R Hariharan
With the capture of Kilinochchi, the Sri Lanka security forces have exploded the myth of LTTE’s invincibility. Faith in their strength had created thousands of followers among Sri Lankan Tamil expatriates who supported V. Prabhakaran’s 20-year war to create an independent Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka.
Kilinochchi’s loss is the biggest setback Prabhakaran has faced in the current Eelam war. It also marks the virtual end of the LTTE’s conventional war capability. The LTTE’s last stronghold at Elephant Pass astride the A9 Jaffna-Kandy highway will probably become untenable as two divisions in the north and two divisions in the south are now available to capture it.
More importantly, the victory is a feather in Sri Lanka President Mahinda Rajapakse’s cap. He had made the elimination of the LTTE and “freeing Tamils from its clutches” his main agenda and built all his actions around it. With this in view, he walked out of the ceasefire agreement with the LTTE and discarded the peace process in 2002 when the LTTE offered an opening to take up the military option in 2006, a few months after he assumed office.
The President’s focused agenda had given the Sri Lanka army commander Lt Gen. Sarath Fonseka to plan and conduct his operations with clear goals. The President had given the commander a free hand in the conduct of operations and provided the wherewithal for it. The army commander enjoyed very good personal rapport with the President’s two brothers — Basil and Gotabaya — who were in key appointments to make the presidential agenda a reality.
The President took full advantage of the international environment created in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks to get the LTTE banned in Canada and the EU, two notable sources of political, material and financial support to the LTTE. It also enabled him to gain access to the intelligence resources of the US and India.
In the earlier Eelam wars, the LTTE had always managed to bounce back and come out stronger to fight the armed forces. This time, the army commander had carefully planned his operations cashing in on three advantages he enjoyed.
These were the overwhelming strength of the army built over three years, the full use of air power and imaginative use of the navy to end the LTTE’s domination of the sea around the northern and eastern province. The navy systematically set about to dismantle the marine supply chain of the LTTE. It had a merchant fleet of dozen ships which were used to ferry arms and military equipment that sustained the war. By 2007, the navy systematically hunted and destroyed them.
The operational plan was also aimed at cutting the external access of the LTTE to India through the Gulf of Mannar and to Southeast Asia through the eastern coasts. Unlike his predecessors, the army commander focused on operations on the outer perimeter than tackling the A9 highway dominated by the LTTE.
The Tigers in a guerrilla mode could pose a few problems for Sri Lanka. Over four tonnes of C4 explosives are reported to have been recovered from suspected LTTE caches in Colombo and its suburbs during 2008. This would indicate the ability of the LTTE to create mayhem in Colombo and other towns.
The capture of Kilinochchi will undoubtedly have a fallout on the future of the Tamil people who had been struggling for autonomy and equal treatment with the majority Sinhalese for over three decades.
The LTTE had totally marginalised the Tamil polity to be a mere proxy in the parliament. Few others who resisted the LTTE had to fall back upon the government’s patronage for survival. This equation will change as the LTTE slowly loses relevance in the daily life of the Tamil people.
However, it is doubtful whether the Sri Lanka Tamil polity will immediately seize the opening offered by the LTTE’s falling fortunes. They have to be sure of their personal safety from the LTTE’s dreaded killer squads that had ruthlessly eliminated some of the tallest of Tamil politicians. And that may take time.
President Rajapaksa’s style of governance had ridden roughshod over the norms of human rights and media freedom. Rule of law had taken a downturn with police high-handedness running riot. Activities of NGOs have come under constant scrutiny of the government, curbing their freedom to operate. Media is under selective censorship. Kidnapping and even killing of businessmen and journalists had become rampant.
Overall, this had created unease and a feeling of insecurity among sections of the population. These issues had attracted strong international criticism and Sri Lanka had been taken to task at UN forums also.
Once the war takes a backseat over time, the President will have to tackle these issues more vigorously to avoid more international embarrassment for Sri Lanka.
Rajapaksa will be facing a new set of political dilemmas when normality of sorts is restored. The President is likely to come under tremendous pressure for evolving a political package for solving the Tamil issue. Even if he goes for a national election by leveraging his military success to improve his strength in the parliament, the dilemma of the Tamil issue is likely to continue.
In India, with the general elections in the offing, political equations with Sri Lanka could change as they are dependent upon the shape of coalition dispensation at Delhi.
So the Sri Lanka Tamil issue is likely be in the limelight once again. And that could mean a different play in India-Sri Lanka relations.
Courtesy: The Telegraph, Jan 3, 2009
http://www.telegraphindia.com/section/foreign/index.jsp
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