by Adm. Arun Prakash (Retd)
The "blame-game" which has inevitably reared its ugly head in the aftermath of the 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks instantly reminded me of the fervent appeals of three successive Chiefs of R&AW to Naval HQ, in recent years, to loan them naval officers for analysis of maritime intelligence. They were seriously concerned that they did not have the necessary in-house expertise available to draw the right conclusions and inferences from the mass of information the agency collected from open, human and technical sources. And very correctly they approached the Navy.
Lack of maritime intelligence has also been the Navy's bane for years, so we understood the handicap R&AW worked under, fully shared their concern, and felt that it was the navy's duty to help. I recall (as the Chief of Personnel) having personally selected some officers for deputation to R&AW, but to my consternation, I learnt within a few months that most wanted to return to the navy. Before I go any further, let me just say that this piece is not about intelligence failure. It is about a failure on a larger scale which represents an equal degree of danger to the nation.
The naval officers deputed to R&AW did not wish to continue with their deputation and I learnt that this was not a new phenomenon) because when they were assigned their desks in the Cabinet Secretariat they found to their dismay that they had been placed under officers who were many years their junior in terms of service. Having taken this stoically, they then found that they were deprived of things like telephones, stenographers and transport because the "status" assigned to them did not entitle them to these utilities.
The R&AW authorities were most sympathetic but pleaded that the they were not in a position to alter the equivalences, apparently "laid down" by a Kafkaesque Department of Personnel. Neither pay-scales nor years of service nor any logic seem to guide this fixation of relativities of Armed Forces officers with civilian counterparts. It was not that we had not experienced such discrimination earlier - the Service HQ have always been chary of sending their officers on deputation - but one felt that intelligence was an issue of national importance and certainly worth undergoing some inconvenience. But we found that naval officers would accept such assignments only with the utmost reluctance.
I have used this example, only because it is symptomatic of a larger malaise: the lack of coordination between organs of the Government of India (GoI) which has contributed to the recent Mumbai fiasco. This should not come as a surprise because the GoI seems so laissez faire in its approach that it will not intervene to eliminate inter-agency inequity even when it clearly results in crippling disfunctionality, as mentioned above. On the contrary, by its acts of omission as well as commission the GoI has been contributing to steady erosion of the locus standi of the Armed Forces in the national security matrix.
In a seemingly illogical and self-destructive continuum, the GoI has progressively and with great deliberation proceeded to marginalize, downgrade and degrade its own Armed Forces, thus undermining the security of the Indian State as surely as the nation's worst enemy. This is a process that has been underway since independence, and at the risk of sounding hyperbolic, I would venture to state that the proverbial last straw may have been added by the 6th Central Pay Commission (CPC).
Today, there is a distinct impression that the CPC has erred grievously on many issues relating to the Armed Forces because they were not represented in the commission, and its recommendations have spread confusion and consternation. One of the most serious consequences (whether intended or not) is the sudden and arbitrary alteration of relativities between the Armed Forces and their civilian counterparts, to the detriment of the former. The resulting change in relationships between the Armed Forces and para-militaries has grave operational implications which do not seem to have been understood at all at the political level.
The ex-Servicemen (ESM) are completely stunned to see the number of anomalies thrown up by the CPC. This confusion has been further compounded by different interpretations being put out in successive letters by the Controller of Defence Accounts. To take just one example: no one understands by what logic a Lieutenant-General, Major-General and Brigadier are going to be paid exactly the same pension, and a Colonel (with half the service) will receive just one hundred rupees less.
The GoI has yet again rejected the "one rank on pension" demand, but not even a feeble attempt has been made to bridge the yawning gap between today's and yesterday's pensioners of the same rank. There is also a distinct impression that the CPC recommendations have been fiddled with, and even changed by the bureaucracy, without due authorization at the political level. Such is the level of discontent and strength of feelings that one hears of planned hunger strikes by ESM; something that would have earlier been unthinkable in the Armed Forces ethos.
The most logical way to avoid this confusion and the resultant sense of grievance in the armed forces and the ESM would have been to place a Service representative, if not in the CPC, then in the Review Committee. Either the committee would have convinced this representative of the appropriateness of the issues or the other way round; thus avoiding controversy, speculation and unhappiness. A few retired Service Chiefs (including this writer) had written to the PM to accord this concession but the appeal remained unanswered.
What people have either not understood, or are imprudently ignoring, is the fact that the CPC recommendations (and subsequent developments) are causing deep resentment, because they strike, not at the monetary status of the Services and the ESM, but at their standing relative to the other services. The Armed Forces just cannot understand (nor has anyone explained to them) why it was necessary to cut them down, yet again, a few notches relative to the police or the civil services at this particular junction. This severe blow to their "izzat" appears illogical and incomprehensible.
If there is indeed a sound rationale for the down-gradation of the Armed Forces, the Government must share it with them, and with the nation. Most importantly, the impression that this is the result of machinations of the bureaucracy, must be dispelled, if untrue; and it must be made amply clear that this decision emanates from the GoI.
Spreading unhappiness and confusion amongst the nation's Armed Forces or demoralizing them, and the 2-3 million strong ESM community does not serve anyone's interest. Should someone in authority not sit up and take notice?
Monday, December 22, 2008
Saturday, December 20, 2008
A 15-year old writes on Mumbai terror strike
This piece on Mumbai terror strike was written by Payoshi Roy, a 15-year old school girl from Bangalore. It gives an idea how the 26/11 terror attack has struck a chord in everyone in India.
STOP, THINK, CRY, LOVE
The siege on Mumbai left even the most experienced of us, stunned. Even those who have become immune to grief and tragedy stopped for a second. The 48-hour encounter with these extremely sophisticated and trained terrorists of Pakistani origin left India burning in every sense of the word. The versions and accounts are endless. Trying to quantify people's grief would not only be futile but indeed low down. People who went for their daily evening session of beer and gossip at the Leopold café, that special once a month dinner at the Taj or for the bitter sweet occasion of farewell at CST Station never returned. This isn't the first time we're hearing about something like this. These stories have been talked about through out this year and to be honest through out our lives. We have experienced five separate series of bomb blasts across the country in this year alone. The dreadful cries of the Gujarat riots are yet to recede from recent memories. The 2006 and 1993 Bombay blasts and riots haunt their victims even now.
However, we are not here to talk about the grief that these victims suffer. Nor do I wish to discuss the various and repeated intelligence failures and lackadaisical attempts of the government and its security agencies. We are here to figure out what exactly is wrong with us, because it is evident that there is something horribly amiss in this country and it's people.
People are not born terrorists. Teenagers do not get up one fine day with the conviction that violence is the path of their lives. The terrorist that battled with NSG in the Taj hotel for over 24 hours was not more that 25 years old. Can any of you imagine the kind of courage and determination that this young boy exemplified in accomplishing such a feat. He is a terrorist, a terrorist who is responsible for the death of over 150 people. He is also a mere boy. A boy whom we have forced into becoming the man he died as. The Indian mujahidin consists of young boys from the JMI College in Delhi. Sadhvi Pragya is in her early twenties. These people are our age. They are people who we see in movie halls and at street corners. They are not aliens of another race. Terrorism was not brought in from Mars. It breeds within us. The worst part is, that we created it.
Every kind of terrorism stems from extremism; and extremism is the most obvious ramification of discrimination. Discrimination is sadly practiced in every nook and corner of our country. We think it's insignificant, we think that it's just the way people are. But it is discrimination and if only we were brave enough to face it.
It is discrimination when the age-old story of Hindu parents refusing to marry their daughter into a Muslim family repeats itself. It is discrimination when parents of Muslim children refuse to sing Hindu bhajans. It is discrimination when Christians refuse to participate in Hindu and Muslim festivals. All of this is discrimination. And every form of terrorism and extremism finds it's roots in this kind of discrimination, which is practiced in each and every one of our homes. That is why we need to look at our homes and our thinking before we cry out in rage and protest against the government and security forces.
Last night you had emotional and angry Mumbai mobs screaming out anti Pakistani slogans.. That is the beginning of terrorism. Have we all gone mad? What does the normal Pakistani family who is probably in their own way praying for the Mumbai victims have anything to do with this? This is the quintessential problem that we are facing. When will we realize that by blaming each other the problem will only intensify.
The Hindus destroyed the Babri masjid. The Muslims blew up a Hindu coach. The Hindus killed a city full of Muslims. Wave after wave of madness. Stop! How long can we go on like this? An eye for an eye has never been the answer and it should not take us a thousand years to accept the truth of this statement.
You had Raj Thakare chasing out the north Indians and Biharis from Maharashtra. Over three hundred North Indians of the NSG saved his beloved Marathi manoos. Where was Bal Thakare then? Forget about this one man, where were the rest of our cosmopolitan Mumbaikers who let this man get away with what he did.. Where were the progressive and peaceful Hindu leaders when churches burnt in Orissa and Karnataka? We should all hang our heads in shame.
In another 60 years we'll have Bihari terrorists attacking Maharashtra and Maharashtrian terrorist retaliating. Next we'll have border security squadrons for our state borders. Don't smile skeptically. The India-Pakistan feud had also started off in 1947 with Muslims being chased out of Delhi and Hindus being chased out of Lahore. Look where it stands now.
Today you have every news channel proudly acclaiming the army, NSG and Marine commandos as heroes.People in Mumbai are running out on the streets to congratulate them. These heroes weren't born today. They have been here all this while. Where were these people of India, the Media, when the IAS used their Machiavellian minds to reduce the salaries of all the Defense Forces. Where were these people when the corporate world squabbled over a few hundred rupees rise in the salaries of these men who always risk their lives to keep us safe? I could not see the bureaucracy putting their life on the line to save hostages in the Trident. I did not see the corporate world dying at the border during the Kargil war. And I did not see Indian citizens who today call these soldiers heroes defending them when they needed us the most.
You want to know what the problem with India is? We're cowards. We don't think as a single nation and we can't stand up for what's right.
I'll give you a small and perfect example of what is wrong with us. We all complain about this country's dirty roads. We love holidaying in London's spick and span streets. The most educated of us are yet to hesitate while throwing a sweet wrapper or lays packet on the street. Or we'll throw it in an already existing dump on the street. We can't even wait till we come across a dustbin. This is what is wrong with us.
We have enough and more to say about Manmohan Singh and Advani and every other useless politician and rightly so. But the fact is that in all honesty we couldn't care less. The best of us don't vote, don't contest in elections and don't even help out N.G.O.s When we can't do anything for our country how dare we, I repeat, how dare we expect anyone else to do anything.
We can go on talking about stepping up security, straightening out our coast guards and eradicating terrorism. But the problem lies not in our security system but in us. It lies in our madrassas, in our temples, in our schools in our homes and in our minds. And until we realize our role, until we open our eyes to this truth, not a thing will change.
Everyone talks about this new India, a shining progressive and young India. Well it's time for Young, New and Shining India to prove herself. Stand up and prove your worth. This so- called liberal and progressive thinking generation needs to root out those weeds that grow in the oldest corners our gardens. We need to start thinking and start talking. Talking to ourselves and to others. We need to start doing. This has to be a national youth movement. We have to make it the beginning of a revolution. Every historic movement starts like this. Vague, uncertain and hesitant but moving towards a common calling motivated by the same inspiration and dream. This is our chance.
Don't tell me that we won't be able to reach out to the people who need to hear what we have to say. These people live among us. There is no limit to what people can achieve when they set out to do something. You are talking about a country whose founding father won a war without raising a weapon. Who have lived on stories of Subhash Chandra Bose calling out for blood and promising freedom. Well we've bled. Now it's time to get our freedom. Freedom from our own mindsets. Freedom from shackles we've placed on ourselves.
These last two days have been the worst attack that India has ever dealt with. If this alarm wasn't loud enough, no alarm will ever wake us up.
How many more people have to die before we respond to India's desperate plea for help?
Payoshi Roy
Class XI
Bishop Cottons Girls School
Bangalore
STOP, THINK, CRY, LOVE
The siege on Mumbai left even the most experienced of us, stunned. Even those who have become immune to grief and tragedy stopped for a second. The 48-hour encounter with these extremely sophisticated and trained terrorists of Pakistani origin left India burning in every sense of the word. The versions and accounts are endless. Trying to quantify people's grief would not only be futile but indeed low down. People who went for their daily evening session of beer and gossip at the Leopold café, that special once a month dinner at the Taj or for the bitter sweet occasion of farewell at CST Station never returned. This isn't the first time we're hearing about something like this. These stories have been talked about through out this year and to be honest through out our lives. We have experienced five separate series of bomb blasts across the country in this year alone. The dreadful cries of the Gujarat riots are yet to recede from recent memories. The 2006 and 1993 Bombay blasts and riots haunt their victims even now.
However, we are not here to talk about the grief that these victims suffer. Nor do I wish to discuss the various and repeated intelligence failures and lackadaisical attempts of the government and its security agencies. We are here to figure out what exactly is wrong with us, because it is evident that there is something horribly amiss in this country and it's people.
People are not born terrorists. Teenagers do not get up one fine day with the conviction that violence is the path of their lives. The terrorist that battled with NSG in the Taj hotel for over 24 hours was not more that 25 years old. Can any of you imagine the kind of courage and determination that this young boy exemplified in accomplishing such a feat. He is a terrorist, a terrorist who is responsible for the death of over 150 people. He is also a mere boy. A boy whom we have forced into becoming the man he died as. The Indian mujahidin consists of young boys from the JMI College in Delhi. Sadhvi Pragya is in her early twenties. These people are our age. They are people who we see in movie halls and at street corners. They are not aliens of another race. Terrorism was not brought in from Mars. It breeds within us. The worst part is, that we created it.
Every kind of terrorism stems from extremism; and extremism is the most obvious ramification of discrimination. Discrimination is sadly practiced in every nook and corner of our country. We think it's insignificant, we think that it's just the way people are. But it is discrimination and if only we were brave enough to face it.
It is discrimination when the age-old story of Hindu parents refusing to marry their daughter into a Muslim family repeats itself. It is discrimination when parents of Muslim children refuse to sing Hindu bhajans. It is discrimination when Christians refuse to participate in Hindu and Muslim festivals. All of this is discrimination. And every form of terrorism and extremism finds it's roots in this kind of discrimination, which is practiced in each and every one of our homes. That is why we need to look at our homes and our thinking before we cry out in rage and protest against the government and security forces.
Last night you had emotional and angry Mumbai mobs screaming out anti Pakistani slogans.. That is the beginning of terrorism. Have we all gone mad? What does the normal Pakistani family who is probably in their own way praying for the Mumbai victims have anything to do with this? This is the quintessential problem that we are facing. When will we realize that by blaming each other the problem will only intensify.
The Hindus destroyed the Babri masjid. The Muslims blew up a Hindu coach. The Hindus killed a city full of Muslims. Wave after wave of madness. Stop! How long can we go on like this? An eye for an eye has never been the answer and it should not take us a thousand years to accept the truth of this statement.
You had Raj Thakare chasing out the north Indians and Biharis from Maharashtra. Over three hundred North Indians of the NSG saved his beloved Marathi manoos. Where was Bal Thakare then? Forget about this one man, where were the rest of our cosmopolitan Mumbaikers who let this man get away with what he did.. Where were the progressive and peaceful Hindu leaders when churches burnt in Orissa and Karnataka? We should all hang our heads in shame.
In another 60 years we'll have Bihari terrorists attacking Maharashtra and Maharashtrian terrorist retaliating. Next we'll have border security squadrons for our state borders. Don't smile skeptically. The India-Pakistan feud had also started off in 1947 with Muslims being chased out of Delhi and Hindus being chased out of Lahore. Look where it stands now.
Today you have every news channel proudly acclaiming the army, NSG and Marine commandos as heroes.People in Mumbai are running out on the streets to congratulate them. These heroes weren't born today. They have been here all this while. Where were these people of India, the Media, when the IAS used their Machiavellian minds to reduce the salaries of all the Defense Forces. Where were these people when the corporate world squabbled over a few hundred rupees rise in the salaries of these men who always risk their lives to keep us safe? I could not see the bureaucracy putting their life on the line to save hostages in the Trident. I did not see the corporate world dying at the border during the Kargil war. And I did not see Indian citizens who today call these soldiers heroes defending them when they needed us the most.
You want to know what the problem with India is? We're cowards. We don't think as a single nation and we can't stand up for what's right.
I'll give you a small and perfect example of what is wrong with us. We all complain about this country's dirty roads. We love holidaying in London's spick and span streets. The most educated of us are yet to hesitate while throwing a sweet wrapper or lays packet on the street. Or we'll throw it in an already existing dump on the street. We can't even wait till we come across a dustbin. This is what is wrong with us.
We have enough and more to say about Manmohan Singh and Advani and every other useless politician and rightly so. But the fact is that in all honesty we couldn't care less. The best of us don't vote, don't contest in elections and don't even help out N.G.O.s When we can't do anything for our country how dare we, I repeat, how dare we expect anyone else to do anything.
We can go on talking about stepping up security, straightening out our coast guards and eradicating terrorism. But the problem lies not in our security system but in us. It lies in our madrassas, in our temples, in our schools in our homes and in our minds. And until we realize our role, until we open our eyes to this truth, not a thing will change.
Everyone talks about this new India, a shining progressive and young India. Well it's time for Young, New and Shining India to prove herself. Stand up and prove your worth. This so- called liberal and progressive thinking generation needs to root out those weeds that grow in the oldest corners our gardens. We need to start thinking and start talking. Talking to ourselves and to others. We need to start doing. This has to be a national youth movement. We have to make it the beginning of a revolution. Every historic movement starts like this. Vague, uncertain and hesitant but moving towards a common calling motivated by the same inspiration and dream. This is our chance.
Don't tell me that we won't be able to reach out to the people who need to hear what we have to say. These people live among us. There is no limit to what people can achieve when they set out to do something. You are talking about a country whose founding father won a war without raising a weapon. Who have lived on stories of Subhash Chandra Bose calling out for blood and promising freedom. Well we've bled. Now it's time to get our freedom. Freedom from our own mindsets. Freedom from shackles we've placed on ourselves.
These last two days have been the worst attack that India has ever dealt with. If this alarm wasn't loud enough, no alarm will ever wake us up.
How many more people have to die before we respond to India's desperate plea for help?
Payoshi Roy
Class XI
Bishop Cottons Girls School
Bangalore
Institutional Mechanism for Handling Terrorism and Insurgency
R Hariharan
[I wrote this article in September 2008 - before Mumbai terror strike - as a background paper for a presentation at a seminar for NGOs titled “Violence and Insurgencies in India” organised by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation and the Vishwa Yuvak Kendra at Manali from September 7 to 10, 2008.]
Nature of insurgency and terrorism
There is a lot of confusion in understanding terrorism. It is often confused with acts of violence. The dynamics of global political and economic changes during the last two decades have churned up social order and traditional value systems in the country. The resulting social and economic contradictions have given rise to a number of political and social conflicts. At the same time, increasing empowerment of deprived sections of society has made their demand for their rights more strident.
Over the years, these sections have increased their influence in shaping state policies. Inevitably the mobility of marginalized sections often results in acts of political violence. The recent Gurjar agitation in Rajasthan is a good example of social discontent degenerating into mindless violence against the state. Such violence can be successfully defused through people friendly political and administrative mechanisms of the state. Though these conflicts are inevitable, they can be isolated if the state is sensitive and responsive to public grievances. Such acts of violence should not be confused with insurgency or terrorism.
Insurgency is aimed at capture of state power. Since independence India has been facing militancy and insurgency by sections of population fighting for a variety of causes. The causes generally relate to preservation of ethnic, linguistic, religious or territorial identity. They adopt militancy and insurgency as unconventional modes to fight for their goals against the well entrenched state machinery. Insensitive or repressive administration and cold war polemics provided the incentive for such struggles to spread. Ethnic insurgencies of the northeast come under this category.
However, the globalization of trade and the realignment of global power equation after the collapse of the Soviet Union towards the end of the millennium have nudged insurgency struggles to the sidelines. In this environment, many insurgent movements indulge in acts of terror as a coercive tool to achieve their ends. This has made the dividing line between insurgents and terrorists very thin.
Despite such use of terror as a tool by insurgents, terrorism has its own distinct sphere in the world of violence. Terrorism is aimed destabilizing social order through violent acts of terror, killings and intimidating the population rather than capturing state power. Early in this millennium, Islamic obscurantism emerged as a major practitioner of terrorism. It has found terrorism a cost effective way to wage a war against nations considered as “threats” to their concept of Islamic way of life. The Al Qaeda’s 9/11 strikes in the US and the series of Jihadi attacks in Pakistan and India are manifestations of this phenomenon.
Controlling terrorism
The emergence of terrorism as a global threat to order and peace has become a major cause of international concern particularly after 9/11 Al Qaeda attacks in the US. International community has come together to coordinate their activities to root out terrorism. International protocols are coming into force to control maritime traffic, illegal arms purchases and traffic, and money laundering to eradicate the internationalisation of terrorism through front organisations and propaganda tools to spread their influence. The European Union and the US have introduced strong enactments to curb terrorism.
However, such international actions can be fully effective only if frontline countries of South Asia take equally strong action to control terrorism. Unfortunately, lack of national consensus in acting against terrorists due to overriding political considerations based upon playing up religious divide in countries like India has prevented collective action against terrorism.
Elements of success of terrorists and insurgents
Insurgents always try to make their struggle relevant to the common man as popular support is the lifeblood of insurgency. Invariably they espouse popular causes and provide rallying points for the social, economic and political grievances of aggrieved population. They use violent methods to destroy the existing state mechanisms and establish their control over society to achieve their ends. Insurgents thrive in areas where the administration is insensitive to the peoples’ actual or felt grievances.
Often, the majority-dominated democratic systems that deny adequate space for articulation for the sentiments of minority population breed such movements. In democratic societies, political parties tend to exploit the existing political, social and cultural divide among the people for their own advantage. Thus the explosive environment built up by poor governance, corruption, political opportunism and unbridled use of state machinery to curb fundamental rights make the job easier for the insurgent to win popular support. Absence of a conflict resolution mechanism in such a set up further alienates the population from the population. External powers exploit such situations to finance and arm insurgent groups to further their agenda.
Hence it is important the state introduces systemic improvements in all arms of administration, including the initiation of a dialogue process with the aggrieved population. Experience in our country has shown that systemic improvements alone cannot wean away the public support to insurgency movements if the state cannot ensure the physical security of the common man. To regain the trust of the alienated population the state has to show it is a reliable functional entity that can ensure security of the people. To do this the state has to physically curb the insurgents from interfering with the normal life of people even as the state introduces systemic improvements. Then only insurgency movements will lose their relevance to the people. This will lead to their neutralization. In the Indian context Mizoram is a good example of such success.
In our country the non-state actors have exploited the existing or potential conflict areas in society to further their influence. For instance, in the backward tribal regions of Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, and Orissa the Maoist insurgents have expanded their hold using the long standing and unattended grievances of tribal population and landless poor. They have emerged as the alternate to democratic and administrative instruments denied to the affected people. In these parts social security mechanism are absent and the Maoists have tried to exploit such gaps to increase their influence.
In these regions the exploitative social class like money lenders, exploitative land owners, in collusion with corrupt politicians and bureaucrats have alienated the poor from having a say in the grass root democratic bodies. Over the years such exploitative sections have been exercising their coercive power over the people. And the state machinery, particularly the law enforcing agencies, has gained the reputation as organs of exploitation rather than governance. With acts of terrorism the insurgents have managed to gain power and resources to spread their areas of control. The government does not have cohesive political and social strategies to regain the trust of people in the affected and give them a sense of security.
Unlike the insurgent, the terrorist tries to gain control over the population through acts of terror aimed at instilling fear among them. Creation of a supportive social ambience required for the growth of insurgency is not a perquisite for the success of terrorist movements. Terrorist acts are perpetrated by small number of highly motivated and indoctrinated people who feel totally alienated from the mainstream. Terrorism grows by its acts of daring and audacity giving it a larger than life image among the people. It creates a sense of awe and exposes the state as ineffective machinery to safeguard the security of the citizen.
Terrorist organizations like the Al Qaeda or Lashkar-e-Taiba operate in extreme secrecy. Special intelligence effort must be made to unearth their network of supporters, sources of finance and arms, training methods, front organizations, and sleeper agents within other political and social organizations. Terrorists are increasingly using modern electronic and web-based communication and media systems to increase the impact their violent acts on the public.
Institutional mechanism to fight terrorism and insurgency
In order to fight them effectively, creation of a national authority to evolve dynamic counter insurgency and terrorism policies and execute them with vigour. Its overall aim should be to discourage, deter, detect, and defeat the use of violence and terror as a tool by non state actors against the state. It has to work in close coordination with national and state level intelligence and police agencies. Broadly it has to be composed of three elements - advisory, strategic planning assessment, and tactical operations. It should be able to have at its disposal forces specially trained for carrying out special operations with adequate mobility, technology and fire power support to respond to the needs of states affected by non state actors.
To be effective in a plural society the institutional mechanism should have autonomy of decision making to insulate it from political manipulation. This in practice would increase its accountability at the national and state levels. It would also make it responsive to real time dynamics of terrorism.
As each region has its own social issues affecting the fight against terrorism, the execution should be local police and administrative machinery along with the central institutions. This would result in evolving local conflict resolution mechanism so that the relevance of insurgent groups to the socially exploited people diminishes over a period. Participatory development, responsive administration, and removal of grievances would ultimately reinforce the success generated by physically eliminating the insurgents through the use of force.
Quick response to acts of terrorism can be effective if only the administration ensures unbiased follow up action and deterrent administration of justice, ensuring the rule of law. At the same time socio-political strategies to wean away the people should also be in place in tandem. Respect to human rights should be adhered to by the law enforcers so that they provide a more attractive security alternative to the people. Then only the state can improve the credibility of the administration among the people and discourage the appeal held by non state actors.
The state and local administration should be encouraged to adopt preventive strategies sufficiently early without undue emphasis on the exclusive use of force. However in areas where non state actors are active the aim should be to free the population from their influence through the use of security forces in tandem with measures to revamp a people-friendly administration measures to restore normal life and resume development activities in such areas.
Ideally the mechanism should respond from below upwards and take action above downwards, link laterally with diverse government departments to implement cohesive strategies. It should not be intrusive and allow full freedom for local communities to solve their communal, caste and tribal issues and intervene only when extremism enters the scene. This would imply the involvement of the people in having a say on the issues of governance and development.
To be meaningful local democratic institutions should be strengthened to freely operate and act as the mechanism for ventilating and redressing people’s grievances. This would reduce the relevance of insurgents to the people and sections of society. Panchayat raj institutions should be strengthened and be empowered to assume this responsibility as the areas are freed from the influence of non state actors.
Role of NGOs
NGOs are the conscience keepers of society. They form an important part of the civil society which acts as a non-formal bridge between the population and the administration. Thus NGOs have a role in both the active and passive phase of counter insurgency. In the conflict management phase, NGOs can provide succour to the affected population and provide an interface between them and the administration wherever needed. They can act as a forum for the public to ventilate their grievances and pass them on to the administration. In order to be able to function in insurgency and terrorism affected areas, the NGOs run the risk of antagonising both the administrative machinery and the extremists. So they will have to operate without bias and be seen as neutral agents in the conflict. This requires close monitoring and guidance of field workers activities in affected areas. Then NGOs can increase their usefulness to the people.
In the conflict resolution phase, NGOs can act as facilitators for evolving the modalities for putting in place a conflict resolution mechanism. The credibility of NGOs can only be improved if they act without fear or favour. Then only they will be able to operate in such areas and be useful in bringing succour to the people.
September 4, 2008
[I wrote this article in September 2008 - before Mumbai terror strike - as a background paper for a presentation at a seminar for NGOs titled “Violence and Insurgencies in India” organised by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation and the Vishwa Yuvak Kendra at Manali from September 7 to 10, 2008.]
Nature of insurgency and terrorism
There is a lot of confusion in understanding terrorism. It is often confused with acts of violence. The dynamics of global political and economic changes during the last two decades have churned up social order and traditional value systems in the country. The resulting social and economic contradictions have given rise to a number of political and social conflicts. At the same time, increasing empowerment of deprived sections of society has made their demand for their rights more strident.
Over the years, these sections have increased their influence in shaping state policies. Inevitably the mobility of marginalized sections often results in acts of political violence. The recent Gurjar agitation in Rajasthan is a good example of social discontent degenerating into mindless violence against the state. Such violence can be successfully defused through people friendly political and administrative mechanisms of the state. Though these conflicts are inevitable, they can be isolated if the state is sensitive and responsive to public grievances. Such acts of violence should not be confused with insurgency or terrorism.
Insurgency is aimed at capture of state power. Since independence India has been facing militancy and insurgency by sections of population fighting for a variety of causes. The causes generally relate to preservation of ethnic, linguistic, religious or territorial identity. They adopt militancy and insurgency as unconventional modes to fight for their goals against the well entrenched state machinery. Insensitive or repressive administration and cold war polemics provided the incentive for such struggles to spread. Ethnic insurgencies of the northeast come under this category.
However, the globalization of trade and the realignment of global power equation after the collapse of the Soviet Union towards the end of the millennium have nudged insurgency struggles to the sidelines. In this environment, many insurgent movements indulge in acts of terror as a coercive tool to achieve their ends. This has made the dividing line between insurgents and terrorists very thin.
Despite such use of terror as a tool by insurgents, terrorism has its own distinct sphere in the world of violence. Terrorism is aimed destabilizing social order through violent acts of terror, killings and intimidating the population rather than capturing state power. Early in this millennium, Islamic obscurantism emerged as a major practitioner of terrorism. It has found terrorism a cost effective way to wage a war against nations considered as “threats” to their concept of Islamic way of life. The Al Qaeda’s 9/11 strikes in the US and the series of Jihadi attacks in Pakistan and India are manifestations of this phenomenon.
Controlling terrorism
The emergence of terrorism as a global threat to order and peace has become a major cause of international concern particularly after 9/11 Al Qaeda attacks in the US. International community has come together to coordinate their activities to root out terrorism. International protocols are coming into force to control maritime traffic, illegal arms purchases and traffic, and money laundering to eradicate the internationalisation of terrorism through front organisations and propaganda tools to spread their influence. The European Union and the US have introduced strong enactments to curb terrorism.
However, such international actions can be fully effective only if frontline countries of South Asia take equally strong action to control terrorism. Unfortunately, lack of national consensus in acting against terrorists due to overriding political considerations based upon playing up religious divide in countries like India has prevented collective action against terrorism.
Elements of success of terrorists and insurgents
Insurgents always try to make their struggle relevant to the common man as popular support is the lifeblood of insurgency. Invariably they espouse popular causes and provide rallying points for the social, economic and political grievances of aggrieved population. They use violent methods to destroy the existing state mechanisms and establish their control over society to achieve their ends. Insurgents thrive in areas where the administration is insensitive to the peoples’ actual or felt grievances.
Often, the majority-dominated democratic systems that deny adequate space for articulation for the sentiments of minority population breed such movements. In democratic societies, political parties tend to exploit the existing political, social and cultural divide among the people for their own advantage. Thus the explosive environment built up by poor governance, corruption, political opportunism and unbridled use of state machinery to curb fundamental rights make the job easier for the insurgent to win popular support. Absence of a conflict resolution mechanism in such a set up further alienates the population from the population. External powers exploit such situations to finance and arm insurgent groups to further their agenda.
Hence it is important the state introduces systemic improvements in all arms of administration, including the initiation of a dialogue process with the aggrieved population. Experience in our country has shown that systemic improvements alone cannot wean away the public support to insurgency movements if the state cannot ensure the physical security of the common man. To regain the trust of the alienated population the state has to show it is a reliable functional entity that can ensure security of the people. To do this the state has to physically curb the insurgents from interfering with the normal life of people even as the state introduces systemic improvements. Then only insurgency movements will lose their relevance to the people. This will lead to their neutralization. In the Indian context Mizoram is a good example of such success.
In our country the non-state actors have exploited the existing or potential conflict areas in society to further their influence. For instance, in the backward tribal regions of Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, and Orissa the Maoist insurgents have expanded their hold using the long standing and unattended grievances of tribal population and landless poor. They have emerged as the alternate to democratic and administrative instruments denied to the affected people. In these parts social security mechanism are absent and the Maoists have tried to exploit such gaps to increase their influence.
In these regions the exploitative social class like money lenders, exploitative land owners, in collusion with corrupt politicians and bureaucrats have alienated the poor from having a say in the grass root democratic bodies. Over the years such exploitative sections have been exercising their coercive power over the people. And the state machinery, particularly the law enforcing agencies, has gained the reputation as organs of exploitation rather than governance. With acts of terrorism the insurgents have managed to gain power and resources to spread their areas of control. The government does not have cohesive political and social strategies to regain the trust of people in the affected and give them a sense of security.
Unlike the insurgent, the terrorist tries to gain control over the population through acts of terror aimed at instilling fear among them. Creation of a supportive social ambience required for the growth of insurgency is not a perquisite for the success of terrorist movements. Terrorist acts are perpetrated by small number of highly motivated and indoctrinated people who feel totally alienated from the mainstream. Terrorism grows by its acts of daring and audacity giving it a larger than life image among the people. It creates a sense of awe and exposes the state as ineffective machinery to safeguard the security of the citizen.
Terrorist organizations like the Al Qaeda or Lashkar-e-Taiba operate in extreme secrecy. Special intelligence effort must be made to unearth their network of supporters, sources of finance and arms, training methods, front organizations, and sleeper agents within other political and social organizations. Terrorists are increasingly using modern electronic and web-based communication and media systems to increase the impact their violent acts on the public.
Institutional mechanism to fight terrorism and insurgency
In order to fight them effectively, creation of a national authority to evolve dynamic counter insurgency and terrorism policies and execute them with vigour. Its overall aim should be to discourage, deter, detect, and defeat the use of violence and terror as a tool by non state actors against the state. It has to work in close coordination with national and state level intelligence and police agencies. Broadly it has to be composed of three elements - advisory, strategic planning assessment, and tactical operations. It should be able to have at its disposal forces specially trained for carrying out special operations with adequate mobility, technology and fire power support to respond to the needs of states affected by non state actors.
To be effective in a plural society the institutional mechanism should have autonomy of decision making to insulate it from political manipulation. This in practice would increase its accountability at the national and state levels. It would also make it responsive to real time dynamics of terrorism.
As each region has its own social issues affecting the fight against terrorism, the execution should be local police and administrative machinery along with the central institutions. This would result in evolving local conflict resolution mechanism so that the relevance of insurgent groups to the socially exploited people diminishes over a period. Participatory development, responsive administration, and removal of grievances would ultimately reinforce the success generated by physically eliminating the insurgents through the use of force.
Quick response to acts of terrorism can be effective if only the administration ensures unbiased follow up action and deterrent administration of justice, ensuring the rule of law. At the same time socio-political strategies to wean away the people should also be in place in tandem. Respect to human rights should be adhered to by the law enforcers so that they provide a more attractive security alternative to the people. Then only the state can improve the credibility of the administration among the people and discourage the appeal held by non state actors.
The state and local administration should be encouraged to adopt preventive strategies sufficiently early without undue emphasis on the exclusive use of force. However in areas where non state actors are active the aim should be to free the population from their influence through the use of security forces in tandem with measures to revamp a people-friendly administration measures to restore normal life and resume development activities in such areas.
Ideally the mechanism should respond from below upwards and take action above downwards, link laterally with diverse government departments to implement cohesive strategies. It should not be intrusive and allow full freedom for local communities to solve their communal, caste and tribal issues and intervene only when extremism enters the scene. This would imply the involvement of the people in having a say on the issues of governance and development.
To be meaningful local democratic institutions should be strengthened to freely operate and act as the mechanism for ventilating and redressing people’s grievances. This would reduce the relevance of insurgents to the people and sections of society. Panchayat raj institutions should be strengthened and be empowered to assume this responsibility as the areas are freed from the influence of non state actors.
Role of NGOs
NGOs are the conscience keepers of society. They form an important part of the civil society which acts as a non-formal bridge between the population and the administration. Thus NGOs have a role in both the active and passive phase of counter insurgency. In the conflict management phase, NGOs can provide succour to the affected population and provide an interface between them and the administration wherever needed. They can act as a forum for the public to ventilate their grievances and pass them on to the administration. In order to be able to function in insurgency and terrorism affected areas, the NGOs run the risk of antagonising both the administrative machinery and the extremists. So they will have to operate without bias and be seen as neutral agents in the conflict. This requires close monitoring and guidance of field workers activities in affected areas. Then NGOs can increase their usefulness to the people.
In the conflict resolution phase, NGOs can act as facilitators for evolving the modalities for putting in place a conflict resolution mechanism. The credibility of NGOs can only be improved if they act without fear or favour. Then only they will be able to operate in such areas and be useful in bringing succour to the people.
September 4, 2008
Friday, December 12, 2008
Unless you sacrifice, you can't fight terror
Colonel R Hariharan is a specialist on South Asia military intelligence. He served as the head of intelligence for the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka between 1987 and 1990. He is associated with the South Asia Analysis Group and the Chennai Centre for China Studies.
Colonel Hariharan spoke to rediff.com's Shobha Warrier about what needs to be done to avoid terror attacks like the one in Mumbai terror attacks.
Media reports say that the Indian intelligence agencies had prior information about the Mumbai terror attacks. After every terror attack, we hear reports that intelligence agencies had prior information about it. Where is it going wrong then? Do you call this an intelligence failure?
I have no hesitation in saying that it was intelligence failure that led to the attacks. Today's terrorists are more tech savvy than the establishment. Intelligence failure is not only the failure of intelligence agencies. They have to process the information and make an assessment.
There are more than 12 agencies like the Customs, the Enforcement Directorate etc which collect intelligence information, and this excludes the state police.
Firstly, the quality of intelligence collected has to be validated. No agency shares the information with everybody because they want to score brownie points.
What we need is a central control room where intelligence information is shared and immediate action is taken. We don't have a culture of centralised control rooms. I know the Intelligence Bureau has enough intelligent officers, but they don't process intelligence information properly because they are in a hurry to push it so that the responsibility does not fall on them.
How important is processing the information?
It is the most important part of intelligence gathering. You may say, a terror strike is coming from the coast. But from where? Which coast? From whom? When? These questions are never answered. In military intelligence, we don't accept this kind of nonsense.
The Americans failed in processing the information before the 9/11 attacks. We told them a year earlier that Islamic militant guys are being trained in flying. We had told Australia that they are being trained in Australian flying schools. They passed it on to the Americans but nobody took action because they had too much information.
We have to have management in our information systems. Technology is rudimentary in India. We are a lazy nation as far as the governing system is concerned. So, why blame the intelligence agencies alone? You should blame the government, the various departments and ourselves.
Do you think the current attacks will ring alarm bells and something concrete will happen?
I am not an optimist. I expect some more strikes to come. Will just changing the Union home minister solve the problem?
I am not seeing any action now. There will be more strikes. Something like what is happening in Bangkok has to happen in India too. Everything has to be stopped to make the government act. People have to take to the streets. Only that works.
The ordinary people of India feel that after the 9/11 attacks, the US could stop any further attack while in India, every month, there is a terror strike...
Are we prepared to sacrifice some of our fundamental rights? That is the bottom line. The US has sacrificed part of their fundamental rights. US laws are very stringent. We didn't want POTA which guarantees witness protection.
Where should the overhaul start?
It has to be there everywhere; from the grass-roots to the middle level to the structural level.
Three things are important. At the state level, they must read and process the information themselves. The central agencies and state agencies should share information all the time. Today, they don't do that. The culture of sharing of information should come. In Assam, I have seen only army guys in the meetings; the state guys won't even turn up. Some sort of commitment has to come within the states.
Two, the country must learn to sacrifice some rights to fight terror. While fighting terror, you cannot have the same freedom. Unless you sacrifice, you can't fight terror.
Three, our laws will not hold today's times. You catch two out of 15 terrorists, but you cannot prosecute them. Human rights fellows will make a noise; courts will give them bail even if they are murderers. That is why so many Maoists are not being prosecuted. So, you require a special law.
The coast of India is controlled by many departments, and do you feel it is high time the coast comes under one agency, say the Coast Guard?
There are 12 agencies involved in the coastal security of India. In this country, nobody will give up power. Port security is under the ministry of shipping! What does it know of security?
In the US, when a ship comes to the sea, it comes under the Coast Guard. It is responsible for the coast. Here, it is not. The land is under police, the coastal police have become a big joke. The policemen do not know how to swim. They don't have a sea orientation. Why should you have the same policemen doing the coastal job? You require marine police who should look after coastal and port security.
The Coast Guard has got huge deficiencies like the armed forces. They must make up the deficiency right now. Marine security must come under central authority and the Coast Guard is the best arm. It comes under the navy both in the US and here.
Create internal security separately as a ministry. The time has come.
There is a kind of fear and insecurity in the mind of the people of India.
It can happen in Chennai too. Are you sure it will not happen in the other coasts? In Maharashtra, it will change now just like it changed in Gujarat. Gujarat has a dynamic chief minister and he knows his job. He wanted a law which is similar to what Mumbai is having, but he is not being allowed based on party politics. The Centre also won't bring the law and he also won't be allowed to have a law, and he is asked to control terrorism. What are we afraid of?
When you were gathering intelligence as a military intelligence officer, what were the difficulties you faced?
The major problem is of access to other intelligence agencies. There is no sharing of information. That is the biggest hurdle.
In Sri Lanka, that was what happened. The Research and Analysis Wing was involved in training the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) but it is so compartmentalised that when we went in, the guy from R&AW who was helping us did not have the figures because it was under some other department. So, we must take some hard decisions on sharing information.
Every month there is a terror strike. Will Indians have to learn to live with terror attacks?
Do you know such attacks are happening regularly in the north-east? This is the 8th terror attack this year. I am sure it will continue.
• Unless we must have a transparent policy that will guide the structural framework.
• Unless the media acts conscientiously. You give more prominence to Arundhati Roy for defending a guy who attacked our Parliament.
• Unless the structural mechanism involves states and becomes federal in character.
• Unless decision making is done by experts and not politicians.
• Unless you make up the deficiencies of all the counter-terror mechanisms with modern technology.
• Unless policy making, intelligence and execution work in tandem.
There are politicians in the US and the UK too, but they could manage to stop terror attacks.
Because they are Americans, and we are Indians, I am sorry to say. We have no commitment. Did people react the same way when the Mumbai local trains were attacked? They did not because the rich and VIPs were not involved. Because five star hotels were not involved. Only poor guys, who travelled by train suffered. Did you see the same candles then?
December 12, 2008 | 11:46 IST
Courtesy:
http://www.rediff.com///news/2008/dec/12mumterror-unless-you-sacrifice-you-cant-fight-terror.htm
Colonel Hariharan spoke to rediff.com's Shobha Warrier about what needs to be done to avoid terror attacks like the one in Mumbai terror attacks.
Media reports say that the Indian intelligence agencies had prior information about the Mumbai terror attacks. After every terror attack, we hear reports that intelligence agencies had prior information about it. Where is it going wrong then? Do you call this an intelligence failure?
I have no hesitation in saying that it was intelligence failure that led to the attacks. Today's terrorists are more tech savvy than the establishment. Intelligence failure is not only the failure of intelligence agencies. They have to process the information and make an assessment.
There are more than 12 agencies like the Customs, the Enforcement Directorate etc which collect intelligence information, and this excludes the state police.
Firstly, the quality of intelligence collected has to be validated. No agency shares the information with everybody because they want to score brownie points.
What we need is a central control room where intelligence information is shared and immediate action is taken. We don't have a culture of centralised control rooms. I know the Intelligence Bureau has enough intelligent officers, but they don't process intelligence information properly because they are in a hurry to push it so that the responsibility does not fall on them.
How important is processing the information?
It is the most important part of intelligence gathering. You may say, a terror strike is coming from the coast. But from where? Which coast? From whom? When? These questions are never answered. In military intelligence, we don't accept this kind of nonsense.
The Americans failed in processing the information before the 9/11 attacks. We told them a year earlier that Islamic militant guys are being trained in flying. We had told Australia that they are being trained in Australian flying schools. They passed it on to the Americans but nobody took action because they had too much information.
We have to have management in our information systems. Technology is rudimentary in India. We are a lazy nation as far as the governing system is concerned. So, why blame the intelligence agencies alone? You should blame the government, the various departments and ourselves.
Do you think the current attacks will ring alarm bells and something concrete will happen?
I am not an optimist. I expect some more strikes to come. Will just changing the Union home minister solve the problem?
I am not seeing any action now. There will be more strikes. Something like what is happening in Bangkok has to happen in India too. Everything has to be stopped to make the government act. People have to take to the streets. Only that works.
The ordinary people of India feel that after the 9/11 attacks, the US could stop any further attack while in India, every month, there is a terror strike...
Are we prepared to sacrifice some of our fundamental rights? That is the bottom line. The US has sacrificed part of their fundamental rights. US laws are very stringent. We didn't want POTA which guarantees witness protection.
Where should the overhaul start?
It has to be there everywhere; from the grass-roots to the middle level to the structural level.
Three things are important. At the state level, they must read and process the information themselves. The central agencies and state agencies should share information all the time. Today, they don't do that. The culture of sharing of information should come. In Assam, I have seen only army guys in the meetings; the state guys won't even turn up. Some sort of commitment has to come within the states.
Two, the country must learn to sacrifice some rights to fight terror. While fighting terror, you cannot have the same freedom. Unless you sacrifice, you can't fight terror.
Three, our laws will not hold today's times. You catch two out of 15 terrorists, but you cannot prosecute them. Human rights fellows will make a noise; courts will give them bail even if they are murderers. That is why so many Maoists are not being prosecuted. So, you require a special law.
The coast of India is controlled by many departments, and do you feel it is high time the coast comes under one agency, say the Coast Guard?
There are 12 agencies involved in the coastal security of India. In this country, nobody will give up power. Port security is under the ministry of shipping! What does it know of security?
In the US, when a ship comes to the sea, it comes under the Coast Guard. It is responsible for the coast. Here, it is not. The land is under police, the coastal police have become a big joke. The policemen do not know how to swim. They don't have a sea orientation. Why should you have the same policemen doing the coastal job? You require marine police who should look after coastal and port security.
The Coast Guard has got huge deficiencies like the armed forces. They must make up the deficiency right now. Marine security must come under central authority and the Coast Guard is the best arm. It comes under the navy both in the US and here.
Create internal security separately as a ministry. The time has come.
There is a kind of fear and insecurity in the mind of the people of India.
It can happen in Chennai too. Are you sure it will not happen in the other coasts? In Maharashtra, it will change now just like it changed in Gujarat. Gujarat has a dynamic chief minister and he knows his job. He wanted a law which is similar to what Mumbai is having, but he is not being allowed based on party politics. The Centre also won't bring the law and he also won't be allowed to have a law, and he is asked to control terrorism. What are we afraid of?
When you were gathering intelligence as a military intelligence officer, what were the difficulties you faced?
The major problem is of access to other intelligence agencies. There is no sharing of information. That is the biggest hurdle.
In Sri Lanka, that was what happened. The Research and Analysis Wing was involved in training the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) but it is so compartmentalised that when we went in, the guy from R&AW who was helping us did not have the figures because it was under some other department. So, we must take some hard decisions on sharing information.
Every month there is a terror strike. Will Indians have to learn to live with terror attacks?
Do you know such attacks are happening regularly in the north-east? This is the 8th terror attack this year. I am sure it will continue.
• Unless we must have a transparent policy that will guide the structural framework.
• Unless the media acts conscientiously. You give more prominence to Arundhati Roy for defending a guy who attacked our Parliament.
• Unless the structural mechanism involves states and becomes federal in character.
• Unless decision making is done by experts and not politicians.
• Unless you make up the deficiencies of all the counter-terror mechanisms with modern technology.
• Unless policy making, intelligence and execution work in tandem.
There are politicians in the US and the UK too, but they could manage to stop terror attacks.
Because they are Americans, and we are Indians, I am sorry to say. We have no commitment. Did people react the same way when the Mumbai local trains were attacked? They did not because the rich and VIPs were not involved. Because five star hotels were not involved. Only poor guys, who travelled by train suffered. Did you see the same candles then?
December 12, 2008 | 11:46 IST
Courtesy:
http://www.rediff.com///news/2008/dec/12mumterror-unless-you-sacrifice-you-cant-fight-terror.htm
Wednesday, December 10, 2008
Understanding the mindset of troops fighting insurgents
R Hariharan
Armies face a thankless task if they are called upon to fight insurgents - a section of their own people. The media is often more sympathetic to the plight of the population affected by the operations than the problems faced by the soldier. Troops feel both the public and media are unfair to soldiers doing their duty. Their grouse is understandable because the guerrilla operates among the people and only a thin line divides him and his sympathisers among the population.
Invariably troops employed in counterinsurgency tasks face charges of human rights abuses. It is no consolation that this is a universal phenomenon. It is frequently reported in Afghanistan and Iraq. Nearer home, Sri Lanka is a prime example of this phenomenon. We can also see such cases in India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh.
Troops fighting insurgents at home run into twin problems - professional and cultural and this takes a toll on their performance. The soldier is trained for conventional warfare. He is taught to shoot to kill first, use overwhelming firepower, and destroy enemy defences to retain the initiative at all times. Military training has a high degree of regimentation. Everything is reduced to a drill. So a soldier’s response under fire is reflexive than deliberate. In short, armies are trained to become killing machines of a conventional war. The soldier’s training gives him an abounding faith in his weapon and in his skill to kill his foe. And the macho culture of armed forces encourages this phenomenon.
I remember an instance in 1989, while serving with the Indian Peace Keeping Force. I was attending a party in Colombo in the lawns of the Indian High Commission to celebrate the Republic Day. The Pakistani Naval advisor chatted up me when he learnt I was a senior staff officer of the IPKF. “Colonel, I believe you’re having problem with employment of Madras Regiment units in Sri Lanka operations,” he said. Clearly he was needling me because I was a Tamilian.
In 1965 Pakistan had made a clumsy propaganda effort to play up the so-called South-North divide among some of the South Indian prisoners of war. It not only failed miserably but boomeranged when the Pakistanis were shooed out by the jawans. In reality, the Madras Regiment fought with thorough professionalism during the Jaffna operations. So to reply him was easy; “Commander, I don’t know about your army, but I know our army. If I ask a squad of soldiers to open fire on the passing traffic on Mount Road (in Madras) they will just do that. They would not show any hesitation.” This is the level of conditioning our soldiers have.
The soldier in counterinsurgency operations is supposed to take on the militant hiding among ordinary people without hurting others who are in the location. This is a Herculean task for the soldier because he has to overcome his professional training routine for conventional warfare. So the soldier has to be retrained in counterinsurgency warfare techniques before fighting insurgents. But retraining is not always possible when situations overtake planning as it happened in Sri Lanka.
In counterinsurgency troops rarely confront the enemy face to face. The attacks are indirect attacks and the methods are unconventional. Troops exposed to such nerve wracking experience over a long period develop a strong animal feeling of insecurity. During a confrontation, self preservation becomes their sole priority, overtaking all other considerations. Their nerves are an edge and the use of force is instantaneous at the slightest suspicious move. In other words, they get brutalised in the process of fighting the insurgent in the midst of the population over a period of time. Often those who order the use of army in a knee jerk response in areas where insurgents thrive do not bother to understand this occupational hazard of the soldier.
The infamous case of My Lai massacre in the Tet offensive in the Vietnam War in 1968 is classic example of brutalisation of forces. In this incident that shocked the world for its sheer brutality, the U.S. army soldiers massacred over 500 civilians including women and children. In the trials that followed the massacre, the conscience of the world was touched. In his testimony of private Dennis Bunning said "I would say that most people in our company didn't consider the Vietnamese human... A guy would just grab one of the girls there and in one or two incidents they shot the girls when they got done." This statement explains the brutalised mindset that sets in among soldiers who feel insecure even in the midst of civilians in such circumstances. And the world of armies in action has only marginally improved.
Rotation of troops can partly reduce brutalisation. In Jammu and Kashmir the Army has raised Rashtriya Rifles battalions especially for fighting insurgency. Soldiers are not permanently posted to such units and. serve by rotation. But rotation of troops can only partly reduce the problem of brutalisation.
The typical Indian soldier comes from the rural area into the strange world of armed forces. He also comes with a baggage of prejudices and perceptions of the rural society. He hardly understands human rights because he has not experienced them first hand in his conservative society. He sees the world in tones of black and white, right or wrong. The army takes charge of his life 24x7 – it tells him not only how to shoot to kill, but also how to obey orders without question, dress and eat properly. In short, the army is his Mai-Bhap (father and mother). And unlike urban cynics, he still believes in long forgotten old world values like loyalty to the hand that feeds you.
At times a promotion gives him a status never known earlier because of his low caste, poor education, poverty, or lack of urban smartness. The officers are no exception to this, though they might speak English, and come from an urban middle class background (this variety is dwindling). They may grumble and whine but do what their superiors tell them with little consideration for other things.
The security forces living in this schizophrenic existence counter insurgency theatres fail some time and succeed at some. Either way military operations make good copy because war makes news. If they fail, everybody bays for the blood of the soldier. The soldier has a difficult time understanding this kind of behaviour. The public expectations of the armed forces are very high because they are supposed to uphold the rule of law, justice, order and discipline. If we want the army to live up to such expectations, other limbs of government and society have to show at least incremental improvement. Otherwise the task may well be too big for the army.
Nov 10, 2008 Copyright: GFiles
Armies face a thankless task if they are called upon to fight insurgents - a section of their own people. The media is often more sympathetic to the plight of the population affected by the operations than the problems faced by the soldier. Troops feel both the public and media are unfair to soldiers doing their duty. Their grouse is understandable because the guerrilla operates among the people and only a thin line divides him and his sympathisers among the population.
Invariably troops employed in counterinsurgency tasks face charges of human rights abuses. It is no consolation that this is a universal phenomenon. It is frequently reported in Afghanistan and Iraq. Nearer home, Sri Lanka is a prime example of this phenomenon. We can also see such cases in India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh.
Troops fighting insurgents at home run into twin problems - professional and cultural and this takes a toll on their performance. The soldier is trained for conventional warfare. He is taught to shoot to kill first, use overwhelming firepower, and destroy enemy defences to retain the initiative at all times. Military training has a high degree of regimentation. Everything is reduced to a drill. So a soldier’s response under fire is reflexive than deliberate. In short, armies are trained to become killing machines of a conventional war. The soldier’s training gives him an abounding faith in his weapon and in his skill to kill his foe. And the macho culture of armed forces encourages this phenomenon.
I remember an instance in 1989, while serving with the Indian Peace Keeping Force. I was attending a party in Colombo in the lawns of the Indian High Commission to celebrate the Republic Day. The Pakistani Naval advisor chatted up me when he learnt I was a senior staff officer of the IPKF. “Colonel, I believe you’re having problem with employment of Madras Regiment units in Sri Lanka operations,” he said. Clearly he was needling me because I was a Tamilian.
In 1965 Pakistan had made a clumsy propaganda effort to play up the so-called South-North divide among some of the South Indian prisoners of war. It not only failed miserably but boomeranged when the Pakistanis were shooed out by the jawans. In reality, the Madras Regiment fought with thorough professionalism during the Jaffna operations. So to reply him was easy; “Commander, I don’t know about your army, but I know our army. If I ask a squad of soldiers to open fire on the passing traffic on Mount Road (in Madras) they will just do that. They would not show any hesitation.” This is the level of conditioning our soldiers have.
The soldier in counterinsurgency operations is supposed to take on the militant hiding among ordinary people without hurting others who are in the location. This is a Herculean task for the soldier because he has to overcome his professional training routine for conventional warfare. So the soldier has to be retrained in counterinsurgency warfare techniques before fighting insurgents. But retraining is not always possible when situations overtake planning as it happened in Sri Lanka.
In counterinsurgency troops rarely confront the enemy face to face. The attacks are indirect attacks and the methods are unconventional. Troops exposed to such nerve wracking experience over a long period develop a strong animal feeling of insecurity. During a confrontation, self preservation becomes their sole priority, overtaking all other considerations. Their nerves are an edge and the use of force is instantaneous at the slightest suspicious move. In other words, they get brutalised in the process of fighting the insurgent in the midst of the population over a period of time. Often those who order the use of army in a knee jerk response in areas where insurgents thrive do not bother to understand this occupational hazard of the soldier.
The infamous case of My Lai massacre in the Tet offensive in the Vietnam War in 1968 is classic example of brutalisation of forces. In this incident that shocked the world for its sheer brutality, the U.S. army soldiers massacred over 500 civilians including women and children. In the trials that followed the massacre, the conscience of the world was touched. In his testimony of private Dennis Bunning said "I would say that most people in our company didn't consider the Vietnamese human... A guy would just grab one of the girls there and in one or two incidents they shot the girls when they got done." This statement explains the brutalised mindset that sets in among soldiers who feel insecure even in the midst of civilians in such circumstances. And the world of armies in action has only marginally improved.
Rotation of troops can partly reduce brutalisation. In Jammu and Kashmir the Army has raised Rashtriya Rifles battalions especially for fighting insurgency. Soldiers are not permanently posted to such units and. serve by rotation. But rotation of troops can only partly reduce the problem of brutalisation.
The typical Indian soldier comes from the rural area into the strange world of armed forces. He also comes with a baggage of prejudices and perceptions of the rural society. He hardly understands human rights because he has not experienced them first hand in his conservative society. He sees the world in tones of black and white, right or wrong. The army takes charge of his life 24x7 – it tells him not only how to shoot to kill, but also how to obey orders without question, dress and eat properly. In short, the army is his Mai-Bhap (father and mother). And unlike urban cynics, he still believes in long forgotten old world values like loyalty to the hand that feeds you.
At times a promotion gives him a status never known earlier because of his low caste, poor education, poverty, or lack of urban smartness. The officers are no exception to this, though they might speak English, and come from an urban middle class background (this variety is dwindling). They may grumble and whine but do what their superiors tell them with little consideration for other things.
The security forces living in this schizophrenic existence counter insurgency theatres fail some time and succeed at some. Either way military operations make good copy because war makes news. If they fail, everybody bays for the blood of the soldier. The soldier has a difficult time understanding this kind of behaviour. The public expectations of the armed forces are very high because they are supposed to uphold the rule of law, justice, order and discipline. If we want the army to live up to such expectations, other limbs of government and society have to show at least incremental improvement. Otherwise the task may well be too big for the army.
Nov 10, 2008 Copyright: GFiles
Sri Lanka:The Slow Crawl to Kilinochchi
R Hariharan
On Sunday December 7, the security forces were within “kissing distance” of the outer defence lines Kilinochchi, announced the defence spokesman. On Monday, December 8, it became “Troops in Kilinochchi are targeting the town and they are in the vicinity of the town.” However, by December 9 it seems the security forces’ strategic focus had shifted from Kilinochchi to Mullaitivu according to the defence ministry. This contradicts what the army commander Lt Gen Sarath Fonseka said in his Sunday Observer interview on the same day; he said “after capturing Kilinochchi the security forces will definitely capture Mullaithivu...”
In military parlance, this kind of shift in 24 hours takes place only in tactical rather than strategic focus. Somebody is not getting the terminology right or the army is facing major problems in turning the “kiss” into reality in Kilinochchi. Its two pronged offensive on Kilinochchi by Task Force-I from the west and by 57 Division from the southwest was reported facing very heavy LTTE resistance. Could this have compelled them a change in the security forces’ strategy? The defence spokesman had acknowledged this at least on the Task Force-I front. In the Muhamalai sector also there appear to be no substantial progress in spite of 53 Division’s claims of having captured 800 m long and 8 km wide line of defences there. All these bits put together would indicate stalling of offensive.
A second possibility is that 59 Division was making better progress having captured Alampil on December 8. With Task Force-III making good progress on A34 Mankulam-Mullaitivu road branching off eastwards from A9 road 59 Division’s offensive to Mullaitivu would be benefited. So a tactical shift of immediate focus from Kilinochchi to Mullaitivu is understandable.
But such a shift in axis would still be a tactical shift. Ultimately the security forces have to either capture Kilinochchi or force the LTTE to vacate it after they pay a heavy price. Then only the A9 Kandy-Jaffna road can be opened to restore some form of normal life for most of the population of Northern Province. Regaining A9 road from the LTTE control by evicting them from Kilinochchi –Elephant Pass would always remain the strategic objective of the entire operation.
But these are all military semantics; in the absence of independent sources to verify operational information, semantics of both the defence spokesman and the LTTE become important; they indicate the issues hidden behind the words.
After the capture of Pooneryn on November 15, crossing Akkarayankulam bund on October 31, and capture of Mankulam on November 17, it is a month. Evidently since then, momentum of advance has been stalled due to adverse weather on a few days, and stiff LTTE resistance that had been progressively increasing. This would contradict repeated Sri Lankan assertion that the LTTE was on the run. If this is not so, what is holding up the troops?
Loss of momentum in an offensive means more time for the opponent to recoup, rest, repair and readjust defences, reinforce positions, launch counter offensives and inflict more casualties. And cost of war in terms of men, material and money goes up as the clock ticks in days and days become months. The more it is prolonged the better it is for the forces on the defence.
Fortunately, the army commander has cleverly put himself in an advantageous position with multiple options of axes to pick and choose. He also has adequate troops for achieving the strategic objective. Even granting the monsoon rains that affected both sides comes in fits and starts the progress is becoming slow and taking too long. This raises a few operational questions:
• Why the offensive to Kilinochchi is ending up as a slow crawl?
• Has the LTTE built up its strength beyond the ken of four divisions?
• Is the army commander facing a major operational dilemma or political rider interfering with his operations for reasons not known to the public?
In this context, Lt Gen Sarath Fonseka’s comments on India’s role in Sri Lanka in an interview to the Sunday Observer is interesting for more reasons than his derogatory description of Nedumaran and Vaiko,(Tamil Nadu politicians who head the pro-LTTE political lobby in Tamil Nadu) as jokers who receive money from the LTTE. Regarding the operations he sounded quite confident of capturing both Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu. He was not unduly worried about the slow progress or any casualties. There was apparently no operational stress. Does it mean operations are going on smoothly at an accepted pace? In the absence of access to information our questions still linger, unanswered.
The interview had a political content not usually found in interviews of army chiefs. His sarcastic comment was clearly provocative. As anticipated it drew widespread condemnation from political parties in Tamil Nadu and Government of India protested to Sri Lanka on the issue. There was quick apology from the Defence Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapakse the General’s remarks. And in the corrective action that followed, Colombo axed the editor of Sunday Observer while the errant General went scot-free. One cannot imagine the army commander casually tackling a political issue involving a sensitive neighbour without some tacit official acceptance of his perceptions. The freedom of operation given by the President to Lt Gen Fonseka appears to go well beyond the military kind.
And this is not the first time Gen Fonseka has made a politically controversial remark His interview inn October 2008 to the National Post, a Canadian daily, created enough concerns among Tamils when he said: “I strongly believe that this country belongs to the Sinhalese but there are minority communities and we treat them like our people…We being the majority of the country, 75%, we will never give in and we have the right to protect this country…We are also a strong nation … They can live in this country with us. But they must not try to, under the pretext of being a minority, demand undue things.”
While that remark did not endear him to Tamils and caused more concerns in the ethnically polarised nation, Sinhala right wing lobbies applauded him.
Why is Lt Gen Fonseka making such controversial remarks repeatedly? Does he nurture political ambitions after he completes his extended tenure next year? His latest remark on Tamilnadu politicians in the Sunday Observer interview definitely raises this question.
But whatever be the reason, such provocative remarks of the army commander only strengthen the Tamil suspicions of the ulterior objective of Sri Lanka government’s war against the LTTE.
On Sunday December 7, the security forces were within “kissing distance” of the outer defence lines Kilinochchi, announced the defence spokesman. On Monday, December 8, it became “Troops in Kilinochchi are targeting the town and they are in the vicinity of the town.” However, by December 9 it seems the security forces’ strategic focus had shifted from Kilinochchi to Mullaitivu according to the defence ministry. This contradicts what the army commander Lt Gen Sarath Fonseka said in his Sunday Observer interview on the same day; he said “after capturing Kilinochchi the security forces will definitely capture Mullaithivu...”
In military parlance, this kind of shift in 24 hours takes place only in tactical rather than strategic focus. Somebody is not getting the terminology right or the army is facing major problems in turning the “kiss” into reality in Kilinochchi. Its two pronged offensive on Kilinochchi by Task Force-I from the west and by 57 Division from the southwest was reported facing very heavy LTTE resistance. Could this have compelled them a change in the security forces’ strategy? The defence spokesman had acknowledged this at least on the Task Force-I front. In the Muhamalai sector also there appear to be no substantial progress in spite of 53 Division’s claims of having captured 800 m long and 8 km wide line of defences there. All these bits put together would indicate stalling of offensive.
A second possibility is that 59 Division was making better progress having captured Alampil on December 8. With Task Force-III making good progress on A34 Mankulam-Mullaitivu road branching off eastwards from A9 road 59 Division’s offensive to Mullaitivu would be benefited. So a tactical shift of immediate focus from Kilinochchi to Mullaitivu is understandable.
But such a shift in axis would still be a tactical shift. Ultimately the security forces have to either capture Kilinochchi or force the LTTE to vacate it after they pay a heavy price. Then only the A9 Kandy-Jaffna road can be opened to restore some form of normal life for most of the population of Northern Province. Regaining A9 road from the LTTE control by evicting them from Kilinochchi –Elephant Pass would always remain the strategic objective of the entire operation.
But these are all military semantics; in the absence of independent sources to verify operational information, semantics of both the defence spokesman and the LTTE become important; they indicate the issues hidden behind the words.
After the capture of Pooneryn on November 15, crossing Akkarayankulam bund on October 31, and capture of Mankulam on November 17, it is a month. Evidently since then, momentum of advance has been stalled due to adverse weather on a few days, and stiff LTTE resistance that had been progressively increasing. This would contradict repeated Sri Lankan assertion that the LTTE was on the run. If this is not so, what is holding up the troops?
Loss of momentum in an offensive means more time for the opponent to recoup, rest, repair and readjust defences, reinforce positions, launch counter offensives and inflict more casualties. And cost of war in terms of men, material and money goes up as the clock ticks in days and days become months. The more it is prolonged the better it is for the forces on the defence.
Fortunately, the army commander has cleverly put himself in an advantageous position with multiple options of axes to pick and choose. He also has adequate troops for achieving the strategic objective. Even granting the monsoon rains that affected both sides comes in fits and starts the progress is becoming slow and taking too long. This raises a few operational questions:
• Why the offensive to Kilinochchi is ending up as a slow crawl?
• Has the LTTE built up its strength beyond the ken of four divisions?
• Is the army commander facing a major operational dilemma or political rider interfering with his operations for reasons not known to the public?
In this context, Lt Gen Sarath Fonseka’s comments on India’s role in Sri Lanka in an interview to the Sunday Observer is interesting for more reasons than his derogatory description of Nedumaran and Vaiko,(Tamil Nadu politicians who head the pro-LTTE political lobby in Tamil Nadu) as jokers who receive money from the LTTE. Regarding the operations he sounded quite confident of capturing both Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu. He was not unduly worried about the slow progress or any casualties. There was apparently no operational stress. Does it mean operations are going on smoothly at an accepted pace? In the absence of access to information our questions still linger, unanswered.
The interview had a political content not usually found in interviews of army chiefs. His sarcastic comment was clearly provocative. As anticipated it drew widespread condemnation from political parties in Tamil Nadu and Government of India protested to Sri Lanka on the issue. There was quick apology from the Defence Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapakse the General’s remarks. And in the corrective action that followed, Colombo axed the editor of Sunday Observer while the errant General went scot-free. One cannot imagine the army commander casually tackling a political issue involving a sensitive neighbour without some tacit official acceptance of his perceptions. The freedom of operation given by the President to Lt Gen Fonseka appears to go well beyond the military kind.
And this is not the first time Gen Fonseka has made a politically controversial remark His interview inn October 2008 to the National Post, a Canadian daily, created enough concerns among Tamils when he said: “I strongly believe that this country belongs to the Sinhalese but there are minority communities and we treat them like our people…We being the majority of the country, 75%, we will never give in and we have the right to protect this country…We are also a strong nation … They can live in this country with us. But they must not try to, under the pretext of being a minority, demand undue things.”
While that remark did not endear him to Tamils and caused more concerns in the ethnically polarised nation, Sinhala right wing lobbies applauded him.
Why is Lt Gen Fonseka making such controversial remarks repeatedly? Does he nurture political ambitions after he completes his extended tenure next year? His latest remark on Tamilnadu politicians in the Sunday Observer interview definitely raises this question.
But whatever be the reason, such provocative remarks of the army commander only strengthen the Tamil suspicions of the ulterior objective of Sri Lanka government’s war against the LTTE.
Friday, December 5, 2008
Sri Lanka: Allegations Over the Use of Cluster Bombs in the war
By R Hariharan
The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have accused the Sri Lankan air force of dropping cluster bombs on an internally displaced persons (IDP) camp in Vanni area on November 29, 2008. According to the TamilNet report three refugees were killed and 29 shelters of displaced persons were destroyed in the air strike. Recordings of oral accounts of those affected are also available on the Internet. The North East Secretariat on Human Rights (NESoHR) and the Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation (TRO), two NGOs who work in the area and are known for their pro-LTTE sympathies, have also published detailed reports of the incident.
Regardless of the source of these reports, the allegation needs to be thoroughly investigated by a neutral body because the use of cluster bombs on civilian settlements is most inhuman and should not be condoned under any circumstances. More so when the civilians were fleeing from the war and are housed in temporary shelters as in the case in point. If the reports are true, those responsible for it should be taken to task and the affected people should be adequately compensated.
The NESoHR has reported that the SLAF had dropped 16 cluster bombs on the IDP camp in Uzhavanoor in the early hours of the day. Identifying the camp location as four km down the Sundikulam junction on the Paranthan-Mullaitivu road, NESoHR report said that apart from the three deaths 26 people were also injured in the air strike on the camp. The TRO said in another report on the air strike that the camp, constructed and maintained by it and another local NGO, was set up in an area declared as "safe zone" in November by the Sri Lanka government. The photographs of bombs published with the reports showed markings in Russian.
Cluster bombs, like 'jumping' mines and claymore mines, are one of the cruel inventions of war from the World War II days. Each cluster bomb delivers about 2000 small bomblets known as sub-munitions over a wide area. Over the last six decades its deadliness has been refined to offer a bouquet of death to humans and materials through fragmentation, anti-armour, and anti-material varieties. A combination of these can be put together in one payload. Both artillery and aircraft can be used to deliver the deadly payload.
What makes cluster bomb use deadly to civilians is its residual effect. It releases many small unexploded bomblets over a wide area that are capable of killing and maiming civilians long after they are dropped. Israel gained a lot of notoriety when its left over bomblets of cluster bombing of Beirut in 2006 caused avoidable death and destruction to civilians returning to their bombed out city after they pulled out of Lebanon.
Considering the seriousness of the allegations, the casual treatment meted out to these reports by Sri Lanka is surprising. One reason could be that the reports were possibly an international propaganda ploy of the LTTE. The allegations of the LTTE and pro-LTTE NGOs have come at a time when the issue of use of cluster bombs is in international limelight. An international conclave of nations, international NGOs and UN bodies had just met at Oslo to sign the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM). Ninety two countries including Britain, Australia, Canada, France, and Germany signed the CCM at Oslo on November 3. Significant absentees at the Oslo convention included Russia, China, Israel, United States and India.
Though Sri Lanka is not a signatory to the CCM, it will be in Sri Lanka's interest to clear the allegations for three reasons – the weapon is inhuman, its use on unarmed non-combatants is despicable, and Sri Lanka probably possesses some cluster bombs like most of the countries in the sub-continent. And if it is LTTE's international propaganda effort, Sri Lanka has all the more reason to call the bluff.
05-Dec-2008 http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cnotes5%5Cnote486.html
The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have accused the Sri Lankan air force of dropping cluster bombs on an internally displaced persons (IDP) camp in Vanni area on November 29, 2008. According to the TamilNet report three refugees were killed and 29 shelters of displaced persons were destroyed in the air strike. Recordings of oral accounts of those affected are also available on the Internet. The North East Secretariat on Human Rights (NESoHR) and the Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation (TRO), two NGOs who work in the area and are known for their pro-LTTE sympathies, have also published detailed reports of the incident.
Regardless of the source of these reports, the allegation needs to be thoroughly investigated by a neutral body because the use of cluster bombs on civilian settlements is most inhuman and should not be condoned under any circumstances. More so when the civilians were fleeing from the war and are housed in temporary shelters as in the case in point. If the reports are true, those responsible for it should be taken to task and the affected people should be adequately compensated.
The NESoHR has reported that the SLAF had dropped 16 cluster bombs on the IDP camp in Uzhavanoor in the early hours of the day. Identifying the camp location as four km down the Sundikulam junction on the Paranthan-Mullaitivu road, NESoHR report said that apart from the three deaths 26 people were also injured in the air strike on the camp. The TRO said in another report on the air strike that the camp, constructed and maintained by it and another local NGO, was set up in an area declared as "safe zone" in November by the Sri Lanka government. The photographs of bombs published with the reports showed markings in Russian.
Cluster bombs, like 'jumping' mines and claymore mines, are one of the cruel inventions of war from the World War II days. Each cluster bomb delivers about 2000 small bomblets known as sub-munitions over a wide area. Over the last six decades its deadliness has been refined to offer a bouquet of death to humans and materials through fragmentation, anti-armour, and anti-material varieties. A combination of these can be put together in one payload. Both artillery and aircraft can be used to deliver the deadly payload.
What makes cluster bomb use deadly to civilians is its residual effect. It releases many small unexploded bomblets over a wide area that are capable of killing and maiming civilians long after they are dropped. Israel gained a lot of notoriety when its left over bomblets of cluster bombing of Beirut in 2006 caused avoidable death and destruction to civilians returning to their bombed out city after they pulled out of Lebanon.
Considering the seriousness of the allegations, the casual treatment meted out to these reports by Sri Lanka is surprising. One reason could be that the reports were possibly an international propaganda ploy of the LTTE. The allegations of the LTTE and pro-LTTE NGOs have come at a time when the issue of use of cluster bombs is in international limelight. An international conclave of nations, international NGOs and UN bodies had just met at Oslo to sign the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM). Ninety two countries including Britain, Australia, Canada, France, and Germany signed the CCM at Oslo on November 3. Significant absentees at the Oslo convention included Russia, China, Israel, United States and India.
Though Sri Lanka is not a signatory to the CCM, it will be in Sri Lanka's interest to clear the allegations for three reasons – the weapon is inhuman, its use on unarmed non-combatants is despicable, and Sri Lanka probably possesses some cluster bombs like most of the countries in the sub-continent. And if it is LTTE's international propaganda effort, Sri Lanka has all the more reason to call the bluff.
05-Dec-2008 http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cnotes5%5Cnote486.html
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