the U.S.

Pakistan's army: Divided it stands

[Recently I read a provocative analysis by Pervez Hoodbhoy on what is happening in Pakistan and how Pakistan army has contributed to the present state of disorder there. I am sharing it here with the readers. It presents a scary picture because an unstable Pakistan is a potential danger not only for India but South Asia as a whole.] 

By Pervez Hoodbhoy, 12 August 2011 

[Why is the Army getting weaker? The problem is not the lack of materiel – guns, bombs, men, and money. These have relatively easy fixes. Instead it is the military’s diminished moral power and authority, absence of charismatic leadership, and visibly evident accumulation of property and wealth. More than anything else, the Army has sought to please both the Americans as well as their enemies] 

Pakistan bleeds from a thousand cuts. If things had gone according to plan it is India that should have been hurting now, not Pakistan. The army’s 25 years-old low-cost, high-impact strategy of covert warfare would have liberated Kashmir and secured Afghanistan from Indian influence.

India - Independence: Partition

By Lt Gen SK Sinha (Retd.)

The Army’s contribution to India’s Independence and its role during the Partition of the Sub-Continent, have not received much attention. As one who served in the Army before and after Independence, as also witnessed the Partition holocaust, I would like to place on record my recollections of that period. My views on these two aspects of our Nation’s history are based on my personal experience and not on any erudite research.

Can India do an operation like the US did in Abbottabad?

 

By Col R Hariharan

Can Indian security forces carry out a special operation like the US SEALS did in Abbottabad?

The US SEALS struck within the backyard of Pak military establishment but in 40 minutes killed the most wanted terrorist of the decade Osama bin Laden. As the TV and other media had a field day covering the operation and its aftermath, the inevitable question why can't India carryout an operation like that to catch any of the 20-odd India's most wanted terrorists hiding in Pakistan was raised.

In answering it we must be realistic; we should not even contemplate such overseas special operations unless we fulfil three basic parameters for their success: strong national leadership with decision making ability as demonstrated by President Obama, realtime intelligence about the target before, during and after the operations, and technical support system including air lift and communication for special forces. I fear at present we do not fulfil any of these three basic parameters.

India-China Relations: Getting out of the Gridlock

By Col R Hariharan (Retd.)

 

Coming to terms with each other

During the last three decades the global security environment has drastically changed, ushering in greater cooperation and convergence among nations.  Both China and India have taken advantage of the significant changes in world economic order following the liberalisation of global trade. This process has been helped by rapid advances in information technology and networked communication. China had a head start of a decade and a half over India in revamping its economy and clocked double digit growth during this period. China’s domestic saving rate of over 50 percent has enabled it to develop extensive infrastructure. These advantages have helped it emerge as global manufacturing hub. However, its economy is largely dependent upon exports.

India despite waking up to a late start is also on the high growth path. Though not as spectacular as China, Indian economy is also growing at a steady rate of above eight percent. India has emerged as world leader in IT based services. Blessed with a large English knowing population, it has become a source of managerial and engineering talent for multi national companies. Indian entrepreneurs are investing globally more than ever before; they have acquired more overseas enterprises than the Chinese. Despite poor infrastructure, its manufacturing industry is clawing its way to be on par with more advanced economies of the world. Unlike China, its economy is dependent more upon domestic consumption than exports.  In short, Indian economy has become too big for China to ignore, just as India finds China.

Setting aside the contentious issues of long gestation for routine consideration, both China and India countries have been pragmatic in trying to build better political, economic and trade relations. China-India trade, though weighted heavily in favour of China, which was at $ 38.2 billion in 2007, is estimated to have reached $ 32 billion million mark in the first six months of 2010! After Prime Minister Dr Man Mohan Singh visited Beijing and met with Chinese Wen Jiabao in January 2008, the two countries came out with a vision statement titled “a shared vision for the 21^st century.”  Like all vision statements it painted a rosy future of shared perceptions and projections. Its progress had been slow and measured with both countries opting for safe options rather than looking for out of the box ideas.

Managing the global financial crisis

Both China and India appear to have managed cope up with the global financial crisis struck it in their own fashion, despite differences in their political systems and processes. However, the export dependent Chinese manufacturing economy suffered more though Indian service industry dependent upon the U.S. and European markets also faltered.

Though a number of Western analysts are sceptical of China’s economic recovery, the International Monetary Fund’s July 2010 review is more kind. It said, “China was hit hard by the global financial crisis. However, the authorities’ quick, determined, and effective policy response has helped mitigate the impact on the economy and ensured that China has led the global recovery.” [1]

Despite millions of job losses due to fall in exports, China clocked 6.1 per cent growth in the first quarter of 2009 to achieve a growth of over 9 per cent at the end of the year. It is targeting a growth of 10.5 per cent this year. The IMF further added: “China’s recovery had significant positive spillovers to the region and the global economy, initially through increased demand for commodities—contributing to an upswing in global commodity prices—and later through higher imports of capital goods. The balance of payments saw a dramatic shift with the current account falling quickly as exports slowed and imports surged. Despite the lower current account, reserve accumulation has continued to be rapid.”

Not only that; China with a foreign exchange reserve of around $2 trillion took full advantage of the U.S. fiscal crisis to create a space for itself in the  international power equation. The West has come to look to China for stabilizing their sagging economies. The impact of these moves is evident in the subtle changes in the way the U.S. and the West had been looking at China. The U.S. started downplaying its perennial complaints about human rights abuses in China. It has recognised the role China can play in keeping the military regime in Myanmar in leash.

United Kingdom had already gone a step further. Even as early as October 29, 2008 British foreign secretary David Miliband had apologized to China for not having renounced those actions British actions in the past, including the Simla Accord (1913) and thus the McMahon Line, describing them an anachronism and colonial legacy.[2] The British “apology” used as a political expediency has probably knocked down the fundamental basis of India’s stand on the Sino-Indian border dispute.

The global financial downturn has underlined two things. Firstly, China has to maintain its world leadership status in manufacturing and that would imply meeting the increasing demand for raw material and energy resources. It has to open up new markets for Chinese products while keeping the competitive economies of Asia and America at bay. Though this might be viewed as an exercise in international trade, it has to be driven by international relations backed by strategic defence capability. Secondly, China appears to have understood the all encompassing nature of strategic security and economic security as one of its key drivers. This appears to have been missed out by other major powers including the U.S. 

Strategic perceptions

China’s present strategy appears to focus on managing the external environment to ensure conditions conducive to its economic development. China’s manufacturing industry has increasingly huge appetite for petroleum and raw material inputs sourced from all over the world including Africa and Latin America. Chinese goods are finding their way the world over. China’s international relations appear to be mainly focused on retaining its status as a global economic power with the PLA safeguarding such interests. It has shown little hesitation in dealing with ‘rogue regime’ like Sudan and Myanmar to serve its purpose.

As China looks increasingly to outside world for its growth and prosperity, and for an increasing role in the global power structure, its vulnerability increases. So from a nation drawing its strength land based forces, China is working to increasing its maritime capability.  Protecting the ‘sea lines of communication’ (SLOC), improving port infrastructure in Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Pakistan etc. along the SLOC and keeping the seas free of piracy in choke points are all important for China’s maritime security. To fulfil these obligations, we can expect Chinese naval presence in international waters to increase in the coming years.

A second aspect is the Chinese perception of threats to national unity and internal stability. China’s Defence White Paper 2008 makes a pointed reference to “Separatist forces working for "Taiwan independence," "East Turkistan independence" and "Tibet independence" pose threats to China's unity and security.[3] China’s promotion of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) started with special focus on terrorist threat originating in the Central Asian and Afghan regions has relevance to this perception. Significantly the White Paper also talks of damages caused by increasing non-traditional security threats like terrorism, natural disasters, economic insecurity, and information insecurity showing a clear understanding strategic security threats in the modern context.

In consonance with these perceptions, the Pentagon Report 2010 “Military and Security Development Involving the People’s Republic of China” identifies three components of PLA mission.[4] These are providing guarantee of strength for the CCP to consolidate its rule, provide security guarantee for safeguarding the period of opportunity for national development and providing powerful strategic support. The PLA modernisation which is going for a decade now has to be understood in this context.

China continues to be wary of US intentions in the Asia-Pacific region including in South Asia. Beijing’s Defence White Paper 2008 had described the ‘increasing US military presence in Asia-Pacific’ as China’s ‘security concern.’[5] China’s opposition to the US-led ‘exclusive bilateral alliances in Asia – Pacific region, all left over by the cold war’ was highlighted by Lt. Gen Ma Xiaotian the Chinese delegate to the Shangrila 2009 Dialogue.[6] The Pentagon Report 2010 “Military and Security Development Involving the People’s Republic of China” presented to the U.S. Congress has expressed its concern on this count, particularly with reference to development of China’s navy, missile and nuclear capabilities. So India’s growing strategic convergence with the U.S. and the signing of Indo-US civilian nuclear agreement has increased Chinese suspicions of India.

Frozen attitudes  

Based on its historical experience, China is highly sensitive to its territorial integrity. It considers it as a “unitary whole and inviolable.” It will not tolerate foreign intrusions into China, creation of concessions, or any coercive seizure of territory from Chinese control (e.g., Hong Kong and Taiwan). As analyst Dean Cheng puts it “In the South Asian context, from the perspective of the CCCP leadership, Tibet, like Taiwan, is part of China, and any threat to Chinese control is wholly unacceptable.”[7]

China is not prepared to accept borders that were demarcated in the past by foreign powers. In order to “correct” border issues, China had used force to strengthen its stance both against the Soviet Union (1969) and India (1962). Now that China is economically and militarily stronger than ever before, it has the capability and leadership to do it again if the need arises. Whether China would indulge in this luxury when it is trying to assert its international status as a responsible power would probably be dictated by the global environment.

India’s military defeat in 1962, when the Chinese Premier Chou En-Lai decided to “teach a lesson to India,” has left a legacy of suspicion and distrust on all things Chinese. In a way the 1962 war was a culmination of India’s failure to read the Chinese correctly and take timely action in the years preceding the war. As veteran leader of freedom struggle JB Kripalani said even before the war, India had lost “12,000 square miles of our territory without striking a single blow.”[8]  He was referring to the Aksai Chin area in Eastern Ladakh through which the Chinese had built a road linking Tibet with Xingjian in 1957-58. And India took note of Chinese intrusion only in 1959!

Though the 1962 Sino-Indian war was smaller in scale than India’s later day wars with Pakistan, it had far reaching effects in both countries. It was a big loss of face for India, which was a founder leader of the Non Aligned Movement in the seventies. But probably more lasting damage was done to India’s self confidence in dealing with China on an equal footing. Even after nearly five decades of the 1962 war, many in India consider the Chinese not trustworthy and nurture deep animosity.

On the other hand, the war reinforced Chinese suspicions of India’s intentions in Tibet. No doubt this was coloured due to the continued presence of Dalai Lama and a large number of Tibetan refugees in India, who aspire for freedom. The resounding success in the war probably encouraged China to believe that India could be browbeaten with an aggressive stance.

As the Dalai Lama is aging, the issue of his succession remains a potential source of internal unrest in Tibet. Its effect could make it an explosive issue among the Tibetan refugees in India. This is an issue in which India can do little, unless both the Dalai Lama and China want it. The future is unclear and only time can tell how the Tibetan issue will pan out.

 

Shaping of India policy

China considers India as the most important nation in South Asia. India has the largest population next only to China. Indian economy is growing at a fast pace and Indian goods and services dominate South Asian markets. Indian armed forces are undergoing modernisation. India has developed its own medium and short range missiles and its air force has acquired Russian made Sukhoi30MK I combat aircraft which is superior to the ones supplied to China. Indian navy is also getting an aircraft carrier from Russia. India is building its own nuclear submarine which is facilitated by its experience with nuclear submarine leased from Russia.

Ever since the Chinese occupation of Tibet in 1950, the contentious issues of un-demarcated India-Tibet border and its claims in Aksai Chin and South Tibet (Arunachal Pradesh) have become strategically important for China for reasons of both stability and internal security.

According the Pentagon Report 2010, to improve the PLA capability in the region the liquid fuelled CSS-3 IRBMs (intermediate range ballistic missiles) have been replaced with more advanced solid fuelled CSS-5 MRBMs (medium range ballistic missiles) and developing infrastructure in a big way. The Report also states that China was investing in road development along the Sino-Indian border “primarily to facilitate development in Western China; improved roads would also support PLA border defence operations.” It also speaks about possible contingency plan to induct airborne troops in this region.

The strategic sensitivity of Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh claimed by the Chinese has grown since 1962 for controlling the restive populations of Xingjian and Tibet and integrate them. As Pakistan and Nepal could influence the sensitive underbelly of these regions building strategic relations is imperative for China. For developing a major Chinese conventional or unconventional threat against India their geographical location can be handy.

China has leveraged Pakistan’s animosity to India to its advantage to build multifaceted relationship with Pakistan. Over the years it has been the main supplier of weapons systems and air and naval combat craft. Pakistan is one of the few countries where China is co-producing K8 trainer aircraft and JF17 fighter aircraft. China has also supplied Pakistan with M-11 SRBM (short range ballistic missiles). It was also involved in helping Pakistan develop technology to produce nuclear weapons. This bonding is growing and ultimately. The development of road, rail and gas pipeline infrastructure between China and Pakistan through the Gilgit-Baltistan region as well as port facilities in Gwadar have a large strategic context for both China and Pakistan. While China’s remote Xingjian gains direct access to the major sea routes, the rail and road communications would provide for better development of the region. It will also enable China to strength its strategic presence in this troubled region.  

Nepal’s social, cultural and economic activity had been dominated by India for centuries. However, the Chinese shadow has been growing over the country for sometime now. The rise of Maoists in Nepal’s power structure gives China greater ability to influence government policy. There is a sizeable segment in Nepal which would like to wean away the country from overwhelming Indian influence. Greater interaction and trade and commerce with China would find support from this segment.

Even otherwise, the Nepalese government would welcome improved infrastructure link with Tibet.  Prime Minister Madhav Kumar Nepal had requested China to extend the Beijing-Lhasa railway line to Kathmandu at a Chinese cultural festival in Kathmandu on October 10, 2009. He said: "The economic ties between Nepal and China could be taken to a new height if the railway line that has reached up to Lhasa from mainland China could be extended up to Kathmandu, and economic infrastructure could be developed on the Himalayan transit points between Nepal and China."[9] While Nepal would benefit by the railway link, it will have far reaching strategic significance for India. In any future Indian confrontation with China it would help faster build up of Chinese forces against, particularly when China completes the construction a network of six railway lines in Tibet by 2020.

Periodic tensions and growing uneasiness

Despite the increasing political and trade links, India China relations continue to be shaken up by periodic turbulence. There are a number of reasons for this.

India has generally been playing down China’s periodic needling in a bid to keep its fall out within manageable proportions so that functional relations are not damaged. As a result, India has given the impression of a passive partner in its interactions with China. It has taken little action to erase this popular impression.

This has only reinforced the general belief that India has given up on the issue of Chinese occupation of the Aksai Chin region accepting it as a fact of life. Even the issue of finding an alignment acceptable to both countries to delineate the 4,057 km border has made little progress despite 13 rounds of talks. So in times of turbulence these hardy perennial issues always surface among the people.

In February 2009 barely a year after the joint vision statement, there was an escalation of tension between the two countries. The Chinese objected to the visit of Indian Prime Minister Dr Man Mohan Singh to Arunachal Pradesh. The Chinese Foreign Ministry conveyed similar objections when President Pratibha Patil visited Tawang in early April. India played down these aberrations, and dealt with the issue at the government level.

However, the Chinese did not allow their objections to be dismissed as another instance of Chinese ambivalence in handling of foreign relations.[10] The Chinese started issuing visas stapled to passports in the case of Indian citizens of Kashmir origin. The issue came to a head when China refused to issue a visit to a serving officer of the army - Lt General Jamwal who had commanded troops in Kashmir. New Delhi has reacted strongly an issued a demarche to Beijing. India is also reported to have reciprocated by refusing visas to Chinese PLA officers including one who was to attend a course at the National Defence College in India. For the time being, India had suspended other military interactions with China.

The situation got further heated up when Selig S. Harrison in an article in the New York Times of August 27, 2010 said “…reports from a variety of foreign intelligence sources, Pakistani journalists and Pakistani human rights workers reveal two important new developments in Gilgit-Baltistan: a simmering rebellion against Pakistani rule and the influx of an estimated 7,000 to 11,000 soldiers of the People’s Liberation Army.”[11] B Raman commenting on the report said: Selig’s wake-up call should not have been a surprise to intelligence sources and policy-makers in India and the US. They were aware of the high level of involvement of the PLA of China and its nuclear establishment in the construction and maintenance of high-altitude roads in Gilgit-Baltistan. The PLA was interested in infrastructure development and maintenance in Gilgit-Baltistan because of its strategic importance for possible use by the PLA in the event of another military conflict with India. China’s nuclear establishment was interested because it wanted to use the PLA-constructed Karakoram Highway as an overland route for the movement of missiles and spare parts to Pakistan.”[12] 

Apparently alarmed at the increasing collaboration between China and Pakistan, Prime Minister Dr Man Mohan Singh in one of his rare public comments on China cautioned the nation about the changing attitude of China. He told the Times of India, “China would like to have a foothold in South Asia and we have to reflect on this reality, we have to be aware of this. There is a new assertiveness among the Chinese. It is difficult to tell which way it will go. So it's important to be prepared” The news report said the Prime Minister also cautioned that China could use India's “soft underbelly” of Kashmir, a region disputed with Pakistan, “to keep India in low level equilibrium.”[13]

Getting out of the gridlock

China has achieved big power status conferred by its booming economy and military strength. In keeping with this, it will continue to expand its presence in South Asia just as it had already done with ASEAN countries. A significant feature of China’s trade relations is it does not allow contentious and unsettled political issues with other nations to interfere in developing trading relations with them.  Japan and Taiwan are two good examples of this policy. China is doing the same in India where it has emerged as the largest trading partner.

As Dr Man Mohan Singh had said the world is large enough for India and China to “cooperate and compete”. However, South Asia is India’s area of influence and dominance. So when China makes forays into South Asia it will increasingly compete with India in gaining political, social and economic influence in South Asian countries. As China’s strategic security perceptions are closely interwoven with economic and energy security, all Chinese moves will have a strategic content.  

In the case of Pakistan it has already built close strategic relations. It has invested in Afghanistan in copper mining and it is also involved in infrastructure projects there. As already discussed China is increasing its infrastructure and political links with Nepal. China is also in the process of building closer relations with Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. It has given liberal loans and assistance to develop land and port infrastructure in the two countries. Both Bangladesh and Sri Lanka governments and armed forces have developed fraternal relations over the years. China will attempt to build even closer relations with these two countries when the PLA navy graduates into blue water league in the coming decade and make their presence in strength in the Indian Ocean region.

We have to get out of the shrill rhetoric that flows from populist perceptions of China. India has to recognise the realities of Chinese presence in South Asia. To manage this development, our strategic foreign policy formulation on China has to be holistic and not piecemeal. At present our national leadership and security watchdogs do not appear to be ready to embark upon such a visionary approach. Thus as a nation we are reconciled to pedestrian strategies. So it is not surprising our China policy comes alive only in the form of reactive responses rather than strategic initiatives. If strategic initiatives are in existence, their visibility is low and their articulation is not audible. 

 

Former Indian Ambassador to China Salman Haider’s remark “We are stuck in an unproductive course” aptly sums up the mental gridlock in which we find ourselves while dealing with China.[14] How long are we going to continue with endless talks at the level of bureaucracy? People who have had career long exposure to China like R Swaminathan have stressed the need to look for out of the box ideas to resolve at least the issues which are manageable by both sides - the boundary question and Chinese claims on Indian territory.[15] We have enough expertise to give form to such solutions. But political leadership has to get out of the mental block on China to make a break through. Ultimately it all boils down to visionary national leadership. Do we have it? That is the moot point.   

(Col. R Hariharan, a retired Military Intelligence officer is associated with the South Asia Analysis Group, and the Chennai Centre for China Studies. E-mail:colhari@yahoo.com Website: www.colhariharan.org)

Written on October 6, 2010 for www.cnfworldfocus.org 

---

NOTES

[1] http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2010/pn10100.htm  

[2] Times of India, January 9, 2010  http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/UK-stand-on-McMahon-Line-bolstering-Beijings-  claims/articleshow/5426009.cms

[3] China’s National Defense in 2008, Beijing January 2009 http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/2008DefenseWhitePaper_Jan2009.pdf 

[4] Department of Defense,  http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2010_CMPR_Final.pdf

[5] China’s National Defense in 2008, Beijing January 2009

[6] Shangrila Dialogue 2009: 2nd Plenary Session 30 May 2009

[7] China’s view of South Asia and Indian Ocean, 31 August, 2010 http://www.heritage.org/Research/Lecture/China-s-View-of-South-Asia-and-the-Indian-Ocean  

[8] Lok Sabha Debates 11 April 1961                                                                               

[9] Quoted by B Raman, China: India’s Strategic Strangulation South Asia Analysis Group Paper no. 4069 dated  28 September, 2010 www.southasiaanalysis.org

[10] This is one of the frequent themes of analysts who look for differences within the leadership or between the foreign minis try and the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) in foreign policy decision making.

[11] http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/27/op...20china&st=cse

[12] South Asia Analysis Group paper No. 4042 September 15, 2009 “

[13] Reuters, 7 September 2010

[14] DNA, 10 September 2010 http://www.dnaindia.com/

[15] SAAG Paper no. 2569  29-Jan.-2008 Indian Prime Minister’s Visit to China – Jan. 2008 www.southasiaanalysis.org

Building a meaningful strategic relationship with China

By Col R Hariharan

The recent India-China stand-off over the issue of a Chinese visa for Lt General BS Jaswal, a serving commander of Northern Command, has highlighted the tenuous nature of existing ties between the two countries. This incident has shown the limitations in building a military relationship with China, in the absence of greater and closer strategic relationship between the two countries. At present the military relationship in a nascent stage limited to goodwill visit of senior officers and naval ships. There had been a few low level exercises with the participation of sub units of armies of both the countries.

It also raises the fundamental question whether India can build a meaningful military relationship at all with China? Both the countries have no choice to build a strategic relationship in which military relationship would be an important segment. So far India-China relationship building had been a halting process, despite appreciable growth in mutual trade largely to the advantage of China. So building a military relationship is going to be a long haul filled with minefields of petty misunderstandings and minor confrontations.

Building a military relationship is inextricably intertwined with a number of strategic issues in which the two countries have conflicting interests – China’s territorial claims in India’s border areas, presence of sizeable Tibetan refugees who refuse to accept Chinese rule in Tibet, China’s growing relations with India’s close neighbours, growth of integrated strategic defence ties between China and Pakistan, and China’s increasing presence in the Indian Ocean region. These issues have gained new dimensions after the US economic downturn and Washington’s efforts to scale down its strategic moves to contain China. China’s rapid progress in military modernisation – particularly naval and missile capability – have strengthened and made its ambitions to become a global super power a little more realistic.

India had been bending over backwards to accommodate China’s periodic aberrations in its fragile relations. It had always played down even reports of Chinese border intrusions and protests over Indian prime minister’s visits to Arunachal Pradesh. However, New Delhi has reacted strongly in the case of Lt General Jamwal’s visa to China. Apart from issuing a demarche to Beijing, India has reciprocated by refusing visas to Chinese PLA officers including one to attend a course at the National Defence College in India. It has also suspended other military interactions with China, at least for the time being.

If we go by India’s defence minister AK Antony’s reaction the following day, New Delhi appears to have had second thoughts on the issue and tried to play down the whole thing, even as the media went gewgaw over the incident. Answering a media question on the incident, he said "We have close ties with China. There may be some short term problems (emphasis added) but they will not come in the country’s overall approach towards our neighbour." Does this mean the defence minister, who gives form to India’s national defence, has failed to read the strategic signal Beijing has sent with this incident? After all India has gulped down similar rebuffs from Canada to its serving and retired army officers in denying visa for private visits on even more specious grounds. Then why raise the ante in the first place, when China poses a problem over visas?

As B Raman has pointed out in his recent article " Dealing with China’s machinations in J and K" (available at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers41%5Cpaper4004.html) there appears to be a distinct shift in Chinese policy regarding the status of J and K. This is probably in keeping with China’s revised strategic security perceptions. The first relates to Xinjiang – the region troubled by Uighur revolt - on its south-western flank. The potential for Uighur revolt increases when the strategic environment of the Taliban dominated areas along Pakistan-Afghan border changes for the worse as and when American military power is scaled down over the next year.

A second aspect, related to earlier issue, is the likelihood of Pakistan increasing its clout in this region when the muscle power of Taliban increases after American exit. So it would be in China’s interest to further consolidate its strategic relations with Pakistan over the long term. It would also serve China’s global interests: improve China’s access to the Arabian Sea and its energy security. Of course, an added incentive is a militarily more reliable and stronger Pakistan would keep India busy on its western flank. China would then be able to leverage it to its advantage both in negotiations and confrontations with India.

India has always had a problem in rationalising its policy making to meet the needs of national interests in a changing strategic environment. Even on other issues that require real time action, there is a lot of foot dragging and uncertainty to the detriment of national interest both in internal and external policy making. As a direct consequence even manageable issues like Kashmir unrest, Naga insurgency, and Maoist upsurge have become hardy perennials. While these issues have a large internal content, it has also affected foreign policy making with a lack of clarity and definition. India will have to be proactive in building relations with other nations, with clear and visible demarcation of its own interests where it would not make compromises. This is essential in dealing with countries like China who see their own interest in clearly defined terms in every move they make and action they take. The Chinese have made good use of India’s weakness in this respect to needle India as and when it suits them.

Any improvement in this regard requires a change in national mindset. It is doubtful whether the present Indian national leadership, including the political community as a whole, is ready to take charge, instead of deferring decisions and debating the frivolous. Unless this is done, it is going to be increasingly difficult to deal with China. India has to foster a win-win relationship with China. It is essential for handling contentious issues that are often in conflict with national security interests of both the countries. Otherwise as national security interests gather more form and content, India would be the loser. And we cannot afford to do that

Courtesy: South Asia Analysis Group, August 29, 2010
URL: http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers41%5Cpaper4005.html

Is Afghanistan heading for partition?

Is Afghanistan heading for partition, as President Karzai tries to mend fences with the Taliban and the Americans want to wind up their longest ever foreign military campaign? It would appear so. If it happens it will have far reaching strategic implications for South Asian security, particularly for India and Pakistan. Another round of civil war between the Pashto dominant and Pakistan supported Taliban and the other minority tribals is also likely putting the clock back on Afghanistan's perilous experiment with Western democratic practice.

Actually, it was former US ambassador to India Robert D Blackwill set the ball rolling with his article 'A de facto partition for Afghanistan' after which a series of analytical articles on the topic have appeared. A selection of such articles is given below:

Ethnic divide threatens Afghanistan by Laura King
In Los Angeles Times, July 17, 20019
URL http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-afghan-ethnic-tension-20100717,0,7025054,print.story

Needed: A new political order in the Hindu-Kush region: Time has come to accept the de facto partition of Afghanistan by Brahma Chellaney
In The Sunday Guardian, July 18, 2010
URL http://chellaney.spaces.live.com/blog/cns!4913C7C8A2EA4A30!1227.entry

End of the game by K Subhrahmanyam
In Indian Express, July 13, 2010
URL http://www.indianexpress.com/news/end-of-the-game/645627/0

A de facto partition for Afghanistan by Robert D. Blackwill
July7,2010
URL http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0710/39432.html

Chinese Interest in Hambantota, Chittagong Ports --- An Update

By B Raman

China, which is already meeting in the form of a soft loan from its Ex-Im Bank 85 per cent of the cost of construction (US $ 360 million) of the first phase of the Hambantota port in Southern Sri Lanka, has agreed to give another soft loan of US $ 200 million towards the cost of construction of the second phase due to start early next year. An agreement in this regard was signed by the concerned officials during the visit of Chinese Vice Premier Zhang Dejiang to Colombo from June 10 to 12, 2010. With this, the total Chinese funding for the project will come to about US $ 500 million, out of its total estimated cost of US $ one billion. The project being undertaken in three phases is expected to be completed by 2023. It is too early to say whether China will substantially fund the third and last phase too.

2. The first stage due to be ready by end 2010 will allow three ships to berth. The final stage, for which there is no offer of funding yet from China, is planned to accommodate more than 30 ships, which is the present capacity at Colombo. President Mahinda Rajapaksa is trying to develop Hambantota in his home district into another Colombo with its own port as big and as modern as Colombo, its own international airport at Weerawila, its own oil storage facilities and refinery, its own tourist hub, its own international conference hall and its own complex of sports stadia to enable it to bid for the Asian Games one day. He is hoping that the Chinese will ultimately fund the major part of the cost of his Hambantota dream. He has also sought South Korean funding for the proposed international conference hall.

3. While China has readily expanded its financial commitment for the Hambantota project, it is still to make up its mind on the request from Sheikh Hasina, Prime Minister of Bangladesh, made during her visit to China in March last for Chinese financial and construction assistance for the expansion and modernization of the Chittagong port. While the Chinese have agreed to consider her request sympa-thetically, they have not yet come out with a concrete project. Expectations that they would make a firm announcement during the just-concluded visit (June 13 and 14, 2010) to Dhaka by Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping have been belied.

4. Local news agencies did report that during his talks with Sheikh Hasina, Mr.Xi “proposed to give assistance to Bangladesh for building a deep seaport in Chittagong and installing the country's first space satellite” and that “Beijing also agreed to quickly disburse its assistance for the Pagla Water Treatment Plant and the Shahjalal Fertiliser Factory”, but there was no official announcement. Briefing reporters on the outcome of the talks, Foreign Minister Dipu Moni said the Chinese side assured more investment in Bangladesh, and promised to reduce the bilateral trade imbalance by allowing more Bangladeshi products to have duty-free access to the Chinese market. She added that the Chinese agreed to help Bangladesh in ensuring food security and in combating militancy and terrorism. She also said that China also agreed to extend cooperation for the development of telecommunication and infrastructure in Bangladesh. While there was thus a mention of Chinese assistance for the development of infrastructure, there was no specific reference to the proposal for Chinese assistance for the expansion and modernization of the Chittagong port. The issue was formally raised by Sheikh Hasina with the Chinese leaders only in March and it is perhaps too early for the Chinese to come out with a formal proposal.

5. After Gwadar on the Mekran coast of Pakistan, the first phase of which has already been completed and the port commissioned, their focus has been on the early completion of the first phase of the construction of the Hambantota port and its commissioning by the end of this year and the start of the second phase. They are attaching equal priority to the timely completion of the Kyakpyu port off the Arakan coast in Myanmar, the construction of which started last year. While they are interested in taking up the project for the expansion and modernization of the Chittagong port, it does not as yet seem to enjoy the same priority as Gwadar, Hambantota and Kyakpyu, which, in their view, are important for ensuring their energy flows from West Asia and Africa. They do not seem to attach the same urgency to the Chittagong project from the point of view of their energy flows.

6. There are so far no indications of a Chinese interest in a naval base at Hambantota or Kyaukpyu or Chittagong. Their interest in a naval base at Gwadar remains strong. Retired Chinese naval officials have been underlining the importance of rest, refueling and re-stocking facilities for Chinese ships deployed in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden. Gwadar is attractive in this regard, but if the internal security situation in Balochistan where Gwadar is located remains unsatisfactory, Hambantota could become their fall-back choice.

(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)

Courtesy: South Asia Analysis Group, June 16, 2010
URL: http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers39%5Cpaper3863.html

Recommended Reading

China

1. The great China-Pak nuclear nexus by K Subrahmanyam, Times of India, June 21, 2010. URL: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/India/The-great-China-Pak-nuclear-nexus/articleshow/6072859.cms

2. Chinese alert in Xinjiang by B Raman, South Asia Analysis Group, June 19, 2010
URL: http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers39%5Cpaper3868.html

Sri Lanka

1. Comments on appointment of UN panel:

a. Lanka and UN Chief in open battle Sunday Times,Colombo, June 20,2010
URL: http://sundaytimes.lk/100620/News/nws_01.html

b. UN-becoming of the UN Editorial, The Island, June 20,2010
URL: http://www.island.lk/index.php?page_cat=news-section&page=news-section&code_title=55

2. Rejoinders on my comments on 'Who is ruling Sri Lanka'

a. India's Role by Ira de Silva, The Island, June 16, 2010
URL: http://www.island.lk/index.php?page_cat=article-details&page=article-details&code_title=91

b. ‘Who runs Sri Lanka’: A reply to Col. Hariharan by Gamini Gunawardane,
The Island, June 20, 2010
URL: http://www.island.lk/index.php?page_cat=article-details&page=article-details&code_title=391

India-China Relations: An Indian Perspective

By D. S. Rajan


At the request made through e-mail, of Senior Editor Ding Li, of Beijing-based weekly newspaper “Economic Observer”, being brought out both in English and Chinese, an article on “India-China Relations: An Indian Perspective”, containing personal views of Mr D. S. Rajan, Director, Chennai Centre for China Studies, CCCS, on the subject, was prepared; The “Economic Observer”, which began operating in 2000 with its website appearing in 2007, and which describes itself as an ‘independent’ organ nurturing ‘progressive spirit and journalistic integrity’, has now published the Chinese language version of that article for the benefit of its readers on 14 June 2010- URL: http://www.eeo.com.cn/eeo/jjgcb/2010/06/14/172597.shtml. The newspaper has informed the CCCS that such Indian perspectives will help the readers in China to better understand the bilateral relations.


The Chinese publishers have published a verbatim translation of Mr. Rajan’s article, with no attempt to censor. It is a good sign that the Chinese media like Economic Observer, have started educating their readers in such a manner about Indian sensitivities on bilateral issues. The original article of Mr Rajan in English is given below - SAAG


There is a growing perception now that the global economic gravity has shifted to Asia and that India and China, the emerging economic powerhouses in the region, will shape the Twenty-first century. In making such feelings a reality however, the nature of the future dynamics of domestic conditions as well as external relations of the two nations appears a crucial factor; this article attempts to focus in particular on the future prospects for India-China ties on the premise that this, along with the roles of other Asian powers like Japan, is going to be important in the matter of guaranteeing the stability and prosperity of the region as well as rest of the world. The article tries to present the Chinese side with Indian perspectives of key developments. Chinese perspectives are already being made available in India in a similar manner. The writer feels that put together, such exchanges will facilitate creation of a better mutual understanding between the two sides, impacting favourably on the overall India-China relationship.

Growing Optimism

Broadly speaking, India-China ties at government levels remain stable at this juncture; New Delhi and Beijing have established a ‘strategic and cooperative partnership for peace and prosperity’ and signed a document on ‘shared vision for the 21st century’, signifying that the Sino-Indian ties have gone beyond the bilateral context and acquired a global character. Accordingly, India and China are cooperating on international issues related to the diversification of global energy mix, climate change, arms control and disarmament, non-traditional security threats, counter-terrorism, WTO, WMD, human rights and South-South Co-operation. Bilaterally, the two sides now aim at building ‘a relationship of friendship and trust, based on equality, in which each is sensitive to the concerns and aspirations of the other’.

They are not viewing each other as a security threat and are by and large satisfactorily implementing confidence building measures in the disputed border, besides carrying out joint military exercises. Special Representatives of India and China have so far held thirteen rounds of border talks, though with no tangible results. Most important is that with an attitude of promoting ties looking beyond the unsolved and ‘complex’ border dispute, India and China are speeding up their trade and economic contacts. Bilateral trade is fast gathering momentum, with the volume to the tune of US$ 40 billion now and projections for US$ 60 billion by 2010.

China has emerged as India’s largest trading partner, replacing the US, in April 2008- February 2009 period. Also significant is the ongoing momentum in their exchanges of high level visits reflecting the desire of each party to forge stronger ties, of which the recently concluded state visit of Indian President Ms Patil to China is a prominent example. Notwithstanding the encouraging picture brought out above, there are issues deeply dividing India and China; resolving them once for all is of utmost necessity, to further strengthen their relations. There are some talks in India about the past civilisational contacts helping resolution of the issues; they however lack substance. As modern nation states, the India and China have developed geo-political interests, which often tend to clash. What follows is a discussion on the conditions contributing to India-China frictions and the likely scenario in bilateral ties in future.

PROBLEM AREAS


Boundary Issue

As this writer sees, the boundary issue comes foremost in the list of problem areas. It is most sensitive one for both India and China as it relates closely to territorial integrity and sovereignty in respect of each side. It therefore needs to be handled carefully by the two nations.

China’s understanding of Indian perspectives on the boundary issue will remain incomplete if it does not take into account the traditional doubts prevailing in India on China having been territorially ambitious. Examples being quoted in India in this regard include Mao’s description of China’s ‘palm’ (Tibet) and ‘five fingers’ (Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan, NEFA and Ladakh); references are also being made in India to the PRC’s sense of ‘historical loss’ of territories expressed through their maps and atlas series, published in eighties. Such maps had even been seen claiming that India’s Assam, even Andamans, were ‘historically’ parts of China.

Proceeding from ‘doubts’ to substantive points, it is being seen in India that the border positions of India and China are in conflict with each other and hence are difficult to solve. China’s claims are based on its historical stand – all its borders, including with India, are as defined during the Qing dynasty period which ended in 1912.The root of the border problem with India lies in Beijing’s position that a large chunk of its territory, especially the 90,000 Sq km area in the Eastern sector, were illegally taken away by the British India, after the 1914 Simla Convention and that India inherited the British legacy.

This has provided the rationale for Beijing in rejecting the McMahon line, a product of the Convention and in claiming the entire Arunachal Pradesh state of India as part of Chinese territory, called by it as ‘Southern Tibet’ Authoritative scholars in China have categorically stated that Beijing cannot recognize the McMahon line; if it did so, it would amount to Chinese admission of the 1962 conflict as a ‘war of aggression’ as well as an implicit acknowledgement that Tibet was once independent of China . On the other hand, for India, McMahon line remains the ‘de facto’ border with China.

The Sino-Indian border problem remains complicated with the Chinese claiming recently the 2.1 Sq km ‘finger area’ of Sikkim, the status of which as an Indian state has already been recognized by Beijing ‘de facto’. On the current scenario, meriting attention are India’s concerns arising from various factors – the reported Chinese intrusions, said to number 270 in 2008, into the Indian border, the adverse reaction of Beijing to the visit of the Indian Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh to Arunachal Pradesh, China’s bid to stop the loans for Arunachal Pradesh from the Asian Development Bank and strong Chinese state-controlled media criticisms of India’s dispatch of additional troops to and positioning of advanced fighter aircraft in its Eastern border. Adding to India’s discomfort has also been the rise in the level of Chinese media rhetoric against India, noticed in 2009; this has however subsided now.

Sino-Indian border talks, despite thirteen rounds of talks so far between two Special representatives, have not led to any tangible result in finalising a ‘frame work’ for a boundary settlement in accordance with the Agreement on Political Parameters, reached in 2005. While Beijing’s stand is to approach the border issue in the spirit of ‘mutual understanding and mutual accommodation’, India wants ‘ground realities’ to be taken into account. About the reported Chinese claim over Tawang, an interesting argument is that besides strategic factors, the same has been due to the China’s fears that Buddhist monasteries in the border including the one in Tawang have been centers of Tibetan resistance to the Chinese authority and as such, they should be taken over by it. Interestingly, the Chinese have introduced some new elements to the border question by questioning the already agreed position of keeping areas with settled populations out of the dispute. Is China ready for accommodation on the border issue? The statement made by the PRC Ambassador to India in November 2006 that both sides should make compromises on the ‘disputed’ Arunachal may be meaningful in this regard.

China’s general stand is to ‘shelve’ the difficult border issues like the one with India and instead work for ‘common development’. For e.g the PRC wants to ‘shelve’ the South China Sea territorial dispute, leave the Senkaku issue with Japan for ‘future generations’ to solve and ‘put aside the Sino-Indian border dispute waiting for a suitable climate for solution’ (Deng Xiaoping to the then Indian leader Vajpayee, Beijing, 1979). What is being noticed in India is that China never gives up its claims on sovereignty over disputed areas. An example is Japan-China settlement on exploring the disputed Chunxiao gas field in the East China Sea.

Though Beijing has agreed for joint development of the field, it has declared that China’s sovereignty over the field is indisputable. The Chinese ‘shelving’ formula needs close scrutiny of India in particular. As this writer views, this formula has inherent flaws – for some at least, the projected completion of China’s military modernization in 2050 may create new pressures on the leaders in Beijing at that time to become aggressive on all border issues. What are therefore needed are serious efforts from India and China at their border talks, leading to a ‘compromise’ based solution to the issue, much sooner than later.

OTHER BILATERAL ISSUES


Tibet Issue

Tibet issue is prominent among other problems. It can be said that with India accepting the Tibet Autonomous Region as an integral part of China and standing firmly against any anti-China activity of the Dalai Lama from India’s soil, this issue does not figure in Sino-Indian state to state relations. However, Beijing appears to be having reservations on India’s motives with respect to the Dalai Lama. The State-controlled media allegation , made on the eve of Manmohan Singh – Wen Jiabao meeting in Thailand, that the Dalai Lama is colluding with India whenever Sino-Indian border talks are held, along with the Chinese official view that the proposed visit to Arunachal Pradesh by the Dalai Lama in November 2009, ‘further exposes the anti-China and separatist nature of the Dalai clique’ and a subsequent authoritative comment that such visits cast a new shadow on Sino-Indian relations, firmly point to Beijing’s approach linking the Dalai Lama factor with the Sino-Indian border question.


China’s fears need to be understood in the context of March 2008 unrest in Tibet, posing a challenge to China’s sovereignty over that territory, even weakening Beijing’s position in its border negotiations with India. Also, the question as to why India is tolerating the Tibetan Government in Exile in its soil, seems to be bothering China. Premier Wen Jiabao’s description of the Tibet issue as a ‘sensitive’ one in relations with India, assumes significance in the context of what has been said above. The writer feels that Chinese suspicions on India-Dalai Lama relations are not going to disappear soon; the picture may change if talks between Beijing and the exiled spiritual leader succeed, but chances in this regard appear to be bleak at least for the moment.

China-Pakistan Nexus

China-Pakistan nexus is the next major bilateral issue. A better understanding is required in China about India’s sensitivities on this account. The Chinese military, missiles and nuclear help to Pakistan continues, but Beijing is not in a position to give a guarantee to India that Pakistan will not leverage such support from China, to fight against India. Not surprisingly, New Delhi perceives that China’s military assistance to Pakistan has direct implications for India.

China’s Defence Modernisation

On the third issue of China’s military modernization programme, India’s concerns are being expressed through its important government documents, for e.g. the Defence Ministry’s Annual Report (2008-2009) has said that the programme has implications for India’s defence and security. Asking Beijing to show greater transparency in its defence policy and postures, particularly on the double-digit growth in defence spending in last two decades, it has observed that China’s stated aim in its Defence White Paper for 2008 to develop missiles, space based assets and blue water naval capabilities will have an effect on the overall military environment in the neighbourhood of India. The Chinese side should properly address such concerns of India.

China’s policy towards India’s Neighborhood

India’s concerns also relate to China’s attempts to establish a strategic presence in India’s neighbourhood, for e.g port projects like Gwadar (Pakistan), Hambantota(Sri Lanka), Chittagong (Bangladesh). They are giving rise to fears in India of a Chinese encirclement of the country, under what has come to be known as a ‘string of pearls strategy’. The PRC has taken care to officially repudiate such concerns, by asserting that it has no plans to try for domination of the shipping lanes in the Indian Ocean and has no intentions to establish a chain to encircle India. An India-China understanding on the issue is a must for further improving bilateral relations.

India-US Relations

Chinese critical positions on the India-US relations are also a matter of India’s concern. The Chinese have welcomed the India-US Strategic Dialogue and are themselves promoting ties with the US. Still, China seems to nurture fears about US-India collusion against it. Its official media description of India’s policy as one ‘befriending the far and attacking the near’ is unmistakably an indirect, but strong criticism of the developing strategic relations between India and the US.

East Asia Integration


It would be necessary for China to pay attention to the Indian perception that it hesitates to accept India’s leading role in the East Asian regional integration process on the plea that the process should only be based on ASEAN+3 (China, Japan and South Korea) cooperation, and that ‘ outsiders’ like India, Australia and New Zealand have no place in it.

India’s Defence Strategy

Reports in India about the country’s defence strategy visualizing war on two fronts- Pakistan and China, have been commented upon in China. A Chinese comment (China Youth Daily) has said that India’s real target is China, not Pakistan. Indian strategic planners have only done a scenario building; war is not an option for India, which wants to settle its historic problems with its two neighbours peacefully. Under the strategy, both land and sea power are getting emphasis in India, which reflects a logical consideration of the country’s geopolitical position.

How to read Chinese Media?

The Indian public does not understand the reasons for appearance of hawkish views on India in some of China’s strategic journals/websites. Global Times and writers like Colonel Dai Xu, have often given controversial views on India. How far such views reflect official thinking remains a question in India. Is the People’s Liberation army (PLA) influencing China’s foreign policy making? Even the US Defence Secretary Robert Gates has hinted to such possibilities (Shangrila Dialogue, Singapore, 2010).The answer to such misgivings may lie in the need for reporting transparency in China.

Economy

Questions are being asked in China on how India will use its economic power. They are similar to doubts in India and abroad about China’s intentions once its modernization programme gets completed, say in 2050. China has announced peaceful development as its goal. India’s objectives are on the same lines – enriching the entrepreneurial and economic potential of the country through a suitable reform strategy as well as integrating the country with the world’s economic system under a new order. India’s increasing role in G-20 mechanism speaks for the latter in particular. Another basic point relates to attempts to compare the development models of India and China. Which one is the better? A debate may be unending in this regard- generally, the Indian model based on democracy is being viewed favourably from a long term point of view than that of China which rests on a one-party system. The main difference is that while China has been following a model based on investment flow from abroad and exports. India has been giving a boost to entrepreneurship and free enterprise. In the opinion of the writer, the Indian superiority in the service sector notwithstanding, it will not be easy for India to catch up fast with China, which has already emerged as a manufacturing giant.

What will be India’s global interests as an emerging power is another topic getting focus in China. As Dr Manmohan Singh, the Indian Prime Minister puts it, India’s goal is to gain its rightful place in the comity of nations, making full use of the opportunities offered by a globalised world, operating on the frontiers of modern science and technology and using modern science and technology as important instruments of national economic and social development. The emerging India’s partnerships with the US, China and other powers, India’s role in the G-20 mechanism etc stand to explain its interests in the 21st century. Realising its responsibilities as a growing power, India is cooperating with other nations on addressing issues of global concern like terrorism, climate change, disarmament, world trade etc.

In conclusion, it can be said that there are mixed views on China in India; Indians are noticing the prevailing good atmosphere in bilateral relations at state levels, but their concerns are continuing on China’s strategic intentions vis-à-vis India. More and more people to people contacts between the two sides can bring a beneficial change to such conditions.

(The writer, Mr D. S. Rajan, is presently Director of the Chennai Centre for China Studies, Chennai, India. Views expressed are his own. This article is a contribution to the Chinese newspaper, “The Economic Observer’, www.eeo.com.cn).

Courtesy: South Asia Analysis Group www.southasiaanalysis.org

Recommended Reading

US-India relations

US Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs Robert O Blake, Jr, discusses with Rediff.com’s Aziz Haniffa the recent inaugural U.S.-India strategic dialogue, June 14, 2010
http://news.rediff.com/slide-show/2010/jun/14/slide-show-1-interview-with-us-assistant-secretary-of-state-robert-blake.htm

Harsh V. Pant on "US-India strategic dialogue: Move beyond symbolism," June 08, 2010 http://news.rediff.com/column/2010/jun/08/us-india-strategic-dialogue-move-beyond-symbolism.htm

Af-Pak affairs

Indian Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao’s speech on "Afghanistan-India-Pakistan Trialogue" organised by Delhi Policy Group, June 13, 2010 http://meaindia.nic.in/

Former Indian Foreign Secretary Maharajakrishna Rasgotra on "Afghanistan: the march of folly," June 12, 2010 http://www.hindu.com/2010/06/12/stories/2010061265111400.htm

K. Subrahmanyam on "Iran’s N-ambitions Now ‘taqiya’ strategy comes into play" in which he discusses the issue of Shia Iran building nuclear weapon capability against Sunni (Pakistan+ Saudi) nuclear threat, June 14, 2010 http://www.tribuneindia.com/2010/20100614/edit.htm#4

The New York Times "Report Says Pakistan Intelligence Agency Exerts Great Sway on Afghan Taliban." It summarizes a report prepared by the London School of Economics http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/14/world/asia/14pstan.html

Pakistani writer Ali Sethi on "One Myth, Many Pakistans," June 11, 2010 http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/13/opinion/13sethi.html?scp=1&sq=Ali%20Sethi&st=cse