Sri Lanka: Why military matters in the North?

By Col. R. Hariharan 

President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s Victory Day speech this year on May 19 was largely a defensive discourse justifying the continued presence large army formations in the North. The sense of triumphalism that had become hallmark of Victory Day speeches was missing this year. 

This is understandable as the President’s speeches from last year onwards have become increasingly reactive as international focus on Sri Lanka in recent times had been presenting it in bad light.  Many of Sri Lanka’s problems are based on age-old prejudices and three decades of bad blood between the ethnic communities.  

Fonseka's second war

By Col R Hariharan

The presidential pardon to General Sarath Fonseka (officially it is ‘ex-General’ as he has been stripped of his hard earned rank) after he completed only two years of a three-year jail sentence should come as no surprise.

As things happen in the Island nation, the idea touched off speculations on when and how he will be released. Of course, there was a lot of build up before it really happened with the perennial political go-between Tiran Alles MP took up the General’s case for pardon with his one time pal - the President. And the former Army Chief comes up once again in national focus with the speculation on what is he going to do?   

Should India vote for war crime motion on Sri Lanka?

[This article was written for and published by www.rediff.com before the voting at UNHRC on March 22.]

This is a question that is being debated not only in the UN Human Rights Council meeting at Geneva or Sri Lanka, but in India as well. This came about, typically the way Parliament responds to issues these days, after members from Tamil Nadu stalled the crucial pre-budget parliamentary session, says Colonel R Hariharan.

Clearly Indian government is trying to find its famous "middle path" to make up its mind. And 'middle path' as per its standard operative procedure is to buy time. So we see the hapless minister, facing the flak from the media and other political parties, indulging in word play rather than answering question squarely.

Sri Lanka Perspectives – May 2011

by Col R Hariharan

External developments

Even as Sri Lanka celebrated Victory Day for the second year on May 27, allegations of war crimes and human rights violations in the last stages of its ‘final’ war the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) continued to haunt it. Sri Lanka’s damage control actions so far do not appear to have yielded much dividend. The latest in these efforts was a 3-day international seminar “Defeating Terrorism – the Sri Lankan Experience” organised by the Sri Lanka Army at Colombo from May 31. Sri Lanka expected participation from 45 countries. This is probably an exercise to vindicate the approach it adopted to defeat terrorism to deflect the increasing international flak over war crimes allegations. 

Sri Lanka: Jayalalithaa fires the first salvo

By Col. R. Hariharan
 

After staging a spectacular victory over her bête noire M Karunanidhi-led Dravida Munnetra Kazagham(DMK) in Tamil Nadu assembly elections, Ms Jayalalithaa, leader of the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazagham (AIADMK), has called upon the Indian government for action against the Sri Lanka  President Mahinda Rajapaksa for alleged war crimes and genocide of Tamils. Speaking at her very first press conference, Ms Jayalalithaa said “The President of Sri Lanka must be tried for war crimes and brought before the International Court of Law…” The AIADMK leader added, "India can no longer remain a silent spectator….If necessary, an economic blockade will have to be resorted to bring a recalcitrant Sri Lanka to heel."

Sri Lanka: Cleaning up the act

By Col R Hariharan

The report of the three-member UN  panel of experts set up to advise UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon on alleged war crimes and human rights violations committed during the final stages of the Eeelam war has produced two reactions – both on expected lines.

In the report made public by the UN on April 25, the panel found many of the allegations “credible” against both the Government of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). This has vindicated the suspicion of all those who had been accusing Sri Lanka government of committing these crimes. This section includes many liberal governments of West, INGOs, Tamil Diaspora, human rights activists both within and outside Sri Lanka and of course the rump of the LTTE still trying to revive the defunct organisation amidst Tamil Diaspora. (One will notice that I have omitted India and Tamil Nadu where attitudes are not crystallised as the issue is inexorably mired in domestic and national politics, not unlike Sri Lanka.) However, this disparate section has neither a common agenda nor a forum for collective action; it constituents widely differ on the follow up action to be taken on the report. These range from increasing diplomatic pressure to bring it up in the UN Security Council to indicting President Mahinda Rajapaksa for war crimes.     

Sri Lanka Perspectives – April 2011

By Col R Hariharan

UN advisory panel report and its fall out

The report of the three-member UN  panel of experts, set up to advise UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon on allegations of war crimes and human rights abuse during the final stages of the Eeelam war, has found credible reports of war crimes committed by both the Government of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The report released by the UN on April 25, has made the following recommendations to the Secretary General:

a.    The Government of Sri Lanka should immediately commence “genuine investigations” into these and other alleged violations of international humanitarian and human rights law committed by both sides involved in the armed conflict.

b.    The Secretary- General should immediately establish an independent international mechanism, whose mandate should include: monitoring and assessing the extent to which Sri Lanka is carrying out domestic accountability process and investigations and advising the Secretary General on its findings; and conduct investigations independently into the alleged violations.

An ode to the Indian soldier

March 09, 2011   7:57:38 PM
Manvendra Singh

While India has chosen to forget the sacrifices of its soldiers in foreign land, Sri Lanka has erected a memorial in honour of the IPKF’s fallen heroes.

I was on the lookout for Harpal’s name. Like all those who knew him I too had been devastated by the loss of the Ropar Khalsa. He had that infectious persona. I had last seen him at his unit mess, during the 1987 cricket world cup. Even as the country partook in its cricket craze, there were those who didn’t have that luxury, as they were at war for India.

Sri Lanka Perspectives – January 2011

By Col R Hariharan 

Politics

Sri Lanka political scene is getting hot as new members are being elected for 330 local bodies throughout the country on March 17, 2011. In these elections, 12.7 million voters would be electing 3,931 members to four Municipal Councils, 39 Urban Councils and 258 Pradeshiya Sabhas.

These elections in the Northern Province have become a prestigious one for President Mahinda Rajapaksa as the ruling United Peoples Freedom Alliance (UPFA) and its Tamil partner Eelam Peoples Democratic Party (EPDP) had not fared well in winning voter confidence in the presidential and parliamentary polls and local body elections for Jaffna and Vavuniya. 

Rajapaksa would like to use the local elections to establish the UPFA footprint in the North to legitimise his claim of being the leader of people from all communities. With the work on restoration of infrastructure and rehabilitation of internally displaced population going at a slow pace in the war torn north, the morale of a northern Tamils is low. Another irritant for the Tamils is the visible presence of the army everywhere; the army has been acting as an overlord of the civil administration. To top it all, law and order in Jaffna has deterriorated fast with murders and other criminal acts showing a sharp increase. So as of now UPFA and EPDP’s chances of asserting their presence in these elections in the North appear low.

The Tamil National Alliance (TNA), the former political proxy of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), contesting now as the Ilankai Tamil Arasu Katchi (ITAK) – the Tamil name of the erstwhile Federal Party – is expected to capture majority of the seats in the elections in this district. They had fared well in the Jaffna local poll and parliamentary elections. The United National Party (UNP) which had some roots in the past in the North hopes to do better. The President would like to strike a deal with ITAK to prevent it from becoming a loose cannon in the power play in the North. So far the ITAK had been elusive. It is using this opportunity to leverage with the President for finalising the much delayed devolution package for Tamil minority. As of now, there is no sign of any quick progress in this regard.

In the East, the Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP) led by the President’s former ally Pillaiyan has decided to contest on its own symbol. As the three communities – Muslims, Tamils and Sinhalas – are almost in equal numbers, the election results are a wide open question, though UPFA is expected to do better.

The whole local election scene became a comedy of errors as nearly 20 percent of the nominations were rejected on technical grounds and trivial errors by returning officers. Both the UPFA and the main opposition party United National Party (UNP) were mortified to find a large number of their nominations rejected in many parts of the country. This was particularly damaging for the UPFA as its nominations to 35 local councils in 12 districts were rejected. The rejection in 16 local bodies in the Jaffna district including three Urban Councils (Velvettiturai, Point Pedro and Chavakachcheri) and 13 Pradeshiya Sabhas will perhaps become the biggest spoil sport for the UPFA’s efforts to show flag in the North.

Tamil Diaspora

To gain maximum mileage out of the publicity generated by the disastrous visit of President Rajapaks to the Oxford Union last month, pro-separatist segments of Sri Lanka Tamil Diaspora appear to be getting their anti-Rajapaksa act together. Though they are rive with internal differences, they appear to be united in bringing down President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s reputation using his problems in handling the strong adverse international allegations about Sri Lanka army’s war crimes and human rights violations.

The latest salvo was fired when three plaintiffs filed a law suit in a US District court in Washington seeking $ 30 million to compensate relatives of victims of killed in three incidents during the war by Sri Lanka army. The case was filed under the U.S. Torture Victim Protection Act 1991 which provides for victims to seek compensation from individuals in foreign states who commit acts of torture. The President’s spokesman dismissed the case as a publicity stunt by “mercenaries” of the LTTE. 

The Tamils Against Genocide, a Diaspora Tamil organisation, expressed disappointment that the U.S, had not taken action on this issue when President Rajapaksa made a quiet visit to the U.S. said to be for medical check up during the month. The Amnesty International also expressed similar sentiments.

The Eelam sympathisers were shocked when Swiss police arrested ten former LTTE representatives in the country on January 11, 2011. According to knowledgeable Diaspora columnist DBS Jeyaraj, those arrested included the present head of the LTTE in Switzerland Vijaratnam Sivanesan alias Ragu alias Ragupathy, his predecessor Chelliah Kularajasekeram alias Kulam and the influential Swiss Tiger finance chief Chelliah Jeyapalan alias Abdullah. They are facing charges of money laundering and belonging to a criminal organisation. Switzerland is the home of about 32, 000 Sri Lanka Tamils; and the country had been an important source of  LTTE funding.  

India-Sri Lanka relations

The usually cordial relations between India and Sri Lanka came under severe pressure when two Tamil Nadu fishermen were killed within a span of ten days during the month allegedly by the Sri Lankan Navy. Though Sri Lanka vehemently denied the involvement of its navy in the incidents and attributed them to ‘miscreants’ there was widespread anger in Tamil Nadu. In a slightly disturbing aftermath, some fringe elements of pro-LTTE parties in Tamil Nadu raided the Mahabodhi Society in Chennai and attacked a Bhikku and damaged some of the property at the Buddhist temple. This was the first time such an attack on Sinhalas has taken place in Tamil Nadu during the last two decades.

Reflecting the political sensitivities in Tamil Nadu, Government of India has reacted very strongly to the killing of fishermen. Terming the incidents as "very serious" and "unacceptable", India has said that such incidents had "no justification" and called on Sri Lankan authorities to "desist" from the use of force. India lodged a strong protest with Colombo.

In the latest incident one fisherman was killed and two others injured while fishing off Kodiakarai coast on January 22. The man, who had put out to sea with two others from Pushpavanam coastal hamlet, died after Sri Lankan Naval personnel allegedly tied a rope around his neck and pushed him into the water. Earlier, in another incident on January 12, an Indian fisherman was killed in Palk Straits when Sri Lankan Navy allegedly opened fire at three fishermen, who put out to sea from Jagadapattinnam near Pudukottai.

As stated in the Sri Lanka Perspectives December 2010, such incidents gain greater significance as the Congress-DMK is alliance passing through a critical phase due to the 2G scam, and as the Tamil Nadu state elections are nearing. So New Delhi’s strong reaction is not surprising. In a follow up, India’s foreign secretary Ms Nirupama Rao is slated to proceed to Colombo to discuss the issue when she calls upon President Rajapaksa and meets other leaders.

In October 2008, India and Sri Lanka had reached an understanding on “practical arrangements to deal with bona fide Indian and Sri Lankan fishermen crossing the International Maritime Boundary Line.” After that, killing of Indian fishermen, particularly those crossing Sri Lanka maritime boundary had decreased rapidly. In view of this, the latest killings particularly the one said to be on the Indian side of the boundary, need to be investigated fully. The possible involvement of elements opposed to the growth of cordial relations between the two countries in triggering such incidents should not be ruled out.    

Written on January 31, 2011

Courtesy: South Asia Security Trends, February 2011, www.security-risks.com

Sri Lanka: False Notes in Rajapaksa's Second Symphony

By Col R Hariharan

 

President Mahinda Rajapaksa started his second innings as President when he was sworn in at an auspicious hour on November 19, 2010 with all the pomp and ceremony associated with the coronation of royalty. “It Is fitting in a way” thousands of his supporters would say because President Rajapaksa is now “monarch of all he surveys.” Not only his United Peoples Freedom Alliance (UPFA) has bagged two thirds majority in parliament but also dutifully amended the Constitutional two-term restriction imposed on presidents. With that the President’s second tenure that would have been his swan song, has now been turned into an orchestration for a second symphony, with options open for him to compose more.

Though the beaming President Rajapaksa looked supremely confident as he watched a military parade and the screaming fly past of air force jets on the occasion, there were a few false notes within few days of the second term.

• The first came when 104 members out of 161 members of the UPFA coalition were ushered into a jumbo cabinet. It included the prime minister, the new class of 11 senior ministers, 61 ministers and 31 deputy ministers. In his first term Rajapaksa’s coalition did not enjoy the advantage of two-thirds majority and his adoption of the ‘jumbo cabinet’ strategy to strengthen his coalition in parliament had some validity. But why has he fallen to the same ‘jumbo’ tactic? Does it mean he has doubts about retaining the loyalties of his coalition members? With his mass popularity, does the President really feel politically insecure? This doubt is further reinforced when we see the senior ministers - trusted lieutenants of earlier years - have been given the option of attending cabinet meetings when they chose, despite holding high sounding portfolios! Have they been put to pasture? Does it mean the President wants to keep them at arms length in his decision making process?

• The second jarring note is the way portfolios have been allotted to the ministers. In spite of such large number of ministers, the President has retained the vital portfolios of defence, finance and planning, ports and aviation and highways under him. President’s brother Basil Rajapaksa will be handling planning and development as before. The portfolios allocated to other ministers and deputy ministers are confusing. They also appear apportioned from cohesive entities, and we can expect the ministers to trample upon each others territory. Does this mean the President has little confidence in his cabinet members in delivering his development agenda of which he has been speaking at length? Or is it for more mundane reasons of keeping the ministers on the leash as they look for small pickings?

 Of course, there was also the President’s ill-timed, if not ill-advised, visit to the U.K. to address the Oxford Union. The President’s 100-strong entourage  marked a big occasion in his calculus. The organisers aborted the meeting the day before it was scheduled for reasons of security after a well orchestrated protest march of Sri Lankan Tamil expatriates, largely peppered with Tamil Tiger acolytes, threatened to converge on Oxford to disrupt the meeting. The Tamil protest had a well-timed added provocation when Channel 4 TV beamed an old but more detailed version of the gruesome slaughter of Tamil women captives allegedly by Sri Lankan army soldiers in uniform. The British government kept the legendary stiff upper lip and had nothing to say Oxford SNAFU as Rajapaksa’s visit was ‘unofficial.’ Wikileaks also added its pennyworth up loading cables on how the US ambassador Ms Patricia Butenis felt the President and his team had collective responsibility for war crimes.

The President bravely weathered the cold rebuff in Oxford in the icy British winter and went home to a thundering reception by an adulatory crowd. Regardless of the Tamil Tigers colouring of the war crimes issue, the Oxford experience should be a moment of truth for the President. He has to face the issue squarely at the international level and clean up, if not erase, his and Sri Lanka’s image blurred by war crimes allegation. No locally compounded formulation of the Lesson Learnt Commission-kind will can do this. Solutions like the one proposed by his irrepressible minister Mervyn Silva to educate all Englishmen from the highest officers to the lowest on Mahinda Chinthanaya can only provide comic relief. Sri Lanka has a credibility deficit in this respect. And this has to be overcome.

The President in a recent interview given to N Ram, the Editor in chief of the Hindu, had explained the rationale behind getting the constitutional two-term bar on the president lifted. He said he had found in the past, presidents were effective only in the first year of their second term after which they became lame ducks. As per this reasoning, the lifting of the constitutional limitation would enable him to use the second term fully for “development of the people.” If that was his idea, neither his cabinet nor its structuring gives confidence of fulfilling Rajapaksa’s hopes.

Moreover, with the abolishing of the two-term limitation for the President, Sri Lanka may end up with a life time president, though Rajapaksa had disclaimed any such intention in his Hindu interview. Going by his demonstrated political acumen, President Rajapaksa is probably shrewder than other ‘life term’ presidents of the world to make such a mistake. Some of the ‘life termers’ who rose to pinnacle of fame ultimately ended up in the dust bin of history. [Of course, there is a modern day precedence of a president who became an emperor! Jean Bèdel Bokassa, President of Central African Republic, declared himself President for Life in 1972 and crowned himself as emperor in 1976! Of course, he was overthrown later and died in custody is a matter of inconvenient detail.]    

As Oliver Goldsmith wrote “Popular glory is a perfect coquette; her lovers must toil, feel every inquietitude, indulge every caprice, and perhaps at last jilted in the bargain.” President Rajapaksa needs to rewrite his opening of the second symphony lest it fails at the altar of popular glory. He needs it to get his development agenda succeed.

 

Sri Lanka: Fonseka’s Perils of Playing Politics and its Implications

By Col R Hariharan

For General Sarath Fonseka who revamped a demoralised Sri Lanka army and led it to final victory in the nearly three-decade long campaign against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in May 2009, its aftermath had not been peaceful. His woes appear to be mounting after an army court martial found him guilty of dabbling in politics while in uniform and recommended his cashiering. And President Mahinda Rajapaksa promptly confirmed the harsh sentence, stripping his rank and hard earned military honours and medals. The hapless General is facing a few more court martial that would haunt him in the coming years.

It will be difficult for non-military minds to understand the ignominy of cashiering. It is much more than stripping of rank and medals of General Fonseka (I do not have the heart to drop his rank and call him Mister Fonseka, although this is what has been reduced to now). It is the negation of the contribution of a person who served the army for 38 years to become the first-ever chief of defence staff. And in the history of Sri Lanka his victory against the Tamil insurgents will always be hyphenated with his cashiering. Only four years back he was lucky enough to escape (with serious injuries) a LTTE suicide bomber assassination attempt him in 2006. It seems the perils of politics have proved more deadly to the General than the Tamil Tiger assassin.

As I am not privy to Fonseka’s court martial proceedings or judgement I am unable to comment on its legality. Even if his political contacts were substantive as decided by the court, Fonseka was neither the first Sri Lankan army officer to do so nor will he be the last. The history of Sri Lanka’s three decades of war against the LTTE is strewn with examples of army officers either favoured or discarded by political masters, not necessarily for reasons of military competency. So it will be reasonable to conclude the Fonseka episode has its seeds in politics of power; after all the government has not shown the same alacrity shown in prosecuting the General to put on the dock even a single hardened LTTE leader held in custody for over a year.

This is evident if we see the sequence of events after the war ended and General Fonseka was hailed as a national hero, sharing the victory banners alongside the President. Politicians were a little unnerved at the soaring popularity of the General after the war and a subdued campaign sideline his contribution in the Eelam War was launched.

The campaign within the government against the General gained more decibels when he spoke of his plans to expand the army, making the politicians even more nervous. Though his plan was not accepted, the government’s mind on his future became clear when it decided not to extend his tenure as Chief of Staff after December 2009 when it ended. The process of cutting down the war hero to size was truly in place when the government offered him the job of secretary in the ministry of sports after his retirement!

The point of no return was probably reached when he developed political ambitions and decided to throw his gauntlet against President Mahinda Rajapaksa seeking his second term as president. The situation was further aggravated when the deeply divided opposition rallied together to put him up as their common candidate against Rajapaksa. In the run up to the presidential poll, Fonseka’s campaign threw a scare, though ultimately he polled fewer votes than Ranil Wickremesinghe did in the presidential election 2005.

The presidential election campaign saw the transformation of the General, generally considered a Sinhala hawk, into a champion of Tamil problem. And it was anachronistic to see that elements of Tamil Diaspora that had supported the LTTE, which tried to kill him, were his election bedfellows! Even as the pre-election campaign gathered momentum, political screws against the General were tightened. Conspiracy theories of military coup and take over abounded, Gajaba regiment troops deployed for his security were withdrawn for suspected personal loyalty to the General and serving officers considered loyal to Fonseka were given the walking papers. Even the retired servicemen who supported him were not spared. And in a clear break from the past even some elements of army joined the tar brush brigade to paint Fonseka as a villain during the election campaign. The smear campaign had three parts; prosecution of the General on the legal cases relating to three aspects.

The army and civil intelligence sleuths have "discovered" a whole range of offences committed by the General during his tenure as army commander. Presumably there was a prima facie case at least in some of them. But their inaction in showing the same diligence they later displayed when he became political loose cannon is rather intriguing.

Thus in an oblique way it was the General’s rapid rise in national popularity charts that did him in. It led him to the bogs of party politics and he quickly got entangled in its culture of intrigues and character assassination. Otherwise he would have probably ended up enjoying his well earned retirement, expanding on his concept of counter terrorism warfare in haloed portals of military learning everywhere.

But his prosecution has shown the weakness of Sri Lankan system in action where checks and balances of government action appear to have been sacrificed to serve political interest. While this is inevitable in party-politics it is detrimental to the long term interest of healthy growth of democracy. At present Sri Lanka is involved in a serious exercise of revising its constitution. A key dilemma is the changeover of the present presidential system to a Westminster type parliamentary democracy, limiting the powers of executive president. A compromise is likely to be struck - to have the cake and eat it in typical South Asian style - by retaining the presidential system while clipping his powers. But constitution largely remains a document in parchment unless political parties and the people are able to exercise full powers guaranteed to them in the constitution. Will they be allowed to do this or become victims of maelstrom of power? This question has to be confronted not only by politicians and the civil society but the intelligentsia as well. Otherwise mere changes in constitutional structure will be a cosmetic surgery that does not cure the underlying maladies.

Courtesy: South Asia Analysis Group, August 29, 2010
URL: http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cnotes6%5Cnote598.html

President’s clear vision, key factor in eradicating terrorism

By Shanika Siriyananda

* Gotabaya - one of three leaders who crushed LTTE
* Lanka’s successful strategy - a valuable lesson
* Arrest of KP, a great success
* Indo-Lanka Accord had lots of loose ends

A specialist on South Asian military intelligence, Colonel R. Hariharan said that apart from lack of international support, including India to the LTTE to survive the final battle, the prime factor for the demise of the LTTE was President Rajapaksa’s clear political determination to eliminate Prabhakaran and the LTTE.

In an interview with the Sunday Observer Col. Hariharan, who served as the Head of the intelligence for the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka between 1987 and 1990, said President Rajapaksa’s political leadership had geared the entire government machinery to achieve the single goal - annihilation of the LTTE.

“In brief, he provided the critical support needed for the success of military operations the national leadership”, he said.

The military intelligence specialist said that Sri Lanka’s successful war strategy would definitely provide many valuable lessons for all nations.

Col. Hariharan said Kumaran Pathmanathan’s (KP) arrest was a great success for Sri Lanka’s efforts to curb the resurgence of LTTE internationally and would have a big impact on the future of overseas LTTE operations.

According to Col. Hariharan, though the LTTE remnants are trying to ‘stage’ a come back, it will not be a reality as the internationally activated pro-LTTE groups are split into two factions - political and military.

He said that though there were some LTTE sympathizers who appreciate its militancy, it was doubtful that they have the capability of mastering the support of the Tamil Nadu’s mainstream politics.

Following are the excerpts of the interview:

Q: The government is credited for annihilating the LTTE. What were the main factors that contributed to the victory?
A: I have written extensively on this. I would summarize my reasons as follows, not necessarily in the order of priority:
1. President Rajapaksa’s clarity of objective - to eliminate Prabhakaran and the LTTE and providing leadership support to combine policy making, planning and executing actions not only the armed forces or the ministry of defence but the entire government machinery to achieve this goal. This enabled the government to cash in on the weaknesses of the LTTE not only on the military front but also politically and internationally. In brief, he provided the critical support needed for the success of military operations, the - national leadership.

President Rajapaksa’s efforts to transform the armed forces into fighting machines should not be ignored. To reach his goal he created a politico-administrative structure to help the armed forces achieve their military objectives, unmindful of its enormous cost in terms of finance, manpower, governance and international relations. He also provided the much needed political support for the armed forces.

2. Maintaining close relations with India and thereby ensuring that the LTTE does not gain either large scale political or other clandestine support from India, interfering politically or otherwise both internally and internationally to affect the Sri Lanka government actions or operations.

3. Allowing the armed forces to plan and execute their operations without political interference is achieved. Providing all out support to them to maintain military superiority all through the operations. This enabled the armed forces to build adequate fire power and carry out its offensive successfully.

4. Making full use of the global anti-terror environment to fight the LTTE. This made it possible to gain valuable international support - notably from the U.S. to conduct military operations, though there were critical moments towards the end of the war due to their human rights concerns.

The President in a strategic ploy identified his campaign against the LTTE as part of the global war against terrorism. India and the U.S. started providing regular intelligence inputs and technical support on the movement of LTTE’s shipping logistics. The LTTE was banned in 32 countries particularly after the assassination of Sri Lankan foreign minister Lakshman Kadirgamar. Consequently the foreign assistance to Sri Lanka in its war against the LTTE gained legitimacy.

5. Mounting a high profile information and publicity campaign on the war, which the LTTE could never match. This enabled to garner large scale public support for the war which was lacking in earlier campaigns as the LTTE propaganda organs were more effective.

Q: Where do you think was the turning point of the LTTE’s fall?
A: As a military analyst, I think the LTTE lost the war, when they could not break the army’s stranglehold of Elephant Pass-Paranthan-Kilnochchi area that started after the logistic shipping support was destroyed. The LTTE could not launch any sizeable counter attacks to break the investment.

Q: What went wrong for the LTTE?
A: Before the war the lack of political strategy was LTTE’s problem. In 2002, they were controlling most of what they called the ‘Tamil Eelam’, yet they could not take advantage of the peace process and strike a win-win deal with Sri Lanka. Similarly they never made up with India, where they were dependent upon weak political parties for support.

During the conflict LTTE choice of fighting a conventional war instead of fighting an insurgency battle which is their strength, was a big strategic error. They just did not have the numbers or fire power to fight a conventional battle with Sri Lanka, particularly after they lost recruiting bases in Tamil areas in the East when Karuna broke away. When they were overwhelmed by army, they did not have a responsive strategy in place.

Q: Still the LTTE’s remnants are trying to show that they are alive. Can they make an impact in the present environment?
A: I doubt very much that they can carry out any spectacular terrorist attack within Sri Lanka in their present state. However, they may have the capability to do something more visible overseas. We should remember it took Prabhakaran two decades to build the LTTE into a powerful force. They have neither a leader like Prabhakaran to lead them nor a global environment that would help them as it did in the 90s to stage a powerful comeback.

Q: What is your comment on post-war Sri Lanka?
A: While military success has been achieved, the charged atmosphere built up during the war needs to be defused. This would require people affected by the conflict resuming normal life as early as possible. While this is a huge national challenge, it has to produce more visible results. Modern governance demands ensuring people enjoy fundamental freedoms. As it is a notion in the minds of people, it is they who should feel a sense of security and trust in the government.

Q: What do you have to say about President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s military strategy?
A:Military strategy is only a part of national strategy when a nation goes to war. This was provided by President Rajapaksa and he gave enough space to armed forces to come into full bloom to carry out their campaign.

Q: The force behind the entire military manoeuvre was Defence Secretary, Gotabhaya Rajapaksa. How do you see his commitment?
A: Of course, he was fully committed to achieve the President’s objectives; that was why he was appointed for the job. The President had always been the supreme commander of the three services. While Basil Rajapaksa provided the political interface for the war, Gotabaya Rajapaksa provided the government interface for military operations. But as Defence Secretary he provided vital interface between the national leadership and military leadership so that the entire campaign was conducted smoothly. I am sure his military background was a great help in this. So I would rate him as one of the three key leaders who helped Sri Lanka win the war.

Q: Out of 11,000 ex-LTTE cadres, over 8,000 are still in state custody undergoing rehabilitation. How best do you think the government can train them to become useful citizens?
A:They should find a place in society to live a meaningful life without fear of deprivation. This requires more than a few months of training. It requires an environment where they can look forward to the future rather than go back to the past.

Q: How do you see the arrest of KP? Did it make a huge impact on the LTTE’s future in the international sphere?
A:It is a great success for Sri Lanka’s efforts to curb the resurgence of LTTE internationally. Yes, it will have a big impact on the future of overseas LTTE.

Q: How vital is his contribution to the post conflict Sri Lanka?
A:It is too early to assess.

Q: What is your assessment of the LTTE’s international network?
A: It is not united but split into two major groups the ideologues of Eelam who want to politically keep the Eelam struggle alive and the militant elements. I don’t know whether they will join together in the near term.

Q: What are your observations on the LTTE’s activities in Tamil Nadu and how do you view the pro-LTTE views expressed by certain politicians and sympathizers of the outfit?
A:The LTTE activities in Tamil Nadu are neither visible nor assertive. There are some LTTE sympathizers who appreciate its militancy. But the Eelam issue has a wider appeal. The plight of Tamils in war zones affects a very large number of people. There are issues which some of the political parties are trying to cash in. But I doubt whether they have the capability to make a strong on Tamil Nadu’s mainstream politics.

Q: Do you agree that India made a blunder by grooming LTTE in early 80s?
A: I am against arming any insurgent groups either locally or internationally. I had made this clear in my own military channels in the 80s, though army was not involved in the training of Tamil militants.

Q: How vital was the India’s stance on defeating the LTTE and do you agree that Prabhakaran had much hopes that the international community including India would save him at the last minute?
A: I think India’s intelligence, political and international support was one of the winning factors for Sri Lanka. I believe Prabhakaran overestimated the readiness of the international community to bail him out. Of course, political support in India for him was not sufficiently strong to do this job. Apparently he failed to realize this.

Q: Why did he fail to convince them? What went wrong?
A:Three things in his conduct were instrumental in losing international credibility over a time: killing Rajiv Gandhi, willful disregard for international efforts to make the peace process a success, and global war on terror after 9/11 the world was not prepared to accept terrorism as a tool to fight for ethnic or other rights.

Q: Did the IPKF fail in defeating the LTTE?
A:The IPKF was not sent to defeat LTTE. It was to help Sri Lanka government to enforce the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement in which the disarming of Tamil militants was provided for. That was how it got embroiled in war with LTTE.

Q: What were the difficulties the IPKF faced in dealing with the LTTE?
A:I can only give a strategic analyst’s perspective but it might disappoint those expecting political brownie points. The IPKF at the beginning faced three problems - lack of role clarity, inadequate information, and security forces’ own structural snags.

The Indian army had very little warning to prepare for its overseas deployment. Nobody was very clear what its role in Sri Lanka would be because the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord had a lot of loose ends. India was signing a third party undertaking to do its bit for an internal problem of Sri Lanka. So it was bristled with uncertainties as the two signing powers and the Tamil militants who were non-signatories had to conform to the Accord to make it a success. So the troops were initially sent only as a token force to show solidarity with Sri Lanka rather than fight a pitched battle with the LTTE.

Secondly, the Indian security forces had very little information available on Sri Lanka’s political and militancy problems. This might be surprising as many accuse India of plotting the whole thing. This is far from true. So the Indian army went there without adequate preparation.

It had obsolete maps and an inadequate knowledge of Sri Lanka. To top it all, it was supposed to meet the continuous demands of Sinhalese and Tamils who had built high expectations. Military Intelligence had a few assets - both information and sources - when it landed. (Information sharing among intelligence agencies in all nations is minimal for fear of compromise of sources.)

Structurally, when the war started, a joint services command had to be created to conduct an insurgency operation in a foreign country. This was totally a new experience for the three services. Troops had to be flown in and they were not familiar with either the terrain or ground situation when they were put directly from Jaffna airport to join the operations. However, the three services rose to the occasion and improvised command and control structure and improved it as operations progressed.

Q: Do you think the LTTE became stronger with the withdrawal of the IPKF?
A:The LTTE was at its weakest when the IPKF left. It was confined to a small space in Vanni. It had suffered heavy casualties - losing most of the junior leaders. That was why it desperately built bridges with President Premadasa which resulted in the pull out of the IPKF at a crucial stage for LTTE. In fact, it provided the oxygen the LTTE needed for survival and stage a comeback in the North and parts of East where it massacred a few hundred policemen. So it became stronger by default.

Q: Who were the main LTTE leaders who came across during your stay in Sri Lanka? How do you see Prabhakaran’s militant mind?
A:When we were in talking terms initially in August 1987, I have seen all the top leaders of the LTTE including Prabhakaran, Kittu, and Mahatthaya etc. I had no rapport with them but they knew who I was. Prabhakaran as a militant believed in the overwhelming power of the gun to achieve his goals. This led to his downfall as he failed to seize the opportunities the peace process offered in 2002.

Q: How do you recollect your three -year stay in Sri Lanka as the intelligence head of the IPKF?
A: As a Tamil, Sri Lanka was never a foreign country for me. So it pained me more to see the great human tragedy that was turning the country - one of the most beautiful ones I had seen - into a battleground. I found the people of Sri Lanka - Tamils, Sinhalese, Muslims and everyone warm hearted and more easy-going than Indians. When I visited Colombo I was amazed everyone revelling as though they had nothing to do with the war in the North!

Q: Sri Lanka’s military strategy that ended the Asia’s longest civil war will be a case study for other nations threatened with internal conflicts?
A:Of course; even failed operations teach us many things. So a successful war like Sri Lanka’s definitely provides many valuable lessons for all nations.

Q: The Maoists and the Naxalites have increased their attacks in India. Do you think the LTTE cadres who are believed to have escaped from Sri Lanka are supporting them?
A: No. There were some marginal contacts between Maoists and the LTTE when the latter was powerful. To my knowledge, even these were commercial deals between two ‘fraternal’ organizations. Now there are safer pastures for fleeing LTTE elements to seek refuge than the hotbeds of Maoist violence in India.

Q: Where are these safer pastures for fleeing LTTEers?
A: I can only conclude that they would mix with families fleeing Sri Lanka as refugees; of course that does not make all those refugees LTTEers. I am sure Canadian and Australian intelligence also some of the countries like Indonesia would be doing this.

Q: No doubt, intelligence played a vital role in defeating the LTTE. How vital is strengthening the intelligence networks locally and in the post conflict era?
A:Intelligence is a silent shield. It does not distinguish between war time and peace time. At all times it has to be functional. As it provides foreknowledge, it is vital to prevent wars as much as to win them.
Courtesy: Sunday Observer, August 15, 2010
URL:http://www.sundayobserver.lk/2010/08/15/sec03.asp

Sri Lanka’s Diaspora Strategies

By Col R Hariharan

Sri Lanka appears to be following Hindu philosophy’s four ways of dealing with people - Sama, Dana, Bheda and Dand - in defusing the Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora’s potential to incubate separatist militancy of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) kind.

While Sama uses logical reasoning and common sense to explain one’s position, Dana is the classical carrot ploy of offering incentives – as Americans say ‘if you can’t win them, buy them.’ Bheda the third option is the one that politicians indulge all the time – create a split to win over a section. Dand, the last resort is to use force (or the stick, the other half of the proverbial carrot ploy).

The recent high profile public projection of the former LTTE international affairs representative and a high security prisoner Kumaran Pathmanathan (KP) is apparently a part of Sri Lanka’s Bheda strategy. It fits in well with the larger Sri Lankan game plan to handle the Tamil Diaspora. Already it seems to have worked as a few known personalities of the Tamil Diaspora (who had supported the LTTE in the past) have agreed to join hands with KP and participate in the reconstruction process in the North.

KP had confirmed this in a series of media interviews recently. According to him his newly formed NGO outfit ‘The North-East Rehabilitation and Development Organisation' (NERDO) located in Vavuniya, was preparing to play a key role in the rehabilitation, reconstruction and resettlement processes. With years of overseas exposure in his LTTE days, KP had built influential Diaspora connections. While all of them may not join KP’s efforts, he seems to have thrown a spanner in the works of sections of the Diaspora to rebuild a unified organisation to carry forward the LTTE cause. Of course, hard boiled LTTE acolytes would now find justification to call him a quisling.

Justifying his action to collaborate with the government, KP said it was essential for Tamils to realise the ground realities in a post-LTTE era in the island nation and review its strategy to meet the new challenges. His said he was only “concerned about the welfare of the people, particularly children, though some seek fresh funding to cause mayhem. People are fed up with war and every effort should be made to alleviate their suffering without playing politics with a purely humanitarian motive.” This is so true. Logical reasoning with LTTE supporters had never worked successfully in the past when the LTTE’s flag was flying high. But words coming from a senior leader like KP in times of adversity would definitely create at least second thoughts in their minds.

In his interview, KP comes out as a man of sound common sense and pragmatism. He attributed the defeat of the LTTE to the change in global political leaders’ attitude to the LTTE after the 9/11 al Qaeda attack and the US led war on Jihadi terrorism in its wake. Prabhakaran did not realise the urgent need to change the LTTE strategy to suit the new environment. KP’s observation “there is a new world order today, which does not tolerate armed campaigns and that is the hard reality,” showed a realism much needed by those still voicing LTTE slogans.

The increasing public projection of KP in spite of his detention has caused uneasiness among Tamil politicians who consider it as Rajapaksa’s ploy to destabilise them. This fear is probably justified as KP is no ordinary prisoner. Normally as a member of the inner cabinet of Prabhakaran he should be cooling his heels in the Sri Lankan version of the Guantanamo Bay, where his former colleagues are awaiting prosecution. His arrest in Malaysia and rendition and rendition was the biggest story of the year after the defeat of the LTTE.

But even before KP completed his first year of imprisonment, rumours are thick that the elusive former chief arms procurer of the LTTE, may rise like the proverbial phoenix from the ashes of Tamil militancy to join the political mainstream. And if the media space he is already hogging, even as a prisoner, is any indication the process for his political anointment has already started. It fits in well with a series of stories that started with his much publicised visit to Vanni in the company of Tamil Diaspora leaders to look at the state of rehabilitation and the formation of a NGO for canalising contributions from the Diaspora thereafter.

KP’s candid interviews bearing his views not only on the LTTE’s defeat and Tamils suffering but also his favourable comments on the Defence Secretary and the President came as icing on the cake of his publicity blitz. There is no doubt that KP’s privileged public access is part of a Sri Lankan game plan. However, his political rehabilitation may come through only after his evidence as a crown witness is fully milked during the prosecution of 737 LTTE hard core cadres in custody. This process could take a year to complete unless special courts are set up. If this surmise is correct, probably KP is slated to occupy a place in the political firmament in 2011.

Even before the war, Sri Lanka had embarked upon an effort to make it difficult for LTTE to retain its foothold in many countries. The President, prime minister, and the foreign minister in the past had stressed this aspect in their international visits and appearances. Apart from these efforts, Sri Lanka said it was launching with the help of INTERPOL a coordinated effort to dismantle LTTE’s international network. These efforts got a big push when Sri Lankan military intelligence recently unearthed highly classified documents and diaries of Castro, former head of the LTTE's international wing, at Viswamadu. These documents have provided details of LTTE international activists engaged in human trafficking, arms smuggling and financial bases in East Asia, Western Europe, Canada and Africa.

In this context it is interesting to note that the Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa touched upon this aspect while addressing the Galle dialogue on maritime security conference over the week end. He said, “no matter how powerful we are individually, so long as we act in isolation, we will be ineffective against threats arising from the trans-national operations of non-state actors.”

Can Sri Lanka wean over the Tamil Diaspora from the Eelam cause and support to resurrection of Tamil militancy?

To answer yes to this question would be oversimplifying a complex problem compounded by uneven composition of the Diaspora. And it would also be ignoring the historical realities of how the Tamil Diaspora became the main supporters of Tamil militancy. The Tamil Diaspora is neither uniform nor clearly segmented in their support to the Eelam cause.

Basically they act in two planes. One is on the emotional plane based upon their own bitter experience over the years, having lost their kith and kin. Their inability to directly go the aid of their kin when they are still suffering makes them angry now. Swayed by emotions on happenings in Sri Lanka the majority probably belong to this category. The Sri Lankan strategies aided by KP would probably work on this segment, provided political initiatives are also taken in tandem.

The other segment has a much deeper ideological belief in preserving the Tamil identity and creation the Tamil Eelam as the only process to do it. This segment has its origins even before the LTTE was born. This segment is deeply suspicious of majority Sinhalese’s political intentions due to historical experience. And it had been the fountainhead of separatism. It would probably be never wholly won over by the reasoning of the type KP dispenses. However, he may make a dent in its system of beliefs.

This segment needs political solutions to disprove their ingrained beliefs. These have not been forthcoming for the last three decades from successive Sri Lankan governments. And even now little has been done, other than talking about implementing even a half way house solution like the 13th amendment to the constitution.

Prof Rohan Gunaratne, Sri Lanka’s own high profile terrorism analyst of international repute, touched upon this home truth while speaking on post war challenges of Sri Lanka in Colombo last week. He said “failure of Sri Lankan leaders to govern a multi-ethnic and a multi-religious society since independence precipitated Sri Lanka ’s ethno-political conflict. Sri Lanka ’s political masters compromised Sri Lanka’s long term national and strategic interests for short term political gain. Unless Sri Lankan politicians build the understanding to never again to play ethnic and religious based politics, poison the ground by radicalizing its youth, and reinforce ethnic and religious divisions, the country is likely to suffer a repetition of its unfortunate past.”

The Sri Lanka government and the national leadership would do well to heed his words of caution as there is no indication they are attending to this vital aspect of political confidence building.

Unless this is attended to mere Machiavellian strategies in handling the Diaspora would not provide a satisfactory solution.

Courtesy: South Asia Analysis Group
www.southasiaanalysis.org

SRI LANKA PERSPECTIVES - JULY 2010

Col R Hariharan (Retd.)

Initiatives to win over Diaspora

Sri Lanka appears to have scored a major success in winning over a section of the Tamil Diaspora that had actively supported the LTTE to participate in the reconstruction process in the Tamil areas. This was confirmed in a newspaper interview by Kumaran Pathmanathan (KP) who was the LTTE’s international affairs representative now in Sri Lankan custody. His newly formed outfit ‘The North-East Rehabilitation and Development Organisation' (NERDO) located in Vavuniya, was preparing to play a key role in the rehabilitation, reconstruction and resettlement processes in the war ravaged areas. He expected the support for the move from the Tamil Diaspora. KP had influential connections in the Diaspora in his LTTE days.

Justifying his action to collaborate with the government, he said it was essential for Tamils to realise the ground realities in a post-LTTE era in the island nation and review its strategy to meet the new challenges. His said he was only “concerned about the welfare of the people, particularly children, though some seek fresh funding to cause mayhem. People are fed up with war and every effort should be made to alleviate their suffering without playing politics with a purely humanitarian motive.” His effort could find favour with sections of Diaspora who are still suspicious of Sri Lanka government moves.

In his interview, KP attributed the defeat of the LTTE to the change in global political leaders’ attitude to the LTTE prompted by the 9/11 al Qaeda attack and the US led war on al Qaeda. Prabhakaran did not realise the urgent need to change the LTTE strategy accordingly. KP’s observation “there is a new world order today, which does not tolerate armed campaigns and that is the hard reality,” showed a lot of pragmatism.

Apart from these efforts, Sri Lanka with the help of INTERPOL has launched a coordinated effort to dismantle LTTE’s international network using information gathered by the Sri Lankan military intelligence from captured documents. In particular the recent unearthing of highly classified documents and diaries of Castro, former head of the LTTE's international wing, at Viswamadu has given details of LTTE international activists engaged in human trafficking, arms smuggling and financial bases in East Asia, Western Europe, Canada and Africa. This carrot and stick method could induce more Diaspora to support KP’s rehabilitation effort as many sections of Diaspora who consider rehabilitation as the priority.

The increasing public projection of KP in spite of his detention has caused jitters among Tamil politicians who consider it as Rajapaksa’s ploy to destabilise them by allowing KP to participate in politics.

LTTE prisoners

The Commissioner General of Rehabilitation in a media interview has said that 7,948 former LTTE combatants, including about 1,100 females were still undergoing rehabilitation. He said 700 of the 1,100 females were now working in the garment trade. About 400 are being trained as Montessori teachers while others were learning English, IT and drama ‘therapy’. He said families of detained persons were regularly allowed to visit them.

When the war ended last year the army held 11,686 LTTE cadres, including members of the suicide squad as prisoners. They were kept in more than 20 detention centres after the war. Now only 12 such centres, including two meant for women, were operational. All ex-LTTE child soldiers have been handed over to their parents after undergoing rehabilitation training.

Among the detainees 737 hardcore elements have been identified and charge sheets are being prepared to prosecute them.

Conditions in Northern Province

The Ceylon Communist Party has come out with a detailed field report on the prevailing conditions in war ravaged Northern Province. The report has said though the government’s massive physical infrastructure programme was going on, many old and new issues in the environment have denied the people any sense of liberation. On the contrary, they felt betrayed both by the LTTE and the State though both had promised them liberation. People were in a confused, disillusioned, abandoned and demoralized state of mind.

The physical reconstruction programme was focusing on basic infrastructure such as roads and telecommunication. Reconstructed government departments, modernized urban commercial centres and towns were active and flourishing with 15 major banks and financial agencies opening offices in Jaffna. However, vast majority of the population were leading a life below subsistence level.

Army was present everywhere along the roads, in villages and towns. In many areas landmine clearance has been undertaken. Army’s continued presence, reinforcement and expansion of the security forces have become a cause for concern for the people. People were anxious about role of the security forces in controlling and monitoring their social, cultural and religious activities for fear of reprisals. However, incidence of abductions, rape and torture and generalized abuse has drastically come down.

The report said the government simply lacked the political will for undertaking an accelerated, comprehensive and integrated process of resettlement, rehabilitation, reconstruction and development. The rehabilitation effort was pitiful, since the general public and civil society of the country was not being mobilized in the relief process. The government gave permission to only a selected few of them to operate in the Province.

Attack on media network

A dozen men armed with assault rifles and petrol bombs attacked the offices of privately owned Voice of Asia Network in the early hours of July 30. The network controls three FM stations including Vettri FM, a Tamil one. According to the management said in the attack its studios, control room and library were destroyed. Two persons were injured.

The owners had backed the main opposition candidate, ex-army chief Sarath Fonseka, in the last presidential election. Another journalist Eknaligoda, a critic of the government and supporter of Fonseka, who disappeared two days before the election in January has still not been traced. The attacks have not enhanced Sri Lanka’s reputation as a state where media criticism is not tolerated.

Increasing Chinese footprint

Zhang Ze - Deputy Director of the Department of treaty of and Law of the Foreign Affairs Ministry of China and ten Chinese army officers including senior colonels, lieutenant colonels and majors were on a visit northern and eastern provinces East including Kilinochchi, Mannar and Mullaitivu to advise on use of de-mining equipment supplied by the Chinese and to provide knowledge on de-mining tasks.
China has also assisted the army re-deployment process in the north after the war.

Chinese pre-fabricated technology was being used in permanent buildings constructed for the forces. Already the army has established the 68 Division headquarters at Sugandirapuram, Puthukudirippu east of the Kandy-Jaffna A9 road. According to the army commander, although the Jaffna peninsula had seen the largest concentration of forces before Eelam war IV, today the biggest deployment was in the Vanni. With permanent buildings coming up for army in government land, the army hopes to vacate private buildings and land occupied by them.

EU tariff concessions

The European Union has officially announced that Sri Lanka would lose the GSP+ trade concessions in August after it failed to respond to a set of conditions laid down by the Commission. However it was open for negotiations with the Sri Lankan government despite the decision.

The EU also expressed regretted Sri Lanka’s decision to remain silent on the proposals by the EU for Sri Lanka to obtain a temporary extension of the trade tariff benefits by meeting some conditions. In June the EU had offered to delay the suspension of GSP+ trade concessions by six months if Sri Lanka responded to its questions on tangible progress on shortcomings in its implementation of three UN human rights conventions a number of outstanding issues. However, the government had firmly rejected the EU conditional offer.
31 July 2010

Courtesy: South Asia Security Trends,Vol 4 No 6 July 2010
www.security-risks.com

Looking back at the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord

By R. Hariharan

It is 23 years since the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement was signed on July 29, 1987. The agreement is popularly referred to as the Rajiv-Jayewardene Accord, after its architects — Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and President J.R. Jayewardene.

Unfortunately, the event is today remembered only for its unpleasant fallout after India unwittingly got entangled in a counter-insurgency war with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) from 1987 to 1990. After sacrificing the lives of over 1,200 of its soldiers, India felt cheated when President Ranasinghe Premadasa joined hands with the LTTE to send the Indian troops out of Sri Lanka before they had completed their job.

But India had an even worse experience after the troops were pulled out: in 1991, an LTTE suicide-bomber killed Rajiv Gandhi at the venue of a public meeting near Chennai. The killing, masterminded by LTTE chief V. Prabakaran, had more than a symbolic impact. It ended the popular support Tamil militants had enjoyed in Tamil Nadu. India scaled down its active involvement in Sri Lanka, and adopted a passive approach to the Sri Lankan Tamil issue. Prabakaran's strategic blunder ultimately cost him his life: Sri Lanka, helped by India, crushed the LTTE in the fourth round of the war in 2009.

The Rajiv-Jayewardene Accord was perhaps too ambitious in its scope as it sought to collectively address all the three contentious issues between India and Sri Lanka: strategic interests, people of Indian origin in Sri Lanka and Tamil minority rights in Sri Lanka. Its success depended on sustained political support from both the countries. So the Accord got sidelined when political leaders who were unhappy with the Accord came to power in both countries almost at the same time. As a result, the Tamil minorities, who had put their faith in it, were in limbo. These unsavoury developments have clouded the understanding of the positive aspects of the Accord. After all, it was the Accord that enabled Sri Lankan Tamils to gain recognition for some of their demands in Sri Lankan politics and in the Sri Lankan Constitution.

The Accord was unique as it marked a new beginning with respect to India's articulation of power, never exercised after India's war with Pakistan in 1971 that helped the birth of Bangladesh. India's Sri Lanka operation was more complex than the Bangladesh war on a few counts. The operation had to be carried out in an island-nation; this imposed severe strategic constraints. It was an unconventional war waged against a Tamil insurgent group with strong connections in Tamil Nadu. And, India's vague articulation of its military intervention in support of the Accord triggered an emotional backlash against it in both countries.

The focus of the Accord, signed in the waning years of the Cold War era, was undoubtedly strategic. It aimed to keep Americans from gaining a foothold in Sri Lanka. This was a departure from India's traditional policy that was fixated largely on two issues — the status of people of Indian origin in Sri Lanka, and the Tamil minority's quest for democratic rights. India's new-found articulation of military power in Sri Lanka, though halting and probably unintentional, sent a strong message to its neighbours and global powers. This was further reinforced in 1989 when India sent a military contingent in response to a request from the government of Maldives — another island neighbour — and crushed an attempted coup there.

India's military intervention also demonstrated the country's readiness to fulfil its commitments to its neighbours. Significantly, it delineated India's strategic zone of influence in the Indian Ocean region. Since then, India has expanded its real-time naval capability. This was seen during the December 2004 tsunami strike: an Indian naval ship was at the scene on the Sri Lankan coast within a matter of hours to bring succour to the affected people.

India's strategic strength in this part of Indian Ocean is now recognised by the major powers. Perhaps this influenced the U.S. decision to build its strategic security relationship with India. India's keenness to find a lasting solution to Sri Lanka's Tamil issue was again demonstrated during the international peace process in Sri Lanka in 2002. Though India was not actively involved in it, the sponsor-nations, notably the U.S. and Norway, regularly sought India's counsel during the implementation phase. It is a pity that India failed to use its influence to ensure the success of the peace process.

India's military foray into Sri Lanka also proved to be a unique learning experience for the Indian armed forces in conducting operations across the seas. It brought home the nitty-gritty of joint operations command for smooth overseas operations. Carrying out counter-insurgency operations that had political ramifications both at home and abroad highlighted the limitations of New Delhi's decision-making process. The absence of a structure at the top to coordinate political and security decision-making did affect India's campaign. These lessons have greater relevance for India now as global and South Asian regional strategic security architectures change rapidly.

India had consistently affirmed its support for a unified Sri Lanka and opposition to the creation of an independent Tamil Eelam. At the same time, India was sympathetic to the Tamil quest for equitable rights in Sri Lanka. Even the Rajiv-Jayewardene Accord had its roots in India's effort to give form and substance to it. The strong sympathy of the people of Tamil Nadu for their brethren in Sri Lanka was an important factor in shaping India's policy on this issue. Sri Lanka had to reckon with this factor in its strategic calculus in its three military campaigns against the Tamil militant group.

However, India's benign Sri Lanka posture after its ill-fated military intervention and gory aftermath enabled Sri Lanka to build bridges with India. Wisely, India also did not allow the frictions of the intervening decades to come in the way and reciprocated Sri Lanka's efforts. Both countries have adopted a win-win strategy to build upon the positives of their relationship. These efforts culminated in the signing of India's first-ever free trade agreement with Sri Lanka in 2000. As a result, India-Sri Lanka relations now have a unique status in South Asia.

Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa was elected President in 2005; his campaign focus was on defeating the LTTE and crushing Tamil separatism. The advantages of close relations with India came in handy when he decided to clip the LTTE's wings after the peace process of 2002 failed to make progress even in three years. Though India was not a significant arms-supplier during Eelam War 2006, it had helped train the Sri Lankan armed forces and provided valuable intelligence inputs on the LTTE's intricate international logistic and support network. Sri Lanka managed to dismantle this apparatus and crippled the Tigers, paving the way for their defeat. More than all this, the governments in New Delhi and Chennai together managed the tricky fallout of the Eelam war in Tamil Nadu and saw to it that things did not get out of hand. This thwarted the efforts of the pro-LTTE parties and supporters in Tamil Nadu to create a pro-Tiger upsurge.

As a result, the LTTE could neither use Tamil Nadu as a logistic and support base nor influence India's political decisions during the war. India's own bitter experience with the LTTE probably shaped its public posture during Sri Lanka's war. At the same time, perhaps India realised that it would be untenable to allow the LTTE, which had grown into one of the world's strongest insurgent groups, to operate as a loose cannon in its strategic neighbourhood. This was perhaps one of the reasons for India's hands-off attitude as the Sri Lankan Army relentlessly pursued and ultimately crushed the LTTE.

Unfortunately, India was unable to significantly influence the Sri Lankan government in the aftermath of war. Even a year after the war ended, a political solution to meet the Tamil minority's demands has not been evolved. Normal life has not been restored to a sizeable population affected by the war in the Northern Province. They are yet to recover from the trauma of war as the pace of reconstruction is not consistent with their colossal needs.

It is people, not treaties, which make relations between nations meaningful. Unless India makes a difference in the lives of the people of both countries, its relations with Sri Lanka will not address the broader aspects of strategic security. This is the important takeaway as we look at the Rajiv-Jayewardene Accord after over two decades.
Courtesy: The Hindu, July 29, 2010

Sri Lanka Perspectives - June 2010

By Col R Hariharan

India-Sri Lanka relations

India and Sri Lanka signed seven agreements during President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s visit to New Delhi from June 8 to 11, 2010. The maiden visit after his re-election may be considered a success for the President as India barely touched upon sensitive issues like the UN advisory panel on human rights violations during the war and devolution of powers to Tamil minority in the interactions with the President and his delegation.

Indian Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh’s statement that “a meaningful devolution package, building upon the 13th Amendment, would create the necessary conditions for a lasting political settlement” showed by and large India had accepted the Rajapaksa approach. India’s stress on rehabilitation issues of Tamils would indicate that its continued focus on this aspect rather than on resuming a dialogue on ethnic issues. The allocation of Rs 1000 crores as assistance to build 50,000 houses for people displaced due to the war and other assistance to improve communication and other infrastructure illustrate this.

In a bid to build closer relations both countries agreed upon taking a number of steps. These include improving interconnectivity with the introduction of Colombo-Tuticorin, Talaimannar-Rameswaram ferry services, Indian assistance to improve Palaly Airport and Kankesanthurai Harbour, and conducting a feasibility study for linking electricity grids of the two countries. India has also offered to extend the bandwidth to set up satellite-interactive terminals in Sri Lanka.

The joint statement issued after the meeting between the President and Indian Prime Minister indicated some cautious steps taken to build closer strategic relations. These include: India’s assurance to examine a Sri Lankan suggestion for establishing a joint information mechanism on the likely oil and gas fields straddling India- Sri Lanka maritime boundary; promotion of dialogue on security and defence issues including an annual defence dialogue; and promoting the use of space technology for a variety of services. The Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance on Criminal Matters and Agreement on Transfer of Sentenced Prisoners signed during the visit would provide for structural improvement to security and legal framework.
The Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) proposal was not mentioned in the joint statement, although measures for developing “a framework for sustainable economic partnership and addressing outstanding issues” of the Free Trade Agreement found a place in the joint statement. This would indicate that CEPA would come up sooner than later. The agreement on establishing Indian consular presence in Jaffna and in Hambantota also should be viewed in the context of furthering trading interests rather than strategic linkages.

China-Sri Lanka agreements

Chinese Vice-Premier, Zhang Dejiang led a 30-member delegation to Sri Lanka on a three-day official trip close on the heels of President Rajapaksa's visit to India. It showed Sri Lanka’s careful balancing of relations between India and China.

During the visit Sri Lanka signed six agreements for enhanced cooperation in highways development, information technology and communications, development of maritime ports and the second phase of the Hambantota Port Development project (for which China has offered financial assistance of US$ 200 million) and maintenance of the Bandaranaike Memorial International Conference Hall built by China.

Vice Premier Zhang, when he met President Rajapaksa on June 12, also discussed the progress of projects including the Norochcholai Coal Power Project, the Hambantota Port Development and the Mattala International Airport.

International issues

Sri Lanka has reacted angrily to UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon’s appointment of an expert panel to advise him on human rights violations in the final stage of the island’s civil war. The UN panel announced on June 22 is headed by former Indonesian Attorney General Marzuki Darusman, with Ms Yasmin Sooka, a former member of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission and Steven Ratner, an American law professor, as members. According to a UN spokesperson the advisory panel’s mandate was limited to advising the secretary general and it was “not a fact-finding or investigative body.”

President Rajapaksa rejected the UN move, and the External affairs minister G.L. Peiris called it “an unnecessary interference” and said the government should be given “a free space to make its own findings.” The government has also said it would not issue visa for the UN panel members to visit Sri Lanka. China, Japan, India and Russia had been generally supportive of Sri Lanka government move to investigate the human rights aberrations on its own while the West, particularly the EU and the United States had been for an international panel.

Although the issue has whipped up national sentiments among the people, both General Sarath Fonseka, army commander during the war who is under arrest now, and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam’s US based activist and a member of the Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam Rudrakumaran have offered to co-operate with the UN panel. This is likely to further embarrass the Sri Lanka government who see an international conspiracy to demean the country’s achievement in these moves.

As though to confirm this conjecture, the EU also announced on June 22 that it would extend GSP+ tariff concessions to Sri Lanka after August 15 for “a limited additional period, subject to a clear and written commitment” to undertake 15 specific actions it considered as related to human rights within a six-month period from July.

The 15 areas for action included implementation of the Sri Lankan constitution’s 17th Amendment, the repeal of emergency regulations, co-operation with UN human rights bodies, release of a list of detained LTTE combatants and other suspects, and an end to harassment of journalists.
Prof GL Peiris, External Affairs Minister, rejecting the conditions said the government would not “surrender decision making powers, very sensitive and crucial matters to any foreign government.”

This does not augur well for Sri Lankan exports, particularly ready made garments which are heavily dependent upon EU markets. In the coming months we can expect Sri Lanka government to scale down its rhetoric and take some action repair its international relations.

National budget

Sri Lanka budget for the current year, already delayed by seven months, aims to reduce the budget deficit to 8% as against last year’s 9.9% deficit. This would represent the biggest reduction in deficit in recent times. With a view to spur growth targeted at 7% this year the government halved the import tax on cars and cut levies on electronics goods in the run up to the budget. The government hopes to increase tax revenue to at least 17 percent of GDP over the medium term, from 14.5 percent in 2009.

However, its meagre increase in wages for government servants and levy of additional taxes on food articles are likely to stir up public protests.

Sri Lanka’s budget plans are apparently in conformity with the International Monetary Fund’s conditional loan to replenish Sri Lanka’s foreign exchange reserves. Under the IMF’s $2.5 billion loan programme, during the month the fund approved the release of fifth tranche of $ 408 million. This would indicate the IMF is satisfied with the government’s measures to tighten fiscal discipline.

Political moves

The government appears to have taken some action to use Kumaran Pathmanathan known better as KP, former international representative of the Tamil Tigers held in captivity, to build better relations with pro-LTTE Diaspora. In a carefully orchestrated move it allowed KP to visit North with a Diaspora delegation ostensibly to consider some rehabilitation project. In the coming months its political impact could be far reaching.
June 30, 2010
South Asia Security Trends Vol 4 No 6
Courtesy: www.security-risks.com

Tamil blog on Eelam Tamil issue

My e-mail interview in Tamil on Sri Lanka Tamil issue given to the Eelam Nation News website on June 29, 2010 has been uploaded in my Tamil blog at http://hariharanalasal.blogspot.com/


To access it kindly click on . Of course the interview is available at the website of the Eelam Nation News at www.eelamnationnews.com

Dr Dayan Jayatilleka explains why for Sri Lanka, India is indispensable

Two of my recent Sri Lanka up dates in SAAG (also published in this blog) "Indian Concerns in Sri Lanka" on June 6th and "Sri Lanka: Much ado about few things" on June 17th relating to Sri Lanka President Mahinda Rajapaksa's visit reproduced in Sri Lanka media appear to have ruffled the feathers of many in the Sinhalese lobby. They have questioned the very basis of India-Sri Lanka relations, which occupies a unique place in the sub continent. They are equating it with Sri Lanka -China relations which are altogether on a different plane.

I found Dr Dayan Jaya, well known political analyst and Left Wing intellectual, who served as Sri Lanka's permanent representative to the UN, Geneva, during the crucial period of the Eelam War IV, had eloquently explained why India is more indispensable for Sri Lanka than Sri Lanka is for India in a recent interview to Lakbimanews. And it was carried in the www.transcurrents.com on June 12, 2010. I am reproducing Dr Jayatilleka's interview here for readers benefit (though in my view Sri Lanka is also equally indispensable for India)courtesy Lakbimanews.

For India, Sri Lanka is not indispensable, but for Sri Lanka, India is indispensable

An Interview with Dr.Dayan Jayatilleka
By Rathindra Kuruwita

Question: President Mahinda Rajapaksa left for India recently and he is set to show his Indian counterpart a draft of the proposed Constitutional amendments. This is seen by many as a gesture of subjugation and their requests to open a Deputy High Commissioner’s office in Kandy and a consulate office in Hambanthota and their insistence of implementing the 13th Amendment are seen by many as attempts to impose their will on Sri Lanka?

Answer:You use the term ‘many’. Who are these ‘many’ and where are they? I have only seen criticisms voiced by the usual handful of Southern extremists, and some small political parties both in government as well as defeated ones. President Rajapaksa is a patriot and a realist, a pragmatist. The handful of critics may be patriots but they are not realists. When we antagonized India we could not win the war, but when we correctly managed relations with India, we won the war. If India had opposed us or not supported us, we may not have been able to win or withstand the Western moves to stop the war. There is a saying that there is no such thing as a free lunch. Every relationship is reciprocal. Sri Lanka has to reciprocate for India’s support.

We must bear in mind that we still need that support because, though the hot war has been won by us, a cold war continues against us in the global arena.

We need India’s support to balance off those who are hostile to us or are influenced by the pro-Eelam trend in the Tamil Diaspora. India is our buffer with the USA. Delhi is under pressure to take a stand hostile to us, or to stop supporting us. That pressure comes from Tamil Nadu but not only from Tamil Nadu...from India’s civil society as well as some of India’s Western friends. If India stops supporting us, not even the Non Aligned Movement will defend us fully, because they take their cue from respected Third World states such as India.

If India allows Tamil Nadu or Kerala to become rear base areas once again for LTTE activity, we will have endless security problems. It is only someone who is deaf, dumb and blind to geo-political realities, who will not admit that India has a stake in our Tamil issue, simply because they have 70 million Tamils separated from our territory by a narrow strip of water. As for the 13th Amendment, I must say very clearly that this is the cheapest price to pay. It is simply a matter of letting the Northern and Eastern provincial councils have the same powers as enjoyed by the provincial councils in all other parts of the island for the last 20 years. If we don’t settle for the 13th Amendment now, we shall jeopardize our military gains and we shall probably have to pay a much higher price some years from now.

The request to open a consulate office in Hambantota seems to be an attempt to balance out the Chinese influence in the area. Wouldn’t this add to the already existing tension between the two super powers? And how would this tussle affect Sri Lanka?

We have to balance carefully between China and India. China is our most consistent and strongest single friend, but the reality is that even with its growing power, China is rather too far to come to our aid if our closest and only neighbor makes a move that is unfriendly to us. As we saw during the tsunami, India’s Navy can put a ring of steel around this island in hours, and even project her naval power up to Indonesia. China’s Navy has not yet developed such a capacity.

We must be aware of our strategic vulnerabilities. We must understand the limits of our China card. In the 1980s, J R Jayewardane’s UNP government thought that Sri Lanka can play the American card against India but he failed. Today, no one must have the opposite but similar illusion that we have a China card to play against India. Even China will not want to upset its relations with giant India, over little Sri Lanka. China did not come to its ally and our friend Pakistan’s aid during the Kargil crisis, when it was pushed back by India. China doesn’t want the West to entangle and entrap it in a tussle with India, which will prevent the onward rise of Asia as a whole.

Sri Lanka must realize that there is a miracle going on, namely the economic rise of Asia, which is propelled by two engines, China and India. It is bigger than the original Industrial revolution! If we plug into both these engines, we can rise with the rest of Asia. If not, we shall be left on the ground, like Myanmar. The man renowned as the Sage of Asia, Lee Kwan Yew, recently said that China and India are two great trees and that Singapore must find a spot in the shade where the branches of these two great trees intertwine. I think that is true, and good advice, for Sri Lanka too.

Although India can match China or the USA in meeting Sri Lanka’s economic needs, it cannot help us on the world political stage as do China or the USA who have UN veto powers. Your opinion please?

India is a member of G 20. It is also a member of many groupings of intermediate powers such as BRICS which consists of Russia, China, Brazil, India and South Africa. If India gives a green light the West, will move against us. The US hasn’t so far, because of its strategic partnership with India, which it needs in order to balance off China. As I said before, without India’s support we will not even get that of our ‘tribe’ the Non Aligned Movement. India has longstanding close relations with Russia, South Africa and Latin America. In fact, India is one of the few powers that have support in the West as well as the East, in the North and well as the South, while China and the USA are competitors who do not have support in some parts of the international system.

We must never forget that despite China’s goodwill, not a dog supported us when India went against us in 1987. Today, despite China’s political support, Sudan is before the International Criminal Court, because it was referred there by the Security Council and China did not block it. The basic reality is that Sri Lanka’s closest friend China is not closest to Sri Lanka physically, geographically! We must neither embarrass nor overburden our friend China nor must we place all our eggs in the Beijing basket.

It was China and Russia that helped us out in the United Nations in the recent past. And they can also assist us in the future as allegations of war crimes gather momentum. So are we jeopardizing their support by seemingly giving into the demands of the Indians?

Russia will not help us if India says not to. Take that from me. The US would have moved against us in the UN and more importantly the IMF last year, if not for India putting in a word in our favour. We have been operating under the Indian and Chinese umbrellas diplomatically, but if the Indian umbrella is furled up, nobody will back us. Our friends will start stepping away from us. This is the basic point: India is so big; it is such a vast market and so powerful an economic player; it is so vital strategically, that no one will take our side against India; no one will support us if India is known to be against us.

I can tell you that as far as certain key issues go, such as the Tamil question and a political settlement with the Tamils, there is no difference between the views of India, China, Russia and the USA! That is true of the Non-aligned countries as well. You noticed that we almost had a problem recently with a pro-Tamil Eelam infiltration and manifestation in revolutionary Venezuela! All these countries want us to settle the Tamil problem politically, by which they mean some kind of autonomy. No one supports Tamil Eelam and no one, not even the USA, has called for federalism, but everyone, and I mean all our friends, want us to solve this problem fast, by means of devolution of power. For India, Sri Lanka is not indispensable, but for Sri Lanka, India is indispensable. That is the cold reality. That is the hard fact.

Can we use the interest shown by all these powers, China, India, USA and the EU without eventually antagonizing one or more parties?

Of course, we can. Lakshman Kadirgamar did it. Before that, Mrs Sirimavo Bandaranaike did it. But we cannot keep saying no to every issue to everybody! And we cannot manage on our own! We must reach out to all, on all points of the compass. We must dialogue with all. Prof GL Pieris has the ability to do that, which he has proven with his successful US trip and meeting with Hillary Clinton. Once again, we have a foreign minister that every Sri Lankans and Sri Lankans everywhere can be proud of.

We must have a policy that defends our vital interests, and compromise on things that are not vital. We must safeguard our core strategic and security interests, while making concessions on tactical issues. Each of these powers has something we need and each of them needs something from us. In order to get what we need we need to give something, which sometimes means giving up something. We cannot have the kavum and eat it at the same time!

The first thing is to understand that we cannot live in isolation, like frogs in the well. If we try, we will crash economically and the Tamil Eelam forces waiting outside the country will triumph. We must also understand that we cannot have everything our way; we cannot negotiate with the rest of the world from a position of strength because we do not have such strength. To build up strength we must have good relations with the world and expand those relations, getting as much as we can and more importantly, learning as much as we can. Each of the global players or sectors you mentioned wants certain things from us, and we should give them whatever does not harm our core interest and our good relations with the other global player or friend. We can have a policy of good relations with all, but at the expense of none.

Since we have an external enemy working round the clock against us, namely the pro-Tamil Eelam section of the Tamil Diaspora, our international policy must be one of building the broadest global united front; the widest global partnerships. If we don’t isolate the Tamil Eelamists, they will isolate Sri Lanka! Here I must repeat what I said earlier: the one thing that all the players you mentioned - China, USA, India, EU, have in common is an urgent need to see Sri Lanka release and rehabilitate IDPs, reconstruct the North and east and arrive at a political settlement with the Tamil people based on some form of autonomy and self- administration. If we do that, we can remove or reduce the pressure on Sri Lanka on issues of war crimes etc. As a top Chinese diplomat and official once told me “You must help us to help you. Sri Lanka must give its friends something to help Sri Lanka with”.

One year after the defeat of the LTTE, what is Sri Lanka’s position in the world. Would you agree if I say, we have not properly used the opportunities given to us to improve relations with other countries? South Indian politicians and its population are still very much anti-Sri Lankan, a sentiment which was clear during the recently held IIFA. Elements of Tamil extremists have set up a transnational government and seem to have gained many sympathizers in the west?

One year after the victory in war, Sri Lanka is not where it should be, either in the world or internally. We have lost the war of opinion in the world’s media. If, as I had recommended, we had quickly followed up the military victory with the implementation of the 13th Amendment while the TNA was disoriented, we’d have been dealing with our ally Douglas Devananda. We lost that moment and momentum because of some small ideological caucuses of ultra nationalist pundits who have a dis- proportionate influence. Even after that opportunity was lost, there are things we could have done.

The government has made the same mistake as the Bush administration after the war in Iraq, namely the absence of a clear postwar plan and program for the area and primarily, the people. Our military did its job superbly, but who congratulates us internationally, one year after? No one, not even our friends defend us publicly when we are criticized! Why? Because, the politicians and the development ministries have not followed up the achievement of the military.

We fought and won a Just War (‘Saadharana Yuddhayak’), but the world looks at us and does not see a Just Peace (‘Saadhaarana Saamayak’) having resulted. What the world sees is something like an occupation of a foreign country or foreign people. Because we do not yet have a Just Peace, world opinion doubts whether it was a Just War to begin with! That is not a sustainable peace.

Simply put, if by today we had a Tamil Chief Minister and an elected Northern Provincial council, the IIFA partial boycott would not have been possible and furthermore, we may not have had this much international pressure on ‘war crimes accountability mechanisms’ either. If we could have shown results in the North, winning the Tamil people over with a fair and just peace, the rest of the world would have told those who criticize us to shut up.

I must also say that in the year after the war, Sri Lanka is losing, or has lost the battle for world opinion. I am not speaking only of the West. In a brand new book, the highly respected senior leader of Singapore, Lee Kwan Yew says that though the Tamil Tigers have been killed, the problem has not been settled and that Sinhalese extremism will be unable to keep the Tamils, who are a ‘capable’ community, ‘submissive’. So it is not just the INGOs and the liberal west which is critical of our postwar policies, direction and situation.

Col. P. Hariharan in his article “India’s concerns in Sri Lanka: Update no. 199’ says that ‘the three things he (Rajapaksa) achieved in his first term of office - wiping out Prabhakaran and his Tamil Tigers, re-election for a second term with increased margin of votes and an unprecedented victory in parliamentary poll with 60% mandate from the voters - give him the confidence to talk from a position of strength to New Delhi.’ Do you think it’s an accurate description of the situation since it stands in contrast with many other commentators who claim that President Rajapaksa has no other option but to agree to everything that India puts on the table?

The only leaders who can talk from a position of strength to New Delhi are President Obama of the USA and President Hu Jin Tao of China, but they are both wise enough not to do so.

What can Sri Lanka do to overcome the challenges both locally and internationally in the coming years?

We must use our brains, and may I say our best brains. We must deploy our best talent to face the global challenge and fight the Cold War against Sri Lanka. We must rebuild our educational system to the point that we can produce those who can compete in the global arena and beat those forces hostile to us. We need to build up quality human resources. Today our external and internal relations are tied together. Our external relations depend in large measure on how we resolve our internal problem with the Tamils.

Remember that it is not a purely internal problem though we may like to think so. In the first place the world is globalised; humanity lives in the era of globalization, so there are no purely internal questions. In the second place the Tamils are spread not only in Tamil Nadu but throughout the world, from the USA to Malaysia and South Africa. We must learn from King Dutugemunu. He wiped out the armed Tamil challenge as manifested in a separate kingdom with a separate king and a separate army. He knew that with the Indian Ocean at our backs, we cannot tolerate two kingdoms with two rival armies on this small island.

However, the story tells us that after the victory he appointed a Tamil sub-king and allowed the people of the area to be governed according to their cultural norms and customs. As a wise strategist he didn’t try to control and dominate everything, nor did he try to change the basic character of the area he had liberated. What he implemented postwar, is another word for provincial devolution within a strong unitary state. King Dutugemunu was wise enough not to think of culturally colonizing the Tamils. We cannot wipe out the Tamils collective identity.

If they think we are doing so, they will resist peacefully. If we are seen by the world to crush non-violent Tamil civic resistance, not in the cause of Tamil Eelam or in support of the Tigers, but simply to protect their identity and ancestral homelands, then we will embarrass our friends and we shall have no one to back us. This is when the pro-Tamil Eelam Tamil Diaspora will have its day. Who knows what stand the big powers and the UN will take then? It is far better to have a timely political process and grant a measure of autonomy while the state is still on top.

[Dr Dayan Jayatilleka, formerly Sri Lanka’s Permanent Representative to the UN in Geneva, is currently a Visiting Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies of the National University of Singapore. This interview appeared in Lakbima News.These are his personal views and do not reflect the views of the Institute.]