I have been writing a monthly assessment of the Sri Lanka situation for 'Security Trends' a strategic security journal published from New Delhi. They reflect my ability to assess the future course of events in Sri Lanka. These are written at the end of each month and contain an assessment on future trends. They are published here with the permission of the publishers. For copyright reasons the articles in this series may be reproduced with the permission of the publishers available at www.security-risks.com
Overview
August 2008 had been one of the most successful months for Sri Lanka President Mahinda Rajapaksa on both political and military fronts. The ruling United Peoples Freedom Alliance (UPFA) came out with thumping success, securing comfortable majority in the elections held during the month for the provincial councils in the North Central and Sabaragamuwa provinces. The continued success of the security forces in the northern offensive against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) during the month undoubtedly contributed to the electoral success of the President.
Having scored sizeable success in three provincial council elections held so far in 2008, there had been widespread speculation that the Present would call for general election to the parliament. However, President Rajapaksa had clarified that the general election would be held only in 2010 at the end of the tenure of the present parliament. As the President is now firmly in saddle having sidelined the two major political threats from the United National Party (UNP) and the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), the erstwhile supporter of the coalition rule, perhaps he felt that there was no need to go for a general election.
By end August 2008, the security forces appear to have firmly established themselves along line from area south of Nachikuda in Mannar Coast –Uyilankulam/ Akkarayankulam-Tunukkai west of A9 Kandy-Jaffna highway with three divisions. This is 12 km short of Kilinochchi, the administrative headquarters of the LTTE. In the Welioya sector in eastern Mullaitivu district, one division has successfully progressed to line Tannimurippukulam Lake-Andankulam- Jeevan Base-Southern end of Nayaru Lagoon and took charge of Uluthavely on the coast line further south. The months saw some fierce battles with the LTTE losing more cadres according to the defence sources.
The LTTE’s major offensive action has been limited to a daring raid by the LTTE’s air force which struck the Eastern Naval Headquarters at Trincomalee with two light aircraft. Though they dropped only two bombs out of which one failed, death of four sailors in the attack with injuries to 10 others came as a strong reminder that the LTTE has not yet been fully crippled. The raid also exposed the air defence setup for early warning, prevention and retaliation of the Air Tiger strikes as far from satisfactory.
On the international front, the 14th Conference of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) took place in Colombo during the first week of August 2008 without any major security snags. The President had reasons to be pleased with the focus of the conference on terrorism threat in South Asia. The successful conduct of the conference despite the internal strife has undoubtedly added another feather in the President’s cap.
India-Sri Lanka relations again came under the limelight for all the wrong reasons during and after the SAARC conference. Prior to the conference the proposal for a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) which would have brought a lot of synergy in trade between the two countries was hastily given up in the face of local opposition. Even as the conference was in progress, a security glitch saw the Indian National Security Advisor MK Narayanan stranded without a transport. He had to take a hotel taxi from the conference venue to return to his room. To add insult to injury he was asked to walk on foot as the taxi did not have security clearance to proceed to the hotel. While the Sri Lankan hosts apologized for the confusion, MK Narayanan figured in another unconnected sequel after his candid comments on the Sri Lanka war situation. In his interview to the Straits Times newspaper he said the victories in battle would not win the war till devolution of powers to Tamils is carried out. This created a mild flutter in the Colombo ruling circles.
Military Operations
The progress of offensive operations during the month was as under:
• In the Mannar Sector, Task Force-1 advanced further along the Mannar coast from Vellankulam along A32 Mannar-Poooneryn road. They are at present consolidating their position after capturing Mulankavil and are likely to take Nachikuda, the last of the Sea Tiger bases on this coast, in the next few days. That would give substance to their threat to Pooneryn. This is in tandem with the progress of the 57 Division which entered Mullaitivu (West) district by first week. After major engagements at Kalvilan, Tunukkai and Uyilankulam it is at Akkarayankulam taking the threat to Kilinochchi closer, by passing A9 axis from Mankulam to Kilinochchi on the east. All actions had two major advantages – air support and excellent use of commando troops particularly in the Task Force-1’s success. By the end of the month the troops of Task Force 2 had captured the important stronghold of Palamoddai, close to the A9 highway north of Omanthai. This opens up yet another option for security forces to progress the operations.
• On the Welioya sector, 59 Division managed to capture Jeevan Base, the fourth the LTTE stronghold to fall in the area. Further they progressed to Andankulam a major stronghold. The other three –Sugandan Base, Michael Base and Munnagam Base were captured in operations in May-July. Though the LTTE tactically vacated the bases, it would compel it to revert to non conventional operations in this area. By the end of the month, the division made further progress to take control of Uluthavely on the Kokkuthoduval coast. This would make the Sea Tiger operations off Mullaitivu even more difficult.
• Sri Lanka navy is slowly increasing its domination of the Mannar Bay north of Mannar extending short of Nachikuda, which were usually dominated by Sea Tiger operations. A minor naval raid on LTTE’s temporary post in Iranativu islet south of Delft Island showed that the naval support to major land operations on Pooneryn would probably be available.
These operations have shown that the security forces are increasingly confident of conducting of large scale operations on a wide front. More than ever before the security forces are in terrain that could delay counter attacks and are well poised to launch offensive on Pooneryn, Kilinochchi either singly or in coordination with a northern offensive along Muhamalai sector to catch the LTTE in an anvil. However they are more likely to develop a threat to Pooneryn and Kilinochchi simultaneously and exploit success in either front to progress further. After firming up their present position they are likely to resume the offensive in the next two weeks.
LTTE
The much awaited LTTE response to the security forces advance has not yet materialised. Their announcement of unilateral ceasefire during the SAARC was never taken seriously either by the Sri Lankans or the international community showing the further loss of respect for its military prowess.
If the LTTE intends halting the advance in order to retain strategic control on A9 highway, it has to launch counterattacks every time it loses of a defensive position even after it is lost. However, they do not enjoy either the force level or lethal firepower required to do so. As this author had maintained in the past, it will have to attempt to destabilise the advancing forces by hitting at place of its choosing in the long line of communication. This might well be made through in the gap east of the A9 highway between Omanthai and 59 Division in Welioya sector. This would probably enable a sizeable force to infiltrate to strike in A29 road in the heart of predominantly Sinhala inhabited north central province.
Viewed in the LTTE’s limitations discussed above, the moderately successful Air Tiger raid on Eastern Naval Headquarters in Trincomalee on August 26 assumes some significance. Two LTTE light aircraft carrying improvised bombs raided the Naval Headquarters in a sneak raid. Only one of them managed to drop two bombs in the living area of the base in which four sailors were killed while possibly 20 others were injured. The Navy appears to have picked them up 40 km short of the target and anti aircraft fire was brought on them. This appears to have made the completion of the LTTE mission only partly successful. Air force fighters which took off could not find them or engage them. Presumably the LTTE aircraft flew a flight path hugging the coast line which would be difficult to detect.
The raid has provided a ray of hope for the LTTE acolytes both at home and abroad. This moderate assertion has not come a day soon, as there had been talk of ‘after Kilinochchi what?’ in the air among them. Apart from this it has exposed serious flaws in the air defence network of the security forces particularly against raids by light aircraft flying below radar horizon. To overcome this, firmly committed air warning posts will have to be established along the air ingress routes of Vavuniya-Trincomalee districts boundaries using civil defence and police forces. Presumably this effort had not been effective and the LTTE are likely to exploit this gap.
Future portends
The erosion of the LTTE Sea Tigers ability to roam the Gulf of Mannar would be further curtailed with fall of Nachikuda in the coming week. This would increase their logistic pressure. We can expect the LTTE to try to indirectly overcome this by whipping up agitation on alleged atrocities of Indian fisherman in Mannar Bay by pro-LTTE elements. However, both the state and central governments appear to be firm in strictly curbing the resurgence of LTTE activity in Tamil Nadu.
Given this scenario, the Sri Lanka security forces would be emboldened to step up naval operations in this region to carry out to coordinated army-navy offensive against Pooneryn. Even if it is not taken up, the latent threat in tandem with the offensive against Kilinochchi is likely to tie down large segment of LTTE cadres. Considering the psychological and political gains of capturing Kilinochchi, we can expect the security forces build up for major offensive in the coming weeks. As the area west of A9 is sandy and more open than the dense forest areas east of the highway, Welioya sector is unlikely to make dramatic progress particularly when rains lash this region.
The President riding the crest of success is unlikely to give in to any international pressures for suspension of operations as a prelude to peace talks. However, the increasing number of refugees converging on Kilinochchi could touch 2.5 lakhs in three weeks and trigger international pressures afresh. To manage this pressure the Sri Lanka state will have to take urgent relief measures which unfortunately do not appear to figure in the government priorities. This could have adverse political reaction in Tamil Nadu.
August 31,2008
Copyright: Security Trends
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