[This article published in the www.southasiaanalysis.org on May 19, 2009 could not be published earlier for technical reasons. Though some of the comments have been overtaken by developments subsequently, still few others are valid still.]
With the death of V Prabhkakaran curtains came down on the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) as a viable military entity in the Eelam War IV on Sunday May 17, 2009. He had little chance of survival as troops from three divisions of Sri Lanka Security Forces swept through Prabhakaran’s last hideout in the strip of barely a few hundred metres, north of Mullaitivu. Along with him his trusted lieutenants Pottu Amman, the intelligence chief and veteran leader Soosai who had survived earlier war were also reported killed.
As expected speculation is rife about the way he died - whether he committed suicide biting the cyanide capsule, or grievously injured in operation or wilfully massacred by the security forces. These speculations are of little consequence as he is no more to lead the Tamil Tigers once again. President Rajapaksa confirmed his death in a telephone call to the Indian Foreign Minsiter Pranab Mukherjee yesterday. One can expect the Sri Lanka government to scotch the rumours when they produce the evidence of his death requested by India to close the case against Prabhakaran and Pottu Amman two of the prime-accused in the Rajiv Gandhi assassination case.
Understandably, the LTTE and its acolytes are in a state of denial of their thalaivar’s death. The Sri Lanka Tamil expatriates who had put their faith in Prabhakaran’s immortality and invincibility are in a state of shock. They had been expecting Prabhakaran to produce a miracle of sorts to turn the tide of war in favour of the LTTE. However, when S Pathmanathan, head of LTTE’s international affairs issued a statement denying Prabhakaran’s death and accused of massacring Political chief Nadesan and Pulidevan, it sent the security forces in a tizzy. President Rajapaksa pointedly omitted reference to finding Prabhakaran’s body in his long speech to parliament. And the security forces were desperately looking for the body! After all the high drama and a lot contradictory stories, around noon today security forces have confirmed Prabhakaran’s body has been found in the Nandikadal lagoon. His body was shown in the state TV with skull injuries. That should silence at least those who want the correct information on his death.
The cream of the LTTE leadership including the occupants of two rows behind the leader’s throne, have been wiped out in the last two days of the three-year old war. Among the list of identified bodies among the 200 plus recovered in the Sunday operations include apart from Prabhakaran, his son Charles Anthony, Soosai, Pottu Amman - Intelligence Wing Leader, Bhanu - military leader, Jeyam - military leader, B. Nadesan - LTTE political head, S. Pulidevan - Head of LTTE's Peace Secretariat, Ramesh - special military leader, Ilango - police chief, Sudharman - aide to LTTE leader's son, Thomas - senior intelligence leader, Luxman - military leader, Sri Ram - senior sea tiger cadre, Iseiaravi - female military leader, Kapil Amman - deputy intelligence leader, Ajanthi - female training in charge, Wardha - mortar in charge, Pudiyawan - Secretary to Prabhakarn and Jenarthan - Special military leader.
A few questions come to mind when we read of Prabhakaran’s death.
Why Prabhakaran did not escape from the battle zone?
It is not easy to answer because it depends upon the moody leader’s mindset in the last stages of battle. There were a few opportunities even as battle in Puthukkudiyiruppu was being fought. Having some knowledge of the way he operates many of us believed that he would make a get away, go into hiding, and stage a comeback to pursue once again his dogged fight to carve out an independent Eelam. This would have required a Plan B in his operational plan. He may not have had such a Plan B to execute and died on the battlefield just he advised his cadres. While this sounds in keeping with the popular image of Prabhakaran as the relentless leader ready to sacrifice his life, it raises the question, was he so desperate to do so because he could not do otherwise due to army and naval blockade. Given Prabhakaran’s penchant for security it is difficult to believe he could not have sneaked out if he had wanted to do so. Perhaps not; only time will tell.
The security forces have claimed the three leaders Prabhakaran, Pottu Amman, and Soosai were killed when they ran into a Special Forces squad while driving out in an ambulance with protection. Why would they expose themselves to collective risk by travelling together in such a fashion?
Considering the high state of secrecy and security that is always there when Prabhakaran moves, it appears unbelievable in the face of it. But battle conditions impose strange compulsions. The LTTE is in disarray in its last hideout; leaders might have been injured and were being evacuated from the zone of active firing. The area of operation was terribly restricted and there might not have been enough vehicles to carry them separately. And on way they could have run into the security forces to meet their end. So only on the basis of transportation the news cannot be discounted.
Who will don the mantle of LTTE? Can it be revived?
If one sees the heights of strength from which the LTTE has fallen, it looks a near impossible task. Apart from eliminating the leadership the war has taken the lives of 15,000-20,000 LTTE cadres, and supporters. And a few hundred thousand people – young and old – who were kith and kin of the LTTE are orphaned now. Probably some remnants of cadres are scattered in pockets in the island and overseas.
There is no experienced and charismatic leader with proven record in the horizon to rally the scattered cadres to motivate them to fight once again and build the organisation with the same vigour as Prabhakaran, because leaders like him don’t come every day. The LTTE has a lot of assets overseas – most of them in benami (fake) ownership. Prbably Pathmanathan would be in the know of these assets. Whether he has the competency and desire to play the lead role using these assets to revive the LTTE is a moot point.
Death of Prabhakaran removes the LTTE from the leadership role accorded to it by the international community when it supported the Oslo Accord. Now there is a void in the power equation; can the dissonant voices of Tamil leaders unite to demand the essential rights of Tamils? But we have been hearing cacophony than united voices; so it is difficult to say so, though I wish I could.
With LTTE no more there as a roadblock, it is for Indian leadership to decide for how long it is going to keep Sri Lanka in low profile in its foreign policy framework.
Saturday, May 30, 2009
Perils of a US-China Marriage of Convenience
The increasing economic convergence between the US and China can have adverse impact on India's strategic security environment in South Asia. My copyrighted article published May 2009 issue of the GFiles Magazine tries to substantiate this concern. It is reproduced here courtesy GFiles:
Between the dragon and the deep blue sea
THE global economic downslide triggered by the US fiscal crisis has introduced a new paradigm in the international power equation. The West appears to be looking at China, sitting on nearly $2 trillion of Forex reserve, to stabilize their sagging economies. Even in the current economic downturn, despite 25 million job losses due to fall in exports, China has clocked 6.1 per cent growth in the first quarter year on year. This year it is targeting 8 per cent annual growth.
In contrast, the US figures are skewed with an annual deficit of $1.7 trillion, unfunded debt of $11.1 trillion, and unfunded liabilities of at least $43 trillion. So it was not surprising that Chinese President Hu Jintao’s suggestion that possibly IMF special drawing rights should replace the dollar as the main reserve currency dominated the thought process of the latest G20 summit, even before it began. And it seems the Chinese money power is here to stay for some time as the American woes have just begun.
The American dispensation under President Barack Obama is clearly downplaying human rights abuses in China, the perennial hobbyhorse of its China policy, much to the horror of human rights conscience keepers. This was dramatically illustrated in February this year, during Hilary Clinton’s visit to Beijing – her first port of call after assuming office as the US Secretary of State.
Her main concern on this trip was not China’s human rights abuses on which she spoke so critically during her September 1995 visit as the spouse of President Bill Clinton. It was more down to earth: reassuring Beijing about the safety of its large investments in US government securities and keeping the Chinese trade surplus capital flowing to the US.
The signs are clear: the US and China are entering into a marriage of necessity. The Chinese depend upon US consumers for a quick recovery of their export-oriented manufacturing sector while the US depends upon China to continue its purchase of US Treasury Bonds to finance President Obama’s stimulus plan. This symbiotic relationship in the making can influence the US stand on many contentious issues that had confronted its relations with China. And many other Western powers queuing up for Chinese largesse are going to be no different.
Historically, China considered itself the Middle Kingdom – the centre of the world. And it is well on the way to turning this into a modern-day reality. Even before the global economic downturn, China was going about it systematically in three areas – international assertion of power, modernization of the armed forces, and emergence as the number one economic superpower. Now it is leveraging the global economic crisis to enable the process.
China is already a dominant military power in Asia. The Pentagon annual report on Chinese Military Power released on March 25 considers the growth of China’s Navy a source of concern. According to the report, China has the “most active landbased ballistic and cruise missile program in the world”. At the strategic level, this includes the long-range ICBM with a range of almost 7,000 miles – good enough to target any location in the US, let alone Asia. China is also building more Type-094 ballistic missile submarines. It is poised to make a major breakthrough in submarine technology. The development of Hainan naval base has caused both Japan and India concern.
With increasing Chinese political and economic forays in India’s neighbourhood, China will increasingly occupy a large horizon in India’s security spectrum. As the US economic recovery may well last the whole duration of President Obama’s presidency, we can expect some changes in the US policy prescriptions to cater to Chinese sensitivities to affect South Asia.
The American dispensation under President Obama is clearly downplaying human rights abuses in China, the perennial hobbyhorse of its China policy, much to the horror of human rights conscience keepers
How should India respond to this new US-China equation? The new government taking over the reins of power in New Delhi in May may be saddled with this uncomfortable question. During 2008, Chinese strategic analysts have even hinted at the possibility of a limited war with India over the border question! China had been sending mixed signals on its relationship with India. A few illustrations will suffice.
When President Pratibha Patil visited the Buddhist pilgrim town of Tawang in early April, the Chinese Foreign Ministry was not happy about it and conveyed its objections The American dispensation under President Obama is clearly downplaying human rights abuses in China, the perennial hobbyhorse of its China policy, much to the horror of human rights conscience keepers India-China trade has grown from $18 million in 1991 to $38.2 billion in 2007. It is set to grow to $60 billion in 2010 to New Delhi. This is not the first time Beijing has done so. In February, Beijing objected to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s scheduled visit to Arunachal Pradesh (“Southern Tibet”, in Chinese parlance), in particular Tawang. Though the Prime Minister visited Arunachal Pradesh, he avoided going to Tawang! The Chinese reasoning was simple: Tawang is within the territory claimed by China although it had been under Indian rule ever since India became independent.
The Chinese objection came only a month after the two countries had signed “The Shared Vision for 21st Century”, a document jointly affirming far-reaching cooperation between the two countries, during Manmohan Singh’s visit to Beijing. Both nations also signed a Memorandum of Understanding for cooperation in 10 different fields ranging from armed forces to railways, healthcare and rural development.
On October 29 last year, British foreign secretary David Miliband announced that the previous British actions, including the Simla Accord (1913) and thus the McMahon Line, had been an anachronism and a colonial legacy. He apologized to China for not having renounced those actions earlier. The British “apology” knocks down the very basis of India’s stand on the Sino-Indian border dispute. It is unclear what India’s reaction to all this, including Miliband’s statement, was because India never unambiguously expresses its sensitivities on specific issues to the concerned countries. This is so even in the case of Sri Lanka. It is time we started stating our views clearly, if not loudly, when the issues affect us.
Indian policymakers – not merely MEA bureaucrats, but political leaders as well – have to take a hard look at how we handle foreign policy. As R Swaminathan, former Special Secretary, suggests, we should evolve a national foreign policy just as we have a national security policy. The two policies should dovetail each other to reinforce national strategic goals. We should learn to evolve a national political consensus on major foreign policy issues so that other countries we deal with know they are dealing with the nation and “not merely with a transient government”. As a nation, we cannot afford to dither any longer.
There are three fundamental issues relating to China that confront us – the border dispute, increasing Chinese influence in our neighbourhood, and the presence of the Dalai Lama and Tibetan refugees in our midst. Each one of them merits a detailed analysis. But the first two issues are more easily tractable than the Tibetan issue. As far as the border dispute is concerned, both nations can go on “talking” forever, given the Asian penchant to defer rather than resolve uncomfortable issues. It would probably be prudent now to accept the present Line of Actual Control on our border with Tibet and turn it into a “Line of Administrative Control”, as suggested by Swaminathan. The discussions on the border dispute can go on without military confrontation now and then.
South Asia, with a growing economy of over 1.5 billion people, is an enormous market for Chinese goods. China is trying to increase its influence in this region through political, military and economic means. It has made significant progress in trade in this region. It has built strong bonds with Pakistan and Bangladesh, which harbour sanctuaries of terrorist organizations operating against India. It has built a symbiotic relationship with Myanmar’s ruling junta. In Nepal, the Maoist regime is more favourably disposed towards China than India. China’s footprint is increasing in Sri Lanka. These are realities.
However, India has its own strategic and economic advantages in dealing with China as well as its neighbours. India is too big an economic entity for China to ignore. India-China trade has grown from $18 million in 1991 to $38.2 billion in 2007. It is set to grow to $60 billion in 2010. So India needs to take multi-faceted initiatives to leverage its advantages and make it difficult for China to make further inroads in this region. China will continue to flex its military muscle on our borders and extend its presence further in the Indian Ocean.
We need to build our military clout to discourage China. Unfortunately, thanks to bureaucratic red tape, our military modernization is limping. The battle worthiness of the armed forces will be seriously suspect if we do not resolve this perennial problem. In a nutshell, pragmatism rather than politicking need to govern our security and foreign policies. We should clean up our act internally so that we can be powerful externally. There is no other choice.
Copyright: GFiles Magazine, Vol 3, Issue 2 May 2009
http://gfilesindia.com/readmoresubtitle.aspx?subtitle_id=182
Between the dragon and the deep blue sea
THE global economic downslide triggered by the US fiscal crisis has introduced a new paradigm in the international power equation. The West appears to be looking at China, sitting on nearly $2 trillion of Forex reserve, to stabilize their sagging economies. Even in the current economic downturn, despite 25 million job losses due to fall in exports, China has clocked 6.1 per cent growth in the first quarter year on year. This year it is targeting 8 per cent annual growth.
In contrast, the US figures are skewed with an annual deficit of $1.7 trillion, unfunded debt of $11.1 trillion, and unfunded liabilities of at least $43 trillion. So it was not surprising that Chinese President Hu Jintao’s suggestion that possibly IMF special drawing rights should replace the dollar as the main reserve currency dominated the thought process of the latest G20 summit, even before it began. And it seems the Chinese money power is here to stay for some time as the American woes have just begun.
The American dispensation under President Barack Obama is clearly downplaying human rights abuses in China, the perennial hobbyhorse of its China policy, much to the horror of human rights conscience keepers. This was dramatically illustrated in February this year, during Hilary Clinton’s visit to Beijing – her first port of call after assuming office as the US Secretary of State.
Her main concern on this trip was not China’s human rights abuses on which she spoke so critically during her September 1995 visit as the spouse of President Bill Clinton. It was more down to earth: reassuring Beijing about the safety of its large investments in US government securities and keeping the Chinese trade surplus capital flowing to the US.
The signs are clear: the US and China are entering into a marriage of necessity. The Chinese depend upon US consumers for a quick recovery of their export-oriented manufacturing sector while the US depends upon China to continue its purchase of US Treasury Bonds to finance President Obama’s stimulus plan. This symbiotic relationship in the making can influence the US stand on many contentious issues that had confronted its relations with China. And many other Western powers queuing up for Chinese largesse are going to be no different.
Historically, China considered itself the Middle Kingdom – the centre of the world. And it is well on the way to turning this into a modern-day reality. Even before the global economic downturn, China was going about it systematically in three areas – international assertion of power, modernization of the armed forces, and emergence as the number one economic superpower. Now it is leveraging the global economic crisis to enable the process.
China is already a dominant military power in Asia. The Pentagon annual report on Chinese Military Power released on March 25 considers the growth of China’s Navy a source of concern. According to the report, China has the “most active landbased ballistic and cruise missile program in the world”. At the strategic level, this includes the long-range ICBM with a range of almost 7,000 miles – good enough to target any location in the US, let alone Asia. China is also building more Type-094 ballistic missile submarines. It is poised to make a major breakthrough in submarine technology. The development of Hainan naval base has caused both Japan and India concern.
With increasing Chinese political and economic forays in India’s neighbourhood, China will increasingly occupy a large horizon in India’s security spectrum. As the US economic recovery may well last the whole duration of President Obama’s presidency, we can expect some changes in the US policy prescriptions to cater to Chinese sensitivities to affect South Asia.
The American dispensation under President Obama is clearly downplaying human rights abuses in China, the perennial hobbyhorse of its China policy, much to the horror of human rights conscience keepers
How should India respond to this new US-China equation? The new government taking over the reins of power in New Delhi in May may be saddled with this uncomfortable question. During 2008, Chinese strategic analysts have even hinted at the possibility of a limited war with India over the border question! China had been sending mixed signals on its relationship with India. A few illustrations will suffice.
When President Pratibha Patil visited the Buddhist pilgrim town of Tawang in early April, the Chinese Foreign Ministry was not happy about it and conveyed its objections The American dispensation under President Obama is clearly downplaying human rights abuses in China, the perennial hobbyhorse of its China policy, much to the horror of human rights conscience keepers India-China trade has grown from $18 million in 1991 to $38.2 billion in 2007. It is set to grow to $60 billion in 2010 to New Delhi. This is not the first time Beijing has done so. In February, Beijing objected to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s scheduled visit to Arunachal Pradesh (“Southern Tibet”, in Chinese parlance), in particular Tawang. Though the Prime Minister visited Arunachal Pradesh, he avoided going to Tawang! The Chinese reasoning was simple: Tawang is within the territory claimed by China although it had been under Indian rule ever since India became independent.
The Chinese objection came only a month after the two countries had signed “The Shared Vision for 21st Century”, a document jointly affirming far-reaching cooperation between the two countries, during Manmohan Singh’s visit to Beijing. Both nations also signed a Memorandum of Understanding for cooperation in 10 different fields ranging from armed forces to railways, healthcare and rural development.
On October 29 last year, British foreign secretary David Miliband announced that the previous British actions, including the Simla Accord (1913) and thus the McMahon Line, had been an anachronism and a colonial legacy. He apologized to China for not having renounced those actions earlier. The British “apology” knocks down the very basis of India’s stand on the Sino-Indian border dispute. It is unclear what India’s reaction to all this, including Miliband’s statement, was because India never unambiguously expresses its sensitivities on specific issues to the concerned countries. This is so even in the case of Sri Lanka. It is time we started stating our views clearly, if not loudly, when the issues affect us.
Indian policymakers – not merely MEA bureaucrats, but political leaders as well – have to take a hard look at how we handle foreign policy. As R Swaminathan, former Special Secretary, suggests, we should evolve a national foreign policy just as we have a national security policy. The two policies should dovetail each other to reinforce national strategic goals. We should learn to evolve a national political consensus on major foreign policy issues so that other countries we deal with know they are dealing with the nation and “not merely with a transient government”. As a nation, we cannot afford to dither any longer.
There are three fundamental issues relating to China that confront us – the border dispute, increasing Chinese influence in our neighbourhood, and the presence of the Dalai Lama and Tibetan refugees in our midst. Each one of them merits a detailed analysis. But the first two issues are more easily tractable than the Tibetan issue. As far as the border dispute is concerned, both nations can go on “talking” forever, given the Asian penchant to defer rather than resolve uncomfortable issues. It would probably be prudent now to accept the present Line of Actual Control on our border with Tibet and turn it into a “Line of Administrative Control”, as suggested by Swaminathan. The discussions on the border dispute can go on without military confrontation now and then.
South Asia, with a growing economy of over 1.5 billion people, is an enormous market for Chinese goods. China is trying to increase its influence in this region through political, military and economic means. It has made significant progress in trade in this region. It has built strong bonds with Pakistan and Bangladesh, which harbour sanctuaries of terrorist organizations operating against India. It has built a symbiotic relationship with Myanmar’s ruling junta. In Nepal, the Maoist regime is more favourably disposed towards China than India. China’s footprint is increasing in Sri Lanka. These are realities.
However, India has its own strategic and economic advantages in dealing with China as well as its neighbours. India is too big an economic entity for China to ignore. India-China trade has grown from $18 million in 1991 to $38.2 billion in 2007. It is set to grow to $60 billion in 2010. So India needs to take multi-faceted initiatives to leverage its advantages and make it difficult for China to make further inroads in this region. China will continue to flex its military muscle on our borders and extend its presence further in the Indian Ocean.
We need to build our military clout to discourage China. Unfortunately, thanks to bureaucratic red tape, our military modernization is limping. The battle worthiness of the armed forces will be seriously suspect if we do not resolve this perennial problem. In a nutshell, pragmatism rather than politicking need to govern our security and foreign policies. We should clean up our act internally so that we can be powerful externally. There is no other choice.
Copyright: GFiles Magazine, Vol 3, Issue 2 May 2009
http://gfilesindia.com/readmoresubtitle.aspx?subtitle_id=182
Monday, May 18, 2009
Elections in Myanmar: What does it mean?
Elections in Myanmar: What does it mean?
The military regime in Myanmar is planning to hold the first ever elections under the new constitution sometime in 2010. Would it usher in true democracy? Is the ruling military junta ready to share power? Please see my two part interview given to www.mizzima.tv to understand the mess in Myanmar in which the elections are to be held:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k59Cnsqic9M
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EHOgorqva3k
The military regime in Myanmar is planning to hold the first ever elections under the new constitution sometime in 2010. Would it usher in true democracy? Is the ruling military junta ready to share power? Please see my two part interview given to www.mizzima.tv to understand the mess in Myanmar in which the elections are to be held:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?
http://www.youtube.com/watch?
Prabhakaran the Tiger who stuck to his words
The death of Velupillai Prabhakaran the enigmatic leader of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in a fire fight with Sri Lankan forces on Monday probably marks the end of the legend of Tamil Tigers he had scripted and directed. Without a Prabhakaran to lead, motivate and discipline them it would be near impossible to build another Tamil Tiger organisation in the near future.
Prabhakaran is a product the fifties when a whole generation of Tamils in Sri Lanka turned bitter against the government that proclaimed ‘Sinhala only’ was the national language and hurt the pride of the Jaffna Tamil who was the cock of the walk dominating all walks of life. He showed a violent and revengeful methodology for directionless Tamil youth to settle scores with an insensitive Sinhala chauvinist regime that had let loose violence to control Tamil aspirations for equity.
A man of many moods, Prabhakaran was no great orator, an essential skill to be a Tamil politician on both sides of the Palk Strait. In fact, he was a shy man who spoke in a low monotone. But still Prabhakaran had a charisma that enabled him to attract his followers who swore personal loyalty to him. His credibility as a unique leader was carefully built by his daring operations - be it the raid on the Katunayake air base near Colombo in July 1991 or the assassination of President Premadasa of Sri Lanka. His ruthless killings cost him a lot. It turned him paranoid of his own safety. He was shy of publicity and it built an aura of fear around him. On the other hand the mindless killings managed to get the LTTE banned in 33 countries.
The LTTE of Prabhakaran was one among the over 30 Tamil militant organisations that thrived in the aftermath of the infamous Black July pogrom against Tamils in Colombo in 1983. In spite of their lofty Free Eelam rhetoric, many of them degenerated into undisciplined gang of thugs when Sri Lankan government started losing control of Jaffna by 1985-86. It was in this period Prabhakaran set out to make a distinct reputation for the LTTE as a ruthless, disciplined body of Tamil fighters. It was this ironclad discipline that helped him build his insurgent body into one of the most dreaded terrorist force with land, air and sea capability.
There was a streak of cruelty in the way he enforced his punishments whether using a burning tyre around the neck of the victim or using his pistol gang. Drug traffickers and prostitutes were mercilessly put to death. He plotted and killed rival Tamil militant group leaders and cadres who wanted the very same Tamil Eelam he dreamed of because he believed only he could get it. So he did not suffer from any qualms in killing those who stood in his way. And his victims included the high and the mighty including Rajiv Gandhi, Amirthalingam, and Premadasa.
Yet this man’s iron discipline gave way when he fell in love with Mathivathani. And he breached his own rule that no cadre of LTTE would be allowed to marry. Such was the power of love. This personality contradiction was there in his attitude to the use of child soldiers. He was extremely kind to children orphaned due to military action. Yet he did not hesitate to use them as deadly suicide bombers in his Black Tiger squads. They became the cutting edge of naval operations. They did not mind either to sacrifice their lives because by 2008, 356 Black Tigers including 147 young women commandos perished in operations to fulfill the wish of the 'thalaivar' (leader).
He loved movies of martial arts; in fact gun slinging Clint Eastwood movies were a favourite. These videos were the bill of fare of entertainment for cadres in training. Perhaps this was due to his great faith in the power of the weapon.
Prabhakaran had limited education. Yet he showed a readiness to absorb latest technology to improve operational capability. He was always on the look out for the latest developments in communication and weapon technology. That was how he had built up the LTTE’s capability to design rocket weapons and manufacture most of the munitions required for warfare. The air arm of the LTTE showed the innovative use of light aircraft for bombing. His thirst for shock action was satisfied by technology innovations.
Prabhakaran was first among insurgent leaders in realising the value of using psychological warfare techniques as a force multiplier. He quickly adapted the reach of the internet to spread confusion in the enemy ranks. He had a natural sense of military strategy which over the years appeared to have grown a little stodgy.
Prabhakaran glorified death and sacrifice rather than survival and service as the essence of life. He was never comfortable with intellectuals or political pundits. He had little time for politicians or politics because he did not believe in words. Perhaps he believed actions spoke better. His loyalty was to his cause and not his words or promises made to politicians. In fact, that was the biggest weakness in his leadership skill set. He failed to see the political opportunities offered by the peace process 2002 and preferred war. The man who decided the life and death of thousands with a gun in his hand, stuck to what he preached:“Saithu Mudi Alladu Seththu Madi” – do or die. And in the end he did just that.
Prabhakaran is a product the fifties when a whole generation of Tamils in Sri Lanka turned bitter against the government that proclaimed ‘Sinhala only’ was the national language and hurt the pride of the Jaffna Tamil who was the cock of the walk dominating all walks of life. He showed a violent and revengeful methodology for directionless Tamil youth to settle scores with an insensitive Sinhala chauvinist regime that had let loose violence to control Tamil aspirations for equity.
A man of many moods, Prabhakaran was no great orator, an essential skill to be a Tamil politician on both sides of the Palk Strait. In fact, he was a shy man who spoke in a low monotone. But still Prabhakaran had a charisma that enabled him to attract his followers who swore personal loyalty to him. His credibility as a unique leader was carefully built by his daring operations - be it the raid on the Katunayake air base near Colombo in July 1991 or the assassination of President Premadasa of Sri Lanka. His ruthless killings cost him a lot. It turned him paranoid of his own safety. He was shy of publicity and it built an aura of fear around him. On the other hand the mindless killings managed to get the LTTE banned in 33 countries.
The LTTE of Prabhakaran was one among the over 30 Tamil militant organisations that thrived in the aftermath of the infamous Black July pogrom against Tamils in Colombo in 1983. In spite of their lofty Free Eelam rhetoric, many of them degenerated into undisciplined gang of thugs when Sri Lankan government started losing control of Jaffna by 1985-86. It was in this period Prabhakaran set out to make a distinct reputation for the LTTE as a ruthless, disciplined body of Tamil fighters. It was this ironclad discipline that helped him build his insurgent body into one of the most dreaded terrorist force with land, air and sea capability.
There was a streak of cruelty in the way he enforced his punishments whether using a burning tyre around the neck of the victim or using his pistol gang. Drug traffickers and prostitutes were mercilessly put to death. He plotted and killed rival Tamil militant group leaders and cadres who wanted the very same Tamil Eelam he dreamed of because he believed only he could get it. So he did not suffer from any qualms in killing those who stood in his way. And his victims included the high and the mighty including Rajiv Gandhi, Amirthalingam, and Premadasa.
Yet this man’s iron discipline gave way when he fell in love with Mathivathani. And he breached his own rule that no cadre of LTTE would be allowed to marry. Such was the power of love. This personality contradiction was there in his attitude to the use of child soldiers. He was extremely kind to children orphaned due to military action. Yet he did not hesitate to use them as deadly suicide bombers in his Black Tiger squads. They became the cutting edge of naval operations. They did not mind either to sacrifice their lives because by 2008, 356 Black Tigers including 147 young women commandos perished in operations to fulfill the wish of the 'thalaivar' (leader).
He loved movies of martial arts; in fact gun slinging Clint Eastwood movies were a favourite. These videos were the bill of fare of entertainment for cadres in training. Perhaps this was due to his great faith in the power of the weapon.
Prabhakaran had limited education. Yet he showed a readiness to absorb latest technology to improve operational capability. He was always on the look out for the latest developments in communication and weapon technology. That was how he had built up the LTTE’s capability to design rocket weapons and manufacture most of the munitions required for warfare. The air arm of the LTTE showed the innovative use of light aircraft for bombing. His thirst for shock action was satisfied by technology innovations.
Prabhakaran was first among insurgent leaders in realising the value of using psychological warfare techniques as a force multiplier. He quickly adapted the reach of the internet to spread confusion in the enemy ranks. He had a natural sense of military strategy which over the years appeared to have grown a little stodgy.
Prabhakaran glorified death and sacrifice rather than survival and service as the essence of life. He was never comfortable with intellectuals or political pundits. He had little time for politicians or politics because he did not believe in words. Perhaps he believed actions spoke better. His loyalty was to his cause and not his words or promises made to politicians. In fact, that was the biggest weakness in his leadership skill set. He failed to see the political opportunities offered by the peace process 2002 and preferred war. The man who decided the life and death of thousands with a gun in his hand, stuck to what he preached:“Saithu Mudi Alladu Seththu Madi” – do or die. And in the end he did just that.
Tuesday, May 12, 2009
Sri Lanka: Slaughter in the Unsafe Zone
Even the worst votary of the present war in Sri Lanka would be shaken up by the news that over 400 civilians including 100 children were killed last Sunday when the war violently hit the ever shrinking “safe zone,” turning it into the most unsafe zone. And this tragedy is neither the first one, nor going to be the last one.
Of course, the response of everyone - the Sri Lanka security forces (SLSF), the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the international community - who shares the responsibility for the tragedy in some way or other was on well rehearsed lines. The SLSF blamed the LTTE for killing civilians to prevent them from fleeing the war zone, the LTTE accused the SLSF for using artillery to kill Tamils and the international community expressed shock and dismay.
And Indian politicians, who had been flogging the Sri Lanka Tamil tragedy for their own gains in the parliamentary poll underway now, were more concerned on building their shaky coalitions after the election.
The deaths have been reported by a government doctor manning a makeshift hospital. And that is irrefutable though the number of deaths and the culpability for them might be endlessly disputed in the finger pointing exercise that usually follows.
But what do the deaths of the innocent going on regularly for sometime now, indicate?
• The SLSF is not going to stop its offensive although it knew that this avoidable slaughter would happen. It now runs the danger of its victories being tarnished indelibly by the blood of innocent civilians. It is losing its patience for the final victory – the deadline for which had been stretched once too often for its comfort.
• The continued callousness of SLSF in handling Tamil population who had come out of the safe zone and its reluctance to handover the relief camps to non-military control only reinforces the Tamil suspicion that the government’s objective of the war is far from liberation of Tamils from the clutches of the LTTE.
• The conduct of LTTE, the self styled guardians of Tamils, in the safe zone has shown that its survival priorities are above the lives thousands of Tamils under its control. This is not unexpected as the LTTE has a long record of glorifying death, rather than celebrating life. Now it is probably prolonging the inevitable end of war to enable its thalaivars (leaders) to escape; after all only last month it sacrificed 600 of the cream of its fighters in an offensive doomed to failure.
• The SLSF promise of not using artillery in its final offensive was of no relevance except for Indian politicians to score brownie points in their run up to the election. This author had been saying all along that in such a small area, weapons available to infantry units are capable of causing heavy casualties even without artillery fire. If the war is not stopped immediately more and more civilians would be killed by small arms and light weapons fire.
• It would be futile for Sri Lanka Tamils or for that matter for the LTTE to expect Indian politicians to bale them out of this crisis. They have exhausted their political rhetoric and other priorities are taking them over. Those (including the wishful thinkers among the LTTE and its supporters) expecting dramatic changes in India’s Sri Lanka policy after the elections might be disappointed (along with Sri Lanka Tamils), as the new government in New Delhi might put Sri Lanka issue on the backburner, due to the quirks of coalition politics in India.
• Given this bleak future, it is Sri Lanka Tamils who should take charge of their lives. They have to do it themselves, free of the armed liberators of all kind, non-effective politicians who are not there in times of crisis, and international community with its own priorities.
International interest and sympathy for the plight of the trapped civilians is waning, thanks to the infiltration of LTTE elements among the agitating Tamil expatriates in many western metro cities. The red flags with the Tiger symbol increasingly displayed in these agitations are really red flags to liberals who would sympathise with the agitating Tamils. They abhor the LTTE for its human rights abuses. The LTTE does care to answer their question as to why it is not allowing the civilians to leave the war zone. And they do not want to be identified with it in public. And that would be a big loss for Tamils as liberal elements form the backbone of civil society which can prod western democracies into some meaningful action.
Apparently LTTE’s goals in stepping up its presence in these protests are different. Fearing the loss of LTTE’s toehold in the expatriate constituencies, it is probably on a desperate bid to disown responsibility for the military debacle. For sometime now, it has been blaming international community for the problems of Tamils. Its propaganda machines are concocting and circulating stories and CDs of Indian army involvement in Sri Lanka war. So the LTTE takeover of Tamil protests would be a logical option to this end.
The public protests of expatriate Tamils would have carried more weight if Tamils living in Colombo had taken to the streets in a massive show of support. They must be very concerned and more worried about the fate of thousands of their kin stuck in the no war zone. Why are they not doing so even in Colombo which has a Tamil speaking majority population? Is it only because they fear a violent security clamp down on any public protest under the draconian anti terrorism law? Why is the Tamil National Alliance, which had been thundering on the issue in parliament and issuing statements accusing everyone including India, not leading such protests from the front? Is the Sri Lankan Tamil tired of the never ending exercise of war and has given up in despair? Or as the government and its Tamil acolytes claim, the Tamils are happy they have been liberated from the clutches of the LTTE?
Only Sri Lanka Tamils and their so called political leaders living outside the north can answer these questions. And their silence is what leaves Tamils elsewhere baffled even as hundreds of innocent lives have been lost with monotonous regularity in the three year old war.
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cnotes6%5Cnote516.html
Of course, the response of everyone - the Sri Lanka security forces (SLSF), the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the international community - who shares the responsibility for the tragedy in some way or other was on well rehearsed lines. The SLSF blamed the LTTE for killing civilians to prevent them from fleeing the war zone, the LTTE accused the SLSF for using artillery to kill Tamils and the international community expressed shock and dismay.
And Indian politicians, who had been flogging the Sri Lanka Tamil tragedy for their own gains in the parliamentary poll underway now, were more concerned on building their shaky coalitions after the election.
The deaths have been reported by a government doctor manning a makeshift hospital. And that is irrefutable though the number of deaths and the culpability for them might be endlessly disputed in the finger pointing exercise that usually follows.
But what do the deaths of the innocent going on regularly for sometime now, indicate?
• The SLSF is not going to stop its offensive although it knew that this avoidable slaughter would happen. It now runs the danger of its victories being tarnished indelibly by the blood of innocent civilians. It is losing its patience for the final victory – the deadline for which had been stretched once too often for its comfort.
• The continued callousness of SLSF in handling Tamil population who had come out of the safe zone and its reluctance to handover the relief camps to non-military control only reinforces the Tamil suspicion that the government’s objective of the war is far from liberation of Tamils from the clutches of the LTTE.
• The conduct of LTTE, the self styled guardians of Tamils, in the safe zone has shown that its survival priorities are above the lives thousands of Tamils under its control. This is not unexpected as the LTTE has a long record of glorifying death, rather than celebrating life. Now it is probably prolonging the inevitable end of war to enable its thalaivars (leaders) to escape; after all only last month it sacrificed 600 of the cream of its fighters in an offensive doomed to failure.
• The SLSF promise of not using artillery in its final offensive was of no relevance except for Indian politicians to score brownie points in their run up to the election. This author had been saying all along that in such a small area, weapons available to infantry units are capable of causing heavy casualties even without artillery fire. If the war is not stopped immediately more and more civilians would be killed by small arms and light weapons fire.
• It would be futile for Sri Lanka Tamils or for that matter for the LTTE to expect Indian politicians to bale them out of this crisis. They have exhausted their political rhetoric and other priorities are taking them over. Those (including the wishful thinkers among the LTTE and its supporters) expecting dramatic changes in India’s Sri Lanka policy after the elections might be disappointed (along with Sri Lanka Tamils), as the new government in New Delhi might put Sri Lanka issue on the backburner, due to the quirks of coalition politics in India.
• Given this bleak future, it is Sri Lanka Tamils who should take charge of their lives. They have to do it themselves, free of the armed liberators of all kind, non-effective politicians who are not there in times of crisis, and international community with its own priorities.
International interest and sympathy for the plight of the trapped civilians is waning, thanks to the infiltration of LTTE elements among the agitating Tamil expatriates in many western metro cities. The red flags with the Tiger symbol increasingly displayed in these agitations are really red flags to liberals who would sympathise with the agitating Tamils. They abhor the LTTE for its human rights abuses. The LTTE does care to answer their question as to why it is not allowing the civilians to leave the war zone. And they do not want to be identified with it in public. And that would be a big loss for Tamils as liberal elements form the backbone of civil society which can prod western democracies into some meaningful action.
Apparently LTTE’s goals in stepping up its presence in these protests are different. Fearing the loss of LTTE’s toehold in the expatriate constituencies, it is probably on a desperate bid to disown responsibility for the military debacle. For sometime now, it has been blaming international community for the problems of Tamils. Its propaganda machines are concocting and circulating stories and CDs of Indian army involvement in Sri Lanka war. So the LTTE takeover of Tamil protests would be a logical option to this end.
The public protests of expatriate Tamils would have carried more weight if Tamils living in Colombo had taken to the streets in a massive show of support. They must be very concerned and more worried about the fate of thousands of their kin stuck in the no war zone. Why are they not doing so even in Colombo which has a Tamil speaking majority population? Is it only because they fear a violent security clamp down on any public protest under the draconian anti terrorism law? Why is the Tamil National Alliance, which had been thundering on the issue in parliament and issuing statements accusing everyone including India, not leading such protests from the front? Is the Sri Lankan Tamil tired of the never ending exercise of war and has given up in despair? Or as the government and its Tamil acolytes claim, the Tamils are happy they have been liberated from the clutches of the LTTE?
Only Sri Lanka Tamils and their so called political leaders living outside the north can answer these questions. And their silence is what leaves Tamils elsewhere baffled even as hundreds of innocent lives have been lost with monotonous regularity in the three year old war.
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cnotes6%5Cnote516.html
Sunday, May 10, 2009
Media Bytes – Questions on LTTE
[Answers to questions from the media based upon the earlier blog “Media Bytes – LTTE Activity in Tamil Nadu” dated May 8, 2009]
Do you think LTTE has got sleeper cells, which co ordinate suicide missions in India?
Given the style of LTTE operations, I am sure it has sleeper cells operating covertly in Tamil Nadu; these should not be confused with the noisy and overt pro-LTTE elements and acolytes like Nedumaran and Kolathumani. Though I have no access to intelligence reports here, LTTE's pattern of operations in other countries like Canada and UK would indicate the possibility of financial investments in benami business operations of LTTE in Tamil Nadu also. Chennai was an important transit centre for Sri Lankan Tamils before direct flights to Delhi was introduced. As a corollary for fleeing or transiting LTTE cadres, local support can be provided by sleeper cells in Tamil Nadu. There had been cases in the past of local elements acting as interface for LTTE operations to import goods for onward despatch to Sri Lanka, manufacture of parts required for bomb and fuse making, procurement of alloy metals for manufacture of weapons, electronic goods etc. These were all probably acts of sleeper cell.
Usually LTTE plans suicide missions at the highest level in great secrecy mission, so local sleeper cell may not even know about the planned mission. This was not so in the days when the Rajiv assassination plot was hatched; the local sleepers had knowledge about the mission. Other senior leaders also probably knew. But I think the LTTE has now tightened the security of such missions as revealed by some of the suicide bombers caught in Sri Lanka either before they could carryout their task or subsequently. So it is not necessary sleepers in India will have prior knowledge of planned suicide mission. They are likely to provide background information and interface for local facilitation for the operatives.
How important is it for Pottu Amman to be captured alive, given all that he knows about the Rajiv Gandhi assassination and various other conspiracies and tie ups with other militant groups?
While Prabhakaran is vital for the resurrection of LTTE once again, capture of Pottu is vital for those who are trying to eradicate LTTE's vast intelligence network both at home and abroad. Apart from Prabhakaran, he is perhaps one leader who is probably in the know of all nuggets of information relating to the entire operation of the super secret organisation.
So Sri Lankans would be looking for Pottu much more than anyone else because he had been controlling the foreign intelligence network operations of LTTE and that in turn would be linked to LTTE resources and assets overseas. These are said to be sizeable. So I am sure SLSF would like to capture him alive. He would also know about the LTTE linkages with Islamist Jihadi groups, Maoists, and ULFA insurgents and probably PKK.
Compared with these priorities Rajiv assassination is of lesser importance (though politically more important for India). However, if at some stage LTTE wants to be rehabilitated in Indian eyes, Pottu can become a credible scapegoat to be saddled the infamy of being the mastermind of Rajiv Gandhi assassination plot.
Do you think LTTE has got sleeper cells, which co ordinate suicide missions in India?
Given the style of LTTE operations, I am sure it has sleeper cells operating covertly in Tamil Nadu; these should not be confused with the noisy and overt pro-LTTE elements and acolytes like Nedumaran and Kolathumani. Though I have no access to intelligence reports here, LTTE's pattern of operations in other countries like Canada and UK would indicate the possibility of financial investments in benami business operations of LTTE in Tamil Nadu also. Chennai was an important transit centre for Sri Lankan Tamils before direct flights to Delhi was introduced. As a corollary for fleeing or transiting LTTE cadres, local support can be provided by sleeper cells in Tamil Nadu. There had been cases in the past of local elements acting as interface for LTTE operations to import goods for onward despatch to Sri Lanka, manufacture of parts required for bomb and fuse making, procurement of alloy metals for manufacture of weapons, electronic goods etc. These were all probably acts of sleeper cell.
Usually LTTE plans suicide missions at the highest level in great secrecy mission, so local sleeper cell may not even know about the planned mission. This was not so in the days when the Rajiv assassination plot was hatched; the local sleepers had knowledge about the mission. Other senior leaders also probably knew. But I think the LTTE has now tightened the security of such missions as revealed by some of the suicide bombers caught in Sri Lanka either before they could carryout their task or subsequently. So it is not necessary sleepers in India will have prior knowledge of planned suicide mission. They are likely to provide background information and interface for local facilitation for the operatives.
How important is it for Pottu Amman to be captured alive, given all that he knows about the Rajiv Gandhi assassination and various other conspiracies and tie ups with other militant groups?
While Prabhakaran is vital for the resurrection of LTTE once again, capture of Pottu is vital for those who are trying to eradicate LTTE's vast intelligence network both at home and abroad. Apart from Prabhakaran, he is perhaps one leader who is probably in the know of all nuggets of information relating to the entire operation of the super secret organisation.
So Sri Lankans would be looking for Pottu much more than anyone else because he had been controlling the foreign intelligence network operations of LTTE and that in turn would be linked to LTTE resources and assets overseas. These are said to be sizeable. So I am sure SLSF would like to capture him alive. He would also know about the LTTE linkages with Islamist Jihadi groups, Maoists, and ULFA insurgents and probably PKK.
Compared with these priorities Rajiv assassination is of lesser importance (though politically more important for India). However, if at some stage LTTE wants to be rehabilitated in Indian eyes, Pottu can become a credible scapegoat to be saddled the infamy of being the mastermind of Rajiv Gandhi assassination plot.
Saturday, May 9, 2009
Why did the LTTE Fail?
Now the 4th Eelam War is in its final conventional battle ground of barely ten sq kms, many Tamils, who had put great faith in the LTTE and in the magic of Prabhakaran, have not been able to understand why did the LTTE fail this time. In my own assessment, the LTTE performance in the Eelam War IV glaringly displayed Prabhakaran’s limitations in mastering the art of conventional warfare.
Here is my article in the latest issue of Frontline analysing the question why LTTE failed, reproduced courtesy Frontline, who hold the copyright for the article.
Why LTTE Failed
SRI LANKA’S security forces appear to have redeemed their professional reputation with their resounding success in the fourth edition of the Eelam War, which has been going on since 2006 against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), popularly known as the Tamil Tigers. They were not able to achieve decisive results against the LTTE in their three earlier outings.
The United States Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) had rated the Tamil Tigers as “among the most dangerous and deadly extremists in the world”. The FBI said the LTTE’s “ruthless tactics have inspired terrorist networks worldwide, including Al Qaeda in Iraq”. So, the security forces’ success against the LTTE should not be underestimated, particularly when similar wars against insurgents and terrorists in other countries, including Afghanistan, have been dragging on.
The LTTE, over the past 25 years, has built a 15,000-strong force that innovatively adapted its suicide war tactics to both land and naval warfare with deadly results. It mastered the use of terror tactics as a force multiplier. The LTTE’s charismatic and ruthless leader, Velupillai Prabakaran, built a loyal network of cadre – the Black Tigers – whose deadly suicide terror attacks changed the course of political history in Sri Lanka and to a certain extent in India also. Now the insurgents stand reduced to a few hundreds and have lost their entire territory of over 15,000 square kilometres and their equipment, weapons, armament and infrastructure so essential for survival as a viable entity.
The LTTE demonstrated its prowess with a daring suicide attack on Colombo’s Katunayake international airport, destroying 26 military and civil aircraft, in July 2001, just four months before Al Qaeda’s dramatic 9/11 attacks in New York. It sent a strong message to Sri Lanka and the world at large that the LTTE was a formidable force not be trifled with. But the consequences of the 9/11 attack on the global attitude to terrorism was far-reaching. The U.S. marshalled forces for a global war on terror to destroy Al Qaeda and its roots in Islamist terror. And the LTTE was already listed in the U.S. as a foreign terrorist organisation.
The late Anton Balasingham, a close confidant of Prabakaran’s and the political adviser to the LTTE, apparently understood the need to modify the LTTE strategy in the face of the rising tide against terrorism. He persuaded a reluctant Prabakaran to agree to take part in a Norwegian-mediated peace process, deferring the idea of an independent Eelam in favour of finding a solution to accommodate Tamil aspirations within a federal structure. That was how the 2002 peace process came into being.
The LTTE signed the Cease Fire Agreement (CFA) with Sri Lanka in 2002 as part of the peace process from a position of political and military strength, having weathered four wars – three against Sri Lankan security forces and one against Indian forces. It was at the pinnacle of its power at that time. To a certain extent, this enabled the Tamil Tigers to dictate the terms of the peace process, which recognised it as the sole representative of the Tamil minority, a status denied to it earlier. Thus, the peace process accorded parity of status to the LTTE at the negotiating table in its equation with the elected government of Sri Lanka.
By then, the repeated stories of LTTE successes, propagated by its well-oiled propaganda machine that glossed over its significant failures (for example, the retaking of control of Jaffna by the Sri Lanka Army), reinforced the popular belief of Prabakaran’s invincibility in war. It also generated great political expectations among the Tamil population of his ability to satisfy their long-standing aspirations through the peace process although he had dropped the demand for an independent Tamil Eelam. All that has been proved wrong now.
Winston Churchill once remarked, “Those who can win a war well can rarely make a good peace and those who could make a good peace would never have won the war.” This is very true in the case of Prabakaran’s handling of events leading up to the war. His monolithic and egocentric leadership style does not encourage the free exchange of ideas except with his trusted childhood friends. This has been the big roadblock in his strategic decision-making process. Prabakaran failed to use fruitfully the political talent at his disposal, among the seasoned members of the Tamil National Alliance (TNA), in handling complex political issues during the period of peace. Their advice was neither sought nor paid heed to in taking decisions on key issues. The LTTE’s handling of the presidential poll of 2005 is one such instance when their plea for his support to elect Ranil Wickremesinghe, an architect of the peace process, went unheeded.
Wickremesinghe’s rival, Mahinda Rajapaksa, had promised, in his election manifesto, to eliminate LTTE terrorism. Prabakaran not only ignored this but, on the basis of some convoluted reasoning, enforced a boycott of the presidential poll in areas under LTTE control. This action prevented a bulk of the Tamils from voting for Wickremesinghe. This enabled Rajapaksa’s victory with a wafer-thin majority through southern Sinhala votes. And the newly elected President went about systematically dismantling the LTTE.
Similarly, Prabakaran’s handling of the international community lacked coherence. Apparently, he misunderstood the international involvement in the 2002 peace process and thought it was a vindication of the LTTE’s methods. Perhaps this made him complacent when it came to observing the ceasefire in spirit. The LTTE’s conduct, which was in utter disregard of international norms on human rights and humanitarian laws during the entire period of the ceasefire, came under severe criticism from international watchdog bodies and the United Nations. These related to a large number of issues, including the recruitment of child soldiers, illegal arrests and kidnapping apart from the assassinations and suicide bombings. This made the LTTE’s rhetoric on human rights hollow.
While the co-chairs were sympathetic to the Tamil struggle for equity, they were wary of the LTTE’s tactics and covert operations in their own countries. And the LTTE’s indifference to their counsel during the peace process eroded its credibility. Things came to a boil with the assassination of Sri Lankan Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar in August 2005. This wanton act compelled the European Union and Canada to ban the LTTE. Thus, the LTTE shot itself in the foot as it was banned in 32 countries. The ban also coincided with the introduction of strong international protocols in shipping and against money laundering to prevent the international operations of terrorists.
Prabakaran probably failed to appreciate the implications of these developments when he gave the government a legitimate excuse to abandon the peace process after the LTTE made an abortive suicide attack in April 2006 on Lieutenant General Sarath Fonseka, the Army chief. It also enabled Rajapaksa to persuade the international community to crack down on the LTTE’s support network and front organisations in their midst. International cooperation was further enlarged in scope to intelligence sharing and economic aid, which indirectly underwrote Sri Lanka’s mounting burden of war.
Similarly, Prabakaran never made any effort before the war to redeem the LTTE’s relations with India. He failed to tap the fund of sympathy for the Tamil cause that exists in India even among large sections of the non-Tamil population. Presumably, his dubious role in Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination prevented him from dispassionately examining the positive contribution India could have made in pushing the Tamil cause at the negotiating table. Apparently, he put his faith in the international community rather than in India to bail him out when the Sri Lankan government decided to go to war.
This showed a lack of understanding of the complexities of international relations. On the other hand, successive Sri Lankan Presidents went out of their way to keep India in good humour and that helped the country politically and militarily in its war with the LTTE. In Eelam War III (1995-2002), the performance of the Sri Lankan security forces was far from satisfactory. By then, the LTTE had developed the Sea Tiger wing – a daring guerilla navy that played havoc with the Sri Lanka Navy. The Sri Lanka Army had suffered heavy casualties in defending Mullaithivu and suffered a huge setback in Elephant Pass despite its superior strength and firepower. In that operation, the LTTE acquired its modern artillery, armour and high-tech communication systems apart from capturing equipment.
At the start of the peace process, the security forces were a demoralised lot. The terms of the peace process further added to their misery as it prevented them from retaliating when the LTTE’s pistol groups systematically eliminated the forces’ intelligence operatives and killed even military commanders during the first three years of peace. In this backdrop, no one was sure of the ability of Sri Lanka’s forces to sustain an offensive against the LTTE when Eelam War IV started in 2006.
Even after the LTTE defeat in Mavil Aru in the Eastern Province in July 2006, the security forces were cautious in their optimism. However, the LTTE belied the defence analysts’ expectations when it floundered in the Eastern Province, offering stiff resistance only in patches. Perhaps, it was at this time that Rajapaksa and Fonseka made up their minds to go the whole hog against the LTTE in the north.
Although Prabakaran has demonstrated strategic military capability in the past, he appears to have failed to draw two obvious strategic deductions in the developing war scenario, which put the LTTE at a disadvantage. The first was not factoring the impact of the defection of Karuna, his able military commander from Batticaloa, on the LTTE’s overall military capability.
The second was in underestimating the determination of Sri Lanka’s political and military leadership to turn Rajapaksa’s promise to eliminate the LTTE into a reality. Prabakaran never made any effort to patch up with Karuna, who had grievances with respect to the poor representation of easterners in the leadership although they provided the bulk of the LTTE cadre. Instead, he dispatched killers to eliminate Karuna. The rebel leader commanded wide support among cadre in the east, particularly around LTTE strongholds in Batticaloa. A direct consequence of his defection was the disbanding of a bulk of LTTE cadre, other than Karuna’s core supporters. It also drove Karuna into the arms of the Sri Lanka Army for protection. So when the war started in the east, the LTTE’s strength as well as its manoeuvring space was reduced.
In the course of time, recruitment from the east to augment LTTE strength petered out. Ultimately, when the security forces launched their offensive in the north with huge numerical superiority, the LTTE did not have the essential strength to face the onslaught. It was clear that the LTTE would not be able halt the security forces by conventional warfare.
However, somehow Prabakaran failed to use his superior insurgency tactics to overcome his limitations in conventional warfare. Instead, the LTTE adopted a passive defensive strategy with a line of bunds that reduced the natural advantage of guerilla mobility enjoyed by the cadre. The bunds imposed a limited delay as they required heavy firepower to break up the offensive. This was a luxury that the LTTE did not enjoy.
The second aspect was the LTTE leader’s failure to read the mind of Rajapaksa. In his first two years in office, the President had oriented his entire policy framework towards the goal of eliminating the LTTE. His strong support to the operations of the security forces, regardless of national and international compulsions, enabled the Army chief to plan and execute his offensive.
His strategic direction of war, operational planning and neat execution undoubtedly paved the way for success. In the words of Lieutenant General Satish Nambiar, the distinguished Indian Army officer, Fonseka “displayed the qualities of a great military leader nations are blessed with from time to time”. In short, under Fonseka’s leadership, the demoralised armed forces reinvented themselves to become a well-knit and highly motivated force.
As a result, when the security forces went to war in 2006, they were well-trained and enjoyed superiority in firepower and mobility. Learning from the past, they built up force levels on land, in the air and at sea to ensure success against the Tamil Tigers. The Sri Lanka Army went on a recruiting spree. For instance, in the year 2008 alone 40,000 troops were added, to raise 47 infantry battalions, 13 brigades, four task force contingents and two divisions. The Army now has 13 divisions, three task forces and one armoured brigade. Evidently, Prabakaran failed to read the sea change taking place in the capabilities of the security forces and adapt his tactics. Instead, he stuck to a conventional warfare mode that was doomed to fail although it inflicted casualties on the advancing troops.
Fonseka adopted a multi-pronged strategy to split the defending Tamil Tiger ranks and keep them guessing. It aimed at pinning down the LTTE at the forward-defended localities astride the Kandy-Jaffna A-9 road in the north from Kilali-Muhamalai-Nagarkovil and in the south along the Palamoddai-Omanthai line. This prevented the LTTE from thinning out the troops to reinforce its defences along other axes.
Offensives along two broad axes were launched: along the Mannar-Pooneryn/Jaffna A-32 road on the west coast to block LTTE access to Tamil Nadu through the Mannar Sea and along the Welioya-Mullaithivu-Puthukudiyiruppu line on the east coast. Operations on these axes progressively cut off the external supply of military equipment and essential goods to the LTTE by sea. In tandem with ground operations, the Sri Lanka Navy progressively curtailed the freedom of movement of Sea Tiger boats and prevented LTTE shipments from reaching the Sri Lanka coast. In well-planned raids in international waters, the Navy destroyed eight ships of the LTTE’s tramp supply shipping fleet in 2006-07.
Despite faltering steps at times, the security forces maintained the momentum of their offensive in the north from the second half of 2007, which culminated in the dramatic capture in January 2009 of Kilinochchi, the so-called administrative capital of the LTTE. This capture contributed largely to the rapid advance of the security forces in areas east of the A-9 axis, which never gave the withdrawing LTTE a respite or permitted it to deliver a strong counterstroke.
In the present Eelam war, except for a short-lived surprise offensive in the Jaffna peninsula in the early stages of the confrontation in the north, the LTTE was never able to launch proactively a major offensive or a sizable counteroffensive against the security forces that would have turned the course of the war.
The LTTE strategy of carting off all the civilians from captured areas to areas under its control after the fall of Kilinochchi is questionable. This reactive defence strategy affected the mobility of cadre, pinning them down to static defences rather than allowing them to adopt a resilient mobile withdrawal strategy. This strategy neither prevented the security forces from using their heavy weapons or air force nor vindicated the LTTE’s use of civilians as human shields. It only generated adverse publicity, and that the security forces were also blamed for the same callousness in dealing with ordinary people is no consolation as they have emerged as victors.
The performance of the LTTE in Eelam War IV glaringly displayed Prabakaran’s limitations in mastering the art of conventional warfare. As he is an astute military leader, if he survives the current ordeal, he will put on his thinking cap to reinvent the LTTE, just as Fonseka reinvented the security forces when he took on the monumental task of reviving them and leading them to war.•
Copyright: Frontline (Volume 26 - Issue 10 :: May. 09-22, 2009)
http://www.frontlineonnet.com/stories/20090522261001200.htm
Here is my article in the latest issue of Frontline analysing the question why LTTE failed, reproduced courtesy Frontline, who hold the copyright for the article.
Why LTTE Failed
SRI LANKA’S security forces appear to have redeemed their professional reputation with their resounding success in the fourth edition of the Eelam War, which has been going on since 2006 against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), popularly known as the Tamil Tigers. They were not able to achieve decisive results against the LTTE in their three earlier outings.
The United States Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) had rated the Tamil Tigers as “among the most dangerous and deadly extremists in the world”. The FBI said the LTTE’s “ruthless tactics have inspired terrorist networks worldwide, including Al Qaeda in Iraq”. So, the security forces’ success against the LTTE should not be underestimated, particularly when similar wars against insurgents and terrorists in other countries, including Afghanistan, have been dragging on.
The LTTE, over the past 25 years, has built a 15,000-strong force that innovatively adapted its suicide war tactics to both land and naval warfare with deadly results. It mastered the use of terror tactics as a force multiplier. The LTTE’s charismatic and ruthless leader, Velupillai Prabakaran, built a loyal network of cadre – the Black Tigers – whose deadly suicide terror attacks changed the course of political history in Sri Lanka and to a certain extent in India also. Now the insurgents stand reduced to a few hundreds and have lost their entire territory of over 15,000 square kilometres and their equipment, weapons, armament and infrastructure so essential for survival as a viable entity.
The LTTE demonstrated its prowess with a daring suicide attack on Colombo’s Katunayake international airport, destroying 26 military and civil aircraft, in July 2001, just four months before Al Qaeda’s dramatic 9/11 attacks in New York. It sent a strong message to Sri Lanka and the world at large that the LTTE was a formidable force not be trifled with. But the consequences of the 9/11 attack on the global attitude to terrorism was far-reaching. The U.S. marshalled forces for a global war on terror to destroy Al Qaeda and its roots in Islamist terror. And the LTTE was already listed in the U.S. as a foreign terrorist organisation.
The late Anton Balasingham, a close confidant of Prabakaran’s and the political adviser to the LTTE, apparently understood the need to modify the LTTE strategy in the face of the rising tide against terrorism. He persuaded a reluctant Prabakaran to agree to take part in a Norwegian-mediated peace process, deferring the idea of an independent Eelam in favour of finding a solution to accommodate Tamil aspirations within a federal structure. That was how the 2002 peace process came into being.
The LTTE signed the Cease Fire Agreement (CFA) with Sri Lanka in 2002 as part of the peace process from a position of political and military strength, having weathered four wars – three against Sri Lankan security forces and one against Indian forces. It was at the pinnacle of its power at that time. To a certain extent, this enabled the Tamil Tigers to dictate the terms of the peace process, which recognised it as the sole representative of the Tamil minority, a status denied to it earlier. Thus, the peace process accorded parity of status to the LTTE at the negotiating table in its equation with the elected government of Sri Lanka.
By then, the repeated stories of LTTE successes, propagated by its well-oiled propaganda machine that glossed over its significant failures (for example, the retaking of control of Jaffna by the Sri Lanka Army), reinforced the popular belief of Prabakaran’s invincibility in war. It also generated great political expectations among the Tamil population of his ability to satisfy their long-standing aspirations through the peace process although he had dropped the demand for an independent Tamil Eelam. All that has been proved wrong now.
Winston Churchill once remarked, “Those who can win a war well can rarely make a good peace and those who could make a good peace would never have won the war.” This is very true in the case of Prabakaran’s handling of events leading up to the war. His monolithic and egocentric leadership style does not encourage the free exchange of ideas except with his trusted childhood friends. This has been the big roadblock in his strategic decision-making process. Prabakaran failed to use fruitfully the political talent at his disposal, among the seasoned members of the Tamil National Alliance (TNA), in handling complex political issues during the period of peace. Their advice was neither sought nor paid heed to in taking decisions on key issues. The LTTE’s handling of the presidential poll of 2005 is one such instance when their plea for his support to elect Ranil Wickremesinghe, an architect of the peace process, went unheeded.
Wickremesinghe’s rival, Mahinda Rajapaksa, had promised, in his election manifesto, to eliminate LTTE terrorism. Prabakaran not only ignored this but, on the basis of some convoluted reasoning, enforced a boycott of the presidential poll in areas under LTTE control. This action prevented a bulk of the Tamils from voting for Wickremesinghe. This enabled Rajapaksa’s victory with a wafer-thin majority through southern Sinhala votes. And the newly elected President went about systematically dismantling the LTTE.
Similarly, Prabakaran’s handling of the international community lacked coherence. Apparently, he misunderstood the international involvement in the 2002 peace process and thought it was a vindication of the LTTE’s methods. Perhaps this made him complacent when it came to observing the ceasefire in spirit. The LTTE’s conduct, which was in utter disregard of international norms on human rights and humanitarian laws during the entire period of the ceasefire, came under severe criticism from international watchdog bodies and the United Nations. These related to a large number of issues, including the recruitment of child soldiers, illegal arrests and kidnapping apart from the assassinations and suicide bombings. This made the LTTE’s rhetoric on human rights hollow.
While the co-chairs were sympathetic to the Tamil struggle for equity, they were wary of the LTTE’s tactics and covert operations in their own countries. And the LTTE’s indifference to their counsel during the peace process eroded its credibility. Things came to a boil with the assassination of Sri Lankan Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar in August 2005. This wanton act compelled the European Union and Canada to ban the LTTE. Thus, the LTTE shot itself in the foot as it was banned in 32 countries. The ban also coincided with the introduction of strong international protocols in shipping and against money laundering to prevent the international operations of terrorists.
Prabakaran probably failed to appreciate the implications of these developments when he gave the government a legitimate excuse to abandon the peace process after the LTTE made an abortive suicide attack in April 2006 on Lieutenant General Sarath Fonseka, the Army chief. It also enabled Rajapaksa to persuade the international community to crack down on the LTTE’s support network and front organisations in their midst. International cooperation was further enlarged in scope to intelligence sharing and economic aid, which indirectly underwrote Sri Lanka’s mounting burden of war.
Similarly, Prabakaran never made any effort before the war to redeem the LTTE’s relations with India. He failed to tap the fund of sympathy for the Tamil cause that exists in India even among large sections of the non-Tamil population. Presumably, his dubious role in Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination prevented him from dispassionately examining the positive contribution India could have made in pushing the Tamil cause at the negotiating table. Apparently, he put his faith in the international community rather than in India to bail him out when the Sri Lankan government decided to go to war.
This showed a lack of understanding of the complexities of international relations. On the other hand, successive Sri Lankan Presidents went out of their way to keep India in good humour and that helped the country politically and militarily in its war with the LTTE. In Eelam War III (1995-2002), the performance of the Sri Lankan security forces was far from satisfactory. By then, the LTTE had developed the Sea Tiger wing – a daring guerilla navy that played havoc with the Sri Lanka Navy. The Sri Lanka Army had suffered heavy casualties in defending Mullaithivu and suffered a huge setback in Elephant Pass despite its superior strength and firepower. In that operation, the LTTE acquired its modern artillery, armour and high-tech communication systems apart from capturing equipment.
At the start of the peace process, the security forces were a demoralised lot. The terms of the peace process further added to their misery as it prevented them from retaliating when the LTTE’s pistol groups systematically eliminated the forces’ intelligence operatives and killed even military commanders during the first three years of peace. In this backdrop, no one was sure of the ability of Sri Lanka’s forces to sustain an offensive against the LTTE when Eelam War IV started in 2006.
Even after the LTTE defeat in Mavil Aru in the Eastern Province in July 2006, the security forces were cautious in their optimism. However, the LTTE belied the defence analysts’ expectations when it floundered in the Eastern Province, offering stiff resistance only in patches. Perhaps, it was at this time that Rajapaksa and Fonseka made up their minds to go the whole hog against the LTTE in the north.
Although Prabakaran has demonstrated strategic military capability in the past, he appears to have failed to draw two obvious strategic deductions in the developing war scenario, which put the LTTE at a disadvantage. The first was not factoring the impact of the defection of Karuna, his able military commander from Batticaloa, on the LTTE’s overall military capability.
The second was in underestimating the determination of Sri Lanka’s political and military leadership to turn Rajapaksa’s promise to eliminate the LTTE into a reality. Prabakaran never made any effort to patch up with Karuna, who had grievances with respect to the poor representation of easterners in the leadership although they provided the bulk of the LTTE cadre. Instead, he dispatched killers to eliminate Karuna. The rebel leader commanded wide support among cadre in the east, particularly around LTTE strongholds in Batticaloa. A direct consequence of his defection was the disbanding of a bulk of LTTE cadre, other than Karuna’s core supporters. It also drove Karuna into the arms of the Sri Lanka Army for protection. So when the war started in the east, the LTTE’s strength as well as its manoeuvring space was reduced.
In the course of time, recruitment from the east to augment LTTE strength petered out. Ultimately, when the security forces launched their offensive in the north with huge numerical superiority, the LTTE did not have the essential strength to face the onslaught. It was clear that the LTTE would not be able halt the security forces by conventional warfare.
However, somehow Prabakaran failed to use his superior insurgency tactics to overcome his limitations in conventional warfare. Instead, the LTTE adopted a passive defensive strategy with a line of bunds that reduced the natural advantage of guerilla mobility enjoyed by the cadre. The bunds imposed a limited delay as they required heavy firepower to break up the offensive. This was a luxury that the LTTE did not enjoy.
The second aspect was the LTTE leader’s failure to read the mind of Rajapaksa. In his first two years in office, the President had oriented his entire policy framework towards the goal of eliminating the LTTE. His strong support to the operations of the security forces, regardless of national and international compulsions, enabled the Army chief to plan and execute his offensive.
His strategic direction of war, operational planning and neat execution undoubtedly paved the way for success. In the words of Lieutenant General Satish Nambiar, the distinguished Indian Army officer, Fonseka “displayed the qualities of a great military leader nations are blessed with from time to time”. In short, under Fonseka’s leadership, the demoralised armed forces reinvented themselves to become a well-knit and highly motivated force.
As a result, when the security forces went to war in 2006, they were well-trained and enjoyed superiority in firepower and mobility. Learning from the past, they built up force levels on land, in the air and at sea to ensure success against the Tamil Tigers. The Sri Lanka Army went on a recruiting spree. For instance, in the year 2008 alone 40,000 troops were added, to raise 47 infantry battalions, 13 brigades, four task force contingents and two divisions. The Army now has 13 divisions, three task forces and one armoured brigade. Evidently, Prabakaran failed to read the sea change taking place in the capabilities of the security forces and adapt his tactics. Instead, he stuck to a conventional warfare mode that was doomed to fail although it inflicted casualties on the advancing troops.
Fonseka adopted a multi-pronged strategy to split the defending Tamil Tiger ranks and keep them guessing. It aimed at pinning down the LTTE at the forward-defended localities astride the Kandy-Jaffna A-9 road in the north from Kilali-Muhamalai-Nagarkovil and in the south along the Palamoddai-Omanthai line. This prevented the LTTE from thinning out the troops to reinforce its defences along other axes.
Offensives along two broad axes were launched: along the Mannar-Pooneryn/Jaffna A-32 road on the west coast to block LTTE access to Tamil Nadu through the Mannar Sea and along the Welioya-Mullaithivu-Puthukudiyiruppu line on the east coast. Operations on these axes progressively cut off the external supply of military equipment and essential goods to the LTTE by sea. In tandem with ground operations, the Sri Lanka Navy progressively curtailed the freedom of movement of Sea Tiger boats and prevented LTTE shipments from reaching the Sri Lanka coast. In well-planned raids in international waters, the Navy destroyed eight ships of the LTTE’s tramp supply shipping fleet in 2006-07.
Despite faltering steps at times, the security forces maintained the momentum of their offensive in the north from the second half of 2007, which culminated in the dramatic capture in January 2009 of Kilinochchi, the so-called administrative capital of the LTTE. This capture contributed largely to the rapid advance of the security forces in areas east of the A-9 axis, which never gave the withdrawing LTTE a respite or permitted it to deliver a strong counterstroke.
In the present Eelam war, except for a short-lived surprise offensive in the Jaffna peninsula in the early stages of the confrontation in the north, the LTTE was never able to launch proactively a major offensive or a sizable counteroffensive against the security forces that would have turned the course of the war.
The LTTE strategy of carting off all the civilians from captured areas to areas under its control after the fall of Kilinochchi is questionable. This reactive defence strategy affected the mobility of cadre, pinning them down to static defences rather than allowing them to adopt a resilient mobile withdrawal strategy. This strategy neither prevented the security forces from using their heavy weapons or air force nor vindicated the LTTE’s use of civilians as human shields. It only generated adverse publicity, and that the security forces were also blamed for the same callousness in dealing with ordinary people is no consolation as they have emerged as victors.
The performance of the LTTE in Eelam War IV glaringly displayed Prabakaran’s limitations in mastering the art of conventional warfare. As he is an astute military leader, if he survives the current ordeal, he will put on his thinking cap to reinvent the LTTE, just as Fonseka reinvented the security forces when he took on the monumental task of reviving them and leading them to war.•
Copyright: Frontline (Volume 26 - Issue 10 :: May. 09-22, 2009)
http://www.frontlineonnet.com/stories/20090522261001200.htm
Friday, May 8, 2009
Media Bytes – LTTE Activity in Tamil Nadu
Here are the answers given to questions from the media on May 8, 2009.
The STRATFOR, the US strategic security organisation, has assessed that the support in Tamil Nadu for the LTTE means they can exploit the international border to their advantage. Logistic-wise and infrastructure-wise India is best place for them. It said, I quote “The Tigers use India in much the same way that the Taliban and al Qaeda use Pakistan. The Tigers' logistical and training infrastructure in India is especially important during times (like the present) when the Sri Lankan government is hammering them.” It says the LTTE is more dangerous than al Qaeda. What are your comments?
For a long time India knows that the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) is a very dangerous terrorist group. It is for this reason that it has been repeatedly banned for over a decade and a half whenever the issue came up for review. So it is nothing new. However, there are some disturbing indications; three things have taken place all over the world that indicates possible LTTE moves.
The Tamil Diaspora was originally agitating for ceasefire to save the civilians trapped in the no war zone. However, lately this agitation has been taken over by the LTTE. Now these protests are sporting LTTE flags [suitably modified to avoid confronting local laws], displaying Prabhakaran’s pictures and shouting slogans like ‘Prabhakaran is our leader’.This is an important indication. After their take over, the agitations have turned violent directed particularly against the embassies and high commission offices of Sri Lanka, India and China in UK and France. These are not stray incidents; LTTE organises these protests.
Secondly, there had been agitation against army [building up] in India. [On May 5, 2009, a large group of pro-LTTE Tamil political activists blocked a convoy of Indian army trucks near Coimbatore because they believed the trucks were carrying supplies destined for the Sri Lankan military]. A lot of disinformation is being spread about Indian army’s involvement in Sri Lanka. Fake CDs [to support such allegations] are being circulated. For some mysterious reason Government of India has not refuted these allegations. Nobody knows why it is so.
Thirdly, all political parties in India, including the ruling coalition, are soft pedalling the LTTE related issues [apparently not wanting to take on the issue during the election time]. So a lot of things are required to be done in India because the LTTE has large reserve overseas assets in many countries. All these assets will be activated now. Such assets exist in India also. So the danger is very much there. Government of India is well aware of this. Our intelligence agencies are perhaps the best equipped in the world to know what is happening in the LTTE. But the question is what action the Government of India has taken on such information? It remains a mystery because the government is very reluctant to share such information with the public.
But will the LTTE be able to use India as Taliban is using Pakistan?
I don’t know whether Taliban is using Pakistan because Taliban was in fact created by Pakistan. But one thing we all know. The LTTE is the most dangerous organisation – according to an FBI assessment in 2006 it is more dangerous than Hamas, the Palestine insurgent group and better than the Fatah and the PLO. The LTTE had demonstrated its land, sea and air capability. It has the technical capability manufacture its own ammunition, and know how to import arms and. The LTTE had its own merchant ships. It has extensive business assets; in fact according to a Canadian report the LTTE income was estimated at $ 300 million one year from its assets! A lot of inputs on their overseas activity is available But what collective action [to curb this activity] countries are taking is not clear. In any case, the type of collective action they are taking against the Al Qaeda and Taliban is not there [against the LTTE].
Do you think the LTTE will regroup now? Can it do so in India?
It will be very difficult for the LTTE to easily regroup. It has suffered a military defeat, a grievous blow? In any case, [just because it is defeated] why should it give up now? It still has its assets and capabilities. So it will definitely regroup and try to rise up. But it is not going to be an easy task because it has been mauled very badly.
But will they use India for regrouping?
It will not be easy for LTTE to regroup in India although it has the largest Tamil population than any other country. But India also has perhaps the largest active anti-LTTE Tamil population. [Moreover, it is a banned organisation in India. Support to LTTE to regroup is likely to be unacceptable not only to anti-LTTE Tamil population but also to other states and the major political parties.] So it will not be an easy task for them to do it here.
The STRATFOR, the US strategic security organisation, has assessed that the support in Tamil Nadu for the LTTE means they can exploit the international border to their advantage. Logistic-wise and infrastructure-wise India is best place for them. It said, I quote “The Tigers use India in much the same way that the Taliban and al Qaeda use Pakistan. The Tigers' logistical and training infrastructure in India is especially important during times (like the present) when the Sri Lankan government is hammering them.” It says the LTTE is more dangerous than al Qaeda. What are your comments?
For a long time India knows that the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) is a very dangerous terrorist group. It is for this reason that it has been repeatedly banned for over a decade and a half whenever the issue came up for review. So it is nothing new. However, there are some disturbing indications; three things have taken place all over the world that indicates possible LTTE moves.
The Tamil Diaspora was originally agitating for ceasefire to save the civilians trapped in the no war zone. However, lately this agitation has been taken over by the LTTE. Now these protests are sporting LTTE flags [suitably modified to avoid confronting local laws], displaying Prabhakaran’s pictures and shouting slogans like ‘Prabhakaran is our leader’.This is an important indication. After their take over, the agitations have turned violent directed particularly against the embassies and high commission offices of Sri Lanka, India and China in UK and France. These are not stray incidents; LTTE organises these protests.
Secondly, there had been agitation against army [building up] in India. [On May 5, 2009, a large group of pro-LTTE Tamil political activists blocked a convoy of Indian army trucks near Coimbatore because they believed the trucks were carrying supplies destined for the Sri Lankan military]. A lot of disinformation is being spread about Indian army’s involvement in Sri Lanka. Fake CDs [to support such allegations] are being circulated. For some mysterious reason Government of India has not refuted these allegations. Nobody knows why it is so.
Thirdly, all political parties in India, including the ruling coalition, are soft pedalling the LTTE related issues [apparently not wanting to take on the issue during the election time]. So a lot of things are required to be done in India because the LTTE has large reserve overseas assets in many countries. All these assets will be activated now. Such assets exist in India also. So the danger is very much there. Government of India is well aware of this. Our intelligence agencies are perhaps the best equipped in the world to know what is happening in the LTTE. But the question is what action the Government of India has taken on such information? It remains a mystery because the government is very reluctant to share such information with the public.
But will the LTTE be able to use India as Taliban is using Pakistan?
I don’t know whether Taliban is using Pakistan because Taliban was in fact created by Pakistan. But one thing we all know. The LTTE is the most dangerous organisation – according to an FBI assessment in 2006 it is more dangerous than Hamas, the Palestine insurgent group and better than the Fatah and the PLO. The LTTE had demonstrated its land, sea and air capability. It has the technical capability manufacture its own ammunition, and know how to import arms and. The LTTE had its own merchant ships. It has extensive business assets; in fact according to a Canadian report the LTTE income was estimated at $ 300 million one year from its assets! A lot of inputs on their overseas activity is available But what collective action [to curb this activity] countries are taking is not clear. In any case, the type of collective action they are taking against the Al Qaeda and Taliban is not there [against the LTTE].
Do you think the LTTE will regroup now? Can it do so in India?
It will be very difficult for the LTTE to easily regroup. It has suffered a military defeat, a grievous blow? In any case, [just because it is defeated] why should it give up now? It still has its assets and capabilities. So it will definitely regroup and try to rise up. But it is not going to be an easy task because it has been mauled very badly.
But will they use India for regrouping?
It will not be easy for LTTE to regroup in India although it has the largest Tamil population than any other country. But India also has perhaps the largest active anti-LTTE Tamil population. [Moreover, it is a banned organisation in India. Support to LTTE to regroup is likely to be unacceptable not only to anti-LTTE Tamil population but also to other states and the major political parties.] So it will not be an easy task for them to do it here.
Media Bytes on Sri Lanka - May 1, 2009
Media representatives raised a few issues to elicit my assessment of some of the current developments in Sri Lanka. My comments given below are based upon analyses of open source information on operational, political and internal developments, examined in the backdrop of past behaviour of stakeholders.
What will be the strategy for intensifying war options in the No Fire Zone?
Problem of fighting in a narrow corridor with a huge civilian population in battle zone is three fold: separate civilians from LTTE to avoid civilian casualties, break through obstacles and at the same time prevent save own troops from getting channelised into killing areas obstacles, and take on the LTTE piecemeal.
Topographically the narrow land boundaries compound the problem for the troops on the offensive. So offensive troops will have to laterally divide the sector and creep forward if heavy weapons are not to be used as promised. Tactics likely to be used are -
• Separate LTTE combatants from civilians using spotters – presumably from captured cadres who can identify them,
• use aerial surveillance with helicopter gun ships to take on fleeing cadres, destroy boats moving in the inshore sea, destroy dumps of ammo, gasoline, etc. Use SBS, RABS to take on fleeing boats in sea.
• Work in small in decentralised sub units - troops, squads, sections etc. Depend upon close quarter weapons for combat. Form hunter killer teams with special forces, armoured cars and infantry
• If the lagoon conditions permit, launch multi-pronged entries across obstacles laterally from the lagoon side and from inshore area to split and divide the population concentrations in the midst of whom LTTE has taken up positions.
The propaganda war between Sri Lanka and LTTE
For Sri Lanka the key strategy is to counter LTTE propaganda on trapped civilians and soften impact of bad press. Some of the useful techniques could be -
• Allow selected media reps to frontline, handover some of the IDP camps to Red Cross and some INGOs for administration,
• Tone down abusive rhetoric about UN, UK and the world at large.
• Play down adverse reaction in Tamil Nadu as it is likely to be scaled down after voting on May 12.
The post-conflict scenario of Tamil leadership and aspirations.
Some the actions likely to take place in the post conflict scene in the North Emerging scene is likely to give rise to -
• President Rajapaka likely to try and prevent Tamil polity from getting united by attracting some of the leaders to SLFP alliance either directly or through floating new political party of Tamils. Karuna and Pillaiyan will be the main tools.
• UNP will also try and fish to net some Tamil leaders and build them up.
• Minister Douglas Devananda is likely to emerge politically at the most advantageous position in the North to strengthen his influence in the North including Jaffna. This could result in further weeding out of pro-0LTTE elements making it difficult for them to stage a comeback. Aid flow is likely to favour the Minister’s preferred projects.
• As Army would not like the remnants of the LTTE to resurface and create fresh problems, its garrisons in North are likely to be increased in numbers. This move is likely to aggravate the problems created by increase in high security zones.
• Displaced Muslim IDPs from Jaffna could be sent back to the North.
• Indian political support for Sri Lanka Tamils could rise provided the support of Tamil Nadu politicians to the survival of the new coalition taking over in New Delhi. However, there could be no major Indian initiative on Sri Lanka from New Delhi for some months to come as the coalition government has to firm in.
• International and Indian development aid to Sri Lanka is likely to be indirectly and directly tied to level of devolution taking place on the ground.
What will be the strategy for intensifying war options in the No Fire Zone?
Problem of fighting in a narrow corridor with a huge civilian population in battle zone is three fold: separate civilians from LTTE to avoid civilian casualties, break through obstacles and at the same time prevent save own troops from getting channelised into killing areas obstacles, and take on the LTTE piecemeal.
Topographically the narrow land boundaries compound the problem for the troops on the offensive. So offensive troops will have to laterally divide the sector and creep forward if heavy weapons are not to be used as promised. Tactics likely to be used are -
• Separate LTTE combatants from civilians using spotters – presumably from captured cadres who can identify them,
• use aerial surveillance with helicopter gun ships to take on fleeing cadres, destroy boats moving in the inshore sea, destroy dumps of ammo, gasoline, etc. Use SBS, RABS to take on fleeing boats in sea.
• Work in small in decentralised sub units - troops, squads, sections etc. Depend upon close quarter weapons for combat. Form hunter killer teams with special forces, armoured cars and infantry
• If the lagoon conditions permit, launch multi-pronged entries across obstacles laterally from the lagoon side and from inshore area to split and divide the population concentrations in the midst of whom LTTE has taken up positions.
The propaganda war between Sri Lanka and LTTE
For Sri Lanka the key strategy is to counter LTTE propaganda on trapped civilians and soften impact of bad press. Some of the useful techniques could be -
• Allow selected media reps to frontline, handover some of the IDP camps to Red Cross and some INGOs for administration,
• Tone down abusive rhetoric about UN, UK and the world at large.
• Play down adverse reaction in Tamil Nadu as it is likely to be scaled down after voting on May 12.
The post-conflict scenario of Tamil leadership and aspirations.
Some the actions likely to take place in the post conflict scene in the North Emerging scene is likely to give rise to -
• President Rajapaka likely to try and prevent Tamil polity from getting united by attracting some of the leaders to SLFP alliance either directly or through floating new political party of Tamils. Karuna and Pillaiyan will be the main tools.
• UNP will also try and fish to net some Tamil leaders and build them up.
• Minister Douglas Devananda is likely to emerge politically at the most advantageous position in the North to strengthen his influence in the North including Jaffna. This could result in further weeding out of pro-0LTTE elements making it difficult for them to stage a comeback. Aid flow is likely to favour the Minister’s preferred projects.
• As Army would not like the remnants of the LTTE to resurface and create fresh problems, its garrisons in North are likely to be increased in numbers. This move is likely to aggravate the problems created by increase in high security zones.
• Displaced Muslim IDPs from Jaffna could be sent back to the North.
• Indian political support for Sri Lanka Tamils could rise provided the support of Tamil Nadu politicians to the survival of the new coalition taking over in New Delhi. However, there could be no major Indian initiative on Sri Lanka from New Delhi for some months to come as the coalition government has to firm in.
• International and Indian development aid to Sri Lanka is likely to be indirectly and directly tied to level of devolution taking place on the ground.
Wednesday, May 6, 2009
Sri Lanka and India's Strategic Interests
I had written the following article on how India had handled Sri Lanka issue during the Eelam War IV in February 2009 even as the Sri Lanka security forces were on way to Puthukkudiyiruppu after driving the Tamil Tigers out of their strongholds in Elephant Pass-Paranthan-Kilinochchi defence complex.
I am reproducing it here as the appears very much relevant as the political rhetoric on Sri Lanka exchanged between parties contesting the parliamentary election now in progress appear mere words and nothing more.
The article may not be reproduced as its copyright rests with GFiles which published it in their March 2009 issue.
Point of Catharsis
India may lose its strategic edge in the island nation as its government stands poised for victory
The Sri Lanka security forces are poised to end the military capability of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the dreaded Tamil insurgent group that had been ruling its own de facto state within the nation. The LTTE is fighting for survival in the last foothold of its domain that has dramatically shrunk from 11 districts in 2002 to virtually 200 square km now. The offensive going on since 2006 is the fourth episode in the Eelam Wars the two forces have been fighting since the LTTE refused to accept the India-Sri Lanka Agreement in 1987. It felt the Agreement was detrimental to its goal of carving out an independent Tamil Eelam nation in Sri Lanka.
Considered one of the most powerful insurgent bodies in the world, the LTTE under the leadership of Velupillai Prabhakaran had also refined the use of terrorism as a force multiplier in operations. Though Prabhakaran has bounced back stronger from battlefield setbacks in earlier Eelam wars, this time the Sri Lankans appear to have practically neutralized his conventional military capability.
Sri Lanka’s success against the LTTE is due to the singular focus of President Mahinda Rajapaksa in eliminating the war that had hobbled the country’s development.In the past, military operations had swung between well meaning peace initiatives and war due to lack of national consensus on handling the issue of devolution of powers to the Tamil community, which forms a fourth of the population. Rajapaksa got elected as President with a promise to end the Norwegian mediated peace process that limped through from 2002 to 2006. He identified military defeat of the LTTE as the key to resolving the issue and found an effective military chief in the army commander, Lt-Gen Sarath Fonseka, to achieve his ends.
Taking up the military option also ended Sri Lanka’s readiness to evolve a peaceful solution to the Tamil question within a federal framework that formed the basis of the Oslo peace accord. Over 48 countries and UN bodies under the leadership of four co-chairs – the European Union, Japan, Norway and the US – had underwritten the peace process. President Rajapaksa had leveraged the antipathy of Sinhala rightwing politicians and sections of the more conservative Southern Sinhala population to a federal solution to get elected.
His power projection on coming to office has caused widespread concern among civil society, the four co-chairs, and India. His political methods have been questionable. He installed his three brothers in key positions in the political and bureaucratic decision-making process. He has split almost all political parties to his advantage. Corruption and absence of rule of law have become endemic in the country. Human rights have been trampled upon, encouraging mindless enforcement of draconian laws with the security apparatus resulting in disregard for rule of law. This has left the Tamil community with a feeling of insecurity and uncertainty about their future.
This feeling has been enhanced by the strong rightwing Sinhala nationalist stance of Lt-Gen Fonseka who is riding the crest of military success. The increase of the armed forces to over 150,000 in the last 15 years came about as a result of the Eelam wars. The disproportionately large military strength in such a small nation has introduced an unpredictable element in Sri Lanka’s power structure. Sri Lanka is well known for manipulative politics and, even if the armed forces remain aloof from politics, their kinetic power could be exploited by politicians. Thus armed forces would appear to be a new factor influencing Sri Lanka’s policies for some years to come.
India always sympathized with the Sri Lanka Tamil struggle for equity even while it stood for a united Sri Lanka. No doubt this was largely influenced by the strong sentiments on the issue among the 60-million Tamil population living in India. The Tamil issue became a hardy perennial affecting India’s relations with Sri Lanka since the anti-Tamil pogrom in Colombo in 1983. It culminated in the signing of the India-Sri Lanka Agreement in 1987 between the two countries. However, the Agreement floundered due to objections both at home and abroad as it lacked transparency.
India’s military intervention in 1987 to implement the agreement was a fiasco as its objective became skewed when it ended up fighting the LTTE for three years. Political changes both at home and abroad saw the return of the Indian force in 1991, creating only bitterness among all stakeholders.
Since then, India-Sri Lanka relations have focused on common interests in trade and commerce rather than the issue of equity for the Tamil minority. So India played the role of passive spectator during the Oslo peace process in 2002, giving a strategic foothold to external powers at our doorstep without gaining any advantage. India has been a low-profile contributor of mostly non-lethal weapons and services to the expansion of the Sri Lanka armed forces due to the strong objections from India’s Tamil population to any military aid. This has paved the way for China and Pakistan to increase their strategic influence as suppliers of military hardware to Sri Lanka, the strategic vanguard of India in the Indian Ocean.
Overall, India appears to have conducted its affairs in Sri Lanka without adequate attention to its strategic interests over the long term. Its Sri Lanka policy had been reactive at best. Delhi’s coalition political compulsion due to Tamil Nadu’s strong public objections to the suffering of the war-affected Tamil population in Sri Lanka has now become an important factor governing it. However, India finds that it can do little as it had sacrificed its strategic leverage due to external powers in Sri Lanka. This amply demonstrates the lack of a national strategic vision. The time has come to correct the drift in strategic policy in Sri Lanka with a well-integrated political, diplomatic and development initiative.
© GFiles India
http://gfilesindia.com/readmoresubtitle.aspx?subtitle_id=129
I am reproducing it here as the appears very much relevant as the political rhetoric on Sri Lanka exchanged between parties contesting the parliamentary election now in progress appear mere words and nothing more.
The article may not be reproduced as its copyright rests with GFiles which published it in their March 2009 issue.
Point of Catharsis
India may lose its strategic edge in the island nation as its government stands poised for victory
The Sri Lanka security forces are poised to end the military capability of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the dreaded Tamil insurgent group that had been ruling its own de facto state within the nation. The LTTE is fighting for survival in the last foothold of its domain that has dramatically shrunk from 11 districts in 2002 to virtually 200 square km now. The offensive going on since 2006 is the fourth episode in the Eelam Wars the two forces have been fighting since the LTTE refused to accept the India-Sri Lanka Agreement in 1987. It felt the Agreement was detrimental to its goal of carving out an independent Tamil Eelam nation in Sri Lanka.
Considered one of the most powerful insurgent bodies in the world, the LTTE under the leadership of Velupillai Prabhakaran had also refined the use of terrorism as a force multiplier in operations. Though Prabhakaran has bounced back stronger from battlefield setbacks in earlier Eelam wars, this time the Sri Lankans appear to have practically neutralized his conventional military capability.
Sri Lanka’s success against the LTTE is due to the singular focus of President Mahinda Rajapaksa in eliminating the war that had hobbled the country’s development.In the past, military operations had swung between well meaning peace initiatives and war due to lack of national consensus on handling the issue of devolution of powers to the Tamil community, which forms a fourth of the population. Rajapaksa got elected as President with a promise to end the Norwegian mediated peace process that limped through from 2002 to 2006. He identified military defeat of the LTTE as the key to resolving the issue and found an effective military chief in the army commander, Lt-Gen Sarath Fonseka, to achieve his ends.
Taking up the military option also ended Sri Lanka’s readiness to evolve a peaceful solution to the Tamil question within a federal framework that formed the basis of the Oslo peace accord. Over 48 countries and UN bodies under the leadership of four co-chairs – the European Union, Japan, Norway and the US – had underwritten the peace process. President Rajapaksa had leveraged the antipathy of Sinhala rightwing politicians and sections of the more conservative Southern Sinhala population to a federal solution to get elected.
His power projection on coming to office has caused widespread concern among civil society, the four co-chairs, and India. His political methods have been questionable. He installed his three brothers in key positions in the political and bureaucratic decision-making process. He has split almost all political parties to his advantage. Corruption and absence of rule of law have become endemic in the country. Human rights have been trampled upon, encouraging mindless enforcement of draconian laws with the security apparatus resulting in disregard for rule of law. This has left the Tamil community with a feeling of insecurity and uncertainty about their future.
This feeling has been enhanced by the strong rightwing Sinhala nationalist stance of Lt-Gen Fonseka who is riding the crest of military success. The increase of the armed forces to over 150,000 in the last 15 years came about as a result of the Eelam wars. The disproportionately large military strength in such a small nation has introduced an unpredictable element in Sri Lanka’s power structure. Sri Lanka is well known for manipulative politics and, even if the armed forces remain aloof from politics, their kinetic power could be exploited by politicians. Thus armed forces would appear to be a new factor influencing Sri Lanka’s policies for some years to come.
India always sympathized with the Sri Lanka Tamil struggle for equity even while it stood for a united Sri Lanka. No doubt this was largely influenced by the strong sentiments on the issue among the 60-million Tamil population living in India. The Tamil issue became a hardy perennial affecting India’s relations with Sri Lanka since the anti-Tamil pogrom in Colombo in 1983. It culminated in the signing of the India-Sri Lanka Agreement in 1987 between the two countries. However, the Agreement floundered due to objections both at home and abroad as it lacked transparency.
India’s military intervention in 1987 to implement the agreement was a fiasco as its objective became skewed when it ended up fighting the LTTE for three years. Political changes both at home and abroad saw the return of the Indian force in 1991, creating only bitterness among all stakeholders.
Since then, India-Sri Lanka relations have focused on common interests in trade and commerce rather than the issue of equity for the Tamil minority. So India played the role of passive spectator during the Oslo peace process in 2002, giving a strategic foothold to external powers at our doorstep without gaining any advantage. India has been a low-profile contributor of mostly non-lethal weapons and services to the expansion of the Sri Lanka armed forces due to the strong objections from India’s Tamil population to any military aid. This has paved the way for China and Pakistan to increase their strategic influence as suppliers of military hardware to Sri Lanka, the strategic vanguard of India in the Indian Ocean.
Overall, India appears to have conducted its affairs in Sri Lanka without adequate attention to its strategic interests over the long term. Its Sri Lanka policy had been reactive at best. Delhi’s coalition political compulsion due to Tamil Nadu’s strong public objections to the suffering of the war-affected Tamil population in Sri Lanka has now become an important factor governing it. However, India finds that it can do little as it had sacrificed its strategic leverage due to external powers in Sri Lanka. This amply demonstrates the lack of a national strategic vision. The time has come to correct the drift in strategic policy in Sri Lanka with a well-integrated political, diplomatic and development initiative.
© GFiles India
http://gfilesindia.com/readmoresubtitle.aspx?subtitle_id=129
Sunday, May 3, 2009
Anatomy of terror
[The following review of the book 'Terrorism: Patterns of Internationalisation was published in the Pioneer, on May 3, 2009. Col Hariharan has contributed the chapter on the LTTE's international network included in this book which is a compendium of transnational networks of various terrorist organisations in the world.]
Anatomy of Terror
Terrorism: Patterns of Internationalisation is a well-timed endeavour to dissect international terrorism as well as its regional variants, writes Alok Rashmi Mukhopadhyay
Terrorism: Patterns of Internationalisation
Edited by: Jaideep Saikia and Ekaterina Stepanova
Publisher : Sage;
Price: Rs 695
The ever-changing dynamics of global terrorism makes it difficult for security analysts to arrive at any definitive conclusion and also map the motives and location of future terrorist attacks. This book, Terrorism: Patterns of Internationalisation, edited by Jaideep Saikia and Ekaterina Stepanova, is a well-timed endeavour to dissect international terrorism as well as its regional variants. Within the covers, the editors have collected 11 interesting chapters written by well-informed experts. The collations of data along with incisive analyses are the hallmark of the individual contributors who provide a gripping overview of the challenges and concerns that the menace of terrorism poses in South Asia. The impact of the Mumbai terror (26/11) is presented in the form of an epilogue.
Terrorist attacks and incidents have not shown any global trend of receding. The neighbourhood of India, post-Mumbai attacks, is dangerously slipping into violence and instability. The almost daily terrorist attacks in the Pak-Afghan border region have now reached the Punjabi heartland of Pakistan; the conflict in Sri Lanka has reached a decisive stage; and who can forget the bloodshed and the butchery perpetrated by the BDR mutineers in Bangladesh. This book hence provides an insightful perspective to comprehend the current regional security situation.
The introduction shapes the theoretical premise of the book and builds on the common thread of internationalisation of terrorist and militant groups — old and new, secular and religious, global and local, violent and peaceful. It is too early to agree with the introduction as it predicts that, “the upcoming trend of terrorist operations by Islamist cells around the world is likely to be one of decreasing”, because the formation of these cells as well as the radicalisation process of a large number of young Muslims throughout the globe depends on various issues including unexpected global developments.
Alonso and Iribarren’s paper focus on two traditional Europe-based terrorist organisations, IRA and ETA, and their connections beyond the border. As Europe today is consciously removing its internal borders of nation-states and the EU is embracing new members from the East, the future of these two organisations, confined in small and shrinking areas of influence, can easily be guessed. Though these two organisations would possibly indulge in occasional terrorist acts in their own domains, whether they could sustain their actions is, however, the question. What is missing and which could have added great value to the book is a description and analysis of a more recent phenomenon of terrorist networks in Europe having their connections both in Europe and South Asia, specifically in Pakistan. As the unearthing of terrorist modules recently in Britain and their Pakistani connections is indicative of the larger scope of the contemporary threat, this phenomenon is going to occupy more space in the future global security discourse. Hariharan’s chapter is an evidence of a committed observer to monitor the activities of the LTTE and the support it still enjoys from the diaspora. The outfit may be in its last throes but the recent protest march in London by LTTE’s sympathisers have demonstrated that the organisation still has a strong hold over its closely-knit diaspora community.
Subir Bhaumik’s chapter on Bangladesh brings out new information about the country facing the resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism and the danger of gaining root in Bangladeshi secular polity. Scores of terrorist groups in the name of Islam have mushroomed in the last decade and their anachronistic aim is similar for Bangladesh as it is for South Asia in general. While in the last general elections the electorate dumped these radical Islamists, the BDR mutiny proves that there are elements within the establishment that want to destabilise the new government.
Saikia concentrates on the northeast of India, which is geographically distant from the centre and for decades has been facing militancy, insurgency, inter-ethnic conflicts and the strategic threat of ‘Islamisation’ of the region. With painstaking research, he has documented the ISI-DGFI-ULFA nexus to shelter and train terrorist outfits of various hues and plot terrorist attacks in India. Mohamed Osman has made an excellent comparison between the global Islamist movement Hizb ut-Tahrir (HuT) and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) in Southeast Asia. Osman is hopeful that the non-violent HuT would influence not only the JI but even the disgruntled members of LeT and SIMI in South Asia to renounce violence. This is an important observation and needs to be tracked.
Overall, Terrorism: Patterns of Internationalisation would serve as a ready reckoner for policy practitioners and the general readership for its methodical research and exhaustive bibliography.
Courtesy: http://www.dailypioneer.com/173470/Anatomy-of-terror.html
Anatomy of Terror
Terrorism: Patterns of Internationalisation is a well-timed endeavour to dissect international terrorism as well as its regional variants, writes Alok Rashmi Mukhopadhyay
Terrorism: Patterns of Internationalisation
Edited by: Jaideep Saikia and Ekaterina Stepanova
Publisher : Sage;
Price: Rs 695
The ever-changing dynamics of global terrorism makes it difficult for security analysts to arrive at any definitive conclusion and also map the motives and location of future terrorist attacks. This book, Terrorism: Patterns of Internationalisation, edited by Jaideep Saikia and Ekaterina Stepanova, is a well-timed endeavour to dissect international terrorism as well as its regional variants. Within the covers, the editors have collected 11 interesting chapters written by well-informed experts. The collations of data along with incisive analyses are the hallmark of the individual contributors who provide a gripping overview of the challenges and concerns that the menace of terrorism poses in South Asia. The impact of the Mumbai terror (26/11) is presented in the form of an epilogue.
Terrorist attacks and incidents have not shown any global trend of receding. The neighbourhood of India, post-Mumbai attacks, is dangerously slipping into violence and instability. The almost daily terrorist attacks in the Pak-Afghan border region have now reached the Punjabi heartland of Pakistan; the conflict in Sri Lanka has reached a decisive stage; and who can forget the bloodshed and the butchery perpetrated by the BDR mutineers in Bangladesh. This book hence provides an insightful perspective to comprehend the current regional security situation.
The introduction shapes the theoretical premise of the book and builds on the common thread of internationalisation of terrorist and militant groups — old and new, secular and religious, global and local, violent and peaceful. It is too early to agree with the introduction as it predicts that, “the upcoming trend of terrorist operations by Islamist cells around the world is likely to be one of decreasing”, because the formation of these cells as well as the radicalisation process of a large number of young Muslims throughout the globe depends on various issues including unexpected global developments.
Alonso and Iribarren’s paper focus on two traditional Europe-based terrorist organisations, IRA and ETA, and their connections beyond the border. As Europe today is consciously removing its internal borders of nation-states and the EU is embracing new members from the East, the future of these two organisations, confined in small and shrinking areas of influence, can easily be guessed. Though these two organisations would possibly indulge in occasional terrorist acts in their own domains, whether they could sustain their actions is, however, the question. What is missing and which could have added great value to the book is a description and analysis of a more recent phenomenon of terrorist networks in Europe having their connections both in Europe and South Asia, specifically in Pakistan. As the unearthing of terrorist modules recently in Britain and their Pakistani connections is indicative of the larger scope of the contemporary threat, this phenomenon is going to occupy more space in the future global security discourse. Hariharan’s chapter is an evidence of a committed observer to monitor the activities of the LTTE and the support it still enjoys from the diaspora. The outfit may be in its last throes but the recent protest march in London by LTTE’s sympathisers have demonstrated that the organisation still has a strong hold over its closely-knit diaspora community.
Subir Bhaumik’s chapter on Bangladesh brings out new information about the country facing the resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism and the danger of gaining root in Bangladeshi secular polity. Scores of terrorist groups in the name of Islam have mushroomed in the last decade and their anachronistic aim is similar for Bangladesh as it is for South Asia in general. While in the last general elections the electorate dumped these radical Islamists, the BDR mutiny proves that there are elements within the establishment that want to destabilise the new government.
Saikia concentrates on the northeast of India, which is geographically distant from the centre and for decades has been facing militancy, insurgency, inter-ethnic conflicts and the strategic threat of ‘Islamisation’ of the region. With painstaking research, he has documented the ISI-DGFI-ULFA nexus to shelter and train terrorist outfits of various hues and plot terrorist attacks in India. Mohamed Osman has made an excellent comparison between the global Islamist movement Hizb ut-Tahrir (HuT) and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) in Southeast Asia. Osman is hopeful that the non-violent HuT would influence not only the JI but even the disgruntled members of LeT and SIMI in South Asia to renounce violence. This is an important observation and needs to be tracked.
Overall, Terrorism: Patterns of Internationalisation would serve as a ready reckoner for policy practitioners and the general readership for its methodical research and exhaustive bibliography.
Courtesy: http://www.dailypioneer.com/173470/Anatomy-of-terror.html
Friday, May 1, 2009
'Civilians are part of the LTTE concept of war'
April 30, 2009 | 14:47 IST
Colonel R Hariharan is a retired military intelligence officer. He is a prolific writer on insurgency and terrorism. His comments on developments in Bangladesh, Myanmar and Sri Lanka are regarded highly professional and rational. He served in Sri Lanka as the head of intelligence for the Indian Peace Keeping Force between 1987 and 1990.
His experience in Sri Lanka gives him an edge in understanding of the ethnic conflict. Here is his latest commentary on the unfolding tragedy for Sri Lankan Tamils. In an e-mail interview with rediff.com's Sheela Bhatt the colonel provides his insight into the war tactics adopted by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and other relevant issues.
Do you think the plight of 180,000 lakh Sri Lankan Tamils could have been avoided by the Sri Lankan army while taking on the LTTE?
Isn't it quite different from the Indian Army's handling of similar situations in the northeast, Punjab or Kashmir at various point of time?
Both the LTTE and the Sri Lankan army are responsible for the crisis regarding civilians trapped in the war zone. And the civilians are also partly to blame for the situation developing into a crisis. The civilian population involved is a mixed bag of LTTE supporters and their families, families of LTTE members, ordinary people, and officials of various kinds.
The convergence of civilians into LTTE-held areas started when the war advanced slowly from Mannar district but it spread after the fall of Paranthan-Kilinochchi. The civilians fled at the behest of the LTTE because they were scared of their treatment at the hands of the Lankan army and they were still hopeful that the LTTE would hit back.
When the war intensified further, at the request of the Red Cross, it was the Sri Lanka government that declared a safe no fire zone first in an area east of Mankulam. Then it was shifted further to the interior as the army succeeded in pushing back the LTTE dramatically.
In all these stages of war for nearly six months, the LTTE could have allowed the civilians leave the territory now becoming a war zone.
It did not because traditionally the LTTE considers civilian involvement in war as part of its method. Civilians provide some of the administrative cover that would be provided in normal armies. Regular armies also muster civilians for assistance in construction of defences, running supply convoys, medical cover etc.
So civilians are part of the LTTE concept of war. Civilian casualties provide good stories for LTTE propaganda.
The Mullaitivu area was probably selected as the final no fire zone because the land strip provides access only from three directions and sea access was available. This is useful in controlled evacuation. At least theoretically. But the evacuation requires the concurrence of both warring sides. The LTTE to this day had not agreed to their evacuation.
It is in the nature of war that civilians in the vicinity of fighters would get killed. Both sides are fighting to save themselves and kill the other so they don't bother about civilians getting killed in between. This is the sad reality of war.
The Lankan army could have avoided the use of heavy artillery (which the LTTE used throughout) and air strikes.
We avoid this even in J&K as far as possible. But it is matter of war doctrine. And the Lankan army believes, like the Americans, in the use of superior firepower and force in its counter-terror ops (operations). This is what has happened. I don't think it could have been avoided except some effort to separate both the warring sides with a third neutral force and then evacuate the civilians.
America had offered to send the Marines to assist such a process but as it is matter of sovereignty and the Lankan government did not agree. I believe India also did not relish the idea.
So for nearly four months everyone knew this crisis was building up. I had written about it then as many had done. But everyone -- the LTTE, the Lankan government, India, and the international community including the Tamil Diaspora -- wished it away or were pursuing their own agenda. So it is a logical culmination of a developing crisis.
We should not compare Sri Lanka with our situations in the northeast or other insurgency areas. There is a lot of public apathy in India because it is a vast country with lots of diversity and we don't bother so much if a train explodes in the northeast and say 30/40 people are killed. Of course, if three are killed in Chandni Chowk in Delhi it is different.
Our counterinsurgency wars appear to have no deadline. We carry on from one generation to another. And our tactics are more humane. But Sri Lanka is a small country with both the warring sides at it relentlessly for 25 years.
President Mahinda Rajapakse wants to end it now. So I don't think it will be possible to emulate our approach in Sri Lanka.
The LTTE is unique and much deadlier than all the militant bodies we face, we should not forget that.
Can you put in context the Sri Lankan government's announcement that it will not use heavy ammunition? Does it mean the military operation is almost over? They have not used the word ceasefire... so what do they mean in military terms?
I think this is the Sri Lankan response to the growing calls for a halt to the war to save civilians still trapped in the no fire zone. One of the main accusations against Sri Lanka, as stated by the United Nations agencies and international NGOs, is that during the war it had been using heavy weapons and air strikes causing huge civilian casualties in the no fire zone.
In fact, the UN has put the figure of such civilian deaths at over 6,000.
Sri Lanka had been denying this. It has been saying that it was only returning LTTE fire. However, the issue has become a major cause of humanitarian concern not only for Tamils all over the world, but most nations. It is a source of international embarrassment for Sri Lanka.
For all of us in India it had been heartbreaking, tragic news. The US has come out with a strong statement. Three European foreign ministers are visiting Sri Lanka because of this issue. The latest Sri Lankan announcement could be to satisfy, at least partly, some of these concerns.
Apart from the above non-military reasons, the operation has reached almost the goal post. The security forces are within six km of the last LTTE position. There is really no requirement for air strikes. The LTTE positions are probably within range of infantry battalion weapons like machine guns, mortars, grenade launchers, and recoil-less rifles. And probably the LTTE also lost all its artillery assets by now and artillery retaliatory fire might not be required.
Of course, if the security forces do not use artillery during the final assault, they would suffer more casualties because they would inflict fewer casualties on the LTTE.
However, the moot point is that all the infantry weapons are capable of killing any civilians within their range because the operational area is so restricted. So while the casualties might be less, the threat to civilians there exists.
Lastly, the war has not ended with the latest Sri Lanka announcement. The operative words in the statement indicating future course of action is: 'Our security forces will confine their attempts to rescuing civilians who are held hostage and give foremost priority to saving civilians.'
In Sri Lanka's official parlance that means the war would continue because it has always claimed that the objective of the war is to liberate the people held hostage by the LTTE. So the war would continue probably at a slower pace, perhaps less dramatically, provided the LTTE can still sustain.
Was India's assistance to the Sri Lankan military pivotal in any manner for their military victory over the LTTE?
If pivotal means indispensable, no. If India had not provided training assistance and radar and other non lethal equipment Sri Lanka would have got it from China and Pakistan. But Indian intelligence was vital just like US intelligence inputs particularly regarding LTTE shipments.
Moreover, under the current protocols on combating terror, Sri Lanka could have demanded information from India, we could have prevaricated as Pakistan is doing.
But why should we?
We are not obliged to help out the LTTE, a banned organisation in India and 31 other countries.
India should not confuse fighting the LTTE with fighting for the Tamil cause because the LTTE forfeited that expectation when it fought a needless war with India and alienated its support.
India should always support the Tamil struggle for equity. And it should oppose the LTTE's leadership because it has brought only misery.
Don't you think if the Indian government had done some coercive diplomacy some 18 months ago, Sri Lankan Tamil interests would have been better served? It's said that they have been used by the LTTE and uncared for by the Sri Lankan government. Isn't it so?
There is little we could have done because we wished away all our interest in Sri Lanka after the IPKF mishandling and the Rajiv Gandhi assassination by the LTTE. We as a nation did not want to be part of the peace process initiative in 2002. And for Tamil Nadu politicians this was a non issue then because LTTE was the cock of the heap.
Nobody really cared about Sri Lanka (including the Indian media) unless there was a dramatic suicide attack. Leverages come with initiatives. In Sri Lanka we had shown only trade interests, not national strategic interests. So this has been exploited by the LTTE to remain the sole spokesman of Tamil interests; and the Sri Lanka government had in turn found it a cosy situation.
Actually on assuming office, Rajapakse wanted India to join the co-chairs of the peace process and India did not take up the offer. So in a sense India, including the Tamil Nadu politicians, now crying foul failed to protect Tamil interests in Sri Lanka.
Do you think the LTTE will go back to their original tactics of guerrilla war?
Do they have a choice? Prabhakaran if he survives will have to go back to the basics. He is good at it. But at 54 it is a bit difficult to wage war and renew yourself after every defeat.
I think in the next six months the LTTE guerrillas will reappear. They may not be powerful but there will be gore and drama. India should also watch out where they grow.
http://www.rediff.com///news/2009/apr/30interview-with-intelligence-expert-on-ltte-and-sri-lanka.htm
Colonel R Hariharan is a retired military intelligence officer. He is a prolific writer on insurgency and terrorism. His comments on developments in Bangladesh, Myanmar and Sri Lanka are regarded highly professional and rational. He served in Sri Lanka as the head of intelligence for the Indian Peace Keeping Force between 1987 and 1990.
His experience in Sri Lanka gives him an edge in understanding of the ethnic conflict. Here is his latest commentary on the unfolding tragedy for Sri Lankan Tamils. In an e-mail interview with rediff.com's Sheela Bhatt the colonel provides his insight into the war tactics adopted by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and other relevant issues.
Do you think the plight of 180,000 lakh Sri Lankan Tamils could have been avoided by the Sri Lankan army while taking on the LTTE?
Isn't it quite different from the Indian Army's handling of similar situations in the northeast, Punjab or Kashmir at various point of time?
Both the LTTE and the Sri Lankan army are responsible for the crisis regarding civilians trapped in the war zone. And the civilians are also partly to blame for the situation developing into a crisis. The civilian population involved is a mixed bag of LTTE supporters and their families, families of LTTE members, ordinary people, and officials of various kinds.
The convergence of civilians into LTTE-held areas started when the war advanced slowly from Mannar district but it spread after the fall of Paranthan-Kilinochchi. The civilians fled at the behest of the LTTE because they were scared of their treatment at the hands of the Lankan army and they were still hopeful that the LTTE would hit back.
When the war intensified further, at the request of the Red Cross, it was the Sri Lanka government that declared a safe no fire zone first in an area east of Mankulam. Then it was shifted further to the interior as the army succeeded in pushing back the LTTE dramatically.
In all these stages of war for nearly six months, the LTTE could have allowed the civilians leave the territory now becoming a war zone.
It did not because traditionally the LTTE considers civilian involvement in war as part of its method. Civilians provide some of the administrative cover that would be provided in normal armies. Regular armies also muster civilians for assistance in construction of defences, running supply convoys, medical cover etc.
So civilians are part of the LTTE concept of war. Civilian casualties provide good stories for LTTE propaganda.
The Mullaitivu area was probably selected as the final no fire zone because the land strip provides access only from three directions and sea access was available. This is useful in controlled evacuation. At least theoretically. But the evacuation requires the concurrence of both warring sides. The LTTE to this day had not agreed to their evacuation.
It is in the nature of war that civilians in the vicinity of fighters would get killed. Both sides are fighting to save themselves and kill the other so they don't bother about civilians getting killed in between. This is the sad reality of war.
The Lankan army could have avoided the use of heavy artillery (which the LTTE used throughout) and air strikes.
We avoid this even in J&K as far as possible. But it is matter of war doctrine. And the Lankan army believes, like the Americans, in the use of superior firepower and force in its counter-terror ops (operations). This is what has happened. I don't think it could have been avoided except some effort to separate both the warring sides with a third neutral force and then evacuate the civilians.
America had offered to send the Marines to assist such a process but as it is matter of sovereignty and the Lankan government did not agree. I believe India also did not relish the idea.
So for nearly four months everyone knew this crisis was building up. I had written about it then as many had done. But everyone -- the LTTE, the Lankan government, India, and the international community including the Tamil Diaspora -- wished it away or were pursuing their own agenda. So it is a logical culmination of a developing crisis.
We should not compare Sri Lanka with our situations in the northeast or other insurgency areas. There is a lot of public apathy in India because it is a vast country with lots of diversity and we don't bother so much if a train explodes in the northeast and say 30/40 people are killed. Of course, if three are killed in Chandni Chowk in Delhi it is different.
Our counterinsurgency wars appear to have no deadline. We carry on from one generation to another. And our tactics are more humane. But Sri Lanka is a small country with both the warring sides at it relentlessly for 25 years.
President Mahinda Rajapakse wants to end it now. So I don't think it will be possible to emulate our approach in Sri Lanka.
The LTTE is unique and much deadlier than all the militant bodies we face, we should not forget that.
Can you put in context the Sri Lankan government's announcement that it will not use heavy ammunition? Does it mean the military operation is almost over? They have not used the word ceasefire... so what do they mean in military terms?
I think this is the Sri Lankan response to the growing calls for a halt to the war to save civilians still trapped in the no fire zone. One of the main accusations against Sri Lanka, as stated by the United Nations agencies and international NGOs, is that during the war it had been using heavy weapons and air strikes causing huge civilian casualties in the no fire zone.
In fact, the UN has put the figure of such civilian deaths at over 6,000.
Sri Lanka had been denying this. It has been saying that it was only returning LTTE fire. However, the issue has become a major cause of humanitarian concern not only for Tamils all over the world, but most nations. It is a source of international embarrassment for Sri Lanka.
For all of us in India it had been heartbreaking, tragic news. The US has come out with a strong statement. Three European foreign ministers are visiting Sri Lanka because of this issue. The latest Sri Lankan announcement could be to satisfy, at least partly, some of these concerns.
Apart from the above non-military reasons, the operation has reached almost the goal post. The security forces are within six km of the last LTTE position. There is really no requirement for air strikes. The LTTE positions are probably within range of infantry battalion weapons like machine guns, mortars, grenade launchers, and recoil-less rifles. And probably the LTTE also lost all its artillery assets by now and artillery retaliatory fire might not be required.
Of course, if the security forces do not use artillery during the final assault, they would suffer more casualties because they would inflict fewer casualties on the LTTE.
However, the moot point is that all the infantry weapons are capable of killing any civilians within their range because the operational area is so restricted. So while the casualties might be less, the threat to civilians there exists.
Lastly, the war has not ended with the latest Sri Lanka announcement. The operative words in the statement indicating future course of action is: 'Our security forces will confine their attempts to rescuing civilians who are held hostage and give foremost priority to saving civilians.'
In Sri Lanka's official parlance that means the war would continue because it has always claimed that the objective of the war is to liberate the people held hostage by the LTTE. So the war would continue probably at a slower pace, perhaps less dramatically, provided the LTTE can still sustain.
Was India's assistance to the Sri Lankan military pivotal in any manner for their military victory over the LTTE?
If pivotal means indispensable, no. If India had not provided training assistance and radar and other non lethal equipment Sri Lanka would have got it from China and Pakistan. But Indian intelligence was vital just like US intelligence inputs particularly regarding LTTE shipments.
Moreover, under the current protocols on combating terror, Sri Lanka could have demanded information from India, we could have prevaricated as Pakistan is doing.
But why should we?
We are not obliged to help out the LTTE, a banned organisation in India and 31 other countries.
India should not confuse fighting the LTTE with fighting for the Tamil cause because the LTTE forfeited that expectation when it fought a needless war with India and alienated its support.
India should always support the Tamil struggle for equity. And it should oppose the LTTE's leadership because it has brought only misery.
Don't you think if the Indian government had done some coercive diplomacy some 18 months ago, Sri Lankan Tamil interests would have been better served? It's said that they have been used by the LTTE and uncared for by the Sri Lankan government. Isn't it so?
There is little we could have done because we wished away all our interest in Sri Lanka after the IPKF mishandling and the Rajiv Gandhi assassination by the LTTE. We as a nation did not want to be part of the peace process initiative in 2002. And for Tamil Nadu politicians this was a non issue then because LTTE was the cock of the heap.
Nobody really cared about Sri Lanka (including the Indian media) unless there was a dramatic suicide attack. Leverages come with initiatives. In Sri Lanka we had shown only trade interests, not national strategic interests. So this has been exploited by the LTTE to remain the sole spokesman of Tamil interests; and the Sri Lanka government had in turn found it a cosy situation.
Actually on assuming office, Rajapakse wanted India to join the co-chairs of the peace process and India did not take up the offer. So in a sense India, including the Tamil Nadu politicians, now crying foul failed to protect Tamil interests in Sri Lanka.
Do you think the LTTE will go back to their original tactics of guerrilla war?
Do they have a choice? Prabhakaran if he survives will have to go back to the basics. He is good at it. But at 54 it is a bit difficult to wage war and renew yourself after every defeat.
I think in the next six months the LTTE guerrillas will reappear. They may not be powerful but there will be gore and drama. India should also watch out where they grow.
http://www.rediff.com///news/2009/apr/30interview-with-intelligence-expert-on-ltte-and-sri-lanka.htm
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