The Role of Force in Strategic Affairs

[Text of speech by Mr Shivshankar Menon, National Security Advisor, at National Defence College, New Delhi on October 21,2010.]

I am deeply honoured to have been asked to deliver the keynote address before the seminar on “The Role of Force in Strategic Affairs” to celebrate the golden jubilee of this prestigious institution. The NDC has made outstanding contributions to the spread of strategic thought and the integration of civil and military thinking in India. You have today assembled a galaxy of experts and authorities to discuss this important question. We await your deliberations with great expectations.

Rather than trying to anticipate what your seminar will throw up, I thought I would look at two issues that you will probably consider in much more detail. Is there in an Indian doctrine for the use of force in statecraft? And, how have recent changes in the world and strategic affairs affected the role of force in today’s world?

Is there an Indian doctrine for the use of force in statecraft? This is not a question that one normally expects to ask about a power that is a declared nuclear weapon state with the world’s second largest standing army. But India achieved independence in a unique manner; through a freedom movement dedicated to truth and non-violence, and has displayed both ambiguity and opposition to classical power politics. In the circumstances posing the question is understandable and legitimate.

To answer the question let us look at traditional Indian attitudes to force and the lessons India draws from its own history, and at Indian practice since independence in 1947.

Attitudes to Force and Lessons from History

While India may have achieved independence after a non-violent struggle, it was a struggle that Gandhiji described as non-violence of the strong.

As far back as 1928 Gandhiji wrote, “If there was a national government, whilst I should not take any direct part in any war, I can conceive of occasions when it would be my duty to vote for the military training of those who wish to take it.... It is not possible to make a person or society non-violent by compulsion.”

During the Partition riots at his prayer meeting on 26 September 1947 Gandhiji said that he had always been an opponent of all warfare, but that if there was no other way of securing justice war would be the only alternative left to the government.

Faced with the tribal raiders sent by Pakistan into Kashmir in October 1947, Gandhiji said that it was right for the Union Government to save the fair city by rushing troops to Srinagar. He added that he would rather that the defenders be wiped out to the last man in clearing Kashmir’s soil of the raiders rather than submit.

In saying so, Gandhiji was entirely in keeping with a long Indian tradition which has regarded the use of force as legitimate in certain circumstances, namely, if there is no alternative way of securing justice. This is in essence a doctrine for the defensive use of force, when all other avenues are exhausted.

Our two greatest epics, the Mahabharata and Ramayana are about wars, and treat rivalries as natural and normal. And the two classical expositions on the use of force, the Geeta and Bhishma’s death bed lecture on statecraft in the Mahabharata’s Shantiparva are extended explanations of a unique point of view.

The clearest description of the uses of force in statecraft is in the Arthashastra by Chanakya, which deals with both internal and external uses of force.

The lesson that comes through very clearly in both the major Indian epics, which deal with wars of necessity, is also apparent in Kautilya, the original realist, and in Ashoka, the convert to idealism. Ashoka and Kautilya were both products of a highly evolved and intricate tradition of statecraft which must have preceded them for centuries. A simple reading of the Arthashastra suffices to prove how evolved Indian strategic culture was as early as the third century before Christ, and how the use of force was limited both by practical and moral considerations. This was not a doctrine of “God on our side”, (though that helped, as Krishna proved in the Mahabharata). Nor is it about just wars. In the Indian tradition the use of force is legitimate not just if it is in a good cause and its results will be good. Instead, this was a doctrine that saw force as necessary in certain circumstances, to obtain justice, when all other means are exhausted, and which also recognised that force was not always the most effective or efficient means to this end.

The other lesson that Indian thinkers have consistently drawn from history is of the perils of weakness. The colonial narrative of India’s history, stressing “outside” invasions and rulers had as its corollary the conviction that India must avoid weakness at all costs lest that history be repeated. The Indian quest after 1947 for strategic autonomy and for autonomy in the decision to use or threaten force has a long tradition behind it.

What I am trying to say is that Indian strategic culture has an indigenous construct on the role of force in statecraft, modified by our experience in the last two centuries. War and peace are continuing themes in Indian strategic culture. While not celebrating war the culture treats defensive war as acceptable when good fights evil to secure justice. Indian strategic culture has been comfortable with this contradiction. While Gandhiji shunned the use of force and opposed violence in politics he was politically steely and unyielding, and accepted violence as unavoidable and justified in certain circumstances.

As a result of this acceptance of contradictions, Indian strategic culture supports ethical views that dovetail easily with international norms of conduct, whether legal or on human rights. It is a culture that tends instinctively to pluralism, tolerance of different views and positions, and a reliance on argumentation, diplomacy and law before recourse to the use of force. It is therefore no surprise that it seeks a rule based international order to limit the anarchy among states that is sometimes evident.

This aspect of Indian strategic culture is common to what Kanti Bajpai described as the three streams of Indian strategic culture, namely, “Nehruvians”, neo-liberals and hyper-realists. They might differ on the best means but not on India’s strategic goals . To summarise Bajpai, all three streams agree on the centrality of the sovereign state in international relations and recognise no higher authority; see interests, power and violence as the staples of international relations that states cannot ignore; and think that power comprises both military and economic capabilities at a minimum. Beyond this they differ.

Interestingly all three streams, “Nehruvians”, neoliberals and hyperrealists, believe that nuclear weapons are essential for India’s security in a world that has shown no signs of moving to their abolition and elimination.

In other words, there is substantial agreement on values, on goals and even on means in our policies, despite marked and rapid changes in the external environment in which we have operated. That is why the core traits of our foreign and defence policies have persisted since independence, irrespective of the parties in power.

The Indian Practice since 1947

Let us look at this aspect of Indian strategic culture in action, in other words at Indian practice and policy since independence.

• The defence budget has only exceeded 3% of GDP in one year of the last sixty-three.

• There have been clear limits on the use of force internally. The use of military force for internal security functions has been severely circumscribed, limited to those cases where there is a strong correlation to inimical forces abroad such as Nagaland and J&K.

• The armed forces of the Union have only been used defensively against external aggression in the sixty-three years of the Republic.

• India has never sent troops abroad except for UNPKO or at the express request of the legitimate government of the country concerned. This was true in the Maldives in 1987, in Sri Lanka in 1987 and in Bangladesh in 1971.

• India has also never retained territory taken by force in the wars that she has fought. This is so even for some Indian territory taken back from Pakistan in the Indian state of J&K which was returned to Pakistani control after the 1965 and 1971 wars.

India as a NWS

The Indian nuclear doctrine also reflects this strategic culture, with its emphasis on minimal deterrence, no first use against non-nuclear weapon states and its direct linkage to nuclear disarmament. We have made it clear that while we need nuclear weapons for our own security, it is our goal to work for a world free of nuclear weapons, and that we are ready to undertake the necessary obligations to achieve that goal in a time-bound programme agreed to and implemented by all nuclear weapon and other states.

In sum, there is an Indian way, an Indian view and an Indian practice in the use and role of force. We do not claim that it is better or worse than any other way that other nations adopt. It is a result of our own history and experience, and we feel it best suited to our goals and situation. And it too is evolving, both consciously and unconsciously, as is the world around us. It is time now to consciously build our own concepts and strategic thinking, adapted to today’s realities and India’s environment, including on the role of force.

Force in Today’s World

The other issue that you will be considering is how changes in the world and in strategic affairs have affected the role of force.

It seems to me that the changes we see in world politics and the effects of technology are the two factors that have most affected the strategic calculus of those in the international system who might seek to use force for political purposes.

Consider the global political situation first.

With global and regional balances of power characterised by unequal distributions of power; the interdependence between major powers created by globalisation; the state losing its monopoly of violence in contested hegemonies both internally and externally; and the diversity of values espoused by states, world politics today is in an unprecedented state of flux. It does, however seem that the cost to the major powers of using force in their dealings with each other could prevent the emergence of direct conflict between them.

The effects of technology are harder to describe and predict. In the early fifties, there were those who hoped that the unprecedented power of the atom bomb had made war unthinkable and therefore abolished it! Unfortunately, we now know better. In fact we have seen technology place increasingly lethal power in the hands of non-state actors. Terrorism is technologically enabled and knows no boundaries today, even drawing on support from within state systems. After several centuries, once again the state is not the sole or always the predominant factor in the international system. In some cases, it is businesses and individuals who now determine our technological future and it is these units that a successful policy must now increasingly deal with.

We have also seen technology create new domains for contestation, such as cyber space, where the speed of manoeuvre, premium on offense, and the nature of the battle-space make us rethink traditional concepts of deterrence. As technology has expanded the spectrum, the line between conventional and non-conventional warfare has blurred. The definition of force, the classic marker of power, has now expanded, thus changing the utility of force as traditionally configured.

As we enter a world of multiple powers, with rapidly shifting balances, change alone is certain. Unfortunately, force is the hedge chosen by several powers against heightened uncertainty in the international system. The balance is shifting between force and the other instruments of statecraft. We therefore need to develop a new and different statecraft.

If change alone is certain, and if the utility of force in statecraft is itself changing in fundamental ways, it is all the more necessary that we return to the values in which the use of force must be embedded. Ultimately it is not just the logic of politics or technology but the values and purposes of the state and society that determine the choices that we make of the uses and nature of force.

What India seeks is a new security architecture, an open, balanced and inclusive architecture, to correspond to the new situation that is emerging. The security challenges of the twenty-first century are radically different from those of the twentieth. Nuclear confrontation or war between major powers is not as likely as the threat from derivatives of nuclear deterrence, namely, terrorism and nuclear proliferation, which are being used to subvert the emergence of a plural, secular and democratic international order in the twenty-first century. The challenges of a globalised world cannot be handled by twentieth century military alliances or containment strategies.

Conclusion

So in effect my argument is that in India’s experience the use of force must be governed and circumscribed by the values of state and society. I have also tried to suggest that there may be value in studying the Indian way, the Indian view and Indian practice in the use and role of force in state-craft.

It also seems from recent experience that the utility of force, as traditionally configured and conceived, is of limited value in protecting a society or achieving some policy goals. But one can hardly jump to conclusions about the futility of force when limited war under nuclear conditions remains possible, and when adversaries need to be deterred. This debate will continue.

I wish you success in continuing the debate and in your deliberations.

URL: http://mea.gov.in/mystart.php?id=190016584

Nuclear capability of India and China: an analysis

By Col. R. Hariharan

A comparison of nuclear capability of India and China cannot be made in isolation. It has to be derived in the backdrop of their strategic vision, global ambitions and political and social ethos that condition their perceptions. Their strategic vision dictates the development of their nuclear capability (including nuclear policy, concepts, weapons capability and delivery systems) appropriate to the geo-strategic environment.

Strategic setting

Ever since the global economic downturn started around 2008, China’s economic clout had been increasing. And the Obama administration soon after it came to power made special efforts to woo China to seek help in stemming its own economic decline. Apparently China’s global ambitions were strengthened by this. So it was not surprising that it showed reluctance to play ball with Obama administration’s efforts to turn it into a partner in international affairs.

However, one of the important reasons for Chinese reluctance is the suspicion about the U.S. intentions in Asia, where the U.S. had been developing strategic convergence in its relations with India. This was made clear in China’s Defence White Paper 2008 that spoke of ‘increasing US military presence in Asia-Pacific.’ China is wary of a US sponsored creation of an anti-Chinese axis extending from India to Japan. Though this was not referred to by General Ma Xiaotian, the Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the PLA, while speaking at the Shangri La Dialogue 2010 he said “we believe that maintaining security in the Asia-Pacific region serves China's interest, and it is also China's responsibility.” Apparently, the Chinese Navy’s increasingly assertive posture in South China Sea is only an affirmation of this policy.

This power assertion has strong strategic connotations to its ASEAN neighbours in particular as China is likely to be embedded in their security architecture inn the coming years as indicated by Professor Zhuang Jian Zhong, Standing Vice Director, Center for National Strategic Studies, Shanghai Jiaotong University, at the Shangri La Dialogue 2010.

After the Indo-US civilian nuclear bill became a reality, US-India economic relations were poised to grow fast. However, this did not happen as Obama administration had its own hangups on India. However, US-India relations have recently been warming up for the first time after President Obama came to power. The reality is that this has come about only after the impasse in the US-China relations. Now US-India economic relations are poised to grow rapidly only because Indian economy, less dependant upon export market than China, is clocking a steady 8 % growth.

Moreover, even if the US pulls out of Afghanistan, it would perhaps like to retain Pakistan a strategic ally in the region. The Army is likely to continue to decide Pakistan’s strategic posture in the coming years. Perhaps this is the underlying reason for the $ 10 billion U.S. assistance to the Pakistan army. It should not be forgotten that Pakistan, a close ally of China, achieved its nuclear capability aided and abetted by China. These considerations are likely to influence the US form encouraging India to play a major strategic role in Afghanistan and beyond in the west. With such considerations, in the US foreign relations horizon China would continue to occupy a larger space than India in the coming years, regardless the ups and downs of US-China relations.

India dominates South Asian region physically and economically. Soft power of Indian culture spills over the region as well. During the cold war era, it had built strong relationship with Soviet Union, which still has a large residual content in Russia, particularly as a supplier of defence equipment and weaponry. India’s geographic location enables it to be a dominant power in the Indian Ocean region. So it is not surprising that China had been cultivating India’s smaller neighbours who have latent fear of Indian domination. China’s close relation with Pakistan is well known. Nepal and Sri Lanka are increasingly coming under Chinese influence. Except for Pakistan, present emphasis of China’s relationship-building with other neighbours of India appears to have more political and economic than military content.

Nuclear setting

Given India’s comparatively smaller economic and military clout, unlike China, India appears to nurse only regional ambitions. Unlike China, which signed the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a recognised nuclear weapons state, though India did not sign NPT, its nuclear capability got recognition only after it tested nuclear weapons in 1998. So India has fundamental limitations in augmenting its nuclear weapons capability although it is said to have enriched Uranium stockpile to produce another 30 warheads. India’s nuclear arsenal is estimated between 40 and 80 warheads. This is less than the number of warheads Pakistan has and probably one fifth of China’s holdings. Moreover, with limited nuclear tests carried out, questions about their operational performance have been raised.

But the main limitation of India lies in is weak nuclear delivery capability. India at present has only short and intermediate range ballistic missiles. Its naval missile development is aimed at refining its intermediate range capability only. Its first-ever nuclear submarine INS Arihant, now undergoing sea trials, is likely to become operational in 2012, if it keeps to its schedule. Thus at present it has no operational ballistic missile submarine. Its submarine fleet is aging and due to stilted naval procurement programme its fleet is likely to be reduced to half according to one estimate. So India’s nuclear weapon delivery at present is limited to nuclear-capable aircraft and surface ships of the navy only. At present this restricts the reach of India’s nuclear capability to South Asia and Tibet.

After its nuclear tests in 1998, India adopted a "no first use policy." But according to its nuclear policy even though there will be no first-use of nuclear weapons by India, "nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage." But how far these words can be given form remains to be seen. With India’s limited missile capability, second strike capability will have to be based upon its air force and surface ships. Thus India will continue to be vulnerable nuclear missile strikes beyond the intermediate range.

Only in 2003, India established the Strategic Nuclear Command. This join services organisation is responsible for holding all of India’s nuclear weapons, missiles and other assets. It has also executive responsibility for enforcing nuclear policy. However, it is the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) under the Prime Minister that will authorise response to any nuclear strike. Quick decision making under pressure had never been the strong point of CCS. Whether it can do so in real time to order a retaliatory nuclear strike is a moot question.

India’s key weakness is not only in strategic decision making process but tardy implementation of decisions. India has failed to use time as an irreplaceable resource. Thus the state controlled defence research and development programmes regularly fail to keep up their schedules. Defence procurement had become a hotbed of corruption and the bureaucratic procedure appears to be more focused on stemming corruption than on timely procurement of weapon systems. This has not improved despite the complaints of service chiefs; this has considerably weakened the modernisation of armed forces.

On the other hand, China has developed a clearly articulated long term vision for improving its strategic capability in conformity with its global ambitions. It has developed its large scale weapons research, development and manufacturing capability. It has become a major weapon producer and this gives it a powerful clout to favourably spread its influence.

China adopted No First Use nuclear policy well before India in 1964, with the affirmation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons “at any time or under any circumstances.” Though China has reaffirmed its NFU policy in 2009, China’s credibility to do so is low. For instance, there were reports that China had considered nuclear strikes against the Soviet Union in the event of a conventional Soviet attack. It has capability to deliver nuclear weapons from air craft, surface ships and submarines as well as missiles.

Its military modernisation programme is well on the way with focused development to improve its missile and naval capability while turning the huge PLA into a modern force with better mobility and fire power.

China is reported to hold the lowest number of nuclear warheads among the five nuclear weapons states. Though exact number of China’s nuclear arsenal is not known, the figure of around 130 nuclear warheads deployed in missiles and aircraft as given by the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists is probably correct. Probably 70 more are in storage. China has a variety of indigenously developed ICBMs including DF -5 ICBM which has a range of about 15000 Km has been in service since 1980. About 80 warheads are deployed in the ballistic missiles of DF-3, DF-4, DF-5 and DF-21. Of these China is estimated to have 25 DF-5 missiles. Under the military modernization programme, China is improving the missile portability, and performance capability. It has the potential to develop multiple warhead carrying capability in some of the missiles as well.

Though the PLA navy is ranked as the third largest in the world, it had only a defensive capability limited to its coastal region with only brown water capability. However as a result of modernisation efforts, it has now attained green water capability. That would mean it has offensive capability limited to about a thousand miles from its shores. It continues to suffer from weaknesses command C4 systems.

In keeping with increased strategic priorities Chinese navy is in the process of transforming into a blue water navy, though it is still a long way to go. It has developed Type 094 ballistic submarines armed with JL 2 SLBMs with a range of 8000 Km; this would make the western hemisphere within its range. It has developed a large submarine base in Hainan which has been cause of concern to the U.S. and India.

Since the last decade, Chinese naval presence in international waters has been on the rise. It has carried out joint exercises with over a dozen countries including India and Pakistan. In its first international foray, it is operating a flotilla on anti piracy duties in Gulf of Aden. Probably in during the coming decade we will be seeing large scale power assertion of Chinese navy in Indian Ocean region.

Chinese has been instrumental in contributing to the development of Pakistan’s nuclear and missile capabilities, flouting international agreements. The two countries have close strategic links. This could result in the further growth of Pakistan’s nuclear capability in the future. The recent Chinese announcement to give two more nuclear power stations to Pakistan ostensibly under a 1991 contract is a case in point. Though the Bush administration had objected to it earlier, the US appears to have chosen to ignore it now due to political expediency dictated by its Pak-Af posture. Thus China enjoys enormous advantage with its proxy presence in Pakistan.

Conclusion

China enjoys definite advantage over India in three key aspects of exercising nuclear capability: decision making process weapons systems, and delivery options. However, Chinese capability is mostly based on its ICBM systems operating from both land and sea. Its green water capability is being augmented with the development of 094 ballistic submarines armed with SLBMs. This could overcome its limitations in blue water operations. Thus China’s nuclear capability is in tandem with its global ambitions.

Comparatively, India’s nuclear capability is circumscribed by the limits of its regional ambitions. This situation is unlikely to change unless India improves its ability to handle strategic security challenges. To give form to it, better nuclear weapons and missile capabilities are essential. In particular, it has to develop a strong anti-missile capability. India has a long way to go in doing so. India’s strength would depend upon building a win-win relationship with China; at the same time India has to develop closer strategic relations with the US without sacrificing its regional interests. Indo-Russian relations, a little stagnant at present, also need to be nurtured. More than all this it has to speed up modernisation of armed forces. In the coming years, Indian Ocean region is likely to become the scene of power assertion. This would imply the need for making Indian navy a powerful entity so that India does not lose its strategic advantage in the region.
Courtesy: South Asia Analysis Group July 12, 2010
URL: http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers40%5Cpaper3920.html

Recommended Reading

China

1. The great China-Pak nuclear nexus by K Subrahmanyam, Times of India, June 21, 2010. URL: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/India/The-great-China-Pak-nuclear-nexus/articleshow/6072859.cms

2. Chinese alert in Xinjiang by B Raman, South Asia Analysis Group, June 19, 2010
URL: http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers39%5Cpaper3868.html

Sri Lanka

1. Comments on appointment of UN panel:

a. Lanka and UN Chief in open battle Sunday Times,Colombo, June 20,2010
URL: http://sundaytimes.lk/100620/News/nws_01.html

b. UN-becoming of the UN Editorial, The Island, June 20,2010
URL: http://www.island.lk/index.php?page_cat=news-section&page=news-section&code_title=55

2. Rejoinders on my comments on 'Who is ruling Sri Lanka'

a. India's Role by Ira de Silva, The Island, June 16, 2010
URL: http://www.island.lk/index.php?page_cat=article-details&page=article-details&code_title=91

b. ‘Who runs Sri Lanka’: A reply to Col. Hariharan by Gamini Gunawardane,
The Island, June 20, 2010
URL: http://www.island.lk/index.php?page_cat=article-details&page=article-details&code_title=391

Recommended Reading

US-India relations

US Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs Robert O Blake, Jr, discusses with Rediff.com’s Aziz Haniffa the recent inaugural U.S.-India strategic dialogue, June 14, 2010
http://news.rediff.com/slide-show/2010/jun/14/slide-show-1-interview-with-us-assistant-secretary-of-state-robert-blake.htm

Harsh V. Pant on "US-India strategic dialogue: Move beyond symbolism," June 08, 2010 http://news.rediff.com/column/2010/jun/08/us-india-strategic-dialogue-move-beyond-symbolism.htm

Af-Pak affairs

Indian Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao’s speech on "Afghanistan-India-Pakistan Trialogue" organised by Delhi Policy Group, June 13, 2010 http://meaindia.nic.in/

Former Indian Foreign Secretary Maharajakrishna Rasgotra on "Afghanistan: the march of folly," June 12, 2010 http://www.hindu.com/2010/06/12/stories/2010061265111400.htm

K. Subrahmanyam on "Iran’s N-ambitions Now ‘taqiya’ strategy comes into play" in which he discusses the issue of Shia Iran building nuclear weapon capability against Sunni (Pakistan+ Saudi) nuclear threat, June 14, 2010 http://www.tribuneindia.com/2010/20100614/edit.htm#4

The New York Times "Report Says Pakistan Intelligence Agency Exerts Great Sway on Afghan Taliban." It summarizes a report prepared by the London School of Economics http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/14/world/asia/14pstan.html

Pakistani writer Ali Sethi on "One Myth, Many Pakistans," June 11, 2010 http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/13/opinion/13sethi.html?scp=1&sq=Ali%20Sethi&st=cse