By R.Swaminathan
The recent Declaration of Independence by the legislature of Kosovo and the prompt "recognition" of the new State by USA and many EU governments have the potential for far-reaching and not-too-desirable effects on many other similar situations and "separatist" movements around the world. Of immediate international consequence would be the effect on Taiwan (which is holding its referendum on 22 March 2008). The effect on LTTE in Sri Lanka would be of great significance to India. This paper will consider only these two issues and not the entire scene that would include the effects on other "separatist" movements.
Kosovo and Taiwan
Historical
Kosovo had been the battleground where contesting entities had been fighting (for centuries) for sovereignty over the territory. The fight was between the Turkish Ottoman Empire and the Austro-Hungarian Empire at one time, then between the Turks and the Serbs and later between the Albanians and the Serbs. When the victor-imposed Treaty of Versailles (28 June 1919) created the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, Kosovo was made a part of Serbia. The Kingdom was renamed in 1929 as the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. During World War II, Kosovo was a strong base for Tito-led AVNO (Anti-Fascism Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia). After the war, when the new state of SFRJ (Socialist Federated Republics of Jugoslavia) was proclaimed, Kosovo (along with Vojvodina) became one of two �autonomous� provinces of the Republic of Serbia. Many places in Kosovo are of religious and cultural significance to the Serbs; and Kosovo has many important landmarks (like Jajce) of the Partisan struggle during World War II.
The first "foreign" or "outside" presence in Taiwan (also known as Formosa, or beautiful island) could be traced to the establishment of a commercial base on the island by the Dutch, in 1624. Troops from southern Fujian defeated the Dutch in 1662 and the Qing dynasty formally annexed the island to the Fujian Province of China, in 1683. In 1887, Taiwan was upgraded into a regular province of China. Imperial Japan, which had been trying to since 1592 to control Taiwan, defeated China in the First Sino-Japanese War in 1894-95; and Taiwan was ceded to Japan �in perpetuity� by the Treaty of Shinonoseki. Around 1935, Japan started the process of assimilation and appointed tens of thousands of Taiwanese in the Japanese Army.
During 1942-45, Japan based a massive camp for Allied Prisoners of War in Taiwan; and the Japanese Navy used it as an operational base. The signing of the (victor-imposed) Instrument of Surrender on 15 August 1945 signalled the end of the Japanese occupation of Taiwan. The KMT-ruled Republic of China accepted the surrender of Japanese forces in Taihoku on 25 October 1945. Since that date till now, Taiwan has been in the possession of the �Republic of China�. By the time the Civil War (Maoist Revolution) ended with the proclamation of the People�s Republic of China on 1 October 1949, the KMT had moved the seat of government of the �Republic of China� from Nanjing to Taipei; and about 1.3 million refugees had moved from the mainland to Taiwan.
Changing Status
The resentment of the Albanian majority in Kosovo against discrimination caused by Serbian nationalism and chauvinism was held in check during the Tito (who hailed from Croatia) era, mainly because of his iconic status. However, when SFRJ ultimately broke up into its component units, the demand and justification for an independent Kosovo became stronger. The Declaration of Independence by Kosovo could, in effect, be termed as a reversal of the earlier non-consensual and externally-imposed inclusion in Serbia. An independent status for Kosovo had been recommended in 1997 by the Special Envoy of the UN Secretary General, but was not accepted by Security Council.
The status of Kosovo since 1999 has been of a territory under UN administration and NATO (read EU in recent years) protection. Even now, Kosovo�s Declaration of Independence may not get the approval of UNSC, because of possible veto by Russia and China. The new state, however, has received and would receive recognition from many powerful states. Kosovo is a new addition to the list of religion (Islam) based states; and is the first such one in Europe. It is likely to remain non-viable (politically, economically and militarily) for a long time. A realistic assessment would be that it would effectively be an EU protectorate for the foreseeable future.
Since the establishment of the PRC in 1949, Taiwan has been the only remnant of the erstwhile Republic of China. USA continued to have diplomatic, commercial and military relations with Taiwan for more than two decades considering it to be the legitimate government of China. Even now, some governments continue with that policy; and many countries have commercial relations with Taiwan, without having diplomatic relations. In effect, the present effort at asserting an identity separate from China (based on a resolution passed by the Democratic Progressive Party on 30 September 2007) is aimed at accepting the reality of the past six decades. The referendum on 22 March 2008 is about seeking admission to the UN as "Taiwan" instead of as "China". It is about giving up the fantasy of being the "sole" government of China and living with the reality of being a small remnant of old China; and changing the name of the country from "Republic of China" to "Taiwan".
"Recognition"
In a different era, diplomatic recognition of a State was normally based on whether or not that entity had the attributes of a nation-state. However, recognition has increasingly become a political act rather than a legal determination. Governments decide on the recognition of a new state (or of a state which has undergone a systemic change) on the basis of self-interest and not of any prescribed values. This self-interest is considered from two angles, i.e. whether according recognition would further one's interests with the new entity and whether such act would adversely affect one's relations with other countries; and a balance is struck between the two considerations. To expect value-based decisions on �recognition� is to ask for a utopian international order.
In the case of Kosovo, USA and some major EU countries seem to have determined that the recognition of Kosovo as an independent (Islamic) state would further their overall interests. The anger aroused in Serbia may be considered inconsequential and the opposition of Russia (and China, because of implications to the Taiwan situation) would not, in their determination, detract from the advantages. That Russia would feel marginalized and that China may feel offended may be considered to be additional bonus.
However, in the case of Taiwan, though it would more be a case of the change of name (in accordance with reality) of an independent country than of a declaration of independence, recognition of the changed entity may be more difficult to come by. Recognition of Taiwan would offer very little extra commercial benefits and would lead to direct confrontation with PRC. Very few major countries may want to take that risk. I doubt if the people of Taiwan want this and if the referendum would give a clear mandate in favour of the change in name and status of their country. They may find it difficult to live with being spurned even after such a change.
L T T E
The historical facts relating to the claims of Kosovo and Taiwan to be independent states would not apply to many guerrilla movements, including LTTE. It would therefore not be easy for these to become valid precedents for them to follow. The Declaration of Independence by Kosovo and the change of name by Taiwan are very different from the LTTE�s demand for a separate Tamil State.
The sovereignty over Tamil majority areas in Sri Lanka has never been contested in history. Tamil and Sinhala peoples had been living in reasonable harmony for centuries, till the post-independence phenomenon of aggressive Sinhala nationalism and chauvinism imposed severe discrimination against the Tamils. Essentially, this may be the only common feature between Kosovo and the Tamils in northern and eastern Sri Lanka. The concept of Tamil Eelam is very different from the concept of an independent Kosovo. A Unilateral Declaration of Independence by Pirabhakaran is very unlikely to find any supporters in the international community, as recognition of an independent Tamil Eelam may not pass the dual tests of self-interest. If one looks at the analogies of Kosovo and Taiwan, I doubt if the Tamils in Sri Lanka would appreciate the idea of their homeland becoming a 'vassal' or 'client' of any external state or group of states.
[Mr. R.Swaminathan, Vice President of the Chennai Centre for China Studies can be contacted at rsnathan@gmail.com]
Thursday, March 20, 2008
Tibetan agitation: Some larger issues
By Col R Hariharan (retd.)
British Prime Minister Gordon Brown's statement about the willingness of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao "to enter into a dialogue with the Dalai Lama" in the light of the Tibetan leader's assurance that he did not support total independence for Tibet and that he renounced violence, adds a new dimension to the agitation of Tibetans world over against Chinese rule in Tibet.
The agitation started on March 10, 2008 with a protest march by monks reminiscent of the saffron agitation last year in Myanmar against military dictatorship. This snowballed into a public protest two days later and spread outside among Tibetan community living in adjacent provinces of China and among Tibetan refugees the world over. Violence in Lhasa resulted in deaths estimated around 100, though the official figures are less. Between March 17 and 20, the Chinese came down hard on the protestors. They have made arrests and foreigners including tourists have been asked to leave Tibet.
Despite the Dalai Lama's repeated appeal to his followers to desist from violence, it does not seem to be having the desired effect on them. So the focus will now be on how fast the Chinese control the agitation without courting further adverse publicity. This becomes a prestige issue for the Chinese as the Olympic flame is to travel through parts of the troubled region to put the Beijing Olympics on its first paces in two months. Even if the agitation is quelled or subsides, it has brought to the surface the simmering issue of Tibet. The timing of this agitation is critical as international media focus is shifting to Beijing for the Olympics. It also invites attention to a number of other issues impinging upon not only Tibet and China, but their neighbours and China's global power equation.
Dalai Lama's status
The violence unleashed on Han population and on public assets by the Tibetan agitators despite the Dalai Lama's repeated appeals have raised a question mark over the Dalai Lama's monolithic influence over the Tibetan population living both at home and abroad. In particular, the agitators spearheaded by the Tibetan Youth Congress were clamouring for independence as against the Dalai Lama's emphasis on autonomy for Tibet. The virulence of the agitation appears to have surprised the Dalai Lama and the Chinese. Is the Dalai Lama losing control over the younger generation of expatriates? The answer to this question would decide the fate of the institution of the Dalai Lama in the future. Any uncertainty in the future of Tibetan leadership is going to be a significant issue not only for China but also for countries like India, Nepal, and even Europe which have provided sanctuaries to large number of Tibetans.
The talks to resolve the Tibetan issue between the Dalai Lama and the Chinese Premier could be a long drawn affair. There are basic differences between the two sides on the territorial limits of Tibet as understood by them. Their perceptions on the scope and extent of autonomy are also different. The Chinese strategy in such talks is to stretch them as long as long as possible as seen from our own experience. During this period, if there are institutional changes in Tibetan leadership how far it would be acceptable to the younger generation of Tibetans? What if the Chinese try to identify an incarnation of the Dalai Lama on their own and install him as they did in the case of the Panchen Lama? These issues would affect the durability of any formulation worked out in the talks.
Strategic issues
Next to China, historically India had been having the closest links with Tibet. So turbulence in Tibet or Tibetan leadership could create problems for India both internally and internationally. Both India and China are slowly inching towards building a peaceful relationship between them as dictated by their own economic and diplomatic interests. This burgeoning relationship could be tested if Tibet remains unstable. This is perhaps the reason for the Indian Foreign Minister to carefully nuance his statement on the agitation and India's stand on the Tibet question.
However, if China increases its force levels in Tibet it would become a matter of strategic concern for India. With a strongly pro-Chinese partner in the Maoists in the ruling Nepalese coalition any such large Chinese troop movements even in India's neighbourhood could trigger further concerns for India.
Apart from that, India's continuing dispute with China on the Tibetan boundary question has connotations for India's coalition politics. Memories India's war with China in 1962 over the disputed border still rankle the mind of large sections of Indian public, who consider it an act of betrayal by the Chinese leadership. This feeling will continue to condition Indian political perceptions to a certain extent. So if the Tibetan agitation persists it could find support among the Indian public and polity.
Similarly, the U.S. and the European Union had been taking special interest for a long time on the Tibet issue for various reasons ranging from strategic interests to the right of Tibetans to practice their religion, culture and language, to their human rights. They have been financially supporting Tibetans living overseas that had helped preserve their identity. The Chinese had always been keeping a watchful eye on such links, particularly with non-governmental organisations of these countries.
The U.S. – China relations are perhaps the closest than ever before. China's export economy is largely dependent upon the U.S. markets. The U.S. had been a major investor in the Chinese growth story. However, there is mutual suspicion on both sides due to the unarticulated intentions that drive this relationship. The U.S. moves in recent years to build strategic linkages with India and bring it into a quadrilateral relationship with Japan and Australia as well, has been a source of some security concern for China.
The Tibetans have a strong lobby in the U.S. seats of power. In the early years of Chinese occupation of Tibet, the U.S. had financed and sponsored revolt by sections of Tibetans against the Chinese forces. This historic memory could aggravate latent suspicions of the Chinese leadership about the U.S. stand on the Tibetan agitation and its resolution. So the U.S. actions in the coming weeks would come under careful Chinese scrutiny.
India is unlikely to allow any move of Tibetan activists across its borders with Tibet, particularly if Chinese troops are moved into the autonomous region to control internal situation. In such a situation, Nepal becomes a vulnerable region. However, the Chinese appear to have forced the Nepalese rulers to toe the Chinese line to quell any build up of agitation. The Chinese intelligence representatives are probably operating in border areas to sanitize the Nepalese side of the border also.
Given this situation, Myanmar's troubled northern borders with China become vulnerable to activities of anti-Chinese elements. With loose government control, this region is a haven for operation of insurgent groups, drug smugglers and gunrunners. In the past the U.S., either directly or through NGOs acting as proxies, has armed and infiltrated tribal insurgents to fight the Chinese incursions in the region. This option would always be available for any international sponsor of the Tibetan agitation. While this is in the realms of possibility only at present, the Chinese with long memories are unlikely to ignore it.
In this setting, China would probably like the present client regime of military dictatorship to continue to be in power in Myanmar rather than have democratic parties (which have strong U.S. links) as rulers. With a referendum of suspicious intent on the cards looming in Myanmar in the coming months, China's role in Myanmar is likely to be more firm and in support of the Than Shwe regime in the coming months.
Of course, there are tertiary fall outs as well. The Tibetan agitation close on the heels of an "independent" Kosovo engineered by the NATO allies has larger implications. In the run up to the Taiwan elections, where the opposition Kuomintang party is rooting for closer links with China, the Tibetan agitation and Chinese crackdown have drawn strong reaction. There is even talk of Taiwanese athletes not participating in the Olympics. However, these are early days for the public opinion to gather mass in protest against the Chinese. Only the future will tell whether this happens or not. That would also depend upon how well the Chinese handle a tricky situation without loss of face when the Olympic flame lights up.
Lastly, the Buddhist monks appear to be increasingly asserting their political role in many countries. In Sri Lanka, already the monks' party is an important factor of right wing politics to be counted among the hawks. In Myanmar, the Saffron agitation saw monks leading from the front triggering a nationwide agitation against military regime's oppression. In Tibet, again the saffron clad monks are in the front lines of national confrontation. Is there a latent Buddhist fundamentalist upsurge in the offing, after Islamic, Christian, Jewish, and Hindu fundamentalists? Unlikely, but only time can tell.
(Col. R Hariharan, a retired MI officer, is associated with the South Asia Analysis Group and the Chennai Centre for China Studies. E-mail colhari@yahoo.com)
British Prime Minister Gordon Brown's statement about the willingness of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao "to enter into a dialogue with the Dalai Lama" in the light of the Tibetan leader's assurance that he did not support total independence for Tibet and that he renounced violence, adds a new dimension to the agitation of Tibetans world over against Chinese rule in Tibet.
The agitation started on March 10, 2008 with a protest march by monks reminiscent of the saffron agitation last year in Myanmar against military dictatorship. This snowballed into a public protest two days later and spread outside among Tibetan community living in adjacent provinces of China and among Tibetan refugees the world over. Violence in Lhasa resulted in deaths estimated around 100, though the official figures are less. Between March 17 and 20, the Chinese came down hard on the protestors. They have made arrests and foreigners including tourists have been asked to leave Tibet.
Despite the Dalai Lama's repeated appeal to his followers to desist from violence, it does not seem to be having the desired effect on them. So the focus will now be on how fast the Chinese control the agitation without courting further adverse publicity. This becomes a prestige issue for the Chinese as the Olympic flame is to travel through parts of the troubled region to put the Beijing Olympics on its first paces in two months. Even if the agitation is quelled or subsides, it has brought to the surface the simmering issue of Tibet. The timing of this agitation is critical as international media focus is shifting to Beijing for the Olympics. It also invites attention to a number of other issues impinging upon not only Tibet and China, but their neighbours and China's global power equation.
Dalai Lama's status
The violence unleashed on Han population and on public assets by the Tibetan agitators despite the Dalai Lama's repeated appeals have raised a question mark over the Dalai Lama's monolithic influence over the Tibetan population living both at home and abroad. In particular, the agitators spearheaded by the Tibetan Youth Congress were clamouring for independence as against the Dalai Lama's emphasis on autonomy for Tibet. The virulence of the agitation appears to have surprised the Dalai Lama and the Chinese. Is the Dalai Lama losing control over the younger generation of expatriates? The answer to this question would decide the fate of the institution of the Dalai Lama in the future. Any uncertainty in the future of Tibetan leadership is going to be a significant issue not only for China but also for countries like India, Nepal, and even Europe which have provided sanctuaries to large number of Tibetans.
The talks to resolve the Tibetan issue between the Dalai Lama and the Chinese Premier could be a long drawn affair. There are basic differences between the two sides on the territorial limits of Tibet as understood by them. Their perceptions on the scope and extent of autonomy are also different. The Chinese strategy in such talks is to stretch them as long as long as possible as seen from our own experience. During this period, if there are institutional changes in Tibetan leadership how far it would be acceptable to the younger generation of Tibetans? What if the Chinese try to identify an incarnation of the Dalai Lama on their own and install him as they did in the case of the Panchen Lama? These issues would affect the durability of any formulation worked out in the talks.
Strategic issues
Next to China, historically India had been having the closest links with Tibet. So turbulence in Tibet or Tibetan leadership could create problems for India both internally and internationally. Both India and China are slowly inching towards building a peaceful relationship between them as dictated by their own economic and diplomatic interests. This burgeoning relationship could be tested if Tibet remains unstable. This is perhaps the reason for the Indian Foreign Minister to carefully nuance his statement on the agitation and India's stand on the Tibet question.
However, if China increases its force levels in Tibet it would become a matter of strategic concern for India. With a strongly pro-Chinese partner in the Maoists in the ruling Nepalese coalition any such large Chinese troop movements even in India's neighbourhood could trigger further concerns for India.
Apart from that, India's continuing dispute with China on the Tibetan boundary question has connotations for India's coalition politics. Memories India's war with China in 1962 over the disputed border still rankle the mind of large sections of Indian public, who consider it an act of betrayal by the Chinese leadership. This feeling will continue to condition Indian political perceptions to a certain extent. So if the Tibetan agitation persists it could find support among the Indian public and polity.
Similarly, the U.S. and the European Union had been taking special interest for a long time on the Tibet issue for various reasons ranging from strategic interests to the right of Tibetans to practice their religion, culture and language, to their human rights. They have been financially supporting Tibetans living overseas that had helped preserve their identity. The Chinese had always been keeping a watchful eye on such links, particularly with non-governmental organisations of these countries.
The U.S. – China relations are perhaps the closest than ever before. China's export economy is largely dependent upon the U.S. markets. The U.S. had been a major investor in the Chinese growth story. However, there is mutual suspicion on both sides due to the unarticulated intentions that drive this relationship. The U.S. moves in recent years to build strategic linkages with India and bring it into a quadrilateral relationship with Japan and Australia as well, has been a source of some security concern for China.
The Tibetans have a strong lobby in the U.S. seats of power. In the early years of Chinese occupation of Tibet, the U.S. had financed and sponsored revolt by sections of Tibetans against the Chinese forces. This historic memory could aggravate latent suspicions of the Chinese leadership about the U.S. stand on the Tibetan agitation and its resolution. So the U.S. actions in the coming weeks would come under careful Chinese scrutiny.
India is unlikely to allow any move of Tibetan activists across its borders with Tibet, particularly if Chinese troops are moved into the autonomous region to control internal situation. In such a situation, Nepal becomes a vulnerable region. However, the Chinese appear to have forced the Nepalese rulers to toe the Chinese line to quell any build up of agitation. The Chinese intelligence representatives are probably operating in border areas to sanitize the Nepalese side of the border also.
Given this situation, Myanmar's troubled northern borders with China become vulnerable to activities of anti-Chinese elements. With loose government control, this region is a haven for operation of insurgent groups, drug smugglers and gunrunners. In the past the U.S., either directly or through NGOs acting as proxies, has armed and infiltrated tribal insurgents to fight the Chinese incursions in the region. This option would always be available for any international sponsor of the Tibetan agitation. While this is in the realms of possibility only at present, the Chinese with long memories are unlikely to ignore it.
In this setting, China would probably like the present client regime of military dictatorship to continue to be in power in Myanmar rather than have democratic parties (which have strong U.S. links) as rulers. With a referendum of suspicious intent on the cards looming in Myanmar in the coming months, China's role in Myanmar is likely to be more firm and in support of the Than Shwe regime in the coming months.
Of course, there are tertiary fall outs as well. The Tibetan agitation close on the heels of an "independent" Kosovo engineered by the NATO allies has larger implications. In the run up to the Taiwan elections, where the opposition Kuomintang party is rooting for closer links with China, the Tibetan agitation and Chinese crackdown have drawn strong reaction. There is even talk of Taiwanese athletes not participating in the Olympics. However, these are early days for the public opinion to gather mass in protest against the Chinese. Only the future will tell whether this happens or not. That would also depend upon how well the Chinese handle a tricky situation without loss of face when the Olympic flame lights up.
Lastly, the Buddhist monks appear to be increasingly asserting their political role in many countries. In Sri Lanka, already the monks' party is an important factor of right wing politics to be counted among the hawks. In Myanmar, the Saffron agitation saw monks leading from the front triggering a nationwide agitation against military regime's oppression. In Tibet, again the saffron clad monks are in the front lines of national confrontation. Is there a latent Buddhist fundamentalist upsurge in the offing, after Islamic, Christian, Jewish, and Hindu fundamentalists? Unlikely, but only time can tell.
(Col. R Hariharan, a retired MI officer, is associated with the South Asia Analysis Group and the Chennai Centre for China Studies. E-mail colhari@yahoo.com)
Tuesday, February 26, 2008
Kosovo & LTTE Separatism
(February 25, Colombo – Chennai, Sri Lanka Guardian) Kosovo is no more a part of Serbia and has become a free state. Nation after nation have begun to recognize this new status. This development has become a popular news story throughout the world and questions have begun about how this would influence various liberation movements, and in the case of Sri Lanka, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.
Nilantha Ilangamuwa set his task to get a cross-section of views from experts in various parts of the world particularly concerned with liberation movements. How did Kosovo achieve this status?
Here we present what Col R. Hariharan shared with the Sri Lanka Guardian.
Questions:
What do you think declared of independence (UDI) by Kosovo from Serbia? How is it an influence to other guerilla movements, who are seeking separate state such as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)?
Answer:
Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence is all together different in nuance and content from the demand for Tamil Eelam by sections of Tamil polity and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).
The evolution of the word balkanisation relating to this volatile region of erstwhile Yugoslavia indicates the instability and shifting tectonic relationship between Serbs, Croats, Bosnians, Slovanians and Kosovan Albanians in the Balkans for centuries. There are religious, racial, linguistic and cultural differences between these communities occupying this region. Chauvinism of different varieties is endemic to this region.Global powers in different centuries have played upon these differences to create constituencies for themselves for their imperial aims. Kosovo independence is only yet another manifestation of this with the US and the NATO powers ranged on one side and the Russians on the other.
The German conquest of this region in the World War II and the fight against it by the nationalists united under Tito gave him a national leader a status. This led to the creation of a united Yugoslavian state once again under him. Marshall Tito, though a Croat, was able to rule the whole country as one united entity by virtue of his personality and ruthless style of Communist leadership. When he fell out with the Soviet Union, he used the cold war rivalries to survive and keep his Communist regime in power. After he died the unity wrought by monolithic control collapsed and Yugoslavia broke up into smaller states. The break up of the Soviet Union and the emergence of new republics in the same region almost coincided with the disintegration of Yugoslav state.
The two major countries among Balkan states Serbia and Croatia have different religions (Orthodox and Catholic respectively) and languages (written in different scripts) with historical affinities with Russia and Germany respectively. Being the two major power blocs in the erstwhile Yugoslavia their assertion of power came to a boil when Serb leader Mlasevic came to power. Mlasevic considered Serbia as the legitimate successor of Yugoslavia, fostered Serbian chauvinism.
It was in this scene, the Albanians majority in Kosovo decided to fight Serbian authority and launched the struggle for independence. Mlasevic’s ruthless use of force to put down the Kosovans fight for their identity and pogroms carried out against them kindled worldwide sympathy for Kosovo. When the UN Security Council did not accept the recommendation for its independence in 1997, the NATO countries and the US used their forces to bombard Serbia relentlessly so that it was forced to accept UN presence to govern Kosovo in an interim arrangement in 1999.
The Kosovo declaration of independence has neither UN mandate nor approval. The UDI is not likely to be accepted by many countries because it is outside the ambit of UN process. Many nations which have internal separatist insurgencies fear their recognition of Kosovo would set precedence for similar demands in their countries. Such nations also include some members of the EU like Spain. However as Kosovo has the presence of EU troops under UN umbrella it could succeed in surviving thanks to the support of the US and some of the important members of the EU. Within the Security Council it is doubtful whether it would ever be approved. So its anomalous existence is likely to continue.
It is difficult to predict how the UDI of Kosovo would affect the fate of other insurgency movements because they have diverse agenda, background, and operational environments in societies different from the Europe. Some like the Kurdish insurgency has trans-national character involving more than one nation. Some others like the Baloch in Pakistan have regional and tribal grievances. In Kashmir most of the insurgent groups do not have independence as the goal.
This applies to the LTTE struggle also. The Tamils have a long history of living alongside Sinhala population. Till 1973 there had never been any Tamil insurgency to form a united Tamil nation. Otherwise, with Tamil Nadu across the sea, historically the Tamils would have carved out a united Tamil nation involving parts of Sri Lanka and India long ago. Secondly, the Kosovo independence came about not because of Albanian struggle alone. It found support from the west and the US. That type of international support for Tamil Eelam does not exist. And the LTTE’s ruthless style of operation against Tamils and Sinhalas – troops and civilians alike - has alienated global sympathy that was there in plenty in 1983. Of course much would depend upon how the Sri Lanka government comes out of the present war. If it uses it as an opportunity to subjugate and alienate Tamil population due to feeling of Sinhala superiority instead of genuine nation building, no Kosovo is needed to rekindle international opinion in favour of Tamils.
Thirdly, international laws are selectively applied upon weaker states. It is often used as a tool in the power struggle of nations. Kosovo has proved this. After all the US human rights record is not lily white; still nations enforced their will on Serbia on the very same charges! A major reason is the US has a transparent system of governance that did not exist in Serbia. This is an important reason why Serbia does not find too many friends.
Lastly, legal precedents do not always translate into similar action; but possession does (as the saying possession is three fourths of law goes). This applies to nation states, however they originate. Both sides are right now trying to prove this maxim in Sri Lanka through military means.
http://lankaguardian.blogspot.com/2008/02/kosovo-ltte-separatism.html
Nilantha Ilangamuwa set his task to get a cross-section of views from experts in various parts of the world particularly concerned with liberation movements. How did Kosovo achieve this status?
Here we present what Col R. Hariharan shared with the Sri Lanka Guardian.
Questions:
What do you think declared of independence (UDI) by Kosovo from Serbia? How is it an influence to other guerilla movements, who are seeking separate state such as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)?
Answer:
Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence is all together different in nuance and content from the demand for Tamil Eelam by sections of Tamil polity and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).
The evolution of the word balkanisation relating to this volatile region of erstwhile Yugoslavia indicates the instability and shifting tectonic relationship between Serbs, Croats, Bosnians, Slovanians and Kosovan Albanians in the Balkans for centuries. There are religious, racial, linguistic and cultural differences between these communities occupying this region. Chauvinism of different varieties is endemic to this region.Global powers in different centuries have played upon these differences to create constituencies for themselves for their imperial aims. Kosovo independence is only yet another manifestation of this with the US and the NATO powers ranged on one side and the Russians on the other.
The German conquest of this region in the World War II and the fight against it by the nationalists united under Tito gave him a national leader a status. This led to the creation of a united Yugoslavian state once again under him. Marshall Tito, though a Croat, was able to rule the whole country as one united entity by virtue of his personality and ruthless style of Communist leadership. When he fell out with the Soviet Union, he used the cold war rivalries to survive and keep his Communist regime in power. After he died the unity wrought by monolithic control collapsed and Yugoslavia broke up into smaller states. The break up of the Soviet Union and the emergence of new republics in the same region almost coincided with the disintegration of Yugoslav state.
The two major countries among Balkan states Serbia and Croatia have different religions (Orthodox and Catholic respectively) and languages (written in different scripts) with historical affinities with Russia and Germany respectively. Being the two major power blocs in the erstwhile Yugoslavia their assertion of power came to a boil when Serb leader Mlasevic came to power. Mlasevic considered Serbia as the legitimate successor of Yugoslavia, fostered Serbian chauvinism.
It was in this scene, the Albanians majority in Kosovo decided to fight Serbian authority and launched the struggle for independence. Mlasevic’s ruthless use of force to put down the Kosovans fight for their identity and pogroms carried out against them kindled worldwide sympathy for Kosovo. When the UN Security Council did not accept the recommendation for its independence in 1997, the NATO countries and the US used their forces to bombard Serbia relentlessly so that it was forced to accept UN presence to govern Kosovo in an interim arrangement in 1999.
The Kosovo declaration of independence has neither UN mandate nor approval. The UDI is not likely to be accepted by many countries because it is outside the ambit of UN process. Many nations which have internal separatist insurgencies fear their recognition of Kosovo would set precedence for similar demands in their countries. Such nations also include some members of the EU like Spain. However as Kosovo has the presence of EU troops under UN umbrella it could succeed in surviving thanks to the support of the US and some of the important members of the EU. Within the Security Council it is doubtful whether it would ever be approved. So its anomalous existence is likely to continue.
It is difficult to predict how the UDI of Kosovo would affect the fate of other insurgency movements because they have diverse agenda, background, and operational environments in societies different from the Europe. Some like the Kurdish insurgency has trans-national character involving more than one nation. Some others like the Baloch in Pakistan have regional and tribal grievances. In Kashmir most of the insurgent groups do not have independence as the goal.
This applies to the LTTE struggle also. The Tamils have a long history of living alongside Sinhala population. Till 1973 there had never been any Tamil insurgency to form a united Tamil nation. Otherwise, with Tamil Nadu across the sea, historically the Tamils would have carved out a united Tamil nation involving parts of Sri Lanka and India long ago. Secondly, the Kosovo independence came about not because of Albanian struggle alone. It found support from the west and the US. That type of international support for Tamil Eelam does not exist. And the LTTE’s ruthless style of operation against Tamils and Sinhalas – troops and civilians alike - has alienated global sympathy that was there in plenty in 1983. Of course much would depend upon how the Sri Lanka government comes out of the present war. If it uses it as an opportunity to subjugate and alienate Tamil population due to feeling of Sinhala superiority instead of genuine nation building, no Kosovo is needed to rekindle international opinion in favour of Tamils.
Thirdly, international laws are selectively applied upon weaker states. It is often used as a tool in the power struggle of nations. Kosovo has proved this. After all the US human rights record is not lily white; still nations enforced their will on Serbia on the very same charges! A major reason is the US has a transparent system of governance that did not exist in Serbia. This is an important reason why Serbia does not find too many friends.
Lastly, legal precedents do not always translate into similar action; but possession does (as the saying possession is three fourths of law goes). This applies to nation states, however they originate. Both sides are right now trying to prove this maxim in Sri Lanka through military means.
http://lankaguardian.blogspot.com/2008/02/kosovo-ltte-separatism.html
International response to Sri Lanka war after the end of CFA
R. Hariharan
The European Union's decision to renew the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) plus scheme provided for Sri Lanka's exports for another three years from January 2009, despite its adverse reaction to the ending of the ceasefire agreement (CFA) by Sri Lanka government. (The GSP plus concession enables Sri Lanka to export its goods and products to the EU at reduced or exempted tax and duty levies.) This decision comes in the face of strong stand taken by Germany on this issue. In an interview published on February 9 Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul, German Minister for Economic Cooperation and Development, had said that if Sri Lanka continued with the military option without seeking credible political solution to the conflict in Sri Lanka she would demand the EU to withdraw the GSP offered to Sri Lanka.
This clearly illustrated the ambivalence between thought and action that underlines the response of international community in responding to contentious issues. This applies not only to the Sri Lanka issue, but many other similar global issues.
There has been widespread international concern at the growing human rights violations and disregard for humanitarian concerns in Sri Lanka ever since the security forces went on the offensive against in December 2005.
Sri Lanka's reluctance to allow international involvement in either monitoring or improving the Human Rights situation has not endeared it to other nations even while the CFA was in force. This concern has been compounded by major escalation in the Eelam war-4 resulting in heavy loss of life since then. Moreover, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) response to the security forces offensive with series of blasts and killings targeting civilians in the south has further compounded international concerns over the Sri Lanka war.
Undoubtedly these developments have disappointed friendly nations who had put their time and resources in giving form and content to the now defunct peace process 2002. With the security forces on the threshold of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) heartland in the north, the battle would only intensify further, choking the hopes of reviving international mediation process for bringing peace, perhaps irrevocably.
Apart from the four co-chairs of Tokyo Donors Conference – the EU, Japan, Norway and the U.S., India, Canada and the UK have consistently shown great interest in helping Sri Lanka resolve the Tamil issue peacefully. Though their reaction to the Sri Lankan walkout from the CFA varied, their response had two common elements: regret at the government decision to withdraw from the CFA and a reminder that Sri Lanka could resolve the issue not merely by military means but with a political package on devolution. Despite such clarity on basic issues, international community's future course of action in respect of Sri Lanka's active pursuit of war will be conditioned by their national self interest.
India as a major regional power has its own equation with other members of the Tokyo Donors Conference and other western powers. India - Sri Lanka relation is unique due to closeness geographical, cultural and trade interests. It has its own coordinates, conditioned by many geo-strategic issues. Among these India's interest in ensuring smooth resolution of the problem of Sri Lanka Tamils so that it does not affect the peace and tranquillity in both countries is an important one. So study of India's response to Sri Lanka war comes under a category different from other countries.
The LTTE's dependence upon its global support network of Sri Lanka Tamil expatriates to progress the war in Sri Lanka has inevitably drawn it within the ambit of the U.S-led global war on terror. At the same time, it also served as incentive for the international community led by power centres from three continents – the U.S., the EU, Japan (and Norway representing the peace lobbies) – take a lead in gilding a Sri Lanka peace package with developmental finance as incentive. As a result the Sri Lanka government and the LTTE agreed upon the CFA and the Norwegian mediated peace process in 2002. India dogged by the ghosts of its bitter experience at peace making in Sri Lanka in the past tacitly agreed to the mediation "intrusion" by external players, in what it had considered as its own domain of power. However, the large scale violation of the ceasefire by the LTTE till December 2005 and by the Sri Lanka government as well thereafter has probably led to the disillusionment of the four co-chairs with both the Sri Lanka government and the LTTE.
The demise of the peace process has also resulted in the dismantling of the international structural assets painfully built to moderate and monitor the peace process. Along with that, much of the Lanka-friendly attitudes of nations actively involved in the peace process are also eroded.
If international understanding of the Sri Lanka government's stand on ending the ceasefire is interpolated on a scale of 1 to 9, India and Japan with a score of 6 show a close understanding. At the same time, they have made clear that military solution alone was unworkable. Both have tended to play down Sri Lanka's performance on human rights issues and do not air their views freely in public. They are unlikely to go along with international of collective action, if any, to coerce Sri Lanka government to improve human rights. However, they are likely to support any persuasive measures for producing the same results. The same applies to resumption of peace negotiations also.
On the other hand, the U.S. (with a score of 5) has shown a keen understanding of the Sri Lankan stand than the rest. The U.S. has stressed the need for the government to come out with a devolution package for Tamils without further delay. The U.S. has also put some riders on future aid and military assistance till Sri Lanka mends its dismal human rights record. At the same time these actions were balanced with other acts or statements to soften the impact. For instance the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) issued a statement terming the LTTE as the most dreaded role model of Al Qaeda almost at the same time as the U.S. issued a statement critical of the Sri Lanka government for abandoning the CFA. We can expect the U.S. to continue this carefully tailored approach in Sri Lanka. While the U.S. has a fairly good understanding of the Tamil quest for equal rights, it neither condones nor supports the LTTE, which has been representing the Tamil interests in the peace process. So it will continue to cooperate with the government in Sri Lanka while supporting the resumption of peace parleys. At best, the U.S. would pitch more forcefully to sponsor the presence of a UN Human Rights watchdog at Colombo.
The UK, with the same score of 5 as the U.S., appears to be slightly better nuanced in its approach than other EU members. However, the large and influential Tamil expatriate lobby in the UK is already bringing considerable political pressures on the ruling party to make the government policy more sensitive and considerate to the Tamil struggle for equity. When the elections get closer this could generate more positive action than issuing palliative statements on Sri Lanka Tamils. This could result in bringing more pressure upon Sri Lanka government.
The EU with 4 points and Norway at 3 points have shown strong resentment of Sri Lanka's disdain for international concerns on ending the CFA and on its deteriorating human rights record. They have been strident in the UN in their demand for structural and qualitative improvement on the Human Rights front in Sri Lanka. They are likely to keep up pressure on this question, diplomatically and in public, both within and outside the UN. However, internally the EU members have their own differing perceptions on the overall situation in Sri Lanka. These will condition their behaviour and prescription on any proposal for collective action.
Canada appears to figure somewhere between the EU and Norway. It is driven both by local political considerations where Tamils have a strong say, and the opposing stands taken by the ruling party and the opposition on the LTTE's war. Unlike its predecessor, the present government in Canada is strongly opposed to terrorism of the LTTE kind and had been fully cooperating with the U.S. in its actions against the LTTE. Without loud statements such actions by Canada are likely to continue. At the same time, Canada has equally strong stand on human rights issues in conformity with that of the EU.
The attitudes of China and Pakistan to Sri Lanka have been largely conditioned by considerations of strategic security, trade and geo-politics. Their interest lies in creating their own special space in Sri Lanka's policy horizon. China would like to establish a strategic foothold in Sri Lanka beyond security orientation relating to India. Probably Chinese interests are focused on the larger canvass of Indian Ocean security. China would continue to maintain and enlarge upon the existing goodwill between the two countries through improved commercial relations and armament sales. While India with its geographical and cultural closeness would always have an advantage in its relations with Sri Lanka, Sri Lanka would like to use the competitive nature of the India-China relations to gain maximum advantage for its own benefit.
In the case of Pakistan, the interest is more oriented to South Asia focusing on India's increasing assertion in the region and Asia. Many Sri Lankans perceive Pakistan as a friend particularly on occasions when India had not been helpful in issues impinging upon the Tamil conflict. While this attitude may not be a great advantage in building better trade relations between Sri Lanka and Pakistan, it is handy for Sri Lanka in its current phase of war to source arms supply from Pakistan. Sri Lanka's increasingly close relationship with India makes it a unique listening post for Pakistan's India operations. And Pakistan will continue to take full advantage of its relations with Sri Lanka to exploit this unique status of Sri Lank.
Thus both China and Pakistan have identified themselves completely with the actions of the Sri Lanka government. By doing this without any "suspicious agenda" from Sri Lanka's point of view, Sri Lanka's relationship with both these countries is likely to flourish. Of course, political and geo-strategic constraints on Sri Lanka over such a growth will always be there.
Attitude towards the LTTE
The LTTE has been finding it hard to reconcile itself to the fall in international esteem ever since it walked out of the peace process. Its continued refusal to read the changing international mood and come to terms with reality was evident from its statement on the CFA even as early as February 22, 2007. It said "It (the CFA) recognised Tamil Eelam's de facto existence, with its unique characteristics; a distinct population; a government comprising a defence force, a police force, a judiciary, a civil administration and other institutions for effective governance of a people, and capability of entering into agreements with other governments, with a line of control reflecting the ground reality of the existence of the Tamil homeland demarcated with recognised borders. The CFA recognised the balance of power between the GOSL (Government of Sri Lanka) and the LTTE, and was premised on this balance of power…" However, its intention to resume the war of secession made in the same statement has not helped nations like Norway and the EU which had tried to revive the peace process.
This attitudinal rigidity coupled with its renewed violent actions against civilian targets well outside its beat after the end of the CFA is probably an important consideration in shaping international lack of interest in the LTTE's style of fighting for Tamil rights. The LTTE's political head B Nadesan's grandiose claim "we are a conventional force. We will launch attacks on military targets but we will not target civilians," even as its bomb squads started hitting civilian targets served only to increase the gap in LTTE's international credibility. So when Nadesan addressed a letter to the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon indicating the readiness of the LTTE to adhere by the CFA scrupulously it made no impact.
The LTTE argument that the only "path open to regain the rights of the Tamil people" was through recognition of the sovereignty of the Tamil nation particularly after being a party to the demise of the CFA and peace process will find few takers internationally. With the continued identification of the LTTE as a part of the global terror regimes, the militant group is likely to find it has less and less freedom to operate outside Sri Lanka in the coming months.
In a nut shell
In concrete terms, the international community is not likely to take any major collective action against Sri Lanka unless they are involved in yet another peace process for which the chances are slim. At the same time, reasons of real politick are likely to discourage collective responsibility of the kind they had shown in 2002-03 that culminated in the peace process, unless both Sri Lanka and the LTTE agree to fully cooperate to ensure success of such an initiative.
Tamil expatriates, who appear to put too much faith in international action in Sri Lanka to force the government to give up the military option and revive the peace process, would do well to remember this. And probably they will have to persuade India to prevail upon Sri Lanka to effect any change because it stands outside the internationally networked stand on this issue. India is in no mood or under compulsion to do this at present for its own reasons. What India can do to make it a win-win situation for all in Sri Lanka requires a more detailed examination because it depends upon what the LTTE, the Tamil expatriates, the people, politicians and the Sri Lanka government should do to help themselves.
So the light at the end of the tunnel is still not visible because the tunnel has not ended. And that is a tragedy for the people of Sri Lanka and all other stakeholders including the international community.
The European Union's decision to renew the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) plus scheme provided for Sri Lanka's exports for another three years from January 2009, despite its adverse reaction to the ending of the ceasefire agreement (CFA) by Sri Lanka government. (The GSP plus concession enables Sri Lanka to export its goods and products to the EU at reduced or exempted tax and duty levies.) This decision comes in the face of strong stand taken by Germany on this issue. In an interview published on February 9 Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul, German Minister for Economic Cooperation and Development, had said that if Sri Lanka continued with the military option without seeking credible political solution to the conflict in Sri Lanka she would demand the EU to withdraw the GSP offered to Sri Lanka.
This clearly illustrated the ambivalence between thought and action that underlines the response of international community in responding to contentious issues. This applies not only to the Sri Lanka issue, but many other similar global issues.
There has been widespread international concern at the growing human rights violations and disregard for humanitarian concerns in Sri Lanka ever since the security forces went on the offensive against in December 2005.
Sri Lanka's reluctance to allow international involvement in either monitoring or improving the Human Rights situation has not endeared it to other nations even while the CFA was in force. This concern has been compounded by major escalation in the Eelam war-4 resulting in heavy loss of life since then. Moreover, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) response to the security forces offensive with series of blasts and killings targeting civilians in the south has further compounded international concerns over the Sri Lanka war.
Undoubtedly these developments have disappointed friendly nations who had put their time and resources in giving form and content to the now defunct peace process 2002. With the security forces on the threshold of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) heartland in the north, the battle would only intensify further, choking the hopes of reviving international mediation process for bringing peace, perhaps irrevocably.
Apart from the four co-chairs of Tokyo Donors Conference – the EU, Japan, Norway and the U.S., India, Canada and the UK have consistently shown great interest in helping Sri Lanka resolve the Tamil issue peacefully. Though their reaction to the Sri Lankan walkout from the CFA varied, their response had two common elements: regret at the government decision to withdraw from the CFA and a reminder that Sri Lanka could resolve the issue not merely by military means but with a political package on devolution. Despite such clarity on basic issues, international community's future course of action in respect of Sri Lanka's active pursuit of war will be conditioned by their national self interest.
India as a major regional power has its own equation with other members of the Tokyo Donors Conference and other western powers. India - Sri Lanka relation is unique due to closeness geographical, cultural and trade interests. It has its own coordinates, conditioned by many geo-strategic issues. Among these India's interest in ensuring smooth resolution of the problem of Sri Lanka Tamils so that it does not affect the peace and tranquillity in both countries is an important one. So study of India's response to Sri Lanka war comes under a category different from other countries.
The LTTE's dependence upon its global support network of Sri Lanka Tamil expatriates to progress the war in Sri Lanka has inevitably drawn it within the ambit of the U.S-led global war on terror. At the same time, it also served as incentive for the international community led by power centres from three continents – the U.S., the EU, Japan (and Norway representing the peace lobbies) – take a lead in gilding a Sri Lanka peace package with developmental finance as incentive. As a result the Sri Lanka government and the LTTE agreed upon the CFA and the Norwegian mediated peace process in 2002. India dogged by the ghosts of its bitter experience at peace making in Sri Lanka in the past tacitly agreed to the mediation "intrusion" by external players, in what it had considered as its own domain of power. However, the large scale violation of the ceasefire by the LTTE till December 2005 and by the Sri Lanka government as well thereafter has probably led to the disillusionment of the four co-chairs with both the Sri Lanka government and the LTTE.
The demise of the peace process has also resulted in the dismantling of the international structural assets painfully built to moderate and monitor the peace process. Along with that, much of the Lanka-friendly attitudes of nations actively involved in the peace process are also eroded.
If international understanding of the Sri Lanka government's stand on ending the ceasefire is interpolated on a scale of 1 to 9, India and Japan with a score of 6 show a close understanding. At the same time, they have made clear that military solution alone was unworkable. Both have tended to play down Sri Lanka's performance on human rights issues and do not air their views freely in public. They are unlikely to go along with international of collective action, if any, to coerce Sri Lanka government to improve human rights. However, they are likely to support any persuasive measures for producing the same results. The same applies to resumption of peace negotiations also.
On the other hand, the U.S. (with a score of 5) has shown a keen understanding of the Sri Lankan stand than the rest. The U.S. has stressed the need for the government to come out with a devolution package for Tamils without further delay. The U.S. has also put some riders on future aid and military assistance till Sri Lanka mends its dismal human rights record. At the same time these actions were balanced with other acts or statements to soften the impact. For instance the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) issued a statement terming the LTTE as the most dreaded role model of Al Qaeda almost at the same time as the U.S. issued a statement critical of the Sri Lanka government for abandoning the CFA. We can expect the U.S. to continue this carefully tailored approach in Sri Lanka. While the U.S. has a fairly good understanding of the Tamil quest for equal rights, it neither condones nor supports the LTTE, which has been representing the Tamil interests in the peace process. So it will continue to cooperate with the government in Sri Lanka while supporting the resumption of peace parleys. At best, the U.S. would pitch more forcefully to sponsor the presence of a UN Human Rights watchdog at Colombo.
The UK, with the same score of 5 as the U.S., appears to be slightly better nuanced in its approach than other EU members. However, the large and influential Tamil expatriate lobby in the UK is already bringing considerable political pressures on the ruling party to make the government policy more sensitive and considerate to the Tamil struggle for equity. When the elections get closer this could generate more positive action than issuing palliative statements on Sri Lanka Tamils. This could result in bringing more pressure upon Sri Lanka government.
The EU with 4 points and Norway at 3 points have shown strong resentment of Sri Lanka's disdain for international concerns on ending the CFA and on its deteriorating human rights record. They have been strident in the UN in their demand for structural and qualitative improvement on the Human Rights front in Sri Lanka. They are likely to keep up pressure on this question, diplomatically and in public, both within and outside the UN. However, internally the EU members have their own differing perceptions on the overall situation in Sri Lanka. These will condition their behaviour and prescription on any proposal for collective action.
Canada appears to figure somewhere between the EU and Norway. It is driven both by local political considerations where Tamils have a strong say, and the opposing stands taken by the ruling party and the opposition on the LTTE's war. Unlike its predecessor, the present government in Canada is strongly opposed to terrorism of the LTTE kind and had been fully cooperating with the U.S. in its actions against the LTTE. Without loud statements such actions by Canada are likely to continue. At the same time, Canada has equally strong stand on human rights issues in conformity with that of the EU.
The attitudes of China and Pakistan to Sri Lanka have been largely conditioned by considerations of strategic security, trade and geo-politics. Their interest lies in creating their own special space in Sri Lanka's policy horizon. China would like to establish a strategic foothold in Sri Lanka beyond security orientation relating to India. Probably Chinese interests are focused on the larger canvass of Indian Ocean security. China would continue to maintain and enlarge upon the existing goodwill between the two countries through improved commercial relations and armament sales. While India with its geographical and cultural closeness would always have an advantage in its relations with Sri Lanka, Sri Lanka would like to use the competitive nature of the India-China relations to gain maximum advantage for its own benefit.
In the case of Pakistan, the interest is more oriented to South Asia focusing on India's increasing assertion in the region and Asia. Many Sri Lankans perceive Pakistan as a friend particularly on occasions when India had not been helpful in issues impinging upon the Tamil conflict. While this attitude may not be a great advantage in building better trade relations between Sri Lanka and Pakistan, it is handy for Sri Lanka in its current phase of war to source arms supply from Pakistan. Sri Lanka's increasingly close relationship with India makes it a unique listening post for Pakistan's India operations. And Pakistan will continue to take full advantage of its relations with Sri Lanka to exploit this unique status of Sri Lank.
Thus both China and Pakistan have identified themselves completely with the actions of the Sri Lanka government. By doing this without any "suspicious agenda" from Sri Lanka's point of view, Sri Lanka's relationship with both these countries is likely to flourish. Of course, political and geo-strategic constraints on Sri Lanka over such a growth will always be there.
Attitude towards the LTTE
The LTTE has been finding it hard to reconcile itself to the fall in international esteem ever since it walked out of the peace process. Its continued refusal to read the changing international mood and come to terms with reality was evident from its statement on the CFA even as early as February 22, 2007. It said "It (the CFA) recognised Tamil Eelam's de facto existence, with its unique characteristics; a distinct population; a government comprising a defence force, a police force, a judiciary, a civil administration and other institutions for effective governance of a people, and capability of entering into agreements with other governments, with a line of control reflecting the ground reality of the existence of the Tamil homeland demarcated with recognised borders. The CFA recognised the balance of power between the GOSL (Government of Sri Lanka) and the LTTE, and was premised on this balance of power…" However, its intention to resume the war of secession made in the same statement has not helped nations like Norway and the EU which had tried to revive the peace process.
This attitudinal rigidity coupled with its renewed violent actions against civilian targets well outside its beat after the end of the CFA is probably an important consideration in shaping international lack of interest in the LTTE's style of fighting for Tamil rights. The LTTE's political head B Nadesan's grandiose claim "we are a conventional force. We will launch attacks on military targets but we will not target civilians," even as its bomb squads started hitting civilian targets served only to increase the gap in LTTE's international credibility. So when Nadesan addressed a letter to the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon indicating the readiness of the LTTE to adhere by the CFA scrupulously it made no impact.
The LTTE argument that the only "path open to regain the rights of the Tamil people" was through recognition of the sovereignty of the Tamil nation particularly after being a party to the demise of the CFA and peace process will find few takers internationally. With the continued identification of the LTTE as a part of the global terror regimes, the militant group is likely to find it has less and less freedom to operate outside Sri Lanka in the coming months.
In a nut shell
In concrete terms, the international community is not likely to take any major collective action against Sri Lanka unless they are involved in yet another peace process for which the chances are slim. At the same time, reasons of real politick are likely to discourage collective responsibility of the kind they had shown in 2002-03 that culminated in the peace process, unless both Sri Lanka and the LTTE agree to fully cooperate to ensure success of such an initiative.
Tamil expatriates, who appear to put too much faith in international action in Sri Lanka to force the government to give up the military option and revive the peace process, would do well to remember this. And probably they will have to persuade India to prevail upon Sri Lanka to effect any change because it stands outside the internationally networked stand on this issue. India is in no mood or under compulsion to do this at present for its own reasons. What India can do to make it a win-win situation for all in Sri Lanka requires a more detailed examination because it depends upon what the LTTE, the Tamil expatriates, the people, politicians and the Sri Lanka government should do to help themselves.
So the light at the end of the tunnel is still not visible because the tunnel has not ended. And that is a tragedy for the people of Sri Lanka and all other stakeholders including the international community.
Thursday, February 21, 2008
Myanmar: Wishing away Suu Kyi
For
Even those
Daw Suu Kyi brought three ingredients absent in the ‘guided’ politics of
No other politician or military leader in
A referendum is scheduled to be held in May (of course, under the ‘supervision’ of the same dictatorial regime) to approve a new constitution for the country. The ruling junta approved the draft constitution on February 19.The constitution drafting came as a sequel to the consideration of a “road map for democracy” by a national convention of members handpicked by the military regime. The deliberations of the omnibus national convention of 1000 members dragged on for 14 years with the military regime twisting the elbows of the participating members to toe its line. The major political and ethnic minority parties boycotted the convention denouncing its undemocratic ways of functioning. On the whole, the national convention lacking transparency and representative character was clearly used by the military junta to buy time to delay the process of democratisation mainly to satisfy international community.
The new constitution is supposed to provide for a ‘democratic set up’ for the country’s change over from military control of government to peoples rule. The constitution has been drafted by the Commission for Drafting the State Constitution, and chaired by the Chief Justice U Aung Toe. The 54 members of the commission were picked by the military regime. According to U Aung Toe the new constitution has been drafted in accordance with the six objectives of the National Convention. These included national unity, multi-party democracy, and values such as justice, liberty and equality.
The draft also provides for military participation in political leadership. This has kindled the fears of political parties that the new constitution would be used as an instrument to legitimise the role of military within a ‘guided democracy’ for perpetuity. This fear is legitimate as the 104 basic principles of the constitution are said to provide for reservation of at least 25 percent of the seats in all government bodies for the military. Ethnic minorities who form a sizeable part of the population also feel uneasy with the way the military regime has road rolled the whole process. They have seen how the regime had used dubious means to dissipate the struggle of minorities for space in national power structure.
Naturally the major national political and ethnic minority parties have condemned the move to hold a referendum on the draft constitution which has not been made public. The National League for Democracy (NLD), which was not allowed to rule in spite of winning a thumping majority in the last democratic elections held in 1990, has asked for throwing open the draft constitution for public review. It has also asked the military regime to explain the essence of the constitution to the people before the referendum in May. These are very reasonable demands considering that the NLD did not have a say in the process of constitution making despite enjoying the support of the people as demonstrated in the last democratic election.
The Myanmar Foreign Minister Nyan Win announced the decision not to permit Daw Suu Kyi to contest the 2010 elections because she had married a foreigner, at a meeting of foreign ministers of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in
A group of seven Nobel laureates including Desmond Tutu of
However, the international sanctions regime has clearly failed to curb the style of the military regime because many nations have only been paying lip service to them for reasons of real politicks and perceived national interest. The November 2007 report of the Human Rights Watch (HRW) has identified 27 companies in 13 countries as having investment interests in
Apart from the energy potential, for both
For
However, without the participation of
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi with her unique national and international appeal represents the single factor that could upset the strategy of the military regime. This is the main reason for the military junta’s single-minded focus in physically controlling access to Daw Suu Kyi. This also the reason why it is preventing her active participation even in the limited political space it is prepared to allow for others. But the writing on the wall is clear. The regime cannot simply wish away Daw Suu Kyi and what she represents.
Most of the western nations have come out strongly against the
The military regime has outlived its relevance as there is a restive population in the country whose voice can only get stronger and louder. This was seen during the saffron revolution of the monks last year. Given this setting, it is for
Friday, February 15, 2008
Crisis over LTTE issue result of a Lankan ploy
By M.C. Rajan in Chennai 7-2-08 http://www.mailtoday.in/epapermain.aspx
Karunanidhi’s daughter Kanimozhi called on Sonia Gandhi on Wednesday to diffuse a political crisis that has been getting worse by the day.
Last Saturday, finance minister P. Chidambaram had criticised the state government, prompting the chief minister the next day to dare the Centre to sack him. On Monday, the Intelligence Bureau director PC Haldar, was rushed in to appease the CM.
The crisis that has now sucked in the country’s top politicians was borne of an Opposition campaign that LTTE has become very active in Tamil Nadu. The campaign picked up momentum with rumours spreading all over south
Mathivathani was supposed to have landed at the Mandapam refugee camp, fleeing the Sri Lankan air force’s incessant bombardment of Tamil areas in north Lanka. Believe it or not, the “first lady of Eelam” had even enquired after the well being of her subjects! Her “mission” apparently was to identify a hospital for her wounded husband. Next, it was the turn of the “supreme leader of Eelam” to turn up to convalesce at a TN hospital, either in
After a fortnight of such rumours, the Congress walked out of the TN Assembly. But interestingly, neither the Centre nor any other agency has any confirmation of the alleged heightened LTTE activities in TN.
Experts feel this is primarily the handiwork of Sri Lankan intelligence. “It is almost impossible,” says Col Hariharan, laughing off reports of Prabhakaran crossing over to Tamil Nadu. “It could well be the mischief of Sri Lankan intelligence agencies. They are the ones who will benefit by spreading such rumours,” he argues.
Hariharan is one of the most credible military analysts in the country and was the head of Military Intelligence for the Indian Peace Keeping Mission headquartered in
He insists that the Tiger chief could not have fled his jungle hideout. “I know the LTTE. I had interacted with the Tiger leadership. I have seen Prabhakaran at close quarters. This just can’t be true,” he insists.
He rules out the involvement of Indian intelligence, though the IB has been issuing warnings of LTTE plots in Chennai. “The rumours are intended to provide a psychological advantage to the battle-fatigued Lankan forces. Further, it is also aimed at creating an element of doubt about the invincibility of the LTTE chief,” he analyses.
Hariharan points out that there is just one exit route for Prabhakaran: the Naachi Kuda area in north
The Colonel is not ready to buy the theory that Prabhakaran was critically wounded. “It is only wishful thinking at best. According to my sources and information coming from the island, Prabhakaran has not suffered any major injury,” he maintains.
The LTTE has been cornered in the jungles of Vanni and is fighting with their back to the wall. Still, it seems highly unlikely that the guerrilla leader could have crossed over to
Even before the excitement created by these rumours of Prabhakaran’s sighting could die down, the police claimed to have busted a LTTE conspiracy to assassinate V. Perumal, an anti-Tiger Lankan leader. He was scheduled to attend a marriage in the city. But it wasn’t explained why the LTTE should kill an inconsequential politician.
Intelligence officials were aghast at the stories about the movement of the LTTE leader and his wife. The rumours hit the state when Sri Lankan army chief Gen. Fonseka claiming that Prabhakaran was critically wounded in an air strike. With no denial coming up from the Tigers, he continued to maintain his theory that the Tiger leader was either bedridden or had fled.
Police combed the entire coastline. Nothing came out of these operations. But nothing could be left to chance as Karunanidhi remains embattled ever since he wrote an elegy for slain LTTE leader Thamilchelvan.
Sri Lanka: Caught Between Tweedledum and Tweedledee
Col R Hariharan (retd)
Tweedledum and Tweedledee
Agreed to have a battle!
For Tweedledum said Tweedledee
Had spoiled his nice new rattle.
Just then flew down a monstrous crow,
As black as a tar-barrel!
Which frightened both the heroes so,
They quite forgot their quarrel.'
- Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking Glass
And the suggestion to implement to fully implement the 13th Amendment, that is celebrating its twentieth birthday, comes after the APRC had 63 sittings over a period of one and a half years! The action of the APRC reminds me of the Tamil proverb "Malayai kalli eliyai pidithan" (dug up the mountain to catch a mouse).
Had this action been taken in 1987-88 by the crafty Sri Lankan President JR Jayawardane who introduced the 13th amendmen, the country would have avoided bloodshed, acrimony and conflict that has dogged it for two decades. This was not done. So the price the nation has paid at the altar of political expedience, ethnic fanaticism, and religious and language frenzy is colossal. It can never be calculated in actual terms. Roughly it involved sacrificing the lives of over 80,000 people from
But caught between the Tweedledum and Tweedledee of
At least the JVP had been consistent in its opposition to the whole effort of the APRC. Both the UNP which was instrumental in pushing through the 13th amendment and the SLFP which had opposed it, had occupied the Temple Trees in the last two decades of war, mayhem and peace. But they did not care to implement it in full during their rule. So there are sufficient grounds for Tamils to ask the question "are the mainstream political parties of
It is equally strange that President Rajapaksa now requires the APRC recommendation to take action on what is already in the statute books of the government. One cannot but agree with the views of Western Peoples Front (WPF) one of the smaller parties, on the whole charade of trying to delay devolution of powers using the APRC as an instrument to do the dirty deed. Questioning the need to reintroduce an already active legislative instrument, the press release, the WPF said: "13th amendment is already law. What is pending is the implementation of the same. Failure to implement what is already law is the sole business of the government. The All Party Conference and the APRC were formed to discuss and develop a set of new constitutional proposals addressing what is referred as the ethnic problem or the Tamil problem."
However we cannot find fault with Tissa Vithrana, the chairman of the APRC, for this imbroglio because the good man is trying to shore up some positive action towards devolution as the APRC appears to be having an eternal dialogue rooted in rigid and frozen beliefs on what is good for Sri Lanka rather than what will save the country from further collapse, death and destruction. The sad thing is that the nation had not been able to use the services of a person of Vitharana's calibre to work out a meaningful solution speedily. Pragmatism rather than political expediency or backroom deals is the need of the hour if
Unfortunately, the political situation in
Tamils of all hues must also share the blame for leaving it to a military machine like the LTTE to decide the fate of all Tamils. It has always put its own interests before considering what is good for the largest number of people. Now weakened politically and militarily, it is doubtful whether the LTTE, extant or extinct, can ever deliver devolution of power to the people. It has not been able devolve powers to its own flock all these years.
Instead of breast beating and despairing with cries of 'I told you so', it is the responsibility of Tamil politicians including those of the TNA to ensure that they unite to see the President fully implements the 13th Amendment in letter and spirit. If they can do that the Tamil struggle for democratic rights would be genuine and not by silently watching the bombing buses carrying women and children or condoning suicide attacks. The time for silence is over. They should make the full implementation of the 13th Amendment could be a beginning of national reconciliation and path to full devolution of powers.
Lastly, President Rajapaksa has an excellent opportunity now to implement the 13th Amendment not only to please India or any political lobby, or buy time to find the "final solution" to the LTTE, but to achieve his lofty aim of building a united Sri Lanka, practically from the ashes. But will he do it? Only he can answer.
In this context the lines of Bob Dylan's modern version of 'Tweedledee and Tweedledum' come to my mind. It goes like this:
Tweedle-dee Dee is a lowdown, sorry old man
Tweedle-dee Dum, he'll stab you where you stand
"I've had too much of your company,"
Says, Tweedle-dee Dum to Tweedle-dee
That would be a human tragedy of immense proportions.
Courtesy: SAAG Paper No 2566 26 Jan 2008
ttp://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers26%5Cpaper2566.html
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Appendix
ACTION TO BE TAKEN BY THE PRESIDENT TO FULLY IMPLEMENT RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION AS A PRELUDE TO THE APRC PROPOSALS
1. Introduction
1.1 The APRC was mandated by the President to prepare a set of proposals that would be the basis for a solution to the national question. After 63 sittings over a period of 1½ years the consensus document is being finalised and it should be possible to hand it over to the President in the very near future. The outcome would be a basis for appropriate constitutional arrangements. Implementation of this would of course require amendment of the present Constitution, and in respect of some Articles, approval by the People at a referendum. This would of course take time, once a favourable climate is established.
1.2 Under the circumstances, the APRC taking into consideration its own proposals has identified a course of action to achieve maximum and effective devolution of powers to the provinces in the short term. The emphasis would be on meeting the aspirations of the Tamil speaking peoples, especially in the North and East. This would be done within the framework of the present Constitution, that is, the 1978 Constitution. The course of action proposed by the APRC would be implementable with immediate effect, and envisages an interim arrangement pending the restoration of democratically elected Provincial Councils in the North and East.
1.3 The 13th Amendment to the 1978 Constitution was enacted following the Indo Sri Lanka Agreement of July 1987. It resulted in the setting up of Provincial Councils throughout
1.4 Implementation of subjects and functions devolved on the Provinces through the Concurrent List has not taken place at all due to the fact most of these subjects and functions were retained by the Centre as if they also belonged to the Reserved List.
2. Steps necessary to permit Maximum Devolution of Powers to Provinces under the 13th Amendment
2.1 The Government should endeavour to implement the 13th Amendment to the Constitution in respect of legislative, executive and administrative powers, overcoming existing shortcomings.
2.2 Adequate funds should be provided by the Government to facilitate effective functioning of the Provincial Councils.
2.2.1 The Centre should hereinafter route all finances in respect of special projects undertaken by the Centre in the Provinces, if they are on subjects under the purview of the Provinces, through the respective Provincial Administrations.
3. Special Arrangements necessary to permit Maximum Devolution of Powers to the Northern and
3.1 The APRC is of the view that conditions in the
3.2 Conditions in the
3.3 As it is not possible to hold elections in the North, the President could make appropriate order to establish an Interim Council for the
3.4 The Interim Council of a Province will aid and advise the Governor in the exercise of his executive powers, and will function until Provincial Council elections are held in that Province.
3.4.1 The Interim Council should reflect the ethnic character of that Province.
3.4.2 It is proposed that the Interim Council for a Province should consist of individuals who have political experience and an abiding interest in the development of the Province and in its people and be acceptable to the people of the Province. A person to qualify for appointment as a member of an Interim Council should have a thorough knowledge of the particular Province.
4. Implementation of the Official Languages Provision of the Constitution
4.1 The Government should take immediate steps to ensure that Parliament enacts laws to provide for the full implementation of Chapter IV of the Constitution on Language.
4.2 There are many contexts in which remedial measures will assume an administrative, rather than a legislative, character.
The following are instances of measures which should be strenuously accelerated and implemented by the Government.
(a) recruitment of Tamil speaking police officers in sufficient numbers to enable Tamil speaking members of the public, not only in the North and East, but in the country as a whole, to transact business in their own language in police stations;
(b) the taking of all steps, including recruitment of staff and procurement of equipment to enable Tamil speaking members of the public to deal with Ministries, Government Departments, statutory corporations and all other public bodies in their own language;
(c) the regular holding of, and streamlining of procedures for, mobile "clinics" where officials fluent in the Tamil language will engage problem solving on the spot;
(d) the provision of interpreters, translators and other relevant facilities in all courts of law, so that the needs of members of provincial minority communities are catered fully with regard to all aspects of the administration of justice;
(e) The Sinhala minorities in the North and East suffer from disadvantages similar to those affecting Tamil speaking peoples as mentioned above. Suitable steps should be taken to address them along the same lines.
The All Party Representative Committee (APRC) comprised:
- United National Party (D)
- Jathika Hela Urumaya
- Sri Lanka Muslim Congress
- All
- Mahajana Eksath Peramuna
- National Unity
- Up-country People's Front
- Communist Party of
- Eelam People's Democratic Party
- National Congress
- Western People's Front
- Lanka Sama Samaja Party
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