Colonel R Hariharan (retd), who served as the head of intelligence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka 1987 to 1990, analyses the war on the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in an interview to rediff.com's Shobha Warrier.
The question often asked was, after Killinocchi, what? How significant was the fall of Killinocchi?
Killinocchi has three dimensions. Two dimensions are directly relevant to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, and one of these is relevant to the Sri Lankan government.
First, the LTTE dimension. Killinocchi was promoted as the capital of the LTTE, on the basis of which it was trying to be on par with the Sri Lankan government in the 2002 peace talks. That was because they signed the ceasefire agreement and agreed to the peace process under the Oslo agreement. So, in a way the Sri Lankan government recognised indirectly the LTTE as the representative of the Tamil people. There were elected members of Parliament who are Tamils, but they were not there as part of the peace process.
So, the LTTE had built up a huge infrastructure to project Killinocchi as the capital with all the fanfare, judiciary, police, etc. It even had its own civil and criminal procedure courts. But it ignored the fact that they still had to depend on civil supplies from the Sri Lankan government.
The government agents, who are equivalent to our collectors or deputy commissioners, were still there. So, it gave the LTTE and those sections of Tamils who are their supporters a feeling of euphoria; that a Tamil Eelam was just around the corner.
From that perspective, the capture of Killinocchi has come as a sort of a rude awakening.
Would you say it is a big blow to the LTTE?
It is a rude awakening because the thinking until then was that the LTTE was equivalent to the Sri Lankan government. But possessing Killinocchi did not make the LTTE a government. To be a government, you require much bigger things, not just this kind of settings or decoration. So, it is a psychological blow to the LTTE.
Only psychological?
That is the second dimension I am talking about. The psychological aspect is far more important than the military conflict. This psychological blow became aggravated because for a long time, people were calling it Stalingrad and Leningrad and El Alamein. It is a very big blow for the Diaspora that has been supporting the dream of a Tamil Eelam.
Now, let me talk about the military defeat of Killinocchi. The military defeat was actually not a defeat, as the LTTE has been losing the war all along. What it has done now is to progressively withdraw.
When you have to occupy a large area with limited forces, you fight what is called a mobile defence strategy. The LTTE has done that. It involves distributing smaller forces along likely routes of advance of the Sri Lankan army, delay them, inflict casualties, pull back a little further to a second line of defence, and again retreat the same way to a third line of defence.
What has happened here is, all axes have converged at Killinocchi. That is astride the A9 highway axis. It is not only psychologically important but it is the lifeline required to sustain Jaffna. Till now, the Sri Lankan government had to ask the army and navy to ferry supplies and protect them along the long sea route from Trincomalee to Jaffna. That was because the land route was closed, and this was the lifeline.
There is another route along the western Mannar coast. But this requires a ferry crossing, and this ferry has been in disuse though the Sri Lankan army had captured it a couple of months ago. That loss itself was huge for the LTTE.
The fall of Killinocchi aggravated the situation, and it became a strategic blow to the LTTE. The LTTE had given the impression that they were invincible. Now, the Sri Lankan army has damaged this image of the LTTE's military invincibility.
Even before the fall of Killinocchi wasn't the LTTE on the back foot?
Yes, the LTTE had been suffering a lot of causalities even before the fall of Killinocchi. Their fortunes had been on decline. Considering that, pulling out from Killinocchi was the most sensible thing for them to do.
What about the loss of Elephant Pass? How significant was it?
Between Killinocchi and Elephant Pass, there is a place called Paranthan, and that is the most significant place. When the Sri Lankans occupy Paranthan, Killinocchi will be cut off from both the north and the south. And this was exactly what the Sri Lankans did.
So, tactically, it was unsound to place all bets on Killinocchi. The LTTE should have defended Paranthan instead of Killinocchi, from a purely strategic point of view. Perhaps because Killinocchi was touted as the capital, they did it.
Killinocchi also has a big population, and the LTTE's assets are there. At the last moment, they cannot abandon it and go to Paranthan. Paranthan was lost on January 1. After a week, Killinocchi fell.
Do you feel by conquering these three inter-related vital points, the Sri Lankan army has won the war?
The moment Killinocchi and Paranthan fell, the LTTE was finished.
What about Mullaitheevu?
Mullaitheevu is at the easternmost part of Sri Lanka, and is a district headquarters in the middle of a rainforest; a very thick jungle. The population is very low, and much of what there was has trickled out.
In the last two days, nearly 2,000 people have come out from the LTTE's area. The LTTE cannot physically control these people; they require to be fed. Ultimately you will find only the LTTE cadres, and probably their immediate families, left there.
Even if you don't capture Mullaitheevu, you just surround them and the rest of the northern province is open, and you can restore normalcy.
The LTTE is very good at jungle warfare. If LTTE men are inside the jungle and the Sri Lankan army outside, what will be the outcome?
The Sri Lankan army won't remain outside. They want to eliminate the LTTE 100 per cent. So, they will carry on with the operations. The LTTE is somewhat in the same position as they were in when we (the IPKF) left.
From your experience in the IPKF, please tell us how different is it today?
In our time, they never captured Mullaitheevu. And A9 Highway was in our hands. They were occupying Jaffna but they were not occupying the whole of the A9. The other groups were there then. So, it was not easy for the LTTE to keep the A9 closed. They were occupying a tract from Chavakassery to Jaffna, that is, the Jaffna Peninsula.
We drove them from there, and they sort of dispersed to Mullaitheevu. We didn't use artillery or air power then; just restricted ourselves to infantry operations. We had two-and-a-half divisions then, but the Sri Lankans now have a much bigger force. The LTTE was also less powerful then. Their weapons have improved.
It was reported that there were four air strips at Mullaitheevu ...
The Sri Lankan army have found not four, but six air strips, out of which two are very big ones. It was built during the peace process. That means they (the LTTE) were preparing for war. That also shows the LTTE's intention was never peace. Otherwise, they would not have invested so much money in a one-and-a-half km runway.
You mentioned that the LTTE had to employ fewer forces in large areas. Does that mean they are getting fewer and fewer fighters?
Yes. The forces for the LTTE used to come from the Eastern Province because they are less educated, and the population is more intact. In the Northern Province, however, many people have emigrated.
The Sri Lankan army was more severe in the north, and there had been more violent conflicts there in the past. That population reservoir which used to provide recruits on an average of 2,000 to 3,000 a year, has reduced over a period of time. You also have to train them for at least six months to one year.
Do you think the LTTE is losing its popularity among the local population?
It is not merely popularity. It is physically not possible because the supply of recruits from the Eastern Province has dried up.
Secondly, when you are losing territory, people will be hesitant to join you and support you. In 1983, it was different. That generation faced harsh repression at the hands of the Sri Lankan government. That generation has become old. Many leaders have died.
In the last 25 years, the outlook of the Tamils has also changed. This generation's perspective is different. Jaffna society has totally changed. In the colleges, you find only women, and there are no men to study. They have emigrated, joined the LTTE, or are illiterate.
This time, from the early days of the war, the Sri Lankan army claimed victory. As a person who knew the LTTE, the Sri Lankan army and the area, were you expecting this kind of retreat from the LTTE?
As a matter of fact, I had been saying this since two years ago; that strategically the LTTE is poised to lose the war.
Why did you feel so?
Because of two issues. One: international attitudes have changed. It has been branded as a terrorist organisation. Despite that, the US agreed to a peace process. But the LTTE had not been sincere in following the peace process. The Sri Lankan government also did not follow the peace process later. LTTE chief Prabhakaran thus antagonised the international community.
When his hand was suspected in the killing of foreign minister Lakshman Kadirgamar, the international community was very annoyed. The EU (European Union) and Canada banned the LTTE. The Sri Lankan Diaspora in the EU and Canada were two important sources of money and material support for the organisation. The UK is another player.
Terrorism protocol has made it very difficult for LTTE to use international shipping and it was dependent on international shipping for men and material. The LTTE has not been able to overcome the international road blocks this time around. It did not reinvent itself.
The LTTE had not bothered to cultivate India. After Rajiv Gandhi's assassination, it could have followed a middle path because it still had some goodwill in India among some sections. The LTTE overestimated its influence in India, or thought it could bypass India. That was why it was dealing directly with the Sri Lankan government. It didn't bother about India.
It took India for granted. On the other hand, the Sri Lankan government bothered with India.
Do you think Prabhakaran would be hiding inside the jungles?
Of course, he is hiding.
Do you think the Sri Lankan army will capture him?
I don't think Prabhakaran will allow his capture. Either he will fight and die, or bite a capsule. Like Hitler did, he will die. I don't think there is a possibility of capturing him and handing him over to India!
Do you think a resurrection of the LTTE is possible? They have resurrected themselves strongly in the past.
Now we come to where we began, the third aspect, the Sri Lankan aspect. It purely depends upon how Sri Lankans use the success. If success is purely for the ruling party coalition to buttress itself forgetting the basic problem of how LTTE came into being, the end result will be different.
It all started because the Tamils failed to get equal rights from the Sinhalese politically. Has the condition improved? I fear it has not. The 13th Amendment is not being implemented fully.
It looks as if it is back to square one. If such a situation continues, Tamils will take it up politically first and it will continue for some time. If it doesn't succeed, they will revert to militancy. Even those guys who broke away from the LTTE may revert to militancy. A man like (LTTE rebel and now Sri Lankan member of parliament) Karuna also has to be elected by Tamil constituents later.
Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapakse says there will be elections in the Northern Province and there will be a Tamil chief minister. But having a Tamil chief minister without powers is a joke.
There is also a sizeable Muslim segment, which speaks Tamil, and they are politically aware. They are also watching this. They know what happens to Tamils today will happen to them tomorrow.
You mean the end result of 30 years of war is nothing?
After 30 years of struggle, nearly 70,000 Tamils have died, and there is no achievement.
I don't think the Sri Lankan government will allow the LTTE to come up. Militarily they have succeeded. Now it is for the Sri Lankans to sort out their problems. The Sinhalese have to accommodate the Tamils. Otherwise, there will be war again, and war is costly for both.
It has proved that only an arms struggle by the Tamils has not proved beneficial to Tamils. Conversely, only a military solution will not prove beneficial. The country has to politically solve the problem. A prolonged arms struggle has a life period unlike a prolonged political struggle.
Had the LTTE stuck to the India-Sri Lanka accord without fighting India, I feel probably they would have achieved better results.
Interview done on January 17, 2009
Courtesy: www.rediff.com January 23, 2009
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