By Nilantha Ilangamuwa, Sri Lanka Guardian
February 07, 2009:
Are you optimistic about progress of the Sri Lankan Security Forces approach to wiping out the Tamil Tigers?
Yes; as of now the Sri Lanka security forces are poised to finish off the military capability of the LTTE. They will do it in the coming days it seems. When we are dealing with non state actors - insurgents and terrorists - the terms "wiping out" has little meaning because a single suicide bomber in the wrong place at the right time can wipe out a leader as happened to President Premadasa or Rajiv Gandhi and that can cause immense changes. So I would not call LTTE's defeat as "wiping out" but military defeat.
There are many reasons for the present success against the LTTE but President Rajapaksa's single minded pursuit of the goal of "finishing off" the LTTE (regardless of the cost, national and international contrarian views, and other negative aspects of war) is the most important one.
The other important factor is Prabhakaran losing touch with the changed world attitude towards terrorist bodies. Now, after 8 years of 9/11, the world is making it more and more difficult for terrorist bodies to operate globally freely as they used to. Look at Pakistan and see the high price it is paying now for nurturing the Taliban. Prabhakaran did not factor this though Anton Balasingham probably understood this when he sold the idea of joining the Oslo peace process to the LTTE. After his death Prabhakaran probably lost even the little touch he had with the world as understood everywhere else.
The 3rd factor was Prabhakaran's fall out with Karuna. Karuna's exit from the LTTE and its important contribution to Sri Lanka's success is not given the credit it deserves. Strategically it freed the army from the burden of the east after the LTTE was swept out, while closing the recruiting base of the LTTE. It also split the Tamil ranks.
Lastly, the armed forces deserve full credit for fighting a well planned operation with effective military leadership and the coordination of the navy and air force which also rose to the occasion. It was a professional job. However, as we have limited information at this stage I don't know how much the victory cost the armed forces and the nation. But that does not diminish their successes.
What in your opinion are the root causes of this very complicated and chronic war? The conflict in Sri Lanka is now internationalised. What is your assessment on this horrible problem and its root causes and its future?
In all wars root causes are of non-military in origin. Sri Lanka is no exception. In Sri Lanka you are not fighting with an external enemy but a segment of your own population. It became internationalised because the national polity could not cope with it politically when the opportunity was there. And it got out of hand.
"But I am not so sure even now I was wrong. The LTTE has an elephantine memory. Is Karuna sure that a man with a loaded gun is not roaming around even now to wreak vengeance on him for his sins of parting with Prabhakaran? I am sure he is not; you can ask him. He will agree with me."
____________________
In the closely, globally networked environment of the present days, no conflict - whether local or international - is going to go unreported. So in a way there are going to be no more national wars anymore because there is a huge international lobby for preserving the basic rights of every man - even if he is a murderer or a terrorist. Nations have to be prepared for this changing dynamics of war. On the plus side it has the advantage of drawing international support for a national war effort as President Rajapaksa has done.
But the turning point was the disenchantment of the Tamil population with Sri Lanka's leadership after the Black July riots. That ended their feeling of security and trust in the Sri Lankan state. Even now I wonder whether it is fully restored because too much blood has been shed on both sides.
The LTTE emerged as a powerful force because it cashed in on the failure of the TULF and the Sri Lankan State to resolve Tamil grievances politically. It provided use of force as the only alternative answer to achieve results. And for the next 30 years internal political differences in Sri Lanka hobbled the State from taking decisive political action to remove Tamil grievances. Similarly military action against the LTTE was in fits and starts. That was at the root of survival of LTTE.
Even now I am not too sure how speedily the Sri Lankn State is going to address the Tamil issue. Like most Sri Lankan Tamils (though I am not one) my level of optimism on this count is around 40 per cent only. I know this will offend many of your readers. But it can be turned to 60 per cent if the 13th Amendment is implemented in letter and spirit. It will go further to 75 percent if the APRC is allowed to present its unbiased recommendations and if they are implemented.
Sounds unreasonable? No; that is because political solutions are not as neat as military ones. There are a lot of grey areas that cloud them. And both sides have to make sacrifices as much in a political solution as in a military solution. But politicians are generally reluctant to make sacrifices. But I live on hope.
You were the head of intelligence on Sri Lanka, when the Indian Peace Keep Force was active in the Island nation, cracking down on the Tamil Tigers. The IPKF suffered around 1,255 killed in action and several thousand wounded; LTTE casualties are not known reliably. I know you have spoken and written so many times about that era and its strategies, and on countering, losing and winning against the Tigers. I would be happy if you can compare the past situation under the IPKF with the present situation under the Sri Lankan Forces.
I think the two situations should not be compared. Both are unique in their own way.
1. The IPKF was fighting with a half-baked mandate in a foreign nation - I am still not clear what its mandate was. So ours was not a national commitment but a political one reduced to a military responsibility; after all the country was not ours. We were operating in a Sri Lanka where both Sinhalese and Tamils were suspicious of us because their dreams and our reality were different. The change in national leadership in both countries created problems for the army both at home and abroad. We could not fulfil even our half-understood mandate because politicians in both countries did not want us to do it. All these things do not happen within your own country though politicians will always have their own agenda but we are accustomed to dealing with them.
2. The LTTE then was learning conventional operations then but probably it is so fit now that it can teach others. It now has had both air and naval wings though the air wing was rudimentary. This showed the way it was thinking ahead of waging war always. Its international supply and support structure was now fully in place, as it could not depend upon India even for reliable covert supplies after it murdered Rajiv Gandhi. It was the unfinished job of the IPKF that opened up the world for LTTE's dream of building a conventional army. It was indirectly underwritten because the Tamil diaspora was terribly disappointed with India. (Even now they send me more hate mails than Sri Lankans from Sri Lanka!)
3. Our warfare was more restrictive. We did not use artillery and airpower (except gunships which were mostly used in Vanni; we had very few of them). We did not get any support from Tamil Nadu where the ruling party ensured that the pro-LTTE elements got the maximum leeway from our action. This was bad for the morale of troops.
I can keep on adding. But in the 20 years since we went there, warfare has become more deadly on both sides. That is the bottom line. I am glad I retired. Otherwise I might not have been here.
If the LTTE hadn't assassinated your friendly and young Leader on your own soil, do you think India would never have turned against the Tamil Tigers?
In Tamil there is a proverb; "Aththaikku meesai mulaithaal sithappa". In English it would be "If the aunt grows a moustache she would be uncle." Your question is like that. In India and Sri Lanka so many things have changed in the last 20 years. Tami Nadu is more global than local after the IT revolution. India has no more a soft spot for Moscow as in the Cold War period. The US is its strategic ally now. Both India and Sri Lanka are closer in relations than ever before. So we should not attach too much importance to Rajiv's death in India's deciding its Sri Lanka policy. But it did affect India's perceptions of the LTTE that had gone sour after the 1987 war. It closed the official door for it. If it had not happened perhaps India would have joined the co-chairs when the Oslo peace process 2002 came into being. That's what I feel.
You have given six points in 2004 of Karuna Amman and his newly built movement against the Tamil Tigers. According to your assessment in 2004, "Politically Karuna appears to be in a no-win situation. With so many issues loaded against him, can Karuna emerge victorious? Politics is the art of the possible; so the story may not end here. In Karuna's case he has started with the end move; he has to leave the gun to take to the political rostrum. But he cannot do that as long as the LTTE's threat to his person exists." But today Karuna has become a Member of Parliament through the Government. Actually I think he has won. But what do you think of his political career and his future?
But I am not so sure even now that I was wrong. The LTTE has an elephantine memory. Is Karuna sure that a man with a loaded gun is not roaming around even now to wreak vengence on him for his sin of parting with Prabhakaran? I am sure he is not; you can ask him. He will agree with me. After all for lesser sins people like Amirthalingam and Neelan were done to death by the LTTE. Probably that is why Karuna hopes to join the SLFP; that would at least minimise the risk of meeting an infiltrator from the LTTE among the TMVP cadres.
About his politics, my answer is simple. I don't know. But as I said then, politics is the art of the possible. If he can do good as an MP I am sure he can establish himself politically. Let us give him some peaceful time before he does that. He is making the difficult journey into the political field which is no less dangerous than a military mine field. And in Sri Lanka in both fields people die.
Norway, Japan, USA and EU have asked the Tigers and the government of Sri Lanka to negotiate terms for the LTTE's capitulation. At the same time, the four countries are determined that the government in Colombo must demonstrate that it can respect its international human rights obligations and give international representatives unimpeded access to inspect camps where Tamils are held in custody or under supervision. But the GoSL rejected the truce with the Tigers and also at the same time the Tigers didn't give any comment on their laying down arms. In this context what is the responsibility of the International Community on the Lankan issue?
Human rights are basic to good governance. It is essential for the State to demonstrate to its citizens that it gives them these rights that are denied by totalitarian organisations like the LTTE. Each state has to make its decision on this, not because others have a better or worse record, but because it has to make a difference to win the war against insurgents. And so Sri Lanka has no choice on this if it truly wants to win the war. It does not matter that the US has Guantanamo Bay, and Israel uses cluster bombs on Palestine refugees. Sri Lanka is not their country; Sri Lanka is yours.
International responsibility is a nebulous thing. It is elusive. Look at the Palestine problem. The least they can do is to ensure that the LTTE does not flourish on their soil while helping Sri Lanka's polity to ensure that the Tamil issue is resolved amicably and quickly. They should use non-military leverage that nations use in such situations. Otherwise again there will be the growth of a second generation insurgency that nobody including the international community wants.
In the meantime the Tamil National alliance has said to the Tokyo Co-chairs who called on the Tamil Tigers to lay down their arms and surrender to the Sri Lankan government, that ithas been the firm and consistent position of the Tamil people that the island of Sri Lanka is inhabited by the Tamil nation and the Sinhala nation. What do you think of the TNA's concept of two nations within one country? Do not forget that the TNA MPs are paid and maintained by the Sri Lankan Government, and when they take oath they promise to protect and uphold the constitution of the Sri Lanka.
I don't think even the TNA takes all this rhetoric seriously. My suggestion to them is to cut off their umbilical cord to the LTTE quickly and work out a political package that is realistic in the present context and sell it to the APRC, President Rajapaksa and if need be India (I don't know whether India would bet on them; they did that in 1987 and got burnt). Otherwise they will be sidelined by the Tamil people. I am not too sure that it has not happened already. Except for a few of them most TNA leaders are not to be seen in parliament so what is all this talk about the oath and so on.
At the end of the War, the post War situation in Sri Lanka will be as important a period as the present situation in the country. Nowhere in the World can we see an easy "mission totally accomplished" end in guerrilla warfare. A good example is eastern Sri Lanka which the Government declared liberated many months ago, but there are still some serious military incidents happening there. According to your reading, how does Sri Lanka totally accomplish mission over the civil war?
First don't promise too much to the public. I think patience is a Buddhist virtue. But that does not mean the government should take its own time. I think the most important thing is for Tamil people everywhere to feel secure. So if you have an army garrisons in every town in the North and the East for the next 5 years, your mission is going to be dismantled invisibly in the minds of people. People must be involved in development plans and restoration of normal life. That means local governments must become operational. Accessibility to government benefits must be without discrimination. Government should learn to talk Tamil. There is a Tamil description for Lord Murugan: "Thamizhil waidharyum Vazhthuvan," meaning the God is supposed to bless even those who abuse him in Tamil. That is the power of this language over its people. (Probably it is the same for the Sinhalese people; but I don't know Sinhalese; but I can imagine.)
If you carry out military operations while the visible results of peace gradually come up, people will help you to win the war against the insurgency. This is what we have seen in the Punjab and Mizoram. And this is what we have to do in Kashmir I have no doubt. So that is what Sri Lanka should do if it wants to prevent a resurgence of the LTTE; not by occupying HSZ forever (we are vacating our own version of HSZ in Kashmir now).
People should feel they are better off after the war than before. It is as simple and as complex as that depending upon how you want to go about it. In the East the more difficult option is being adopted. I hope they change it.
Courtesy: www.srilankaguardian.org
Sunday, February 8, 2009
Thursday, February 5, 2009
Red tape binds Natioal Security through inaction
We should thank The Pioneer newspaper for bringing to the focus an issue accepted as unavoidable in defence procurement. Its editorial “Defence Compromised” in its issue dated February 5, 2009 how mindless red tape bound bureaucracy is compromising our national defence priorities.
It is fashionable for many of the vocal do-gooders on the TV chats to say that we are wasting money too much money in defence procurement that should be spent on welfare.
It seems the truth is not as simple as that. The truth is the Defence Ministry surrendered a mind boggling Rs 16,000 crores because it could not be spent within the year. The culprit is bureaucract; “unnecessary procedures, bottlenecks and red-tapism”as Defence Minister AK Antony says are to blame for the slow pace of modernisation of India’s defence forces.
We can only say wake up India. Will somebody shake up the slumbering bureaucracy? Will the learned PM speak a little loudly to do it?
The disturbing editorial is worth reproducing in full; here it is.
UPA succeeds in emasculating military
Defence Minister AK Antony, known to be a man of few words, has been extraordinarily candid while admitting that “unnecessary procedures, bottlenecks and red-tapism”, and not the lack of funds, are to blame for the slow pace of modernisation of India’s defence forces. Of course, there’s nothing startlingly new about his comments, nor should we be surprised by the fact that the Ministry of Defence has been routinely surrendering funds allocated under the annual Budget.
As reported by this newspaper on Thursday, the ministry has returned Rs 16,000 crore over the past five years which remained unspent. Budget allocations are not made on the basis of ad hoc calculations, but by computing the financial requirements of a ministry in any given year to meet both administrative costs and expenditure on projects. In the case of the Ministry of Defence, the allocations would include funds to procure military hardware required by the Army, Navy and Air Force, for which detailed internal discussions would have already been completed and the cost computed.
Therefore, if the ministry has been surrendering unspent funds at the end of each financial year, we can only presume that the planned procurements were not made. There is ample evidence to substantiate this point: From conducting anti-terrorism operations to maintaining vigil along the nation’s 7,000 km coastline, from launching surgical strikes against enemy camps to deploying troops for possible conventional war, the defence forces are severely handicapped. This point has been highlighted repeatedly, most notably after the 26/11 fidayeen attack on Mumbai, but neither the political leadership nor the bureaucracy has bothered to fix the problem. Instead, we have heard more promises being made on expediting the procurement of hardware — from night vision goggles to bullet-proof jackets, multi-role combat aircraft to gunboats, precision-guided missiles to field guns — with little or no follow-up action.
The unnecessary procedures, bottlenecks and red-tapism that Mr Antony has talked about are not fictitious reasons causing inordinate delay in the procurement of military hardware. But it is equally true that these can be resolved if the Government of the day is determined to place national interest above bureaucratic sloth and partisan politics. To cite the Bofors scam, from which an Italian ‘businessman’ benefited, as the reason for holding up defence procurements is to talk utter rot and must be ignored with the contempt it deserves. The Bofors scam happened more than two decades ago and had politicians and bureaucrats been truly bothered about not allowing a repetition of that scandal then they would have restructured procurement norms to make them more transparent. Indeed, the UPA Government framed the Defence Procurement Procedure which was billed as a big step towards transparency and expediting the purchase of desperately needed military hardware. The Government now owes an explanation as to why the DPP has not facilitated fresh acquisitions. Did the Government have to wait till the fag-end of its tenure to discover that perhaps the DPP needs further fine-tuning?
The issue, really, is about intentions. This Government is headed by a Prime Minister who would like to see the defence forces emasculated. This is also the Government which initiated a witch-hunt for the defence purchases made by the NDA regime although it could not come up with an iota of evidence to prove wrong-doing.
That Rs 16,000 crore meant for the modernisation of our defence forces remained unspent during its tenure is only to be expected.
It is fashionable for many of the vocal do-gooders on the TV chats to say that we are wasting money too much money in defence procurement that should be spent on welfare.
It seems the truth is not as simple as that. The truth is the Defence Ministry surrendered a mind boggling Rs 16,000 crores because it could not be spent within the year. The culprit is bureaucract; “unnecessary procedures, bottlenecks and red-tapism”as Defence Minister AK Antony says are to blame for the slow pace of modernisation of India’s defence forces.
We can only say wake up India. Will somebody shake up the slumbering bureaucracy? Will the learned PM speak a little loudly to do it?
The disturbing editorial is worth reproducing in full; here it is.
UPA succeeds in emasculating military
Defence Minister AK Antony, known to be a man of few words, has been extraordinarily candid while admitting that “unnecessary procedures, bottlenecks and red-tapism”, and not the lack of funds, are to blame for the slow pace of modernisation of India’s defence forces. Of course, there’s nothing startlingly new about his comments, nor should we be surprised by the fact that the Ministry of Defence has been routinely surrendering funds allocated under the annual Budget.
As reported by this newspaper on Thursday, the ministry has returned Rs 16,000 crore over the past five years which remained unspent. Budget allocations are not made on the basis of ad hoc calculations, but by computing the financial requirements of a ministry in any given year to meet both administrative costs and expenditure on projects. In the case of the Ministry of Defence, the allocations would include funds to procure military hardware required by the Army, Navy and Air Force, for which detailed internal discussions would have already been completed and the cost computed.
Therefore, if the ministry has been surrendering unspent funds at the end of each financial year, we can only presume that the planned procurements were not made. There is ample evidence to substantiate this point: From conducting anti-terrorism operations to maintaining vigil along the nation’s 7,000 km coastline, from launching surgical strikes against enemy camps to deploying troops for possible conventional war, the defence forces are severely handicapped. This point has been highlighted repeatedly, most notably after the 26/11 fidayeen attack on Mumbai, but neither the political leadership nor the bureaucracy has bothered to fix the problem. Instead, we have heard more promises being made on expediting the procurement of hardware — from night vision goggles to bullet-proof jackets, multi-role combat aircraft to gunboats, precision-guided missiles to field guns — with little or no follow-up action.
The unnecessary procedures, bottlenecks and red-tapism that Mr Antony has talked about are not fictitious reasons causing inordinate delay in the procurement of military hardware. But it is equally true that these can be resolved if the Government of the day is determined to place national interest above bureaucratic sloth and partisan politics. To cite the Bofors scam, from which an Italian ‘businessman’ benefited, as the reason for holding up defence procurements is to talk utter rot and must be ignored with the contempt it deserves. The Bofors scam happened more than two decades ago and had politicians and bureaucrats been truly bothered about not allowing a repetition of that scandal then they would have restructured procurement norms to make them more transparent. Indeed, the UPA Government framed the Defence Procurement Procedure which was billed as a big step towards transparency and expediting the purchase of desperately needed military hardware. The Government now owes an explanation as to why the DPP has not facilitated fresh acquisitions. Did the Government have to wait till the fag-end of its tenure to discover that perhaps the DPP needs further fine-tuning?
The issue, really, is about intentions. This Government is headed by a Prime Minister who would like to see the defence forces emasculated. This is also the Government which initiated a witch-hunt for the defence purchases made by the NDA regime although it could not come up with an iota of evidence to prove wrong-doing.
That Rs 16,000 crore meant for the modernisation of our defence forces remained unspent during its tenure is only to be expected.
The moment of truth for the LTTE
R. Hariharan
The moment of truth appears to have arrived for the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. Its fall could not have been more dramatic; a few days ago a few thousand people of Jaffna, on whose behalf the LTTE says it is fighting, wanted it to release the civilian population held as a human shield in a small area in the northeastern corner of the Northern Province. Far from saving the lives of over 2.5 lakh Tamils there as it claims to be seeking to do, the LTTE has put them in the line of fire that is directed against itself.
There were two other jolts for the LTTE. In Chennai, Dravida Munnetra Kazagham leader and Chief Minister M. Karunanidhi reiterated that he does not support the LTTE that had weakened the Tamil resistance.
The European Union, Japan, Norway, and the U.S., the four co-chairs of the Oslo peace process 2002, called upon the LTTE to lay down weapons and surrender after accepting the amnesty offer put forth by the Sri Lanka government and prevent further loss of civilian life. It is an irony of fate that in 2002 the very same co-chairs had tacitly accepted the LTTE as the spokesman of the Tamil population at peace talks. Unfortunately, instead of vigorously pursuing the objective of getting the best devolution package through the talks, the LTTE focussed on building its armed strength with the trappings of a government — its own police, judiciary and administration. It did not matter that the LTTE had to leave to the Sri Lanka government the tasks of providing health care and supplying essential goods for the people living in areas under LTTE control.
Even while speaking of its own legitimacy to take over the administration of the north and the east under the interim self- governing authority proposal, the LTTE’s pistol groups went around killing scores of people, including Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar and a General of the Sri Lanka Army.
When the tsunami came on Boxer Day 2005, thousands of Tamils perished. Their plight touched the whole world and money came pouring in from everywhere. It is true that the Sri Lanka government should share the blame for its failure to implement its agreement with the LTTE with respect to tsunami relief. But even as the LTTE was complaining loudly about that, it was trying to strike deals worth millions of dollars with illegal arms dealers abroad to procure advanced missile systems and other weapons. This came to light during a sting operation carried out by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation a year later.
The LTTE enjoyed an unprecedented level of support and goodwill among the people of Tamil Nadu during 1983. Despite its record of killing Tamil militant leaders of repute such as Sri Sabharatnam of the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO) and hundreds of cadres of other groups including the People’s Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE), the Prabakaran mystique persisted and many Tamils ignored his seeming character aberrations.
However, the LTTE started dissipating its goodwill in India when it colluded with its “sworn Sinhala enemy,” President Ranasinghe Premadasa, to get the Indian forces off its back and send them out of Sri Lanka. However, the LTTE did not use its newfound bonhomie with the President for the benefit of Tamils. Instead, it killed Premadasa after carrying out a bloodbath of thousands of cadres of the Eelam Peoples Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF. Their only sin was that unlike the LTTE, they had accepted the Indo-Sri Lanka accord.
The LTTE relentlessly pursued the members of the EPRLF leadership who had taken refuge in India and killed many of them in Chennai. The final act of killing Rajiv Gandhi, the man who had proactively intervened in Sri Lanka to help Tamils, also killed Prabakaran’s equation with India. No amount of political or parochial rhetoric is going to repair the damage done to the LTTE’s image, particularly in Tamil Nadu, by that act.
Its failing fortunes in the present war have pushed the LTTE back to the position in which it was in 1987 — under mortal danger from the Sri Lanka security forces. It was India that rescued the LTTE then. Now that the LTTE is fighting for survival once again, its propaganda machine is asking the people of India to save Tamils in Sri Lanka. There is no sign of contrition on Prabakaran’s part for killing Rajiv Gandhi — which would have been the logical first step for mending fences with India.
But the LTTE, it seems, works on its own logic. Otherwise how do we understand its broadside against India even at this, its hour of need? The pro-LTTE TamilNet quotes an article saying, “It is an open secret that the present Indian Establishment, run by Sonia Congress, is waging its own proxy war in the island of Sri Lanka, concurrent to Colombo’s war against Tamil Nationalism. In its frustration arising from its incapability of achieving anything positively, India is not only heading for maintaining perpetual trouble in Sri Lanka, but also is inviting turmoil to a part of its own country.”
Prabakaran seems to have forgotten his own statement on India in his last Heroes Day message wherein he said: “Our people always consider India as our friend. They have great expectations that the Indian superpower will take a positive stand on our national question.” Is it all changed now when the LTTE talks of “India inviting turmoil to a part of its own country”?
The LTTE has to come to terms with the reality all over the world now. The world has lost its patience with terrorism. Most nations consider the methods used by organisations like the LTTE to be terror tactics. That was one of the main reasons for the LTTE’s downslide in the present war.
The time has come for the LTTE to give up war. It has to help the people rebuild their lives shattered by 25 years of war. Already hundreds of civilians have died in the artillery bombardment because the LTTE has not made up its mind to end the war that it is not winning. Prabakaran should act now and free them.
The way out for the LTTE is clear: Prabakaran should remove the fetters on the leaders of the Tamil National Alliance (TNA), its political proxy in the Sri Lankan Parliament, and allow them to make meaningful contributions to bringing about peace. The LTTE probably knows that its final act will be over with an offensive launched by five to six divisions of the Sri Lanka security forces on its redoubt. Before that happens, the LTTE can do one act of goodwill by letting free the hapless population it is holding today.
Courtesy: The Hindu, February 5, 2009
The moment of truth appears to have arrived for the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. Its fall could not have been more dramatic; a few days ago a few thousand people of Jaffna, on whose behalf the LTTE says it is fighting, wanted it to release the civilian population held as a human shield in a small area in the northeastern corner of the Northern Province. Far from saving the lives of over 2.5 lakh Tamils there as it claims to be seeking to do, the LTTE has put them in the line of fire that is directed against itself.
There were two other jolts for the LTTE. In Chennai, Dravida Munnetra Kazagham leader and Chief Minister M. Karunanidhi reiterated that he does not support the LTTE that had weakened the Tamil resistance.
The European Union, Japan, Norway, and the U.S., the four co-chairs of the Oslo peace process 2002, called upon the LTTE to lay down weapons and surrender after accepting the amnesty offer put forth by the Sri Lanka government and prevent further loss of civilian life. It is an irony of fate that in 2002 the very same co-chairs had tacitly accepted the LTTE as the spokesman of the Tamil population at peace talks. Unfortunately, instead of vigorously pursuing the objective of getting the best devolution package through the talks, the LTTE focussed on building its armed strength with the trappings of a government — its own police, judiciary and administration. It did not matter that the LTTE had to leave to the Sri Lanka government the tasks of providing health care and supplying essential goods for the people living in areas under LTTE control.
Even while speaking of its own legitimacy to take over the administration of the north and the east under the interim self- governing authority proposal, the LTTE’s pistol groups went around killing scores of people, including Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar and a General of the Sri Lanka Army.
When the tsunami came on Boxer Day 2005, thousands of Tamils perished. Their plight touched the whole world and money came pouring in from everywhere. It is true that the Sri Lanka government should share the blame for its failure to implement its agreement with the LTTE with respect to tsunami relief. But even as the LTTE was complaining loudly about that, it was trying to strike deals worth millions of dollars with illegal arms dealers abroad to procure advanced missile systems and other weapons. This came to light during a sting operation carried out by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation a year later.
The LTTE enjoyed an unprecedented level of support and goodwill among the people of Tamil Nadu during 1983. Despite its record of killing Tamil militant leaders of repute such as Sri Sabharatnam of the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO) and hundreds of cadres of other groups including the People’s Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE), the Prabakaran mystique persisted and many Tamils ignored his seeming character aberrations.
However, the LTTE started dissipating its goodwill in India when it colluded with its “sworn Sinhala enemy,” President Ranasinghe Premadasa, to get the Indian forces off its back and send them out of Sri Lanka. However, the LTTE did not use its newfound bonhomie with the President for the benefit of Tamils. Instead, it killed Premadasa after carrying out a bloodbath of thousands of cadres of the Eelam Peoples Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF. Their only sin was that unlike the LTTE, they had accepted the Indo-Sri Lanka accord.
The LTTE relentlessly pursued the members of the EPRLF leadership who had taken refuge in India and killed many of them in Chennai. The final act of killing Rajiv Gandhi, the man who had proactively intervened in Sri Lanka to help Tamils, also killed Prabakaran’s equation with India. No amount of political or parochial rhetoric is going to repair the damage done to the LTTE’s image, particularly in Tamil Nadu, by that act.
Its failing fortunes in the present war have pushed the LTTE back to the position in which it was in 1987 — under mortal danger from the Sri Lanka security forces. It was India that rescued the LTTE then. Now that the LTTE is fighting for survival once again, its propaganda machine is asking the people of India to save Tamils in Sri Lanka. There is no sign of contrition on Prabakaran’s part for killing Rajiv Gandhi — which would have been the logical first step for mending fences with India.
But the LTTE, it seems, works on its own logic. Otherwise how do we understand its broadside against India even at this, its hour of need? The pro-LTTE TamilNet quotes an article saying, “It is an open secret that the present Indian Establishment, run by Sonia Congress, is waging its own proxy war in the island of Sri Lanka, concurrent to Colombo’s war against Tamil Nationalism. In its frustration arising from its incapability of achieving anything positively, India is not only heading for maintaining perpetual trouble in Sri Lanka, but also is inviting turmoil to a part of its own country.”
Prabakaran seems to have forgotten his own statement on India in his last Heroes Day message wherein he said: “Our people always consider India as our friend. They have great expectations that the Indian superpower will take a positive stand on our national question.” Is it all changed now when the LTTE talks of “India inviting turmoil to a part of its own country”?
The LTTE has to come to terms with the reality all over the world now. The world has lost its patience with terrorism. Most nations consider the methods used by organisations like the LTTE to be terror tactics. That was one of the main reasons for the LTTE’s downslide in the present war.
The time has come for the LTTE to give up war. It has to help the people rebuild their lives shattered by 25 years of war. Already hundreds of civilians have died in the artillery bombardment because the LTTE has not made up its mind to end the war that it is not winning. Prabakaran should act now and free them.
The way out for the LTTE is clear: Prabakaran should remove the fetters on the leaders of the Tamil National Alliance (TNA), its political proxy in the Sri Lankan Parliament, and allow them to make meaningful contributions to bringing about peace. The LTTE probably knows that its final act will be over with an offensive launched by five to six divisions of the Sri Lanka security forces on its redoubt. Before that happens, the LTTE can do one act of goodwill by letting free the hapless population it is holding today.
Courtesy: The Hindu, February 5, 2009
Friday, January 30, 2009
Memories a War No One Wanted
Col R Hariharan
The Tamil version of this article was published in The Sunday Indian (Tamil)on January 12, 2009.
“Meet this Army officer. He is the man who killed our son,” the middle aged man pointed at me as he introduced me to his wife. My wife was shocked. But I knew his pain, so I was nonchalant. It happened in 1989 in my own home in Chennai. I knew them quite well in Jaffna. In fact, their house was the first one I visited when I set foot on the red earth of Jaffna on August 5, 1987 as part of the Indian Peace Keeping Force. His 18-year old son was also there. The handsome young fellow was a “Tamil Tiger” of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. In Jaffna everybody called them “Boys.”.
When quite unexpectedly our war with the Tigers started a few months later, I learnt the young fellow had gone to Mannar to fight against our troops. So I had told our men to take him alive and not kill him. “He is a Tamil Tiger so he may chew the cyanide capsule. Don’t allow him to do it,” I had warned. But what happened was quite tragic.
When the clash took place, he swallowed the cyanide capsule and dropped dead even before our troops got to him. How can I explain all this to his father in distress? But the boy’s death hurt me like hundred other incidents I faced in Sri Lanka as Military Intelligence chief for three years. As a Tamil I had a professional advantage there, but emotionally it was a torture daily to see innocent Tamil civilians dying in the war. The unhappy experience left deep scars in me. I sympathize with the Tamil struggle for equal rights with majority Sinhalas, but I do not accept taking up arms as the means to gain them.
My involvement with the Indian forces in Sri Lanka came unexpectedly. I was the senior most MI officer among the handful of Tamil MI officers at that time. Some relatives of our extended family lived in Jaffna and Colombo; so I was familiar with the Tamil issue. The Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement was conceived in haste and executed without thinking through a long term strategy. Ostensibly it had two goals – to preserve India’s strategic security interests and to help out Sri Lankan Tamils get their just rights while maintaining the unity of Sri Lanka. These were political and diplomatic goals rather than military one. To top it all, Indian Peace Keeping Force had no written mandate. Some oral instructions went even beyond our goals - we were told to be ready protect Sri Lanka President Jayawardane from possible backlash to the Agreement from Sinhalas and Sri Lanka army!
When I reached Chennai on August 2, 1987 the Southern Army Commander Lt Gen Depinder Singh told me to be ready to go to Jaffna to assist Indian troops tasked with the implementation of the Agreement. Sri Lanka had asked for Indian troops help in disarming the Tamil militants. “You will be required to be there for about 3 days, I guess. Nobody knows. I have no clear cut mandate. But I expect Prabhakaran to follow others and deposit his arms,” He said. That was how I reached Jaffna three days later with two pairs of uniform and nothing else. Gen Depinder could not have been more wrong on both counts. Prabhakaran never fully accepted the Agreement or gave up his goal of creating an independent Tamil Eelam. And I returned formally back to India only after three years. So much for our readiness for war in Sri Lanka!
The first two months were the best period of peace and tranquility we had, though the LTTE was dragging its feet in surrendering arms and accepting the proposed interim administration set up for the Northeast Province. I could see the trouble brewing. Even as we landed in Sri Lanka, Rajendra, our family friend and retired civil servant of Sri Lanka who had served under Jayawardane had warned me. “Rajiv Gandhi is a baby in politics. The wily Jayawardane is going to eat him up for breakfast. His idea is to make you fight the Tigers by October. You just wait and watch.” I passed on his assessment to New Delhi. Rajendra did not live to see his deadly forecast come true when we went to war. He was killed when a bomb burst near his house in Jaffna in the first week of war.
The LTTE confrontation with Indian army reached a new high when Thileepan, one the young LTTE leaders, went on a fast unto death on September 15, 1987 over “India’s failure to implement the Agreement.” The LTTE organized widespread anti-Indian public protests all over Jaffna. New Delhi chose to ignore the worsening situation and left it to the army to handle sensitive political and diplomatic issues for which the army had no competency or expertise. Thileepan never broke his fast and died on September 26, 1987. It only worsened our increasingly bitter relationship with the LTTE.
But the breaking point came on October 3, 1987 when Sri Lanka Navy apprehended senior LTTE leaders Pulendran, Kumarappa and 13 other members when in mid sea off Point Pedro when they were returning from Tamil Nadu coast. The two leaders were found carrying arms. They were kept in custody in Sri Lanka Army base at Palaly. President Jayawardane wanted to fly them to Colombo to face a number of criminal charges pending against them for involvement in some of the major LTTE attacks in which a number of civilians were killed. (Pulendran was accused of masterminding the attack that killed 139 pilgrims in Anuradhapura.) India tried to persuade President Jayawardane to release them as a goodwill gesture to preserve amity. However he did not budge. Probably he saw trying them as a political opportunity to regain some of the lost popularity among Sinhalas. We believed he would never allow them to go back alive.
I was present at the air base on October 5, when the Sri Lanka army decided to forcibly fly them to Colombo. I knew Major General Jayaratne, Jaffna Commander of Sri Lanka, who had done an army course with me in India. He made a last ditch effort to persuade Colombo to hand them over to Indian custody. But he failed; “President says no and out they go” he told us unhappily. The Sri Lankan officer standing next to me said, “My god, it is going to be war all over again.”
We were watching as the Sri Lankan troops dragged the cadres out just as they bit cyanide capsules. The LTTE leader Mahathia had smuggled cyanide capsules when he visited them earlier. They were carried dying, frothing at the mouth and their limbs twitching as the Sri Lankan troops loaded them in ambulances. Some of the soldiers kicked the dying men. It was one of the saddest moments in my life to see them dying so needlessly, when peace was so near, just to satisfy the egos of two leaders. My colleague Capt Chandok had tears in his eyes. I had always felt India’s failure to act strongly in that incident was the point of no return for LTTE’s decision to go to war.
Next day the Sri Lankans handed over the 12 bodies to us. (Three cadres had escaped death thanks to effective first aid.) Senior LTTE leaders Mahathiya and Yogi came to collect the bodies. The atmosphere was gloomy. I saw Koteeswaran, the legal advisor of LTTE, who was known to me with them. I requested him to persuade Prabhakaran not to get into armed confrontation with the army. “We don’t want to fight Tamils; we came to help them. And our army is huge and can fight for the next 20 years. We have been doing it in Nagaland for 30 years. So kindly put some sense in Prabhakaran’s mind,” I added. The able attorney looked sad. “Col sir, you are right but who can talk sense to Thambi,” he said. Mahathiya was grim. “Now you are handing over 12 bodies of our cadres. You will collect 1200 bodies of your own soldiers,” he said as the bodies wrapped in white shroud were loaded in LTTE vans. Mahathiya was so prophetic; we lost 1255 soldiers in our war with the LTTE. Only he could not predict his own death later when Prabhakaran killed him for being a RAW agent. And my friend the soft spoken Koteeswaran was also shot dead by unknown persons before we left. What a waste!
Mankind has always glorified war. They are so depicted in epics. I have seen three major wars and at least ten other insurgency conflicts in India, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. The truth is wars are tragic because death visits us everyday. I have lost so many people known to me in wars during nearly 30 years of my army service. They belonged to different armies and insurgent groups. They fought for a cause and died. But was it worth it? I wonder. I remember Major Gopalakrishna, the only son of a widowed mother from Madurai. Just before the India-Pakistan war he was to be sent to Soviet Union for special training. But war became imminent and he was unloaded from the plane. Next day, two days before the war, he was killed when a single bullet from somewhere hit him when a few of us were moving around the border area.
Once in Trincomalee I got information that the LTTE had sent two assassins to kill Padmanbha, leader of the EPRLF (Eelam Peoples Liberation Front) which was supporting us. I called him at 3 AM to warn him about it. Padmanabha laughed at the information. “Col Sir, don’t wake me up for this. Don’t lose your sleep also over this. I died the day I took up arms to fight for my belief,” he said and went back to sleep. I could not do so. Though he survived then, sadly death in the form of LTTE did not spare him. They killed him in Chennai after the war was over.
I had my own brush with death a few times in wars. In Sri Lanka it was in 1989 I think. I had gone with Lt Gen AS Kalkat, our commander, in a helicopter to visit our troops fighting in a LTTE stronghold in Nithikaikulam in Mullaitivu district. Just as we stepped out of the helicopter, a LTTE rocket whizzed past us and hit the helicopter which burst into a ball of fire. Death missed us by a whisker. We jumped over a bund nearby to take cover as another rocket hit set one more helicopter standing there on fire. Our escort helicopter gunship hovering over us for our protection fired a few rockets at our foes. We were spared our lives. It was on that day that wars lost their glamour for me, not out of fear of my life, but at the utter futility of it all. Why was Gopalakrishna killed by a lone bullet even before the war started? And why we were spared even by rocket fire in the thick of war? I don’t know the answers.
January 6, 2009
courtesy: The Sunday Indian/Tamil January 12, 2009
The Tamil version of this article was published in The Sunday Indian (Tamil)on January 12, 2009.
“Meet this Army officer. He is the man who killed our son,” the middle aged man pointed at me as he introduced me to his wife. My wife was shocked. But I knew his pain, so I was nonchalant. It happened in 1989 in my own home in Chennai. I knew them quite well in Jaffna. In fact, their house was the first one I visited when I set foot on the red earth of Jaffna on August 5, 1987 as part of the Indian Peace Keeping Force. His 18-year old son was also there. The handsome young fellow was a “Tamil Tiger” of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. In Jaffna everybody called them “Boys.”.
When quite unexpectedly our war with the Tigers started a few months later, I learnt the young fellow had gone to Mannar to fight against our troops. So I had told our men to take him alive and not kill him. “He is a Tamil Tiger so he may chew the cyanide capsule. Don’t allow him to do it,” I had warned. But what happened was quite tragic.
When the clash took place, he swallowed the cyanide capsule and dropped dead even before our troops got to him. How can I explain all this to his father in distress? But the boy’s death hurt me like hundred other incidents I faced in Sri Lanka as Military Intelligence chief for three years. As a Tamil I had a professional advantage there, but emotionally it was a torture daily to see innocent Tamil civilians dying in the war. The unhappy experience left deep scars in me. I sympathize with the Tamil struggle for equal rights with majority Sinhalas, but I do not accept taking up arms as the means to gain them.
My involvement with the Indian forces in Sri Lanka came unexpectedly. I was the senior most MI officer among the handful of Tamil MI officers at that time. Some relatives of our extended family lived in Jaffna and Colombo; so I was familiar with the Tamil issue. The Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement was conceived in haste and executed without thinking through a long term strategy. Ostensibly it had two goals – to preserve India’s strategic security interests and to help out Sri Lankan Tamils get their just rights while maintaining the unity of Sri Lanka. These were political and diplomatic goals rather than military one. To top it all, Indian Peace Keeping Force had no written mandate. Some oral instructions went even beyond our goals - we were told to be ready protect Sri Lanka President Jayawardane from possible backlash to the Agreement from Sinhalas and Sri Lanka army!
When I reached Chennai on August 2, 1987 the Southern Army Commander Lt Gen Depinder Singh told me to be ready to go to Jaffna to assist Indian troops tasked with the implementation of the Agreement. Sri Lanka had asked for Indian troops help in disarming the Tamil militants. “You will be required to be there for about 3 days, I guess. Nobody knows. I have no clear cut mandate. But I expect Prabhakaran to follow others and deposit his arms,” He said. That was how I reached Jaffna three days later with two pairs of uniform and nothing else. Gen Depinder could not have been more wrong on both counts. Prabhakaran never fully accepted the Agreement or gave up his goal of creating an independent Tamil Eelam. And I returned formally back to India only after three years. So much for our readiness for war in Sri Lanka!
The first two months were the best period of peace and tranquility we had, though the LTTE was dragging its feet in surrendering arms and accepting the proposed interim administration set up for the Northeast Province. I could see the trouble brewing. Even as we landed in Sri Lanka, Rajendra, our family friend and retired civil servant of Sri Lanka who had served under Jayawardane had warned me. “Rajiv Gandhi is a baby in politics. The wily Jayawardane is going to eat him up for breakfast. His idea is to make you fight the Tigers by October. You just wait and watch.” I passed on his assessment to New Delhi. Rajendra did not live to see his deadly forecast come true when we went to war. He was killed when a bomb burst near his house in Jaffna in the first week of war.
The LTTE confrontation with Indian army reached a new high when Thileepan, one the young LTTE leaders, went on a fast unto death on September 15, 1987 over “India’s failure to implement the Agreement.” The LTTE organized widespread anti-Indian public protests all over Jaffna. New Delhi chose to ignore the worsening situation and left it to the army to handle sensitive political and diplomatic issues for which the army had no competency or expertise. Thileepan never broke his fast and died on September 26, 1987. It only worsened our increasingly bitter relationship with the LTTE.
But the breaking point came on October 3, 1987 when Sri Lanka Navy apprehended senior LTTE leaders Pulendran, Kumarappa and 13 other members when in mid sea off Point Pedro when they were returning from Tamil Nadu coast. The two leaders were found carrying arms. They were kept in custody in Sri Lanka Army base at Palaly. President Jayawardane wanted to fly them to Colombo to face a number of criminal charges pending against them for involvement in some of the major LTTE attacks in which a number of civilians were killed. (Pulendran was accused of masterminding the attack that killed 139 pilgrims in Anuradhapura.) India tried to persuade President Jayawardane to release them as a goodwill gesture to preserve amity. However he did not budge. Probably he saw trying them as a political opportunity to regain some of the lost popularity among Sinhalas. We believed he would never allow them to go back alive.
I was present at the air base on October 5, when the Sri Lanka army decided to forcibly fly them to Colombo. I knew Major General Jayaratne, Jaffna Commander of Sri Lanka, who had done an army course with me in India. He made a last ditch effort to persuade Colombo to hand them over to Indian custody. But he failed; “President says no and out they go” he told us unhappily. The Sri Lankan officer standing next to me said, “My god, it is going to be war all over again.”
We were watching as the Sri Lankan troops dragged the cadres out just as they bit cyanide capsules. The LTTE leader Mahathia had smuggled cyanide capsules when he visited them earlier. They were carried dying, frothing at the mouth and their limbs twitching as the Sri Lankan troops loaded them in ambulances. Some of the soldiers kicked the dying men. It was one of the saddest moments in my life to see them dying so needlessly, when peace was so near, just to satisfy the egos of two leaders. My colleague Capt Chandok had tears in his eyes. I had always felt India’s failure to act strongly in that incident was the point of no return for LTTE’s decision to go to war.
Next day the Sri Lankans handed over the 12 bodies to us. (Three cadres had escaped death thanks to effective first aid.) Senior LTTE leaders Mahathiya and Yogi came to collect the bodies. The atmosphere was gloomy. I saw Koteeswaran, the legal advisor of LTTE, who was known to me with them. I requested him to persuade Prabhakaran not to get into armed confrontation with the army. “We don’t want to fight Tamils; we came to help them. And our army is huge and can fight for the next 20 years. We have been doing it in Nagaland for 30 years. So kindly put some sense in Prabhakaran’s mind,” I added. The able attorney looked sad. “Col sir, you are right but who can talk sense to Thambi,” he said. Mahathiya was grim. “Now you are handing over 12 bodies of our cadres. You will collect 1200 bodies of your own soldiers,” he said as the bodies wrapped in white shroud were loaded in LTTE vans. Mahathiya was so prophetic; we lost 1255 soldiers in our war with the LTTE. Only he could not predict his own death later when Prabhakaran killed him for being a RAW agent. And my friend the soft spoken Koteeswaran was also shot dead by unknown persons before we left. What a waste!
Mankind has always glorified war. They are so depicted in epics. I have seen three major wars and at least ten other insurgency conflicts in India, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. The truth is wars are tragic because death visits us everyday. I have lost so many people known to me in wars during nearly 30 years of my army service. They belonged to different armies and insurgent groups. They fought for a cause and died. But was it worth it? I wonder. I remember Major Gopalakrishna, the only son of a widowed mother from Madurai. Just before the India-Pakistan war he was to be sent to Soviet Union for special training. But war became imminent and he was unloaded from the plane. Next day, two days before the war, he was killed when a single bullet from somewhere hit him when a few of us were moving around the border area.
Once in Trincomalee I got information that the LTTE had sent two assassins to kill Padmanbha, leader of the EPRLF (Eelam Peoples Liberation Front) which was supporting us. I called him at 3 AM to warn him about it. Padmanabha laughed at the information. “Col Sir, don’t wake me up for this. Don’t lose your sleep also over this. I died the day I took up arms to fight for my belief,” he said and went back to sleep. I could not do so. Though he survived then, sadly death in the form of LTTE did not spare him. They killed him in Chennai after the war was over.
I had my own brush with death a few times in wars. In Sri Lanka it was in 1989 I think. I had gone with Lt Gen AS Kalkat, our commander, in a helicopter to visit our troops fighting in a LTTE stronghold in Nithikaikulam in Mullaitivu district. Just as we stepped out of the helicopter, a LTTE rocket whizzed past us and hit the helicopter which burst into a ball of fire. Death missed us by a whisker. We jumped over a bund nearby to take cover as another rocket hit set one more helicopter standing there on fire. Our escort helicopter gunship hovering over us for our protection fired a few rockets at our foes. We were spared our lives. It was on that day that wars lost their glamour for me, not out of fear of my life, but at the utter futility of it all. Why was Gopalakrishna killed by a lone bullet even before the war started? And why we were spared even by rocket fire in the thick of war? I don’t know the answers.
January 6, 2009
courtesy: The Sunday Indian/Tamil January 12, 2009
Wednesday, January 28, 2009
Martyr's widow not allowed into Rashtrapati Bhavan
It is a shame how this nation treats its people - even the widow of a soldier who has been awarded the highest medal on the same day by the President of India!! Shame on you India. Here is the media report:
Wed, Jan 28 02:13 AM
It takes extraordinary valour to win the Ashok Chakra, the country's highest peacetime gallantry award. But that is no guarantee a soldier would get the respect that should accompany that recognition.
On Republic Day, President Pratibha Patil bestowed Shanti Bohra with Havildar Bahadur Singh Bohra's Ashok Chakra (posthumous) in front of the entire nation. But a few hours later, the martyr's 29-year-old wife and her two daughters, aged five and three, were turned away from the gates of the Rashtrapati Bhavan.
Shanti had travelled from Jodhpur to receive the award. Her pleas with Patil's staff that she had no place to leave her daughters behind, fell on deaf ears.
A Rashtrapati Bhavan official, not authorised to speak to the media, said, "At formal functions, children are not allowed. Only those invited by name are allowed for security reasons.
" However, had the matter been brought to the notice of officials, it could have been resolved as it involved a highly decorated soldier's family, he claimed. "Some consideration should have been shown towards the lady.
Where was she supposed to have left her kids?" asked an outraged army officer. Bohra, a squad commander of 10 Para (Special Forces), led an assault team carrying out counter-terrorist operations in Jammu and Kashmir's Lawanz area.
Last September, he engaged a group of heavily armed terrorists and killed three of them despite several gunshot injuries. His citation reads: "Bohra displayed most conspicuous bravery and made supreme sacrifice for the nation.
Wed, Jan 28 02:13 AM
It takes extraordinary valour to win the Ashok Chakra, the country's highest peacetime gallantry award. But that is no guarantee a soldier would get the respect that should accompany that recognition.
On Republic Day, President Pratibha Patil bestowed Shanti Bohra with Havildar Bahadur Singh Bohra's Ashok Chakra (posthumous) in front of the entire nation. But a few hours later, the martyr's 29-year-old wife and her two daughters, aged five and three, were turned away from the gates of the Rashtrapati Bhavan.
Shanti had travelled from Jodhpur to receive the award. Her pleas with Patil's staff that she had no place to leave her daughters behind, fell on deaf ears.
A Rashtrapati Bhavan official, not authorised to speak to the media, said, "At formal functions, children are not allowed. Only those invited by name are allowed for security reasons.
" However, had the matter been brought to the notice of officials, it could have been resolved as it involved a highly decorated soldier's family, he claimed. "Some consideration should have been shown towards the lady.
Where was she supposed to have left her kids?" asked an outraged army officer. Bohra, a squad commander of 10 Para (Special Forces), led an assault team carrying out counter-terrorist operations in Jammu and Kashmir's Lawanz area.
Last September, he engaged a group of heavily armed terrorists and killed three of them despite several gunshot injuries. His citation reads: "Bohra displayed most conspicuous bravery and made supreme sacrifice for the nation.
Killing of Civilians:Hands of Both Govt and LTTE are Tainted
The security forces have captured Mullaitivu, the last bastion of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). This is comes as the icing on the cake of their achievements in the war against one of the toughest insurgent forces in the world, which has no hesitation in using terror tactics. However, the security forces have to address an issue that is disturbing not only to NGOs and UN humanitarian agencies but to many others who are no sympathisers of the LTTE.
In the last few days almost all international news agencies have reported the death of a number of civilians in Sri Lankan air strikes and artillery shelling carried out repeatedly to soften up the LTTE defences in support of the advancing security forces. A report of the Associated Press quoted Sri Lankan health officials saying that at lest 30 civilians were killed in a single day on January 20 due to shelling on a school and a hospital in the newly declared safety zone. The fact that the TamilNet, the pro LTTE website, had been reporting such deaths of civilians almost every day does not minimise the gravity of these incidents. Hundreds of civilians have died in such firing; even Indian newsmen who had been to Mullaittivu have confirmed it. One Indian reporter has spoken of heaps of dead bodies lying outside the makeshift hospital in Mullaittivu.
The death and injury among civilian population used as the human shield of the LTTE is caused when the security forces use artillery fire and air strikes to neutralise the LTTE pockets embedded in the midst of civilians. So it cannot be condoned as inevitable "collateral damage" of war. Such reports are even more serious if death and destruction of civilians come from an area that is supposed to be "safety zone". So it is not surprising that the issue has drawn strong criticism worldwide.
Deaths of civilians and displacement of population from their habitations are perhaps the two most certain events in any war. When a society unleashes war as a solution, such happenings are to be expected. And war is also the biggest violation of citizens' basic right to life and property. The expectation of privation is no consolation to the hapless population struggling just to survive between the foes.
So what both the government and the LTTE do to mitigate their suffering is as important as winning or losing in battlefields.
It is in the nature of air strikes and artillery bombardment to cause death and destruction in areas around the target. Even with all the technology for precision strikes, both air and artillery fire has inherent probability error in hitting the target area. In fact even the most accurate artillery gun has to correct its fire for every target with a couple of salvos before it opens its barrage on the target. This is done to minimise error of shells not hitting the target. Such an area would extend to a radius of at least 100 yards around the target. That is how the damages from 'collateral' causes occur. As it is inherent in the use of artillery fire to call it collateral is absurd. The use of artillery fire and air strikes in civilian areas regardless of compulsions is to be condemned strongly because it is so inhuman.
Unfortunately bombs and bullets do not discriminate between soldiers and "human shields" or hapless civilians trying flee the battlefield. In times of war, displaced population have neither the resources nor energy to take protective measures taken by the troops. Women and children form bulk of such civilian casualties because they cannot run as fast as men to safety.
The security forces are repeatedly told to exercise caution while using their fire power. War is not a cricket match; it is each man fighting not only to save himself, but to kill the enemy to fulfil his commander's mission. That is why soldiers are trained to become part of a gigantic killing machine that armies are. Their principles of war tell them to use superior force with preponderance of fire power while maintaining their objective. Under such compulsions of war, expecting the security forces to enforce a zero civilian casualty policy is extremely difficult if not impossible. So it is for other government agencies to take measures to ameliorate the fall out of battles on civil population well in advance and train them on how to save themselves.
In this regard the hands of both the government and the LTTE are tainted. The security forces have stepped up the use of artillery including multi barrel rocket fire and air power even as the LTTE areas are shrinking every day increasing the density of civilians per square kilometre. And the role of the LTTE is despicable and heartless. Even the UN has critically commented on the LTTE's cynical strategy of not allowing civilian population to get out of the battle zone, even though it knows that it is not going to defend the area unto death of the last of its cadres.
The government run by an elected body of people's representatives cannot absolve its responsibility in this respect by blaming the LTTE. As an organised government its norms are clearly defined and public accountability is an essential part of it. It is expected to perform better than the LTTE which has no pretension of such niceties and has only its leader Prabhakaran's edicts as norms of functioning.
Media is the conscience keeper of society. When the government fails to operate according to the norms of governance, it is the duty of media to report it. This is more so in times of war, when people accept the curbing some of their fundamental freedoms in the national interest. Unfortunately, the Sri Lankan media feels increasingly insecure when they face violence and intimidation directly or indirectly from elements of government or suspected to have close connections with it.
President Rajapaksa had been enjoying better press than his predecessors and most of the other politicians. In spite of this, his repeated reassurances on media freedom have not made much headway because other limbs of the government continue add a new episode to media confrontation almost daily. What is surprising is the government attitude to the media trying to report on the war, when only government is the "authorised source" of information.
The latest in the government's firing line was the BBC Sandeshaya for quoting the civilian casualty figures given by a representative of Mullaittivu hospital in its report. Media men dig for news from any available source when they are denied independent access to the happenings. This is what is happening
Victory in war is a heady thing. It can cloud government's perspectives on fundamental issues of governance. Victories in battlefields would not mean much in the long run if people do not feel secure and trust the government. The opposition Janatha Vimuthi Peramuna leader put it aptly: "These war victories can be meaningful to the people only when democracy is restored." Unfortunately, Sri Lanka is giving the impression that this is not happening.
January 27, 2009
Published in www.southasiaanalysis.org as "SRI LANKA: War and the Humanitarian Crisis in Vanni – Update No. 164"
In the last few days almost all international news agencies have reported the death of a number of civilians in Sri Lankan air strikes and artillery shelling carried out repeatedly to soften up the LTTE defences in support of the advancing security forces. A report of the Associated Press quoted Sri Lankan health officials saying that at lest 30 civilians were killed in a single day on January 20 due to shelling on a school and a hospital in the newly declared safety zone. The fact that the TamilNet, the pro LTTE website, had been reporting such deaths of civilians almost every day does not minimise the gravity of these incidents. Hundreds of civilians have died in such firing; even Indian newsmen who had been to Mullaittivu have confirmed it. One Indian reporter has spoken of heaps of dead bodies lying outside the makeshift hospital in Mullaittivu.
The death and injury among civilian population used as the human shield of the LTTE is caused when the security forces use artillery fire and air strikes to neutralise the LTTE pockets embedded in the midst of civilians. So it cannot be condoned as inevitable "collateral damage" of war. Such reports are even more serious if death and destruction of civilians come from an area that is supposed to be "safety zone". So it is not surprising that the issue has drawn strong criticism worldwide.
Deaths of civilians and displacement of population from their habitations are perhaps the two most certain events in any war. When a society unleashes war as a solution, such happenings are to be expected. And war is also the biggest violation of citizens' basic right to life and property. The expectation of privation is no consolation to the hapless population struggling just to survive between the foes.
So what both the government and the LTTE do to mitigate their suffering is as important as winning or losing in battlefields.
It is in the nature of air strikes and artillery bombardment to cause death and destruction in areas around the target. Even with all the technology for precision strikes, both air and artillery fire has inherent probability error in hitting the target area. In fact even the most accurate artillery gun has to correct its fire for every target with a couple of salvos before it opens its barrage on the target. This is done to minimise error of shells not hitting the target. Such an area would extend to a radius of at least 100 yards around the target. That is how the damages from 'collateral' causes occur. As it is inherent in the use of artillery fire to call it collateral is absurd. The use of artillery fire and air strikes in civilian areas regardless of compulsions is to be condemned strongly because it is so inhuman.
Unfortunately bombs and bullets do not discriminate between soldiers and "human shields" or hapless civilians trying flee the battlefield. In times of war, displaced population have neither the resources nor energy to take protective measures taken by the troops. Women and children form bulk of such civilian casualties because they cannot run as fast as men to safety.
The security forces are repeatedly told to exercise caution while using their fire power. War is not a cricket match; it is each man fighting not only to save himself, but to kill the enemy to fulfil his commander's mission. That is why soldiers are trained to become part of a gigantic killing machine that armies are. Their principles of war tell them to use superior force with preponderance of fire power while maintaining their objective. Under such compulsions of war, expecting the security forces to enforce a zero civilian casualty policy is extremely difficult if not impossible. So it is for other government agencies to take measures to ameliorate the fall out of battles on civil population well in advance and train them on how to save themselves.
In this regard the hands of both the government and the LTTE are tainted. The security forces have stepped up the use of artillery including multi barrel rocket fire and air power even as the LTTE areas are shrinking every day increasing the density of civilians per square kilometre. And the role of the LTTE is despicable and heartless. Even the UN has critically commented on the LTTE's cynical strategy of not allowing civilian population to get out of the battle zone, even though it knows that it is not going to defend the area unto death of the last of its cadres.
The government run by an elected body of people's representatives cannot absolve its responsibility in this respect by blaming the LTTE. As an organised government its norms are clearly defined and public accountability is an essential part of it. It is expected to perform better than the LTTE which has no pretension of such niceties and has only its leader Prabhakaran's edicts as norms of functioning.
Media is the conscience keeper of society. When the government fails to operate according to the norms of governance, it is the duty of media to report it. This is more so in times of war, when people accept the curbing some of their fundamental freedoms in the national interest. Unfortunately, the Sri Lankan media feels increasingly insecure when they face violence and intimidation directly or indirectly from elements of government or suspected to have close connections with it.
President Rajapaksa had been enjoying better press than his predecessors and most of the other politicians. In spite of this, his repeated reassurances on media freedom have not made much headway because other limbs of the government continue add a new episode to media confrontation almost daily. What is surprising is the government attitude to the media trying to report on the war, when only government is the "authorised source" of information.
The latest in the government's firing line was the BBC Sandeshaya for quoting the civilian casualty figures given by a representative of Mullaittivu hospital in its report. Media men dig for news from any available source when they are denied independent access to the happenings. This is what is happening
Victory in war is a heady thing. It can cloud government's perspectives on fundamental issues of governance. Victories in battlefields would not mean much in the long run if people do not feel secure and trust the government. The opposition Janatha Vimuthi Peramuna leader put it aptly: "These war victories can be meaningful to the people only when democracy is restored." Unfortunately, Sri Lanka is giving the impression that this is not happening.
January 27, 2009
Published in www.southasiaanalysis.org as "SRI LANKA: War and the Humanitarian Crisis in Vanni – Update No. 164"
Sri Lanka:Capture of Mullaitivu and the future of LTTE
The capture of Mullaitivu, the last big town under the control of the Liberation of Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), in a way came about as abruptly as Kilinochchi on January 25. But 59 Division of the Sri Lanka security forces which captured Mullaitivu had to fight its way through in some of the worst terrain against well fortified defensive positions.
The fall of Mullaittivu was not unexpected. In fact in my article in the Hindu last week, I had said, "With such a large force confronting them, the LTTE cadres defending Mullathivu are facing a situation that is not dissimilar to what they faced during their defence of Kilinochchi, which crumbled after the government forces broke through the perimeter defences. Mullathivu might face the same fate with the final assault going through as a walk-in into a ghost town."
Only this time around, the approaches to Mullaitivu pulled some surprises with the strong resistance east of Dharmapuram up to Viswamadu-Viswamadukulam. Security forces had reported blasting of the Kalmadukulam tank by the LTTE and flooding the Dharmapuram, Ramanathapuram, and Viswamadu areas to stall the advance f the security forces. According to the media, occupying an area of five square km this tank was the second largest in the north.
However, the LTTE cadres in defending area between Puthukkudiyiruppu and to its south and west have little chance of holding on with approximately five divisions converging on it from three directions. 55 Division advancing along Nagarkovil-Chundikulam axis in the north captured Chundikulam crossing the lagoon of the same name. It plans to link up with 59 Division in Mullaitivu which would close the last bit of free access to the sea between Mullaitivu and Chundikulam to the LTTE.
The chief of LTTE Velupillai Prabhakaran has become elusive even as a lot of hype was built up by the security forces about his presence in Mullaitivu area. As the Sri Lanka expects to rout the LTTE completely by March 2009, Prbhakaran's whereabouts become crucial after Mullaittivu's capture. The LTTE has been silent on speculations about its supreme leader, having lost its tenor due to the fading fortunes of war.
The Sri Lankan army commander Lt Gen Sarath Fonseka has claimed that 95 percent of the LTTE is "finished." Territorially speaking he is probably correct. But I am sure the security forces know that would not be the "real" 95 percent of the LTTE unless most of the cadres are killed or caught and the weapon inventories of the LTTE are accounted for. They also would acknowledge Prabhakaran has to exit the Sri Lanka scene for "finishing" the LTTE finally.
His continued leadership is vital for rebuilding the LTTE to survive another day. He has been the guiding spirit of the LTTE in war and peace all these years and many of the followers would not know what do without his command. More than that, he has not allowed the rise of any other leader to the stature of being his successor. As the LTTE revolves around Prabhakaran his death or apprehension could fold up the LTTE. His fate is also interlinked with the fortunes of his acolytes and fellow travellers both at home and abroad, particularly in Tamil Nadu.
Just before Mullaittivu fell, there had been widespread speculation in Sri Lanka media that he might have gone to Kerala or Tamil Nadu or even Penang State in Malaysia. All the three regions, where pockets of LTTE sympathisers exist, are not in the good books of Sri Lanka. However, at present these stories appear to be more fiction than factual.
With these stories, the Sri Lanka intelligence agencies probably hoped to demoralise the LTTE cadres defending Mullaitivu.
The LTTE cadres at the battle front are out of touch with Prabhakaran. This is not surprising as Prabhakaran normally does not join frontline battles though he keeps close touch with operations. The Tiger leader is also known to change his location frequently even in normal times. These are sensible survival precautions of a paranoid leader who has made too many enemies. And that is how he has survived. The Prabhakaran mystique is built as much on his low visibility and as the high secrecy of his location.
But where is Prabhakaran? Despite inspired stories about his departure to India, Malaysia or elsewhere, he runs the risk of being arrested in most of the 37 countries the have banned the LTTE in some form or other. Only Myanmar, Thailand and Kampuchea could become destinations of a fleeing LTTE leader. Of course, South Africa and Eritrea are touted as two other possibilities. But both are too far and travel would be too risky for the LTTE leader. The LTTE had a history of striking deals with corrupt elements of Myanmar military regime. But its socially downtrodden Tamil ethnic population has little influence and the military regime might sacrifice Prabhakran in adversity. Kampuchea where the LTTE had been buying his arms and Thailand where the LTTE has some clout with powerful Sri Lankan Tamil expatriates appear to be the only possibilities.
But own assessment is that given his doggedness built around the goal of achieving Tamil Eelam, Prabhakaran might not quit Sri Lanka to the comfort of Sri Lanka government. Tamil Nadu and Kerala coasts are the easiest to reach. Tamil Nadu in particular is an attractive destination for Prabhakaran because LTTE has built support assets there. However, it could be extremely risky also. Prabhakaran may welcome Indian coast for the limited use as a transit point before sneaking out to one of the western countries where death sentence does not exist and such leaders do get accommodated. After all Britain still has given refuge to one of the most wanted Chechen terrorist leaders. So Tamil Nadu and Kerala would do well to be on guard as Sri Lankan boats getting abandoned on India coasts have been repeatedly reported since last December.
January 27, 2009
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cnotes5%5Cnote495.html
The fall of Mullaittivu was not unexpected. In fact in my article in the Hindu last week, I had said, "With such a large force confronting them, the LTTE cadres defending Mullathivu are facing a situation that is not dissimilar to what they faced during their defence of Kilinochchi, which crumbled after the government forces broke through the perimeter defences. Mullathivu might face the same fate with the final assault going through as a walk-in into a ghost town."
Only this time around, the approaches to Mullaitivu pulled some surprises with the strong resistance east of Dharmapuram up to Viswamadu-Viswamadukulam. Security forces had reported blasting of the Kalmadukulam tank by the LTTE and flooding the Dharmapuram, Ramanathapuram, and Viswamadu areas to stall the advance f the security forces. According to the media, occupying an area of five square km this tank was the second largest in the north.
However, the LTTE cadres in defending area between Puthukkudiyiruppu and to its south and west have little chance of holding on with approximately five divisions converging on it from three directions. 55 Division advancing along Nagarkovil-Chundikulam axis in the north captured Chundikulam crossing the lagoon of the same name. It plans to link up with 59 Division in Mullaitivu which would close the last bit of free access to the sea between Mullaitivu and Chundikulam to the LTTE.
The chief of LTTE Velupillai Prabhakaran has become elusive even as a lot of hype was built up by the security forces about his presence in Mullaitivu area. As the Sri Lanka expects to rout the LTTE completely by March 2009, Prbhakaran's whereabouts become crucial after Mullaittivu's capture. The LTTE has been silent on speculations about its supreme leader, having lost its tenor due to the fading fortunes of war.
The Sri Lankan army commander Lt Gen Sarath Fonseka has claimed that 95 percent of the LTTE is "finished." Territorially speaking he is probably correct. But I am sure the security forces know that would not be the "real" 95 percent of the LTTE unless most of the cadres are killed or caught and the weapon inventories of the LTTE are accounted for. They also would acknowledge Prabhakaran has to exit the Sri Lanka scene for "finishing" the LTTE finally.
His continued leadership is vital for rebuilding the LTTE to survive another day. He has been the guiding spirit of the LTTE in war and peace all these years and many of the followers would not know what do without his command. More than that, he has not allowed the rise of any other leader to the stature of being his successor. As the LTTE revolves around Prabhakaran his death or apprehension could fold up the LTTE. His fate is also interlinked with the fortunes of his acolytes and fellow travellers both at home and abroad, particularly in Tamil Nadu.
Just before Mullaittivu fell, there had been widespread speculation in Sri Lanka media that he might have gone to Kerala or Tamil Nadu or even Penang State in Malaysia. All the three regions, where pockets of LTTE sympathisers exist, are not in the good books of Sri Lanka. However, at present these stories appear to be more fiction than factual.
With these stories, the Sri Lanka intelligence agencies probably hoped to demoralise the LTTE cadres defending Mullaitivu.
The LTTE cadres at the battle front are out of touch with Prabhakaran. This is not surprising as Prabhakaran normally does not join frontline battles though he keeps close touch with operations. The Tiger leader is also known to change his location frequently even in normal times. These are sensible survival precautions of a paranoid leader who has made too many enemies. And that is how he has survived. The Prabhakaran mystique is built as much on his low visibility and as the high secrecy of his location.
But where is Prabhakaran? Despite inspired stories about his departure to India, Malaysia or elsewhere, he runs the risk of being arrested in most of the 37 countries the have banned the LTTE in some form or other. Only Myanmar, Thailand and Kampuchea could become destinations of a fleeing LTTE leader. Of course, South Africa and Eritrea are touted as two other possibilities. But both are too far and travel would be too risky for the LTTE leader. The LTTE had a history of striking deals with corrupt elements of Myanmar military regime. But its socially downtrodden Tamil ethnic population has little influence and the military regime might sacrifice Prabhakran in adversity. Kampuchea where the LTTE had been buying his arms and Thailand where the LTTE has some clout with powerful Sri Lankan Tamil expatriates appear to be the only possibilities.
But own assessment is that given his doggedness built around the goal of achieving Tamil Eelam, Prabhakaran might not quit Sri Lanka to the comfort of Sri Lanka government. Tamil Nadu and Kerala coasts are the easiest to reach. Tamil Nadu in particular is an attractive destination for Prabhakaran because LTTE has built support assets there. However, it could be extremely risky also. Prabhakaran may welcome Indian coast for the limited use as a transit point before sneaking out to one of the western countries where death sentence does not exist and such leaders do get accommodated. After all Britain still has given refuge to one of the most wanted Chechen terrorist leaders. So Tamil Nadu and Kerala would do well to be on guard as Sri Lankan boats getting abandoned on India coasts have been repeatedly reported since last December.
January 27, 2009
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cnotes5%5Cnote495.html
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