The LTTE has been left leaderless after the death of Prabhakaran.He ran it as a fief because it was the heart and soul of the organisation. My take on the subject is reproduced here kind courtesy Frontline magazine (Volume 26 - Issue 12 :: Jun. 06-19, 2009. (The article presumes the LTTE intelligence chief Pottu Amman was also killed in the operation, though his body is yet to be recovered.)
Succession Squabble
THE acknowledgement of the death of V. Prabakaran by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) on May 17 came from Selvarasa Pathmanathan, the organisation’s international representative, a week after the Sri Lankan security forces announced it. This is not surprising as the LTTE under the monolithic leadership of Prabakaran had always wished away information he found either uncomfortable or inconvenient. Pathmanathan’s signed statement to the British Broadcasting Corporation on May 24 probably sent shock waves through the acolytes of the LTTE the world over, who had been in a state of denial over the LTTE leader’s death.
Pathmanathan sowed further confusion among LTTE ranks when he said: “We have already announced that we have given up violence and agreed to enter a democratic process to achieve the rights for the Tamil (self) determination of our people.” Armed struggle to carve out an independent Tamil Eelam is the basic reason for the support the LTTE has enjoyed among many Sri Lankan Tamil expatriates.
However, the pro-LTTE website TamilNet, which carried Pathmanathan’s statement, did not include the portion relating to the decision to give up violence and enter the democratic process, which was mentioned in the BBC report. TamilNet also put out a statement from the LTTE’s Department for Diaspora Affairs (DDA) that said it did not want to acknowledge Prabakaran’s death “without explicit authorisation from the LTTE leadership”. It insisted that the LTTE leadership was safe and “it will re-emerge when the right time comes”. Other reports quoted LTTE international intelligence leader Arivazhagan as confirming that Prabakaran was still alive as late as May 22.
It was clear from the tone of the news items in pro-LTTE websites that they would maintain the fiction that the LTTE leadership was still alive as long as possible.
Pro-LTTE political leaders from Tamil Nadu also appeared to be toeing the same line. Vaiko, leader of the Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazagham (MDMK), who considers himself a personal friend of Prabakaran’s, and Nedumaran, a long-term frontman of the LTTE in Tamil Nadu, came out strongly against the veracity of Pathmanathan’s statement. Vaiko appealed to Tamils elsewhere in the world not to believe it, while Nedumaran questioned the legitimacy of Pathmanathan to issue the statement. He said: “Except the generals close to Prabakaran, none has the authority to issue official statements.”
In a way he was correct, as Pathmanathan, though he was anointed by Prabakaran as the head of the LTTE’s international affairs in January 2009, was probably not senior enough in the tightly controlled leadership hierarchy to be given the freedom to issue public statements on his own. But this was not the first time that Pathmanathan had issued statements on behalf of the organisation since he assumed office as its international representative, and the very same leaders did not question his legitimacy earlier.
The LTTE, strictly operating under the control of Prabakaran and his deputy Pottu Amman, probably did not have a contingency plan of action to handle the situation in the absence of both leaders. Given the vengeful mindset of Prabakaran, it would have been heresy in the LTTE to even think of such a contingency. When the entire top and middle level leadership was eliminated on the battle front, Pathmanathan was the only senior leader left alive with a seal of approval from Prabakaran.
The timing of his statement is also interesting. The United Nations Human Rights Council’s emergency meeting in Geneva to consider the violations of human rights by both sides in Sri Lanka was scheduled for May 26. Both the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE have taken the meeting seriously. On the eve of the meeting, the Sri Lankan government announced its intention to hold elections for the Jaffna Municipal Council and the Vavuniya Pradesiya Sabha between August 4 and 17, presumably to give the impression that the situation was more normal in the Northern Province than it appeared. Similarly, the LTTE representative’s disavowal of violence also came on the eve of the meeting. Pathmanathan, with his long international experience in handling LTTE affairs, might have thought it prudent to present the LTTE in a better light on the occasion by issuing a statement to suit it. (In any case, Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa quickly rejected the LTTE’s offer, saying that he did not believe “the LTTE can enter a democratic process after years of their violent activities”.)
ASSETS TO PROTECT
In spite of the international developments, the conflicting statements emanating in the name of the LTTE have all the indications of a serious succession squabble brewing in its top echelons both at home and abroad. Given that the LTTE is a complex organisation, totally shrouded in secrecy, and in the absence of a clearly indicated line of succession, the power struggle to it take over could be long drawn and might draw some blood.
The LTTE’s large and carefully created asset base spread over many countries is cash-rich and provides an added incentive for the power struggle to turn fierce. Jane’s Intelligence Review in August 2008 assessed the LTTE’s annual income at $200-300 million. It rated the LTTE as the second biggest income-generating terrorist organisation in the world, the first being the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), with income derived from the sale of cocaine. In the words of Jane’s Intelligence Review, the LTTE’s sources of income were both legal and illegal and probably came “from shipping to drugs and extortion by a network of professional managers – both Tamils and others – across a string of countries”. Investigation of select Tamil charities in the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada has shown that the LTTE used them as an effective and legitimate way to collect and transfer money to LTTE entities in Sri Lanka.
In his lifetime, Prabakaran was the single most powerful leader of the LTTE. He was the heart and soul of the organisation, providing it with the much needed mystique to attract and retain a loyal band of cadre. The LTTE’s elite force of suicide bombers – the Black Tigers – swore loyalty to him and not to the organisation. He did not allow a second line of leadership to evolve naturally. He came down heavily on potential contenders for power as Mahathaya (Mahendraraja), his one-time aide and lieutenant, discovered to his detriment.
Prabakaran’s death has left a big void in the LTTE leadership. His successor will find it very difficult to meet the high expectations of supporters, particularly after the organisation has been so grievously mauled. The new leader will require extraordinary skills to recoup the LTTE’s assets, marshal the scattered flock and motivate it to build up the organisation all over again. There is no single leader in sight within the LTTE who can meet this stringent requirement.
In addition to this, Prabakaran’s successor should be popular enough to attract and retain the loyalty of cadre and supporters while being strong enough to exercise his muscle power to assert his authority. He should also be able to impress the LTTE satraps presiding over the overseas tentacles of the organisation and controlling the assets. As Prabakaran did not nominate a successor, any new aspirant for the LTTE leadership will have to gain the acceptance of three constituencies of the organisation: the fighting elements, the expatriate segment and fellow travellers extending value-added support to the LTTE.
The front-line fighting segment made up of the LTTE rank and file still eluding capture in Sri Lanka is the most important constituency. The security forces have claimed that the LTTE lost around 22,000 cadre, while 9,100 of them have been apprehended. These figures might be exaggerated, and the LTTE has probably lost between 12,000 and 15,000 cadre in Eelam War IV. After suffering a crushing defeat and left leaderless in isolated pockets, many of these cadre, including the sleeper cells, are likely to be a demoralised lot. Sri Lanka has already announced that the security forces will continue to hunt them out until the last vestige of the LTTE is eradicated from Sri Lanka.
So it is not surprising that Karuna (Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan), the former LTTE leader who is now a Minister in Mahinda Rajapaksa’s government and a vice-president of the ruling Sri Lanka Freedom Party, is attracting cadre from this segment. And President Rajapaksa is likely to encourage this trend further. Under this difficult ambience, any new leader of the LTTE will find it an uphill task to retain the loyalty of such cadre and strengthen his power base within Sri Lanka.
The expatriate segment of supporters comprises a melange of identities and backgrounds. It has its own pulls and pressures based on its perceptions of the Tamil Eelam question. It is to the credit of Prabakaran that he was able to commandeer the support of such a disparate group.
DEGENERATION
On the ground, the style of operation of LTTE representatives, particularly in Canada and the U.K., progressively degenerated over the years. In spite of the LTTE’s much publicised penchant for discipline, there were complaints of LTTE operatives using of a mix of extortion, coercion, intimidation and even violence to muster support. In the absence of the strong hand of Prabakaran, this situation is likely to deteriorate further, with each group trying to outdo the other. Controlling the local chapters of the LTTE and keeping the proxies handling the LTTE’s vast overseas assets on a tight leash will be an important factor in re-establishing the authority of a new leadership. But this may not happen with the urgency the issue deserves.
Lastly, the Tamil struggle for equity attracted the support of non-governmental organisations and sections of the intellectual and political community although the LTTE had assumed its leadership role using questionable methods. Politicians, human rights activists and intellectuals in many countries including India, Canada, and the U.K. chose to support LTTE-sponsored causes and movements ignoring its negative aspects because they believed in its organisational effectiveness. Their support has been critical in indirectly building up the LTTE’s image in international fora, including the U.N., often to the embarrassment of Sri Lanka. Unless the new leadership is able to take charge and assert itself quickly, this support may dissipate.
Pathmanathan is probably making a pitch to emerge as a potential candidate to take over the LTTE leadership. Better known by his nickname KP – which stands for Kumaran Pathmanathan, he is no front-line military commander. His skill in overseas operations enabled him to organise the LTTE’s supply chain on the basis of a captive tramp shipping network that became the lifeline for the LTTE.
He was under a cloud for some time when Prabakaran suspected his financial integrity. However, he was reinstated as international representative, in the place of the late Anton Balasingham, to revamp the LTTE’s overseas operations to meet its battlefield needs.
Pathmanathan is an organisational man with a sound knowledge of clandestine international operations. Even if he musters the support of the overseas segments in his bid for leadership, his acceptance among the fighting elements of the LTTE will remain a question mark as he comes out as a poor option after Prabakaran. His behind-the-scenes skills may not be enough to create enthusiasm even among the Tamil public, particularly when Tamil politicians such as Douglas Devananda and Karuna are going to occupy an increasingly larger political space.
Considering all these aspects, the LTTE is likely to be in internal convulsions for some time over the leadership issue. It may require the collective skills of expatriate leaders to hammer out a solution acceptable to all segments. In the interim, the internal squabble might not only increase in decibels but also end in fisticuffs. To avoid such a contingency, a collective leadership may emerge. But such committee solutions would take the dynamics out of leadership just when the organisation needs it the most to survive as a viable entity.•
The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)’s acknowledgement of the death of V Prabhakaran on May 17, 2009, came from its international representative Selvarasa Pathmanathan, a week after the Sri Lanka security forces (SLSF) announced it. This is not surprising as the LTTE under the monolithic leadership of Prabhakaran had always wished away information he found either uncomfortable or inconvenient. Pathmanathan’s signed statement to the BBC on May 24 probably sent shock waves among the LTTE acolytes the world over, who had been in a state of denial over the LTTE leader’s death.
Pathmanathan sowed further confusion among the LTTE ranks when he said “We have already announced that we have given up violence and agreed to enter a democratic process to achieve the rights for the Tamil (self) determination of our people.” Armed struggle for carving out an independent Tamil Eelam had been the basic reason for the support LTTE enjoyed among many of the Sri Lanka Tamil expatriates.
However, the pro-LTTE website TamilNet which carried Pathmanathan’s statement did not include the portion relating to giving up violence and agreeing to enter the democratic process included in the BBC report. The TamilNet also put out a statement from the LTTE’s Department for Diaspora Affairs (DDA) which did not want to acknowledge Prabhakaran’s death “without explicit authorisation from the LTTE leadership.”
It insisted that the LTTE leadership was safe and “it will re-emerge when the right time comes.” Other reports quoted LTTE international intelligence leader Arivazhagan who confirmed that Prabhakaran was still alive as late as May 22.
It was clear from the tone of news items in pro-LTTE websites that they would maintain the fiction that the LTTE leadership was still alive as long as possible. Pro-LTTE political leaders from Tamil Nadu also appeared to be toeing the same line. Vaiko, leader of the Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazagham (MDMK) who considers himself as a personal friend of Prabhakaran, and Pazha Nedumaran, a long term front man of the LTTE in Tamil Nadu, came out strongly against the veracity of Pathmanathan’s statement. Vaiko appealed to Tamils elsewhere in the world not to believe it, while Pazha Nedumaran questioned the legitimacy of Pathmanathan to issue the statement. He said “Except the generals close to Prabhakaran, none has the authority to issue official statements.”
In a way he was correct as Pathmanathan, though anointed by Prabhakaran as the head of LTTE’s international affairs only in January 2009, was probably not senior enough in the tightly controlled leadership hierarchy to be given the freedom to issue public statements on his own. But this was not the first statement that Pathmanathan had issued statements on behalf of the organization since he assumed office as its international representative; and the very same leaders did not question his legitimacy earlier.
The LTTE, strictly operating under the control of Prabhakaran and his deputy Pottu Amman, probably did not have a contingency plan of action to handle the situation in the absence of both the leaders. Given the vengeful mindset of Prabhakaran even thinking of such a contingency would have been heresy in the LTTE. When the entire top and middle level leadership was eliminated in the battlefront, Pathmanathan was the only senior leader left alive with a seal of approval from dead leader.
The timing of his statement is also interesting. TheUN Human Rights Commission emergency meeting in Geneva to consider the violations of human rights by both sides in Sri Lanka was scheduled for May 26. Both the Sri government and the LTTE have taken the meeting seriously. On the eve of the meeting Sri Lanka government has announced its intention to hold elections for the Jaffna Municipal Council and Vavuniya Pradesiya Sabha between August 4 and 17, presumably to show that the situation was more normal in Northern Province than it appeared. Similarly, the LTTE representative’s disavowal of violence also comes on the eve of the meeting. Pathmanathan with his long international experience in handling LTTE affairs might have thought it prudent to present the LTTE in better light on the occasion by issuing a statement to suit the occasion. (In any case the Sri Lanka’s defence secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa had quickly rejected the LTTE’s offer saying that he did not believe “the LTTE can enter a democratic process after years of their violent activities.”)
In spite of the international developments, the conflicting statements emanating in the name of the LTTE gives all the indications of a serious succession squabble brewing in its top echelons both at home and abroad. Given the LTTE’s complex organization totally shrouded in secrecy, and the absence of a clearly indicated line of succession the power struggle to take over the body could be long drawn and might draw some blood.
The LTTE’s large, carefully created asset base spread over many countries is cash rich and provides an added incentive for the power struggle to turn fierce. The Jane’s Intelligence Review in August 2008 had assessed the LTTE’s annual income at $200-300 million. It rated the LTTE as the second biggest income generating terrorist organization in the world, the first being the Revolutionary Armed Group of Colombia, with income derived from sale of cocaine. In the words of Jane’s Intelligence Review the LTTE sources of income were both legal and illegal and probably came “from shipping to drugs and extortion by a network of professional managers – both Tamils and others – across a string of countries.” Investigation of selected Tamil charities in the UK, the US, and Canada have shown that the LTTE used them as an effective and legitimate way to collect and transfer money to the LTTE entities in Sri Lanka.
Prabhakaran in his lifetime had remained as the single most powerful leader of the LTTE. He was the heart and soul of the organisation providing it the much needed mystique to attract and retain a loyal band of cadres. The LTTE’s elite force of suicide bombers - Black Tigers – swore loyalty to him and not to the organisation. He did not allow a second line of leadership succession to evolve naturally. He came down heavily to eliminate potential contenders of power as his one-time aide and lieutenant Mahathiya (Mahedraraja) discovered to his detriment.
Prabhakaran’s death has left too big a void in LTTE leadership. His successor would find it very difficult to meet the high expectations of supporters particularly after the organisation has been mauled grievously. The new leader would require extraordinary skills to recoup LTTE’s assets, marshal the scattered flock and motivate them to build the organisation all over again. There is no single leader in sight within the LTTE who can meet this stringent requirement.
In addition to this Prabhakaran’s successor should be popular enough to attract and retain the loyalty of cadres and supporters, while being strong enough to exercise his muscle power to assert his authority. He should also be able to impress the LTTE satraps presiding over the overseas tentacles of the organisation controlling the assets. As Prabhakaran had not nominated a successor, any new aspirant for the LTTE leadership will have to gain the acceptance of three constituencies of the organisation – the fighting elements, the expatriate segment and fellow travellers extending value added support to the LTTE.
The frontline fighting segment made up of LTTE rank and file still eluding capture in Sri Lanka is the most important constituency. The security forces have claimed that the LTTE had lost around 22,000 cadres while 9,100 of them have been apprehended. Though these figures might be exaggerated, the LTTE has probably lost between 12000 and 15000 cadres in the Eelam War IV. After suffering a crushing defeat and left leaderless in isolated pockets, many of these cadres including the sleeper cells are likely to be demoralised lot. Sri Lanka has already announced that the security forces would continue to hunt them out till the last vestige of LTTE is eradicated from Sri Lanka.
So it is not surprising that the.former LTTE leader Karuna (Vinayagamoorthy Muralidharan), now a minister and a vice president of the ruling Sri Lanka Freedom party, attracting cadres from this segment of. And President Rajapaksa is likely to encourage this trend further. Under this difficult ambience any new leader of the LTTE will have an uphill task to retain the loyalty of such cadres to strengthen his power base within Sri Lanka.
The expatriate segment of supporters is a melange of identities and backgrounds. It has its own pulls and pressures based on their perceptions of the Tamil Eelam question. It is to the credit of Prabhakaran that he was able to commandeer the support of such a disparate group.
On the ground the style of operation of the LTTE representatives particularly in Canada and the UK had progressively degenerated over the years In spite of the LTTE’s much publicised penchant for discipline. There had been complaints of LTTE operatives using of a mix of extortion, coercion, intimidation and even violence to muster support. In the absence of the strong hand of Prabhakaran this situation is likely to further deteriorate with each group trying to outdo the other. Controlling the local chapters of the LTTE and keeping the proxies handling LTTE’s vast overseas assets on a tight leash would be an important factor in re-estabishing the authority of a new leadership. But this may not happen with the urgency the issue deserved.
Lastly, the Tamil struggle for equity had been attracting the support of NGOs and sections of intellectual and political community although the LTTE had assumed its leadership role using questionable methods. Politicians, human rights activists and intellectuals in many countries including India, Canada, and the UK had chosen to support LTTE sponsored causes and movements ignoring its negative aspects because they believed in the organisational effectiveness of the LTTE. Their support had been critical in indirectly building the LTTE’s image in international forums including the UN, often to the embarrassment of Sri Lanka. Unless the new leadership is able to take charge and assert itself quickly, their support may dissipate.
Pathmanathan is probably making a pitch to emerge as a potential candidate to take over the LTTE leadership. Pathmanathan better known by his nickname KP – standing for Kumaran Pathmanathan – is no frontline military commander. His skill in overseas operations enabled him to organise LTTE’s supply chain based on a captive tramp shipping network that became the lifeline of sustenance for the LTTE. He had come under a cloud for sometime when Prabhakaran suspected his financial integrity. However, he was reinstated as international representative, in the place of the late Anton Balasingham to revamp LTTE overseas operations to meet the battlefield needs. Pathmanathan is an organizational man with sound knowledge of clandestine international operations. Even if he musters the support of overseas segments in his bid for leadership, his acceptance among the fighting elements of the LTTE will remain a question mark as he comes out as a poor option after Prabhakaran. His behind the scene skills may not be enough to create enthusiasm even among Tamil public, particularly when Tamil politicians like Douglas Devananda and Karuna are going to occupy increasingly larger political space.
Considering all these aspects the LTTE is likely to be in internal convulsions for sometime over the leadership issue. It may require the collective skills of expatriate leaders to hammer out a solution acceptable to all segments. In the interim the internal squabble might not only increase in decibels, but also end in fisticuffs. To avoid such a contingency a collective leadership may emerge. But such committee solutions would take the dynamics out of leadership when the organisation needs it most to survive as a viable entity.
Copyright: Frontline
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