R Hariharan
On Sunday December 7, the security forces were within “kissing distance” of the outer defence lines Kilinochchi, announced the defence spokesman. On Monday, December 8, it became “Troops in Kilinochchi are targeting the town and they are in the vicinity of the town.” However, by December 9 it seems the security forces’ strategic focus had shifted from Kilinochchi to Mullaitivu according to the defence ministry. This contradicts what the army commander Lt Gen Sarath Fonseka said in his Sunday Observer interview on the same day; he said “after capturing Kilinochchi the security forces will definitely capture Mullaithivu...”
In military parlance, this kind of shift in 24 hours takes place only in tactical rather than strategic focus. Somebody is not getting the terminology right or the army is facing major problems in turning the “kiss” into reality in Kilinochchi. Its two pronged offensive on Kilinochchi by Task Force-I from the west and by 57 Division from the southwest was reported facing very heavy LTTE resistance. Could this have compelled them a change in the security forces’ strategy? The defence spokesman had acknowledged this at least on the Task Force-I front. In the Muhamalai sector also there appear to be no substantial progress in spite of 53 Division’s claims of having captured 800 m long and 8 km wide line of defences there. All these bits put together would indicate stalling of offensive.
A second possibility is that 59 Division was making better progress having captured Alampil on December 8. With Task Force-III making good progress on A34 Mankulam-Mullaitivu road branching off eastwards from A9 road 59 Division’s offensive to Mullaitivu would be benefited. So a tactical shift of immediate focus from Kilinochchi to Mullaitivu is understandable.
But such a shift in axis would still be a tactical shift. Ultimately the security forces have to either capture Kilinochchi or force the LTTE to vacate it after they pay a heavy price. Then only the A9 Kandy-Jaffna road can be opened to restore some form of normal life for most of the population of Northern Province. Regaining A9 road from the LTTE control by evicting them from Kilinochchi –Elephant Pass would always remain the strategic objective of the entire operation.
But these are all military semantics; in the absence of independent sources to verify operational information, semantics of both the defence spokesman and the LTTE become important; they indicate the issues hidden behind the words.
After the capture of Pooneryn on November 15, crossing Akkarayankulam bund on October 31, and capture of Mankulam on November 17, it is a month. Evidently since then, momentum of advance has been stalled due to adverse weather on a few days, and stiff LTTE resistance that had been progressively increasing. This would contradict repeated Sri Lankan assertion that the LTTE was on the run. If this is not so, what is holding up the troops?
Loss of momentum in an offensive means more time for the opponent to recoup, rest, repair and readjust defences, reinforce positions, launch counter offensives and inflict more casualties. And cost of war in terms of men, material and money goes up as the clock ticks in days and days become months. The more it is prolonged the better it is for the forces on the defence.
Fortunately, the army commander has cleverly put himself in an advantageous position with multiple options of axes to pick and choose. He also has adequate troops for achieving the strategic objective. Even granting the monsoon rains that affected both sides comes in fits and starts the progress is becoming slow and taking too long. This raises a few operational questions:
• Why the offensive to Kilinochchi is ending up as a slow crawl?
• Has the LTTE built up its strength beyond the ken of four divisions?
• Is the army commander facing a major operational dilemma or political rider interfering with his operations for reasons not known to the public?
In this context, Lt Gen Sarath Fonseka’s comments on India’s role in Sri Lanka in an interview to the Sunday Observer is interesting for more reasons than his derogatory description of Nedumaran and Vaiko,(Tamil Nadu politicians who head the pro-LTTE political lobby in Tamil Nadu) as jokers who receive money from the LTTE. Regarding the operations he sounded quite confident of capturing both Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu. He was not unduly worried about the slow progress or any casualties. There was apparently no operational stress. Does it mean operations are going on smoothly at an accepted pace? In the absence of access to information our questions still linger, unanswered.
The interview had a political content not usually found in interviews of army chiefs. His sarcastic comment was clearly provocative. As anticipated it drew widespread condemnation from political parties in Tamil Nadu and Government of India protested to Sri Lanka on the issue. There was quick apology from the Defence Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapakse the General’s remarks. And in the corrective action that followed, Colombo axed the editor of Sunday Observer while the errant General went scot-free. One cannot imagine the army commander casually tackling a political issue involving a sensitive neighbour without some tacit official acceptance of his perceptions. The freedom of operation given by the President to Lt Gen Fonseka appears to go well beyond the military kind.
And this is not the first time Gen Fonseka has made a politically controversial remark His interview inn October 2008 to the National Post, a Canadian daily, created enough concerns among Tamils when he said: “I strongly believe that this country belongs to the Sinhalese but there are minority communities and we treat them like our people…We being the majority of the country, 75%, we will never give in and we have the right to protect this country…We are also a strong nation … They can live in this country with us. But they must not try to, under the pretext of being a minority, demand undue things.”
While that remark did not endear him to Tamils and caused more concerns in the ethnically polarised nation, Sinhala right wing lobbies applauded him.
Why is Lt Gen Fonseka making such controversial remarks repeatedly? Does he nurture political ambitions after he completes his extended tenure next year? His latest remark on Tamilnadu politicians in the Sunday Observer interview definitely raises this question.
But whatever be the reason, such provocative remarks of the army commander only strengthen the Tamil suspicions of the ulterior objective of Sri Lanka government’s war against the LTTE.
Wednesday, December 10, 2008
Friday, December 5, 2008
Sri Lanka: Allegations Over the Use of Cluster Bombs in the war
By R Hariharan
The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have accused the Sri Lankan air force of dropping cluster bombs on an internally displaced persons (IDP) camp in Vanni area on November 29, 2008. According to the TamilNet report three refugees were killed and 29 shelters of displaced persons were destroyed in the air strike. Recordings of oral accounts of those affected are also available on the Internet. The North East Secretariat on Human Rights (NESoHR) and the Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation (TRO), two NGOs who work in the area and are known for their pro-LTTE sympathies, have also published detailed reports of the incident.
Regardless of the source of these reports, the allegation needs to be thoroughly investigated by a neutral body because the use of cluster bombs on civilian settlements is most inhuman and should not be condoned under any circumstances. More so when the civilians were fleeing from the war and are housed in temporary shelters as in the case in point. If the reports are true, those responsible for it should be taken to task and the affected people should be adequately compensated.
The NESoHR has reported that the SLAF had dropped 16 cluster bombs on the IDP camp in Uzhavanoor in the early hours of the day. Identifying the camp location as four km down the Sundikulam junction on the Paranthan-Mullaitivu road, NESoHR report said that apart from the three deaths 26 people were also injured in the air strike on the camp. The TRO said in another report on the air strike that the camp, constructed and maintained by it and another local NGO, was set up in an area declared as "safe zone" in November by the Sri Lanka government. The photographs of bombs published with the reports showed markings in Russian.
Cluster bombs, like 'jumping' mines and claymore mines, are one of the cruel inventions of war from the World War II days. Each cluster bomb delivers about 2000 small bomblets known as sub-munitions over a wide area. Over the last six decades its deadliness has been refined to offer a bouquet of death to humans and materials through fragmentation, anti-armour, and anti-material varieties. A combination of these can be put together in one payload. Both artillery and aircraft can be used to deliver the deadly payload.
What makes cluster bomb use deadly to civilians is its residual effect. It releases many small unexploded bomblets over a wide area that are capable of killing and maiming civilians long after they are dropped. Israel gained a lot of notoriety when its left over bomblets of cluster bombing of Beirut in 2006 caused avoidable death and destruction to civilians returning to their bombed out city after they pulled out of Lebanon.
Considering the seriousness of the allegations, the casual treatment meted out to these reports by Sri Lanka is surprising. One reason could be that the reports were possibly an international propaganda ploy of the LTTE. The allegations of the LTTE and pro-LTTE NGOs have come at a time when the issue of use of cluster bombs is in international limelight. An international conclave of nations, international NGOs and UN bodies had just met at Oslo to sign the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM). Ninety two countries including Britain, Australia, Canada, France, and Germany signed the CCM at Oslo on November 3. Significant absentees at the Oslo convention included Russia, China, Israel, United States and India.
Though Sri Lanka is not a signatory to the CCM, it will be in Sri Lanka's interest to clear the allegations for three reasons – the weapon is inhuman, its use on unarmed non-combatants is despicable, and Sri Lanka probably possesses some cluster bombs like most of the countries in the sub-continent. And if it is LTTE's international propaganda effort, Sri Lanka has all the more reason to call the bluff.
05-Dec-2008 http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cnotes5%5Cnote486.html
The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have accused the Sri Lankan air force of dropping cluster bombs on an internally displaced persons (IDP) camp in Vanni area on November 29, 2008. According to the TamilNet report three refugees were killed and 29 shelters of displaced persons were destroyed in the air strike. Recordings of oral accounts of those affected are also available on the Internet. The North East Secretariat on Human Rights (NESoHR) and the Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation (TRO), two NGOs who work in the area and are known for their pro-LTTE sympathies, have also published detailed reports of the incident.
Regardless of the source of these reports, the allegation needs to be thoroughly investigated by a neutral body because the use of cluster bombs on civilian settlements is most inhuman and should not be condoned under any circumstances. More so when the civilians were fleeing from the war and are housed in temporary shelters as in the case in point. If the reports are true, those responsible for it should be taken to task and the affected people should be adequately compensated.
The NESoHR has reported that the SLAF had dropped 16 cluster bombs on the IDP camp in Uzhavanoor in the early hours of the day. Identifying the camp location as four km down the Sundikulam junction on the Paranthan-Mullaitivu road, NESoHR report said that apart from the three deaths 26 people were also injured in the air strike on the camp. The TRO said in another report on the air strike that the camp, constructed and maintained by it and another local NGO, was set up in an area declared as "safe zone" in November by the Sri Lanka government. The photographs of bombs published with the reports showed markings in Russian.
Cluster bombs, like 'jumping' mines and claymore mines, are one of the cruel inventions of war from the World War II days. Each cluster bomb delivers about 2000 small bomblets known as sub-munitions over a wide area. Over the last six decades its deadliness has been refined to offer a bouquet of death to humans and materials through fragmentation, anti-armour, and anti-material varieties. A combination of these can be put together in one payload. Both artillery and aircraft can be used to deliver the deadly payload.
What makes cluster bomb use deadly to civilians is its residual effect. It releases many small unexploded bomblets over a wide area that are capable of killing and maiming civilians long after they are dropped. Israel gained a lot of notoriety when its left over bomblets of cluster bombing of Beirut in 2006 caused avoidable death and destruction to civilians returning to their bombed out city after they pulled out of Lebanon.
Considering the seriousness of the allegations, the casual treatment meted out to these reports by Sri Lanka is surprising. One reason could be that the reports were possibly an international propaganda ploy of the LTTE. The allegations of the LTTE and pro-LTTE NGOs have come at a time when the issue of use of cluster bombs is in international limelight. An international conclave of nations, international NGOs and UN bodies had just met at Oslo to sign the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM). Ninety two countries including Britain, Australia, Canada, France, and Germany signed the CCM at Oslo on November 3. Significant absentees at the Oslo convention included Russia, China, Israel, United States and India.
Though Sri Lanka is not a signatory to the CCM, it will be in Sri Lanka's interest to clear the allegations for three reasons – the weapon is inhuman, its use on unarmed non-combatants is despicable, and Sri Lanka probably possesses some cluster bombs like most of the countries in the sub-continent. And if it is LTTE's international propaganda effort, Sri Lanka has all the more reason to call the bluff.
05-Dec-2008 http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cnotes5%5Cnote486.html
Accountability of Intelligence Agencies
By B. Raman
The Intelligence Bureau (IB) and the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW) have mounted a damage-control exercise by sharing with senior journalists details of technical intelligence (TECHINT) collected by them, which clearly indicated that the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), the Pakistani terrorist organisation, which is a member of Osama bin Laden's International Islamic Front (IIF) For Jihad Against the Crusaders and the Jewish People, was planning to carry out sea-borne terrorist strikes against hotels on Mumbai's coast, one of the hotels being the Taj Mahal hotel, which was actually attacked and occupied by some terrorists on the night of November 26, 2008. This intelligence was disseminated by them to those responsible for physical security. It seems to be the contention of the IB and the R&AW that what happened in Mumbai was a serious instance of physical security failure and failure to act on available intelligence and not an instance of intelligence failure.
2. Other independent reports indicate that the reports were acted upon by the Mumbai Police and the security authorities of the Taj Mahal Hotel. It was not as if they ignored them. The Mumbai Police alerted the hotels mentioned in the R&AW report and advised them on the need to strengthen security. The Mumbai Police also set up a security barrier at a point near the sea where , in their assessment, clandestine landings might take place.
3. The two specific reports of the R&AW based on intercepts were disseminated in September. There was no follow-up report for nearly five weeks, either from the IB or the R&AW. As a result, the Mumbai Police and hotels downgraded the security alert. The Taj Mahal Hotel removed a security barrier, which they had erected, and the Mumbai Police removed the security barrier which they had set up to prevent clandestine landings. The terrorists from Pakistan seem to have landed at this very point, where the Mumbai Police had erected the security barrier on the receipt of the alert from the R&AW.
4. The R&AW and the IB have their offices in Mumbai headed by senior officers to interact closely with the local police and the Armed Forces units. All of them are members of special co-ordination committees. How come the IB and the R&AW officers did not come to know that the security alert had been downgraded following the non-receipt of any follow-up reports from the R&AW? Did the R&AW immediately advise the Mumbai Police, the Navy and the hotel authorities that the alert should be continued till they receive information that the LET has abandoned its plans?
5. While the intercepts of September speak well of the interception capability of the R&AW, it does not necessarily speak well of its capability for analysis, assessment and follow-up action. Many questions are relevant in this regard: In what form did it report the intelligence? Did it tone it down while reporting the intercepts in a paraphrased form? Did it tell the persons to whom it sent the two reports of September that the intelligence was based on intercepts of telephone conversations of an LET operative based in Pakistan? If it did not do so on grounds of operational security, how come it is now sharing them with journalists? This only strengthens the suspicion that the IB and the R&AW show a greater readiness to share sensitive intelligence with journalists to protect themselves than with each other to protect the nation and its people. To which Ministries and departments were the reports sent and at what level?
6. Unless one looks into all these questions, one cannot say where the failures occurred, which made the terrorist strikes possible. In 1987, the R&AW received a human intelligence report about a Khalistani plot to kill Rajiv Gandhi, then Prime Minister, during his visit to Rajghat on Mahatma Gandhi's birthday. The R&AW officer----of the rank of Director, one rank below a Joint Secretary--- conveyed the information in a written note to a Joint Secretary in the Home Ministry and the Delhi Police. He did not alert other senior officers.
7. The report proved to be accurate. Rajiv Gandhi narrowly escaped the assassination attempt. T. N. Seshan, who was then co-ordinating the security arrangements for Rajiv Gandhi, was asked to enquire into this. He held both the Delhi Police and the R&AW responsible for omissions, which could have led to a national tragedy. He blamed the Delhi Police for inaction on the R&AW report and the R&AW for not realising the gravity of the information when it was received and for disseminating it at a lower level without alerting the senior officers responsible for Rajiv's security.
8. A report in the "Hindustan Times" of December 2, 2008, quotes an unnamed officer of the R&AW as saying that its job in the Mumbai case was over with sending the report to the concerned quarters in the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS) and that it had no other responsibility since it does not operate in Indian territory.
9. This is a highly irresponsible mindset, which needs to be checked. B. N. Mallick and R. N. Kao, the founding fathers of the Indian intelligence, used to stress on their officers that the responsibility of an intelligence officer does not stop with his sending a memo or a note about intelligence of a serious nature collected. It is equally their responsibility to ensure that the intelligence receives the attention it deserves in the ministries and departments concerned and that the necessary follow-up action is taken. In respect of terrorism, the role and responsibility of an intelligence officer starts from the moment he collects a piece of intelligence and continues till it is acted upon and the act of terrorism thwarted.
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Government of India, New Delhi, and presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)
December 3, 2008
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers30%5Cpaper2958.html
The Intelligence Bureau (IB) and the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW) have mounted a damage-control exercise by sharing with senior journalists details of technical intelligence (TECHINT) collected by them, which clearly indicated that the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), the Pakistani terrorist organisation, which is a member of Osama bin Laden's International Islamic Front (IIF) For Jihad Against the Crusaders and the Jewish People, was planning to carry out sea-borne terrorist strikes against hotels on Mumbai's coast, one of the hotels being the Taj Mahal hotel, which was actually attacked and occupied by some terrorists on the night of November 26, 2008. This intelligence was disseminated by them to those responsible for physical security. It seems to be the contention of the IB and the R&AW that what happened in Mumbai was a serious instance of physical security failure and failure to act on available intelligence and not an instance of intelligence failure.
2. Other independent reports indicate that the reports were acted upon by the Mumbai Police and the security authorities of the Taj Mahal Hotel. It was not as if they ignored them. The Mumbai Police alerted the hotels mentioned in the R&AW report and advised them on the need to strengthen security. The Mumbai Police also set up a security barrier at a point near the sea where , in their assessment, clandestine landings might take place.
3. The two specific reports of the R&AW based on intercepts were disseminated in September. There was no follow-up report for nearly five weeks, either from the IB or the R&AW. As a result, the Mumbai Police and hotels downgraded the security alert. The Taj Mahal Hotel removed a security barrier, which they had erected, and the Mumbai Police removed the security barrier which they had set up to prevent clandestine landings. The terrorists from Pakistan seem to have landed at this very point, where the Mumbai Police had erected the security barrier on the receipt of the alert from the R&AW.
4. The R&AW and the IB have their offices in Mumbai headed by senior officers to interact closely with the local police and the Armed Forces units. All of them are members of special co-ordination committees. How come the IB and the R&AW officers did not come to know that the security alert had been downgraded following the non-receipt of any follow-up reports from the R&AW? Did the R&AW immediately advise the Mumbai Police, the Navy and the hotel authorities that the alert should be continued till they receive information that the LET has abandoned its plans?
5. While the intercepts of September speak well of the interception capability of the R&AW, it does not necessarily speak well of its capability for analysis, assessment and follow-up action. Many questions are relevant in this regard: In what form did it report the intelligence? Did it tone it down while reporting the intercepts in a paraphrased form? Did it tell the persons to whom it sent the two reports of September that the intelligence was based on intercepts of telephone conversations of an LET operative based in Pakistan? If it did not do so on grounds of operational security, how come it is now sharing them with journalists? This only strengthens the suspicion that the IB and the R&AW show a greater readiness to share sensitive intelligence with journalists to protect themselves than with each other to protect the nation and its people. To which Ministries and departments were the reports sent and at what level?
6. Unless one looks into all these questions, one cannot say where the failures occurred, which made the terrorist strikes possible. In 1987, the R&AW received a human intelligence report about a Khalistani plot to kill Rajiv Gandhi, then Prime Minister, during his visit to Rajghat on Mahatma Gandhi's birthday. The R&AW officer----of the rank of Director, one rank below a Joint Secretary--- conveyed the information in a written note to a Joint Secretary in the Home Ministry and the Delhi Police. He did not alert other senior officers.
7. The report proved to be accurate. Rajiv Gandhi narrowly escaped the assassination attempt. T. N. Seshan, who was then co-ordinating the security arrangements for Rajiv Gandhi, was asked to enquire into this. He held both the Delhi Police and the R&AW responsible for omissions, which could have led to a national tragedy. He blamed the Delhi Police for inaction on the R&AW report and the R&AW for not realising the gravity of the information when it was received and for disseminating it at a lower level without alerting the senior officers responsible for Rajiv's security.
8. A report in the "Hindustan Times" of December 2, 2008, quotes an unnamed officer of the R&AW as saying that its job in the Mumbai case was over with sending the report to the concerned quarters in the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS) and that it had no other responsibility since it does not operate in Indian territory.
9. This is a highly irresponsible mindset, which needs to be checked. B. N. Mallick and R. N. Kao, the founding fathers of the Indian intelligence, used to stress on their officers that the responsibility of an intelligence officer does not stop with his sending a memo or a note about intelligence of a serious nature collected. It is equally their responsibility to ensure that the intelligence receives the attention it deserves in the ministries and departments concerned and that the necessary follow-up action is taken. In respect of terrorism, the role and responsibility of an intelligence officer starts from the moment he collects a piece of intelligence and continues till it is acted upon and the act of terrorism thwarted.
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Government of India, New Delhi, and presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)
December 3, 2008
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers30%5Cpaper2958.html
Tuesday, December 2, 2008
Sri Lanka Perspectives Series - October 2008
I have been writing a monthly assessment of the Sri Lanka situation for 'Security Trends' a strategic security journal published from New Delhi. They reflect my ability to assess the future course of events in Sri Lanka. These are written at the end of each month and contain an assessment on future trends. They are published here with the permission of the publishers. For copyright reasons the articles in this series may be reproduced with the permission of the publishers available at www.security-risks.com
Overview
As the existence of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in the north became precarious, the continuing war affecting over 200,000 Tamils living in LTTE controlled touched off an upsurge of protest in Tamil Nadu with almost all political parties lending a hand. The LTTE happy at these developments tried to project its demand for immediate ceasefire through local politicians in the state. And M Karunanidhi, the chief minister, always sympathetic to the cause of Eelam Tamils, gave an ultimatum to the Centre threatening to pull out his Dravida Munnetra Kazagham (DMK) party members from the parliament by end October 2008 if the war was not stopped. Resignation of DMK members could have affected the survival of Dr Manmohan Singh’s ruling coalition in Delhi. So there was a flurry of diplomatic and political activity in Delhi, Chennai and Colombo.
However, the Centre managed to assuage the feelings of Tamil Nadu with some adroit diplomacy with Sri Lanka. After discussions with the Sri Lanka Presidential advisor Basil Rajapaksa at Delhi, the two countries issued a joint statement. Sri Lanka agreed to take all measures to ensure the safety and well being of Tamils affected in the war zone and speed up the devolution process for equitable rights to Tamils. India decided to despatch 80 tons of relief material to the affected people. Significantly the question of ceasefire did not figure in the statement. The LTTE has continued to kindle the embers of sympathy in Tamil Nadu; even political parties distancing themselves from the LTTE have continued to keep the issue alive in their activities. However, in Sri Lanka the President has probably politically gained more mileage out of this as he had shown his ability to keep India politically at bay despite Tamil Nadu politicians pin pricks.
The rapid progress of the Sri Lanka security forces in the Northern Province ran into twin troubles to slow them down on their tracks during October 2008. The northeast monsoon rains came down heavily affecting the cross country mobility of the security forces operating west of A9 Kandy –Jaffna highway. The monsoon rains in spurts are likely to continue the whole of November which could slow down the operations of the security forces. The security forces encountered heavy resistance on a defence line approximately 13 km from Kilinochchi and suffered heavy casualties.
Military Operations
Despite establishing contact by mid September 2008, advancing troops were held up for nearly six weeks due to stiff resistance in the outer defences of the LTTE in area Akkarayankulam Lake, roughly 15 km from Kilinochchi, the administrative capital. The rains further added to their woes. After suffering heavy casualties the security forces managed to capture the heights of bunds around the lake only by end October. This should ease their forward movement whenever there is a break in the rainfall.
The advancing security forces in this sector encountered LTTE defences based on bunds across both the approaches west of Kilinochchi. One bund of about 17 km long extended from Nachchikuda on the north-western coast to Akkarayankulam.
Task Force I advancing towards Pooneryn trying to by pass the heavily fortified Nachikuda base had to neutralise defences based on the obstacle at Kambivelliyavillu, Pandiveddiaru, Maninyankulam, Vannerikulam, and Jeyapuram with stiff opposition. Surrounded on three sides, the LTTE vacated the Nachikuda base on October 29. With the loss of this base the LTTE control on the northwest coast from Silvattuai to the Pooneryn salient is practically finished. This would result in denial of the coast to smuggle LTTE supplies as well as an alternate route to infiltrate Jaffna. The access to the road would also facilitate faster build up of offensive against Pooneryn located14 km from Nachikuda.
On the Welioya sector, 59 Division managed to further consolidate their area expanding it progressively. With the capture of Gajabapura, the division is established in secure area up to Nayaru lagoon. As the lagoon ridden Mullaitivu coast line would be affected by monsoon and as they troop strength is inadequate, the division is unlikely to launch major offensives at least till December.
A single light aircraft of the LTTE air wing on October 30 made a sneak raid and dropped two bombs damaging two turbines of the Kelanitissa power plant. This has resulted in interruption of electricity power supply for nearly six months. The same sortie also managed to bomb Thalladi military base in Mannar Sector. Despite detection by Sri Lankan radars and being airborne for more than one hour, the LTTE aircraft evaded the F7 interceptor. It failed to shoot down the raider as its missile could not lock on the taarget. This would indicate serious flaws in the security forces air defence system and poor training of pilots of air force. This air raid though not a major success would undoubtedly boost the morale of the LTTE.
However, the naval machine gunners on board two merchant vessels gave a better account in repelling a suicide raid by three Sea Tiger boats off Myliddy near Kankesanturai port in Jaffna peninsula on October 22. They sank one and drove off two other boats which tried to raid the ships carrying food supplies for Jaffna.
LTTE
The LTTE appears to have cleverly used the ground and the monsoon rains to its advantage. It managed to inflict heavy casualties particularly in 57 Divisions battles based around the Akkarayankulam lake area. Only in the third week of October the Division could breakthrough the defences and push the LTTE from the defences. In a single operation in this area on Oct 19, the security forces lost '33 soldiers as against the LTTE’s loss of 12 cadres. In addition 48 soldiers were injured and three were missing, which would mean loss of one company of troops. However, given the force level constraints and sheer numerical superiority of the security forces, it is doubtful whether the LTTE can afford to mount such costly encounters in future in this sector.
In this front, the LTTE appears to have used CS gas against the assaulting troops. CS is not a prohibited item in the international protocol on chemical warfare. Basically an irritant, a type of tear gas, it is used by police in some countries for crowd control. It is not clear how useful it is as without gas masks for the defenders.
After the successful suicide attack killing retired Lt Gen Janaka Perera and 27 other civilians on September 26 in Anuradhapura, the LTTE carried out another attack on Maithripala Sirisena, Minister of Agricultural Development Maithripala Sirisena, Minister of Agricultural Development & Agrarian Services Development and General Secretary of the ruling Sri Lanka Freedom Party in the outskirts of Colombo on October 9. However, except for the suicide bomber no one else was killed though five others were injured. The anti terrorism police have also recovered a cleverly improvised ‘book bomb’ from a Jaffna school teacher working in Bandarawela. This would indicate that despite the stepped up security the LTTE would continue its efforts at sabotage and suicide attacks.
Future portends
The obstacle based defence extending from Nachikuda to Akkarayankulam and further up across the road communication up to A9 highway near Iranamadu indicate the LTTE had selected this line for halting the advancing Sri Lanka forces. Though the LTTE caused heavy casualties probably in the proportion of at least two Sri Lankan soldiers for every cadre killed, the laid back defensive position has given away too much territory at too low a price for the security forces. In the bargain the LTTE failed to defend the vital north-western coastal supply route from Silvatturai to Nachikuda vital for retaining their conventional capability. This would indicate perhaps the LTTE would cause maximum casualty in the operations in the coming weeks till the monsoon runs out of rains in December and then pull back to the jungles of Mullaitivu.
The slow and cautious progress of the security forces in earlier months for keeping the casualties low has resulted in their main battle for Kilinochchi to be fought in adverse weather conditions. As a result they have lesser air and artillery support and reduced mobility. As the A32 axis along the coast is wide open now after the fall of Nachikuda, we can expect the LTTE to take on the security forces in area Pooneryn. Loss of Pooneryn would mean the loss of LTTE ability to carryout artillery strikes against the Palali air base. This could also result in losing the ability to engage the administrative echelons of 53 and 54 divisions deployed against the Muhamalai-Elephant Pass/Nagarkovil front in the north.
The ability of the LTTE air wing to carry out sneak attack despite use of air defence measures should be a cause for concern for the Sri Lankans. We can expect the LTTE to carry out a dramatic attack against some of the valuable targets including VIPs, ports and defence headquarters in Colombo.
With the erosion of their ability in the Gulf of Mannar LTTE Sea Tigers appear to be trying to stage a comeback in northern coast line of Jaffna. Though risky, Jaffna coast provides alternate access to Vedaranyam in Tamil Nadu coast, east of the controversial Rama Sethu. We can expect this coast line to become active with more encounters between the Sri Lanka Navy and the Sea Tigers, as the LTTE’s logistic pressure increases. We can expect the LTTE to try to indirectly overcome this by whipping up agitation in Tamil Nadu by pro-LTTE elements. However, despite political polemics both the state and central governments appear to be firm in strictly curbing the resurgence of LTTE activity in Tamil Nadu.
According to the data of UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, as on Oct 24 in all 144,560 persons belonging to Kilinochchi district alone have been displaced due to war. This figure is likely to swell to over two lakhs in the coming moths and a major humanitarian tragedy may be in the offing. That could stir up political protests further in Tamil Nadu.
Oct 31, 2008 Copyright:www.security-risks.com
Overview
As the existence of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in the north became precarious, the continuing war affecting over 200,000 Tamils living in LTTE controlled touched off an upsurge of protest in Tamil Nadu with almost all political parties lending a hand. The LTTE happy at these developments tried to project its demand for immediate ceasefire through local politicians in the state. And M Karunanidhi, the chief minister, always sympathetic to the cause of Eelam Tamils, gave an ultimatum to the Centre threatening to pull out his Dravida Munnetra Kazagham (DMK) party members from the parliament by end October 2008 if the war was not stopped. Resignation of DMK members could have affected the survival of Dr Manmohan Singh’s ruling coalition in Delhi. So there was a flurry of diplomatic and political activity in Delhi, Chennai and Colombo.
However, the Centre managed to assuage the feelings of Tamil Nadu with some adroit diplomacy with Sri Lanka. After discussions with the Sri Lanka Presidential advisor Basil Rajapaksa at Delhi, the two countries issued a joint statement. Sri Lanka agreed to take all measures to ensure the safety and well being of Tamils affected in the war zone and speed up the devolution process for equitable rights to Tamils. India decided to despatch 80 tons of relief material to the affected people. Significantly the question of ceasefire did not figure in the statement. The LTTE has continued to kindle the embers of sympathy in Tamil Nadu; even political parties distancing themselves from the LTTE have continued to keep the issue alive in their activities. However, in Sri Lanka the President has probably politically gained more mileage out of this as he had shown his ability to keep India politically at bay despite Tamil Nadu politicians pin pricks.
The rapid progress of the Sri Lanka security forces in the Northern Province ran into twin troubles to slow them down on their tracks during October 2008. The northeast monsoon rains came down heavily affecting the cross country mobility of the security forces operating west of A9 Kandy –Jaffna highway. The monsoon rains in spurts are likely to continue the whole of November which could slow down the operations of the security forces. The security forces encountered heavy resistance on a defence line approximately 13 km from Kilinochchi and suffered heavy casualties.
Military Operations
Despite establishing contact by mid September 2008, advancing troops were held up for nearly six weeks due to stiff resistance in the outer defences of the LTTE in area Akkarayankulam Lake, roughly 15 km from Kilinochchi, the administrative capital. The rains further added to their woes. After suffering heavy casualties the security forces managed to capture the heights of bunds around the lake only by end October. This should ease their forward movement whenever there is a break in the rainfall.
The advancing security forces in this sector encountered LTTE defences based on bunds across both the approaches west of Kilinochchi. One bund of about 17 km long extended from Nachchikuda on the north-western coast to Akkarayankulam.
Task Force I advancing towards Pooneryn trying to by pass the heavily fortified Nachikuda base had to neutralise defences based on the obstacle at Kambivelliyavillu, Pandiveddiaru, Maninyankulam, Vannerikulam, and Jeyapuram with stiff opposition. Surrounded on three sides, the LTTE vacated the Nachikuda base on October 29. With the loss of this base the LTTE control on the northwest coast from Silvattuai to the Pooneryn salient is practically finished. This would result in denial of the coast to smuggle LTTE supplies as well as an alternate route to infiltrate Jaffna. The access to the road would also facilitate faster build up of offensive against Pooneryn located14 km from Nachikuda.
On the Welioya sector, 59 Division managed to further consolidate their area expanding it progressively. With the capture of Gajabapura, the division is established in secure area up to Nayaru lagoon. As the lagoon ridden Mullaitivu coast line would be affected by monsoon and as they troop strength is inadequate, the division is unlikely to launch major offensives at least till December.
A single light aircraft of the LTTE air wing on October 30 made a sneak raid and dropped two bombs damaging two turbines of the Kelanitissa power plant. This has resulted in interruption of electricity power supply for nearly six months. The same sortie also managed to bomb Thalladi military base in Mannar Sector. Despite detection by Sri Lankan radars and being airborne for more than one hour, the LTTE aircraft evaded the F7 interceptor. It failed to shoot down the raider as its missile could not lock on the taarget. This would indicate serious flaws in the security forces air defence system and poor training of pilots of air force. This air raid though not a major success would undoubtedly boost the morale of the LTTE.
However, the naval machine gunners on board two merchant vessels gave a better account in repelling a suicide raid by three Sea Tiger boats off Myliddy near Kankesanturai port in Jaffna peninsula on October 22. They sank one and drove off two other boats which tried to raid the ships carrying food supplies for Jaffna.
LTTE
The LTTE appears to have cleverly used the ground and the monsoon rains to its advantage. It managed to inflict heavy casualties particularly in 57 Divisions battles based around the Akkarayankulam lake area. Only in the third week of October the Division could breakthrough the defences and push the LTTE from the defences. In a single operation in this area on Oct 19, the security forces lost '33 soldiers as against the LTTE’s loss of 12 cadres. In addition 48 soldiers were injured and three were missing, which would mean loss of one company of troops. However, given the force level constraints and sheer numerical superiority of the security forces, it is doubtful whether the LTTE can afford to mount such costly encounters in future in this sector.
In this front, the LTTE appears to have used CS gas against the assaulting troops. CS is not a prohibited item in the international protocol on chemical warfare. Basically an irritant, a type of tear gas, it is used by police in some countries for crowd control. It is not clear how useful it is as without gas masks for the defenders.
After the successful suicide attack killing retired Lt Gen Janaka Perera and 27 other civilians on September 26 in Anuradhapura, the LTTE carried out another attack on Maithripala Sirisena, Minister of Agricultural Development Maithripala Sirisena, Minister of Agricultural Development & Agrarian Services Development and General Secretary of the ruling Sri Lanka Freedom Party in the outskirts of Colombo on October 9. However, except for the suicide bomber no one else was killed though five others were injured. The anti terrorism police have also recovered a cleverly improvised ‘book bomb’ from a Jaffna school teacher working in Bandarawela. This would indicate that despite the stepped up security the LTTE would continue its efforts at sabotage and suicide attacks.
Future portends
The obstacle based defence extending from Nachikuda to Akkarayankulam and further up across the road communication up to A9 highway near Iranamadu indicate the LTTE had selected this line for halting the advancing Sri Lanka forces. Though the LTTE caused heavy casualties probably in the proportion of at least two Sri Lankan soldiers for every cadre killed, the laid back defensive position has given away too much territory at too low a price for the security forces. In the bargain the LTTE failed to defend the vital north-western coastal supply route from Silvatturai to Nachikuda vital for retaining their conventional capability. This would indicate perhaps the LTTE would cause maximum casualty in the operations in the coming weeks till the monsoon runs out of rains in December and then pull back to the jungles of Mullaitivu.
The slow and cautious progress of the security forces in earlier months for keeping the casualties low has resulted in their main battle for Kilinochchi to be fought in adverse weather conditions. As a result they have lesser air and artillery support and reduced mobility. As the A32 axis along the coast is wide open now after the fall of Nachikuda, we can expect the LTTE to take on the security forces in area Pooneryn. Loss of Pooneryn would mean the loss of LTTE ability to carryout artillery strikes against the Palali air base. This could also result in losing the ability to engage the administrative echelons of 53 and 54 divisions deployed against the Muhamalai-Elephant Pass/Nagarkovil front in the north.
The ability of the LTTE air wing to carry out sneak attack despite use of air defence measures should be a cause for concern for the Sri Lankans. We can expect the LTTE to carry out a dramatic attack against some of the valuable targets including VIPs, ports and defence headquarters in Colombo.
With the erosion of their ability in the Gulf of Mannar LTTE Sea Tigers appear to be trying to stage a comeback in northern coast line of Jaffna. Though risky, Jaffna coast provides alternate access to Vedaranyam in Tamil Nadu coast, east of the controversial Rama Sethu. We can expect this coast line to become active with more encounters between the Sri Lanka Navy and the Sea Tigers, as the LTTE’s logistic pressure increases. We can expect the LTTE to try to indirectly overcome this by whipping up agitation in Tamil Nadu by pro-LTTE elements. However, despite political polemics both the state and central governments appear to be firm in strictly curbing the resurgence of LTTE activity in Tamil Nadu.
According to the data of UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, as on Oct 24 in all 144,560 persons belonging to Kilinochchi district alone have been displaced due to war. This figure is likely to swell to over two lakhs in the coming moths and a major humanitarian tragedy may be in the offing. That could stir up political protests further in Tamil Nadu.
Oct 31, 2008 Copyright:www.security-risks.com
Monday, December 1, 2008
Mumbai terror strike and Prabhakaran's expectations of India's support
The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) chief Prabhakaran's usually much hyped Great Hero's Day 2008 speech on November 27 became a casualty of the daring terror strike on the same day in Mumbai. Holding the city to ransom for three days the terror story hogged headlines and only few of the Indian print media carried Prabhakaran's speech on the sidelines, while the visual media ignored it.
And this time he needed the ears of New Delhi, more than Tamil Nadu, to act upon his strong plea for India's support for his armed struggle and lifting the Indian ban on the LTTE. Actually this was the central theme of his, otherwise recycled, annual speech.
The Manmohan Singh coalition is fighting a battle to survive the ground swell of criticism for its abysmally poor performance in handling the Mumbai terror strike. In a knee jerk reaction so typical of New Delhi, long standing proposals to strengthen the counter terror apparatus at the Centre and the states are hurriedly being resurrected. With the general elections in another three months, no Indian political party can afford any more to soft pedal terrorism of any hue – religious, ideological or ethnic. The national impact of the Mumbai terror raid is so strong that policy makers from now onwards can only take a hard line on activities of terrorist organisations. And in India that includes the LTTE, whose conduct had qualified it to be banned as a terrorist organisation. Only recently the Delhi High Court has upheld the ban on the LTTE.
The first counter measures against terror are already in the pipeline and relate to coastal and marine terrorism. Stricter control of illegal entrants, tightening of security at airports and harbours, tightening of shipping and fisheries control, and tougher vetting of visitors from neighbouring countries would probably follow. The proposed federal agency for integrating the national response to terror attacks and expansion of the reach of the counter terror force - the Natinal Security Guard (NSG) to the metros might take a little more time to come through. But surely come they will, for the government had been dithering on these issues for years now.
And all this is bad news for Prabhakaran's mission to win friends and influence people in India.
Happy at the resurgence of political support in Tamil Nadu for the LTTE, Prabhakaran called it a "great changes taking place in India." Prabhakaran is probably expecting greater acceptance of the LTTE in Tamil Nadu encouraged by the revival of pro-LTTE elements in Tamil Nadu as the "dormant voices in support of our struggle" re-emerging aloud again, as he termed them.
Perhaps in a bid to save the face of Tamil Nadu leaders who are demanding immediate ceasefire, he explained his readiness to talk peace, after listing out the record of failed peace efforts in the past. He stressed that Tamil genocide was taking place as a result of the war, to strike a chord among Tamils everywhere.
It is significant that Prabhkaran wants India's help on his own terms as there is not a word of regret or remorse in the speech for his own betrayal of India when it had actively intervened in support of the Tamil cause in the past. He has not even provided a fig leaf of apology for the role of LTTE in the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, former Indian prime minister on the soil of Tamil Nadu.
It is out of question for any politician in India to ask people to wish away (as Prabhakaran had done) not only the Rajiv assassination but also the LTTE's black record of killings of his own kind let alone his opponents, Tamil or otherwise. This attitudinal problem of Prabhakaran will make it difficult for any worthwhile Tamil politician to openly express support for the LTTE, even if the ban on the LTTE is lifted. Many Sri Lankan Tamils apparently consider these issues as not germane to their struggle which has been militarily taken over by the LTTE.
But across the Palk Straits it is still considered as the LTTE's unacceptable conduct, particularly when it had depended upon India's goodwill for its survival, not once, but many times in the past. Prabhakaran's refusal to recognize this is manifest in his description of the earlier Indian interventions as "injurious to the people of Tamil Eelam, as well as to their struggle." Obviously this was to justify his collusion with President Premadasa, of the same "racist Sinhala state, "to throw out the Indian forces which went to Sri Lanka to help Tamils. Not only that, his love-hate thoughts on India were evident when he blamed "the racist Sinhala state, with its intrigues, conspired to bring enmity between our freedom movement and the earlier Indian administration." So his platitudes of India "the super power" sound hollow.
Prabhakaran has castigated "some countries which identified themselves as so-called Peace Sponsors, rushed into activities which impaired negotiations." Obviously this was a reference to the U.S. and the EU who have banned the LTTE as a terrorist organisation. They have also busted LTTE clandestine arms procurement rings and clamped down its front organisations including some NGOs. He probably felt no more confident of influencing them to mend their ways in favour of the LTTE.
As a corollary, his need for India to bale him out is more than ever before as the security forces are closing in on the LTTE bastion at Kilinochchi.
So it was not surprising to read that he had "great expectations that the Indian super power will take a positive stand on our national question." Probably, he expects further political pressure from Tamil Nadu to influence India. He felt Tamil Nadu "has taken heart to rise on behalf of our people at this hour of need. This timely intervention has gratified the people of Tamil Eelam and our freedom movement and given us a sense of relief." Of course Sri Lankan Tamils plight is dear to the heart of Tamils but not the self-inflicted plight of the LTTE.
Though India has unequivocally stated that it was against the creation of an independent Tamil Eelam, the LTTE leader had "cordially" requested them "to raise their voice firmly in favour of our struggle for a Tamil Eelam state, and to take appropriate and positive measures to remove the ban which remains an impediment to an amicable relationship between India and our movement." Does he really believe in his call? Or a stray event like the celebration of his birthday by a group of lawyers in the Madras High Court has kindled his high expectations? Prabhakaran is too shrewd for that. All this hype built over Indian support is probably to boost up his constituency among expatriate Tamils and the LTTE cadres battling it out in Wanni under adverse conditions.
The Great Heroes Day statement only shows that despite his strategic blunders Prabhakaran is yet to introspect and come to term with the dynamics of sub-continental reality. If he wants Indian support he has to change his script drastically. And it has to be on India's terms, not his. That might well be an academic question in the case of Prabhkaran.
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cnotes5%5Cnote484.html
And this time he needed the ears of New Delhi, more than Tamil Nadu, to act upon his strong plea for India's support for his armed struggle and lifting the Indian ban on the LTTE. Actually this was the central theme of his, otherwise recycled, annual speech.
The Manmohan Singh coalition is fighting a battle to survive the ground swell of criticism for its abysmally poor performance in handling the Mumbai terror strike. In a knee jerk reaction so typical of New Delhi, long standing proposals to strengthen the counter terror apparatus at the Centre and the states are hurriedly being resurrected. With the general elections in another three months, no Indian political party can afford any more to soft pedal terrorism of any hue – religious, ideological or ethnic. The national impact of the Mumbai terror raid is so strong that policy makers from now onwards can only take a hard line on activities of terrorist organisations. And in India that includes the LTTE, whose conduct had qualified it to be banned as a terrorist organisation. Only recently the Delhi High Court has upheld the ban on the LTTE.
The first counter measures against terror are already in the pipeline and relate to coastal and marine terrorism. Stricter control of illegal entrants, tightening of security at airports and harbours, tightening of shipping and fisheries control, and tougher vetting of visitors from neighbouring countries would probably follow. The proposed federal agency for integrating the national response to terror attacks and expansion of the reach of the counter terror force - the Natinal Security Guard (NSG) to the metros might take a little more time to come through. But surely come they will, for the government had been dithering on these issues for years now.
And all this is bad news for Prabhakaran's mission to win friends and influence people in India.
Happy at the resurgence of political support in Tamil Nadu for the LTTE, Prabhakaran called it a "great changes taking place in India." Prabhakaran is probably expecting greater acceptance of the LTTE in Tamil Nadu encouraged by the revival of pro-LTTE elements in Tamil Nadu as the "dormant voices in support of our struggle" re-emerging aloud again, as he termed them.
Perhaps in a bid to save the face of Tamil Nadu leaders who are demanding immediate ceasefire, he explained his readiness to talk peace, after listing out the record of failed peace efforts in the past. He stressed that Tamil genocide was taking place as a result of the war, to strike a chord among Tamils everywhere.
It is significant that Prabhkaran wants India's help on his own terms as there is not a word of regret or remorse in the speech for his own betrayal of India when it had actively intervened in support of the Tamil cause in the past. He has not even provided a fig leaf of apology for the role of LTTE in the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, former Indian prime minister on the soil of Tamil Nadu.
It is out of question for any politician in India to ask people to wish away (as Prabhakaran had done) not only the Rajiv assassination but also the LTTE's black record of killings of his own kind let alone his opponents, Tamil or otherwise. This attitudinal problem of Prabhakaran will make it difficult for any worthwhile Tamil politician to openly express support for the LTTE, even if the ban on the LTTE is lifted. Many Sri Lankan Tamils apparently consider these issues as not germane to their struggle which has been militarily taken over by the LTTE.
But across the Palk Straits it is still considered as the LTTE's unacceptable conduct, particularly when it had depended upon India's goodwill for its survival, not once, but many times in the past. Prabhakaran's refusal to recognize this is manifest in his description of the earlier Indian interventions as "injurious to the people of Tamil Eelam, as well as to their struggle." Obviously this was to justify his collusion with President Premadasa, of the same "racist Sinhala state, "to throw out the Indian forces which went to Sri Lanka to help Tamils. Not only that, his love-hate thoughts on India were evident when he blamed "the racist Sinhala state, with its intrigues, conspired to bring enmity between our freedom movement and the earlier Indian administration." So his platitudes of India "the super power" sound hollow.
Prabhakaran has castigated "some countries which identified themselves as so-called Peace Sponsors, rushed into activities which impaired negotiations." Obviously this was a reference to the U.S. and the EU who have banned the LTTE as a terrorist organisation. They have also busted LTTE clandestine arms procurement rings and clamped down its front organisations including some NGOs. He probably felt no more confident of influencing them to mend their ways in favour of the LTTE.
As a corollary, his need for India to bale him out is more than ever before as the security forces are closing in on the LTTE bastion at Kilinochchi.
So it was not surprising to read that he had "great expectations that the Indian super power will take a positive stand on our national question." Probably, he expects further political pressure from Tamil Nadu to influence India. He felt Tamil Nadu "has taken heart to rise on behalf of our people at this hour of need. This timely intervention has gratified the people of Tamil Eelam and our freedom movement and given us a sense of relief." Of course Sri Lankan Tamils plight is dear to the heart of Tamils but not the self-inflicted plight of the LTTE.
Though India has unequivocally stated that it was against the creation of an independent Tamil Eelam, the LTTE leader had "cordially" requested them "to raise their voice firmly in favour of our struggle for a Tamil Eelam state, and to take appropriate and positive measures to remove the ban which remains an impediment to an amicable relationship between India and our movement." Does he really believe in his call? Or a stray event like the celebration of his birthday by a group of lawyers in the Madras High Court has kindled his high expectations? Prabhakaran is too shrewd for that. All this hype built over Indian support is probably to boost up his constituency among expatriate Tamils and the LTTE cadres battling it out in Wanni under adverse conditions.
The Great Heroes Day statement only shows that despite his strategic blunders Prabhakaran is yet to introspect and come to term with the dynamics of sub-continental reality. If he wants Indian support he has to change his script drastically. And it has to be on India's terms, not his. That might well be an academic question in the case of Prabhkaran.
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cnotes5%5Cnote484.html
Wednesday, November 19, 2008
Sri Lanka: An Analysis of Military Situation
Operational situation
As expected Task Force-I of the Sri Lanka security forces captured Pooneryn on November 15 freeing A32 highway from the control of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). But the security forces used the continued spell of fine weather and the newly raised Task Force-3 to capture of Mankulam, a key junction on the A9 Kandy-Jaffna lifeline on November 17. On the eastern seaboard of Mullaitivu district, 59 Division captured Mulliyavalai village, 10 km from Mullaitivu, the key coastal town of the area.
These developments in three different axes substantively increase the strategic options available to the security forces. All of them will also add to the pressure on the LTTE already beleaguered in its last footholds in Kilinochchi-Elephant Pass on the arterial road of A9. Once, A9 road is opened up under the security forces control, the hold of the LTTE on the jugular of Jaffna’s normal life will be lost. As a corollary it will also lose its relevance to the peninsular population.
The opening of the A32 Mannar-Pooneryn route will substantively reduce the logistic burden on the security forces, easing pressure on their limited airlift capability. Task Force-I can provide flank support to 57 Divison’s thrust on Kilinochchi from the southwest. Its artillery and possibly machine guns can also interdict the escape routes of LTTE cadres through the lagoon waters when 53 Division strikes along the northern axis of Muhamalai-Elephant Pass.
The capture Mankulam provides two options for the Task Force-III to progress operations along A9 axis in support of 53 Division offensive from the north, and or support from Mankulam side the 57 Division offensive on Kilionchchi-Elephant Pass from southwest. But the more likely course of the Task Force-III will be to develop a threat to the heartland of the LTTE from Mankulam to the east along road Mankulam-Oddusuddan-Mullaitivu. This would prevent any LTTE counter stroke developing on the Kilinochchi offensive, and also tie down the LTTE when 59 Division launches offensive from area Mulliyavalai where a number of roads converge increasing offensive options.
Thus with some quick successes the security forces have built up a five division strong threat against the LTTE with adequate reserves to hold the ground freed from the control of the insurgents.
In my analysis on the failure of the security forces' half-hearted divisional offensive along axis Muhamalai-Elephant Pass in April 2008 (SAAG Note No 447 of May 29, 2008 “Sri Lanka: An analysis of military operations – Update No. 141” available at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/notes5/note447.html ), I had said
“The strong defences of LTTE in Muhamalai axis to Kilinochchi show that it is not going to allow easy passage through. Strategically, the security forces will have to probably consider coordinating the Jaffna offensive along A9 with offensive along A32-Pooneryn to enhance the threat to Kilinochichi and weaken the LTTE defences. Whether the security forces have the wherewithal to carry out such a complex operation is the question only the Army commander can answer best.”
The security forces appear to have done just that after seven months, during which three divisions have been inducted into battle to increase the force level and thrust lines. And now the security forces goal would be not merely to capture Paranthan and Kilinochchi on A9 highway but to launch multiple offensives on the Muhamalai-Elephant Pass-Kilinochchi complex to restore normal life in Northern Province. And when that materializes, President Rajapaksa may give form to media speculations of a general election.
LTTE’s limited options
As the LTTE had been fighting mainly delaying actions the security forces casualties in the operation would be maximized if only the LTTE decides on a do-or-die stand at Kilinochchi. In the past, the LTTE tactics had always been to pull back after fighting delaying actions and build up a strong counterstroke. This had kindled widespread expectations of such a LTTE strike which is yet to come.
While this had succeeded in the earlier war, this time around the security forces appear to be ready to prevent a replay of the same script. There are three reasons for this: the security forces are not carrying through the offensive with the same troops holding static positions; they have multiple axes as well as substantive strength to deflate a counter stroke and lastly, the offensive capability of the Sea Tigers who provided vital support has been substantively eliminated on both the western and eastern coasts. (In fact, the security forces have neutralized repeated efforts of the Sea Tigers to take any initiative in the sea along the eastern coast north of Mullaitivu from Champianpattu to Nayaru where the LTTE still has some freedom to operate.)
With A32 road in the hands of security forces and with 59 Division along the east coast (and probably 55 Division too from Nagarkovil southwards) and the navy denying the LTTE access to sea routes of overseas supply to sustain the war, the LTTE’s options appear very limited. Strategically the LTTE would probably be better off to consolidate its armed strength after fighting a delaying action than defend Kilinochchi strongly and further deplete its dwindling strength. But that would be a decision based on military logic and reasoning rather than on the convoluted logic of an insurgent force operating on a different plane. So strictly speaking it is difficult to read Prabhakaran’s mind. It would be overambitious to expect him to again pull a rabbit out of the hat with a masterful counter stroke at this belated stage as some of his overseas supporters expect him to do.
Political implications of military success
Undoubtedly, military successes one after the other have strengthened the hands of President Rajapaksa and the hawks in Sri Lanka politics. Thus even the consideration of any peace move would be shelved till military success is taken to its logical conclusion of making the LTTE irrelevant. This has been amply made clear by the President in his statements on a number of occasions. The military successes have also strengthened President’s resolve to pursue the war. They have also exposed the limitations of India’s ability to influence the course of events.
The delicate pulls and pressures of coalition politics on the central government and the Tamil Nadu government so close to the parliamentary elections have prevented the emergence of any substantive Indian political initiative on Sri Lanka. In Tamil Nadu there is widespread dismay at the plight of lakhs of Tamils deprived of their homes, livelihood, and shelter caught in the wilderness of battle zones. It is easy to dismiss the snowballing public protests and hunger strikes organized in Tamil Nadu asking for a ceasefire in Sri Lanka as part of Prabhakaran’s strategy or as political gimmick of local parties. However that would be ignoring the mindset of large sections of people in the state who abhor his style of mindless killings while feeling genuinely distressed over the plight of internally displaced Tamils in Sri Lanka.
The Tamil and Sinhala polity in Sri Lanka have not been able to work out a political strategy for evolving a win-win formula either among themselves or collectively to foster a feeling of security and trust among Tamil population. Some sections of them, particularly Tamil leaders, expect India and everyone other than themselves to undertake this delicate task. No external force including India on their own can generate security and trust among the population.
Ultimately Sri Lanka has to come to terms with the issues and evolve a process by which a suitable environment for lasting peace is created and this will not be helped by military victories alone. Till then the military options avidly pursued by both sides for achieving short term ends will dominate the national scene And even if the Fourth Eelam War is won by the Sri Lankan government, ultimately the loser would be the nation as a section of the people would not to trust their rulers or feel secure under them. And that might sow the seeds of the next round of war.
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cnotes5%5Cnote482.html
As expected Task Force-I of the Sri Lanka security forces captured Pooneryn on November 15 freeing A32 highway from the control of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). But the security forces used the continued spell of fine weather and the newly raised Task Force-3 to capture of Mankulam, a key junction on the A9 Kandy-Jaffna lifeline on November 17. On the eastern seaboard of Mullaitivu district, 59 Division captured Mulliyavalai village, 10 km from Mullaitivu, the key coastal town of the area.
These developments in three different axes substantively increase the strategic options available to the security forces. All of them will also add to the pressure on the LTTE already beleaguered in its last footholds in Kilinochchi-Elephant Pass on the arterial road of A9. Once, A9 road is opened up under the security forces control, the hold of the LTTE on the jugular of Jaffna’s normal life will be lost. As a corollary it will also lose its relevance to the peninsular population.
The opening of the A32 Mannar-Pooneryn route will substantively reduce the logistic burden on the security forces, easing pressure on their limited airlift capability. Task Force-I can provide flank support to 57 Divison’s thrust on Kilinochchi from the southwest. Its artillery and possibly machine guns can also interdict the escape routes of LTTE cadres through the lagoon waters when 53 Division strikes along the northern axis of Muhamalai-Elephant Pass.
The capture Mankulam provides two options for the Task Force-III to progress operations along A9 axis in support of 53 Division offensive from the north, and or support from Mankulam side the 57 Division offensive on Kilionchchi-Elephant Pass from southwest. But the more likely course of the Task Force-III will be to develop a threat to the heartland of the LTTE from Mankulam to the east along road Mankulam-Oddusuddan-Mullaitivu. This would prevent any LTTE counter stroke developing on the Kilinochchi offensive, and also tie down the LTTE when 59 Division launches offensive from area Mulliyavalai where a number of roads converge increasing offensive options.
Thus with some quick successes the security forces have built up a five division strong threat against the LTTE with adequate reserves to hold the ground freed from the control of the insurgents.
In my analysis on the failure of the security forces' half-hearted divisional offensive along axis Muhamalai-Elephant Pass in April 2008 (SAAG Note No 447 of May 29, 2008 “Sri Lanka: An analysis of military operations – Update No. 141” available at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/notes5/note447.html ), I had said
“The strong defences of LTTE in Muhamalai axis to Kilinochchi show that it is not going to allow easy passage through. Strategically, the security forces will have to probably consider coordinating the Jaffna offensive along A9 with offensive along A32-Pooneryn to enhance the threat to Kilinochichi and weaken the LTTE defences. Whether the security forces have the wherewithal to carry out such a complex operation is the question only the Army commander can answer best.”
The security forces appear to have done just that after seven months, during which three divisions have been inducted into battle to increase the force level and thrust lines. And now the security forces goal would be not merely to capture Paranthan and Kilinochchi on A9 highway but to launch multiple offensives on the Muhamalai-Elephant Pass-Kilinochchi complex to restore normal life in Northern Province. And when that materializes, President Rajapaksa may give form to media speculations of a general election.
LTTE’s limited options
As the LTTE had been fighting mainly delaying actions the security forces casualties in the operation would be maximized if only the LTTE decides on a do-or-die stand at Kilinochchi. In the past, the LTTE tactics had always been to pull back after fighting delaying actions and build up a strong counterstroke. This had kindled widespread expectations of such a LTTE strike which is yet to come.
While this had succeeded in the earlier war, this time around the security forces appear to be ready to prevent a replay of the same script. There are three reasons for this: the security forces are not carrying through the offensive with the same troops holding static positions; they have multiple axes as well as substantive strength to deflate a counter stroke and lastly, the offensive capability of the Sea Tigers who provided vital support has been substantively eliminated on both the western and eastern coasts. (In fact, the security forces have neutralized repeated efforts of the Sea Tigers to take any initiative in the sea along the eastern coast north of Mullaitivu from Champianpattu to Nayaru where the LTTE still has some freedom to operate.)
With A32 road in the hands of security forces and with 59 Division along the east coast (and probably 55 Division too from Nagarkovil southwards) and the navy denying the LTTE access to sea routes of overseas supply to sustain the war, the LTTE’s options appear very limited. Strategically the LTTE would probably be better off to consolidate its armed strength after fighting a delaying action than defend Kilinochchi strongly and further deplete its dwindling strength. But that would be a decision based on military logic and reasoning rather than on the convoluted logic of an insurgent force operating on a different plane. So strictly speaking it is difficult to read Prabhakaran’s mind. It would be overambitious to expect him to again pull a rabbit out of the hat with a masterful counter stroke at this belated stage as some of his overseas supporters expect him to do.
Political implications of military success
Undoubtedly, military successes one after the other have strengthened the hands of President Rajapaksa and the hawks in Sri Lanka politics. Thus even the consideration of any peace move would be shelved till military success is taken to its logical conclusion of making the LTTE irrelevant. This has been amply made clear by the President in his statements on a number of occasions. The military successes have also strengthened President’s resolve to pursue the war. They have also exposed the limitations of India’s ability to influence the course of events.
The delicate pulls and pressures of coalition politics on the central government and the Tamil Nadu government so close to the parliamentary elections have prevented the emergence of any substantive Indian political initiative on Sri Lanka. In Tamil Nadu there is widespread dismay at the plight of lakhs of Tamils deprived of their homes, livelihood, and shelter caught in the wilderness of battle zones. It is easy to dismiss the snowballing public protests and hunger strikes organized in Tamil Nadu asking for a ceasefire in Sri Lanka as part of Prabhakaran’s strategy or as political gimmick of local parties. However that would be ignoring the mindset of large sections of people in the state who abhor his style of mindless killings while feeling genuinely distressed over the plight of internally displaced Tamils in Sri Lanka.
The Tamil and Sinhala polity in Sri Lanka have not been able to work out a political strategy for evolving a win-win formula either among themselves or collectively to foster a feeling of security and trust among Tamil population. Some sections of them, particularly Tamil leaders, expect India and everyone other than themselves to undertake this delicate task. No external force including India on their own can generate security and trust among the population.
Ultimately Sri Lanka has to come to terms with the issues and evolve a process by which a suitable environment for lasting peace is created and this will not be helped by military victories alone. Till then the military options avidly pursued by both sides for achieving short term ends will dominate the national scene And even if the Fourth Eelam War is won by the Sri Lankan government, ultimately the loser would be the nation as a section of the people would not to trust their rulers or feel secure under them. And that might sow the seeds of the next round of war.
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cnotes5%5Cnote482.html
Thursday, November 13, 2008
First Things First in Fighting Terrorism
In spite of confronting extremism and terrorism for over three decades, the government and the administration both at the Centre and states appear to be unable to tackle the problem. This lassitude appear to have spread to the preventive, investigative and operational aspects. The macabre story of terrorist bomb blasts that started in New Delhi in 2005 has continued with increasing frequency in Mumbai, Jaipur, Ahmedabad and again at Delhi during the years that followed. These acts have only reinforced the popular impression that the administration was groping in the dark about how to tackle the terrorists. Many saw that clumsiness rather than organised follow up action as the hallmarks of administration’s response to terrorism.
The national response after every major terror attack vividly shows all that is wrong with this “Indian” response. Usually it starts with immediate visual media coverage of the scene with the public and policemen milling around the blast site. Invariably a serving or retired police officer would be called upon to comment on the blast even as the news trickled in. A senior police officer would cut in to announce the suspected involvement of one of the Jihadi terrorist groups in the blast. Police assessments would be freely given even as half baked information crawled on the news strip at the bottom of the TV screen. The Union Home Ministry not to be left out would say a warning about the impending terror attack was given to the state authorities. Usually, a prompt denial by the state government would follow the claims of New Delhi. Unfazed the Home Ministry would call for an immediate meeting of either state home ministers or heads of police in Delhi to ‘improve the system.’
The Union Home Minister or his junior partner would come on the TV to say the nation would not bow to terrorist elements and assure “all assistance” to the state to combat terrorism. The state police would triumphantly announce a series arrests of suspected terrorists . If the body count due to the attack was large, the prime minister would appeal to the nation to be calm and maintain communal harmony. Of course, the opposition and ruling parties at the Centre and states would trade accusations and allegations of failure to rein in terrorists. Everyone would talk of failure and incompetence of intelligence and security agencies and stress the need to coordinate their work. If the damage to public reputation is serious, a group of ministers would be formed to look into some perennial issues like revamping national security and intelligence agencies.
When dust settles on the event and the media focus shifts to the next non-event of a Bollywood scandal, the whole nation would go into a comatose state. And the government at the centre and state, presumably giving a silent sigh of relief, would carry on as before till the next blast hits the headlines. The whole exercise in futility must be heart breaking for serious minded civil servants and security services members. The administration is seen as pliable, helpless, and ineffective body. This makes it more difficult for them to motivate their teams. Glorification of the terrorist in public mind is a more dangerous consequence of when such attitude is firmed in. As the terrorist gains a larger than life image, witnesses are unnerved stalling progress in the case. This self defeating cycle has resulted in separatists and terrorists scoring brownie points in their ‘war’ against the state.
Though one can fault the Gujarat administration on a few issues, on tackling terrorism it has shown foresight and planning. This had enabled the police to quickly take follow up actions not only in investigating of the Ahmedabad serial blasts of July 2008 but dig deep into terrorists’ ramifications. The follow up actions were at three levels: coordinating the stakeholders, intelligence and investigative agencies at the Centre and states connected with the whole series of blasts; correlating forensic findings, and coordinating a series of arrests of local activists connected with the case in a number of states.
Terrorism is operatively different from insurgency and other forms of extremism. It corrodes the relationship between the state and its citizen to destroy the security and trust of the citizen in the government through physical violence and intimidation. Terrorism cannot be eliminated only by developmental economic tools or educating the public, though they reduce the relevancy of terrorist cause to the people. The state has to deter, discourage, dismantle and defeat the terrorists from destabilizing normal life of the people.
Terrorists are able to proactively operate because they have clarity on what they should do, how they should do and who will do them. To effectively handle terrorism, the state has to match, if not surpass, the terrorists’ clarity of purpose. Such clarity of what is required to be done, who will do it and how it will be done should percolate down to the lowest operational level.
My own experience in Sri Lanka as head of intelligence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force, which had a hazy mandate, taught me a few valuable lessons. A green field intelligence operation takes about 18 months to mature. But in the overseas turf of Sri Lanka, the time frame had to be compressed to one year. On assignment, I prepared a task table identifying as I saw ‘things to do.’ There were 223 items from the mundane to the complex. The duration of each task varied from a few hours (to get a chair and a table for my use and rustle up a telephone!) to three years. This rationalisation process enabled me to go ahead with some clarity on the what-who-how tasking. A few items were added as they appeared and the prioritisation was juggled to fit in demands of a changing operational environment.
Time is a valuable resource available to both terrorists and security administrators. Success comes to those who effectively use time as a resource. Real time response to information can come only if data base management is planned well in advance. Modern information management systems provide this advantage to the administrator. Only he has to get out his conventional mindset to leverage such tools. Unforeseen bottle necks, unclear responsibility, absence of essential competencies and external resources, and lack of problem solving methodology are some of the time wasters. Time based management by objectives, monitoring of progress to reach milestones, and evolving dynamic standard operative procedures are some of other methods that could help the administrator to keep ahead of terrorists. A project management format could help in time management.
Everyone blames the politicians for undermining the rule of law and governance. This is true to certain extent, though politicians always reinforce success because its fall out benefits them. Gujarat has shown how much can be achieved even within the existing scheme of things. Gujarat’s organised approach has also benefited the unravelling of the Mujahiddin’s tentacles in many other states also. So in fighting terrorism, security administrators need to do first things first; that is to get organised. They need clarity of thought to evolve a ‘what-who-how’ methodology. And that does not require any external inputs, but the will to win.
Oct 13, 2008
Copyright: GFiles
The national response after every major terror attack vividly shows all that is wrong with this “Indian” response. Usually it starts with immediate visual media coverage of the scene with the public and policemen milling around the blast site. Invariably a serving or retired police officer would be called upon to comment on the blast even as the news trickled in. A senior police officer would cut in to announce the suspected involvement of one of the Jihadi terrorist groups in the blast. Police assessments would be freely given even as half baked information crawled on the news strip at the bottom of the TV screen. The Union Home Ministry not to be left out would say a warning about the impending terror attack was given to the state authorities. Usually, a prompt denial by the state government would follow the claims of New Delhi. Unfazed the Home Ministry would call for an immediate meeting of either state home ministers or heads of police in Delhi to ‘improve the system.’
The Union Home Minister or his junior partner would come on the TV to say the nation would not bow to terrorist elements and assure “all assistance” to the state to combat terrorism. The state police would triumphantly announce a series arrests of suspected terrorists . If the body count due to the attack was large, the prime minister would appeal to the nation to be calm and maintain communal harmony. Of course, the opposition and ruling parties at the Centre and states would trade accusations and allegations of failure to rein in terrorists. Everyone would talk of failure and incompetence of intelligence and security agencies and stress the need to coordinate their work. If the damage to public reputation is serious, a group of ministers would be formed to look into some perennial issues like revamping national security and intelligence agencies.
When dust settles on the event and the media focus shifts to the next non-event of a Bollywood scandal, the whole nation would go into a comatose state. And the government at the centre and state, presumably giving a silent sigh of relief, would carry on as before till the next blast hits the headlines. The whole exercise in futility must be heart breaking for serious minded civil servants and security services members. The administration is seen as pliable, helpless, and ineffective body. This makes it more difficult for them to motivate their teams. Glorification of the terrorist in public mind is a more dangerous consequence of when such attitude is firmed in. As the terrorist gains a larger than life image, witnesses are unnerved stalling progress in the case. This self defeating cycle has resulted in separatists and terrorists scoring brownie points in their ‘war’ against the state.
Though one can fault the Gujarat administration on a few issues, on tackling terrorism it has shown foresight and planning. This had enabled the police to quickly take follow up actions not only in investigating of the Ahmedabad serial blasts of July 2008 but dig deep into terrorists’ ramifications. The follow up actions were at three levels: coordinating the stakeholders, intelligence and investigative agencies at the Centre and states connected with the whole series of blasts; correlating forensic findings, and coordinating a series of arrests of local activists connected with the case in a number of states.
Terrorism is operatively different from insurgency and other forms of extremism. It corrodes the relationship between the state and its citizen to destroy the security and trust of the citizen in the government through physical violence and intimidation. Terrorism cannot be eliminated only by developmental economic tools or educating the public, though they reduce the relevancy of terrorist cause to the people. The state has to deter, discourage, dismantle and defeat the terrorists from destabilizing normal life of the people.
Terrorists are able to proactively operate because they have clarity on what they should do, how they should do and who will do them. To effectively handle terrorism, the state has to match, if not surpass, the terrorists’ clarity of purpose. Such clarity of what is required to be done, who will do it and how it will be done should percolate down to the lowest operational level.
My own experience in Sri Lanka as head of intelligence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force, which had a hazy mandate, taught me a few valuable lessons. A green field intelligence operation takes about 18 months to mature. But in the overseas turf of Sri Lanka, the time frame had to be compressed to one year. On assignment, I prepared a task table identifying as I saw ‘things to do.’ There were 223 items from the mundane to the complex. The duration of each task varied from a few hours (to get a chair and a table for my use and rustle up a telephone!) to three years. This rationalisation process enabled me to go ahead with some clarity on the what-who-how tasking. A few items were added as they appeared and the prioritisation was juggled to fit in demands of a changing operational environment.
Time is a valuable resource available to both terrorists and security administrators. Success comes to those who effectively use time as a resource. Real time response to information can come only if data base management is planned well in advance. Modern information management systems provide this advantage to the administrator. Only he has to get out his conventional mindset to leverage such tools. Unforeseen bottle necks, unclear responsibility, absence of essential competencies and external resources, and lack of problem solving methodology are some of the time wasters. Time based management by objectives, monitoring of progress to reach milestones, and evolving dynamic standard operative procedures are some of other methods that could help the administrator to keep ahead of terrorists. A project management format could help in time management.
Everyone blames the politicians for undermining the rule of law and governance. This is true to certain extent, though politicians always reinforce success because its fall out benefits them. Gujarat has shown how much can be achieved even within the existing scheme of things. Gujarat’s organised approach has also benefited the unravelling of the Mujahiddin’s tentacles in many other states also. So in fighting terrorism, security administrators need to do first things first; that is to get organised. They need clarity of thought to evolve a ‘what-who-how’ methodology. And that does not require any external inputs, but the will to win.
Oct 13, 2008
Copyright: GFiles
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