Retired Indian army chief Gen. Shankar Roychowdhury (Retd) now a Member of Parliament
in a hard hitting article titled "For ex-servicemen, parity in rank, pension long overdue" has highlighted the struggle of ex-servicemen who had been surrendering their medals in thousands to the President of India, the supreme commander of armed forces, as a protest against the non enforcement of "one rank one pension" for the veterans promised long back.
Unfortunately, when this protest started the media by and large ignored it without realising the implications of the struggle on the serving soldiers. They are silently watching the military pensioners struggle slowly picking up national attention. Indian armed forces have a hoary history of accepting the dispensation of the government without demur. And the pensioners were also soldiers in the past years who had this discipline ingrained in them. Why are they complaining loudly now? To understand the issue, Gen Roychowdhury's article is reproduced here:
In this context, perhaps India is an island in South Asia, where the armed forces had been the bulwark in ensuring the security of the democratic nation. And people respect the army for its unflinching loyalty. But are they looking after the guy who stands duty in harsh conditions along the icy mountains of Siachen Glacier or the scorching deserts of Rajastan bordering Pakistan? Time they did.
Here is the text of Gen Roychowdhury's article:
---------------------------
Three hundred or so weather-beaten old military veterans returned their medals to the President of India on February 8 as a mark of protest against official apathy in the matter of “one rank one pension” (OROP) a feeble flapping of wings by an irrelevant group which barely made any ripples in the public domain. Nevertheless, it should serve as a small, perhaps minuscule, reminder of the continuing dissatisfaction and unhappiness of a forgotten community. It is, of course, no secret that the defence services have been bitterly resentful of the recommendations of the Sixth Pay Commission with respect to pay scales and, perhaps, more significantly in terms of downgraded equivalence with their civilian counterparts.
Whatever dissatisfaction on these and other aspects may have been expressed within the services, they did not find their way into the public domain, and the service chiefs too maintained a stiff upper lip, though they were undoubtedly concerned about its effects on their respective forces and with good reason. They jointly chose to highlight their unhappiness with stunning and totally unprecedented gesture of not accepting the new pay scales until anomalies had been looked into and ironed out and chose to continue with the existing pay scales in the interim period, a unique “Gandhigiri” in uniform, something unheard of earlier, which must have caused a flutter in the bureaucratic and ministerial dovecotes of South Block. Some in the print media, and at least, one irascible former diplomat were perhaps nudged to fume and splutter that it was really uppity for the services to “demand” pay scales, parity of service and protocol with the civil servants and all that — bad for discipline, don’t you know! Better keep these soldierwallahs at heel!
The moral courage of the service chiefs was exemplary during their undoubted crisis of conscience, and fully in consonance with the second stanza of the Credo of the Indian Military Academy — “The honour welfare and comfort of the men you command come next”, which ranks below the safety, honour and welfare of the country, but well above “your own ease comfort and safety” which comes “Last — Always and Everytime”.
Ex-servicemen were most supportive, anxious and fully concerned, but wisely refrained from raising issues pertaining to their serving comrades who were best left to the official hierarchy. They focused on issues pertaining to ex-servicemen for which they adopted the prevalent customs of the strange world outside the service — meetings at Jantar Mantar, processions, slogans, fasts and even intended self-immolation. All this was alien to their traditional environment and something that many within the community were themselves uncomfortable with. Throughout the whole proceedings, the armed forces — the “Fauj” — maintained total impassivity, but their silence was deafening in its own context. They watched, listened and noted because the present generation of soldiers no longer conform to the traditional public stereotype of dumb-driven cattle. They are intelligent, highly-trained and highly-skilled craftsmen in a deadly trade. They are not mercenaries or contract soldiers fighting for pay.
The government came out with two amazing statements: The government did not have the resources to grant OROP and if granted to ex-servicemen, the public sector, the paramilitary forces and the civil establishment would also want the same.
To take the second point first — ex-servicemen of the Indian Army, Navy and Air Force are not, repeat not, from paramilitary forces, the public sector or the civil establishment. In their own time, they constituted the “Ultima ratio regis” — the King’s last argument, India’s last resort when all else has failed, and they have the track record to prove it. Comparisons are, therefore, ill-informed and odious and should not be made.
As for availability of funds, India is no longer a “poor” country and while financial resources at the disposal of the government may not be unlimited, there is certainly no crippling shortage either.
Extensive investments have been made in the social sector and it is, indeed, right that this should be so, yet it is also undeniable that there is massive haemorrhage of public funds from flagship projects like the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme. With proper supervision and oversight, funds for OROP can certainly be found if the haemorrhage is staunched, and proper accountability enforced.
The OROP movement by ex-servicemen is perhaps not a desirable development, but there has to be some other credible alternate method of drawing attention of the government to an intrinsically social issue. However, it is the possible long-term implications of such agitations which should be of concern to present and future governments — its effects on the serving soldiers, sailors and airmen, including their officers, who constitute the rigidly-disciplined world of defence forces. The relationship between the serving and former soldiers is umbilical and their perceptions and values fundamentally identical. The OROP agitation by ex-servicemen presents a complex paradox of service values and ethos impacted by the realities of the world outside the services. At this stage all that can be said is that matters are seriously wrong and require to be looked into.
In the midst of all this comes Mumbai 26/11, with its 24x7 breaking news coverage of commandos from the Special Action Group (SAG) of the National Security Guard (NSG — all Army, by the way) dropping onto Nariman House and excited chatter about surgical strikes against Pakistan on chat shows. Also around this time, almost unnoticed, the “Bharat sarkar” makes an announcement granting, amongst other benefits, a separate Pay Commission for the defence services, one of the very long-standing demands of the armed forces hitherto dismissed out of hand by the bureaucracy.
Coincidence? Am I reading things into it or might there be (as is whispered) a connection between Mumbai 26/11 and the sudden change in attitude of the government on Sixth Pay Commission awards to the defence services?
Meanwhile, reports out of Pakistan indicate that the Taliban are on the move and are headed our way. So be glad India, that you have one of the finest armed forces in the world — on land, sea and air. Look after them, even pamper them a little, but above all, be thankful, because if you have to call upon them again, they will be there.
Wednesday, February 25, 2009
Saturday, February 21, 2009
Sri Lanka: First Take on LTTE Air raids on Colombo
The ability of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) to shock and surprise once again came into play when two light aircraft of its air wing made a daring bid to bomb the headquarters of the Air Force in Colombo and the Katunayake air base near the capital around 9.45 PM on February 20, 2009. But unlike the LTTE's earlier six bombing raids this time the two aircraft did not return home. Both were shot down by the much maligned Sri Lankan air defence system that got into action quickly on spotting the aircraft.
The LTTE reported that the "successful" air raids were carried out by two elite Black Air Tigers Col Rooban and Lt Col Sirithiran, both decorated pilots having flown earlier bombing missions of the LTTE. The pro-LTTE TamilNet website reporting the news displayed a photograph showing the two smiling pilots standing with the LTTE chief V Prabhakaran in the middle with his arms around them. Of course, there was no smile on his face.
The army reported one of the aircraft dropped a bomb on the Internal Revenue building near Air Headquarters, but crashed between third and twelfth floors breaking into pieces. Body parts of the pilot and parts of the air craft debris have been recovered. . According to the government newspaper Daily News, 50 people injured (including two of them who died later) in the incident were admitted to a Colombo hospital.
The other aircraft on the mission to bomb Katunayake air base was hit and crashed nearby. It was later found in a badly damaged condition with the dead pilot inside the aircraft. Bombs and explosives it carried were found intact in the aircraft according to defence sources.
The air raid has come at a time when the operations weighted heavily against the LTTE so far are in the last lap. In fact, the security forces, encircling the last patch (less than 100 sq km according to defence website) northwest of Mullaittivu, reported further gains in nibbling into the LTTE territory both in the north and west of Puthukkudiyiruppu. Though the missions appear to have failed they give some useful pointers into various aspects of the situation:
• Planning and carrying out an air raid after losing seven air strips shows that the LTTE has not lost its nerve yet. So any call to the LTTE to abandon its fight and surrender its arms is unlikely to yield any results. And that means the unwelcome baptism of fire of civilians trapped in the war zone is likely to continue. This is grim news for everyone. It also means the security forces operations will further be slowed down.
• The failure of the air raid has shown that the security forces air defence system was not lulled into complacency when the LTTE went on its last legs of fighting. This would indicate that the security forces had an inkling of residual air capacity of the LTTE as the aircraft were not recovered so far. More importantly they had factored in the possibility of the LTTE surprising them.
• One of the important question remaining to be answered is from where did the two aircraft emerge. I had written about the possibility of mothballed aircraft hidden in underground defences for future use. Apparently it was not done like that. That would indicate the LTTE had the confidence of safely taking them out and launching them on a mission, even though it might sound like its last hurrah.
• Lastly, the Vanni area east of A9 highway is saturated with troops. If the aircraft had taken off from one of the secret airstrips remaining in the jungle between the A35 Paranthan-Mullaittivu road and A32 Mankulam-Mullaittivu road it might have been detected early by troops on the ground. It is not known whether air defence got such a warning. If not, is there a secret airstrip outside the Vanni area say south of Mannar, which is lightly policed, from where they could have taken off? When the air force pieces the details together, would probably be in a better position to answer these questions in the coming days, I presume.
Even in this first take, one thing appears to be certain. The war is not going to end so easily; so probably Karuna is correct in his assessment that it would drag on say for a year or more.
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cnotes5%5Cnote499.html
The LTTE reported that the "successful" air raids were carried out by two elite Black Air Tigers Col Rooban and Lt Col Sirithiran, both decorated pilots having flown earlier bombing missions of the LTTE. The pro-LTTE TamilNet website reporting the news displayed a photograph showing the two smiling pilots standing with the LTTE chief V Prabhakaran in the middle with his arms around them. Of course, there was no smile on his face.
The army reported one of the aircraft dropped a bomb on the Internal Revenue building near Air Headquarters, but crashed between third and twelfth floors breaking into pieces. Body parts of the pilot and parts of the air craft debris have been recovered. . According to the government newspaper Daily News, 50 people injured (including two of them who died later) in the incident were admitted to a Colombo hospital.
The other aircraft on the mission to bomb Katunayake air base was hit and crashed nearby. It was later found in a badly damaged condition with the dead pilot inside the aircraft. Bombs and explosives it carried were found intact in the aircraft according to defence sources.
The air raid has come at a time when the operations weighted heavily against the LTTE so far are in the last lap. In fact, the security forces, encircling the last patch (less than 100 sq km according to defence website) northwest of Mullaittivu, reported further gains in nibbling into the LTTE territory both in the north and west of Puthukkudiyiruppu. Though the missions appear to have failed they give some useful pointers into various aspects of the situation:
• Planning and carrying out an air raid after losing seven air strips shows that the LTTE has not lost its nerve yet. So any call to the LTTE to abandon its fight and surrender its arms is unlikely to yield any results. And that means the unwelcome baptism of fire of civilians trapped in the war zone is likely to continue. This is grim news for everyone. It also means the security forces operations will further be slowed down.
• The failure of the air raid has shown that the security forces air defence system was not lulled into complacency when the LTTE went on its last legs of fighting. This would indicate that the security forces had an inkling of residual air capacity of the LTTE as the aircraft were not recovered so far. More importantly they had factored in the possibility of the LTTE surprising them.
• One of the important question remaining to be answered is from where did the two aircraft emerge. I had written about the possibility of mothballed aircraft hidden in underground defences for future use. Apparently it was not done like that. That would indicate the LTTE had the confidence of safely taking them out and launching them on a mission, even though it might sound like its last hurrah.
• Lastly, the Vanni area east of A9 highway is saturated with troops. If the aircraft had taken off from one of the secret airstrips remaining in the jungle between the A35 Paranthan-Mullaittivu road and A32 Mankulam-Mullaittivu road it might have been detected early by troops on the ground. It is not known whether air defence got such a warning. If not, is there a secret airstrip outside the Vanni area say south of Mannar, which is lightly policed, from where they could have taken off? When the air force pieces the details together, would probably be in a better position to answer these questions in the coming days, I presume.
Even in this first take, one thing appears to be certain. The war is not going to end so easily; so probably Karuna is correct in his assessment that it would drag on say for a year or more.
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cnotes5%5Cnote499.html
Friday, February 20, 2009
Emerging Issues in Managing Counter Terrorist Operations
India had been fighting extremism, militancy and insurgency of many kinds ever since it became an independent nation in 1947. India had been at the receiving end of trans-national terrorism for many decades now. However, in the past the world had sidelined it as part of India's disputes with its neighbours. But after 9/11 Al Qaeda attacks in New York, this attitude changed with the recognition of Pakistan as the homebase of Jihadi terrorism.
It was only after 26/11 terrorist attacks in Mumbai, India was recognised as one of the frontline states facing the threat of global terrorism. Now terrorism has become a major national security concern as demonstrated in the national impact created by the 26/11 terrorist raids. In this attack less than a dozen terrorists infiltrating from Pakistan demonstrated their awesome power by holding one of the largest cities of the world to ransom for three days!
Terrorism is now reckoned as an added dimension in international security calculus particularly since the U.S sponsored global war on terror was unleashed after the 9/11 terror strikes. Security and Law Enforcement Agencies (SLEA) have to fully understand contemporary terrorism and tailor their approach to tackle it successfully. In their response to the gloablisation of terrorism, the states tolerance levels against other forms of anti-state activities have also undergone a change after. Thus the state's stance has hardened after discovering seamless connectivity between some of the terrorist groups and other types of non-state actors.
Profile of contemporary terrorism
The 9/11 strike, the attack on Marriott Hotel in Pakistan and the 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks have shown the modern terrorists in action. In these attacks the terrorists have shown a penchant for meticulous planning and execution, using tools of modern technology. The modern terrorist belongs to a different genre than his predecessors 30 years back. Contemporary terrorism is increasingly getting a global profile though its roots continue to be local.
Global networking: Al Qaeda and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have demonstrated two different models of global networking. While Jihadi terrorists operate on a loose affiliation of like minded groups inspired by religious extremism across many continents, the LTTE uses ethnic identity as the tool to build its network among expatriate Tamils. They operate on a global scale using dedicated and indoctrinated locals networked in many countries to gain access to political support, finance, arms and technical expertise across the globe.
Multiple dimensions: The modern terrorist organisation operates on many dimensions. It uses legitimate business as a cover to finance terrorist operations. Traditional hawala channels of illegal money transfer have been refined to organise fund flow from abroad. Front organisations involved in legitimate business or social work have been used as part of an integrated strategy to build tentacles of the organisation in many countries. Local criminal networks, narcotic gangs, illegal arms traders and human traffickers are often used to assist terrorist operations. Corrupt local officials are also used to provide critical support to these anti-state organisations.
Global propaganda war: Global TV and web networks provide a wide field for the terrorist to propagate his cause and make exaggerated claims of success. And this comes free of cost in most of the cases as media channels compete for news. At the same time, terrorist organizations also wage psychological warfare in the target country against the state and its security forces by denigrating them through well-planted news stories in local and inter-national media. Thus killing of a terrorist in an encounter is often branded as murder. Often, the local politicians for their own selfish interest play into the hands of terrorists by supporting such 'causes.'
Out of the box thinking: The modern terrorist is fairly well educated and fully aware of the implications of his actions unlike his predecessors two decades ago. He has the ability to think out of the box in selecting targets, choice of countries and methods of operation. He uses access to information available in free societies to assist his planning and execution of operation. Religious freedom and freedom of expression prevalent in democracies are fully exploited to propagate terrorist ideology through religious schools and places of worship.
Technology orientation: The modern terrorist is tech-savvy. Mobile phone has replaced cumbersome clandestine radio sets as the mode of communication.. They are used not only to communicate, but also trigger terrorist action from remote locations. The Internet is his real time communication mode. He uses modern high power explosives and does not hesitate to improvise them when the need arises. Knowledge resources available in the web are a boon to him. His international networking helps him access to technology solutions to problems in planning and execution.
Changing social expectations
Just as the terrorist profile has changed, social expectations from the SLEA have also undergone changes. Growing literacy and urbanisation have resulted in greater public awareness of happenings around the world. Civil society is also spreading awareness of human rights and fundamental freedoms among citizens more than ever before.
As a result there is a greater demand for accountability from the SLEA in carrying out operations against non-state actors. The Right to Information Act (RTI) is in force now. Though it is not yet in full bloom, in the coming years RTI is likely to lead to a more open society with greater transparency in official action. In keeping with this trend the demand for conformity of official actions to laws of the land is likely to become the order of the day soon.
With the insidious influence of politics becoming an external force affecting performance of internal security agencies, actions of SLEA have to be very carefully planned to avoid drawing flak from public and politicians in addition to achieving results. As SLEA operations are now performed under the full glare of media and public scrutiny, they have unwittingly become ingredients that influence operational results. Unfortunately, the SLEA have not been paying adequate attention to some of these "soft issues" that indirectly impact operational results. The soft issues include human rights, media management, and interface with population. These issues have often clouded the operational decision making and execution process affecting the final results. Time and again weaknesses of the SLEA in these issues have been exploited by terrorists to their advantage. The SLEA have no choice but to evolve strategies to enable them to turn such "soft issues" issues as a positive value addition to augment operational effectiveness.
SOFT ISSUES
Human rights
Emergency situations brought about by operations against non state actors often cramp citizens normal life; frequently their basic democratic and civil rights are also curtailed under special laws enacted to tackle terrorism. Typically, in such environments the citizens' right to assemble or move freely, express their opinion on banned organisations, and indulging in democratic forms of protest like strikes and agitations to rally public opinion run the risk of attracting police action. Generally, well informed public accept such restrictions for reasonable period as essential part of the State's response to terrorist acts. However they expect the SLEA to conform to the laws and not exceed powers conferred on them.
However, in an environment where extremists are operating there is an erosion of public trust and credibility in the State. Particularly in communally or ethnically charged atmosphere, violations of human rights by the SLEA gain disproportionately high negative publicity even though people may ignore such aberrations of terrorist outfits.
The men in uniform coming from rural areas are often unaware of the rights of citizens because they themselves have not enjoyed such rights. So misuse of such powers conferred on them under laws like the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act 2008 (UAPA), the National Security Act (NSA) of 1980, or the Maharashtra Control Of Organised Crime Act of 1999 (MCOCA) is possible.
Human rights have become a global concern with international watchdogs like the Amnesty International (AI) and Human Rights Watch (HRW) monitoring it all over the globe. Their reports wield considerable influence in the western world particularly in the EU countries and the U.S. The UN also has its own bodies to monitor human rights among its member states. Human rights lobbies influence government policy making in many countries. As Human Rights awareness increases, it will increasingly affect executive actions of governments in many ways.
Security forces the world over are increasingly becoming aware of the importance of human rights issues. Though SLEA are taking tentative measures to tone up the system, still there are a number of functional issues. The main problem of security forces is lack of sensitivity to the dynamics of human rights in operations. Much of the misuse of anti-terrorism laws is due to political compulsions and brutalisation of police forces. However, an important factor in misuse of the special powers is due to indifference of SLEA in disciplining their own ranks. The SLEA leadership itself has to set a role model in adhering to such norms for subordinates to follow. In fact, handling human rights issue should become as a part of standard operative procedure. Then only the rank and file will take human rights issues seriously. Any violation of human rights should be handled through the due process of law and not be condoned as a routine. There is a need for self accountability and transparency in handling such cases.
Media management
Counter terrorism operations are also wars to win hearts and minds of the people. Modern tools of interactive media have made news coverage an important mode of reaching the public and influencing their opinion. At the same time, news channels are in a highly competitive business to gain viewership. Though majority of the media is supportive of the State effort, competition among them often results in spread of half baked and sensational information. There are also inherent risks of compromise of security of operations through investigative and sting operational stories put out by media. There is a need for the SLEA to balance security requirements with the information needs of the public and media.
Empowerment of commanders to directly communicate with the media can also be counterproductive as many SLEA commanders lack adequate formal training on public communication.
Ideally the media should be turned into an ally of the State and the security forces. To achieve this the SLEA have to plan and develop media strategies in tune with the operational environment. Hostile media is a tool that is often used by non state actors to indirectly project their cause. The SLEA should be prepared to handle hostile media as well as scoop artists. The best strategy is to provide adequate facilities to the media to access real time information, within the constraints of security. However, this is not always possible if State policy imposes restrictions for political reasons.
In such cases SLEA out of frustration often use extra legal methods to handle hostile media; such acts are bound to damage their case further. The troops in field must be fully made aware of the risk in such high handed behaviour. Prosecuting or proscribing hostile media is an extreme step that should be resorted to only in exceptional circumstances as it invariably increases negative publicity. So it has to be used cautiously in extreme cases only. Cultivating a friendly press over the long term requires a level of openness in providing regular information and access to media through well trained media communicators. This has to be ingrained in culture of troops public conduct. However, these actions have to be part of an overall strategy rather than a reactive knee jerk response. Everyone must be impressed that a friendly media is worth a hundred military victories in winning the trust of the people.
Interface with the public
Population living in areas of civil strife face enormous problems in their daily life. Deterioration or absence of public services and stilted functioning of government agencies are the norm rather than exception in such areas. As a result, there is no viable government mechanism to handle public grievances i such areas. Invariably there is no rule of law and this further erodes the credibility of the government machinery. The non state actors exploit such a situation to build their grass root support. It also helps them to collect funds and enlist recruits. This enables them to assert their power posing as true agents of deliverance.
In such an environment the SLEA are the only visible manifestation of government. Already disillusioned with the government machinery's performance, the public see the SLEA as agents of a non-effective and corrupt system. This can be seen in Naxalite dominated areas in Chattisgarh and Jharkand. Wherever the SLEA has been able to project a positive image, they have achieved lasting success in these areas. Creation of a people-friendly mental attitude among the troops has to be reflected in all their actions. A structured public interface to handle grievances provides a key value addition to operational success. To be effective, the grievance system should also provide a feedback to the users on follow up action taken. Involvement of public volunteers and NGOs in such endeavours will increase its credibility.
The public services are usually dislocated in areas where militancy and extremism are active. In order to improve relations with the people, the SLEA public grievance system should also interface with public services like public health, power and water supply, and civil supplies and work closely with them to attend to public complaints speedily. Attaching representatives of public service agencies with the grievance system can be useful in improving the overall credibility of the force.
OPERATIONAL LEADERSHIP
The SLEA operational leadership is geared only to handling issues related to the basic role of the agency involved. While the time tested, traditional training methods and processes have their own merits, the SLEA leadership has to adapt the methodology to effectively handle contemporary terrorism. Situational leadership style is required to tackle terrorists; essential skill sets for commanders and leaders in the field include clear communication style, team operation, structured operational planning and problem solving methodology, and an understanding of modern communication tools. More than all this the leader is required to build a learning organisation of his command.
Though some of the focus areas of leadership might be appointment and organisation specific, there are core elements common to all. These include flexibility of approach, adaptability, brainstorming for solutions to difficult problems, and learning from each operation. The leaders have to keep abreast of current developments in the terrorism scene they are operating in. There is no short cut to periodic orientation courses specifically designed for forces at various levels to understand lessons learnt in earlier operations carried out and techniques adopted in them. . This will require a culture which encourages the leadership ability to analyse and assess situations and take quick follow up actions.
SLEA need to modernise their mindset on using modern technology tools. Unless this is becomes part of the training at recruits level the forces will resist use of new technology tools to improve operational performance. Databases on terrorists and their allies need to be created on a real time basis and used for drawing useful assessments. These databases should be networked both nationally and globally. As these are now being created, the SLEA officers even at junior levels need to be trained on their use.
The 26/11 Mumbai terror raids have amply demonstrated lack of networking among the SLEA. Bureaucratic structuring of command and control systems, inter-ministerial/ departmental jealousies at the state and central level, and ego conflicts between agencies and their leaders are some of the biggest obstacles to effective net-working. Official measures alone cannot bring about improvement in this situation unless there is a conscious effort among leaders at various levels to do so. Such interactions need to be encouraged through informal networking techniques apart from adopting a structured system of follow up action taken on information in the pipeline.
CONCLUSION
A new breed of terrorists who believe in using religious faith as a vehicle to usurp the political process through violent means have become a major security threat. The modern terrorists are networked globally. This has enabled them to procure modern weapons and tools of terrorism. They have also globally gained access to finance, information and expert manpower required to carryout their tasks. They fully exploit the modern means of communication to carry out their operations as well as propaganda. Other non-state actors also tend to copy some of the methods used by terrorists in their actions. Thus there is a risk of this culture encouraging overall national security cannot be under estimated.
The SLEA has to understand the increasing expectations of society. There is greater public consciousness of their rights to good governance. This requires greater accountability of official action at all levels.
There are a number of leadership challenges in operating against terrorism. In order to meet the current needs, the SLEA need to relearn the leadership style, techniques and methodologies. Training of the rank and file need to be oriented for effective use of modern technology tools. To improve their overall performance, SLEA need to not only cooperate and coordinate their operations, but also learn to counter terrorist propaganda and progressively project a positive public friendly image. This can be achieved if only a user friendly public interface is built up to change people's mindset.
(Extracts of this article were included in a presentation made a course of senior officers of the BSF at the Indian Institute of Management, Indore on February 14, 2009)
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers31%5Cpaper3061.html
It was only after 26/11 terrorist attacks in Mumbai, India was recognised as one of the frontline states facing the threat of global terrorism. Now terrorism has become a major national security concern as demonstrated in the national impact created by the 26/11 terrorist raids. In this attack less than a dozen terrorists infiltrating from Pakistan demonstrated their awesome power by holding one of the largest cities of the world to ransom for three days!
Terrorism is now reckoned as an added dimension in international security calculus particularly since the U.S sponsored global war on terror was unleashed after the 9/11 terror strikes. Security and Law Enforcement Agencies (SLEA) have to fully understand contemporary terrorism and tailor their approach to tackle it successfully. In their response to the gloablisation of terrorism, the states tolerance levels against other forms of anti-state activities have also undergone a change after. Thus the state's stance has hardened after discovering seamless connectivity between some of the terrorist groups and other types of non-state actors.
Profile of contemporary terrorism
The 9/11 strike, the attack on Marriott Hotel in Pakistan and the 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks have shown the modern terrorists in action. In these attacks the terrorists have shown a penchant for meticulous planning and execution, using tools of modern technology. The modern terrorist belongs to a different genre than his predecessors 30 years back. Contemporary terrorism is increasingly getting a global profile though its roots continue to be local.
Global networking: Al Qaeda and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have demonstrated two different models of global networking. While Jihadi terrorists operate on a loose affiliation of like minded groups inspired by religious extremism across many continents, the LTTE uses ethnic identity as the tool to build its network among expatriate Tamils. They operate on a global scale using dedicated and indoctrinated locals networked in many countries to gain access to political support, finance, arms and technical expertise across the globe.
Multiple dimensions: The modern terrorist organisation operates on many dimensions. It uses legitimate business as a cover to finance terrorist operations. Traditional hawala channels of illegal money transfer have been refined to organise fund flow from abroad. Front organisations involved in legitimate business or social work have been used as part of an integrated strategy to build tentacles of the organisation in many countries. Local criminal networks, narcotic gangs, illegal arms traders and human traffickers are often used to assist terrorist operations. Corrupt local officials are also used to provide critical support to these anti-state organisations.
Global propaganda war: Global TV and web networks provide a wide field for the terrorist to propagate his cause and make exaggerated claims of success. And this comes free of cost in most of the cases as media channels compete for news. At the same time, terrorist organizations also wage psychological warfare in the target country against the state and its security forces by denigrating them through well-planted news stories in local and inter-national media. Thus killing of a terrorist in an encounter is often branded as murder. Often, the local politicians for their own selfish interest play into the hands of terrorists by supporting such 'causes.'
Out of the box thinking: The modern terrorist is fairly well educated and fully aware of the implications of his actions unlike his predecessors two decades ago. He has the ability to think out of the box in selecting targets, choice of countries and methods of operation. He uses access to information available in free societies to assist his planning and execution of operation. Religious freedom and freedom of expression prevalent in democracies are fully exploited to propagate terrorist ideology through religious schools and places of worship.
Technology orientation: The modern terrorist is tech-savvy. Mobile phone has replaced cumbersome clandestine radio sets as the mode of communication.. They are used not only to communicate, but also trigger terrorist action from remote locations. The Internet is his real time communication mode. He uses modern high power explosives and does not hesitate to improvise them when the need arises. Knowledge resources available in the web are a boon to him. His international networking helps him access to technology solutions to problems in planning and execution.
Changing social expectations
Just as the terrorist profile has changed, social expectations from the SLEA have also undergone changes. Growing literacy and urbanisation have resulted in greater public awareness of happenings around the world. Civil society is also spreading awareness of human rights and fundamental freedoms among citizens more than ever before.
As a result there is a greater demand for accountability from the SLEA in carrying out operations against non-state actors. The Right to Information Act (RTI) is in force now. Though it is not yet in full bloom, in the coming years RTI is likely to lead to a more open society with greater transparency in official action. In keeping with this trend the demand for conformity of official actions to laws of the land is likely to become the order of the day soon.
With the insidious influence of politics becoming an external force affecting performance of internal security agencies, actions of SLEA have to be very carefully planned to avoid drawing flak from public and politicians in addition to achieving results. As SLEA operations are now performed under the full glare of media and public scrutiny, they have unwittingly become ingredients that influence operational results. Unfortunately, the SLEA have not been paying adequate attention to some of these "soft issues" that indirectly impact operational results. The soft issues include human rights, media management, and interface with population. These issues have often clouded the operational decision making and execution process affecting the final results. Time and again weaknesses of the SLEA in these issues have been exploited by terrorists to their advantage. The SLEA have no choice but to evolve strategies to enable them to turn such "soft issues" issues as a positive value addition to augment operational effectiveness.
SOFT ISSUES
Human rights
Emergency situations brought about by operations against non state actors often cramp citizens normal life; frequently their basic democratic and civil rights are also curtailed under special laws enacted to tackle terrorism. Typically, in such environments the citizens' right to assemble or move freely, express their opinion on banned organisations, and indulging in democratic forms of protest like strikes and agitations to rally public opinion run the risk of attracting police action. Generally, well informed public accept such restrictions for reasonable period as essential part of the State's response to terrorist acts. However they expect the SLEA to conform to the laws and not exceed powers conferred on them.
However, in an environment where extremists are operating there is an erosion of public trust and credibility in the State. Particularly in communally or ethnically charged atmosphere, violations of human rights by the SLEA gain disproportionately high negative publicity even though people may ignore such aberrations of terrorist outfits.
The men in uniform coming from rural areas are often unaware of the rights of citizens because they themselves have not enjoyed such rights. So misuse of such powers conferred on them under laws like the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act 2008 (UAPA), the National Security Act (NSA) of 1980, or the Maharashtra Control Of Organised Crime Act of 1999 (MCOCA) is possible.
Human rights have become a global concern with international watchdogs like the Amnesty International (AI) and Human Rights Watch (HRW) monitoring it all over the globe. Their reports wield considerable influence in the western world particularly in the EU countries and the U.S. The UN also has its own bodies to monitor human rights among its member states. Human rights lobbies influence government policy making in many countries. As Human Rights awareness increases, it will increasingly affect executive actions of governments in many ways.
Security forces the world over are increasingly becoming aware of the importance of human rights issues. Though SLEA are taking tentative measures to tone up the system, still there are a number of functional issues. The main problem of security forces is lack of sensitivity to the dynamics of human rights in operations. Much of the misuse of anti-terrorism laws is due to political compulsions and brutalisation of police forces. However, an important factor in misuse of the special powers is due to indifference of SLEA in disciplining their own ranks. The SLEA leadership itself has to set a role model in adhering to such norms for subordinates to follow. In fact, handling human rights issue should become as a part of standard operative procedure. Then only the rank and file will take human rights issues seriously. Any violation of human rights should be handled through the due process of law and not be condoned as a routine. There is a need for self accountability and transparency in handling such cases.
Media management
Counter terrorism operations are also wars to win hearts and minds of the people. Modern tools of interactive media have made news coverage an important mode of reaching the public and influencing their opinion. At the same time, news channels are in a highly competitive business to gain viewership. Though majority of the media is supportive of the State effort, competition among them often results in spread of half baked and sensational information. There are also inherent risks of compromise of security of operations through investigative and sting operational stories put out by media. There is a need for the SLEA to balance security requirements with the information needs of the public and media.
Empowerment of commanders to directly communicate with the media can also be counterproductive as many SLEA commanders lack adequate formal training on public communication.
Ideally the media should be turned into an ally of the State and the security forces. To achieve this the SLEA have to plan and develop media strategies in tune with the operational environment. Hostile media is a tool that is often used by non state actors to indirectly project their cause. The SLEA should be prepared to handle hostile media as well as scoop artists. The best strategy is to provide adequate facilities to the media to access real time information, within the constraints of security. However, this is not always possible if State policy imposes restrictions for political reasons.
In such cases SLEA out of frustration often use extra legal methods to handle hostile media; such acts are bound to damage their case further. The troops in field must be fully made aware of the risk in such high handed behaviour. Prosecuting or proscribing hostile media is an extreme step that should be resorted to only in exceptional circumstances as it invariably increases negative publicity. So it has to be used cautiously in extreme cases only. Cultivating a friendly press over the long term requires a level of openness in providing regular information and access to media through well trained media communicators. This has to be ingrained in culture of troops public conduct. However, these actions have to be part of an overall strategy rather than a reactive knee jerk response. Everyone must be impressed that a friendly media is worth a hundred military victories in winning the trust of the people.
Interface with the public
Population living in areas of civil strife face enormous problems in their daily life. Deterioration or absence of public services and stilted functioning of government agencies are the norm rather than exception in such areas. As a result, there is no viable government mechanism to handle public grievances i such areas. Invariably there is no rule of law and this further erodes the credibility of the government machinery. The non state actors exploit such a situation to build their grass root support. It also helps them to collect funds and enlist recruits. This enables them to assert their power posing as true agents of deliverance.
In such an environment the SLEA are the only visible manifestation of government. Already disillusioned with the government machinery's performance, the public see the SLEA as agents of a non-effective and corrupt system. This can be seen in Naxalite dominated areas in Chattisgarh and Jharkand. Wherever the SLEA has been able to project a positive image, they have achieved lasting success in these areas. Creation of a people-friendly mental attitude among the troops has to be reflected in all their actions. A structured public interface to handle grievances provides a key value addition to operational success. To be effective, the grievance system should also provide a feedback to the users on follow up action taken. Involvement of public volunteers and NGOs in such endeavours will increase its credibility.
The public services are usually dislocated in areas where militancy and extremism are active. In order to improve relations with the people, the SLEA public grievance system should also interface with public services like public health, power and water supply, and civil supplies and work closely with them to attend to public complaints speedily. Attaching representatives of public service agencies with the grievance system can be useful in improving the overall credibility of the force.
OPERATIONAL LEADERSHIP
The SLEA operational leadership is geared only to handling issues related to the basic role of the agency involved. While the time tested, traditional training methods and processes have their own merits, the SLEA leadership has to adapt the methodology to effectively handle contemporary terrorism. Situational leadership style is required to tackle terrorists; essential skill sets for commanders and leaders in the field include clear communication style, team operation, structured operational planning and problem solving methodology, and an understanding of modern communication tools. More than all this the leader is required to build a learning organisation of his command.
Though some of the focus areas of leadership might be appointment and organisation specific, there are core elements common to all. These include flexibility of approach, adaptability, brainstorming for solutions to difficult problems, and learning from each operation. The leaders have to keep abreast of current developments in the terrorism scene they are operating in. There is no short cut to periodic orientation courses specifically designed for forces at various levels to understand lessons learnt in earlier operations carried out and techniques adopted in them. . This will require a culture which encourages the leadership ability to analyse and assess situations and take quick follow up actions.
SLEA need to modernise their mindset on using modern technology tools. Unless this is becomes part of the training at recruits level the forces will resist use of new technology tools to improve operational performance. Databases on terrorists and their allies need to be created on a real time basis and used for drawing useful assessments. These databases should be networked both nationally and globally. As these are now being created, the SLEA officers even at junior levels need to be trained on their use.
The 26/11 Mumbai terror raids have amply demonstrated lack of networking among the SLEA. Bureaucratic structuring of command and control systems, inter-ministerial/ departmental jealousies at the state and central level, and ego conflicts between agencies and their leaders are some of the biggest obstacles to effective net-working. Official measures alone cannot bring about improvement in this situation unless there is a conscious effort among leaders at various levels to do so. Such interactions need to be encouraged through informal networking techniques apart from adopting a structured system of follow up action taken on information in the pipeline.
CONCLUSION
A new breed of terrorists who believe in using religious faith as a vehicle to usurp the political process through violent means have become a major security threat. The modern terrorists are networked globally. This has enabled them to procure modern weapons and tools of terrorism. They have also globally gained access to finance, information and expert manpower required to carryout their tasks. They fully exploit the modern means of communication to carry out their operations as well as propaganda. Other non-state actors also tend to copy some of the methods used by terrorists in their actions. Thus there is a risk of this culture encouraging overall national security cannot be under estimated.
The SLEA has to understand the increasing expectations of society. There is greater public consciousness of their rights to good governance. This requires greater accountability of official action at all levels.
There are a number of leadership challenges in operating against terrorism. In order to meet the current needs, the SLEA need to relearn the leadership style, techniques and methodologies. Training of the rank and file need to be oriented for effective use of modern technology tools. To improve their overall performance, SLEA need to not only cooperate and coordinate their operations, but also learn to counter terrorist propaganda and progressively project a positive public friendly image. This can be achieved if only a user friendly public interface is built up to change people's mindset.
(Extracts of this article were included in a presentation made a course of senior officers of the BSF at the Indian Institute of Management, Indore on February 14, 2009)
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers31%5Cpaper3061.html
Thursday, February 19, 2009
Mourning the War Dead
R Hariharan
Generally we seem to be picking up the wrong things from the U.S. and miss out on some of the things that have made it a unique nation. I read this article a few days back written by Chiristina Bellantoni in the Washington Times on how the U. S. President Barack Obama, in spite of his busy schedule sends out condolence letters signed by him as ‘Barack’ to the parents of soldiers killed in action in Afghanistan.
In a touching comment, Thya Merz, mother of Marine Lance Corporal Julian Brennan killed on Jan 24 in Afghanistan referred to President Obama’s letter said, “This was real, it was personal, it was so important to us." She further told the reporter that the letter was signed “Barack’ and not 'president,' just his first name, and it just felt like, OK, my son has been acknowledged.” Incidentally, Julian was married to his fiancée six weeks before he was sent on to fight in Afghanistan.
The president was not just reproducing a master copy of a condolence letter to be sent to all. He drafted them in his own hand and sent it for typing! He personalised each letter after gathering details about the person, his hometown and where he was stationed. Can we imagine this happening in our country or for that matter in any of the South Asian countries, where thousands of soldiers die every year and the newspapers in most cases do not even give their names! And it is not their fault. The bureaucracy considers the dead soldiers as numbers and the politicians do not want too many body bags to be seen in public for political reasons.
This is where the U.S. culture is different. President Obama who did not support the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq had this to say to a news channel on this duty that falls on every president. He said the duty falls to him, though he did not initiate the wars and opposed the invasion of Iraq. In those moments of signing the letters, “you realize every decision you make counts.” As the supreme commander the signing of the condolence letter affirms the President’s ownership of the war. And it is not only Obama who signs such letters. His predecessor George W Bush was equally committed to this duty. That unfortunately is not the equation in India.
I had given the example of our attitude in my blog on January 28 titled “Martyr’s widow not allowed into Rashtrapati Bhavan” regarding a war widow who had come to receive the medal in honour of her dead husband at the Republic Day parade. She was not allowed into the Rashtrapati Bhavan to attend a reception because the young soldier’s wife had two small kids. And she was not smart enough to leave them elsewhere to fend for themselves! Will that ever happen? I am not optimistic. For us people are nobody because we are one too many. And soldiers are mere numbers. If one or two die the newspapers may not even report such news. But for every family of the soldier such a national attitude is galling.
Let us not confuse our national attitudes with ahimsa and the philosophy of non violence. It has nothing to do with that. It is the way we look at the dead. Life is not sacred here, even for vegetarians. In the end I would like to quote Mrs Merz. She said “One of the things I felt committed to even though I didn't agree with our military ventures was reading the names of the troops killed as they were listed. I just need to think about these people as individuals, and I hope that as a nation we are doing that and seeing them as real sons and daughters.” That is exactly what we are not doing.
Generally we seem to be picking up the wrong things from the U.S. and miss out on some of the things that have made it a unique nation. I read this article a few days back written by Chiristina Bellantoni in the Washington Times on how the U. S. President Barack Obama, in spite of his busy schedule sends out condolence letters signed by him as ‘Barack’ to the parents of soldiers killed in action in Afghanistan.
In a touching comment, Thya Merz, mother of Marine Lance Corporal Julian Brennan killed on Jan 24 in Afghanistan referred to President Obama’s letter said, “This was real, it was personal, it was so important to us." She further told the reporter that the letter was signed “Barack’ and not 'president,' just his first name, and it just felt like, OK, my son has been acknowledged.” Incidentally, Julian was married to his fiancée six weeks before he was sent on to fight in Afghanistan.
The president was not just reproducing a master copy of a condolence letter to be sent to all. He drafted them in his own hand and sent it for typing! He personalised each letter after gathering details about the person, his hometown and where he was stationed. Can we imagine this happening in our country or for that matter in any of the South Asian countries, where thousands of soldiers die every year and the newspapers in most cases do not even give their names! And it is not their fault. The bureaucracy considers the dead soldiers as numbers and the politicians do not want too many body bags to be seen in public for political reasons.
This is where the U.S. culture is different. President Obama who did not support the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq had this to say to a news channel on this duty that falls on every president. He said the duty falls to him, though he did not initiate the wars and opposed the invasion of Iraq. In those moments of signing the letters, “you realize every decision you make counts.” As the supreme commander the signing of the condolence letter affirms the President’s ownership of the war. And it is not only Obama who signs such letters. His predecessor George W Bush was equally committed to this duty. That unfortunately is not the equation in India.
I had given the example of our attitude in my blog on January 28 titled “Martyr’s widow not allowed into Rashtrapati Bhavan” regarding a war widow who had come to receive the medal in honour of her dead husband at the Republic Day parade. She was not allowed into the Rashtrapati Bhavan to attend a reception because the young soldier’s wife had two small kids. And she was not smart enough to leave them elsewhere to fend for themselves! Will that ever happen? I am not optimistic. For us people are nobody because we are one too many. And soldiers are mere numbers. If one or two die the newspapers may not even report such news. But for every family of the soldier such a national attitude is galling.
Let us not confuse our national attitudes with ahimsa and the philosophy of non violence. It has nothing to do with that. It is the way we look at the dead. Life is not sacred here, even for vegetarians. In the end I would like to quote Mrs Merz. She said “One of the things I felt committed to even though I didn't agree with our military ventures was reading the names of the troops killed as they were listed. I just need to think about these people as individuals, and I hope that as a nation we are doing that and seeing them as real sons and daughters.” That is exactly what we are not doing.
Sri Lanka: War And The Politics Of Peace
First things first
Recently, there is a perceptible change in New Delhi as far as Sri Lanka is concerned. It is trying to clearly articulate what it can do and what it cannot. And asking Sri Lanka to enforce a ceasefire is one of the things it cannot do as stated in Parliament by Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee on February 18. But that is not enough. With thousands of civilian population trapped in the war zone increasingly falling victims of a shooting war, the first thing India should be doing is to make vigorous efforts to get the trapped population out. As this is a humanitarian effort, the four co-chairs and India along with the UN should evolve a joint strategy to achieve this on a priority. Mere appeals will not do.
However, even if an international methodology is evolved, the warring sides will have to accept it. While the Sri Lanka government can be pressurised because it has legitimate national and international obligations, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) is a loose cannon. It might not be amenable to their effort without garnering some advantage. This is where the Tamil Nadu politicians, who have been agitating for an immediate halt to the war to save the Tamil population, can constructively contribute. All Tamil parties should jointly appeal to the LTTE to accept international effort to extricate the beleaguered population. Parties in touch with the LTTE grapevine should use these links usefully to persuade it for this purpose. That would be a visible testimony of Tamil politicians’ real concern for Tamils suffering death and destruction every day as the war closes in.
This is the first thing all the stakeholders must be doing if they really want to save lives of people not fighting the war. Other rhetoric can be hyped up when the election fever heats up.
War, ceasefire and peace
There had been repeated calls for resuming negotiations between the Sri Lanka government and the LTTE ever since the talks were stalled in the peace progress 2002. The international calls for finding peaceful resolution of the conflict is getting louder as the LTTE’s fighting its battle of survival. The callers’ ranks include India, UK, Canada, many members of the EU and the U.S. Of course, these countries have an abiding interest in Sri Lanka for their own reasons. Though pillorying them has become a popular pastime in Sri Lanka, it should not be forgotten that these nations generally wish well for the country.
In the corridors of power in Colombo such calls for negotiations are viewed as treason. Though these days the government is speaking in many voices on other issues, it is a unanimous NO on the resumption of talks with the LTTE. Their suspicion is typical of a climate of war that prevails now in Colombo. The armed forces despite the unexpectedly stiff LTTE resistance at Puthukkudiyiruppu are on the brink of neutralising the LTTE’s power base in the country. And any call for peace that would halt the last lap to success is bound to be suspect. But that in no way diminishes the need to examine the question “what to do after the war”?
The drastic pruning of LTTE’s military power is likely to marginalise its influence on Tamil population. So strategically it would be unwise now for the government to announce a ceasefire as a prelude to negotiations with the LTTE, without some strategic gain. That was why President Rajapaksa had repeatedly offered to talk to the LTTE after it lays down the arms. India’s Home Minister P Chidambaram and Foreign Minister Mukherjee have given similar calls a few weeks. The LTTE has also shown its readiness for talks but laying down arms is not acceptable to it. That would be a very big loss of face to Prabhakaran. Such a move would make it a political orphan when it loses the war. The LTTE has not given up its option to pursue its war on the unconventional mode. Of course, it will have to scale down in scope and content of such operations in keeping with its adverse circumstances.
This is the one big reason why the government should start negotiating with the representatives of the Tamil constituency now, when the LTTE is down. With the loss of military power the LTTE automatically loses its ability to call the shots in any peace process as it did in 2002. If the government can initiate and successfully progress such a process, the LTTE will lose its toehold on the Tamil issue. Is President Rajapaksa’s invitation to all Tamil parties, including the pro LTTE Tamil National Alliance TNA) for talks the beginning of such an initiative? There is no harm in hoping for such a positive development, though other indications are not so encouraging.
In Sri Lanka parliament nearly 20 percent of the members speak Tamil. Yet they have never been able to take a united stand on any issue. Of course in a democracy it is not necessary for linguistic groups to do so as they can do it through their parties. But on the devolution issue, lack of unity has weakened the Tamil political clout. It is unlikely that things would be different now much as the Tamils might wish. Take the TNA for instance. Even though the LTTE guns at its back are being silenced, members of the polyglot alliance are unlikely to agree among themselves even on their future course of action, let alone other major issues.
Given this setting, talks with Tamil parties may not go through to produce worthwhile results. And the President probably knows this. To achieve results, he has to use the devolution package Mr Tissa Vitharana is putting together in the all party committee. And it has to be sold to Sinhalas and Tamils. If this is not done, the political impasse is likely to continue as the Tamil and Sinhala divide has widened over the years.
During the 30 years of struggle since Tamils took up the Tamil Eelam option, there are a number of influences and vested interests that have intruded between Tamil and Sinhala communities. These included the issue of separatism, international powers and expatriates, selfish political interests and the LTTE usurping Tamil leadership. Operating on their own at various levels, these influences have turned what was essentially a political dialogue into a military confrontation.
To reverse this process, the three riders (international involvement, militarization of society and the LTTE dominance) will have to be turned into productive channels for peace. For achieving this everyone will have to work hard. Both communities must decide to abandon violence as the means of settling issues between them. To do this, entrenched prejudices on both sides need to be set aside. The idea of separatism must be buried by Tamils just as Sinhalas should show in their deeds readiness to consider Tamils as equal partners in building the fractured nation. A dynamic leadership is required to initiate this process. Who else can provide that other than politicians and civil society? They have to rise up to the occasion. They have no other choice. No external power or agency can do this because the process has to have Sri Lankan ownership to succeed
Internationalisation of the issue had contributed to the continuation of the armed conflict to a certain extent. The failure of the peace process 2002 has shown the limitations of the four co-chairs – the European Union, Japan, Norway and the U.S. and their well intentioned effort to end the war. It failed because the two warring sides had their own doubts about the credentials of the foreign powers involved. Moreover, they did not believe the process of negotiated peace would succeed.
Unlike others, India is one external power that could have made a difference. It had been on a listening watch after its unsavoury experience in its earlier spell of active intervention in Sri Lanka. But there are changes taking place in India as well. In Tamil Nadu all the three major political parties – the DMK, the AIADMK, and the Congress – have made clear that while they support the Tamil struggle for equitable powers, they do not consider the LTTE as their sole representative. India should actively work with the Sri Lanka government to trigger the political process. That will be in India’s interest as much as Sri Lanka’s. And Tamil Nadu politicians can stop sloganeering and make a positive contribution for peace by working on the representatives of Tamil constituency and politicians in the island to use the political opportunity meaningfully to arrive at a win-win situation.
Time is a valuable resource in showing visible results. In the past, many political efforts to resolve the Tamil question had floundered when key decisions were delayed or allowed die by procrastination. One of the reasons for the failure of the peace process 2002 was lack of visible results on a time-bound basis. This has only reinforced the suspicion among the aggrieved parties; it also generated a lot of cynicism about the intentions of such peace exercises. A well structured devolution process with clear bench mark of actions on a pre determined time schedule only can bring back trust and security between the Tamil and Sinhala communities.
The LTTE is likely to tap afresh the nearly million-strong Sri Lankan Tamil expatriates through its overseas network for bouncing back as a reckonable force. In its vocabulary, that means growth of its military power sans political content. Failure of a renewed political process would act as an incentive for LTTE’s military revival. That would be a tragedy for all the other stakeholders trying to move away from a military solution to achieve a political resolution of the problem.
Nations with strong LTTE front organisations and large ethnic Tamil populations in their midst like Canada, the U.S., UK, other EU nations, and India must ensure the resurgence of LTTE is halted in its tracks in their soil. Some of the political constituencies in these countries take up any cause for garnering a few more votes; they have ended up recycling the LTTE cause as the Tamil cause. They will have to do some soul searching if they want to do their bid to build peace. Tamil expatriates have a moral responsibility to rise up to the occasion to make peace possible just as they showed they can progress war. That would be a fitting tribute from them to all the souls of many hues martyred in the seemingly never ending conflict.
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cnotes5%5Cnote498.html
Recently, there is a perceptible change in New Delhi as far as Sri Lanka is concerned. It is trying to clearly articulate what it can do and what it cannot. And asking Sri Lanka to enforce a ceasefire is one of the things it cannot do as stated in Parliament by Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee on February 18. But that is not enough. With thousands of civilian population trapped in the war zone increasingly falling victims of a shooting war, the first thing India should be doing is to make vigorous efforts to get the trapped population out. As this is a humanitarian effort, the four co-chairs and India along with the UN should evolve a joint strategy to achieve this on a priority. Mere appeals will not do.
However, even if an international methodology is evolved, the warring sides will have to accept it. While the Sri Lanka government can be pressurised because it has legitimate national and international obligations, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) is a loose cannon. It might not be amenable to their effort without garnering some advantage. This is where the Tamil Nadu politicians, who have been agitating for an immediate halt to the war to save the Tamil population, can constructively contribute. All Tamil parties should jointly appeal to the LTTE to accept international effort to extricate the beleaguered population. Parties in touch with the LTTE grapevine should use these links usefully to persuade it for this purpose. That would be a visible testimony of Tamil politicians’ real concern for Tamils suffering death and destruction every day as the war closes in.
This is the first thing all the stakeholders must be doing if they really want to save lives of people not fighting the war. Other rhetoric can be hyped up when the election fever heats up.
War, ceasefire and peace
There had been repeated calls for resuming negotiations between the Sri Lanka government and the LTTE ever since the talks were stalled in the peace progress 2002. The international calls for finding peaceful resolution of the conflict is getting louder as the LTTE’s fighting its battle of survival. The callers’ ranks include India, UK, Canada, many members of the EU and the U.S. Of course, these countries have an abiding interest in Sri Lanka for their own reasons. Though pillorying them has become a popular pastime in Sri Lanka, it should not be forgotten that these nations generally wish well for the country.
In the corridors of power in Colombo such calls for negotiations are viewed as treason. Though these days the government is speaking in many voices on other issues, it is a unanimous NO on the resumption of talks with the LTTE. Their suspicion is typical of a climate of war that prevails now in Colombo. The armed forces despite the unexpectedly stiff LTTE resistance at Puthukkudiyiruppu are on the brink of neutralising the LTTE’s power base in the country. And any call for peace that would halt the last lap to success is bound to be suspect. But that in no way diminishes the need to examine the question “what to do after the war”?
The drastic pruning of LTTE’s military power is likely to marginalise its influence on Tamil population. So strategically it would be unwise now for the government to announce a ceasefire as a prelude to negotiations with the LTTE, without some strategic gain. That was why President Rajapaksa had repeatedly offered to talk to the LTTE after it lays down the arms. India’s Home Minister P Chidambaram and Foreign Minister Mukherjee have given similar calls a few weeks. The LTTE has also shown its readiness for talks but laying down arms is not acceptable to it. That would be a very big loss of face to Prabhakaran. Such a move would make it a political orphan when it loses the war. The LTTE has not given up its option to pursue its war on the unconventional mode. Of course, it will have to scale down in scope and content of such operations in keeping with its adverse circumstances.
This is the one big reason why the government should start negotiating with the representatives of the Tamil constituency now, when the LTTE is down. With the loss of military power the LTTE automatically loses its ability to call the shots in any peace process as it did in 2002. If the government can initiate and successfully progress such a process, the LTTE will lose its toehold on the Tamil issue. Is President Rajapaksa’s invitation to all Tamil parties, including the pro LTTE Tamil National Alliance TNA) for talks the beginning of such an initiative? There is no harm in hoping for such a positive development, though other indications are not so encouraging.
In Sri Lanka parliament nearly 20 percent of the members speak Tamil. Yet they have never been able to take a united stand on any issue. Of course in a democracy it is not necessary for linguistic groups to do so as they can do it through their parties. But on the devolution issue, lack of unity has weakened the Tamil political clout. It is unlikely that things would be different now much as the Tamils might wish. Take the TNA for instance. Even though the LTTE guns at its back are being silenced, members of the polyglot alliance are unlikely to agree among themselves even on their future course of action, let alone other major issues.
Given this setting, talks with Tamil parties may not go through to produce worthwhile results. And the President probably knows this. To achieve results, he has to use the devolution package Mr Tissa Vitharana is putting together in the all party committee. And it has to be sold to Sinhalas and Tamils. If this is not done, the political impasse is likely to continue as the Tamil and Sinhala divide has widened over the years.
During the 30 years of struggle since Tamils took up the Tamil Eelam option, there are a number of influences and vested interests that have intruded between Tamil and Sinhala communities. These included the issue of separatism, international powers and expatriates, selfish political interests and the LTTE usurping Tamil leadership. Operating on their own at various levels, these influences have turned what was essentially a political dialogue into a military confrontation.
To reverse this process, the three riders (international involvement, militarization of society and the LTTE dominance) will have to be turned into productive channels for peace. For achieving this everyone will have to work hard. Both communities must decide to abandon violence as the means of settling issues between them. To do this, entrenched prejudices on both sides need to be set aside. The idea of separatism must be buried by Tamils just as Sinhalas should show in their deeds readiness to consider Tamils as equal partners in building the fractured nation. A dynamic leadership is required to initiate this process. Who else can provide that other than politicians and civil society? They have to rise up to the occasion. They have no other choice. No external power or agency can do this because the process has to have Sri Lankan ownership to succeed
Internationalisation of the issue had contributed to the continuation of the armed conflict to a certain extent. The failure of the peace process 2002 has shown the limitations of the four co-chairs – the European Union, Japan, Norway and the U.S. and their well intentioned effort to end the war. It failed because the two warring sides had their own doubts about the credentials of the foreign powers involved. Moreover, they did not believe the process of negotiated peace would succeed.
Unlike others, India is one external power that could have made a difference. It had been on a listening watch after its unsavoury experience in its earlier spell of active intervention in Sri Lanka. But there are changes taking place in India as well. In Tamil Nadu all the three major political parties – the DMK, the AIADMK, and the Congress – have made clear that while they support the Tamil struggle for equitable powers, they do not consider the LTTE as their sole representative. India should actively work with the Sri Lanka government to trigger the political process. That will be in India’s interest as much as Sri Lanka’s. And Tamil Nadu politicians can stop sloganeering and make a positive contribution for peace by working on the representatives of Tamil constituency and politicians in the island to use the political opportunity meaningfully to arrive at a win-win situation.
Time is a valuable resource in showing visible results. In the past, many political efforts to resolve the Tamil question had floundered when key decisions were delayed or allowed die by procrastination. One of the reasons for the failure of the peace process 2002 was lack of visible results on a time-bound basis. This has only reinforced the suspicion among the aggrieved parties; it also generated a lot of cynicism about the intentions of such peace exercises. A well structured devolution process with clear bench mark of actions on a pre determined time schedule only can bring back trust and security between the Tamil and Sinhala communities.
The LTTE is likely to tap afresh the nearly million-strong Sri Lankan Tamil expatriates through its overseas network for bouncing back as a reckonable force. In its vocabulary, that means growth of its military power sans political content. Failure of a renewed political process would act as an incentive for LTTE’s military revival. That would be a tragedy for all the other stakeholders trying to move away from a military solution to achieve a political resolution of the problem.
Nations with strong LTTE front organisations and large ethnic Tamil populations in their midst like Canada, the U.S., UK, other EU nations, and India must ensure the resurgence of LTTE is halted in its tracks in their soil. Some of the political constituencies in these countries take up any cause for garnering a few more votes; they have ended up recycling the LTTE cause as the Tamil cause. They will have to do some soul searching if they want to do their bid to build peace. Tamil expatriates have a moral responsibility to rise up to the occasion to make peace possible just as they showed they can progress war. That would be a fitting tribute from them to all the souls of many hues martyred in the seemingly never ending conflict.
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cnotes5%5Cnote498.html
Sunday, February 15, 2009
'By continuing a losing war LTTE's achieving nothing'
The Sri Lankan ethnic crisis has simmered and boiled for decades without a solution in sight. As the Lankan army closes in on the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, in what is believed as the final squeeze, human rights activists and others are concerned at the tremendous cost to civilians.
Colonel R Hariharan (retired), a specialist on South Asia military intelligence, served in Sri Lanka as the head of intelligence for the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka between 1987 and 1990, a crucial period in the ethnic conflict.
Col Hariharan joined readers on Rediff Chat on February 5, 2009 to answer their queries on the crisis in Sri Lanka and about India's role in the conflict, if any.
Here's the chat transcript:
jefferson asked: LTTE will be finished off,alright,but does that in anyway give us a strategic advantage in the region?I do not think so,as on any given day srilanka is going to side with pakistan due to their own vote bank politics and china for their deep distrust of India.
Col Hariharan: I do not agree with your views. India-Sri Lanka common networking is far beyond Pakistan-Sri Lanka links. Sri Lanka has signed a free trade agreement with India and the trade is poised to reach $ 4 billion. Nowadays national security involves not only territorial security but economic security as well. So the relationship will flourish when Indian investment goes to northern province.
________________________________________
vijaykumar asked: I feel if LTTE joined hands with TULF and other moderate Tamil organisations, the Sri Lankan would have got the support of India and Sri Lanka cannot antagonise India. Here the LTTE made the biggest blunder by eliminating other Tamil leaders and antagonising India by assassinating Rajiv Gandhi. Now they have no friends in the world except some unemployed politicians from Tamilnadu.
Col Hariharan: I fully agree with you.
________________________________________
senthil asked: Hi Col.Hari, Why did the IPKF behaved more biased and made the atrocities against tamilian in Eelam? Does Indian army has moral values for this action?
Col Hariharan: Wrong. This is mostly propaganda and unfortunately army has no direct way of answering such accusations. Ask this question to politicians who spread this and govern countries. In war there are aberrations and army punishes in courtmartial many people even now in J and K for offences.
________________________________________
ved asked: Jai Hind Sir, Sir is it possible to separate the LTTE and Srilankan Tamils? in a sense, does a Lankan Tamil back the LTTTE? or is it just a self-proclaimed authority for Tamils?
Col Hariharan: It is a fact that the LTTE has killed more Tamil leaders than Sri Lankan authorities or army. Tamils are mortally scared of giving their opinion on LTTE. But at the moment LTTE is the only powerful force that was listened to by the Sri Lanka govt.
________________________________________
neog asked: When the ailing Indian prime minister took time to condemn the bombing of innocent civilians in Gaza, but he's very much comfortable with Indian tamils getting killed every day. This is why people losing their faith in something called India.
Col Hariharan: I partly agree with you. We should condemn killing of Tamils by all including LTTE. And we should also condemn killing of others - Sinhalas and Muslims and Tamils by LTTE. Unfortunately we don't react like that but America does.
________________________________________
vijaykumar asked: Why India is not highlighting the killings of Sri Lankan Tamil leaders by LTTE? In fact it is LTTE not Sri Lankan Government is responsible for total elimination of local Tamil leadership and intelligensia.
Col Hariharan: See my earlier answers on the same issue.
________________________________________
neog asked: We Indians should understand the history of conflict, most of the commentators are not aware of many facts. RAW created LTTE to fight against Srilankan government, till then Tamils were following Gandhian approach. Most of Indians esp. outside Tamilnadu think this is Srilankan problem and Indians should not worry about this. But the fact is Srilankan government never gave citizenship to Indian Tamils in Srilanka and they were treated as second class people. One thing i must praise of Srilanka and Indian government, they both did a commendable job in hiding these facts from the common people. Supporting LTTE and Supporting Tamils in Srilanka are two different things, as a Indian citizen i do not support LTTE, but i feel for the suffering of Indian Tamils there at Srilankan millitary hands. Please refer to wiki and other neutral sources and educate yourself for the sake of humanity. Can Hariharan deny any of these facts??
Col Hariharan: These are your perceptions.Don't call them facts. Don't give super powers to RAW to create LTTE. Prabhakaran started it much before RAW got into picture.
________________________________________
Kumar asked: It is quite ridiculous that the ruling party in TN is trying to impose its will on India's Lanka policy. The latest being asking Lankan military personnel who had come for training at an air base in TN to leave under pressure from politicians in TN. Can the Centre's foreign policy be held hostage to local politics?
Col Hariharan: I think TN govt has shown commendable restraint on the subject. It could be for political reasons; but I feel it can contribute better if it can parley with Tamil leaders in Sri Lanka to evolve a political proposal to solve Tamil issue of devolution.
________________________________________
NS asked: Mr. Hariharan.... do you think Rajiv Gandhi made a mistake in sending the IPKF when SL Govt went back on many peace processes in the past. Our army men laid down their lives for some other country's internal problem. IPKF in end was un-welcomed by both LTTE and SL govt.
Col Hariharan: I think Rajiv was taken in by JR Jayawrdane the then President of Sri Lanka. He was a wily old political fox. And Rajiv was new to politics. I think our troops were sent hastily with no clear political or military mandate.
________________________________________
mpadmam asked: You said that "the LTTE had not bothered to cultivate ties with India." But they tried their best to find a favour with the Indian government. It was the Congress government who after 18 long years of silence wnat to use the Rajiv Ghandi's killing as a excuse to punish the Tamils and side along with the Sinhala Government in Sri-Lanka.
Col Hariharan: You call killing a popular leader of India as an excuse! This is the problem if you deal with the issue thinking that the LTTE is the only saviour. People can decide their own destiny. They should be allowed to do so. Who has been punishing whom? When nations deal with issues they do have selective amnesia. I fear this is affecting your viewpoint.
________________________________________
Mani asked: Recently LTTE website said Next battle would be probably in TN and not in Lanka. Do you see such possibilities?
Col Hariharan: Let the LTTE survive the day and get Tamil Eelam; then we will see.
________________________________________
Ravi asked: Dear Sir, What are the options of suppressed people (in SL) when their non-violence movement is not yielding any results for about 30 years ?.
Col Hariharan: Good question. This is what is bothering me. India and four co-chairs now come hard on Sri Lanka to get the devolution process through. They can do it because they have a big clout. Tamil politicians on both sides of Palk Strait should evolve a viable package and put it up. Instead of that they are fighting among themselves!
________________________________________
jitu asked:If Central Govt comes under pressure from Tamil Nadu, to negotiate with Srilanka for peaceful talks with tiger rebels, won't it be contadictory to its stand in Kashmir?
Col Hariharan: Theoretically yes. But where is Prabhakaran, there is a warrant out for him in two countries!
________________________________________
Ela asked: Srilanka is the only country which does arial attacks towards their own civilians only after Adolf Hitler. It's a known fact that civilians are killed by SL Armed Forces. Why india is providing military assistance to srilanka? why we train Srilankan Forces in India? why we provide huge sum of money to continue war without interest? Why we are doing false propaganda in media? Do you think that a organisation can survive without people support for around 30 years? Leave me, you, and fellow others... Eelam tamils, the ones who suffer supports LTTE what's our problem? why we are interfering their state of affairs?
Col Hariharan answers: I am against use of air force against own citizens. But about India's problems with LTTE - none. Dont expect us to intervene when LTTE is in trouble. We intervene politically only. Dont go gaw gaw over Indian arms, hardly any. Get hold of other guys like Pakistan and China on this.
________________________________________
Hash asked: Sir, Unlike India, don't you think Srilanka has got a free hand in finishing terrorim in its backyard...No human right activists, no UN, no USA and ofcourse no Unruly neighbour like Pakistan?
Col Hariharan: I agree because 32 countries had branded LTTE as terrorist and the US is waging a global war on terror. Sri Lanka President has cleverly used this opening when the world got tired of Sri Lanka-LTTE bickering during the peace process
________________________________________
Shahezadi asked: Sir Vanakkams from this side of the Vindhyas. It has been talked about for long, but can you clarify on the kind of assistance India, through RAW and otherwise, extended the LTTE in those halcyon days?
Col Hariharan: I was in fighting insurgents in Assam those days. You should ask LTTE to honestly acknowledge the assistance they received from RAW. Go thru' Google search, you may get details.
________________________________________
Santosh asked: Col Hariharan people like you why abscond from politics? Why you people think politics is nasty?
Col Hariharan: I was never in politics to abscond. I left it for brilliant guys and not ordinary man like me.
________________________________________
theepan asked: Hello sir , why Brahmin people like you are against Tamil nationalism?
Col Hariharan: Because you have Dravidian colour in what you see.
________________________________________
Roger2009 asked: Dear Sir. What happens after army takes over and completes the sweep in sri lanka. will sri lanka then emerge as a new nation free from all troubles. Will Sri Lanka strengthen ties with India or eat the Chinese loliipop and wage war against India?
Col Hariharan: Thank you for a positive question. I hope it happens; but in the past Sri Lanka politicians never allowed this to happen. I hope they have better sense this time. Otherwise somewhere another Prabhakaran might be born some years from now. No chance any lollipop from China; why should China use Sri Lanka to wage war? They can come directly through the border. I think they have other preoccupations of falling trade to fight with India now.
________________________________________
fgdfgdfg asked: Sir,Are there any lessons learnt from this major fiasco, I call this major fiasco because Tamils who are fighting in Lankan are basically from India.
Col Hariharan: Wrong. You mean fiasco of LTTE? People fighting there are all Sri Lankans.
________________________________________
sanjud asked: What is LTTE please brief in detail
Col Hariharan: You go to Google search and ask. You will get over 1000 pieces on LTTE. Ateast 140 of them are mine.
________________________________________
saun asked: In your article in today's "Hindu", you say "The time has come for the LTTE to give up war" What then happens to the aspirations of the Tamils SL who have obviously been sidelined there? also what is going to be the effect on india vis a vis a refugee crisis that could escalate in TN?
Col Hariharan: By continuing a losing war you are achieving nothing. But if political process takes over you will save a few hundred lives. No refugees are coming at an alarming rate. In any case we have nearly 2 lakhs of them for the last 25 years. A few more will create little problem.
________________________________________
Jk asked: Dear Col, i have been closely following this issue ever since the 80s and am sure our India Army would have made the island free of this trouble had the then govts givena free run to the Indian Peace keeping force.. ur opinion on this pls
Col Hariharan: I partly agree. We need to think through problems and evolve clear political goal. Then only army can succeed. this did not happen.
________________________________________
Ela asked: Hi Hariharan, to my previous question, you said that India intervenes politically, then why we are providing training to their Forces in our land. We don't even condemn SL govt when they kill civilians. Why?
Col Hariharan answers: Sri Lanka is not an enemy country. We should condemn killing of civilians.
________________________________________
hoihoieee asked: Sir let me tell you, whats going to happen if this war goes like this, first off all every one in the LTTE will be shattered and the explosives will be dived with different people and in those case a gorilla war fare will be introduced in the region of LTTE in which a huge loss of human death and a heavy loss of monitory will be there what sreelanka is going to adopt for this crises and i think there is a amicable solution for this if the srilankan govt can give equal rights to every thig same like as sinhalas then there wont be any conflict and the LTTE can form a political party of thir own if the govt is going to supress the LTTE they are going to grow only thats for sure.
Col Hariharan:I wish they follow this advice. LTTE should have taken to politics when it was popular. It would have saved a lot of blood shed. 70000 people dead! 24000 Tamil youth as LTTE cadres! At the end of it families are in wilderness. Its tragic.
________________________________________
tamilveeran asked: What steps are being taken to ensure the well being of displaced citizens?
Col Hariharan: I am sorry so far not enough is being done for them. I think India should take a lead.
________________________________________
Canadian asked: Col. Hariharan, I would like to present an international view point on the situation in Sri Lanka. Whilst it is true that the Tamil were mal-treated by the Sinhalese in Sri Lanka in the 60s and 70s but resorting to any sort of violence or terrorism is wrong in my view point. What I would like to ask you is this, how does an average Sinhali view an average Tamil living in Sri Lanka? Now that the LTTE is on the verge of extinction, at least militarily, does it mean the era of mal-treatment of the Tamils in the 60s and 70s will begin again? I am sorry if the question sounds naive but I have had only so much exposure to this situation. Many thanks A Canadian
Col Hariharan: I agree with you. With my experience of nearly 30 years fighting terrorists and insurgents, I think insurgency is invariably self destructive unless it has a clear political goal that is graded with using power of guns as trade off. Colombo the capital is a majority Tamil city. It elects two Tamil speaking MPs. But the contradiction is none of the policemen in Colombo speak Tamil (though Colombo is trying to remedy the situation they say; it is yet to be seen). In all small towns you find Tamil shops in Sri Lanka. But sense of security and trust between the two communities is not full because 30 years of war is clouding perceptions of generations. Let us hope it changes.
________________________________________
SBA asked: Sri lanka may defeat LTTE. But things will get worse, similar to Iraq, because: 1) LTTE will fight with suicide bombers only. 2) The triumphalistic mood of Sinhalese will overpower any moderate sinhalese overtures to Tamils. Political settlements/ negotiations will be dominated by the hardcore Sinhalese, so they will not succeed.
Col Hariharan: This is the worst case scenario. You have ignored what all the other Tamils everywhere will be doing in this period. I think we should not accept the suppression of moderate elements on both sides.
________________________________________
narendiran asked: Gud day sir, its nice to be here to see your view points. Sir, you might be aware of LTTE suicide squad and till now they have not participated in the current fight? what is yoour startergy if they are unleashed for the war........
Col Hariharan: They are not in such large nos. And the war has brought in tight security measures, so many attempts had failed.
________________________________________
jeffrson asked: Colonel,I do agree that FTA has done a lot good to the bilateral relationship.What is your long term view of the geo-political scenario with reference to emerging/emerged china which is already building a port at hambanbota? and this is the reason for which i expressed my doubts on srilanka.
Col Hariharan: Hambantota can be a potential trouble spot if India and China go to war. But Sri Lanka is so close to India, China can never have supremacy over it in case India decides to put its foot down. I think Sri Lankans know this. So we should watch Hambantota without overplaying
________________________________________
LTTE asked: I am Indian but faith in Tamil, I want to know how peace will come back
Col Hariharan: We have to work towards it. I am like you only.
________________________________________
Suresh asked: Sir, Do you feel any possibility of a comeback for the LTTE??
Col Hariharan: It can come back if Sri Lanka govt does not pay heed to historical Tamil demands. I think Sri Lankans know this.
________________________________________
Real-Jackson asked: It is obvious that the Indian establishment has decided to back the Sinhalese fully. Is there any possible dangers in this? The Tamil Diaspora and a section of TN are clearly not happy at this. Has India planned for all this.
Col Hariharan : Correction. India is backing the elected govt and not a dictatorship body. But I agree India should help Tamils get their just rights. India planned nothing and that is the tragedy.
________________________________________
99ravi asked: Do you think that srilanka government will come clean and pass the necessary amendments alowing equal rights to tamils in lanka.
Col Hariharan: We live on hope; I hope they do.
________________________________________
Ravi Iyer asked: Why can't we (India) use the same method and eliminate Naxals? Though this can be true for ULFA too, I recognize that ULFA operates close to the international border? So we can atlest eliminate the Naxals..
Col Hariharan: We cant use copy cat methods. Each insurgency is unique.But I agree ULFA is fighting dirty. So are Naxals. And we have not decided whether it is a problem of the state or centre.
________________________________________
ravichandra asked,sir, its nice to hear that sirlankan army blocked out almost all hide points of LTTE and still didn't find His chief .. my Question is if he still Alive and if he escape he might be very dangerous and powerful till next decade sir.. its better to catch him live or dead.. and Sirlankans be happy from being Away from this all activity ....
Col Hariharan: I think he is very much there. At least for the time being. It wont be so easy to catch or kill him. He is a wily one who always survives. Let us see what happens...
________________________________________
Col Hariharan: Thank you all for your active participation. It is nice chatting with you. Keep up your interest in our neighbour. That's a healthy way of learning about our own environment.
Courtesy: www.rediff.com February 09, 2009 | 15:06 IST
Colonel R Hariharan (retired), a specialist on South Asia military intelligence, served in Sri Lanka as the head of intelligence for the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka between 1987 and 1990, a crucial period in the ethnic conflict.
Col Hariharan joined readers on Rediff Chat on February 5, 2009 to answer their queries on the crisis in Sri Lanka and about India's role in the conflict, if any.
Here's the chat transcript:
jefferson asked: LTTE will be finished off,alright,but does that in anyway give us a strategic advantage in the region?I do not think so,as on any given day srilanka is going to side with pakistan due to their own vote bank politics and china for their deep distrust of India.
Col Hariharan: I do not agree with your views. India-Sri Lanka common networking is far beyond Pakistan-Sri Lanka links. Sri Lanka has signed a free trade agreement with India and the trade is poised to reach $ 4 billion. Nowadays national security involves not only territorial security but economic security as well. So the relationship will flourish when Indian investment goes to northern province.
________________________________________
vijaykumar asked: I feel if LTTE joined hands with TULF and other moderate Tamil organisations, the Sri Lankan would have got the support of India and Sri Lanka cannot antagonise India. Here the LTTE made the biggest blunder by eliminating other Tamil leaders and antagonising India by assassinating Rajiv Gandhi. Now they have no friends in the world except some unemployed politicians from Tamilnadu.
Col Hariharan: I fully agree with you.
________________________________________
senthil asked: Hi Col.Hari, Why did the IPKF behaved more biased and made the atrocities against tamilian in Eelam? Does Indian army has moral values for this action?
Col Hariharan: Wrong. This is mostly propaganda and unfortunately army has no direct way of answering such accusations. Ask this question to politicians who spread this and govern countries. In war there are aberrations and army punishes in courtmartial many people even now in J and K for offences.
________________________________________
ved asked: Jai Hind Sir, Sir is it possible to separate the LTTE and Srilankan Tamils? in a sense, does a Lankan Tamil back the LTTTE? or is it just a self-proclaimed authority for Tamils?
Col Hariharan: It is a fact that the LTTE has killed more Tamil leaders than Sri Lankan authorities or army. Tamils are mortally scared of giving their opinion on LTTE. But at the moment LTTE is the only powerful force that was listened to by the Sri Lanka govt.
________________________________________
neog asked: When the ailing Indian prime minister took time to condemn the bombing of innocent civilians in Gaza, but he's very much comfortable with Indian tamils getting killed every day. This is why people losing their faith in something called India.
Col Hariharan: I partly agree with you. We should condemn killing of Tamils by all including LTTE. And we should also condemn killing of others - Sinhalas and Muslims and Tamils by LTTE. Unfortunately we don't react like that but America does.
________________________________________
vijaykumar asked: Why India is not highlighting the killings of Sri Lankan Tamil leaders by LTTE? In fact it is LTTE not Sri Lankan Government is responsible for total elimination of local Tamil leadership and intelligensia.
Col Hariharan: See my earlier answers on the same issue.
________________________________________
neog asked: We Indians should understand the history of conflict, most of the commentators are not aware of many facts. RAW created LTTE to fight against Srilankan government, till then Tamils were following Gandhian approach. Most of Indians esp. outside Tamilnadu think this is Srilankan problem and Indians should not worry about this. But the fact is Srilankan government never gave citizenship to Indian Tamils in Srilanka and they were treated as second class people. One thing i must praise of Srilanka and Indian government, they both did a commendable job in hiding these facts from the common people. Supporting LTTE and Supporting Tamils in Srilanka are two different things, as a Indian citizen i do not support LTTE, but i feel for the suffering of Indian Tamils there at Srilankan millitary hands. Please refer to wiki and other neutral sources and educate yourself for the sake of humanity. Can Hariharan deny any of these facts??
Col Hariharan: These are your perceptions.Don't call them facts. Don't give super powers to RAW to create LTTE. Prabhakaran started it much before RAW got into picture.
________________________________________
Kumar asked: It is quite ridiculous that the ruling party in TN is trying to impose its will on India's Lanka policy. The latest being asking Lankan military personnel who had come for training at an air base in TN to leave under pressure from politicians in TN. Can the Centre's foreign policy be held hostage to local politics?
Col Hariharan: I think TN govt has shown commendable restraint on the subject. It could be for political reasons; but I feel it can contribute better if it can parley with Tamil leaders in Sri Lanka to evolve a political proposal to solve Tamil issue of devolution.
________________________________________
NS asked: Mr. Hariharan.... do you think Rajiv Gandhi made a mistake in sending the IPKF when SL Govt went back on many peace processes in the past. Our army men laid down their lives for some other country's internal problem. IPKF in end was un-welcomed by both LTTE and SL govt.
Col Hariharan: I think Rajiv was taken in by JR Jayawrdane the then President of Sri Lanka. He was a wily old political fox. And Rajiv was new to politics. I think our troops were sent hastily with no clear political or military mandate.
________________________________________
mpadmam asked: You said that "the LTTE had not bothered to cultivate ties with India." But they tried their best to find a favour with the Indian government. It was the Congress government who after 18 long years of silence wnat to use the Rajiv Ghandi's killing as a excuse to punish the Tamils and side along with the Sinhala Government in Sri-Lanka.
Col Hariharan: You call killing a popular leader of India as an excuse! This is the problem if you deal with the issue thinking that the LTTE is the only saviour. People can decide their own destiny. They should be allowed to do so. Who has been punishing whom? When nations deal with issues they do have selective amnesia. I fear this is affecting your viewpoint.
________________________________________
Mani asked: Recently LTTE website said Next battle would be probably in TN and not in Lanka. Do you see such possibilities?
Col Hariharan: Let the LTTE survive the day and get Tamil Eelam; then we will see.
________________________________________
Ravi asked: Dear Sir, What are the options of suppressed people (in SL) when their non-violence movement is not yielding any results for about 30 years ?.
Col Hariharan: Good question. This is what is bothering me. India and four co-chairs now come hard on Sri Lanka to get the devolution process through. They can do it because they have a big clout. Tamil politicians on both sides of Palk Strait should evolve a viable package and put it up. Instead of that they are fighting among themselves!
________________________________________
jitu asked:If Central Govt comes under pressure from Tamil Nadu, to negotiate with Srilanka for peaceful talks with tiger rebels, won't it be contadictory to its stand in Kashmir?
Col Hariharan: Theoretically yes. But where is Prabhakaran, there is a warrant out for him in two countries!
________________________________________
Ela asked: Srilanka is the only country which does arial attacks towards their own civilians only after Adolf Hitler. It's a known fact that civilians are killed by SL Armed Forces. Why india is providing military assistance to srilanka? why we train Srilankan Forces in India? why we provide huge sum of money to continue war without interest? Why we are doing false propaganda in media? Do you think that a organisation can survive without people support for around 30 years? Leave me, you, and fellow others... Eelam tamils, the ones who suffer supports LTTE what's our problem? why we are interfering their state of affairs?
Col Hariharan answers: I am against use of air force against own citizens. But about India's problems with LTTE - none. Dont expect us to intervene when LTTE is in trouble. We intervene politically only. Dont go gaw gaw over Indian arms, hardly any. Get hold of other guys like Pakistan and China on this.
________________________________________
Hash asked: Sir, Unlike India, don't you think Srilanka has got a free hand in finishing terrorim in its backyard...No human right activists, no UN, no USA and ofcourse no Unruly neighbour like Pakistan?
Col Hariharan: I agree because 32 countries had branded LTTE as terrorist and the US is waging a global war on terror. Sri Lanka President has cleverly used this opening when the world got tired of Sri Lanka-LTTE bickering during the peace process
________________________________________
Shahezadi asked: Sir Vanakkams from this side of the Vindhyas. It has been talked about for long, but can you clarify on the kind of assistance India, through RAW and otherwise, extended the LTTE in those halcyon days?
Col Hariharan: I was in fighting insurgents in Assam those days. You should ask LTTE to honestly acknowledge the assistance they received from RAW. Go thru' Google search, you may get details.
________________________________________
Santosh asked: Col Hariharan people like you why abscond from politics? Why you people think politics is nasty?
Col Hariharan: I was never in politics to abscond. I left it for brilliant guys and not ordinary man like me.
________________________________________
theepan asked: Hello sir , why Brahmin people like you are against Tamil nationalism?
Col Hariharan: Because you have Dravidian colour in what you see.
________________________________________
Roger2009 asked: Dear Sir. What happens after army takes over and completes the sweep in sri lanka. will sri lanka then emerge as a new nation free from all troubles. Will Sri Lanka strengthen ties with India or eat the Chinese loliipop and wage war against India?
Col Hariharan: Thank you for a positive question. I hope it happens; but in the past Sri Lanka politicians never allowed this to happen. I hope they have better sense this time. Otherwise somewhere another Prabhakaran might be born some years from now. No chance any lollipop from China; why should China use Sri Lanka to wage war? They can come directly through the border. I think they have other preoccupations of falling trade to fight with India now.
________________________________________
fgdfgdfg asked: Sir,Are there any lessons learnt from this major fiasco, I call this major fiasco because Tamils who are fighting in Lankan are basically from India.
Col Hariharan: Wrong. You mean fiasco of LTTE? People fighting there are all Sri Lankans.
________________________________________
sanjud asked: What is LTTE please brief in detail
Col Hariharan: You go to Google search and ask. You will get over 1000 pieces on LTTE. Ateast 140 of them are mine.
________________________________________
saun asked: In your article in today's "Hindu", you say "The time has come for the LTTE to give up war" What then happens to the aspirations of the Tamils SL who have obviously been sidelined there? also what is going to be the effect on india vis a vis a refugee crisis that could escalate in TN?
Col Hariharan: By continuing a losing war you are achieving nothing. But if political process takes over you will save a few hundred lives. No refugees are coming at an alarming rate. In any case we have nearly 2 lakhs of them for the last 25 years. A few more will create little problem.
________________________________________
Jk asked: Dear Col, i have been closely following this issue ever since the 80s and am sure our India Army would have made the island free of this trouble had the then govts givena free run to the Indian Peace keeping force.. ur opinion on this pls
Col Hariharan: I partly agree. We need to think through problems and evolve clear political goal. Then only army can succeed. this did not happen.
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Ela asked: Hi Hariharan, to my previous question, you said that India intervenes politically, then why we are providing training to their Forces in our land. We don't even condemn SL govt when they kill civilians. Why?
Col Hariharan answers: Sri Lanka is not an enemy country. We should condemn killing of civilians.
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hoihoieee asked: Sir let me tell you, whats going to happen if this war goes like this, first off all every one in the LTTE will be shattered and the explosives will be dived with different people and in those case a gorilla war fare will be introduced in the region of LTTE in which a huge loss of human death and a heavy loss of monitory will be there what sreelanka is going to adopt for this crises and i think there is a amicable solution for this if the srilankan govt can give equal rights to every thig same like as sinhalas then there wont be any conflict and the LTTE can form a political party of thir own if the govt is going to supress the LTTE they are going to grow only thats for sure.
Col Hariharan:I wish they follow this advice. LTTE should have taken to politics when it was popular. It would have saved a lot of blood shed. 70000 people dead! 24000 Tamil youth as LTTE cadres! At the end of it families are in wilderness. Its tragic.
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tamilveeran asked: What steps are being taken to ensure the well being of displaced citizens?
Col Hariharan: I am sorry so far not enough is being done for them. I think India should take a lead.
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Canadian asked: Col. Hariharan, I would like to present an international view point on the situation in Sri Lanka. Whilst it is true that the Tamil were mal-treated by the Sinhalese in Sri Lanka in the 60s and 70s but resorting to any sort of violence or terrorism is wrong in my view point. What I would like to ask you is this, how does an average Sinhali view an average Tamil living in Sri Lanka? Now that the LTTE is on the verge of extinction, at least militarily, does it mean the era of mal-treatment of the Tamils in the 60s and 70s will begin again? I am sorry if the question sounds naive but I have had only so much exposure to this situation. Many thanks A Canadian
Col Hariharan: I agree with you. With my experience of nearly 30 years fighting terrorists and insurgents, I think insurgency is invariably self destructive unless it has a clear political goal that is graded with using power of guns as trade off. Colombo the capital is a majority Tamil city. It elects two Tamil speaking MPs. But the contradiction is none of the policemen in Colombo speak Tamil (though Colombo is trying to remedy the situation they say; it is yet to be seen). In all small towns you find Tamil shops in Sri Lanka. But sense of security and trust between the two communities is not full because 30 years of war is clouding perceptions of generations. Let us hope it changes.
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SBA asked: Sri lanka may defeat LTTE. But things will get worse, similar to Iraq, because: 1) LTTE will fight with suicide bombers only. 2) The triumphalistic mood of Sinhalese will overpower any moderate sinhalese overtures to Tamils. Political settlements/ negotiations will be dominated by the hardcore Sinhalese, so they will not succeed.
Col Hariharan: This is the worst case scenario. You have ignored what all the other Tamils everywhere will be doing in this period. I think we should not accept the suppression of moderate elements on both sides.
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narendiran asked: Gud day sir, its nice to be here to see your view points. Sir, you might be aware of LTTE suicide squad and till now they have not participated in the current fight? what is yoour startergy if they are unleashed for the war........
Col Hariharan: They are not in such large nos. And the war has brought in tight security measures, so many attempts had failed.
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jeffrson asked: Colonel,I do agree that FTA has done a lot good to the bilateral relationship.What is your long term view of the geo-political scenario with reference to emerging/emerged china which is already building a port at hambanbota? and this is the reason for which i expressed my doubts on srilanka.
Col Hariharan: Hambantota can be a potential trouble spot if India and China go to war. But Sri Lanka is so close to India, China can never have supremacy over it in case India decides to put its foot down. I think Sri Lankans know this. So we should watch Hambantota without overplaying
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LTTE asked: I am Indian but faith in Tamil, I want to know how peace will come back
Col Hariharan: We have to work towards it. I am like you only.
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Suresh asked: Sir, Do you feel any possibility of a comeback for the LTTE??
Col Hariharan: It can come back if Sri Lanka govt does not pay heed to historical Tamil demands. I think Sri Lankans know this.
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Real-Jackson asked: It is obvious that the Indian establishment has decided to back the Sinhalese fully. Is there any possible dangers in this? The Tamil Diaspora and a section of TN are clearly not happy at this. Has India planned for all this.
Col Hariharan : Correction. India is backing the elected govt and not a dictatorship body. But I agree India should help Tamils get their just rights. India planned nothing and that is the tragedy.
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99ravi asked: Do you think that srilanka government will come clean and pass the necessary amendments alowing equal rights to tamils in lanka.
Col Hariharan: We live on hope; I hope they do.
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Ravi Iyer asked: Why can't we (India) use the same method and eliminate Naxals? Though this can be true for ULFA too, I recognize that ULFA operates close to the international border? So we can atlest eliminate the Naxals..
Col Hariharan: We cant use copy cat methods. Each insurgency is unique.But I agree ULFA is fighting dirty. So are Naxals. And we have not decided whether it is a problem of the state or centre.
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ravichandra asked,sir, its nice to hear that sirlankan army blocked out almost all hide points of LTTE and still didn't find His chief .. my Question is if he still Alive and if he escape he might be very dangerous and powerful till next decade sir.. its better to catch him live or dead.. and Sirlankans be happy from being Away from this all activity ....
Col Hariharan: I think he is very much there. At least for the time being. It wont be so easy to catch or kill him. He is a wily one who always survives. Let us see what happens...
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Col Hariharan: Thank you all for your active participation. It is nice chatting with you. Keep up your interest in our neighbour. That's a healthy way of learning about our own environment.
Courtesy: www.rediff.com February 09, 2009 | 15:06 IST
Crystal Gazing On Sri Lanka
The future of Sri Lanka conflict has raised a lot of global conflict. Here are some questions from a Russian media and my answers to them; they give an over view assessment of the whole situation:
Q1. What is the current state of play in Sri Lanka as you see it? Is peace as far off now as it ever was? Have there been any achievements in the last 30 years?
A: Complete peace will come back to the island nation only when Tamil speaking minority and majority Sinhalas trust each other and feel secure with each others rule. This requires a long healing process. Even after the military defeat of LTTE it will continue to simmer in provoking guerrilla struggle. But despite this if the govt introduces devolution of powers to Tamils in progressive stages the healing process will begin and take about 5 years. But there are political forces against the process on both sides who could be obstacles to this process.
Other takes:
1. It shows that unless is India involved in the mediation process, international community can achieve little to ease the conflict situation.
2. In the lat 30 years of struggle Tamil people have impressed upon the world the righteousness of their cause; this has made the world and the Sinhala people examine the issue more positively.
3. It has also proved the limitations of armed struggle in achieving aims on both sides;
Q2. Militarily speaking, what do you envisage is the next move for both the government forces and the LTTE?
A: Govt has raised a huge military disproportionate to Sri Lanka's size. There is an element of militarism that is disturbing as it represents rightwing Sinhala nationalism rather than Sri Lankan nationalism. Army has become a power to reckon with in Sri Lanka so like Pakistan it can perpetuate its importance. By current indications I expect an army detachment in every major Tamil concentration to openly or discreetly keep an eye on Tamils so that they dont go back to take up arms. This is bad for restoring confidence in govt among Tamils that it would not treat them as 2nd class citizens which they feel it does. Govt needs to take Tamils into confidence progressively and withdraw armed forces back to their barracks. As far as the LTTE is concerned its initial worry would be to survive; it may seek shelter in neighbouring India which is a risk for the latter. It will recoup its global assets to build its organisation afresh. This will definitely happen if Prabhakaran survives the dragnet thrown to catch him. I think he is too uncanny to get caught so easily.
Q3. Considering the LTTE now find themselves limited to less than 200 sq km of land area in Mullaittivu will their attacks get more desperate and vicious?
A: Already its attacks are desperate. Otherwise when the end is so close why lose more people? They had always been vicious because they have a militant mindset without political nuances in their conduct. It cannot change now because Prabhakaran will not.
Q3. How much international goodwill is there for the LTTE or indeed the government - especially in India?
A: We should not confuse Tamil Nadu with India. Likewise let us not confuse sympathy for Tamil cause with LTTE. But right now Tamil Nadu wields considerable clout with govt in Delhi for reasons of coalition. But it will not always be so. It will clear up after the results of next election in Apr '09 and the type of coalition govt formed in Delhi. Indians as a whole, probably 60%, are sympathetic to the Tamil cause. Others are indifferent probably. This is a ball park figure based on feedbacks I get.And it may not be correct. LTTE is admired for carrying on their fight for so many years successfully but admiration is not sympathy in a crisis situation for LTTE. So overall at least 80 % inn India will be hostile to LTTE as there is an attitudinal change to terrorism after Jihadi strikes. This compunded their disgust at LTTE after Rajiv Gandhi killing.
Q4. Do you think the recent suicide bomb attack marks a new period where we will see more assaults like this? If so, how can the govt act without losing any international support?
It is an act of desperation; I expect such attacks not here but elsewhere after LTTE lies low for a few more months. Govt should develop patience. Use of artillery to return fire will be counter productive as it causes casualties. They will have to nibble into terrirtory little by little before sending in commandos to finish off embedded LTTE elements. I think army is probably thinking on these lines. LTTE cannot hold on forever.
Q5. How effective do you think the Sri Lanka military's new safety zone for civilians will be?
A:Depends upon what the safety zone gives the people who take refuge there. If safety is there then that means both sides are adhering to rules of the game. But I am not optimistic. Because LTTE will break any positive move by international community to rein in its activity; already Sri Lankans are resisting it.
Q6. The Sri Lankan army commander Lt Gen Sarath Fonseka has claimed that 95 percent of the LTTE is 'finished' is he right?
A:Probably 85% of conventional capacity of LTTE is finished. It is only my guesswork; I hope he is in a better position to assess but I am not too sure. But leadership down to subunit level and Prabhakaran must be eliminated to really 'finish' LTTE. Probably the army commander knows this.
Q7. How do you envisage the situation unfolding the the next days and weeks?
A: The current impasse will carry on for a couple of weeks when both sides run out goodwill and LTTE finishes its reserves of ammo and food. Civilians will continue to trickle out and LTTE would grudgingly allow it causing some casualties now and then just the army would. International community will continue to do what it does best - make a lot of noise. India will simmer. If Prabhakaran quits the scene, LTTE enthusiasm may wane.
Q8. Why is it the western media have largely ignored this conflict?
Basically because it has no interest in any conflict unless Westerners are getting killed or their troops are doing the killing. Who cares any more if only Africans kill their own kind? Look at Darfur. You will understand. Of course Palestine conflict is an exception to this thanks to Jihadi terrorism's sins and Israel's successful selling of the conflict for its "survival" in the West.
February 13, 2009 www.southasiaanalysis.org
Q1. What is the current state of play in Sri Lanka as you see it? Is peace as far off now as it ever was? Have there been any achievements in the last 30 years?
A: Complete peace will come back to the island nation only when Tamil speaking minority and majority Sinhalas trust each other and feel secure with each others rule. This requires a long healing process. Even after the military defeat of LTTE it will continue to simmer in provoking guerrilla struggle. But despite this if the govt introduces devolution of powers to Tamils in progressive stages the healing process will begin and take about 5 years. But there are political forces against the process on both sides who could be obstacles to this process.
Other takes:
1. It shows that unless is India involved in the mediation process, international community can achieve little to ease the conflict situation.
2. In the lat 30 years of struggle Tamil people have impressed upon the world the righteousness of their cause; this has made the world and the Sinhala people examine the issue more positively.
3. It has also proved the limitations of armed struggle in achieving aims on both sides;
Q2. Militarily speaking, what do you envisage is the next move for both the government forces and the LTTE?
A: Govt has raised a huge military disproportionate to Sri Lanka's size. There is an element of militarism that is disturbing as it represents rightwing Sinhala nationalism rather than Sri Lankan nationalism. Army has become a power to reckon with in Sri Lanka so like Pakistan it can perpetuate its importance. By current indications I expect an army detachment in every major Tamil concentration to openly or discreetly keep an eye on Tamils so that they dont go back to take up arms. This is bad for restoring confidence in govt among Tamils that it would not treat them as 2nd class citizens which they feel it does. Govt needs to take Tamils into confidence progressively and withdraw armed forces back to their barracks. As far as the LTTE is concerned its initial worry would be to survive; it may seek shelter in neighbouring India which is a risk for the latter. It will recoup its global assets to build its organisation afresh. This will definitely happen if Prabhakaran survives the dragnet thrown to catch him. I think he is too uncanny to get caught so easily.
Q3. Considering the LTTE now find themselves limited to less than 200 sq km of land area in Mullaittivu will their attacks get more desperate and vicious?
A: Already its attacks are desperate. Otherwise when the end is so close why lose more people? They had always been vicious because they have a militant mindset without political nuances in their conduct. It cannot change now because Prabhakaran will not.
Q3. How much international goodwill is there for the LTTE or indeed the government - especially in India?
A: We should not confuse Tamil Nadu with India. Likewise let us not confuse sympathy for Tamil cause with LTTE. But right now Tamil Nadu wields considerable clout with govt in Delhi for reasons of coalition. But it will not always be so. It will clear up after the results of next election in Apr '09 and the type of coalition govt formed in Delhi. Indians as a whole, probably 60%, are sympathetic to the Tamil cause. Others are indifferent probably. This is a ball park figure based on feedbacks I get.And it may not be correct. LTTE is admired for carrying on their fight for so many years successfully but admiration is not sympathy in a crisis situation for LTTE. So overall at least 80 % inn India will be hostile to LTTE as there is an attitudinal change to terrorism after Jihadi strikes. This compunded their disgust at LTTE after Rajiv Gandhi killing.
Q4. Do you think the recent suicide bomb attack marks a new period where we will see more assaults like this? If so, how can the govt act without losing any international support?
It is an act of desperation; I expect such attacks not here but elsewhere after LTTE lies low for a few more months. Govt should develop patience. Use of artillery to return fire will be counter productive as it causes casualties. They will have to nibble into terrirtory little by little before sending in commandos to finish off embedded LTTE elements. I think army is probably thinking on these lines. LTTE cannot hold on forever.
Q5. How effective do you think the Sri Lanka military's new safety zone for civilians will be?
A:Depends upon what the safety zone gives the people who take refuge there. If safety is there then that means both sides are adhering to rules of the game. But I am not optimistic. Because LTTE will break any positive move by international community to rein in its activity; already Sri Lankans are resisting it.
Q6. The Sri Lankan army commander Lt Gen Sarath Fonseka has claimed that 95 percent of the LTTE is 'finished' is he right?
A:Probably 85% of conventional capacity of LTTE is finished. It is only my guesswork; I hope he is in a better position to assess but I am not too sure. But leadership down to subunit level and Prabhakaran must be eliminated to really 'finish' LTTE. Probably the army commander knows this.
Q7. How do you envisage the situation unfolding the the next days and weeks?
A: The current impasse will carry on for a couple of weeks when both sides run out goodwill and LTTE finishes its reserves of ammo and food. Civilians will continue to trickle out and LTTE would grudgingly allow it causing some casualties now and then just the army would. International community will continue to do what it does best - make a lot of noise. India will simmer. If Prabhakaran quits the scene, LTTE enthusiasm may wane.
Q8. Why is it the western media have largely ignored this conflict?
Basically because it has no interest in any conflict unless Westerners are getting killed or their troops are doing the killing. Who cares any more if only Africans kill their own kind? Look at Darfur. You will understand. Of course Palestine conflict is an exception to this thanks to Jihadi terrorism's sins and Israel's successful selling of the conflict for its "survival" in the West.
February 13, 2009 www.southasiaanalysis.org
Sunday, February 8, 2009
Human rights are basic to good governance - Col. R. Hariharan
By Nilantha Ilangamuwa, Sri Lanka Guardian
February 07, 2009:
Are you optimistic about progress of the Sri Lankan Security Forces approach to wiping out the Tamil Tigers?
Yes; as of now the Sri Lanka security forces are poised to finish off the military capability of the LTTE. They will do it in the coming days it seems. When we are dealing with non state actors - insurgents and terrorists - the terms "wiping out" has little meaning because a single suicide bomber in the wrong place at the right time can wipe out a leader as happened to President Premadasa or Rajiv Gandhi and that can cause immense changes. So I would not call LTTE's defeat as "wiping out" but military defeat.
There are many reasons for the present success against the LTTE but President Rajapaksa's single minded pursuit of the goal of "finishing off" the LTTE (regardless of the cost, national and international contrarian views, and other negative aspects of war) is the most important one.
The other important factor is Prabhakaran losing touch with the changed world attitude towards terrorist bodies. Now, after 8 years of 9/11, the world is making it more and more difficult for terrorist bodies to operate globally freely as they used to. Look at Pakistan and see the high price it is paying now for nurturing the Taliban. Prabhakaran did not factor this though Anton Balasingham probably understood this when he sold the idea of joining the Oslo peace process to the LTTE. After his death Prabhakaran probably lost even the little touch he had with the world as understood everywhere else.
The 3rd factor was Prabhakaran's fall out with Karuna. Karuna's exit from the LTTE and its important contribution to Sri Lanka's success is not given the credit it deserves. Strategically it freed the army from the burden of the east after the LTTE was swept out, while closing the recruiting base of the LTTE. It also split the Tamil ranks.
Lastly, the armed forces deserve full credit for fighting a well planned operation with effective military leadership and the coordination of the navy and air force which also rose to the occasion. It was a professional job. However, as we have limited information at this stage I don't know how much the victory cost the armed forces and the nation. But that does not diminish their successes.
What in your opinion are the root causes of this very complicated and chronic war? The conflict in Sri Lanka is now internationalised. What is your assessment on this horrible problem and its root causes and its future?
In all wars root causes are of non-military in origin. Sri Lanka is no exception. In Sri Lanka you are not fighting with an external enemy but a segment of your own population. It became internationalised because the national polity could not cope with it politically when the opportunity was there. And it got out of hand.
"But I am not so sure even now I was wrong. The LTTE has an elephantine memory. Is Karuna sure that a man with a loaded gun is not roaming around even now to wreak vengeance on him for his sins of parting with Prabhakaran? I am sure he is not; you can ask him. He will agree with me."
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In the closely, globally networked environment of the present days, no conflict - whether local or international - is going to go unreported. So in a way there are going to be no more national wars anymore because there is a huge international lobby for preserving the basic rights of every man - even if he is a murderer or a terrorist. Nations have to be prepared for this changing dynamics of war. On the plus side it has the advantage of drawing international support for a national war effort as President Rajapaksa has done.
But the turning point was the disenchantment of the Tamil population with Sri Lanka's leadership after the Black July riots. That ended their feeling of security and trust in the Sri Lankan state. Even now I wonder whether it is fully restored because too much blood has been shed on both sides.
The LTTE emerged as a powerful force because it cashed in on the failure of the TULF and the Sri Lankan State to resolve Tamil grievances politically. It provided use of force as the only alternative answer to achieve results. And for the next 30 years internal political differences in Sri Lanka hobbled the State from taking decisive political action to remove Tamil grievances. Similarly military action against the LTTE was in fits and starts. That was at the root of survival of LTTE.
Even now I am not too sure how speedily the Sri Lankn State is going to address the Tamil issue. Like most Sri Lankan Tamils (though I am not one) my level of optimism on this count is around 40 per cent only. I know this will offend many of your readers. But it can be turned to 60 per cent if the 13th Amendment is implemented in letter and spirit. It will go further to 75 percent if the APRC is allowed to present its unbiased recommendations and if they are implemented.
Sounds unreasonable? No; that is because political solutions are not as neat as military ones. There are a lot of grey areas that cloud them. And both sides have to make sacrifices as much in a political solution as in a military solution. But politicians are generally reluctant to make sacrifices. But I live on hope.
You were the head of intelligence on Sri Lanka, when the Indian Peace Keep Force was active in the Island nation, cracking down on the Tamil Tigers. The IPKF suffered around 1,255 killed in action and several thousand wounded; LTTE casualties are not known reliably. I know you have spoken and written so many times about that era and its strategies, and on countering, losing and winning against the Tigers. I would be happy if you can compare the past situation under the IPKF with the present situation under the Sri Lankan Forces.
I think the two situations should not be compared. Both are unique in their own way.
1. The IPKF was fighting with a half-baked mandate in a foreign nation - I am still not clear what its mandate was. So ours was not a national commitment but a political one reduced to a military responsibility; after all the country was not ours. We were operating in a Sri Lanka where both Sinhalese and Tamils were suspicious of us because their dreams and our reality were different. The change in national leadership in both countries created problems for the army both at home and abroad. We could not fulfil even our half-understood mandate because politicians in both countries did not want us to do it. All these things do not happen within your own country though politicians will always have their own agenda but we are accustomed to dealing with them.
2. The LTTE then was learning conventional operations then but probably it is so fit now that it can teach others. It now has had both air and naval wings though the air wing was rudimentary. This showed the way it was thinking ahead of waging war always. Its international supply and support structure was now fully in place, as it could not depend upon India even for reliable covert supplies after it murdered Rajiv Gandhi. It was the unfinished job of the IPKF that opened up the world for LTTE's dream of building a conventional army. It was indirectly underwritten because the Tamil diaspora was terribly disappointed with India. (Even now they send me more hate mails than Sri Lankans from Sri Lanka!)
3. Our warfare was more restrictive. We did not use artillery and airpower (except gunships which were mostly used in Vanni; we had very few of them). We did not get any support from Tamil Nadu where the ruling party ensured that the pro-LTTE elements got the maximum leeway from our action. This was bad for the morale of troops.
I can keep on adding. But in the 20 years since we went there, warfare has become more deadly on both sides. That is the bottom line. I am glad I retired. Otherwise I might not have been here.
If the LTTE hadn't assassinated your friendly and young Leader on your own soil, do you think India would never have turned against the Tamil Tigers?
In Tamil there is a proverb; "Aththaikku meesai mulaithaal sithappa". In English it would be "If the aunt grows a moustache she would be uncle." Your question is like that. In India and Sri Lanka so many things have changed in the last 20 years. Tami Nadu is more global than local after the IT revolution. India has no more a soft spot for Moscow as in the Cold War period. The US is its strategic ally now. Both India and Sri Lanka are closer in relations than ever before. So we should not attach too much importance to Rajiv's death in India's deciding its Sri Lanka policy. But it did affect India's perceptions of the LTTE that had gone sour after the 1987 war. It closed the official door for it. If it had not happened perhaps India would have joined the co-chairs when the Oslo peace process 2002 came into being. That's what I feel.
You have given six points in 2004 of Karuna Amman and his newly built movement against the Tamil Tigers. According to your assessment in 2004, "Politically Karuna appears to be in a no-win situation. With so many issues loaded against him, can Karuna emerge victorious? Politics is the art of the possible; so the story may not end here. In Karuna's case he has started with the end move; he has to leave the gun to take to the political rostrum. But he cannot do that as long as the LTTE's threat to his person exists." But today Karuna has become a Member of Parliament through the Government. Actually I think he has won. But what do you think of his political career and his future?
But I am not so sure even now that I was wrong. The LTTE has an elephantine memory. Is Karuna sure that a man with a loaded gun is not roaming around even now to wreak vengence on him for his sin of parting with Prabhakaran? I am sure he is not; you can ask him. He will agree with me. After all for lesser sins people like Amirthalingam and Neelan were done to death by the LTTE. Probably that is why Karuna hopes to join the SLFP; that would at least minimise the risk of meeting an infiltrator from the LTTE among the TMVP cadres.
About his politics, my answer is simple. I don't know. But as I said then, politics is the art of the possible. If he can do good as an MP I am sure he can establish himself politically. Let us give him some peaceful time before he does that. He is making the difficult journey into the political field which is no less dangerous than a military mine field. And in Sri Lanka in both fields people die.
Norway, Japan, USA and EU have asked the Tigers and the government of Sri Lanka to negotiate terms for the LTTE's capitulation. At the same time, the four countries are determined that the government in Colombo must demonstrate that it can respect its international human rights obligations and give international representatives unimpeded access to inspect camps where Tamils are held in custody or under supervision. But the GoSL rejected the truce with the Tigers and also at the same time the Tigers didn't give any comment on their laying down arms. In this context what is the responsibility of the International Community on the Lankan issue?
Human rights are basic to good governance. It is essential for the State to demonstrate to its citizens that it gives them these rights that are denied by totalitarian organisations like the LTTE. Each state has to make its decision on this, not because others have a better or worse record, but because it has to make a difference to win the war against insurgents. And so Sri Lanka has no choice on this if it truly wants to win the war. It does not matter that the US has Guantanamo Bay, and Israel uses cluster bombs on Palestine refugees. Sri Lanka is not their country; Sri Lanka is yours.
International responsibility is a nebulous thing. It is elusive. Look at the Palestine problem. The least they can do is to ensure that the LTTE does not flourish on their soil while helping Sri Lanka's polity to ensure that the Tamil issue is resolved amicably and quickly. They should use non-military leverage that nations use in such situations. Otherwise again there will be the growth of a second generation insurgency that nobody including the international community wants.
In the meantime the Tamil National alliance has said to the Tokyo Co-chairs who called on the Tamil Tigers to lay down their arms and surrender to the Sri Lankan government, that ithas been the firm and consistent position of the Tamil people that the island of Sri Lanka is inhabited by the Tamil nation and the Sinhala nation. What do you think of the TNA's concept of two nations within one country? Do not forget that the TNA MPs are paid and maintained by the Sri Lankan Government, and when they take oath they promise to protect and uphold the constitution of the Sri Lanka.
I don't think even the TNA takes all this rhetoric seriously. My suggestion to them is to cut off their umbilical cord to the LTTE quickly and work out a political package that is realistic in the present context and sell it to the APRC, President Rajapaksa and if need be India (I don't know whether India would bet on them; they did that in 1987 and got burnt). Otherwise they will be sidelined by the Tamil people. I am not too sure that it has not happened already. Except for a few of them most TNA leaders are not to be seen in parliament so what is all this talk about the oath and so on.
At the end of the War, the post War situation in Sri Lanka will be as important a period as the present situation in the country. Nowhere in the World can we see an easy "mission totally accomplished" end in guerrilla warfare. A good example is eastern Sri Lanka which the Government declared liberated many months ago, but there are still some serious military incidents happening there. According to your reading, how does Sri Lanka totally accomplish mission over the civil war?
First don't promise too much to the public. I think patience is a Buddhist virtue. But that does not mean the government should take its own time. I think the most important thing is for Tamil people everywhere to feel secure. So if you have an army garrisons in every town in the North and the East for the next 5 years, your mission is going to be dismantled invisibly in the minds of people. People must be involved in development plans and restoration of normal life. That means local governments must become operational. Accessibility to government benefits must be without discrimination. Government should learn to talk Tamil. There is a Tamil description for Lord Murugan: "Thamizhil waidharyum Vazhthuvan," meaning the God is supposed to bless even those who abuse him in Tamil. That is the power of this language over its people. (Probably it is the same for the Sinhalese people; but I don't know Sinhalese; but I can imagine.)
If you carry out military operations while the visible results of peace gradually come up, people will help you to win the war against the insurgency. This is what we have seen in the Punjab and Mizoram. And this is what we have to do in Kashmir I have no doubt. So that is what Sri Lanka should do if it wants to prevent a resurgence of the LTTE; not by occupying HSZ forever (we are vacating our own version of HSZ in Kashmir now).
People should feel they are better off after the war than before. It is as simple and as complex as that depending upon how you want to go about it. In the East the more difficult option is being adopted. I hope they change it.
Courtesy: www.srilankaguardian.org
February 07, 2009:
Are you optimistic about progress of the Sri Lankan Security Forces approach to wiping out the Tamil Tigers?
Yes; as of now the Sri Lanka security forces are poised to finish off the military capability of the LTTE. They will do it in the coming days it seems. When we are dealing with non state actors - insurgents and terrorists - the terms "wiping out" has little meaning because a single suicide bomber in the wrong place at the right time can wipe out a leader as happened to President Premadasa or Rajiv Gandhi and that can cause immense changes. So I would not call LTTE's defeat as "wiping out" but military defeat.
There are many reasons for the present success against the LTTE but President Rajapaksa's single minded pursuit of the goal of "finishing off" the LTTE (regardless of the cost, national and international contrarian views, and other negative aspects of war) is the most important one.
The other important factor is Prabhakaran losing touch with the changed world attitude towards terrorist bodies. Now, after 8 years of 9/11, the world is making it more and more difficult for terrorist bodies to operate globally freely as they used to. Look at Pakistan and see the high price it is paying now for nurturing the Taliban. Prabhakaran did not factor this though Anton Balasingham probably understood this when he sold the idea of joining the Oslo peace process to the LTTE. After his death Prabhakaran probably lost even the little touch he had with the world as understood everywhere else.
The 3rd factor was Prabhakaran's fall out with Karuna. Karuna's exit from the LTTE and its important contribution to Sri Lanka's success is not given the credit it deserves. Strategically it freed the army from the burden of the east after the LTTE was swept out, while closing the recruiting base of the LTTE. It also split the Tamil ranks.
Lastly, the armed forces deserve full credit for fighting a well planned operation with effective military leadership and the coordination of the navy and air force which also rose to the occasion. It was a professional job. However, as we have limited information at this stage I don't know how much the victory cost the armed forces and the nation. But that does not diminish their successes.
What in your opinion are the root causes of this very complicated and chronic war? The conflict in Sri Lanka is now internationalised. What is your assessment on this horrible problem and its root causes and its future?
In all wars root causes are of non-military in origin. Sri Lanka is no exception. In Sri Lanka you are not fighting with an external enemy but a segment of your own population. It became internationalised because the national polity could not cope with it politically when the opportunity was there. And it got out of hand.
"But I am not so sure even now I was wrong. The LTTE has an elephantine memory. Is Karuna sure that a man with a loaded gun is not roaming around even now to wreak vengeance on him for his sins of parting with Prabhakaran? I am sure he is not; you can ask him. He will agree with me."
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In the closely, globally networked environment of the present days, no conflict - whether local or international - is going to go unreported. So in a way there are going to be no more national wars anymore because there is a huge international lobby for preserving the basic rights of every man - even if he is a murderer or a terrorist. Nations have to be prepared for this changing dynamics of war. On the plus side it has the advantage of drawing international support for a national war effort as President Rajapaksa has done.
But the turning point was the disenchantment of the Tamil population with Sri Lanka's leadership after the Black July riots. That ended their feeling of security and trust in the Sri Lankan state. Even now I wonder whether it is fully restored because too much blood has been shed on both sides.
The LTTE emerged as a powerful force because it cashed in on the failure of the TULF and the Sri Lankan State to resolve Tamil grievances politically. It provided use of force as the only alternative answer to achieve results. And for the next 30 years internal political differences in Sri Lanka hobbled the State from taking decisive political action to remove Tamil grievances. Similarly military action against the LTTE was in fits and starts. That was at the root of survival of LTTE.
Even now I am not too sure how speedily the Sri Lankn State is going to address the Tamil issue. Like most Sri Lankan Tamils (though I am not one) my level of optimism on this count is around 40 per cent only. I know this will offend many of your readers. But it can be turned to 60 per cent if the 13th Amendment is implemented in letter and spirit. It will go further to 75 percent if the APRC is allowed to present its unbiased recommendations and if they are implemented.
Sounds unreasonable? No; that is because political solutions are not as neat as military ones. There are a lot of grey areas that cloud them. And both sides have to make sacrifices as much in a political solution as in a military solution. But politicians are generally reluctant to make sacrifices. But I live on hope.
You were the head of intelligence on Sri Lanka, when the Indian Peace Keep Force was active in the Island nation, cracking down on the Tamil Tigers. The IPKF suffered around 1,255 killed in action and several thousand wounded; LTTE casualties are not known reliably. I know you have spoken and written so many times about that era and its strategies, and on countering, losing and winning against the Tigers. I would be happy if you can compare the past situation under the IPKF with the present situation under the Sri Lankan Forces.
I think the two situations should not be compared. Both are unique in their own way.
1. The IPKF was fighting with a half-baked mandate in a foreign nation - I am still not clear what its mandate was. So ours was not a national commitment but a political one reduced to a military responsibility; after all the country was not ours. We were operating in a Sri Lanka where both Sinhalese and Tamils were suspicious of us because their dreams and our reality were different. The change in national leadership in both countries created problems for the army both at home and abroad. We could not fulfil even our half-understood mandate because politicians in both countries did not want us to do it. All these things do not happen within your own country though politicians will always have their own agenda but we are accustomed to dealing with them.
2. The LTTE then was learning conventional operations then but probably it is so fit now that it can teach others. It now has had both air and naval wings though the air wing was rudimentary. This showed the way it was thinking ahead of waging war always. Its international supply and support structure was now fully in place, as it could not depend upon India even for reliable covert supplies after it murdered Rajiv Gandhi. It was the unfinished job of the IPKF that opened up the world for LTTE's dream of building a conventional army. It was indirectly underwritten because the Tamil diaspora was terribly disappointed with India. (Even now they send me more hate mails than Sri Lankans from Sri Lanka!)
3. Our warfare was more restrictive. We did not use artillery and airpower (except gunships which were mostly used in Vanni; we had very few of them). We did not get any support from Tamil Nadu where the ruling party ensured that the pro-LTTE elements got the maximum leeway from our action. This was bad for the morale of troops.
I can keep on adding. But in the 20 years since we went there, warfare has become more deadly on both sides. That is the bottom line. I am glad I retired. Otherwise I might not have been here.
If the LTTE hadn't assassinated your friendly and young Leader on your own soil, do you think India would never have turned against the Tamil Tigers?
In Tamil there is a proverb; "Aththaikku meesai mulaithaal sithappa". In English it would be "If the aunt grows a moustache she would be uncle." Your question is like that. In India and Sri Lanka so many things have changed in the last 20 years. Tami Nadu is more global than local after the IT revolution. India has no more a soft spot for Moscow as in the Cold War period. The US is its strategic ally now. Both India and Sri Lanka are closer in relations than ever before. So we should not attach too much importance to Rajiv's death in India's deciding its Sri Lanka policy. But it did affect India's perceptions of the LTTE that had gone sour after the 1987 war. It closed the official door for it. If it had not happened perhaps India would have joined the co-chairs when the Oslo peace process 2002 came into being. That's what I feel.
You have given six points in 2004 of Karuna Amman and his newly built movement against the Tamil Tigers. According to your assessment in 2004, "Politically Karuna appears to be in a no-win situation. With so many issues loaded against him, can Karuna emerge victorious? Politics is the art of the possible; so the story may not end here. In Karuna's case he has started with the end move; he has to leave the gun to take to the political rostrum. But he cannot do that as long as the LTTE's threat to his person exists." But today Karuna has become a Member of Parliament through the Government. Actually I think he has won. But what do you think of his political career and his future?
But I am not so sure even now that I was wrong. The LTTE has an elephantine memory. Is Karuna sure that a man with a loaded gun is not roaming around even now to wreak vengence on him for his sin of parting with Prabhakaran? I am sure he is not; you can ask him. He will agree with me. After all for lesser sins people like Amirthalingam and Neelan were done to death by the LTTE. Probably that is why Karuna hopes to join the SLFP; that would at least minimise the risk of meeting an infiltrator from the LTTE among the TMVP cadres.
About his politics, my answer is simple. I don't know. But as I said then, politics is the art of the possible. If he can do good as an MP I am sure he can establish himself politically. Let us give him some peaceful time before he does that. He is making the difficult journey into the political field which is no less dangerous than a military mine field. And in Sri Lanka in both fields people die.
Norway, Japan, USA and EU have asked the Tigers and the government of Sri Lanka to negotiate terms for the LTTE's capitulation. At the same time, the four countries are determined that the government in Colombo must demonstrate that it can respect its international human rights obligations and give international representatives unimpeded access to inspect camps where Tamils are held in custody or under supervision. But the GoSL rejected the truce with the Tigers and also at the same time the Tigers didn't give any comment on their laying down arms. In this context what is the responsibility of the International Community on the Lankan issue?
Human rights are basic to good governance. It is essential for the State to demonstrate to its citizens that it gives them these rights that are denied by totalitarian organisations like the LTTE. Each state has to make its decision on this, not because others have a better or worse record, but because it has to make a difference to win the war against insurgents. And so Sri Lanka has no choice on this if it truly wants to win the war. It does not matter that the US has Guantanamo Bay, and Israel uses cluster bombs on Palestine refugees. Sri Lanka is not their country; Sri Lanka is yours.
International responsibility is a nebulous thing. It is elusive. Look at the Palestine problem. The least they can do is to ensure that the LTTE does not flourish on their soil while helping Sri Lanka's polity to ensure that the Tamil issue is resolved amicably and quickly. They should use non-military leverage that nations use in such situations. Otherwise again there will be the growth of a second generation insurgency that nobody including the international community wants.
In the meantime the Tamil National alliance has said to the Tokyo Co-chairs who called on the Tamil Tigers to lay down their arms and surrender to the Sri Lankan government, that ithas been the firm and consistent position of the Tamil people that the island of Sri Lanka is inhabited by the Tamil nation and the Sinhala nation. What do you think of the TNA's concept of two nations within one country? Do not forget that the TNA MPs are paid and maintained by the Sri Lankan Government, and when they take oath they promise to protect and uphold the constitution of the Sri Lanka.
I don't think even the TNA takes all this rhetoric seriously. My suggestion to them is to cut off their umbilical cord to the LTTE quickly and work out a political package that is realistic in the present context and sell it to the APRC, President Rajapaksa and if need be India (I don't know whether India would bet on them; they did that in 1987 and got burnt). Otherwise they will be sidelined by the Tamil people. I am not too sure that it has not happened already. Except for a few of them most TNA leaders are not to be seen in parliament so what is all this talk about the oath and so on.
At the end of the War, the post War situation in Sri Lanka will be as important a period as the present situation in the country. Nowhere in the World can we see an easy "mission totally accomplished" end in guerrilla warfare. A good example is eastern Sri Lanka which the Government declared liberated many months ago, but there are still some serious military incidents happening there. According to your reading, how does Sri Lanka totally accomplish mission over the civil war?
First don't promise too much to the public. I think patience is a Buddhist virtue. But that does not mean the government should take its own time. I think the most important thing is for Tamil people everywhere to feel secure. So if you have an army garrisons in every town in the North and the East for the next 5 years, your mission is going to be dismantled invisibly in the minds of people. People must be involved in development plans and restoration of normal life. That means local governments must become operational. Accessibility to government benefits must be without discrimination. Government should learn to talk Tamil. There is a Tamil description for Lord Murugan: "Thamizhil waidharyum Vazhthuvan," meaning the God is supposed to bless even those who abuse him in Tamil. That is the power of this language over its people. (Probably it is the same for the Sinhalese people; but I don't know Sinhalese; but I can imagine.)
If you carry out military operations while the visible results of peace gradually come up, people will help you to win the war against the insurgency. This is what we have seen in the Punjab and Mizoram. And this is what we have to do in Kashmir I have no doubt. So that is what Sri Lanka should do if it wants to prevent a resurgence of the LTTE; not by occupying HSZ forever (we are vacating our own version of HSZ in Kashmir now).
People should feel they are better off after the war than before. It is as simple and as complex as that depending upon how you want to go about it. In the East the more difficult option is being adopted. I hope they change it.
Courtesy: www.srilankaguardian.org
Thursday, February 5, 2009
Red tape binds Natioal Security through inaction
We should thank The Pioneer newspaper for bringing to the focus an issue accepted as unavoidable in defence procurement. Its editorial “Defence Compromised” in its issue dated February 5, 2009 how mindless red tape bound bureaucracy is compromising our national defence priorities.
It is fashionable for many of the vocal do-gooders on the TV chats to say that we are wasting money too much money in defence procurement that should be spent on welfare.
It seems the truth is not as simple as that. The truth is the Defence Ministry surrendered a mind boggling Rs 16,000 crores because it could not be spent within the year. The culprit is bureaucract; “unnecessary procedures, bottlenecks and red-tapism”as Defence Minister AK Antony says are to blame for the slow pace of modernisation of India’s defence forces.
We can only say wake up India. Will somebody shake up the slumbering bureaucracy? Will the learned PM speak a little loudly to do it?
The disturbing editorial is worth reproducing in full; here it is.
UPA succeeds in emasculating military
Defence Minister AK Antony, known to be a man of few words, has been extraordinarily candid while admitting that “unnecessary procedures, bottlenecks and red-tapism”, and not the lack of funds, are to blame for the slow pace of modernisation of India’s defence forces. Of course, there’s nothing startlingly new about his comments, nor should we be surprised by the fact that the Ministry of Defence has been routinely surrendering funds allocated under the annual Budget.
As reported by this newspaper on Thursday, the ministry has returned Rs 16,000 crore over the past five years which remained unspent. Budget allocations are not made on the basis of ad hoc calculations, but by computing the financial requirements of a ministry in any given year to meet both administrative costs and expenditure on projects. In the case of the Ministry of Defence, the allocations would include funds to procure military hardware required by the Army, Navy and Air Force, for which detailed internal discussions would have already been completed and the cost computed.
Therefore, if the ministry has been surrendering unspent funds at the end of each financial year, we can only presume that the planned procurements were not made. There is ample evidence to substantiate this point: From conducting anti-terrorism operations to maintaining vigil along the nation’s 7,000 km coastline, from launching surgical strikes against enemy camps to deploying troops for possible conventional war, the defence forces are severely handicapped. This point has been highlighted repeatedly, most notably after the 26/11 fidayeen attack on Mumbai, but neither the political leadership nor the bureaucracy has bothered to fix the problem. Instead, we have heard more promises being made on expediting the procurement of hardware — from night vision goggles to bullet-proof jackets, multi-role combat aircraft to gunboats, precision-guided missiles to field guns — with little or no follow-up action.
The unnecessary procedures, bottlenecks and red-tapism that Mr Antony has talked about are not fictitious reasons causing inordinate delay in the procurement of military hardware. But it is equally true that these can be resolved if the Government of the day is determined to place national interest above bureaucratic sloth and partisan politics. To cite the Bofors scam, from which an Italian ‘businessman’ benefited, as the reason for holding up defence procurements is to talk utter rot and must be ignored with the contempt it deserves. The Bofors scam happened more than two decades ago and had politicians and bureaucrats been truly bothered about not allowing a repetition of that scandal then they would have restructured procurement norms to make them more transparent. Indeed, the UPA Government framed the Defence Procurement Procedure which was billed as a big step towards transparency and expediting the purchase of desperately needed military hardware. The Government now owes an explanation as to why the DPP has not facilitated fresh acquisitions. Did the Government have to wait till the fag-end of its tenure to discover that perhaps the DPP needs further fine-tuning?
The issue, really, is about intentions. This Government is headed by a Prime Minister who would like to see the defence forces emasculated. This is also the Government which initiated a witch-hunt for the defence purchases made by the NDA regime although it could not come up with an iota of evidence to prove wrong-doing.
That Rs 16,000 crore meant for the modernisation of our defence forces remained unspent during its tenure is only to be expected.
It is fashionable for many of the vocal do-gooders on the TV chats to say that we are wasting money too much money in defence procurement that should be spent on welfare.
It seems the truth is not as simple as that. The truth is the Defence Ministry surrendered a mind boggling Rs 16,000 crores because it could not be spent within the year. The culprit is bureaucract; “unnecessary procedures, bottlenecks and red-tapism”as Defence Minister AK Antony says are to blame for the slow pace of modernisation of India’s defence forces.
We can only say wake up India. Will somebody shake up the slumbering bureaucracy? Will the learned PM speak a little loudly to do it?
The disturbing editorial is worth reproducing in full; here it is.
UPA succeeds in emasculating military
Defence Minister AK Antony, known to be a man of few words, has been extraordinarily candid while admitting that “unnecessary procedures, bottlenecks and red-tapism”, and not the lack of funds, are to blame for the slow pace of modernisation of India’s defence forces. Of course, there’s nothing startlingly new about his comments, nor should we be surprised by the fact that the Ministry of Defence has been routinely surrendering funds allocated under the annual Budget.
As reported by this newspaper on Thursday, the ministry has returned Rs 16,000 crore over the past five years which remained unspent. Budget allocations are not made on the basis of ad hoc calculations, but by computing the financial requirements of a ministry in any given year to meet both administrative costs and expenditure on projects. In the case of the Ministry of Defence, the allocations would include funds to procure military hardware required by the Army, Navy and Air Force, for which detailed internal discussions would have already been completed and the cost computed.
Therefore, if the ministry has been surrendering unspent funds at the end of each financial year, we can only presume that the planned procurements were not made. There is ample evidence to substantiate this point: From conducting anti-terrorism operations to maintaining vigil along the nation’s 7,000 km coastline, from launching surgical strikes against enemy camps to deploying troops for possible conventional war, the defence forces are severely handicapped. This point has been highlighted repeatedly, most notably after the 26/11 fidayeen attack on Mumbai, but neither the political leadership nor the bureaucracy has bothered to fix the problem. Instead, we have heard more promises being made on expediting the procurement of hardware — from night vision goggles to bullet-proof jackets, multi-role combat aircraft to gunboats, precision-guided missiles to field guns — with little or no follow-up action.
The unnecessary procedures, bottlenecks and red-tapism that Mr Antony has talked about are not fictitious reasons causing inordinate delay in the procurement of military hardware. But it is equally true that these can be resolved if the Government of the day is determined to place national interest above bureaucratic sloth and partisan politics. To cite the Bofors scam, from which an Italian ‘businessman’ benefited, as the reason for holding up defence procurements is to talk utter rot and must be ignored with the contempt it deserves. The Bofors scam happened more than two decades ago and had politicians and bureaucrats been truly bothered about not allowing a repetition of that scandal then they would have restructured procurement norms to make them more transparent. Indeed, the UPA Government framed the Defence Procurement Procedure which was billed as a big step towards transparency and expediting the purchase of desperately needed military hardware. The Government now owes an explanation as to why the DPP has not facilitated fresh acquisitions. Did the Government have to wait till the fag-end of its tenure to discover that perhaps the DPP needs further fine-tuning?
The issue, really, is about intentions. This Government is headed by a Prime Minister who would like to see the defence forces emasculated. This is also the Government which initiated a witch-hunt for the defence purchases made by the NDA regime although it could not come up with an iota of evidence to prove wrong-doing.
That Rs 16,000 crore meant for the modernisation of our defence forces remained unspent during its tenure is only to be expected.
The moment of truth for the LTTE
R. Hariharan
The moment of truth appears to have arrived for the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. Its fall could not have been more dramatic; a few days ago a few thousand people of Jaffna, on whose behalf the LTTE says it is fighting, wanted it to release the civilian population held as a human shield in a small area in the northeastern corner of the Northern Province. Far from saving the lives of over 2.5 lakh Tamils there as it claims to be seeking to do, the LTTE has put them in the line of fire that is directed against itself.
There were two other jolts for the LTTE. In Chennai, Dravida Munnetra Kazagham leader and Chief Minister M. Karunanidhi reiterated that he does not support the LTTE that had weakened the Tamil resistance.
The European Union, Japan, Norway, and the U.S., the four co-chairs of the Oslo peace process 2002, called upon the LTTE to lay down weapons and surrender after accepting the amnesty offer put forth by the Sri Lanka government and prevent further loss of civilian life. It is an irony of fate that in 2002 the very same co-chairs had tacitly accepted the LTTE as the spokesman of the Tamil population at peace talks. Unfortunately, instead of vigorously pursuing the objective of getting the best devolution package through the talks, the LTTE focussed on building its armed strength with the trappings of a government — its own police, judiciary and administration. It did not matter that the LTTE had to leave to the Sri Lanka government the tasks of providing health care and supplying essential goods for the people living in areas under LTTE control.
Even while speaking of its own legitimacy to take over the administration of the north and the east under the interim self- governing authority proposal, the LTTE’s pistol groups went around killing scores of people, including Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar and a General of the Sri Lanka Army.
When the tsunami came on Boxer Day 2005, thousands of Tamils perished. Their plight touched the whole world and money came pouring in from everywhere. It is true that the Sri Lanka government should share the blame for its failure to implement its agreement with the LTTE with respect to tsunami relief. But even as the LTTE was complaining loudly about that, it was trying to strike deals worth millions of dollars with illegal arms dealers abroad to procure advanced missile systems and other weapons. This came to light during a sting operation carried out by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation a year later.
The LTTE enjoyed an unprecedented level of support and goodwill among the people of Tamil Nadu during 1983. Despite its record of killing Tamil militant leaders of repute such as Sri Sabharatnam of the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO) and hundreds of cadres of other groups including the People’s Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE), the Prabakaran mystique persisted and many Tamils ignored his seeming character aberrations.
However, the LTTE started dissipating its goodwill in India when it colluded with its “sworn Sinhala enemy,” President Ranasinghe Premadasa, to get the Indian forces off its back and send them out of Sri Lanka. However, the LTTE did not use its newfound bonhomie with the President for the benefit of Tamils. Instead, it killed Premadasa after carrying out a bloodbath of thousands of cadres of the Eelam Peoples Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF. Their only sin was that unlike the LTTE, they had accepted the Indo-Sri Lanka accord.
The LTTE relentlessly pursued the members of the EPRLF leadership who had taken refuge in India and killed many of them in Chennai. The final act of killing Rajiv Gandhi, the man who had proactively intervened in Sri Lanka to help Tamils, also killed Prabakaran’s equation with India. No amount of political or parochial rhetoric is going to repair the damage done to the LTTE’s image, particularly in Tamil Nadu, by that act.
Its failing fortunes in the present war have pushed the LTTE back to the position in which it was in 1987 — under mortal danger from the Sri Lanka security forces. It was India that rescued the LTTE then. Now that the LTTE is fighting for survival once again, its propaganda machine is asking the people of India to save Tamils in Sri Lanka. There is no sign of contrition on Prabakaran’s part for killing Rajiv Gandhi — which would have been the logical first step for mending fences with India.
But the LTTE, it seems, works on its own logic. Otherwise how do we understand its broadside against India even at this, its hour of need? The pro-LTTE TamilNet quotes an article saying, “It is an open secret that the present Indian Establishment, run by Sonia Congress, is waging its own proxy war in the island of Sri Lanka, concurrent to Colombo’s war against Tamil Nationalism. In its frustration arising from its incapability of achieving anything positively, India is not only heading for maintaining perpetual trouble in Sri Lanka, but also is inviting turmoil to a part of its own country.”
Prabakaran seems to have forgotten his own statement on India in his last Heroes Day message wherein he said: “Our people always consider India as our friend. They have great expectations that the Indian superpower will take a positive stand on our national question.” Is it all changed now when the LTTE talks of “India inviting turmoil to a part of its own country”?
The LTTE has to come to terms with the reality all over the world now. The world has lost its patience with terrorism. Most nations consider the methods used by organisations like the LTTE to be terror tactics. That was one of the main reasons for the LTTE’s downslide in the present war.
The time has come for the LTTE to give up war. It has to help the people rebuild their lives shattered by 25 years of war. Already hundreds of civilians have died in the artillery bombardment because the LTTE has not made up its mind to end the war that it is not winning. Prabakaran should act now and free them.
The way out for the LTTE is clear: Prabakaran should remove the fetters on the leaders of the Tamil National Alliance (TNA), its political proxy in the Sri Lankan Parliament, and allow them to make meaningful contributions to bringing about peace. The LTTE probably knows that its final act will be over with an offensive launched by five to six divisions of the Sri Lanka security forces on its redoubt. Before that happens, the LTTE can do one act of goodwill by letting free the hapless population it is holding today.
Courtesy: The Hindu, February 5, 2009
The moment of truth appears to have arrived for the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. Its fall could not have been more dramatic; a few days ago a few thousand people of Jaffna, on whose behalf the LTTE says it is fighting, wanted it to release the civilian population held as a human shield in a small area in the northeastern corner of the Northern Province. Far from saving the lives of over 2.5 lakh Tamils there as it claims to be seeking to do, the LTTE has put them in the line of fire that is directed against itself.
There were two other jolts for the LTTE. In Chennai, Dravida Munnetra Kazagham leader and Chief Minister M. Karunanidhi reiterated that he does not support the LTTE that had weakened the Tamil resistance.
The European Union, Japan, Norway, and the U.S., the four co-chairs of the Oslo peace process 2002, called upon the LTTE to lay down weapons and surrender after accepting the amnesty offer put forth by the Sri Lanka government and prevent further loss of civilian life. It is an irony of fate that in 2002 the very same co-chairs had tacitly accepted the LTTE as the spokesman of the Tamil population at peace talks. Unfortunately, instead of vigorously pursuing the objective of getting the best devolution package through the talks, the LTTE focussed on building its armed strength with the trappings of a government — its own police, judiciary and administration. It did not matter that the LTTE had to leave to the Sri Lanka government the tasks of providing health care and supplying essential goods for the people living in areas under LTTE control.
Even while speaking of its own legitimacy to take over the administration of the north and the east under the interim self- governing authority proposal, the LTTE’s pistol groups went around killing scores of people, including Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar and a General of the Sri Lanka Army.
When the tsunami came on Boxer Day 2005, thousands of Tamils perished. Their plight touched the whole world and money came pouring in from everywhere. It is true that the Sri Lanka government should share the blame for its failure to implement its agreement with the LTTE with respect to tsunami relief. But even as the LTTE was complaining loudly about that, it was trying to strike deals worth millions of dollars with illegal arms dealers abroad to procure advanced missile systems and other weapons. This came to light during a sting operation carried out by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation a year later.
The LTTE enjoyed an unprecedented level of support and goodwill among the people of Tamil Nadu during 1983. Despite its record of killing Tamil militant leaders of repute such as Sri Sabharatnam of the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO) and hundreds of cadres of other groups including the People’s Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE), the Prabakaran mystique persisted and many Tamils ignored his seeming character aberrations.
However, the LTTE started dissipating its goodwill in India when it colluded with its “sworn Sinhala enemy,” President Ranasinghe Premadasa, to get the Indian forces off its back and send them out of Sri Lanka. However, the LTTE did not use its newfound bonhomie with the President for the benefit of Tamils. Instead, it killed Premadasa after carrying out a bloodbath of thousands of cadres of the Eelam Peoples Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF. Their only sin was that unlike the LTTE, they had accepted the Indo-Sri Lanka accord.
The LTTE relentlessly pursued the members of the EPRLF leadership who had taken refuge in India and killed many of them in Chennai. The final act of killing Rajiv Gandhi, the man who had proactively intervened in Sri Lanka to help Tamils, also killed Prabakaran’s equation with India. No amount of political or parochial rhetoric is going to repair the damage done to the LTTE’s image, particularly in Tamil Nadu, by that act.
Its failing fortunes in the present war have pushed the LTTE back to the position in which it was in 1987 — under mortal danger from the Sri Lanka security forces. It was India that rescued the LTTE then. Now that the LTTE is fighting for survival once again, its propaganda machine is asking the people of India to save Tamils in Sri Lanka. There is no sign of contrition on Prabakaran’s part for killing Rajiv Gandhi — which would have been the logical first step for mending fences with India.
But the LTTE, it seems, works on its own logic. Otherwise how do we understand its broadside against India even at this, its hour of need? The pro-LTTE TamilNet quotes an article saying, “It is an open secret that the present Indian Establishment, run by Sonia Congress, is waging its own proxy war in the island of Sri Lanka, concurrent to Colombo’s war against Tamil Nationalism. In its frustration arising from its incapability of achieving anything positively, India is not only heading for maintaining perpetual trouble in Sri Lanka, but also is inviting turmoil to a part of its own country.”
Prabakaran seems to have forgotten his own statement on India in his last Heroes Day message wherein he said: “Our people always consider India as our friend. They have great expectations that the Indian superpower will take a positive stand on our national question.” Is it all changed now when the LTTE talks of “India inviting turmoil to a part of its own country”?
The LTTE has to come to terms with the reality all over the world now. The world has lost its patience with terrorism. Most nations consider the methods used by organisations like the LTTE to be terror tactics. That was one of the main reasons for the LTTE’s downslide in the present war.
The time has come for the LTTE to give up war. It has to help the people rebuild their lives shattered by 25 years of war. Already hundreds of civilians have died in the artillery bombardment because the LTTE has not made up its mind to end the war that it is not winning. Prabakaran should act now and free them.
The way out for the LTTE is clear: Prabakaran should remove the fetters on the leaders of the Tamil National Alliance (TNA), its political proxy in the Sri Lankan Parliament, and allow them to make meaningful contributions to bringing about peace. The LTTE probably knows that its final act will be over with an offensive launched by five to six divisions of the Sri Lanka security forces on its redoubt. Before that happens, the LTTE can do one act of goodwill by letting free the hapless population it is holding today.
Courtesy: The Hindu, February 5, 2009
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