Trade and economic prospects
The European Council is likely to take a final decision on the extension of the GSP+ tariff concessions to Sri Lanka in the first week of January 2010, to become effective from middle of June, 2010. The investigation report compiled by the EU Committee on the effective implementation of Human Rights in Sri Lanka submitted to the EU Headquarters on Oct 19, 2009 is likely to influence the decision. The report is said to be negative and highlights a number of human rights concerns in Sri Lanka.
However, Sri Lanka Central Bank has said that Sri Lankan exports would not be adversely affected even if the EU withdrew the concession. Quoting the latest external trade data the Bank expected that exports to continue to increase during 2009 and 2010 regardless of the continuation of GSP+ concessions. Quoting the European Commission’s estimate, it assessed the benefits of lower import duties under the GSP+ scheme for the year 2008 at only 1.4% of Sri Lanka’s total exports. “So the loss of preferential duty margin by around 6-7% arising from a potential withdrawal of the GSP plus facility is not expected to have an adverse impact on Sri Lanka’s exports,” the Central Bank added.
It is assessed that loss of the zero tariff concessions could increase the price of Sri Lankan goods up to 10 per cent in the EU markets and make them less competitive. Apparel industry which forms about 45 percent of exports would be hard hit by the withdrawal of concessions. Opposition parties have warned it would mean loss of jobs and reputation of Sri Lanka.
Internally displaced people
The first ever delegation of Tamil Nadu parliamentarians made a five-day visit to Sri Lanka during the month. The 10-memebr “non official” delegation composed of members from the three political parties of the ruling coalition in New Delhi –– the Dravida Munnetra Kazagham (DMK)), the Congress party and the pro-LTTE Viduthalai Chiruthaikal Katchi (VCK) was ostensibly to understand the problems of Tamils, particularly war displaced people living in camps. Evidently, this was a political exercise to remove the stigma that these parties had not helped the Tamils during the war and later in freeing of the IDPs from government controlled camps. In spite of this political intention it was a welcome move as Tamil Nadu politicians were positively thinking about bringing amity between the two ethnic communities in Sri Lanka rather than taking up the Eelam litany to serve their own political ends.
The delegation visited IDP camps and submitted a report to the Tamil Nadu government. It spoke of a promise by President Rajapaksa that 58,000 IDPs would be released within a fortnight. The Sri Lanka government had planned the release even before the delegation’s visit; but it went along to substantiate the delegation’s claim and by the end of the month over 58,000 IDPs were allowed to return home. However, in Tamil Nadu there was only lukewarm interest with the political parties reverting to their original political positions. In particular, the VCK leader Thol Thirumavalavan after a brief pause took up Eelam propaganda, trying to immortalize V Prabhakaran as a national hero of Tamils.
The Sri Lankan Minister for Youth Empowerment and Socio, Economic Development, Arumuga Thondaman visited Chennai to brief the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister apparently on Tamil IDP issue. According to him 1.86 lakh IDPs would continue to stay in camps during the monsoon period as their release was condtional to receiving certification from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees on demining and humanitarian aspects. As of now, Sri Lanka government appears to have succeeded in satisfying ruling Tamil lobbies in Delhi and Chennai.
Human rights issues
Even as dust had not settled on the EU investigation report, Stephen Rapp, U.S. ambassador-at-large for war crimes issues, filed a report to U.S. Congress on incidents relating to violations of international humanitarian law and crimes against humanity in the Sri Lanka war between January to May 2009. The report chronicled allegations of war crimes by both Sri Lanka and the LTTE. The Senate subcommittee on the State Department and foreign operations has called for "a full and independent investigation" so those responsible can be "held accountable."
The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights has also joined in the call for a similar investigation of Sri Lanka's war. These moves are likely to further strengthen the Sri Lanka Tamil Diaspora’s campaign demanding the trial of Sri Lanka army commander and government officials for carrying out genocide of Tamils during the war.
Given this climate of adverse publicity, it is not clear why the government is dragging its feet on taking strong measures to improve its human rights record. The government had generally been describing such criticisms as part of a deliberate international smear campaign. Even ministers in responsible positions had been making loose comments. Typical was the comment of Prime Minister Ratnasiri Wickramanayaka when the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton included Sri Lanka among countries where women were raped during war. Although it could have ignored as a passing reference, the Prime Minister took her to task and linked it to Bill Clinton’s short-lived “affair” with Monica Lewinsky.
What Sri Lanka hopes to gain by such campaign is not clear. The anti-west posturing is probably connected with political rabble rousing for use in forthcoming elections. But already it is making things a little more difficult for Sri Lanka in handling international issues, particularly in the EU, UK and the U.S. And it could get worse when the genocide snowball gathers more momentum.
Political developments
President Mahinda Rajapaksa does not appear to have made up his mind on holding of presidential poll before the parliamentary poll due to be held in early 2010. He would be sacrificing two years of his present term by going for re-election. On the other hand he would like to use his current popularity to gain both a second term and a two thirds majority for his coalition in parliament.
The opposition United National Party (UNP) and the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), despite their ideological differences, appear to be in agreement in fielding General Sarath Fonseka, who has become a national hero after routing the LTTE, as a common presidential candidate against President Rajapaksa. He would be eligible as he is due for retirement when his tenure as CDS ends in December 2009.
Such a move could strengthen the opposition in the President. However, reduce the margin of victory for Rajapaksa who has the political edge. There had been a great deal of speculation in the media about this which has caused concern to the ruling coalition. A subtle campaign is going on to bring down the role of Fonseka by upgrading Rajapaksa’s contribution in winning the war.
Adding insult to the injury the government offered him the appointment of secretary to the Ministry of Sports which the General turned down. We can expect President Rajapaksa to make political moves to dissuade the General from contesting even as the opposition brings pressure on him to contest the presidential poll.
Security
The security forces’ search operations in north and east have unearthed more arms caches during the month. About 60 LTTE members spotted among the IDPs are being sent to rehabilitation camps. Verification of LTTE documents is said to have revealed that the LTTE had supplied arms and ammunition worth Rs 400 crores to Indian insurgent groups particularly in Assam.
Based on information gained from interrogation of prisoners, police have arrested a number of people including police officers and government officials who had been on the pay roll of the LTTE. The CID has arrested Colonel Ranjith Perera and his wife and three others on suspicion of conspiring to assassinate the President. Their interrogation is going on.
However, so far there had been no indication of any fresh LTTE activity.
Courtesy: Security Trends Vol 3 No 9, www.security-risk.com
Sunday, November 8, 2009
Friday, November 6, 2009
A Response to Arundhati Roy: “The heart of India is under attack”
Guest Column by Swati Parashar
In a recently published article in the British newspaper, Guardian, Arundhati Roy offers another scathing critique of the "militarised" Indian state. In her own words "to justify enforcing a corporate land grab, the state needs an enemy" and it has chosen the Maoists. The arguments in this article are not new; if one has followed Roy's other writings on the Maoist issue in India as also on other kinds of non-state violence. She has earlier said that the "Maoists are for the Congress what the Muslims were for the BJP"- in different words, the "other", the enemy that needs to be feared and annihilated. Roy is a prolific writer and thinker and as an intellectual her critique of the state is valid and also much needed. However, it is her doomsday predictions, her vehement and almost rhetorical rejection of the state and her constant demonising of the state, her uncritical endorsement of non state actors and their violent politics, and absolving the people of any responsibility that I would like to problematise further in this article.
To be fair to Roy, her analyses of the Maoist insurgency holds merit in many ways as she talks about the rising gap between rich and poor, injustices faced by the socially backward at the hands of the influential, the ever-growing tentacles of the capitalist free market and the MNCs salivating at opportunities to grab the lands of the poor. All of these are enough to provoke the violent social and political unrest amongst the masses, such as the kinds we have seen with the Naxalites and Maoists. Fact is Roy is not the only one saying this. Several people have pointed this out even while discussing the security implications of and responses to the Maoist challenge. A mere travel across India will reveal the stark differences of wealth. The malls and shopping complexes cater to the growing consumer class while poverty continues unabated.
The root causes of Maoist violence lie in such inequalities, in the exploitative economy, in the apathy of the governments and in the corrupt practices which are unhindered. Coming from Ranchi, the capital of the state of Jharkhand, I am not oblivious to these root causes that have prompted the less privileged to seek refuge in an armed rebellion. If the Chief Minister of a state is busy amassing wealth and purchasing mines in Africa, bureaucrats busy making money to finance their private travels and luxurious lifestyles; what does one expect of a people who struggle to make ends meet and who struggle for every dignity that is befitting of a human life? Armed rebellion and violence seems a viable option for people who have nothing to lose.
However, what Arundhati Roy and others like her choose to ignore is how the Maoist war is not just a war of the have-nots against the haves. By rejecting the offers of dialogue and peaceful negotiations, by refusing to give up violence, causing large scale destruction of infrastructure (schools, railway lines and other public utility goods), by extortions, kidnappings and gruesome killings, the Maoist violence has degenerated into a war against all peoples and public utilities. Any sympathy one may have had for their cause has eroded as one questions whether anti state resistance must involve such mindless destruction and violence that inconvenience people further and add to their miseries. The Maoists are creating and endorsing the very chaos, fear, apathy, exploitation destruction and violence that they are supposed to be resisting.
Roy also overlooks the other important questions. How is the unending supply of arms and weapons, bombs and explosives being made available to the Maoists? If they are all the people dying of hunger, starvation and entrenched in poverty, where do they get the resources needed for their armed rebellion? Where is the money coming from? What are their networks, supply chains? The chaos and fear the Maoists have unleashed is preventing normal activities such as farming and agriculture in remote areas. People who do not agree with their methods are hastily disposing off agricultural land and property and are forced to flee their homes and villages. In several Maoist infected areas where the Maoists have driven out the people, land remains uncultivated. Clearly those terrorised by the Maoists are not "people" worthy of Roy's sympathies.
Roy said in a CNN IBN interview that "my fear is that because of this economic interest the government and establishment actually needs a war. It needs to militarise. For that it needs an enemy; you have an army of very poor people being faced down by an army of rich that are corporate-backed." On the ground level, how does it benefit the state or the governments to have a rebellious group constantly eroding their resources? The security provisions in the light of the Maoist attacks require massive financial and human resources investments that are hardly beneficial to the state. Even for a "militarised" state it is one thing to have an external enemy and threat (that basically enhances its legitimacy) and another to have an intra state insurgency that would erode its resources, question its legitimacy and threaten its very existence. It is one thing to argue, for example, that Pakistan supports terrorism against India and another to say that a militarised state that Pakistan is, it needs the war against the Taliban; it creates and sustains this internal war against the Taliban. The latter, even the hard liners and hawks within the Indian establishment would find it hard to accept. An intra state insurgency aimed at over throwing the state cannot be part of the state's own militarisation plans. It is not in the interest of the Indian state to create and sustain the war with a group of disgruntled citizens.
Moreover, it is hardly a case of "an army of the poor against the army of the rich", as Roy suggests. On the contrary, it seems like the Maoists are better armed, better equipped and have better intelligence facilities. The police and paramilitary forces in India are hardly the "army of the rich." Joining the police in India is fuelled more by an economic need than with the real intention to be an agent of the state. Several policemen and constables are unwilling to risk their lives in Maoist infected areas and are utilising their life savings to get civilian and urban postings. They do not have the requisite arms and weapons to fight the Maoists nor the willingness to fight them. An ill equipped and demotivated police force where constables and policemen are also from poor and backward classes hardly merits such harsh criticism as Roy posits.
In many conversations with policemen in Ranchi, I have found them fearful of any postings in Maoist areas, and continuously requesting for more urban postings like in Ranchi or Jamshedpur. And all of them are not exactly high class wealthy policemen but young and poor men who might eventually be the victim of a Maoist landmine attack or be killed in an encounter. On the other hand, an armed movement, like the Maoists, requires tangible resources and not mere rhetoric and ideology as Roy would have us believe.
I have never argued nor believe that the state is sacrosanct and we should not be critical of the state and its policies. As a feminist I would be the first to argue that patriarchal states promote unequal gender relations and are especially biased against women and minorities. Critique of the state is very necessary in any informed intellectual and democratic policy discourse. However, Roy makes the state into a monstrous actor and absolves �people� of all responsibilities. She never suggests alternatives as to how we must fight/critique the state and instead legitimises anti-state violence all the time. She conveniently overlooks that those who actually die in this anti state violence are not corrupt and wealthy politicians, but poor people, and poor policemen. Francis Indwar, the police inspector of the special branch of the Jharkhand police was the only bread earning member of his family. He was kidnapped and brutally killed by the Maoists not in an armed combat, but in an act contrary to the revolutionary path. The body of the inspector was found in Bundu Police Station area near Ranchi on 6 October 2009. The unarmed policeman was beheaded all in the name of the anti state resistance that Roy justifies. There are many other Francis Indwars. Human rights activists like Roy and others remained silent on the death of Indwar and continue to make noises about the arrests of Maoist leaders and ideologues like Kobad Ghandy and Chhatradhar Mahato. Hundreds of other policemen and other unarmed people have died in the Maoist attacks while Roy accuses the media of demonising the Maoists and coming up with figures about Maoist violence that are inaccurate and even false. The state, the media and also the international community are all against the "people", some people on whom Roy's intellectual discourse inscribes the status of victims!
Roy refuses to hold the Maoists accountable for their violence. Again this would not surprise anyone who follows her writings. She also justified the 26/11 attacks forgetting that the people who died in the brutal acts of terror had nothing to do with the "state" and its policies. Her stance was more problematic when she suggested in another Guardian article last year that it was justified for a group of terrorists to come from across the border and carry out the carnage one saw in Mumbai, all in the name of resisting the state's policies and injustices. She reminded us that we deserved it and it would continue to happen because of the way minorities were treated in India.
It did not worry her that those delivering the violent justice were not even part of the Indian state but misguided jihadis from across the border. What she also forgot to ask in her over zealous need to justify the violence was whether the Muslim minority in India preferred to be represented by such brutal killers. They did not and expressed their sentiments quite clearly by refusing to consider the terrorists as Muslims in the first place. Her sympathies were not for those who died in the Mumbai attacks. Her sympathies are not with Francis Indwar. She had more sympathies for the Taliban who needed to be "understood" as she famously said during her visit to Pakistan. Mourning for the dead in her intellectual understanding is always about which class or discourse the dead belong to.
Roy justifies and legitimises violence by non state actors in the name of self defence and resisting an oppressive state and condemns state violence. It is the exact opposite of what statist discourses do; they do not question violence perpetrated by the states while non state actors become illegitimate monsters and a nuisance. She does not prefer the intellectual middle ground nor concerns herself with the multiplicities of experiences and ideas within any discourse. It is worthwhile to note that she does not engage with the idea of violence itself (a favourite of both the right and the left within the political spectrum). Victimhood is the construct she often uses to justify violence, but victimhood is politically and sparingly applied to those resisting the state alone. Why is one type of violence okay, one type of exclusion okay, one type of fear and exploitation okay, one type of communalism okay? The burden of the ideology she carries is more than the weight of these questions, perhaps.
I have argued that violence has its uses but should not become an end in itself. This seems to be the case with the Maoists as also with the Taliban both of which continue to reject democratic methods and peaceful solutions. Militants and separatists in the North East of India and even Kashmir have all at various points come to the negotiating table. Groups such as the Hamas and even the LTTE had brief periods where they realised the potentials of non violent engagement with the states they resisted and participated in democratic processes. Wherever violence outlives its purpose, the political entity or resistance group meets its doom and fails the very people it represents/acts for. It has happened most recently with the LTTE in Sri Lanka. Excessive use of violence by states also results in their failure and ultimate demise. Khmer Rouge, German Nazism, Italian Fascism all saw their end. Most recently and closer home even the Pakistani regime has realised that violence can turn its ugly head like a Frankenstein monster. By refusing to not engage in a democratic manner and persisting in their violent methods, the Maoists are making the same mistake that groups such as the LTTE have done in the past.
Democracy and democratic methods can also give rise to Nazism and Fascism as we have seen in the past. We could also contest the idea of democracy and democratic methods in India. But I still prefer this democracy to what I see in the neighbourhood (Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nepal, Burma and Bangladesh) or for that matter in many parts of the Western world. Home Minister Mr. Chidambaram has on different occasions said that "Maoists must abjure violence and take the path of democracy and dialogue." The governments of states affected by Maoist violence have been asked to discuss the issues of development, neglect, deprivation and government structure in case they (Maoists) give up arms. Are they willing to seize the opportunity? Roy says that government should talk to the Maoists unconditionally. Is that even a legitimate or logical demand?
And what exactly is this monster called the "state" that Arundhati Roy continues to spell doom for? State comprises of territory, sovereignty, government and most importantly population. We do not exist outside the state but are part of it. In IR theory, as also in other disciplines there is a great deal of pessimism about the state as the international and political actor. However, a total rejection of the state in the developing/underdeveloped world is not only dangerous but is also an indication of a very narrow understanding of the state. Where civil society is still in the nascent stage and where state with all its evils remains the only hope of the people, Roy's arguments are at best empty rhetoric. Feminists also who have been very critical of the statist discourse and the treatment of women under patriarchal states have not called for the total annihilation of the state, but have tirelessly worked for reforms. Even non state groups have been keen to capture political power and run de facto states (LTTE is an example). I am not suggesting that the state is beyond questioning but only that there needs to be a constant and more sustained theoretical and intellectual engagement with the idea of state and alternatives to it. The state, as an idea and as a political entity exists and cannot be wished away overnight.
Roy has raised some very good points/good critiques earlier but making the state into some monster and all of us as helpless people who are victims of the state, manipulated by the state is not exactly an analytical framework which can provide succour to the helpless or serious policy alternatives. State is not an entity out there, but a creation in which most people have a role. She deprives the people of their agentive capabilities, forgetting that state is because of the people and not people because of the state. If the state must change, reform or even be overthrown, we, the people have to accept responsibility and act accordingly.
And finally, violence of all sorts, though sometimes necessary must not outlive its purpose. History bears testimony to that. In violence, we forget who we are.-Mary McCarthy.
(Dr. Swati Parashar is a faculty member at the Department of Politics and Public Administration at the University of Limerick in Ireland. She teaches Feminist International Relations and Conflict and Development. She can be contacted at swatiparashar@hotmail.com)
Courtesy: www.southasiaanalysis.org
In a recently published article in the British newspaper, Guardian, Arundhati Roy offers another scathing critique of the "militarised" Indian state. In her own words "to justify enforcing a corporate land grab, the state needs an enemy" and it has chosen the Maoists. The arguments in this article are not new; if one has followed Roy's other writings on the Maoist issue in India as also on other kinds of non-state violence. She has earlier said that the "Maoists are for the Congress what the Muslims were for the BJP"- in different words, the "other", the enemy that needs to be feared and annihilated. Roy is a prolific writer and thinker and as an intellectual her critique of the state is valid and also much needed. However, it is her doomsday predictions, her vehement and almost rhetorical rejection of the state and her constant demonising of the state, her uncritical endorsement of non state actors and their violent politics, and absolving the people of any responsibility that I would like to problematise further in this article.
To be fair to Roy, her analyses of the Maoist insurgency holds merit in many ways as she talks about the rising gap between rich and poor, injustices faced by the socially backward at the hands of the influential, the ever-growing tentacles of the capitalist free market and the MNCs salivating at opportunities to grab the lands of the poor. All of these are enough to provoke the violent social and political unrest amongst the masses, such as the kinds we have seen with the Naxalites and Maoists. Fact is Roy is not the only one saying this. Several people have pointed this out even while discussing the security implications of and responses to the Maoist challenge. A mere travel across India will reveal the stark differences of wealth. The malls and shopping complexes cater to the growing consumer class while poverty continues unabated.
The root causes of Maoist violence lie in such inequalities, in the exploitative economy, in the apathy of the governments and in the corrupt practices which are unhindered. Coming from Ranchi, the capital of the state of Jharkhand, I am not oblivious to these root causes that have prompted the less privileged to seek refuge in an armed rebellion. If the Chief Minister of a state is busy amassing wealth and purchasing mines in Africa, bureaucrats busy making money to finance their private travels and luxurious lifestyles; what does one expect of a people who struggle to make ends meet and who struggle for every dignity that is befitting of a human life? Armed rebellion and violence seems a viable option for people who have nothing to lose.
However, what Arundhati Roy and others like her choose to ignore is how the Maoist war is not just a war of the have-nots against the haves. By rejecting the offers of dialogue and peaceful negotiations, by refusing to give up violence, causing large scale destruction of infrastructure (schools, railway lines and other public utility goods), by extortions, kidnappings and gruesome killings, the Maoist violence has degenerated into a war against all peoples and public utilities. Any sympathy one may have had for their cause has eroded as one questions whether anti state resistance must involve such mindless destruction and violence that inconvenience people further and add to their miseries. The Maoists are creating and endorsing the very chaos, fear, apathy, exploitation destruction and violence that they are supposed to be resisting.
Roy also overlooks the other important questions. How is the unending supply of arms and weapons, bombs and explosives being made available to the Maoists? If they are all the people dying of hunger, starvation and entrenched in poverty, where do they get the resources needed for their armed rebellion? Where is the money coming from? What are their networks, supply chains? The chaos and fear the Maoists have unleashed is preventing normal activities such as farming and agriculture in remote areas. People who do not agree with their methods are hastily disposing off agricultural land and property and are forced to flee their homes and villages. In several Maoist infected areas where the Maoists have driven out the people, land remains uncultivated. Clearly those terrorised by the Maoists are not "people" worthy of Roy's sympathies.
Roy said in a CNN IBN interview that "my fear is that because of this economic interest the government and establishment actually needs a war. It needs to militarise. For that it needs an enemy; you have an army of very poor people being faced down by an army of rich that are corporate-backed." On the ground level, how does it benefit the state or the governments to have a rebellious group constantly eroding their resources? The security provisions in the light of the Maoist attacks require massive financial and human resources investments that are hardly beneficial to the state. Even for a "militarised" state it is one thing to have an external enemy and threat (that basically enhances its legitimacy) and another to have an intra state insurgency that would erode its resources, question its legitimacy and threaten its very existence. It is one thing to argue, for example, that Pakistan supports terrorism against India and another to say that a militarised state that Pakistan is, it needs the war against the Taliban; it creates and sustains this internal war against the Taliban. The latter, even the hard liners and hawks within the Indian establishment would find it hard to accept. An intra state insurgency aimed at over throwing the state cannot be part of the state's own militarisation plans. It is not in the interest of the Indian state to create and sustain the war with a group of disgruntled citizens.
Moreover, it is hardly a case of "an army of the poor against the army of the rich", as Roy suggests. On the contrary, it seems like the Maoists are better armed, better equipped and have better intelligence facilities. The police and paramilitary forces in India are hardly the "army of the rich." Joining the police in India is fuelled more by an economic need than with the real intention to be an agent of the state. Several policemen and constables are unwilling to risk their lives in Maoist infected areas and are utilising their life savings to get civilian and urban postings. They do not have the requisite arms and weapons to fight the Maoists nor the willingness to fight them. An ill equipped and demotivated police force where constables and policemen are also from poor and backward classes hardly merits such harsh criticism as Roy posits.
In many conversations with policemen in Ranchi, I have found them fearful of any postings in Maoist areas, and continuously requesting for more urban postings like in Ranchi or Jamshedpur. And all of them are not exactly high class wealthy policemen but young and poor men who might eventually be the victim of a Maoist landmine attack or be killed in an encounter. On the other hand, an armed movement, like the Maoists, requires tangible resources and not mere rhetoric and ideology as Roy would have us believe.
I have never argued nor believe that the state is sacrosanct and we should not be critical of the state and its policies. As a feminist I would be the first to argue that patriarchal states promote unequal gender relations and are especially biased against women and minorities. Critique of the state is very necessary in any informed intellectual and democratic policy discourse. However, Roy makes the state into a monstrous actor and absolves �people� of all responsibilities. She never suggests alternatives as to how we must fight/critique the state and instead legitimises anti-state violence all the time. She conveniently overlooks that those who actually die in this anti state violence are not corrupt and wealthy politicians, but poor people, and poor policemen. Francis Indwar, the police inspector of the special branch of the Jharkhand police was the only bread earning member of his family. He was kidnapped and brutally killed by the Maoists not in an armed combat, but in an act contrary to the revolutionary path. The body of the inspector was found in Bundu Police Station area near Ranchi on 6 October 2009. The unarmed policeman was beheaded all in the name of the anti state resistance that Roy justifies. There are many other Francis Indwars. Human rights activists like Roy and others remained silent on the death of Indwar and continue to make noises about the arrests of Maoist leaders and ideologues like Kobad Ghandy and Chhatradhar Mahato. Hundreds of other policemen and other unarmed people have died in the Maoist attacks while Roy accuses the media of demonising the Maoists and coming up with figures about Maoist violence that are inaccurate and even false. The state, the media and also the international community are all against the "people", some people on whom Roy's intellectual discourse inscribes the status of victims!
Roy refuses to hold the Maoists accountable for their violence. Again this would not surprise anyone who follows her writings. She also justified the 26/11 attacks forgetting that the people who died in the brutal acts of terror had nothing to do with the "state" and its policies. Her stance was more problematic when she suggested in another Guardian article last year that it was justified for a group of terrorists to come from across the border and carry out the carnage one saw in Mumbai, all in the name of resisting the state's policies and injustices. She reminded us that we deserved it and it would continue to happen because of the way minorities were treated in India.
It did not worry her that those delivering the violent justice were not even part of the Indian state but misguided jihadis from across the border. What she also forgot to ask in her over zealous need to justify the violence was whether the Muslim minority in India preferred to be represented by such brutal killers. They did not and expressed their sentiments quite clearly by refusing to consider the terrorists as Muslims in the first place. Her sympathies were not for those who died in the Mumbai attacks. Her sympathies are not with Francis Indwar. She had more sympathies for the Taliban who needed to be "understood" as she famously said during her visit to Pakistan. Mourning for the dead in her intellectual understanding is always about which class or discourse the dead belong to.
Roy justifies and legitimises violence by non state actors in the name of self defence and resisting an oppressive state and condemns state violence. It is the exact opposite of what statist discourses do; they do not question violence perpetrated by the states while non state actors become illegitimate monsters and a nuisance. She does not prefer the intellectual middle ground nor concerns herself with the multiplicities of experiences and ideas within any discourse. It is worthwhile to note that she does not engage with the idea of violence itself (a favourite of both the right and the left within the political spectrum). Victimhood is the construct she often uses to justify violence, but victimhood is politically and sparingly applied to those resisting the state alone. Why is one type of violence okay, one type of exclusion okay, one type of fear and exploitation okay, one type of communalism okay? The burden of the ideology she carries is more than the weight of these questions, perhaps.
I have argued that violence has its uses but should not become an end in itself. This seems to be the case with the Maoists as also with the Taliban both of which continue to reject democratic methods and peaceful solutions. Militants and separatists in the North East of India and even Kashmir have all at various points come to the negotiating table. Groups such as the Hamas and even the LTTE had brief periods where they realised the potentials of non violent engagement with the states they resisted and participated in democratic processes. Wherever violence outlives its purpose, the political entity or resistance group meets its doom and fails the very people it represents/acts for. It has happened most recently with the LTTE in Sri Lanka. Excessive use of violence by states also results in their failure and ultimate demise. Khmer Rouge, German Nazism, Italian Fascism all saw their end. Most recently and closer home even the Pakistani regime has realised that violence can turn its ugly head like a Frankenstein monster. By refusing to not engage in a democratic manner and persisting in their violent methods, the Maoists are making the same mistake that groups such as the LTTE have done in the past.
Democracy and democratic methods can also give rise to Nazism and Fascism as we have seen in the past. We could also contest the idea of democracy and democratic methods in India. But I still prefer this democracy to what I see in the neighbourhood (Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nepal, Burma and Bangladesh) or for that matter in many parts of the Western world. Home Minister Mr. Chidambaram has on different occasions said that "Maoists must abjure violence and take the path of democracy and dialogue." The governments of states affected by Maoist violence have been asked to discuss the issues of development, neglect, deprivation and government structure in case they (Maoists) give up arms. Are they willing to seize the opportunity? Roy says that government should talk to the Maoists unconditionally. Is that even a legitimate or logical demand?
And what exactly is this monster called the "state" that Arundhati Roy continues to spell doom for? State comprises of territory, sovereignty, government and most importantly population. We do not exist outside the state but are part of it. In IR theory, as also in other disciplines there is a great deal of pessimism about the state as the international and political actor. However, a total rejection of the state in the developing/underdeveloped world is not only dangerous but is also an indication of a very narrow understanding of the state. Where civil society is still in the nascent stage and where state with all its evils remains the only hope of the people, Roy's arguments are at best empty rhetoric. Feminists also who have been very critical of the statist discourse and the treatment of women under patriarchal states have not called for the total annihilation of the state, but have tirelessly worked for reforms. Even non state groups have been keen to capture political power and run de facto states (LTTE is an example). I am not suggesting that the state is beyond questioning but only that there needs to be a constant and more sustained theoretical and intellectual engagement with the idea of state and alternatives to it. The state, as an idea and as a political entity exists and cannot be wished away overnight.
Roy has raised some very good points/good critiques earlier but making the state into some monster and all of us as helpless people who are victims of the state, manipulated by the state is not exactly an analytical framework which can provide succour to the helpless or serious policy alternatives. State is not an entity out there, but a creation in which most people have a role. She deprives the people of their agentive capabilities, forgetting that state is because of the people and not people because of the state. If the state must change, reform or even be overthrown, we, the people have to accept responsibility and act accordingly.
And finally, violence of all sorts, though sometimes necessary must not outlive its purpose. History bears testimony to that. In violence, we forget who we are.-Mary McCarthy.
(Dr. Swati Parashar is a faculty member at the Department of Politics and Public Administration at the University of Limerick in Ireland. She teaches Feminist International Relations and Conflict and Development. She can be contacted at swatiparashar@hotmail.com)
Courtesy: www.southasiaanalysis.org
Gasping for Air
A vested interest of politics, business and bureaucracy has been strangling the education system
By COL R HARIHARAN
LAST year, as a non-technical member of a corporate campus selection panel, I asked a third year graduate engineering student the difference between the GSM and GPRS systems in mobile phones. Pat came the answer: “GPRS is not in our syllabus, sir.” A more experienced panel member assured me that the student represented all that was wrong with our educational system. The problem was “at the bottom of the pyramid – schooling” that turned creative and intelligent young people into mindless youth, he added.
Six years ago, while heading the corporate social responsibility project of an IT firm, I had regular interaction with over 60 schools run by the Chennai Corporation and nearly 2,000 high achievers of these schools for about two years. The experience left me horrified at the appalling standards of schools and teachers. The negatives were too many: infrastructure was creaking, most of the kids were barely literate, teachers generally lacked commitment, and leadership was noticeable only in islands of excellence.
At the same time, it was heartwarming to see the strong desire among the students to achieve their goals despite the obstacles. They were living testimony to what Mark Twain said: “I have never let my schooling interfere with my education.” I was ashamed that as a citizen I had allowed this to happen to our young people.
Unfortunately, this “wisdom of the Bodhi tree” came after nearly 30 years of involvement in Army training at all levels. Despite its system of regimentation, military training produces amazing results. I have seen first-hand how Munusamy or Bhoop Singh, a barely literate school dropout from the backwoods of Himachal Pradesh or Tamil Nadu, changes totally in just a year-and a-half of training. The lazy and clumsy lout is transformed into a self-confident, disciplined and socially useful member of a team. Army training is always focused and objective-oriented. It teaches even complex systems in easily understandable modules. More than all this it gives confidence to the soldier to face the odds and learn to overcome them, and work to achieve pre-set goals.
Later in life, for a decade I was involved in corporate training in a big way. The corporate world has taken in many of the good points of military training to improve process management skills and achieve productivity of the highest order. It also focuses on keeping abreast of applied knowledge skills to get the best out of people. These two systems of transformational education provide ample pointers to improve our education system. Our corporate social responsibility project aimed at identifying and helping over 1200 high achievers through their senior secondary schooling every year. Corporate volunteers helped the kids, mostly living in slums, to hone their skills and learning to perform even better. Our weekend IT classes were a welcome change for the students because we allowed them to design their own learning.
My sessions on spoken English skills taught me that student participation was at the heart of any learning. My classroom session became a dialogue process full of wit and repartee flying all over. There were also poignant moments when all of us saw the stark reality of their lives. An 11-year-old girl left us stunned when she wrote about her “most memorable experience.” It was about how she lost the sight of one eye due to repeated fires in the slum where she lived.
The kids were far more creative and worldly wise than upper-class kids. They were a keen lot, ready to work hard to learn more. Their goals were clear and their methods pragmatic. These were qualities I had found markedly absent even among MBA students in the business school where I taught part time. The whole experience was a revelation for me.
Unfortunately, my experience with the school principals and teachers was the opposite. Few principals showed interest in upgrading their management skills and using modern tools of management. Some principals did not even want to meet us. We found one principal drunk at 10 am, unable to talk coherently! Many principals were appointed on political consideration. Some teachers assured me payment of money under the table started from the time they applied for teacher training. Barring a handful of committed teachers, the rest appeared to have drifted into the job because it provided a cosy nook in the government set-up.
The principals were mostly a demoralized lot because the education administration was highly bureaucratic. This had probably made them part of the insensitive bureaucracy. It was evident in some schools where cartons of computers were lying unopened because the principals did not want the students to “damage” them. One principal told me that, on an average, she had to send 62 reports a month to the administration! Though she might have exaggerated, it was clear paper work choked school administration and red tape killed any initiative. Infrastructure was uniformly bad and maintenance was shoddy. Toilets were too few and unusable.However, a few street smart principals knew how to pamper politicians and local MPs to improve their schools.
There was a well-meaning IAS officer heading the education bureaucracy at the corporation headquarters. In consultation with him, we designed a process workshop for the heads of schools to discuss and debate their problems to evolve a set of best practices in consultation with experts to improve the running of the schools. There were no takers for the workshop as the administration did not make attendance mandatory. We simply abandoned the project. So much for private participation in public institutions. Education holds the key to break class and caste barriers. As a result it is entangled in a whole range of politically explosive issues. As government controls the largest number of schools and colleges, they have become symbols of assertion of political power. Government educational institutions offer seemingly laid back government jobs. So training and appointment of teachers in government schools is a cash cow for the corrupt. This has created vested interests of politics, business and bureaucracy keeping a stranglehold on our educational system as a whole and on government institutions in particular.
Education as the shared responsibility of the State and the Centre has suffered from lack of leadership commitment. It was treated as a proverbial holy cow, fending for itself from the leftovers in the annual budgets. Added to this is the public inertia in voicing the educational needs in loud and clear terms. I am a product of an average small town government school in the 1960s. Now, the middle class has abandoned government schools. Thus government schools have become the refuge of the lower strata of society, who have no voice in the government.
The falling standards of government schools and the emphasis on English language skills have opened up business opportunities in running private schools. Globalization of education added more money and glamour to the business. An education mafia of politicians and businessmen is promoting private education to increase its money power and social clout.
The government institutions suffering sustained neglect have become hotbeds of politics. In fact, youth wings of political parties in educational institutions have turned them into political testing grounds to promote political and caste violence.
The government institutions have become hotbeds of politics. Youth wings of political parties have turned them into political testing grounds to promote caste violence.
THE state has a fundamental responsibility to provide quality education and health care to the citizens. While the private sector can chip in to add value, the government can never palm off its social responsibility on these two counts. We urgently need conceptual, systemic and structural improvements in the way we educate the young.
Union Education Minister Kapil Sibal should be congratulated for daring to reform our education system. The Minister has to free the education system from the bondage of our inertia. It would be a great achievement if he can build a consensus and get the process of change going within the term of the present government. Unless he is watchful, the zealous Minister may lose his job, thanks to the politically powerful education mafia. It thrives on the inefficiency of the present education system and will resist any change.
But we need to adopt a bottom up approach. Peter McLaughlin, headmaster of Doon School, in a recent interview aptly summed up the role of education as ensuring “children become lifelong learners”. He added that, today, “a narrow and stifling curriculum in most countries has led students to disengage themselves from the testing regime of the education system. Students are no longer intellectually robust. We need to create a critical mass of robust thinkers.”
If that happened, Indians would become responsible and productive members of society. And to achieve that we need to improve the grass-roots schooling at the primary level. We have to redeem education from teaching shops, there is no choice.
Courtesy: GFiles VOL.3 | Issue 8 | NOVEMBER 2009
URL:http://gfilesindia.com/title.aspx?title_id=42
By COL R HARIHARAN
LAST year, as a non-technical member of a corporate campus selection panel, I asked a third year graduate engineering student the difference between the GSM and GPRS systems in mobile phones. Pat came the answer: “GPRS is not in our syllabus, sir.” A more experienced panel member assured me that the student represented all that was wrong with our educational system. The problem was “at the bottom of the pyramid – schooling” that turned creative and intelligent young people into mindless youth, he added.
Six years ago, while heading the corporate social responsibility project of an IT firm, I had regular interaction with over 60 schools run by the Chennai Corporation and nearly 2,000 high achievers of these schools for about two years. The experience left me horrified at the appalling standards of schools and teachers. The negatives were too many: infrastructure was creaking, most of the kids were barely literate, teachers generally lacked commitment, and leadership was noticeable only in islands of excellence.
At the same time, it was heartwarming to see the strong desire among the students to achieve their goals despite the obstacles. They were living testimony to what Mark Twain said: “I have never let my schooling interfere with my education.” I was ashamed that as a citizen I had allowed this to happen to our young people.
Unfortunately, this “wisdom of the Bodhi tree” came after nearly 30 years of involvement in Army training at all levels. Despite its system of regimentation, military training produces amazing results. I have seen first-hand how Munusamy or Bhoop Singh, a barely literate school dropout from the backwoods of Himachal Pradesh or Tamil Nadu, changes totally in just a year-and a-half of training. The lazy and clumsy lout is transformed into a self-confident, disciplined and socially useful member of a team. Army training is always focused and objective-oriented. It teaches even complex systems in easily understandable modules. More than all this it gives confidence to the soldier to face the odds and learn to overcome them, and work to achieve pre-set goals.
Later in life, for a decade I was involved in corporate training in a big way. The corporate world has taken in many of the good points of military training to improve process management skills and achieve productivity of the highest order. It also focuses on keeping abreast of applied knowledge skills to get the best out of people. These two systems of transformational education provide ample pointers to improve our education system. Our corporate social responsibility project aimed at identifying and helping over 1200 high achievers through their senior secondary schooling every year. Corporate volunteers helped the kids, mostly living in slums, to hone their skills and learning to perform even better. Our weekend IT classes were a welcome change for the students because we allowed them to design their own learning.
My sessions on spoken English skills taught me that student participation was at the heart of any learning. My classroom session became a dialogue process full of wit and repartee flying all over. There were also poignant moments when all of us saw the stark reality of their lives. An 11-year-old girl left us stunned when she wrote about her “most memorable experience.” It was about how she lost the sight of one eye due to repeated fires in the slum where she lived.
The kids were far more creative and worldly wise than upper-class kids. They were a keen lot, ready to work hard to learn more. Their goals were clear and their methods pragmatic. These were qualities I had found markedly absent even among MBA students in the business school where I taught part time. The whole experience was a revelation for me.
Unfortunately, my experience with the school principals and teachers was the opposite. Few principals showed interest in upgrading their management skills and using modern tools of management. Some principals did not even want to meet us. We found one principal drunk at 10 am, unable to talk coherently! Many principals were appointed on political consideration. Some teachers assured me payment of money under the table started from the time they applied for teacher training. Barring a handful of committed teachers, the rest appeared to have drifted into the job because it provided a cosy nook in the government set-up.
The principals were mostly a demoralized lot because the education administration was highly bureaucratic. This had probably made them part of the insensitive bureaucracy. It was evident in some schools where cartons of computers were lying unopened because the principals did not want the students to “damage” them. One principal told me that, on an average, she had to send 62 reports a month to the administration! Though she might have exaggerated, it was clear paper work choked school administration and red tape killed any initiative. Infrastructure was uniformly bad and maintenance was shoddy. Toilets were too few and unusable.However, a few street smart principals knew how to pamper politicians and local MPs to improve their schools.
There was a well-meaning IAS officer heading the education bureaucracy at the corporation headquarters. In consultation with him, we designed a process workshop for the heads of schools to discuss and debate their problems to evolve a set of best practices in consultation with experts to improve the running of the schools. There were no takers for the workshop as the administration did not make attendance mandatory. We simply abandoned the project. So much for private participation in public institutions. Education holds the key to break class and caste barriers. As a result it is entangled in a whole range of politically explosive issues. As government controls the largest number of schools and colleges, they have become symbols of assertion of political power. Government educational institutions offer seemingly laid back government jobs. So training and appointment of teachers in government schools is a cash cow for the corrupt. This has created vested interests of politics, business and bureaucracy keeping a stranglehold on our educational system as a whole and on government institutions in particular.
Education as the shared responsibility of the State and the Centre has suffered from lack of leadership commitment. It was treated as a proverbial holy cow, fending for itself from the leftovers in the annual budgets. Added to this is the public inertia in voicing the educational needs in loud and clear terms. I am a product of an average small town government school in the 1960s. Now, the middle class has abandoned government schools. Thus government schools have become the refuge of the lower strata of society, who have no voice in the government.
The falling standards of government schools and the emphasis on English language skills have opened up business opportunities in running private schools. Globalization of education added more money and glamour to the business. An education mafia of politicians and businessmen is promoting private education to increase its money power and social clout.
The government institutions suffering sustained neglect have become hotbeds of politics. In fact, youth wings of political parties in educational institutions have turned them into political testing grounds to promote political and caste violence.
The government institutions have become hotbeds of politics. Youth wings of political parties have turned them into political testing grounds to promote caste violence.
THE state has a fundamental responsibility to provide quality education and health care to the citizens. While the private sector can chip in to add value, the government can never palm off its social responsibility on these two counts. We urgently need conceptual, systemic and structural improvements in the way we educate the young.
Union Education Minister Kapil Sibal should be congratulated for daring to reform our education system. The Minister has to free the education system from the bondage of our inertia. It would be a great achievement if he can build a consensus and get the process of change going within the term of the present government. Unless he is watchful, the zealous Minister may lose his job, thanks to the politically powerful education mafia. It thrives on the inefficiency of the present education system and will resist any change.
But we need to adopt a bottom up approach. Peter McLaughlin, headmaster of Doon School, in a recent interview aptly summed up the role of education as ensuring “children become lifelong learners”. He added that, today, “a narrow and stifling curriculum in most countries has led students to disengage themselves from the testing regime of the education system. Students are no longer intellectually robust. We need to create a critical mass of robust thinkers.”
If that happened, Indians would become responsible and productive members of society. And to achieve that we need to improve the grass-roots schooling at the primary level. We have to redeem education from teaching shops, there is no choice.
Courtesy: GFiles VOL.3 | Issue 8 | NOVEMBER 2009
URL:http://gfilesindia.com/title.aspx?title_id=42
Sunday, November 1, 2009
India-Myanmar Relations : A Review
By R. Swaminathan
Relations between India and Myanmar over nearly five decades have been governed by many complex factors. Amongst them are the strategic location of Myanmar, India’s commitment to idealism-driven support to the restoration of democracy in Myanmar, realism-driven need to deal with those actually governing the country, the implications of China’s increasing presence and role in Myanmar etc. China, fortunately for it, has been able to make its foreign policy decisions without having to bother about the nature of the regime in any country.
India and Myanmar share a complicated and delicate history, marked as much by mistrust as amity. For those who may be interested, a “Historical Background” is annexed to this paper.
POLITICAL
Pro-Democracy Protests in 2007
A series of anti-government protests started in Myanmar on 15 August 2007. The immediate and stated cause of the protests was mainly the decision of the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) to remove fuel subsidies, resulting in very steep increases in the prices of diesel, petrol and compressed natural gas. The first demonstrations were dealt with quickly and harshly, with many arrested and detained. Starting 18 September, the protests were led by thousands of Buddhist monks, and those were also allowed to proceed. Initially, only a few hundred monks walked down the streets but, by end-September, the protesting crowds had grown to 100,000 – both monks and democracy activists. There was a renewed government crackdown on 26 September.
The military junta’s actions against the “peaceful” and “almost Gandhian” ptotestors evoked a considerable amount of international condemnation. However, Beijing expectedly showed more interest in maintaining stability than in pushing for democracy.
In an official statement issued in the wake of the violence, India expressed its support for the "undaunted resolve of the Burmese people to achieve democracy". The Burmese language service of All-India Radio (AIR) was more outspoken in its criticism of Myanmar's military government. It said that India was gradually succeeding in weaning Myanmar away from its near-total dependence on China for economic and military support. It could not therefore be expected to take the strong position that the US, the European Union and Myanmar dissidents were asking her to take; and thus risk - to China's benefit - the precious foothold it had achieved in Myanmar over the previous decade.
Ibrahim Gambari, the United Nations special envoy to Myanmar, undertook a tour across Asia, with the hope of cajoling Asian governments to take a tougher stance on the junta’s crushing of the protests. When he called on India (in October 2007) to join other countries in pressing Myanmar’s military rulers to stop their campaign of repression against pro-democracy protesters, the Indian government described Myanmar as its “close and friendly neighbor” and assured that it would help in Myanmar’s national reconciliation. India’s decision to avoid direct criticism of the military regime came in for a lot of adverse comments. However, it is not as if India was totally silent on the issue. When Myanmar Foreign Minister Nyan Win, who visited India in January 2008, called on Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, the PM emphasized that there was need for greater urgency in bringing about political reforms and national reconciliation. “This process has to be broad-based to include all sections of society, including Aung San Suu Kyi and the various ethnic groups.”
Aung San Suu Kyi
Aung San Suu Kyi (the daughter of “General” Aung San) has been under house arrest almost continually since 1989. When anti-government protests intensified in September 2007, hundreds of monks paid respects to her at the gate of her home. This was the first time in four years that people were able to see her in public. On 29 September, she was allowed to leave her house briefly to meet with a UN envoy who was trying to persuade (eventually, successfully) the junta to ease its crackdown against pro-democracy protesters.
On 4 May 2009, a mentally unbalanced American (John Yettaw) swam across the lake and entered the house of Aung San Suu Kyi, uninvited, and remained there for two nights. Instead of faulting those in charge of security, both the intruder and Suu Kyi were held in prison and put on trial. While the intruder was sentenced to imprisonment, Suu Kyi was awarded (on 11 August 2009) an additional 18 months of house arrest – beyond the earlier term which was due to end on 27 May 2009. The sentencing once again showed how the milit.ary junta was determined to stop her participation in the elections to be held in 2010. In a declared act of “benevolence”, the government had commuted the court’s original sentence of three-years hard labour.
Aung San Suu Kyi’s conviction drew almost universal condemnation. President Obama demanded her immediate release while British Prime Minister Gordon Brown stated that "This is a purely political sentence designed to prevent her from taking part in the regime’s planned elections next year" and called for a UN embargo on all arms exports to Burma. President Nicolas Sarkozy of France sought fresh restrictions on Myanmar's two important export items - rubies and hardwood. Thailand was even more explicit and urged Myanmar to immediately free Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest to allow her to play a role in next year's general election. However, action by the U.N. Security Council was stalled due to reservations on the part of Russia and China. “India’s reaction to the conviction of Aung San Suu Kyi was shameful to say the least. It had not one word of condemnation or even ‘disappointment”, wrote Col. Hariharan, a very senior analyst of intelligence and security issues.
Suu Kyi is said to have written a letter to Than Shwe, offering to work towards reducing international sanctions on Myanmar, and asked to meet representatives of the US, EU and Australia. Either in a reaction to this or in response to US overtures and demands, two meetings were held in October 2009 between the junta's liaison officer (Labor Minister and retired Major General Aung Kyi) and Suu Kyi. She was also allowed to meet with representatives from the US, Australia and the European Union. Her National League for Democracy (NLD) party has also been allowed to meet with foreign diplomats, including a meeting (on 20 October 2009) with the US charge d' affaires. Cynical observers may say that the generals are making yet another attempt to put off international pressure, only to revert back to repression once attention shifts elsewhere. Or, are the generals playing the US card against China, knowing that any improvement in relations with Washington will improve its leverage with Beijing?
Prime Minister General Thein Sein told (on 25 October 2009) the leaders attending the East Asian Summit in Thailand that the junta will consider relaxing the terms of Suu Kyi’s house arrest if she “maintains a good attitude”. He also said that she can contribute to national reconciliation.
Sanctions Regime
World governments remain divided on how to deal with the military junta in Myanmar. Calls for further sanctions by Canada, United Kingdom, United States, and France are opposed by some countries (including China) on the ground that "sanctions or pressure will not help to solve the issue". India had also resolutely opposed the US call for sanctions on Myanmar. There is some disagreement over whether sanctions are the most effective approach to dealing with the junta, with some opining that sanctions may have caused more harm than good to the people.
The International Labour Organization (ILO) has estimated that about 800,000 people are subject to forced labour in Myanmar. It announced in November 2006, that it will seek to prosecute members of the ruling junta – at the International Court of Justice – for crimes against humanity, over this issue.
The military junta moved the national capital from Yangon to a site near Pyinmana in November 2005, and officially named the new capital as Naypyidaw (meaning "city of the kings") on 27 March 2006. In a futile gesture of criticism, many countries still consider the capital to be Rangoon.
Shifting US Position
India has been advising the west to engage with Myanmar and take off the pressure of sanctions. Many in the west thought this was India’s way of keeping up with China. The Obama Administration, after an eight-month-long review, has apparently decided to engage with Myanmar’s generals. On 29 September 2009, US Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell held his first meeting with Myanmar’s Science Minister U Thaung in New York. One of the key issues that India may take up during discussions with Campbell when he transits New Delhi this week, en route to Yangon, will be the delinking of the fledgling engagement process from next year’s elections in Myanmar. This, incidentally, will be the first US official visit to Myanmar in decades. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said (after the East Asian Summit in Thailand) that there was an "atmosphere of hope" about improving relations between Myanmar and the United States.
Dr. Subash Kapila, a noted International Relations and Strategic Affairs analyst, has very recently written a scholarly paper, which can be seen at www.southasiaanalysis.org. He has argued that the United States has for decades shunned Myanmar politically and economically, on the grounds of human rights abuses and democracy. India adopted the same stance till the early 1990s. In the process, both succeeded in pushing Myanmar closer to China. India has to some extent retrieved its strategic losses by a political and economic reach-out to Myanmar. The US is still dithering, though the Obama Administration has made some tentative moves towards normalization of relations with Myanmar. The strategic key for checkmating in South East Asia lies in Myanmar. Dr. Kapila has advocated that the US should frame its future policy towards Myanmar based on the considerations that Myanmar is of geo-strategic significance for US Naval interests, that Myanmar has not been adversarial to the US geo-politically, Myanmar’s importance for South East Asian Security, and that the US could use India as a bridge to reach-out politically to Myanmar. He has also emphasized that Myanmar has not yet become a full strategic satellite of China and that such an eventuality can be pre-empted.
Almost simultaneously, the US House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee was told on 21 October 2009 that a high-level US delegation is expected to visit Myanmar in the coming weeks, in an attempt to progress the US efforts to engage with the military junta. The talks will center on improving the human-rights situation in Myanmar, the claimed intention to move towards democracy, and increasing US influence in a country widely viewed as a key regional ally of China – through improved diplomatic relations. The delegation is hoping to meet Aung San Suu Kyi and representatives of ethnic groups. This policy shift is apparently a part of the US desire to build stronger ties with South East Asia. Some analysts say that it is caused by the realization that Chinese influence in the region has increased considerably in the past decade, when US attention was diverted elsewhere. This may be the beginning of a quiet competition between Washington and Beijing for influence in South East Asia. A US-Myanmar detente would undoubtedly be viewed as a threat to Beijing's strategic interests in the region. A repeal of even some sanctions (before or after the 2010 election) would put the US in direct competition with China for influence in Myanmar.
The US efforts to counterbalance China's influence in South East Asia have a difficult road ahead in Myanmar. China has already secured a strong position in Myanmar, but the US currently has very little leverage. It has no aid programs, civil society building projects or military-to-military exchanges. Even the US diplomatic mission is headed by a charge d' affaires, since the US withdrew its ambassador in 1988.
India-Myanmar Bilateral Relations : Realism Influencing Policy
As a legacy of British rule, Indians had to face (not so latent) resentment amongst the Burmese; due to Indian soldiers (under the British Army) having fought against BIA, due to the perception that Indian officers and staff functioned as tools of the British colonial regime and due to the alleged exploitation by Indian traders and businesses.
India’s relations with Burma were mostly cordial in the early years after independence. Prime Ministers U Nu and Jawaharlal Nehru were close personal and were both prominent figures in Non-Aligned Movement. India helped Myanmar survive its first difficult years as an independent state, including crucially when various political and ethnic insurgent groups threatened to break the new country apart. Without India's massive military and economic aid, U Nu's government may probably have collapsed. However, Indo-Myanmar relations chilled after General Ne Win's military coup in March 1962. Many former democratic leaders of the Myanmar, including U Nu, were given asylum in India.
Personal relations between Indira Gandhi and Ne Win were good. The xenophobic policies of his Revolutionary Council and the nationalization of privately owned businesses and factories (of which an estimated 60% were owned by people of Indian origin) made thousands lose their properties and livelihood. During the four-year period spanning 1964-68, nearly 150,000 Indo-Burmese had to leave the country.
Myanmar is of great strategic significance to both India and China, thanks to its location and long borders with both countries. In the early years of the military regime, India pushed hard for democracy. Myanmar thus gradually moved to embrace China. China has the advantage of being able to work comfortably with authoritarian and quasi-democratic regimes, without any schizophrenic (ideological) commitment to democracy. China has become to Myanmar an increasingly attractive source of low-interest loans, grants, development projects, technical assistance etc. Combined with China's "no strings attached" approach to aid, this is making China a more attractive partner to regimes with questionable records in human-rights and democracy.
By 1993, it seemed obvious that, despite the charisma of Aung San Suu Kyi, the movement for democracy was not making much progress and that the military regime was going ahead with making peace with the ethnic minorities. There was little or no possibility of the military regime relinquishing power to the National League for Democracy. In the absence of dialogue with the Myanmar military, insurgency and narcotics smuggling were assuming alarming proportions in the states bordering Myanmar. In a classic example of how a nation's interests often override normally expected human behavior, pragmatism became the hallmark of India's relations with Myanmar. Quiet contacts were established and a series of agreements signed to deal with cross-border terrorism and narcotics smuggling and to promote trade and economic development along the Indo-Myanmar border.
During the tenure of Narasimha Rao as Prime Minister, India realized that giving too much weight to human rights and democracy in Myanmar over strategic considerations may not be in its long term interests. It started basing its policy not on idealistic ‘isms’ but on national security considerations. It was increasingly felt that the way to bring about change is not through isolation, but through active engagement and persuasion. Accepting the realities, India's call for democracy in Myanmar has been muted in recent years. This has invited a lot of criticism from “purists”. There has also been severe international criticism of India’s closer engagement with the military junta, at a time when the US and EU were concentrating on sanctions, driving Myanmar into even greater isolation.
The success of a nation’s foreign policy is not judged by the high moral grounds that it adopts, but by the advantages that accrue to it. India also realized that the main beneficiary of strained India-Myanmar relations was China, whether for access to all-important hydrocarbon energy sources, transport corridors or strategic control of the Indian Ocean. Thus, a new chapter began.
Energy-starved India has been courting Myanmar, which is rich in natural gas. India has been trying to look after its own practical interests by maintaining good relations with the military junta in Myanmar. Not only is India eager to cash in on Myanmar’s substantial reserves of natural gas, but Indian officials also hope that Myanmar government would help in controlling anti-Indian insurgents along the border.
Rajiv Sikri (a former Secretary in the Ministry of External affairs) has said that India is obviously not doing enough in Myanmar. Decision-makers in New Delhi are not bestowing serious and sustained attention to Myanmar, since the bordering North East states are themselves political lightweights in the eyes of geographically distant New Delhi. This is in sharp contrast to the attention that, for example, Sri Lanka or Afghanistan gets. If Myanmar were to get even half of the grant assistance and the attention that India has given Sri Lanka and Afghanistan, India would considerably improve her position there. There is no time for India to lose in giving much higher priority to relations with Myanmar.
As Kris Srinivasan, a former Foreign Secretary, has observed “The rationale for India’s policy to befriend Myanmar despite that regime’s ill-treatment of people of Indian origin and repression of its own citizens is understandable, but the lack of beneficial results from the new orientation is harder to comprehend. The new strategy has failed even partially to open a closed polity.”
ECONOMIC
Economic Cooperation
Fruitful and balanced economic cooperation may be the most effective method of engaging with Myanmar. During the 9th round of consultations between foreign offices of the two countries in November 2008, the two delegations being led by the Foreign Secretaries, it was decided to implement promptly the bilateral agreements [a framework agreement on the construction and operation of a multi-modal transit and transport facility on the Kaladan River, a MOU on intelligence exchange to combat transitional crime including terrorism, and an agreement on avoidance of double taxation and prevention of fiscal evasion] signed in April during the visit to India by Maung Aye. Vice Chairman of the SPDC (also Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Defense Services and Commander-in-Chief of the Army). In June 2008, Myanmar and India had reached four more economic cooperation agreements, during the visit of Minister of State for Commerce and Power (Jairam Ramesh). These agreements related to bilateral investment promotion, a USD 20-million credit line between the Exim Bank of India and the Myanmar Foreign Trade Bank (MFTB) for the establishment of a manufacturing facility, another 64-million-dollar credit line for three 230 KV transmission lines; and for establishing banking arrangement between the Myanmar Investment and Trade Bank and the United Bank of India.
Most of the economic transactions have so far been between the two governments, in areas like agriculture, telecommunications, aviation and gas exploration. Myanmar has been trying to entice Indian companies to invest in sectors like pharmaceuticals, cement, fertilizer, steel, IT and food processing; but Indian firms seem reluctant to invest, for fear of a repetition of the earlier nationalization drive.
Myanmar-compiled figures show that India's contracted investments in Myanmar reached USD 219.57 million as of January 2008, of which USD 137 million was in the oil and gas sector. India has given USD 100 million credit for Myanmar’s infrastructure, while USD 57 million has been offered to upgrade the railway system. A further USD 27 million in grants has been pledged for road and rail projects, but there is little yet to show in terms of concrete benefit.
Trade
India-Myanmar bilateral trade reached USD 995 million in 2007-08, with Myanmar's exports accounting for USD 810 million. India is Myanmar's fourth largest trading partner (after Thailand, China and Singapore) and absorbs about 25% of its total exports. India hopes to double by 2010 the bilateral trade that now stand at $ one billion.
It is axiomatic that Myanmar needs help from her friends. In order to improve Myanmar’s multi-lateral trade, India can take the initiative by bringing in the ambit of bilateral trade products like bicycles and spare parts, life saving drugs, fertilizers, textiles, gold plated jewelry, fruits, pulses, tea, gems etc. Already, India imports about 60% of Myanmar’s export of pulses. India can provide the technology to improve productivity in Myanmar’s tea industry. Indian expertise in gem cutting and polishing can be harnessed to provide a boost to the semi-precious gem industry in Myanmar.
Border Trade
It was hoped that greater border trade with Myanmar, on the basis of the agreement signed in 1994, would help revitalize the economy of the North East and help to quell narcotic and arms trafficking, but the hope has not been fulfilled. Only one of the two proposed border posts is open. The road on the Indian side to Moreh is sub-standard. Two-way trade is constrained by the small list of tradable goods, excessive regulation and restrictions; and is negligible compared to trade across the Myanmar’s borders with China and Thailand. India’s North East is swamped by goods of Chinese origin, but there is hardly any movement of Indian exports in the opposite direction.
India and Myanmar are considering the upgradation of the border trade carried out at Reedkhoda (India) and Tamu-Moye (Myanmar) to “normal” trade. This was discussed at the third meeting of Myanmar-India Joint Trade Committee held in October 2008 during the second visit of Indian Minister Jairam Ramesh.
Quest for Energy
Nearly seventy percent of India’s oil is imported and only half its gas demand of 170 million cubic meters a day is met internally. China also imports about 40% of its demand. The two countries account for almost 35% of the growth in the global demand for energy. This dependence on imports has forced both countries to bid aggressively for overseas oil assets.
Expecting an exponential growth in its energy demands due to its expanding economy, India has been trying hard in recent years to secure energy supplies. Unfortunately, India’s oil diplomacy has not been sufficiently geared to meet the challenge; and its oil companies have been outsmarted (or under-bid) by Chinese firms in several deals. In the last few years, ONGC has been thwarted by Chinese firms in Kazakhstan, Ecuador and Angola. Top Chinese offshore producer CNOOC Ltd. acquired a 45 % stake in a Nigerian oil and gas field for USD 2.3 billion. ONGC was also in this race, but withdrew due to objections in the cabinet.
Most embarrassingly, India also lost a deal in Myanmar where no open bidding was held. Myanmar decided to decline gas supply to the (proposed-but-grounded) Myanmar-Bangladesh-India pipeline. Instead, it signed an agreement with Petrochina, under which Myanmar’s ministry of energy agreed to sell 6.5 TCF from A-1 block (Rakhine coastline) reserve through an overland pipeline to Kunming, for 30 years. All this happened despite the fact that India’s ONGC Videsh Ltd (OVL) and GAIL (India) Ltd., between them, hold 30% participating interest in this block. Anyhow, Myanmar could not be expected to have waited indefinitely for India and Bangladesh to resolve their mutual differences over a project based on sound economic logic but delayed because of domestic political compulsions. Myanmar, however, says that it could still supply gas to the tri-nation gas pipeline from other gas blocks if Bangladesh and India were successful in ironing out their differences. In answer to the question as to who lost Myanmar, Rajiv Sikri (a former Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs) has written “Various actors bear a collective responsibility”.
In return for various economic concessions (and support in the UN), China seems to have been given preferential access to exploit Myanmar's natural resources and port facilities along Myanmar's coast. Chinese investment includes involvement in the Shwe gas project off Myanmar's western coast. Human rights organizations allege that the offshore project and a dual oil and gas pipeline being constructed from the coast to Kunming have already resulted in human rights abuses and will likely result in many more as the projects progress.
China was scheduled to begin (in September 2009) the laying of 1,100 kms-long, parallel oil and natural gas pipelines from the deep-sea port at Kyaukpyu (on Myanmar’s Arakan coast in the Bay of Bengal) to Kunming. The pipeline will also tap into key blocks in Myanmar’s energy-rich Shwe gas fields that have been given on a 30-year lease to a Chinese-led consortium. The pipeline project was agreed to during the visit Maung Aye to Beijing in mid-June 2009. It will reduce China’s dependence on the narrow Malacca Straits, through which 80% of its oil imports of four million barrels per day currently pass. When the oil and gas pipelines are completed by 2013, Chinese tankers will dock at Kyaukpyu port to transport 600,000 barrels per day from West Asia and Africa. The gas pipeline can move about 12 billion cubic meters of gas annually.
In late September 2007, when the pro-democracy protests were under way, India’s Minister for Petroleum (Murli Deora) visited Myanmar and secured a contract for three deep-water gas exploration projects for the ONGC.
Infrastructure Projects
Both India and China are interested in implementing infrastructure projects in Myanmar, to get access to the Bay of Bengal, India for the North-East and China for its landlocked Yunnan province. India and China had planned to rebuild the (World War II) Stillwell Road, on which work by the Chinese has already started. Recent reports say that India has lost interest in the project. A 1,500 km Trans-Asian Highway between India and Thailand and a railway from Hanoi to Imphal are still being talked about.
The 160 km India-Myanmar Friendship Road, between Tamu and Kalemayo (Myanmar) and going on to Kalewa, was built by India in 2001. It is now being strengthened and resurfaced. It effectively links Manipur with Myanmar. Two other sections at Rhi-Tidim and Rhi-Falam across the border from Mizoram are under way.
An optical fibre network has been laid from linking Kolkata with Yangon and Mandalay.
Kaladan Project
The Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit-cum-Transport Project is essentially transportation project on the River Kaladan, which flows in and out of Mizoram and is navigable all the way to the sea. It empties into the Bay of Bengal near the port of Sittwe (formerly known as Akyab). This port will be developed by India into a major commercial hub, to distribute Mizoram's bamboo crops and Myanmar's forest wealth. Besides 225-km waterway, the project also envisages construction of two roads, ie.e 117 km extending NHI54 to the border and 52 km from the border to Kaleutwa. Sea lanes are also to be developed between Sittwe and Kolkata and Visakhapatnam. Sittwe could also become a major distribution center for oil and gas supplies to India’s North-East.
Kaladan, a wide river with perennial water flow, originates in the upper reaches of Myanmar, enters Mizoram and then meanders back into Myanmar to continue its passage south to the Bay of Bengal. Navigation with 500-ton river crafts is possible all the way from Mizoram. Gooda from the North-East could easily be transported by river to the Bay of Bengal and then onwards to markets in India and elsewhere. The circuitous surface route via Assam and through the Siliguri Corridor could be avoided, cutting transportation costs by nearly half.
Union Minister of State for Commerce and Industry, Jairam Ramesh, announced on 7 January 2008 that India has decided to undertake the project at a cost of more than USD 120 million. The port will be India’s gift to Myanmar, but India would have usage rights. Ramesh termed it as “the most significant initiative the Indian government has taken in South-East Asia”.
When Myanmar realizes the full potential of this project, it may begin utilizing the river for domestic navigational purposes also. Sittwe could eventually become the onshore hub of Myanmar's gas industry once the vast reserves in the Shwe fields in the Bay of Bengal are developed. It is a win-win situation for both India and Myanmar. Further development of the Sittwe port into a gas and oil transshipment terminal may add to its importance. More funds will be required to develop Sittwe to its full potential, but India may (and should) not be averse to putting up the additional funds.
Cyclone Nargis
Cyclone Nargis hit Myanmar on 3 May 2008, causing heavy damage in the densely populated, rice-farming delta of the Irrawaddy Division. There were reports that more than 200,000 people were dead or missing, in the worst recorded natural disaster in Myanmar’s history. UN estimates projected that as many as one million people were left homeless. In the immediate days following the disaster, the military regime complicated recovery efforts by delaying the entry of planes delivering medicine, food, and other supplies. A US naval task force carrying much-needed relief supplies, helicopters and other vehicles as well as manpower was denied permission, based on fears that it could be a prelude to a military invasion. Indian leaders sent condolence messages and rushed urgently needed relief and medical supplies to the affected areas, using two naval ships from Port Blair.
MILITARY
Insurgencies in Myanmar
About twenty minority groups have been carrying on insurgency against the Government of Myanmar, with the Karen being the largest of them. The BBC had estimated in 2004 that upto 200,000 Karen have been driven from their homes during decades of war, with 120,000 more refugees from Myanmar, mostly Karen, living in refugee camps in Thailand, across the border. Another estimate says that more than two million people have fled from Myanmar to Thailand. There are accusations against the military government of “ethnic cleansing”.
Since Beijing reversed its previous policy and withdrew support to the insurgent Burmese Communist Party (BCP) in the 1980s, the BCP collapsed in 1989 resulting in the formation of several ethnic-based insurgent organizations, including narcotics trafficking by the United Wa State Army, now active along the China-Myanmar border.
In early August 2009, in the Kokang incident in Shan State in northern Myanmar, junta troops fought for several weeks against ethnic minorities including Han Chinese, Wa and Kachin. In the first days of the conflict, as many as 10,000 Burmese civilians are said to have fled to Yunnan province in neighboring China. The incident annoyed China.
The military junta has been applying pressure for the ceasefire groups to become border guard units, under army control. Ethnic leaders have so far resisted the demand and with a deadline set for the end of October 2009, civil war may become a possibility. So far, China has been careful to provide only enough support to ethnic insurgents to deter the Myanmar Army from making any rash moves (like at Kokang). This situation may change if closer ties develop between Myanmar and the US.
Insurgencies in India
A (limited) joint Indo-Myanmar military operation against insurgents (striding the Indo-Myanmar border) was undertaken in 1995. However, cooperation in taking action against the cross-border militants petered out. India and Myanmar have varying problems with different sets of insurgents and do not share the same priorities in addressing them. During his visit to India in April 2008, Maung Aye (Vice Chairman of SPDC) assured that Myanmar will never allow the use of its territory by any organization that harms neighboring countries. At the same time, he acknowledged that, likewise, India does not allow its territory to be used by any organization against Myanmar.
Defence Relations
High-level military-to-military contacts began in 2000. In January, Indian Army Chief General Ved Prakash Malik paid a two-day visit to Myanmar. This was followed by the reciprocal visit by his Myanmar counterpart, General Maung Aye, to the northeast Indian city of Shillong. In the aftermath of these meetings, India began to provide non-lethal military support to Myanmar troops along the border. Most of the Myanmar troops' uniforms and other combat gear originated from India, as were the leased helicopters Myanmar needed to counter the ethnic insurgents operating from sanctuaries along both sides of the border.
Since the initial exchange of visits, there has been a steady flow of high level visits from both sides. Junta chief, General Than Shwe, visited India In 2004, followed in December 2006 by the third-highest ranking officer in Myanmar's military hierarchy, General Thura Shwe Mann. The latter toured the National Defense Academy in Khadakvasla and the Tata Motors plant in Pune, which manufactures vehicles for India’s military.
After the relatively small-scale pro-democracy demonstrations in 1988, China stepped in with enhanced military aid, enabling Myanmar's army to expand to some 500,000 men, the second-largest standing army in South east Asia. Indian military is also concerned about China modernizing the naval bases at Hanggyi, Cocos, Akyab,, Mergui and the port at Kyauk Phuy. The situations seems to have become an unequal triangular relationship, where one party seems to be reaping all the benefits.
Some Conclusions
Though China has been able greatly to improve its position in Myanmar and has cultivated civil and military officials, Beijing's efforts in Myanmar may have started running into the pervasive xenophobia and wariness of dependence on any singular foreign power.
Myanmar is not a democracy or a pluralistic society where clamour for human rights, adherence to international norms and standards have much chance of strict observance. It is one of the few bastions of totalitarian governance in the world today. India may have been making a mistake in looking at Myanmar through the Indian prism and experience. The people, the civil society (what there is left of it) and the media behave very differently than in India. The junta seems to believe that they do not matter much and behaves very differently from the governments in India. It should be taken into account that the Myanmar leadership is perceived as being reclusive and essentially xenophobic, almost happy to be in their own “time warp”, wish to be left alone (except as demanded by the changing international situation) and do not want the dominance of any country in Myanmar’s affairs. They also display occasional touches of racialism. Myanmar’s leadership is able to afford the luxury of such positions mainly because of the country’s strategic geographic location and because it has perhaps the largest military in South East Asia. This view of an untrained amateur student of human behavior (like me) may or may not be valid, but is worth consideration by Indian policy-makers.
With all his experience, Rajiv Sikri :feels that Myanmar regards China’s growing influence with suspicion and sees India as the only viable means to balance China’s increasing encroachment, especially in the Kachin and Shan states. For this and other reasons, Myanmar is keen to have good relations with India. India needs to fine-tune its strategy for dealing with Myanmar, focusing not on what should be or might have been, but on what can be done.
Apart from inadequate awareness and respect for the psyche of the leadership in Myanmar, India has not shown much subtlety or finesse (not even matching the limited subtlety or finesse shown in Sri Lanka) in dealing with them. There is no evidence of a clear vision about what we want and how to get it. There is hardly any visible coordinated stance or approach, with too many loose cannons around. Often, India seems to be shooting at its own toes instead of at the target. On the commercial and trade fronts, where most deals are government-to-government, the government’s bureaucratic procedures seem to dominate the decision-making process in the public sector oil companies. There is an urgent need to change this to become commercially competitive in today’s fast-paced international milieu.
Fortunately, India currently enjoys fairly good political, economic and military-relations with Myanmar. India is also involved in infrastructure projects for better India-Myanmar connectivity. However, one cannot but agree with Kris Srinivasan when he concludes that “The outcomes of the energies expended by India over the past two decades have been negligible. The situation calls for a re-appraisal designed to turn the tide more in our favour.
[This paper was prepared by R. Swaminathan, President & DG, International Institute for Security and Safety Management (New Delhi), and former Special Secretary, DG (Security), Govt. of India, for presentation on 29 October 2009 at the National Seminar on “Recent Developments in Myanmar : Implications for India”, organized jointly by the Department of Politics & Public Administration (University of Madras) and Center for Asia Studies (Chennai). He can be contacted at rsnathan@gmail.com]
A N N E X U R E
Historical Background
The Union of Myanmar, known as Burma till 1989, is the largest country by geographical area (678,500 sq kms) in mainland Southeast Asia. It is bordered by China on the northeast (with the Hengduan Shan mountains as the boundary), Laos on the east, Thailand on the southeast, Bangladesh on the west, India on the northwest and the Bay of Bengal to the southwest. One-third of Myanmar’s total perimeter forms an uninterrupted coastline of 1,930 kilometres. Myanmar and India share a border of over 1,600 kilometers. The country's culture, heavily influenced by its neighbours, is based on Theravada Buddhism.
Known human habitation in Myanmar goes back nearly 5000 years, from when the Mon, considered to be the first inhabitants, settled in central Myanmar and along the eastern coast of Bay of Bengal. It is believed that the Mon established some trade and cultural contacts with the early inhabitants of India. The Burmans (originally from Yunnan), who established their first kingdom in Myanmar in 849 A.D., eventually absorbed the communities of the Mon and Pyu people. King Anawrahta (r 1044-1077) set up the Pagan Kingdom bringing about the first unified state of Myanmar. Kublai Khan’s victory in 1287 started a period of continual conflicts that continued for many centuries. The appearance of Europeans had little effect on Myanmar due to these conflicts, until they infringed on the British Raj in Bengal. This brought about British intervention (from 1824) and, though Rangoon was occupied in 1853, all of Burma was formally annexed to British India only in 1886. Burma was administered as a province of British India until 1937, when it became a separate colony. One of the results of the British occupation was the flow of Chinese and Indian immigrants, who tended to exploit the Burmans. Indians were drafted in large numbers into the colonial army during the three Anglo-Burma wars in the 19th century, and about 400,000 Indians were taken there to run various public services. The persons of Indian origin on the eve of the Japanese invasion numbered about 1.1 million.
Strong Burmese resentment against the British was noticed as early as 1919. It was often vented in violent riots that paralyzed Yangon on occasion. Much of the discontent was caused by a perceived disrespect for Burmese culture and traditions, like the British not removing their shoes upon entering Buddhist temples or other holy places. When scandalized Buddhist monks attempted to physically expel a group of shoe-wearing British in Eindawya Pagoda (Mandalay) in October 1919, the leader of the monks was sentenced to life imprisonment for attempted murder. Such incidents inspired the Burmese resistance to use Buddhism as a rallying point for their cause. Buddhist monks became the vanguards of the independence movement, and many died while protesting. Students were also active participants in anti-British activities.
Nationalist sentiments became more evident with the start of World War II. A student leader, Aung San (and his “thirty comrades”) went to Japan for “training”. On return, they founded the Burma Independence Army (BIA) in Bangkok (which was then under Japanese occupation) on 26 December 1941, with the help of Japanese intelligence. When Rangoon fell in March 1942, the BIA formed an administration for the country that operated in parallel with the Japanese military administration. On 1 August 1943, the Japanese declared Burma to be an “independent” nation, and Aung San was appointed War Minister. Later, Aung San became skeptical of the Japanese promises and made plans to organize an uprising in Burma (in cooperation with Communist leaders Thakin Than Tun and Thakin Soe), with help from the British authorities in India. On 27 March 1945, he led the BNA in a revolt against the Japanese occupiers and helped the Allies defeat the Japanese; and the British established a military administration.
The Anti-Fascist Organisation (formed in August 1944) was transformed into the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL), a united front consisting of the BNA, the Communists and the Socialists. The BNA was gradually disarmed by the British, when the Japanese were driven out of Burma. Aung San turned down the rank of Deputy Inspector General of the Burma Army and became the military leader of the People's Volunteer Organisation. He was popularly referred to as Bogyoke (meaning General).
After civilian government was restored in Burma in October 1945, Aung San became the President of the AFPFL in January 1946. In September, he was appointed Deputy Chairman of the Executive Council of Burma by the new British Governor, and was made responsible for defence and external affairs. [This was analogous to the appointment of Jawahar Lal Nehru as the Vice President of the Interim Government in India, in June 1946.] The communists left the AFPFL, when Aung San and others accepted seats on the Executive Council. Aung San (at the age of 31) was to all intents and purposes the Prime Minister. On 27 January 1947, Aung San and Clement Attlee signed an agreement in London guaranteeing Burma's independence within a year. In April, the AFPFL won 196 out of 202 seats in the Constituent Assembly. Tragedy struck on 19 July 1947, when a gang of armed paramilitaries broke into the Secretariat Building and assassinated Aung San and six of his cabinet ministers, who were participating in a meeting of the Executive Council. [The assassination was allegedly carried out on the orders of political rival U Saw, who was subsequently tried and hanged.] U Nu, (a former student leader) and Foreign Minister Ba Maw took over the leadership of the government and AFPFL.
The country became independent on 4 January 1948, as the "Union of Burma". It became the "Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma" on 4 January 1974, before reverting to the "Union of Burma" on 23 September 1988. On 18 June, 1989, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) adopted the name "Union of Myanmar".
Military Rule
Civilian government ended in 1962 when General Ne Win led a military coup and put U Nu in prison. Myanmar now has one of the longest surviving military regimes in the world. Ne Win ruled for nearly 26 years and pursued policies in the name of “Burmese Way to Socialism”. Between 1962 and 1974, Burma was ruled by a Revolutionary Council headed by the general, and almost all aspects of society (business, media, production - including the Boy Scouts) were nationalized or brought under government control. In an effort to consolidate power, General Ne Win and many top generals “resigned” from the military and took civilian posts. They held “elections” under a one-party system and Ne Win ruled Burma between 1974 and 1988, through the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP), which was the sole political party allowed to function. The Burmese Way to Socialism adopted Soviet-style nationalization and central planning and was a kind of an amalgam of Buddhism and Marxism. During this period, Burma became one of the world's most impoverished countries.
People whose ancestors were not from the "original" Myanmar races, i.e. Sino-Burman and Indo-Burman communities, were classified as “associate citizens" or “resident aliens”, with the right to vote, but not allowed to be elected or hold government positions above a certain level. This and the wholesale nationalisation of private enterprises led to the exodus of about 300,000 Burmese Indians.
Almost from the beginning of military rule, there were sporadic protests against it, many organized by students, and were almost always violently suppressed by the government. Student protests were violently broken up every year during 1974-77. Unrest over economic mismanagement and political oppression led to widespread pro-democracy demonstrations throughout the country in 1988. Security forces killed thousands of demonstrators. Ne Win stepped down in July. Aung San Suu Kyi (the daughter of Aung San), in partnership with Brigadier Aung Gyi and General Tin U, tried to appease those who resented the military rule and was only partly successful. Defense Minister General Saw Maung staged a coup in September and formed the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). In 1989, SLORC declared martial law after widespread protests. In July, Aung San Suu Kyi was placed under house arrest and General Tin U put in prison.
In May 1990, the government held free elections for the first time in almost 30 years. The National League for Democracy (NLD), the party of Aung San Suu Kyi, won 392 out of a total 489 seats, and 60 % of the votes. The election results were, however, annulled by SLORC, which arrested most of its top leaders and declared that a non-military government could not be established in Myanmar, without a new constitution. The award of the Nobel Peace Prize to Aung San Suu Kyi in 1991 put a lot of pressure on the SLORC. When General Than Shwe took over as SLORC chairman in 1992, many political prisoners were released and Aung San Suu Kyi was allowed visits from her family; and later allowed to meet a U.S congressman, a UN official and an American reporter.
In 1992, SLORC unveiled plans to create a new constitution through the National Convention, which began 9 January 1993. When the military directed it to give it a major role in the government, NLD party members walked out the convention. The National Convention continues to convene and adjourn. Many major political parties, particularly the NLD, have been absent or excluded, and little progress has been made.
The State Law and Order Restoration Council was renamed as the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) in 1997, with the same leadership as the SLORC.
On 7 February 2008, SPDC announced that a referendum would soon be held relating to the new Constitution, and that elections would be held by 2010. The referendum, held on 10 May 2008, promised a "discipline-flourishing democracy" for the country. The referendum is seen by many as an effort to “legalise” the perpetuation of the military rule.
Courtesy:http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers35%5Cpaper3483.html
Relations between India and Myanmar over nearly five decades have been governed by many complex factors. Amongst them are the strategic location of Myanmar, India’s commitment to idealism-driven support to the restoration of democracy in Myanmar, realism-driven need to deal with those actually governing the country, the implications of China’s increasing presence and role in Myanmar etc. China, fortunately for it, has been able to make its foreign policy decisions without having to bother about the nature of the regime in any country.
India and Myanmar share a complicated and delicate history, marked as much by mistrust as amity. For those who may be interested, a “Historical Background” is annexed to this paper.
POLITICAL
Pro-Democracy Protests in 2007
A series of anti-government protests started in Myanmar on 15 August 2007. The immediate and stated cause of the protests was mainly the decision of the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) to remove fuel subsidies, resulting in very steep increases in the prices of diesel, petrol and compressed natural gas. The first demonstrations were dealt with quickly and harshly, with many arrested and detained. Starting 18 September, the protests were led by thousands of Buddhist monks, and those were also allowed to proceed. Initially, only a few hundred monks walked down the streets but, by end-September, the protesting crowds had grown to 100,000 – both monks and democracy activists. There was a renewed government crackdown on 26 September.
The military junta’s actions against the “peaceful” and “almost Gandhian” ptotestors evoked a considerable amount of international condemnation. However, Beijing expectedly showed more interest in maintaining stability than in pushing for democracy.
In an official statement issued in the wake of the violence, India expressed its support for the "undaunted resolve of the Burmese people to achieve democracy". The Burmese language service of All-India Radio (AIR) was more outspoken in its criticism of Myanmar's military government. It said that India was gradually succeeding in weaning Myanmar away from its near-total dependence on China for economic and military support. It could not therefore be expected to take the strong position that the US, the European Union and Myanmar dissidents were asking her to take; and thus risk - to China's benefit - the precious foothold it had achieved in Myanmar over the previous decade.
Ibrahim Gambari, the United Nations special envoy to Myanmar, undertook a tour across Asia, with the hope of cajoling Asian governments to take a tougher stance on the junta’s crushing of the protests. When he called on India (in October 2007) to join other countries in pressing Myanmar’s military rulers to stop their campaign of repression against pro-democracy protesters, the Indian government described Myanmar as its “close and friendly neighbor” and assured that it would help in Myanmar’s national reconciliation. India’s decision to avoid direct criticism of the military regime came in for a lot of adverse comments. However, it is not as if India was totally silent on the issue. When Myanmar Foreign Minister Nyan Win, who visited India in January 2008, called on Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, the PM emphasized that there was need for greater urgency in bringing about political reforms and national reconciliation. “This process has to be broad-based to include all sections of society, including Aung San Suu Kyi and the various ethnic groups.”
Aung San Suu Kyi
Aung San Suu Kyi (the daughter of “General” Aung San) has been under house arrest almost continually since 1989. When anti-government protests intensified in September 2007, hundreds of monks paid respects to her at the gate of her home. This was the first time in four years that people were able to see her in public. On 29 September, she was allowed to leave her house briefly to meet with a UN envoy who was trying to persuade (eventually, successfully) the junta to ease its crackdown against pro-democracy protesters.
On 4 May 2009, a mentally unbalanced American (John Yettaw) swam across the lake and entered the house of Aung San Suu Kyi, uninvited, and remained there for two nights. Instead of faulting those in charge of security, both the intruder and Suu Kyi were held in prison and put on trial. While the intruder was sentenced to imprisonment, Suu Kyi was awarded (on 11 August 2009) an additional 18 months of house arrest – beyond the earlier term which was due to end on 27 May 2009. The sentencing once again showed how the milit.ary junta was determined to stop her participation in the elections to be held in 2010. In a declared act of “benevolence”, the government had commuted the court’s original sentence of three-years hard labour.
Aung San Suu Kyi’s conviction drew almost universal condemnation. President Obama demanded her immediate release while British Prime Minister Gordon Brown stated that "This is a purely political sentence designed to prevent her from taking part in the regime’s planned elections next year" and called for a UN embargo on all arms exports to Burma. President Nicolas Sarkozy of France sought fresh restrictions on Myanmar's two important export items - rubies and hardwood. Thailand was even more explicit and urged Myanmar to immediately free Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest to allow her to play a role in next year's general election. However, action by the U.N. Security Council was stalled due to reservations on the part of Russia and China. “India’s reaction to the conviction of Aung San Suu Kyi was shameful to say the least. It had not one word of condemnation or even ‘disappointment”, wrote Col. Hariharan, a very senior analyst of intelligence and security issues.
Suu Kyi is said to have written a letter to Than Shwe, offering to work towards reducing international sanctions on Myanmar, and asked to meet representatives of the US, EU and Australia. Either in a reaction to this or in response to US overtures and demands, two meetings were held in October 2009 between the junta's liaison officer (Labor Minister and retired Major General Aung Kyi) and Suu Kyi. She was also allowed to meet with representatives from the US, Australia and the European Union. Her National League for Democracy (NLD) party has also been allowed to meet with foreign diplomats, including a meeting (on 20 October 2009) with the US charge d' affaires. Cynical observers may say that the generals are making yet another attempt to put off international pressure, only to revert back to repression once attention shifts elsewhere. Or, are the generals playing the US card against China, knowing that any improvement in relations with Washington will improve its leverage with Beijing?
Prime Minister General Thein Sein told (on 25 October 2009) the leaders attending the East Asian Summit in Thailand that the junta will consider relaxing the terms of Suu Kyi’s house arrest if she “maintains a good attitude”. He also said that she can contribute to national reconciliation.
Sanctions Regime
World governments remain divided on how to deal with the military junta in Myanmar. Calls for further sanctions by Canada, United Kingdom, United States, and France are opposed by some countries (including China) on the ground that "sanctions or pressure will not help to solve the issue". India had also resolutely opposed the US call for sanctions on Myanmar. There is some disagreement over whether sanctions are the most effective approach to dealing with the junta, with some opining that sanctions may have caused more harm than good to the people.
The International Labour Organization (ILO) has estimated that about 800,000 people are subject to forced labour in Myanmar. It announced in November 2006, that it will seek to prosecute members of the ruling junta – at the International Court of Justice – for crimes against humanity, over this issue.
The military junta moved the national capital from Yangon to a site near Pyinmana in November 2005, and officially named the new capital as Naypyidaw (meaning "city of the kings") on 27 March 2006. In a futile gesture of criticism, many countries still consider the capital to be Rangoon.
Shifting US Position
India has been advising the west to engage with Myanmar and take off the pressure of sanctions. Many in the west thought this was India’s way of keeping up with China. The Obama Administration, after an eight-month-long review, has apparently decided to engage with Myanmar’s generals. On 29 September 2009, US Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell held his first meeting with Myanmar’s Science Minister U Thaung in New York. One of the key issues that India may take up during discussions with Campbell when he transits New Delhi this week, en route to Yangon, will be the delinking of the fledgling engagement process from next year’s elections in Myanmar. This, incidentally, will be the first US official visit to Myanmar in decades. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said (after the East Asian Summit in Thailand) that there was an "atmosphere of hope" about improving relations between Myanmar and the United States.
Dr. Subash Kapila, a noted International Relations and Strategic Affairs analyst, has very recently written a scholarly paper, which can be seen at www.southasiaanalysis.org. He has argued that the United States has for decades shunned Myanmar politically and economically, on the grounds of human rights abuses and democracy. India adopted the same stance till the early 1990s. In the process, both succeeded in pushing Myanmar closer to China. India has to some extent retrieved its strategic losses by a political and economic reach-out to Myanmar. The US is still dithering, though the Obama Administration has made some tentative moves towards normalization of relations with Myanmar. The strategic key for checkmating in South East Asia lies in Myanmar. Dr. Kapila has advocated that the US should frame its future policy towards Myanmar based on the considerations that Myanmar is of geo-strategic significance for US Naval interests, that Myanmar has not been adversarial to the US geo-politically, Myanmar’s importance for South East Asian Security, and that the US could use India as a bridge to reach-out politically to Myanmar. He has also emphasized that Myanmar has not yet become a full strategic satellite of China and that such an eventuality can be pre-empted.
Almost simultaneously, the US House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee was told on 21 October 2009 that a high-level US delegation is expected to visit Myanmar in the coming weeks, in an attempt to progress the US efforts to engage with the military junta. The talks will center on improving the human-rights situation in Myanmar, the claimed intention to move towards democracy, and increasing US influence in a country widely viewed as a key regional ally of China – through improved diplomatic relations. The delegation is hoping to meet Aung San Suu Kyi and representatives of ethnic groups. This policy shift is apparently a part of the US desire to build stronger ties with South East Asia. Some analysts say that it is caused by the realization that Chinese influence in the region has increased considerably in the past decade, when US attention was diverted elsewhere. This may be the beginning of a quiet competition between Washington and Beijing for influence in South East Asia. A US-Myanmar detente would undoubtedly be viewed as a threat to Beijing's strategic interests in the region. A repeal of even some sanctions (before or after the 2010 election) would put the US in direct competition with China for influence in Myanmar.
The US efforts to counterbalance China's influence in South East Asia have a difficult road ahead in Myanmar. China has already secured a strong position in Myanmar, but the US currently has very little leverage. It has no aid programs, civil society building projects or military-to-military exchanges. Even the US diplomatic mission is headed by a charge d' affaires, since the US withdrew its ambassador in 1988.
India-Myanmar Bilateral Relations : Realism Influencing Policy
As a legacy of British rule, Indians had to face (not so latent) resentment amongst the Burmese; due to Indian soldiers (under the British Army) having fought against BIA, due to the perception that Indian officers and staff functioned as tools of the British colonial regime and due to the alleged exploitation by Indian traders and businesses.
India’s relations with Burma were mostly cordial in the early years after independence. Prime Ministers U Nu and Jawaharlal Nehru were close personal and were both prominent figures in Non-Aligned Movement. India helped Myanmar survive its first difficult years as an independent state, including crucially when various political and ethnic insurgent groups threatened to break the new country apart. Without India's massive military and economic aid, U Nu's government may probably have collapsed. However, Indo-Myanmar relations chilled after General Ne Win's military coup in March 1962. Many former democratic leaders of the Myanmar, including U Nu, were given asylum in India.
Personal relations between Indira Gandhi and Ne Win were good. The xenophobic policies of his Revolutionary Council and the nationalization of privately owned businesses and factories (of which an estimated 60% were owned by people of Indian origin) made thousands lose their properties and livelihood. During the four-year period spanning 1964-68, nearly 150,000 Indo-Burmese had to leave the country.
Myanmar is of great strategic significance to both India and China, thanks to its location and long borders with both countries. In the early years of the military regime, India pushed hard for democracy. Myanmar thus gradually moved to embrace China. China has the advantage of being able to work comfortably with authoritarian and quasi-democratic regimes, without any schizophrenic (ideological) commitment to democracy. China has become to Myanmar an increasingly attractive source of low-interest loans, grants, development projects, technical assistance etc. Combined with China's "no strings attached" approach to aid, this is making China a more attractive partner to regimes with questionable records in human-rights and democracy.
By 1993, it seemed obvious that, despite the charisma of Aung San Suu Kyi, the movement for democracy was not making much progress and that the military regime was going ahead with making peace with the ethnic minorities. There was little or no possibility of the military regime relinquishing power to the National League for Democracy. In the absence of dialogue with the Myanmar military, insurgency and narcotics smuggling were assuming alarming proportions in the states bordering Myanmar. In a classic example of how a nation's interests often override normally expected human behavior, pragmatism became the hallmark of India's relations with Myanmar. Quiet contacts were established and a series of agreements signed to deal with cross-border terrorism and narcotics smuggling and to promote trade and economic development along the Indo-Myanmar border.
During the tenure of Narasimha Rao as Prime Minister, India realized that giving too much weight to human rights and democracy in Myanmar over strategic considerations may not be in its long term interests. It started basing its policy not on idealistic ‘isms’ but on national security considerations. It was increasingly felt that the way to bring about change is not through isolation, but through active engagement and persuasion. Accepting the realities, India's call for democracy in Myanmar has been muted in recent years. This has invited a lot of criticism from “purists”. There has also been severe international criticism of India’s closer engagement with the military junta, at a time when the US and EU were concentrating on sanctions, driving Myanmar into even greater isolation.
The success of a nation’s foreign policy is not judged by the high moral grounds that it adopts, but by the advantages that accrue to it. India also realized that the main beneficiary of strained India-Myanmar relations was China, whether for access to all-important hydrocarbon energy sources, transport corridors or strategic control of the Indian Ocean. Thus, a new chapter began.
Energy-starved India has been courting Myanmar, which is rich in natural gas. India has been trying to look after its own practical interests by maintaining good relations with the military junta in Myanmar. Not only is India eager to cash in on Myanmar’s substantial reserves of natural gas, but Indian officials also hope that Myanmar government would help in controlling anti-Indian insurgents along the border.
Rajiv Sikri (a former Secretary in the Ministry of External affairs) has said that India is obviously not doing enough in Myanmar. Decision-makers in New Delhi are not bestowing serious and sustained attention to Myanmar, since the bordering North East states are themselves political lightweights in the eyes of geographically distant New Delhi. This is in sharp contrast to the attention that, for example, Sri Lanka or Afghanistan gets. If Myanmar were to get even half of the grant assistance and the attention that India has given Sri Lanka and Afghanistan, India would considerably improve her position there. There is no time for India to lose in giving much higher priority to relations with Myanmar.
As Kris Srinivasan, a former Foreign Secretary, has observed “The rationale for India’s policy to befriend Myanmar despite that regime’s ill-treatment of people of Indian origin and repression of its own citizens is understandable, but the lack of beneficial results from the new orientation is harder to comprehend. The new strategy has failed even partially to open a closed polity.”
ECONOMIC
Economic Cooperation
Fruitful and balanced economic cooperation may be the most effective method of engaging with Myanmar. During the 9th round of consultations between foreign offices of the two countries in November 2008, the two delegations being led by the Foreign Secretaries, it was decided to implement promptly the bilateral agreements [a framework agreement on the construction and operation of a multi-modal transit and transport facility on the Kaladan River, a MOU on intelligence exchange to combat transitional crime including terrorism, and an agreement on avoidance of double taxation and prevention of fiscal evasion] signed in April during the visit to India by Maung Aye. Vice Chairman of the SPDC (also Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Defense Services and Commander-in-Chief of the Army). In June 2008, Myanmar and India had reached four more economic cooperation agreements, during the visit of Minister of State for Commerce and Power (Jairam Ramesh). These agreements related to bilateral investment promotion, a USD 20-million credit line between the Exim Bank of India and the Myanmar Foreign Trade Bank (MFTB) for the establishment of a manufacturing facility, another 64-million-dollar credit line for three 230 KV transmission lines; and for establishing banking arrangement between the Myanmar Investment and Trade Bank and the United Bank of India.
Most of the economic transactions have so far been between the two governments, in areas like agriculture, telecommunications, aviation and gas exploration. Myanmar has been trying to entice Indian companies to invest in sectors like pharmaceuticals, cement, fertilizer, steel, IT and food processing; but Indian firms seem reluctant to invest, for fear of a repetition of the earlier nationalization drive.
Myanmar-compiled figures show that India's contracted investments in Myanmar reached USD 219.57 million as of January 2008, of which USD 137 million was in the oil and gas sector. India has given USD 100 million credit for Myanmar’s infrastructure, while USD 57 million has been offered to upgrade the railway system. A further USD 27 million in grants has been pledged for road and rail projects, but there is little yet to show in terms of concrete benefit.
Trade
India-Myanmar bilateral trade reached USD 995 million in 2007-08, with Myanmar's exports accounting for USD 810 million. India is Myanmar's fourth largest trading partner (after Thailand, China and Singapore) and absorbs about 25% of its total exports. India hopes to double by 2010 the bilateral trade that now stand at $ one billion.
It is axiomatic that Myanmar needs help from her friends. In order to improve Myanmar’s multi-lateral trade, India can take the initiative by bringing in the ambit of bilateral trade products like bicycles and spare parts, life saving drugs, fertilizers, textiles, gold plated jewelry, fruits, pulses, tea, gems etc. Already, India imports about 60% of Myanmar’s export of pulses. India can provide the technology to improve productivity in Myanmar’s tea industry. Indian expertise in gem cutting and polishing can be harnessed to provide a boost to the semi-precious gem industry in Myanmar.
Border Trade
It was hoped that greater border trade with Myanmar, on the basis of the agreement signed in 1994, would help revitalize the economy of the North East and help to quell narcotic and arms trafficking, but the hope has not been fulfilled. Only one of the two proposed border posts is open. The road on the Indian side to Moreh is sub-standard. Two-way trade is constrained by the small list of tradable goods, excessive regulation and restrictions; and is negligible compared to trade across the Myanmar’s borders with China and Thailand. India’s North East is swamped by goods of Chinese origin, but there is hardly any movement of Indian exports in the opposite direction.
India and Myanmar are considering the upgradation of the border trade carried out at Reedkhoda (India) and Tamu-Moye (Myanmar) to “normal” trade. This was discussed at the third meeting of Myanmar-India Joint Trade Committee held in October 2008 during the second visit of Indian Minister Jairam Ramesh.
Quest for Energy
Nearly seventy percent of India’s oil is imported and only half its gas demand of 170 million cubic meters a day is met internally. China also imports about 40% of its demand. The two countries account for almost 35% of the growth in the global demand for energy. This dependence on imports has forced both countries to bid aggressively for overseas oil assets.
Expecting an exponential growth in its energy demands due to its expanding economy, India has been trying hard in recent years to secure energy supplies. Unfortunately, India’s oil diplomacy has not been sufficiently geared to meet the challenge; and its oil companies have been outsmarted (or under-bid) by Chinese firms in several deals. In the last few years, ONGC has been thwarted by Chinese firms in Kazakhstan, Ecuador and Angola. Top Chinese offshore producer CNOOC Ltd. acquired a 45 % stake in a Nigerian oil and gas field for USD 2.3 billion. ONGC was also in this race, but withdrew due to objections in the cabinet.
Most embarrassingly, India also lost a deal in Myanmar where no open bidding was held. Myanmar decided to decline gas supply to the (proposed-but-grounded) Myanmar-Bangladesh-India pipeline. Instead, it signed an agreement with Petrochina, under which Myanmar’s ministry of energy agreed to sell 6.5 TCF from A-1 block (Rakhine coastline) reserve through an overland pipeline to Kunming, for 30 years. All this happened despite the fact that India’s ONGC Videsh Ltd (OVL) and GAIL (India) Ltd., between them, hold 30% participating interest in this block. Anyhow, Myanmar could not be expected to have waited indefinitely for India and Bangladesh to resolve their mutual differences over a project based on sound economic logic but delayed because of domestic political compulsions. Myanmar, however, says that it could still supply gas to the tri-nation gas pipeline from other gas blocks if Bangladesh and India were successful in ironing out their differences. In answer to the question as to who lost Myanmar, Rajiv Sikri (a former Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs) has written “Various actors bear a collective responsibility”.
In return for various economic concessions (and support in the UN), China seems to have been given preferential access to exploit Myanmar's natural resources and port facilities along Myanmar's coast. Chinese investment includes involvement in the Shwe gas project off Myanmar's western coast. Human rights organizations allege that the offshore project and a dual oil and gas pipeline being constructed from the coast to Kunming have already resulted in human rights abuses and will likely result in many more as the projects progress.
China was scheduled to begin (in September 2009) the laying of 1,100 kms-long, parallel oil and natural gas pipelines from the deep-sea port at Kyaukpyu (on Myanmar’s Arakan coast in the Bay of Bengal) to Kunming. The pipeline will also tap into key blocks in Myanmar’s energy-rich Shwe gas fields that have been given on a 30-year lease to a Chinese-led consortium. The pipeline project was agreed to during the visit Maung Aye to Beijing in mid-June 2009. It will reduce China’s dependence on the narrow Malacca Straits, through which 80% of its oil imports of four million barrels per day currently pass. When the oil and gas pipelines are completed by 2013, Chinese tankers will dock at Kyaukpyu port to transport 600,000 barrels per day from West Asia and Africa. The gas pipeline can move about 12 billion cubic meters of gas annually.
In late September 2007, when the pro-democracy protests were under way, India’s Minister for Petroleum (Murli Deora) visited Myanmar and secured a contract for three deep-water gas exploration projects for the ONGC.
Infrastructure Projects
Both India and China are interested in implementing infrastructure projects in Myanmar, to get access to the Bay of Bengal, India for the North-East and China for its landlocked Yunnan province. India and China had planned to rebuild the (World War II) Stillwell Road, on which work by the Chinese has already started. Recent reports say that India has lost interest in the project. A 1,500 km Trans-Asian Highway between India and Thailand and a railway from Hanoi to Imphal are still being talked about.
The 160 km India-Myanmar Friendship Road, between Tamu and Kalemayo (Myanmar) and going on to Kalewa, was built by India in 2001. It is now being strengthened and resurfaced. It effectively links Manipur with Myanmar. Two other sections at Rhi-Tidim and Rhi-Falam across the border from Mizoram are under way.
An optical fibre network has been laid from linking Kolkata with Yangon and Mandalay.
Kaladan Project
The Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit-cum-Transport Project is essentially transportation project on the River Kaladan, which flows in and out of Mizoram and is navigable all the way to the sea. It empties into the Bay of Bengal near the port of Sittwe (formerly known as Akyab). This port will be developed by India into a major commercial hub, to distribute Mizoram's bamboo crops and Myanmar's forest wealth. Besides 225-km waterway, the project also envisages construction of two roads, ie.e 117 km extending NHI54 to the border and 52 km from the border to Kaleutwa. Sea lanes are also to be developed between Sittwe and Kolkata and Visakhapatnam. Sittwe could also become a major distribution center for oil and gas supplies to India’s North-East.
Kaladan, a wide river with perennial water flow, originates in the upper reaches of Myanmar, enters Mizoram and then meanders back into Myanmar to continue its passage south to the Bay of Bengal. Navigation with 500-ton river crafts is possible all the way from Mizoram. Gooda from the North-East could easily be transported by river to the Bay of Bengal and then onwards to markets in India and elsewhere. The circuitous surface route via Assam and through the Siliguri Corridor could be avoided, cutting transportation costs by nearly half.
Union Minister of State for Commerce and Industry, Jairam Ramesh, announced on 7 January 2008 that India has decided to undertake the project at a cost of more than USD 120 million. The port will be India’s gift to Myanmar, but India would have usage rights. Ramesh termed it as “the most significant initiative the Indian government has taken in South-East Asia”.
When Myanmar realizes the full potential of this project, it may begin utilizing the river for domestic navigational purposes also. Sittwe could eventually become the onshore hub of Myanmar's gas industry once the vast reserves in the Shwe fields in the Bay of Bengal are developed. It is a win-win situation for both India and Myanmar. Further development of the Sittwe port into a gas and oil transshipment terminal may add to its importance. More funds will be required to develop Sittwe to its full potential, but India may (and should) not be averse to putting up the additional funds.
Cyclone Nargis
Cyclone Nargis hit Myanmar on 3 May 2008, causing heavy damage in the densely populated, rice-farming delta of the Irrawaddy Division. There were reports that more than 200,000 people were dead or missing, in the worst recorded natural disaster in Myanmar’s history. UN estimates projected that as many as one million people were left homeless. In the immediate days following the disaster, the military regime complicated recovery efforts by delaying the entry of planes delivering medicine, food, and other supplies. A US naval task force carrying much-needed relief supplies, helicopters and other vehicles as well as manpower was denied permission, based on fears that it could be a prelude to a military invasion. Indian leaders sent condolence messages and rushed urgently needed relief and medical supplies to the affected areas, using two naval ships from Port Blair.
MILITARY
Insurgencies in Myanmar
About twenty minority groups have been carrying on insurgency against the Government of Myanmar, with the Karen being the largest of them. The BBC had estimated in 2004 that upto 200,000 Karen have been driven from their homes during decades of war, with 120,000 more refugees from Myanmar, mostly Karen, living in refugee camps in Thailand, across the border. Another estimate says that more than two million people have fled from Myanmar to Thailand. There are accusations against the military government of “ethnic cleansing”.
Since Beijing reversed its previous policy and withdrew support to the insurgent Burmese Communist Party (BCP) in the 1980s, the BCP collapsed in 1989 resulting in the formation of several ethnic-based insurgent organizations, including narcotics trafficking by the United Wa State Army, now active along the China-Myanmar border.
In early August 2009, in the Kokang incident in Shan State in northern Myanmar, junta troops fought for several weeks against ethnic minorities including Han Chinese, Wa and Kachin. In the first days of the conflict, as many as 10,000 Burmese civilians are said to have fled to Yunnan province in neighboring China. The incident annoyed China.
The military junta has been applying pressure for the ceasefire groups to become border guard units, under army control. Ethnic leaders have so far resisted the demand and with a deadline set for the end of October 2009, civil war may become a possibility. So far, China has been careful to provide only enough support to ethnic insurgents to deter the Myanmar Army from making any rash moves (like at Kokang). This situation may change if closer ties develop between Myanmar and the US.
Insurgencies in India
A (limited) joint Indo-Myanmar military operation against insurgents (striding the Indo-Myanmar border) was undertaken in 1995. However, cooperation in taking action against the cross-border militants petered out. India and Myanmar have varying problems with different sets of insurgents and do not share the same priorities in addressing them. During his visit to India in April 2008, Maung Aye (Vice Chairman of SPDC) assured that Myanmar will never allow the use of its territory by any organization that harms neighboring countries. At the same time, he acknowledged that, likewise, India does not allow its territory to be used by any organization against Myanmar.
Defence Relations
High-level military-to-military contacts began in 2000. In January, Indian Army Chief General Ved Prakash Malik paid a two-day visit to Myanmar. This was followed by the reciprocal visit by his Myanmar counterpart, General Maung Aye, to the northeast Indian city of Shillong. In the aftermath of these meetings, India began to provide non-lethal military support to Myanmar troops along the border. Most of the Myanmar troops' uniforms and other combat gear originated from India, as were the leased helicopters Myanmar needed to counter the ethnic insurgents operating from sanctuaries along both sides of the border.
Since the initial exchange of visits, there has been a steady flow of high level visits from both sides. Junta chief, General Than Shwe, visited India In 2004, followed in December 2006 by the third-highest ranking officer in Myanmar's military hierarchy, General Thura Shwe Mann. The latter toured the National Defense Academy in Khadakvasla and the Tata Motors plant in Pune, which manufactures vehicles for India’s military.
After the relatively small-scale pro-democracy demonstrations in 1988, China stepped in with enhanced military aid, enabling Myanmar's army to expand to some 500,000 men, the second-largest standing army in South east Asia. Indian military is also concerned about China modernizing the naval bases at Hanggyi, Cocos, Akyab,, Mergui and the port at Kyauk Phuy. The situations seems to have become an unequal triangular relationship, where one party seems to be reaping all the benefits.
Some Conclusions
Though China has been able greatly to improve its position in Myanmar and has cultivated civil and military officials, Beijing's efforts in Myanmar may have started running into the pervasive xenophobia and wariness of dependence on any singular foreign power.
Myanmar is not a democracy or a pluralistic society where clamour for human rights, adherence to international norms and standards have much chance of strict observance. It is one of the few bastions of totalitarian governance in the world today. India may have been making a mistake in looking at Myanmar through the Indian prism and experience. The people, the civil society (what there is left of it) and the media behave very differently than in India. The junta seems to believe that they do not matter much and behaves very differently from the governments in India. It should be taken into account that the Myanmar leadership is perceived as being reclusive and essentially xenophobic, almost happy to be in their own “time warp”, wish to be left alone (except as demanded by the changing international situation) and do not want the dominance of any country in Myanmar’s affairs. They also display occasional touches of racialism. Myanmar’s leadership is able to afford the luxury of such positions mainly because of the country’s strategic geographic location and because it has perhaps the largest military in South East Asia. This view of an untrained amateur student of human behavior (like me) may or may not be valid, but is worth consideration by Indian policy-makers.
With all his experience, Rajiv Sikri :feels that Myanmar regards China’s growing influence with suspicion and sees India as the only viable means to balance China’s increasing encroachment, especially in the Kachin and Shan states. For this and other reasons, Myanmar is keen to have good relations with India. India needs to fine-tune its strategy for dealing with Myanmar, focusing not on what should be or might have been, but on what can be done.
Apart from inadequate awareness and respect for the psyche of the leadership in Myanmar, India has not shown much subtlety or finesse (not even matching the limited subtlety or finesse shown in Sri Lanka) in dealing with them. There is no evidence of a clear vision about what we want and how to get it. There is hardly any visible coordinated stance or approach, with too many loose cannons around. Often, India seems to be shooting at its own toes instead of at the target. On the commercial and trade fronts, where most deals are government-to-government, the government’s bureaucratic procedures seem to dominate the decision-making process in the public sector oil companies. There is an urgent need to change this to become commercially competitive in today’s fast-paced international milieu.
Fortunately, India currently enjoys fairly good political, economic and military-relations with Myanmar. India is also involved in infrastructure projects for better India-Myanmar connectivity. However, one cannot but agree with Kris Srinivasan when he concludes that “The outcomes of the energies expended by India over the past two decades have been negligible. The situation calls for a re-appraisal designed to turn the tide more in our favour.
[This paper was prepared by R. Swaminathan, President & DG, International Institute for Security and Safety Management (New Delhi), and former Special Secretary, DG (Security), Govt. of India, for presentation on 29 October 2009 at the National Seminar on “Recent Developments in Myanmar : Implications for India”, organized jointly by the Department of Politics & Public Administration (University of Madras) and Center for Asia Studies (Chennai). He can be contacted at rsnathan@gmail.com]
A N N E X U R E
Historical Background
The Union of Myanmar, known as Burma till 1989, is the largest country by geographical area (678,500 sq kms) in mainland Southeast Asia. It is bordered by China on the northeast (with the Hengduan Shan mountains as the boundary), Laos on the east, Thailand on the southeast, Bangladesh on the west, India on the northwest and the Bay of Bengal to the southwest. One-third of Myanmar’s total perimeter forms an uninterrupted coastline of 1,930 kilometres. Myanmar and India share a border of over 1,600 kilometers. The country's culture, heavily influenced by its neighbours, is based on Theravada Buddhism.
Known human habitation in Myanmar goes back nearly 5000 years, from when the Mon, considered to be the first inhabitants, settled in central Myanmar and along the eastern coast of Bay of Bengal. It is believed that the Mon established some trade and cultural contacts with the early inhabitants of India. The Burmans (originally from Yunnan), who established their first kingdom in Myanmar in 849 A.D., eventually absorbed the communities of the Mon and Pyu people. King Anawrahta (r 1044-1077) set up the Pagan Kingdom bringing about the first unified state of Myanmar. Kublai Khan’s victory in 1287 started a period of continual conflicts that continued for many centuries. The appearance of Europeans had little effect on Myanmar due to these conflicts, until they infringed on the British Raj in Bengal. This brought about British intervention (from 1824) and, though Rangoon was occupied in 1853, all of Burma was formally annexed to British India only in 1886. Burma was administered as a province of British India until 1937, when it became a separate colony. One of the results of the British occupation was the flow of Chinese and Indian immigrants, who tended to exploit the Burmans. Indians were drafted in large numbers into the colonial army during the three Anglo-Burma wars in the 19th century, and about 400,000 Indians were taken there to run various public services. The persons of Indian origin on the eve of the Japanese invasion numbered about 1.1 million.
Strong Burmese resentment against the British was noticed as early as 1919. It was often vented in violent riots that paralyzed Yangon on occasion. Much of the discontent was caused by a perceived disrespect for Burmese culture and traditions, like the British not removing their shoes upon entering Buddhist temples or other holy places. When scandalized Buddhist monks attempted to physically expel a group of shoe-wearing British in Eindawya Pagoda (Mandalay) in October 1919, the leader of the monks was sentenced to life imprisonment for attempted murder. Such incidents inspired the Burmese resistance to use Buddhism as a rallying point for their cause. Buddhist monks became the vanguards of the independence movement, and many died while protesting. Students were also active participants in anti-British activities.
Nationalist sentiments became more evident with the start of World War II. A student leader, Aung San (and his “thirty comrades”) went to Japan for “training”. On return, they founded the Burma Independence Army (BIA) in Bangkok (which was then under Japanese occupation) on 26 December 1941, with the help of Japanese intelligence. When Rangoon fell in March 1942, the BIA formed an administration for the country that operated in parallel with the Japanese military administration. On 1 August 1943, the Japanese declared Burma to be an “independent” nation, and Aung San was appointed War Minister. Later, Aung San became skeptical of the Japanese promises and made plans to organize an uprising in Burma (in cooperation with Communist leaders Thakin Than Tun and Thakin Soe), with help from the British authorities in India. On 27 March 1945, he led the BNA in a revolt against the Japanese occupiers and helped the Allies defeat the Japanese; and the British established a military administration.
The Anti-Fascist Organisation (formed in August 1944) was transformed into the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL), a united front consisting of the BNA, the Communists and the Socialists. The BNA was gradually disarmed by the British, when the Japanese were driven out of Burma. Aung San turned down the rank of Deputy Inspector General of the Burma Army and became the military leader of the People's Volunteer Organisation. He was popularly referred to as Bogyoke (meaning General).
After civilian government was restored in Burma in October 1945, Aung San became the President of the AFPFL in January 1946. In September, he was appointed Deputy Chairman of the Executive Council of Burma by the new British Governor, and was made responsible for defence and external affairs. [This was analogous to the appointment of Jawahar Lal Nehru as the Vice President of the Interim Government in India, in June 1946.] The communists left the AFPFL, when Aung San and others accepted seats on the Executive Council. Aung San (at the age of 31) was to all intents and purposes the Prime Minister. On 27 January 1947, Aung San and Clement Attlee signed an agreement in London guaranteeing Burma's independence within a year. In April, the AFPFL won 196 out of 202 seats in the Constituent Assembly. Tragedy struck on 19 July 1947, when a gang of armed paramilitaries broke into the Secretariat Building and assassinated Aung San and six of his cabinet ministers, who were participating in a meeting of the Executive Council. [The assassination was allegedly carried out on the orders of political rival U Saw, who was subsequently tried and hanged.] U Nu, (a former student leader) and Foreign Minister Ba Maw took over the leadership of the government and AFPFL.
The country became independent on 4 January 1948, as the "Union of Burma". It became the "Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma" on 4 January 1974, before reverting to the "Union of Burma" on 23 September 1988. On 18 June, 1989, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) adopted the name "Union of Myanmar".
Military Rule
Civilian government ended in 1962 when General Ne Win led a military coup and put U Nu in prison. Myanmar now has one of the longest surviving military regimes in the world. Ne Win ruled for nearly 26 years and pursued policies in the name of “Burmese Way to Socialism”. Between 1962 and 1974, Burma was ruled by a Revolutionary Council headed by the general, and almost all aspects of society (business, media, production - including the Boy Scouts) were nationalized or brought under government control. In an effort to consolidate power, General Ne Win and many top generals “resigned” from the military and took civilian posts. They held “elections” under a one-party system and Ne Win ruled Burma between 1974 and 1988, through the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP), which was the sole political party allowed to function. The Burmese Way to Socialism adopted Soviet-style nationalization and central planning and was a kind of an amalgam of Buddhism and Marxism. During this period, Burma became one of the world's most impoverished countries.
People whose ancestors were not from the "original" Myanmar races, i.e. Sino-Burman and Indo-Burman communities, were classified as “associate citizens" or “resident aliens”, with the right to vote, but not allowed to be elected or hold government positions above a certain level. This and the wholesale nationalisation of private enterprises led to the exodus of about 300,000 Burmese Indians.
Almost from the beginning of military rule, there were sporadic protests against it, many organized by students, and were almost always violently suppressed by the government. Student protests were violently broken up every year during 1974-77. Unrest over economic mismanagement and political oppression led to widespread pro-democracy demonstrations throughout the country in 1988. Security forces killed thousands of demonstrators. Ne Win stepped down in July. Aung San Suu Kyi (the daughter of Aung San), in partnership with Brigadier Aung Gyi and General Tin U, tried to appease those who resented the military rule and was only partly successful. Defense Minister General Saw Maung staged a coup in September and formed the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). In 1989, SLORC declared martial law after widespread protests. In July, Aung San Suu Kyi was placed under house arrest and General Tin U put in prison.
In May 1990, the government held free elections for the first time in almost 30 years. The National League for Democracy (NLD), the party of Aung San Suu Kyi, won 392 out of a total 489 seats, and 60 % of the votes. The election results were, however, annulled by SLORC, which arrested most of its top leaders and declared that a non-military government could not be established in Myanmar, without a new constitution. The award of the Nobel Peace Prize to Aung San Suu Kyi in 1991 put a lot of pressure on the SLORC. When General Than Shwe took over as SLORC chairman in 1992, many political prisoners were released and Aung San Suu Kyi was allowed visits from her family; and later allowed to meet a U.S congressman, a UN official and an American reporter.
In 1992, SLORC unveiled plans to create a new constitution through the National Convention, which began 9 January 1993. When the military directed it to give it a major role in the government, NLD party members walked out the convention. The National Convention continues to convene and adjourn. Many major political parties, particularly the NLD, have been absent or excluded, and little progress has been made.
The State Law and Order Restoration Council was renamed as the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) in 1997, with the same leadership as the SLORC.
On 7 February 2008, SPDC announced that a referendum would soon be held relating to the new Constitution, and that elections would be held by 2010. The referendum, held on 10 May 2008, promised a "discipline-flourishing democracy" for the country. The referendum is seen by many as an effort to “legalise” the perpetuation of the military rule.
Courtesy:http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers35%5Cpaper3483.html
Developments in Myanmar and the Security of North East
By Col R Hariharan
[Excerpts of this article were included in a presentation by the author at the National Seminar on “Recent Developments in Myanmar : Implications for India”, organized jointly by the Department of Politics & Public Administration, University of Madras, and Center for Asia Studies, Chennai on 29 October 2009.]
Turbulence in Myanmar
Myanmar is going through throes of change after over 45 years of military rule. The first multiparty elections under the new constitution are to be conducted in 2010. The new constitution was confirmed through a referendum with barely three weeks notice even as Myanmar was being devastated by cyclone Nergis in 2008. Despite its long gestation It hardly represents the democratic aspirations of the people.
Originally, after the 1992 general election was held and the National League for Democracy (NLD) swept the polls, the ruling junta had announced that the newly elected members would draft the new constitution. But the elected members of parliament hardly had a hand in drafting the new constitution in the deliberations of the National Convention entrusted with the task. Although it met on and off for almost 15 years, less than two percent of the parliament members were involved in the final draft.
The members of the National Convention were handpicked by the military to push through the draft scripted by the army. To prevent active involvement of NLD in the process during the tortuous course of constitution making, the junta ensured Aung San Suu Kyi was kept under house arrest. The elected NLD members of parliament were never allowed to present their views in public; in fact they were hounded out and persecuted. The new constitution also does not meet the legitimate demands for autonomy of major ethnic communities that had been waging war for their rights for over four decades. There had been no public discourse on the draft.
So it comes as no surprise that the new constitution is more of a cosmetic exercise than a meaningful effort to transfer power to a democratic government. Its purpose appears to be two fold: to legitimise the role of the army as a power over and above the elected government and to appease growing international demand for restoration of democracy so that sanctions slapped on Myanmar are lifted.
The Tatmadaw (army) has a favoured position in the new constitution. The president has to be an army officer endowed with power to appoint Union ministers and chief ministers of states. He will also nominate judges of the Supreme Court. The Tatmadaw has the right to independently administer all affairs of the armed forces. And the highest court of the country will have no jurisdiction over them! The Commander in Chief of armed forces nominates the ministers of defence, security and home affairs, and border affairs. He shall also appoint armed forces officers as security and the border affair ministers in the governments at the level of state, region and in the self-administered division and zones. It is the C-in-C who nominates parliament members for 25 percent of the seats reserved for the armed forces in Union Assembly (upper and lower houses).
Problems of political democracy
The president has to be an army officer; and persons whose children and spouses owe "allegiance to a foreign power” are barrred from being elected president. Thus the junta has ensured that Aung San Suu Kyi is not allowed to occupy the highest office in the “democratic government” on both the counts as her husband and her children are British citizens. Without her active leadership it is doubtful whether the first step to democracy would ever go further to reach the final goal of making Myanmar a full fledged democracy.
The process of changeover to even limited democracy is not likely to be a smooth process. With the army continuing to wield unfettered power, the civilian government would be hampered from taking independent policy initiatives in three major areas that had been the bane of the country. These are people oriented development, restoring integrity of institutions of governance, and ensuring equitable rights to all citizens regardless of their ethnic origin.
Without Aung San Suu Kyi's active participation in the run up to the elections, the NLD leadership might find it difficult to repeat its successful electoral performance of 1992.
In any case, the army is likely to use strong arm tactics to ensure the NLD is edged out in the election. Coalition politics was never the strong point of Myanmar’s short lived democratic experiment from 1948 to 1962. The opportunistic coalition governments were notorious for infighting, floor crossings and corruption. Thus the chances of a coalition government successfully functioning appear remote. So a period of political instability may well be in the offing. This would only reinforce the army’s belief that it was fundamental to ensure national stability.
Ethnic insurgency
Ethnic insurgency had been the blight on Myanmar from 1948 onwards. The military regime had recently been trying to disarm members of ethnic insurgent groups that had signed ceasefire agreements (ceasefire groups) and enroll in border guards force. However, this process is not complete. Three major ceasefire groups in the northeast bordering China —the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), the United Wa State Army (UNSWA) and the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA)—all of have reportedly rejected its request to disarm and The Kachin Independence Organisation is still dragging its feet.
The MNDAA’s Kokang troops, who are of Chinese ethnicity, had clashed with the troops last month and a few thousand Kokang people had taken refuge in Chinese areas across the border. The UNSWA, an ally of MNDAA, is one of the biggest insurgent groups bordering both China and Thailand. Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) which refused to sign the ceasefire agreement had been in conflict with the government troops along Thai border. These ethnic insurgent groups have little incentive to lay down arms and join the mainstream even when the civilian government is sworn in. As long as the question of their autonomy is not resolved, they are likely to continue to be active. Historically, the army had used the ethnic unrest as the reason for legitimising its hold on power. With the army controlling the defence, border affairs and home affairs ministries, the civilian government has little chance of resolving the issue politically.
International power play
The international sanctions are likely to be lifted when a semblance of democracy is restored the election as part of the new U.S. initiative on Myanmar. Once that happens there is likely to be an international scramble to gain access to Myanmar’s abundant natural resources including oil and natural gas. Inevitably, this could turn Myanmar into a seat of global power play. Both India and China would be watching these developments with caution.
China had used the era of international sanctions to increase its strategic and economic influence in Myanmar and helped the junta to weather international sanctions. As a veto-wielding permanent member of the UN Security Council (UNSC), China had baled out the military regime from international collective action on more than one occasion. This has enabled the Chinese to become well entrenched in the country, building strong linkages with the army. Chinese also dominate the nation’s economic development, trade and commerce. Their influence is likely to be transferred to the political arena also.
In short, China has created a client regime in the military junta. China is unlikely to loosen its hold on Myanmar as it provides strategic land and sea access from Chinese mainland to India and the Indian Ocean. Myanmar’s 1930 km long coastline dominates the eastern arch of the Bay of Bengal, leaning on to the Malacca Strait could help China's mavy to widen its reach. Despite building closer economic links with the U.S. in recent times, China continues to be wary of the U.S. extending its strategic reach in this region. Its suspicions have already been kindled with the increasing Indo-US strategic convergence. So China is going to loom large in front of all nations, including India, aspiring play a bigger role in Myanmar on all fronts.
India’s security compulsions
Geostrategy dictates that India should keep Myanmar in its foreign policy horizon for strategic, economic and developmental reasons. Myanmar’s geographic location astride the India-ASEAN trade routes increases its value for India. It can also open up external land and sea communication links to landlocked north-eastern states. Myanmar’s ocean boundaries are barely 30 km from the Andaman Islands increasing its maritime security potential. Unfortunately, Myanmar’s strategic significance in India’s national security does not appear to have been given the recognition it deserves.
North East is connected to rest of India by “Siliguri Corridor” a tenuous 30-km wide link flanked by Bangladesh and Nepal. Thus strategically, northeast is vulnerable to the developments in its neighbourhood in both peace and war. Large scale illegal migration of Bengalis from Bangladesh into the region has created demographic imbalances resulting in social and economic unrest. The assertion of distinct ethnic identities has resulted in the rise of separatist insurgencies in this region. The assistance received from China and Pakistan at different times had been important for their survival. They also have safe havens in Bangladesh and Myanmar.
India had striven to improve relations with the military junta Myanmar from 1992 onwards as a part of its Look East Policy. This policy had limited success. Despite promises, Myanmar regime had shown little inclination to evict Indian insurgent groups from its soil. Its interest in joint operations against them had been equally poor.
The development of Northeast had been hobbled due to Bangladesh's reluctance to permit transit of Indian goods through its territory. To overcome this problem India has been implementing a multi-modal scheme to open up road and sea access from the Northeast through Myanmar to other ASEAN countries as well as the Indian Ocean. However, India’s two major infrastructure projects including the Sittwe multi modal projects and the much heralded Myanmar – India pipeline have made only slow progress.
During the last two decades, trade and development links between the two countries have improved. However, due to inertia on both sides, growth of trade between the two countries had only been in fits and starts. There appear to be no vigour on either side's attempts to improve mutual trade.
Keeping the hyper sensitivity of the military to the issue of restoration of democracy and freeing of Aung San Suu Kyi, India had soft pedalled them, broadly keeping a neutral stance on these issues. India’s attitude of ignoring the struggle for democracy, focusing only on building relations with the military regime has shocked civil society the world over. In this process India had ignored the democratic forces which would be coming to limelight in the coming years. Thus India will be starting with the baggage of poor credibility while engaging with Myanmar polity. Ushering in of democracy in Myanmar is likely to increase India competitive role with China. And already China enjoys a head start in the country with geo-political and economic advantages. Added to this is its international clout as a permanent member of the UNSC. And China is unlikely to make India’s task any easier. Thus India's best long term bet would be to improve its relations with the political parties and the new government.
Other potential triggers
There are other potential triggers that could destabilise the entire region either directly or indirectly. These issues are connected with the national security of India; and the northeast could become their epicentre of action.
Tibetan issue: As the Dalai Lama is aging and the Tibetan refugees, particularly the younger generation, are getting restive over China’s intransigence on Tibet. If the issue gets out of hand, it could impact followers of Tibetan Buddhism in Arunachal Pradesh. This could activate not only India-Tibet border but also India-Myanmar border. Of course there is the added possibility of a confrontation with the Chinese over the Arunachal border claims of China.
China’s subversive support: Although China-India have been trying to build cordial relations with India, China’s capability to support to insurgents from Manipur and Assam and use them as a pressure point in any political or military confrontation with India should not be ignored. Myanmar could play a vital role in denying sanctuaries and safe passage to insurgents on its soil.
Maoists in Nepal: The ascendancy of Maoists, who are pro-Chinese, to power in Nepal and the spread of their influence provides China a potential opportunity to increase, if not replace, Indian influence in Nepal. If China gains a strategic foothold in Nepal, it would result in manifold increase of northeast's vulnerability. In such a situation any military confrontation in the region is likely to isolate northeast from the rest of India.
Myanmar’s nuclear ambition:
Avenues for action
The stability of Myanmaris directly related to the creation of a stable democracy. It is in the longterm interest of the region that Myanmar is turne into a stable democratic country. Their international community could become complacent after a civilian government comes to power after the 2010 elections. The experience of Myanmarese people's struggle during the past four decades have shown that it would not be possible for them to gain a reasonable response from a brutal regime unless there is international support.
The two giant neighbours India and China along with the US hold the key to ensure stability in Myanmar. Only concerted action on their part could achieve any meaningful results. At present the perspectives of the three nations are based only on their national strategic interests in Myanmar. However, they need to join hands to evolve a new paradigm for change in Myanmar. Such a coordinated strategy could improve the chances of freeing democracy from the shackles of its military rulers.
India should have an action plan to help progressive democratisation of Myanmar. With its strong democratic credentials, India should be able to revive its relationship with political leaders and build a win-win relationship.
India should try and separate trade and developmental relations with Myanmar and ASEAN from the effects of regime change in Myanmar. It has to evolve strategies in collaboration with Thailand and other interested nations of ASEAN to make this a reality.
As there is a friendly Awami League regime in Bangladesh, India should strive to open up alternate land and sea routes through Bangladesh for widening the scope of trade and industry in northeast.
Courtesy: www.southasiaanalysis.org
[Excerpts of this article were included in a presentation by the author at the National Seminar on “Recent Developments in Myanmar : Implications for India”, organized jointly by the Department of Politics & Public Administration, University of Madras, and Center for Asia Studies, Chennai on 29 October 2009.]
Turbulence in Myanmar
Myanmar is going through throes of change after over 45 years of military rule. The first multiparty elections under the new constitution are to be conducted in 2010. The new constitution was confirmed through a referendum with barely three weeks notice even as Myanmar was being devastated by cyclone Nergis in 2008. Despite its long gestation It hardly represents the democratic aspirations of the people.
Originally, after the 1992 general election was held and the National League for Democracy (NLD) swept the polls, the ruling junta had announced that the newly elected members would draft the new constitution. But the elected members of parliament hardly had a hand in drafting the new constitution in the deliberations of the National Convention entrusted with the task. Although it met on and off for almost 15 years, less than two percent of the parliament members were involved in the final draft.
The members of the National Convention were handpicked by the military to push through the draft scripted by the army. To prevent active involvement of NLD in the process during the tortuous course of constitution making, the junta ensured Aung San Suu Kyi was kept under house arrest. The elected NLD members of parliament were never allowed to present their views in public; in fact they were hounded out and persecuted. The new constitution also does not meet the legitimate demands for autonomy of major ethnic communities that had been waging war for their rights for over four decades. There had been no public discourse on the draft.
So it comes as no surprise that the new constitution is more of a cosmetic exercise than a meaningful effort to transfer power to a democratic government. Its purpose appears to be two fold: to legitimise the role of the army as a power over and above the elected government and to appease growing international demand for restoration of democracy so that sanctions slapped on Myanmar are lifted.
The Tatmadaw (army) has a favoured position in the new constitution. The president has to be an army officer endowed with power to appoint Union ministers and chief ministers of states. He will also nominate judges of the Supreme Court. The Tatmadaw has the right to independently administer all affairs of the armed forces. And the highest court of the country will have no jurisdiction over them! The Commander in Chief of armed forces nominates the ministers of defence, security and home affairs, and border affairs. He shall also appoint armed forces officers as security and the border affair ministers in the governments at the level of state, region and in the self-administered division and zones. It is the C-in-C who nominates parliament members for 25 percent of the seats reserved for the armed forces in Union Assembly (upper and lower houses).
Problems of political democracy
The president has to be an army officer; and persons whose children and spouses owe "allegiance to a foreign power” are barrred from being elected president. Thus the junta has ensured that Aung San Suu Kyi is not allowed to occupy the highest office in the “democratic government” on both the counts as her husband and her children are British citizens. Without her active leadership it is doubtful whether the first step to democracy would ever go further to reach the final goal of making Myanmar a full fledged democracy.
The process of changeover to even limited democracy is not likely to be a smooth process. With the army continuing to wield unfettered power, the civilian government would be hampered from taking independent policy initiatives in three major areas that had been the bane of the country. These are people oriented development, restoring integrity of institutions of governance, and ensuring equitable rights to all citizens regardless of their ethnic origin.
Without Aung San Suu Kyi's active participation in the run up to the elections, the NLD leadership might find it difficult to repeat its successful electoral performance of 1992.
In any case, the army is likely to use strong arm tactics to ensure the NLD is edged out in the election. Coalition politics was never the strong point of Myanmar’s short lived democratic experiment from 1948 to 1962. The opportunistic coalition governments were notorious for infighting, floor crossings and corruption. Thus the chances of a coalition government successfully functioning appear remote. So a period of political instability may well be in the offing. This would only reinforce the army’s belief that it was fundamental to ensure national stability.
Ethnic insurgency
Ethnic insurgency had been the blight on Myanmar from 1948 onwards. The military regime had recently been trying to disarm members of ethnic insurgent groups that had signed ceasefire agreements (ceasefire groups) and enroll in border guards force. However, this process is not complete. Three major ceasefire groups in the northeast bordering China —the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), the United Wa State Army (UNSWA) and the National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA)—all of have reportedly rejected its request to disarm and The Kachin Independence Organisation is still dragging its feet.
The MNDAA’s Kokang troops, who are of Chinese ethnicity, had clashed with the troops last month and a few thousand Kokang people had taken refuge in Chinese areas across the border. The UNSWA, an ally of MNDAA, is one of the biggest insurgent groups bordering both China and Thailand. Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) which refused to sign the ceasefire agreement had been in conflict with the government troops along Thai border. These ethnic insurgent groups have little incentive to lay down arms and join the mainstream even when the civilian government is sworn in. As long as the question of their autonomy is not resolved, they are likely to continue to be active. Historically, the army had used the ethnic unrest as the reason for legitimising its hold on power. With the army controlling the defence, border affairs and home affairs ministries, the civilian government has little chance of resolving the issue politically.
International power play
The international sanctions are likely to be lifted when a semblance of democracy is restored the election as part of the new U.S. initiative on Myanmar. Once that happens there is likely to be an international scramble to gain access to Myanmar’s abundant natural resources including oil and natural gas. Inevitably, this could turn Myanmar into a seat of global power play. Both India and China would be watching these developments with caution.
China had used the era of international sanctions to increase its strategic and economic influence in Myanmar and helped the junta to weather international sanctions. As a veto-wielding permanent member of the UN Security Council (UNSC), China had baled out the military regime from international collective action on more than one occasion. This has enabled the Chinese to become well entrenched in the country, building strong linkages with the army. Chinese also dominate the nation’s economic development, trade and commerce. Their influence is likely to be transferred to the political arena also.
In short, China has created a client regime in the military junta. China is unlikely to loosen its hold on Myanmar as it provides strategic land and sea access from Chinese mainland to India and the Indian Ocean. Myanmar’s 1930 km long coastline dominates the eastern arch of the Bay of Bengal, leaning on to the Malacca Strait could help China's mavy to widen its reach. Despite building closer economic links with the U.S. in recent times, China continues to be wary of the U.S. extending its strategic reach in this region. Its suspicions have already been kindled with the increasing Indo-US strategic convergence. So China is going to loom large in front of all nations, including India, aspiring play a bigger role in Myanmar on all fronts.
India’s security compulsions
Geostrategy dictates that India should keep Myanmar in its foreign policy horizon for strategic, economic and developmental reasons. Myanmar’s geographic location astride the India-ASEAN trade routes increases its value for India. It can also open up external land and sea communication links to landlocked north-eastern states. Myanmar’s ocean boundaries are barely 30 km from the Andaman Islands increasing its maritime security potential. Unfortunately, Myanmar’s strategic significance in India’s national security does not appear to have been given the recognition it deserves.
North East is connected to rest of India by “Siliguri Corridor” a tenuous 30-km wide link flanked by Bangladesh and Nepal. Thus strategically, northeast is vulnerable to the developments in its neighbourhood in both peace and war. Large scale illegal migration of Bengalis from Bangladesh into the region has created demographic imbalances resulting in social and economic unrest. The assertion of distinct ethnic identities has resulted in the rise of separatist insurgencies in this region. The assistance received from China and Pakistan at different times had been important for their survival. They also have safe havens in Bangladesh and Myanmar.
India had striven to improve relations with the military junta Myanmar from 1992 onwards as a part of its Look East Policy. This policy had limited success. Despite promises, Myanmar regime had shown little inclination to evict Indian insurgent groups from its soil. Its interest in joint operations against them had been equally poor.
The development of Northeast had been hobbled due to Bangladesh's reluctance to permit transit of Indian goods through its territory. To overcome this problem India has been implementing a multi-modal scheme to open up road and sea access from the Northeast through Myanmar to other ASEAN countries as well as the Indian Ocean. However, India’s two major infrastructure projects including the Sittwe multi modal projects and the much heralded Myanmar – India pipeline have made only slow progress.
During the last two decades, trade and development links between the two countries have improved. However, due to inertia on both sides, growth of trade between the two countries had only been in fits and starts. There appear to be no vigour on either side's attempts to improve mutual trade.
Keeping the hyper sensitivity of the military to the issue of restoration of democracy and freeing of Aung San Suu Kyi, India had soft pedalled them, broadly keeping a neutral stance on these issues. India’s attitude of ignoring the struggle for democracy, focusing only on building relations with the military regime has shocked civil society the world over. In this process India had ignored the democratic forces which would be coming to limelight in the coming years. Thus India will be starting with the baggage of poor credibility while engaging with Myanmar polity. Ushering in of democracy in Myanmar is likely to increase India competitive role with China. And already China enjoys a head start in the country with geo-political and economic advantages. Added to this is its international clout as a permanent member of the UNSC. And China is unlikely to make India’s task any easier. Thus India's best long term bet would be to improve its relations with the political parties and the new government.
Other potential triggers
There are other potential triggers that could destabilise the entire region either directly or indirectly. These issues are connected with the national security of India; and the northeast could become their epicentre of action.
Tibetan issue: As the Dalai Lama is aging and the Tibetan refugees, particularly the younger generation, are getting restive over China’s intransigence on Tibet. If the issue gets out of hand, it could impact followers of Tibetan Buddhism in Arunachal Pradesh. This could activate not only India-Tibet border but also India-Myanmar border. Of course there is the added possibility of a confrontation with the Chinese over the Arunachal border claims of China.
China’s subversive support: Although China-India have been trying to build cordial relations with India, China’s capability to support to insurgents from Manipur and Assam and use them as a pressure point in any political or military confrontation with India should not be ignored. Myanmar could play a vital role in denying sanctuaries and safe passage to insurgents on its soil.
Maoists in Nepal: The ascendancy of Maoists, who are pro-Chinese, to power in Nepal and the spread of their influence provides China a potential opportunity to increase, if not replace, Indian influence in Nepal. If China gains a strategic foothold in Nepal, it would result in manifold increase of northeast's vulnerability. In such a situation any military confrontation in the region is likely to isolate northeast from the rest of India.
Myanmar’s nuclear ambition:
- The military regime in Myanmar confirmed plans to build a nuclear research reactor for “peaceful purposes” in early 2002 with the help of Russia. Selected students and army officers have undergone nuclear orientation and training in Moscow. Nuclear physics departments have been established in the universities of Rangoon and Mandalay with their enrolment controlled by the military regime. Uranium deposits have been found in several areas: Magwe, Taungdwingyi, Kyaukphygon and Paongpyin in Mogok, and Kyauksin and in southern Tenasserim Division and the Russians are said to be involved uranium mining.
- In this nuclear backdrop, recent reports about a secret deal on developing nuclear facilities between Myanmar and North Korea are significant. Both the U.S. and Thailand have voiced their concerns on these reports. Australian strategic studies analyst Desmond Ball and Thailand-based journalist Phil Thornton in 2007 have claimed that Myanmar had secretly constructed a nuclear reactor that would encompass reprocessing technology designed to extract weapons-grade plutonium. These reports were based on information given by defectors and need corroboration.
Avenues for action
The stability of Myanmaris directly related to the creation of a stable democracy. It is in the longterm interest of the region that Myanmar is turne into a stable democratic country. Their international community could become complacent after a civilian government comes to power after the 2010 elections. The experience of Myanmarese people's struggle during the past four decades have shown that it would not be possible for them to gain a reasonable response from a brutal regime unless there is international support.
The two giant neighbours India and China along with the US hold the key to ensure stability in Myanmar. Only concerted action on their part could achieve any meaningful results. At present the perspectives of the three nations are based only on their national strategic interests in Myanmar. However, they need to join hands to evolve a new paradigm for change in Myanmar. Such a coordinated strategy could improve the chances of freeing democracy from the shackles of its military rulers.
India should have an action plan to help progressive democratisation of Myanmar. With its strong democratic credentials, India should be able to revive its relationship with political leaders and build a win-win relationship.
India should try and separate trade and developmental relations with Myanmar and ASEAN from the effects of regime change in Myanmar. It has to evolve strategies in collaboration with Thailand and other interested nations of ASEAN to make this a reality.
As there is a friendly Awami League regime in Bangladesh, India should strive to open up alternate land and sea routes through Bangladesh for widening the scope of trade and industry in northeast.
Courtesy: www.southasiaanalysis.org
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