By R Swaminathan
A quarter century of LTTE-led militancy and terrorism in Sri Lanka came to an end in May 2009. Some of the trends that have been and are emerging in “post-war” Sri Lanka need to be noted and considered by policy-makers in Sri Lanka, India and elsewhere.
Sri Lankan Government
The armed forces of Sri Lanka are entitled to their happiness and pride in having “eliminated” the capabilities of LTTE to mount conventional military operations. Some competent analysts have gone to the extent of praising President Rajapakse as the first leader to have successfully terminated terrorism by military means alone. The Sri Lankan Government (SLG) has claimed that the armed forces of some countries have approached Sri Lanka for training in counter-terrorism techniques.
With the “intoxication” induced by all these goodies, the doubt arises as to whether the overall vision of SLG is becoming blurred by “triumphalism” and/or by the “chauvinistic” demands of its supporters, leading to the ignoring of ground realities. The president and his advisers seem to have concluded that the military defeat of LTTE has at the same time ended the struggle of the Tamils for “equal” citizenship. I would like to sound a note of caution that, while the militant leaders of a major terrorist group have been eliminated or neutralized, the seeds of militancy and terrorism will remain as long as the basic grievances and deprivations are not addressed and effectively resolved. The seemingly low priority accorded to any meaningful progress in evolving a consensual political solution to the Tamil ethnic issue poses the threat that, with the basic causes existing and a solution by peaceful dialogue being indefinitely delayed, other groups or leaders may emerge who once again feel pushed into militancy. US Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia and former Ambassador to Sri Lanka (Robert O Blake) has also warned that Sri Lanka's failure to share power with minority Tamils after the end of the war could lead to renewed violence.
History has shown that a political solution, delivered or credibly promised, is an essential component of reconciliation, in situations as in Sri Lanka. Positive and negative examples can be found in India (the partition of India instigated by the British policy of “divide and rule” when discussions - as advised by Rajaji - might have resulted in an indigenous solution, secessionist and anti-north noises in Tamil Nadu, militancy in Punjab and Mizoram, etc.), erstwhile Soviet Union, China and in many other areas of the world. History has also shown that a mono (ethnic / linguistic / theistic / ideological) State cannot survive for long in a nation whose peoples are multi (ethnic / linguistic / theistic / ideological). Such states have either to perish (as in the Soviet Union) or change (as in USA in mid-1880s, China during its economic turn-around); but the nations survive, with their multi ethnic / linguistic / theistic / ideological nature intact. The lessons of history can be ignored only at one’s own risk.
War consists of a series of actions by the parties involved in the confrontation, but peace is a combination of a state of mind and harmony between all the different ethnic groups that populate Sri Lanka. The president had earlier hinted that a political solution would be offered once the military operations ended. There was also the hint that when the report of the All Party Representative Committee (APRC - under Tissa Vitharana.) was finalized, it would be implemented. Later, the non-participation of the TNA in the formulation of a policy for reconciliation was stated to be delaying progress. The president subsequently convened the All Party Meeting for Development and Reconciliation – without any linkage between political solution (power devolution) and reconciliation. Meanwhile, local body elections were held in Jaffna and Vavuniya without a clear definition of the issues, with very low turnout and with mixed results. President Rajapakse has also reportedly stated that he needs a fresh mandate for working towards a political solution. It is difficult to comprehend as to why separate mandates are required to wage war and to make peace, as making peace is the natural culmination of a successful war effort. These apparently dilatory tactics generate scepticism about a real intention to evolve an equitable political solution. Robert Blake has also warned that if SLG keeps on delaying announcing a political solution, "there is a possibility that they will alienate the Tamil community further and again exacerbate the divisions, and perhaps even give new opportunities for the LTTE”.
It should be obvious that rehabilitation, reconciliation, development and restoration (of democracy) are the most essential measures to be taken without delay. There should be no rigidity in attempting these measures sequentially, as apparently opined by SLG, and efforts need to be made to tackle them almost simultaneously. With the elimination of the military capabilities of the LTTE, SLG can negotiate from a position of strength. It should recognize that the LTTE had indeed brutalized Tamils everywhere and that the LTTE, despite its own grandiose claims, was never synonymous with all Tamils of Sri Lanka. The Sinhalese can and should deal with their Tamil fellow-countrymen in a non-patronising but magnanimous manner and seek national reconciliation. Although the president has repeatedly promised to be generous to the Tamil minority, the fine points of the government’s position are yet to emerge. The deep disappointment of USA with President Rajapakse for relegating the devolution of power in the Tamil majority areas to the back-burner until after the presidential election has been publicly expressed by Robert Blake. He has urged that SLG should figure out ways to have an early dialogue with the Tamil community.
The decision to prohibit the use of ethnic or linguistic identities in the names of political parties is fraught with dangerous possibilities in a multi-ethnic and multi-lingual country. One can only hope that better counsels would ultimately prevail.
Armed Forces
It is not unknown for grateful governments to grant higher ranks to military leaders who have successfully led the armed forces to a significant victory. However, the quick restructuring of the command setup, with the appointment of General Fonseca as Chief of Defense Staff and the vesting of extraordinary powers in the CDS and the Defense Secretary, are intriguing. The accountability of the armed forces to the civilian authority of a cabinet may be diluted.
Normally, the end of war operations results in the reduction in the strength of the armed forces, through demobilization and diversion of excess manpower. However, SLG proposes to expand the armed forces and regularly deploy military units in the north and the east. These new (permanent) deployments are likely to be in the nature of cantonments, i.e. family stations. Depending on the ethnic profile of the deployed forces, this may become another cause for resentment. Also, apart from any effects on the demographic profile of these areas, these trends raise the distinct possibility of the armed forces becoming an additional and credible power center in Sri Lankan politics.
Internally Displaced Persons (IDP)
More than 250,000 refugees (somewhat euphemistically referred to as Internally Displaced Persons - IDP) are in “relief” camps and additional thousands had been semi-permanently “displaced” in earlier years. There are credible reports that the conditions in these camps are as good as could be expected in the current circumstances, but there are contradictory reports (including one by a BBC correspondent who had recently visited one of the camps) that these are in fact internment camps. The president has said that these IDP cannot yet go back to their homes, which (in his words) are “jungles”. A delay in total de-mining of their home areas is one of the reasons cited for their continuing in the camps. The “screening” of the refugees is another cause for delaying their rehabilitation. The claim that more than 40,000 Tamil families have already been rehabilitated in their homes severely strains the credibility of an analyst.
Makeshift hovels in unsatisfactory conditions would be fertile breeding grounds for resentment and the seeds of further future unrest are being nurtured there. The frustration, anger and neglect of legitimate grievances of an already marginalized Tamil population are bound to make ethnic reconciliation and lasting peace distant dreams. There is need for a sense of urgency in resettling the refugees in their old homes. International support and help would certainly be available if the SLG comes out with viable and verifiable procedures. In the meantime, SLG could usefully bring in more transparency in the administration of these camps, by forming monitoring groups with members from different shades of the political spectrum, including Tamils.
The US has also demanded that steps should be taken to ensure that the international community, the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross and others have access to the camps, so that it could be verified that everything that goes on in these camps is up to international standards. The Tamil leadership should, at the minimum, pursue this idea vigorously. They should also demand that their representatives should have access to the camps and to the refugees.
Human Rights
A certain amount of restrictions on human rights would have to be expected when a government is prosecuting a war. The situation should, however, be reversed as soon as possible after the war ends. On the contrary, the current indications are that the president and SLG are increasing intolerant of criticism or dissent, particularly from the media. The “white car” activity and “missing persons” phenomenon are said to be continuing. Except during Eelam War IV, Sri Lanka has had a fairly good record in the area of human rights – if one considers ethnic violence from both sides as an unfortunate national aberration. President Rajapakse would be well advised to take personal initiative to improve the respect for the human rights of all citizens and residents of Sri Lanka.
Economy
Every war imposes severe economic hardships on all citizens. Conversion from a war-driven economy to a peace-dictated economy is even normally slow and painful. The general downturn in global economic activity would make it even more difficult for SLG. There is a school of thought which believes that, if the policies of SLG do not bring about a quick turn-around in the peace-time economy, the sufferings of the people would increase. The possibility that economic discontent may bring the Sinhalas and the Tamils together in their common disaffection against the SLG’s handling of the economic difficulties is also being spoken about. In my personal view, the ethnic division has been made so deep-rooted in the last few decades that the economy has probably reach a near-collapse situation, for the ethnic animosities to be forgotten in attempts to forge a common anti-SLG front. The highly developed survival instinct of the president and his supporters may not let such a situation come about.
Tamil Leadership
The civil leadership of Sri Lankan Tamils had surrendered, not necessarily voluntarily, their leadership role to the LTTE for more than twenty years. They now seem unable to recognize and discharge their new (but natural) responsibilities and opportunities. Their public inactivity and seeming non-involvement in the speedy evolution of a political solution, coupled with the president’s ability to take unquestioned unilateral actions, give the impression that they also subscribe to the SLG’s view that the entire Tamil movement had been defeated when the LTTE was administered its military defeat. It is time that the Tamil leadership get out of their LTTE-imposed stupor and start functioning again as responsible leaders of a marginalized and “deprived” community.
It would perhaps be out of place for me to suggest courses of action to the Tamil leadership, but they could usefully consider some of the following measures:
a. Openly and clearly disown the militancy of LTTE and seek a peaceful resolution within the framework of a unified Sri Lankan nation.
b. Use the delays imposed by the president, to organize themselves into cadre-based parties working amongst the people, with whom they have had little interaction or meaningful contact for two decades.
c. Be politically active and mobilize public opinion throughout Sri Lanka, in favour of ethnic reconciliation at the national level.
d. Consider a coordinated effort by all the Tamil parties, through a “Joint Action Committee”, to demand and urge forward movement on the package for political devolution – instead of merely of waiting for crumbs to fall from the presidential table.
e. Behave as “Sri Lankan” political parties and not look for inspiration and support from outside the country.
Sri Lanka - India
The emerging trend seems to be to sideline India as much as possible. In the field of economic relations, India is increasingly being relegated from its traditional “first choice” role for collaboration in major projects, particularly in the field of infrastructural development. Reports speak of Sri Lanka and China having signed agreements worth USD 350 million relating to the bunkering facility at Hambanthotta and the expressway from Colombo to the Kattanayake Airport. While the Hambanthotta deal can be understood as being part of a composite project, it would be difficult to justify the exclusion of Indian companies from bidding for the expressway project. The Government of India and Indian companies have to take note of this disturbing trend and devise measures to restore India’s leading role in Sri Lanka’s economic development. Special emphasis would be necessary on projects related to the Tamil-populated areas. Preparedness on the part of Indian companies to make significant investments in Sri Lanka and tax incentives for such investment may be useful steps. Essentially, India could try to be more cooperative and helpful on the economic front.
Politically, India has little option but to continue her unobtrusive, non- interventionist, persuasive role in working towards the Tamils being treated as equal citizens the same as the Sinhalas, Muslims etc. The recent statement of the Indian High Commissioner (Alok Prasad), linking a broad-based political settlement to the resettlement of war displaced, should be welcomed. India would not be alone in such an approach. Robert Blake has bluntly stated that continued US aid to Sri Lanka would depend on how expeditiously the Rajapakse government alleviates the lot of the hundreds of thousands of internally displaced Tamil refugees and "on the progress that is made towards political reconciliation and devolution power."
In matters relating to relief and rehabilitation, India could and should be much more pro-active, supportive and involved. It should never be forgotten that Sri Lankan Tamils are natural allies of the Indian people and the government, and that India cannot but help them to attain their legitimate aspirations.
Conclusion
In this critical crossroad of Sri Lankan history, it is for President Rajapakse to decide on his place in that history. Does he want to be known as the Sri Lankan version of Abraham Lincoln, who rendered justice to all citizens irrespective of their ethnicity and helped build a unified multi-ethnic Sri Lanka? Or would he be satisfied with being the president who perpetuated the ethnic division and fractured the country for a long time to come?
[The author, R.Swaminathan, is President & DG, International Institute of Security & Safety Management, New Delhi; and former Special Secretary, DG (Security), Government of India. The paper was prepared to form the basis of his presentation at the National Seminar on India's Foreign Policy: Continuity and Change, organized by the University of Pondicherry on 27 and 28 August 2009, at Pondicherry. He can be contacted at rsnathan@gmail.com]
Sunday, August 30, 2009
Wednesday, August 26, 2009
SRI LANKA: Some Comments on ‘Execution Video’
A highly disturbing video showing the mafia style execution of a naked man said to be a Tamil prisoner, with his hands tied behind his back, by a soldier was shown on Headlines Today TV today. Yesterday British audience saw it on Channel 4. The video footage claimed to have been shot with a mobile phone camera by a Sri Lankan soldier sometime in January 2009 was sent to the media by the Journalists for Democracy in Sri Lanka, a group of Sinhala and Tamil journalists living in exile.
[The comments given below were made on specific issues raised by the Headlines Today TV and as mentioned in the TV broadcast do not minimise the gravity of the accusation made in the video.]
Genuineness of the video
The Sri Lanka authorities were quick to dismiss the video as a doctored one “to defame the Sri Lankan government and armed forces.” Sri Lankan argument cannot be dismissed off hand as the LTTE has mastered the psychological warfare techniques. And Sri Lanka had made a special effort during the course of the three-year old Eelam War IV to counter the LTTE propaganda with its own psychological warfare ploys. Doctored videos have figured in the past as part of the warfare.
Regardless of public perception, the Sri Lanka government has to make an effort to establish it as a fake one because the video has planted a seed of doubt in public mind. To this extent the purpose of those who produced the video and disseminated it to the media has probably been achieved. .
Under the circumstances, the genuineness of the video will probably be never known unless it undergoes a forensic examination. This has to be done by a neutral agency as the Sri Lanka authorities have already dismissed it as a fake. And in the current environment in Sri Lanka, the government is unlikely to entrust the task of authentication to a neutral agency.
Is such an action possible?
There had been a number of complaints of human rights violations in the past in Sri Lanka in which perpetrators of killings and abductions have not been identified or brought to book. As a result among sections of public doubts continue to linger about the sincerity of authorities in investigating and prosecuting such cases. Commissions of inquiry appointed to inquire into them have not enjoyed the freedom or autonomy to do their jobs satisfactorily. Their conduct had not been transparent or above board. Witnesses have been intimidated, and the media freedom to probe such incidents has been curtailed due to fear of retaliation.
This is not related merely to the Eelam War or the Tamil issue but to the larger attitude of the authorities to the rule of law. Some of the ministers have been a law unto themselves and their conduct in a few instances has lowered the dignity of their office. This has been a cause of concern to President Mahinda Rajapaksa also. Increasing instances of police lawlessness has been repeatedly figuring in news reports during this month. Unless there is a genuine effort to clean up of the way the government and administration conducts itself both in private and public, peoples the confidence in the rulers is likely to deteriorate.
And Sri Lanka is not the only nation where such human rights violations, including custodial killings, have been reported. Indian and Pakistani media have been splashing the news of similar instances in their countries. However in Sri Lanka the damage done by such reports is much more as the nation is already facing a problem in reconciling the fractured trust between Sinhala and Tamil communities. So any report that affects the process of reconciliation has to be attended to. Unfortunately this is not happening. And the tragedy is that the feeling insecurity among Tamils is not helped by videos depicting cold blooded killing of unarmed men by soldiers.
On international perceptions
Sri Lanka’s poor human rights record has repeatedly figured in UN forums including the UN Security Council. Whether the video is genuine or not, it adds yet another foil to the human rights activists to take it up in international forums. We can expect this to happen in the coming months. How much it will improve the human rights in Sri Lanka is a question that can be answered by its government only.
[The comments given below were made on specific issues raised by the Headlines Today TV and as mentioned in the TV broadcast do not minimise the gravity of the accusation made in the video.]
Genuineness of the video
The Sri Lanka authorities were quick to dismiss the video as a doctored one “to defame the Sri Lankan government and armed forces.” Sri Lankan argument cannot be dismissed off hand as the LTTE has mastered the psychological warfare techniques. And Sri Lanka had made a special effort during the course of the three-year old Eelam War IV to counter the LTTE propaganda with its own psychological warfare ploys. Doctored videos have figured in the past as part of the warfare.
Regardless of public perception, the Sri Lanka government has to make an effort to establish it as a fake one because the video has planted a seed of doubt in public mind. To this extent the purpose of those who produced the video and disseminated it to the media has probably been achieved. .
Under the circumstances, the genuineness of the video will probably be never known unless it undergoes a forensic examination. This has to be done by a neutral agency as the Sri Lanka authorities have already dismissed it as a fake. And in the current environment in Sri Lanka, the government is unlikely to entrust the task of authentication to a neutral agency.
Is such an action possible?
There had been a number of complaints of human rights violations in the past in Sri Lanka in which perpetrators of killings and abductions have not been identified or brought to book. As a result among sections of public doubts continue to linger about the sincerity of authorities in investigating and prosecuting such cases. Commissions of inquiry appointed to inquire into them have not enjoyed the freedom or autonomy to do their jobs satisfactorily. Their conduct had not been transparent or above board. Witnesses have been intimidated, and the media freedom to probe such incidents has been curtailed due to fear of retaliation.
This is not related merely to the Eelam War or the Tamil issue but to the larger attitude of the authorities to the rule of law. Some of the ministers have been a law unto themselves and their conduct in a few instances has lowered the dignity of their office. This has been a cause of concern to President Mahinda Rajapaksa also. Increasing instances of police lawlessness has been repeatedly figuring in news reports during this month. Unless there is a genuine effort to clean up of the way the government and administration conducts itself both in private and public, peoples the confidence in the rulers is likely to deteriorate.
And Sri Lanka is not the only nation where such human rights violations, including custodial killings, have been reported. Indian and Pakistani media have been splashing the news of similar instances in their countries. However in Sri Lanka the damage done by such reports is much more as the nation is already facing a problem in reconciling the fractured trust between Sinhala and Tamil communities. So any report that affects the process of reconciliation has to be attended to. Unfortunately this is not happening. And the tragedy is that the feeling insecurity among Tamils is not helped by videos depicting cold blooded killing of unarmed men by soldiers.
On international perceptions
Sri Lanka’s poor human rights record has repeatedly figured in UN forums including the UN Security Council. Whether the video is genuine or not, it adds yet another foil to the human rights activists to take it up in international forums. We can expect this to happen in the coming months. How much it will improve the human rights in Sri Lanka is a question that can be answered by its government only.
Wednesday, August 19, 2009
SRI LANKA: It is Hobson’s Choice for Tamils
Two major events - the arrest of Selvarasah Pathmanathan, better known by his acronym ‘KP’ alias Kumaran Pathmanathan and the union council elections in Jaffna and Vavuniuya in the first ten days of August have put the five-decade old Tamil struggle at cross roads.
After the elimination of V Prabhakaran and the military defeat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Tamils are now faced with two choices - both unpalatable potions if past experience is any guide. These are: one - continuing the conflict with Sri Lanka state after the LTTE has lost the war and runs the risk of being totally eclipsed. Two - accepting Rajapaksha government’s offering and reworking a political architecture suited to the post LTTE environment. Probably the second option has a better chance of success.
With KP’s arrest and rendition to Colombo, the Rajapaksha government has sent a strong message that it was taking up the war against the LTTE overseas. It appears determined to crush any the revival of the Tamil Tigers both at home and abroad. KP’s arrest and rendition has a strong symbolic value because after the death of V Prabhakaran he was (self?) anointed as the general secretary of the LTTE despite a brief power struggle. KP had twin advantages going for him. Prabhakaran had installed him in January 2009 as the LTTE’s international representative conferring some legitimacy in the hierarchy. The other was KP’s street smartness in speaking the idiom that would appeal to the Sri Lankan Tamil expatriates, shell shocked after battlefield death of Prabhakaran.
He was also probably favoured because he had better connections and interface with a whole range of LTTE stakeholders - arms dealers, LTTE representatives, lobbyists and even politicians. He has a great deal of experience in vital skills required for revival of the LTTE - procuring and trafficking resources including weapons and armaments for the LTTE. A negative aspect was he had the image of a wheeler dealer rather than the aura of a battlefield leader. Naturally he was not accepted by the peddlers of the romantic image of the LTTE as modern-day Crusaders for the cause. So he continued to remain persona non grata with Vaiko and Nedumaran, leading pro-LTTE Tamil Nadu politicians.
KP appears to have gauged the international mood and soft pedalled the idea of taking up arms again. Though he spoke of it in his Channel 4 interview, he softened it in his numerous interviews. Instead, he spoke of a concept of continuing the separatist struggle politically. This would have been heresy had Prabhakaran been alive. But in the changed circumstances it would have increased the chances of survival and revival of the LTTE in many countries. He also managed to work out an equation with Tamil Eelam dreamers among the Tamil Diaspora. As a result the Provisional Transitional Government of Tamil Eelam (PTGTE) a virtual “government” in the making was announced. Despite its longwinded name, the concept was to keep the dream of Tamil Eelam alive and probably provide enough legal snags to inherit LTTE assets overseas.
Like all episodes of its genre, KP’s arrest in Malaysia, transit through Thailand and rendition to Sri Lanka in an apparently seamless operation has left a lot of unanswered questions. And at best the answers are murky. But a few home truths emerge from the whole episode:
• The governments of Malaysia and Thailand appear to have cooperated with Sri Lanka in this operation, though they may officially disclaim it. Now that the LTTE is toothless and leaderless, in future not only these two countries but many others are likely to extend such help to prevent revival of LTTE activity on their soil. This is connected with the greater convergence of nations on eliminating terrorism globally. That is why Western nations, for all their loud concerns on Sri Lanka’s human rights violations, have been helping her fight the LTTE.
• Only three countries - the US, Russia and Israel have demonstrated capability in this kind of operation. One or more of these countries could have assisted Sri Lanka. (India’s capability might be doubtful on this count although KP’s whereabouts were probably known to it.)
• There are a lot of other speculations in circulation. KP had all along been a shadowy figure; his sudden appearance and large scale visibility in the global media probably enabled intelligence agencies to pin point his actions and trap him. But it is difficult to accept that KP, a seasoned operator with many faces, was casual enough to indulge in overt PR exercise. Has he voluntarily agreed to go under Sri Lanka custody to ensure his survival? A number of stories of information given by him on LTTE arms cache, plots and operatives in Sri Lanka are in circulation support this conjecture. Or has he been betrayed by the rival faction of Nediyavan within the LTTE?
• The coordination required between the LTTE�s largely intact overseas elements and the local remnants in Sri Lanka now in hiding is going to be more and more difficult. Apparently there is no leader in the horizon capable of bonding the local and overseas segments. This could result in the surrender of more demoralised LTTE cadres.
• According to the chief of defence staff Gen Sarath Fonseka at present 15-25 cadres per week are being identified and apprehended from the IDP camps. And the security forces’ strength in Jaffna has been increased by about 115% to 35,000 now. The CDS has once again reiterated that the army would continued be deployed in all key locations to ensure security. Under the circumstances, the security forces are likely to meet with more successes in weeding out LTTE cadres and supporters.
• Buoyed by its success in arresting KP, Sri Lanka is likely to increase the pressure on overseas governments to act against LTTE cells. This could affect proto LTTE bodies’ activities in Tamil Nadu.
With these all these impediments, at present the revival of militancy politics among Tamils is appears a remote possibility. However, the security lobby is likely to play up threat potential of LTTE to station adequate force levels in former LTTE controlled areas to keep the heat on. Thus militancy politics is a non-option for Tamils, at least till such time incubatory environment for its resumption is created.
The results of the local elections in Jaffna and Vavuniya need to be studied in this overall post war socio-political environment. In Jaffna, there was a distinct lack of enthusiasm because the pro-LTTE/Eelam lobbies are either eliminated or under risk of compromise. They had always dominated Jaffna’s political space. Over the years the Eelam Peoples Democratic Party (EPDP) had curbed their activity and prepared the ground in Jaffna for its domination. So its success in alliance with the ruling coalition comes as no surprise. It now has an opportunity to carve out its own a space and distinct Tamil identity. Whether the people and the Rajapaksa government would allow it to do so is the moot point.
There are three ways of interpreting the success of the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) in Vavuniya, where it came out as the party with maximum number of seats. One: as a loyalty vote by pro-LTTE segments of population for the TNA. Two: as a rejection of the ruling alliance because of the continued plight of nearly three-lakh Tamil population kept in camps has eroded their faith in the government. Three: as a vote for the TNA for its assertion of Tamil identity and autonomy as issues for the election. I would go for the second and third reasons given above for TNA’s success.
Both Douglas Devananda of EPDP and Sidathan, leader of the Peoples Liberation Organisation for Tamil Eelam (PLOTE) have conceded their failure to do well in the elections for different reasons. The close identification of EPDP with the Rajapaksha’s government and ruling coalition was probably a handicap in Vavuniya where it had never been strong. On the other hand, PLOTE-led alliance Democratic Peoples Front (DPF), which polled only 0.8% less votes than the TNA, was expected to win as Vavuniya has been its base for a long time. With PLOTE ready to support TNA there is a possibility of such an understanding growing further, if TNA manages to subsume its image as LTTE proxy. The TNA might just do that for its own survival.
For President Rajapaksa the northern election results were probably a disappointment. As he plans to go for an early presidential poll, he would probably re-examine his alliance with Tamil parties to garner sizeable votes from the north which could tilt the balance. So probably we can expect to see some political sleight of hand. Overtures to the TNA from SLFP in the coming months could be part of it.
In a nutshell, KPs arrest has probably foreclosed the option of any meaningful revival of LTTE activity in the near term. So much would depend upon how the Tamil political leaders and people evolve a viable strategy to politically assert themselves in the coming months. So the choice has now been reduced to a one-horse race.
www.southasiaanalysis.org
After the elimination of V Prabhakaran and the military defeat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Tamils are now faced with two choices - both unpalatable potions if past experience is any guide. These are: one - continuing the conflict with Sri Lanka state after the LTTE has lost the war and runs the risk of being totally eclipsed. Two - accepting Rajapaksha government’s offering and reworking a political architecture suited to the post LTTE environment. Probably the second option has a better chance of success.
With KP’s arrest and rendition to Colombo, the Rajapaksha government has sent a strong message that it was taking up the war against the LTTE overseas. It appears determined to crush any the revival of the Tamil Tigers both at home and abroad. KP’s arrest and rendition has a strong symbolic value because after the death of V Prabhakaran he was (self?) anointed as the general secretary of the LTTE despite a brief power struggle. KP had twin advantages going for him. Prabhakaran had installed him in January 2009 as the LTTE’s international representative conferring some legitimacy in the hierarchy. The other was KP’s street smartness in speaking the idiom that would appeal to the Sri Lankan Tamil expatriates, shell shocked after battlefield death of Prabhakaran.
He was also probably favoured because he had better connections and interface with a whole range of LTTE stakeholders - arms dealers, LTTE representatives, lobbyists and even politicians. He has a great deal of experience in vital skills required for revival of the LTTE - procuring and trafficking resources including weapons and armaments for the LTTE. A negative aspect was he had the image of a wheeler dealer rather than the aura of a battlefield leader. Naturally he was not accepted by the peddlers of the romantic image of the LTTE as modern-day Crusaders for the cause. So he continued to remain persona non grata with Vaiko and Nedumaran, leading pro-LTTE Tamil Nadu politicians.
KP appears to have gauged the international mood and soft pedalled the idea of taking up arms again. Though he spoke of it in his Channel 4 interview, he softened it in his numerous interviews. Instead, he spoke of a concept of continuing the separatist struggle politically. This would have been heresy had Prabhakaran been alive. But in the changed circumstances it would have increased the chances of survival and revival of the LTTE in many countries. He also managed to work out an equation with Tamil Eelam dreamers among the Tamil Diaspora. As a result the Provisional Transitional Government of Tamil Eelam (PTGTE) a virtual “government” in the making was announced. Despite its longwinded name, the concept was to keep the dream of Tamil Eelam alive and probably provide enough legal snags to inherit LTTE assets overseas.
Like all episodes of its genre, KP’s arrest in Malaysia, transit through Thailand and rendition to Sri Lanka in an apparently seamless operation has left a lot of unanswered questions. And at best the answers are murky. But a few home truths emerge from the whole episode:
• The governments of Malaysia and Thailand appear to have cooperated with Sri Lanka in this operation, though they may officially disclaim it. Now that the LTTE is toothless and leaderless, in future not only these two countries but many others are likely to extend such help to prevent revival of LTTE activity on their soil. This is connected with the greater convergence of nations on eliminating terrorism globally. That is why Western nations, for all their loud concerns on Sri Lanka’s human rights violations, have been helping her fight the LTTE.
• Only three countries - the US, Russia and Israel have demonstrated capability in this kind of operation. One or more of these countries could have assisted Sri Lanka. (India’s capability might be doubtful on this count although KP’s whereabouts were probably known to it.)
• There are a lot of other speculations in circulation. KP had all along been a shadowy figure; his sudden appearance and large scale visibility in the global media probably enabled intelligence agencies to pin point his actions and trap him. But it is difficult to accept that KP, a seasoned operator with many faces, was casual enough to indulge in overt PR exercise. Has he voluntarily agreed to go under Sri Lanka custody to ensure his survival? A number of stories of information given by him on LTTE arms cache, plots and operatives in Sri Lanka are in circulation support this conjecture. Or has he been betrayed by the rival faction of Nediyavan within the LTTE?
• The coordination required between the LTTE�s largely intact overseas elements and the local remnants in Sri Lanka now in hiding is going to be more and more difficult. Apparently there is no leader in the horizon capable of bonding the local and overseas segments. This could result in the surrender of more demoralised LTTE cadres.
• According to the chief of defence staff Gen Sarath Fonseka at present 15-25 cadres per week are being identified and apprehended from the IDP camps. And the security forces’ strength in Jaffna has been increased by about 115% to 35,000 now. The CDS has once again reiterated that the army would continued be deployed in all key locations to ensure security. Under the circumstances, the security forces are likely to meet with more successes in weeding out LTTE cadres and supporters.
• Buoyed by its success in arresting KP, Sri Lanka is likely to increase the pressure on overseas governments to act against LTTE cells. This could affect proto LTTE bodies’ activities in Tamil Nadu.
With these all these impediments, at present the revival of militancy politics among Tamils is appears a remote possibility. However, the security lobby is likely to play up threat potential of LTTE to station adequate force levels in former LTTE controlled areas to keep the heat on. Thus militancy politics is a non-option for Tamils, at least till such time incubatory environment for its resumption is created.
The results of the local elections in Jaffna and Vavuniya need to be studied in this overall post war socio-political environment. In Jaffna, there was a distinct lack of enthusiasm because the pro-LTTE/Eelam lobbies are either eliminated or under risk of compromise. They had always dominated Jaffna’s political space. Over the years the Eelam Peoples Democratic Party (EPDP) had curbed their activity and prepared the ground in Jaffna for its domination. So its success in alliance with the ruling coalition comes as no surprise. It now has an opportunity to carve out its own a space and distinct Tamil identity. Whether the people and the Rajapaksa government would allow it to do so is the moot point.
There are three ways of interpreting the success of the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) in Vavuniya, where it came out as the party with maximum number of seats. One: as a loyalty vote by pro-LTTE segments of population for the TNA. Two: as a rejection of the ruling alliance because of the continued plight of nearly three-lakh Tamil population kept in camps has eroded their faith in the government. Three: as a vote for the TNA for its assertion of Tamil identity and autonomy as issues for the election. I would go for the second and third reasons given above for TNA’s success.
Both Douglas Devananda of EPDP and Sidathan, leader of the Peoples Liberation Organisation for Tamil Eelam (PLOTE) have conceded their failure to do well in the elections for different reasons. The close identification of EPDP with the Rajapaksha’s government and ruling coalition was probably a handicap in Vavuniya where it had never been strong. On the other hand, PLOTE-led alliance Democratic Peoples Front (DPF), which polled only 0.8% less votes than the TNA, was expected to win as Vavuniya has been its base for a long time. With PLOTE ready to support TNA there is a possibility of such an understanding growing further, if TNA manages to subsume its image as LTTE proxy. The TNA might just do that for its own survival.
For President Rajapaksa the northern election results were probably a disappointment. As he plans to go for an early presidential poll, he would probably re-examine his alliance with Tamil parties to garner sizeable votes from the north which could tilt the balance. So probably we can expect to see some political sleight of hand. Overtures to the TNA from SLFP in the coming months could be part of it.
In a nutshell, KPs arrest has probably foreclosed the option of any meaningful revival of LTTE activity in the near term. So much would depend upon how the Tamil political leaders and people evolve a viable strategy to politically assert themselves in the coming months. So the choice has now been reduced to a one-horse race.
www.southasiaanalysis.org
Monday, August 17, 2009
SRI LANKA: Monsoon Miseries of IDPs
The Menik Farm complex and its temporary shelters, showcased last month as model for camps for people displaced due to the war, has become camps of misery for the residents as monsoon rains are lashing the area.
Sri Lanka media of all shades of opinion have highlighted the terrible conditions created by incessant monsoon rains particularly in camp 2 and camp 4. Tents and temporary shelters are down or collapsed making them unliveable. Some camps do not have access to even water supply. Cooking is not possible and cooked food is not reaching the needy. Toilets are choked or busted. Storm drainage is either not existing or flooded. "As rain waters filled with sewage matter, maggots and human excreta rose in tents sheltering some 20,000 IDPs" is one description of the condition from the media.
And apparently the local administration and the NGOs working at these camps find the task of providing relief to those beleaguered in the flooded camps beyond their limited capability. And monsoon season is not yet over. The logical sequence of the tragedy would be outbreak of epidemic diseases like gastro enteritis striking the affected people. Another hidden danger is that land mines tend to get shifted due to flooding.
Everyone knew this was waiting to happen; monsoon rains have a pre-ordained regularity about them. The NGOs and the media spoke and wrote about it. The authorities and humanitarian agencies, who sited some of the camps in low lying areas, also knew the area was prone to flooding during the monsoon rains. Yet they went ahead and created the camps probably because they did not expect the residents of these camps to be stationed there indefinitely. Probably they were situated as they were for ensuring better physical security than any other reason.
In June itself the government had said the UN agencies were responsible for construction of drainage systems and flood preventive measures at the camp sites. So it was not surprising when the Minister of Resettlement and Disaster Management, Rizad Bathiudeen put the blame on them now. He said "The UN agencies involved in the IDP camps had taken the responsibility of constructing the drainage systems and flood preventive measures. So the Government cannot be blamed for the poor condition of the drainage systems which burst and failed." But the issue is not who is to be blamed, but providing relief to the affected people.
Unfortunately this simple truth appears to have been forgotten as the release of civilians has become a political issue. The opposition United National Party (UNP) leader Ranil Wickremesinghe recently asked the government to expedite the release of civilians held in these camps and inform parliament of the steps taken in this respect. The UNP leaders had strongly criticized the government for detaining innocent people.
And in his hard hitting repartee, Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa had a different take. He accused the opposition of playing politics in what was essentially a national security issue. He highlighted the danger of LTTE operatives living amidst the IDPs in camps. He also pointed out the problem that could be posed if they gain access to the arms and explosives hidden in Vanni.
This aspect cannot be ignored by the government as arms and military equipment caches of LTTE are being unearthed almost everyday and quite a few investigations have been taken up to uncover LTTE�s support network among civilians. But at the same time, the government has an obligation for the welfare of civilians at large. It is not clear how the release of pregnant women, small children and the aged would compromise security. Their continued stay in camps would be only an exercise in humiliating a population that was in the wrong place at the wrong time.
It is clear the Sri Lanka government has suborned all other issues to the continued war against the LTTE. Unfortunately, the humanitarian issues have become casualties in this mix up of priorities. And politicisation of the issue has further messed up action.
A delegation of concerned citizens including Mangala Samaraweera, MP and leader of the breakaway group of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) recently met the Indian External Affairs Minister SM Krishna and made a representation regarding the IDPs. The group sought India to pressurize the Sri Lanka government to demilitarize the camp administration and the rehabilitation process.
It is not clear what action New Delhi has taken on the subject of IDPs. They are likely to continue their stay camps well beyond six months. Indian High Commissioner's message in Colombo on the occasion of the Independence Day conveyed to Sri Lanka that a "broad-based political settlement" of the ethnic conflict would enable the Rs.500-crore relief, reconstruction and rehabilitation package for the nearly three lakh war displaced to be utilised in a more effective and efficient manner.
Does this mean the relief and reconstruction package would come into play when a broad based political settlement is made? Given the political developments in Sri Lanka, India might have to wait a long time for that to happen.
In the meanwhile, what about the IDPs plight? Human dignity is beyond mere supply of relief and construction materials. Will some of our worthy parliament members, who spoke eloquently about the agony of Tamilians in the run up to the elections, take up the issue? Or is it business as usual?
www.southasiaanalysis.org
Sri Lanka media of all shades of opinion have highlighted the terrible conditions created by incessant monsoon rains particularly in camp 2 and camp 4. Tents and temporary shelters are down or collapsed making them unliveable. Some camps do not have access to even water supply. Cooking is not possible and cooked food is not reaching the needy. Toilets are choked or busted. Storm drainage is either not existing or flooded. "As rain waters filled with sewage matter, maggots and human excreta rose in tents sheltering some 20,000 IDPs" is one description of the condition from the media.
And apparently the local administration and the NGOs working at these camps find the task of providing relief to those beleaguered in the flooded camps beyond their limited capability. And monsoon season is not yet over. The logical sequence of the tragedy would be outbreak of epidemic diseases like gastro enteritis striking the affected people. Another hidden danger is that land mines tend to get shifted due to flooding.
Everyone knew this was waiting to happen; monsoon rains have a pre-ordained regularity about them. The NGOs and the media spoke and wrote about it. The authorities and humanitarian agencies, who sited some of the camps in low lying areas, also knew the area was prone to flooding during the monsoon rains. Yet they went ahead and created the camps probably because they did not expect the residents of these camps to be stationed there indefinitely. Probably they were situated as they were for ensuring better physical security than any other reason.
In June itself the government had said the UN agencies were responsible for construction of drainage systems and flood preventive measures at the camp sites. So it was not surprising when the Minister of Resettlement and Disaster Management, Rizad Bathiudeen put the blame on them now. He said "The UN agencies involved in the IDP camps had taken the responsibility of constructing the drainage systems and flood preventive measures. So the Government cannot be blamed for the poor condition of the drainage systems which burst and failed." But the issue is not who is to be blamed, but providing relief to the affected people.
Unfortunately this simple truth appears to have been forgotten as the release of civilians has become a political issue. The opposition United National Party (UNP) leader Ranil Wickremesinghe recently asked the government to expedite the release of civilians held in these camps and inform parliament of the steps taken in this respect. The UNP leaders had strongly criticized the government for detaining innocent people.
And in his hard hitting repartee, Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa had a different take. He accused the opposition of playing politics in what was essentially a national security issue. He highlighted the danger of LTTE operatives living amidst the IDPs in camps. He also pointed out the problem that could be posed if they gain access to the arms and explosives hidden in Vanni.
This aspect cannot be ignored by the government as arms and military equipment caches of LTTE are being unearthed almost everyday and quite a few investigations have been taken up to uncover LTTE�s support network among civilians. But at the same time, the government has an obligation for the welfare of civilians at large. It is not clear how the release of pregnant women, small children and the aged would compromise security. Their continued stay in camps would be only an exercise in humiliating a population that was in the wrong place at the wrong time.
It is clear the Sri Lanka government has suborned all other issues to the continued war against the LTTE. Unfortunately, the humanitarian issues have become casualties in this mix up of priorities. And politicisation of the issue has further messed up action.
A delegation of concerned citizens including Mangala Samaraweera, MP and leader of the breakaway group of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) recently met the Indian External Affairs Minister SM Krishna and made a representation regarding the IDPs. The group sought India to pressurize the Sri Lanka government to demilitarize the camp administration and the rehabilitation process.
It is not clear what action New Delhi has taken on the subject of IDPs. They are likely to continue their stay camps well beyond six months. Indian High Commissioner's message in Colombo on the occasion of the Independence Day conveyed to Sri Lanka that a "broad-based political settlement" of the ethnic conflict would enable the Rs.500-crore relief, reconstruction and rehabilitation package for the nearly three lakh war displaced to be utilised in a more effective and efficient manner.
Does this mean the relief and reconstruction package would come into play when a broad based political settlement is made? Given the political developments in Sri Lanka, India might have to wait a long time for that to happen.
In the meanwhile, what about the IDPs plight? Human dignity is beyond mere supply of relief and construction materials. Will some of our worthy parliament members, who spoke eloquently about the agony of Tamilians in the run up to the elections, take up the issue? Or is it business as usual?
www.southasiaanalysis.org
Sunday, August 16, 2009
'National Security Challenges'
In my nearly three decades of army career, I had the pleasure and pain of serving under 19 generals either directly or almost directly. Many of them had breadth of vision on national security but unfortunately it was limited to territorial aspects only. And quite a few of them had just bad breath. So it was refreshing to read the Chief of Defence Staff Admiral Sureesh Mehta's speech on National Security Challenges made at the National Maritime Foundation, New Delhi on August 10, 2009. Perhaps this is the first time I have read a comprehensive analysis of National Security issues (going well beyond the territorial security) by any serving chief. Of course, Admiral Mehta is due to retire shortly; I hope the government uses his wisdom for years to come.
The essence of his presentation in his own words was:"However, there is a sense that we may not have done adequately rigorous thinking on how to 'manage' our pre-ordained rise to global prominence. With the realisation of our aspirations and greater international recognition will come many more additional responsibilities...The country cannot afford to be indifferent and non-committal on any regional or global issue -- we must have an objective 'national interest assessment' on all questions of importance."
'National Security Challenges'
By Admiral Sureesh Mehta, Chief of Defence Staff and Chief of Naval Staff
We often hear that our rise to global prominence is inevitable. It is an incontestable fact that the significance of India as a rising power is being widely acknowledged, as has been witnessed by several events in the recent past, the most defining of which has perhaps been the inking of the agreement on civil nuclear cooperation with the United States.
Our growing economic status fuelled by a 300 million strong middle class, the demographic advantage of a burgeoning 'young population', our increasing ventures into high technology areas such as space, and future projections of national growth peg us amongst the world's top five economies by 2020. That is just 11 years away.
The professionalism and military might of the armed forces of India are respected the world over. The very recent launch of our very own nuclear submarine 'Arihant' has also sent out a strong signal of our desire to acquire the appropriate strategic military technology and capability.
Despite our several internal challenges and diversities, we are 'rock solid' as a democratic country, surrounded by an extended periphery of varying instability.
It is therefore not surprising that the role of a 'natural' regional power is expected of us. Our aspirations for inclusion as a permanent member of the UN Security Council and for a greater voice in international diplomacy are a result of these developments.
However, there is a sense that we may not have done adequately rigorous thinking on how to 'manage' our pre-ordained rise to global prominence. With the realisation of our aspirations and greater international recognition will come many more additional responsibilities.
The country cannot afford to be indifferent and non-committal on any regional or global issue -- we must have an objective 'national interest assessment' on all questions of importance.
As military forces of India, we would be expected to function as instruments of peace and stability in this rather fragile environment of the Indian Ocean region. We have to get our 'hands dirty' in addressing common concerns in our respective domains. This will call for increased participation in peace operations, efforts such as anti-piracy as also capacity-building and capability-enhancement of smaller and economically weaker nations which look up to us, for support and security.
We must also be seen far away from our shores, working with friendly nations and shaping perceptions, in furtherance of India's foreign policy. Quite evidently, the navy would lead efforts of military diplomacy, given the medium in which it operates and the distinctive characteristics of its platforms. If we pursue a meaningful foreign policy to advance national objectives -- as we do -- then the military instrument can complement this collective endeavour.
Coping with China
It is quite evident that coping with China will certainly be one of our primary challenges in the years ahead. China is in the process of 'consolidating' its comprehensive national power and creating formidable military capabilities.
Once that is done, China is likely to be more assertive on its claims, especially in its immediate neighbourhood. Our 'trust deficit' with China can never be liquidated unless our boundary problems are resolved. China's known propensity for 'intervention in space' and 'cyber-warfare' would also be major planning considerations in our strategic and operational thinking.
Common sense dictates that cooperation with China would be preferable to competition or conflict, as it would be foolhardy to compare India and China as equals. China's GDP is more than thrice that of ours and its per capita GDP is 2.2 times our own. China's early steps to liberalise its economy and invest heavily to modernise its physical infrastructure gave it a substantial edge over India, and made China a more preferred destination for FDI.
India's annual defence expenditure (approximately $30 billion for 2008-2009) is less than half of what China spends on defence. China's official figure is under $40 billion, but it is widely believed that China actually spends more than twice as much. Studies by US think-tanks peg China's defence spending to be anything between $70 billion to $200 billion.
Whether in terms of GDP, defence spending or any other economic, social or development parameters, the gap between the two is just too wide to bridge (and getting wider by the day). In military terms, both conventional and non-conventional, we neither have the capability nor the intention to match China, force for force. These are indeed sobering thoughts and therefore our strategy to deal with China would need to be in consonance with these realities.
The economic penalties resulting from a military conflict would have grave consequences for both nations. It would therefore, undoubtedly be in both our interests, to cooperate with each other in mutually beneficial endeavours, and ensure that the potential for conflict is minimised. This would require pro-active economic, diplomatic, cultural and people-to-people engagement. Our relations with other major powers, notably the USA, Russia, Japan and other East Asian nations need to be nurtured and leveraged to this end.
Our growing relations with South East and East Asian countries would increase opportunities for cooperative engagement with China as well. Since resolution of the border problems, autonomy of Tibet, the China-Pakistan connection, competition for strategic space in the Indian Ocean and management of water resources would be the prime causative factors for any potential tension with China, our diplomatic focus on these issues would have to be maintained.
On the military front, our strategy to deal with China must include reducing the military gap and countering the growing Chinese footprint in the Indian Ocean region. The traditional or 'attritionist' approach of matching 'division for division' must give way to harnessing modern technology for developing high situational awareness and creating a reliable stand-off deterrent.
The non-State actors
Today, we have come to live in an era characterised by the rise of sinister non-State forces which have redefined security responses the world over.
We have witnessed an even more worrying phenomenon of the occasional coalescing of the 'State' with some 'non-State' entities which has created an evil-hybrid. This hybrid, to my mind, has been at the very root of the tragic events in Mumbai in November 2008.
Where should we direct our security efforts? Towards the State-sponsor or the non-State entity? How do we expose the linkages, if any? We have been grappling with this problem for some time now with no satisfactory solution emerging.
Asia today, is witnessing the historical and simultaneous rise of at least four major powers namely, India, China, Japan and the ten countries of ASEAN. Even in these recessionary times, the economic performances of India, China and Indonesia are quite impressive.
On the other hand, Asia is also the ideological crucible of some of the world's ominous non-State forces. Maintaining economic growth, social development and harmony in the face of such disruptive forces will be a thorny problem for many years to come.
Responses to threats
This is a formidable challenge and no country, however large or powerful, has the wherewithal to insulate itself from such omnipresent threats, of which terrorism stoked by distorted religious radicalism is the latest and most grotesque manifestation.
Other universal concerns include threats from traffickers of drugs, arms, human beings, organised poachers, ships that clandestinely discharge oil and toxic cargo into the sea or onto the shores of unsuspecting and ill-informed States, mercenaries and modern-day pirates. In addition, there are several 'non-traditional security threats' as well.
These common challenges can only be faced through the common resolve of like-minded States, facilitated through multilateral structure as well as opportunities and mechanisms for constructive engagement. It will need a transformation in the way we think, and in the way we look at one another. It would also require those nations which have the necessary resources and wherewithal to take the lead in ensuring all forms of security to life, trade and property.
Concerted efforts at capability-enhancement and capacity-building of the smaller countries of the region, through active assistance of larger neighbours would be crucial to such efforts in the long term.
Shaping our immediate neighbourhood
Specifically, we have to be mindful of the need to assist our smaller neighbours in helping themselves. Our capability-enhancement and capacity-building initiatives with Sri Lanka, Seychelles, Maldives and Mauritius could be enhanced to a much greater degree, without the need for any kind of 'quid pro quo'.
I am convinced that as India grows in economic and military stature, it would have to take upon itself, the role of further enabling its neighbours in ways that would not only enhance their own security, but contribute positively to regional stability as well.
On the navy-to-navy level, the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium or IONS, which was launched in February last year, is a significant military maritime construct to bring together regional navies and aimed at addressing common concerns. Our diplomatic utterances with regard to our maritime neighbours must be backed by cohesive engagement.
This requires much greater integration of thought and action between the ministries of external affairs, defence and the Indian armed forces. Our maritime neighbours are the gateways to our strategic frontiers. We need to engage them as much as they need our presence and support. It would be imprudent of us to leave voids in this strategic neighbourhood and watch others extend their influence in our backyard.
Securing our maritime borders
A word on coordination of maritime security closer to our coast. Preventing ingress of terrorists from the sea is an abiding challenge. Our long and porous coastline and several island territories, many of which are uninhabited, offer avenues for infiltration of men and material into our heartland, as well as safe havens for clandestine activities.
Intrusions via the sea are extremely difficult to prevent with our current state of material and organisational preparedness, as we were rudely shocked to realise, when the perpetrators of the Mumbai terror attacks breached the shores with impunity.
With a host of ministries and agencies being stake holders in the maritime arena, any attempt at coastal security will warrant a serious 'whole-of-government' approach, and robust coordination.
The entire sequence of surveillance extending out well beyond our Exclusive Economic Zone, suspicion indication, risk and threat assessments and finally investigation and prosecution is a very complex process, demanding a high level of situational awareness, rapid response and total synergy between all concerned enforcement agencies.
This kind of a capability is also technology-intensive, and obviously very expensive to set up and maintain. However, it must be done in the interest of national security, if we are to prevent intrusions and attacks through the sea route.
Our acute consciousness of 'turf guarding' must give way to a more synergistic way of functioning. A modest beginning has been made, which has to be sustained through concerted efforts of all stake holders, adequate funding and most of all, public awareness.
Internal security
I also need to flag our growing involvement in internal security tasks. Over the past decade-and-a-half, 'internal security' requirements have grown phenomenally. There are unrests of various shades and hues in different states of our country, borne out of equally diverse causative factors.
The addressing of these causes and maintenance of order are, nearly in all cases, a matter of internal governance and therefore, squarely within the purview of the civil administration and the police forces.
The rampant spread of left-wing extremism is particularly worrying and tackling the problem requires a well-thought out strategy.
However, the increasing demand on the armed forces to assume 'law and order' responsibilities is clearly an undesirable trend. While 'aid to civil authority' is a mandated role of the armed forces and they will deliver whenever ordered, this must always be a 'last resort' and 'temporary' measure to be expeditiously withdrawn when the critical need is met.
The armed forces must never be seen as being used 'against' our own population -- the irreversible damage of such action is there for all of us to see in our neighbourhood.
Intelligence
Much has also been reported about our handling of intelligence in the past and also in the aftermath of the 1999 Kargil war and more recently, the Mumbai terror attacks. Our intelligence agencies need to be more focussed towards long term intelligence forecasting and therefore, must direct efforts towards anticipatory security planning -- predicated on actionable intelligence inputs, in addition to immediate and short-term requirements.
Cohesion amongst intelligence agencies and sharing of intelligence in a far more integrated manner is an operational necessity. Integration between all organs of government dealing with intelligence and seamless acquisition, processing of strategic, operational and tactical intelligence and its timely dissemination is of essence.
Information exchange mechanisms with other friendly countries also need to be facilitated to enhance domain awareness in different arenas.
Cyber Warfare and Web Espionage
One field, in which awareness is, at best, nebulous, is cyber warfare. The annual Virtual Criminology Report of 2007, authored by McAfee, warned that international cyber espionage was set to be the biggest single threat to national security in 2008. It claimed that some 120 plus countries are already on the web espionage bandwagon.
Primary targets include critical national infrastructure network systems with electricity, air traffic control, financial markets and government computer networks taking centre-stage. Reports suggest that the USA, Russia and China have acquired considerable capability in this domain.
The Indian armed forces are increasingly investing in networked operations, both singly and a joint fashion. We cannot, therefore, afford to be vulnerable to cyber attacks.
Information Technology is our country's known strength and it would be in our interest to leverage this strength in developing a formidable 'offensive' and 'defensive' cyber warfare capability. Harnessing the gene pool available in academia, private industry and the younger generation of talented individuals is imperative.
Nuclear Issues
Just a brief mention of nuclear issues Speaking at the launch of our first indigenously designed and built nuclear-powered submarine 'Arihant' on July 26, Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh said: 'We do not have any aggressive designs nor do we seek to threaten anyone. We seek an external environment in our region and beyond, that is conducive to our peaceful development and the protection of our value systems. Nevertheless it is incumbent upon us to take all measures necessary to safeguard our country and to keep pace with technological advancements worldwide. It has rightly been said that eternal vigilance is the price of liberty.'
We have had a well-thought our nuclear policy from the 1980s. India is committed to building a capability that will serve her interests and despite several attempts to 'isolate' us in the field of nuclear technology, especially post-1998, we have walked the path alone and created a capability that is recognised today, albeit grudgingly.
We have a draft nuclear doctrine in place, which is restrained, in keeping with our traditional national culture.
Our efforts at achieving credible deterrence are not just about weapons and platforms but also include well-thought out strategies, policies, targetting plans, command and control structures as well as an occasional demonstration of capability.
Our increasing forays in the nuclear field, both military and civilian, would require the highest assurances of nuclear surety and security within the country. This calls for substantial investments in safety and security procedures, testing of environmental parameters, accident prevention and disaster control as well as management.
It also requires a very high degree of awareness and public transparency in proving that our nuclear assets and establishments do not pose a hazard in any way to the population at large
The culture of strategic thinking
I will now return to two somewhat larger issues. Firstly, a word about the intellectual framework to support our National Security Planning. Any coherent National Security Strategy is the outcome of a long-term vision. Envisioning any long-term perspective calls for a deep and involved thought process. In other words, a culture of strategic thinking. John F Kennedy had once remarked: 'Too often... we enjoy the comfort of opinion without the discomfort of thought'.
Strategic decision-making cannot be guided by 'opinion' but by serious 'thought' -- but the reverse is sometimes true. It is unfortunate that discussions on national security in our country have been left largely to think-tanks and academics, and whilst they may do some valuable work in this direction, they lack the executive powers to put thought into action.
For a country of our size and stature, institutionalised strategic thinking mechanism within and outside government is woefully inadequate.
In several established democracies, specialist think-tanks have access to government information on a graded basis. They are often given contracts for studies to be done for the government departments.
In India, we often, jealously guard information, even if it may be required by other government agencies in the execution of their legitimate official duties. Our media too, barring honourable exceptions, has very few people who specialise in defence, though of late a welcome start has been made.
We have to develop much greater mutual interaction between think-tanks, the government, its agencies and the media. In a democracy, the media must be critical -- it is intrinsic to the profession -- but not needlessly adversarial, which is often the case in our country.
The essence of his presentation in his own words was:"However, there is a sense that we may not have done adequately rigorous thinking on how to 'manage' our pre-ordained rise to global prominence. With the realisation of our aspirations and greater international recognition will come many more additional responsibilities...The country cannot afford to be indifferent and non-committal on any regional or global issue -- we must have an objective 'national interest assessment' on all questions of importance."
'National Security Challenges'
By Admiral Sureesh Mehta, Chief of Defence Staff and Chief of Naval Staff
We often hear that our rise to global prominence is inevitable. It is an incontestable fact that the significance of India as a rising power is being widely acknowledged, as has been witnessed by several events in the recent past, the most defining of which has perhaps been the inking of the agreement on civil nuclear cooperation with the United States.
Our growing economic status fuelled by a 300 million strong middle class, the demographic advantage of a burgeoning 'young population', our increasing ventures into high technology areas such as space, and future projections of national growth peg us amongst the world's top five economies by 2020. That is just 11 years away.
The professionalism and military might of the armed forces of India are respected the world over. The very recent launch of our very own nuclear submarine 'Arihant' has also sent out a strong signal of our desire to acquire the appropriate strategic military technology and capability.
Despite our several internal challenges and diversities, we are 'rock solid' as a democratic country, surrounded by an extended periphery of varying instability.
It is therefore not surprising that the role of a 'natural' regional power is expected of us. Our aspirations for inclusion as a permanent member of the UN Security Council and for a greater voice in international diplomacy are a result of these developments.
However, there is a sense that we may not have done adequately rigorous thinking on how to 'manage' our pre-ordained rise to global prominence. With the realisation of our aspirations and greater international recognition will come many more additional responsibilities.
The country cannot afford to be indifferent and non-committal on any regional or global issue -- we must have an objective 'national interest assessment' on all questions of importance.
As military forces of India, we would be expected to function as instruments of peace and stability in this rather fragile environment of the Indian Ocean region. We have to get our 'hands dirty' in addressing common concerns in our respective domains. This will call for increased participation in peace operations, efforts such as anti-piracy as also capacity-building and capability-enhancement of smaller and economically weaker nations which look up to us, for support and security.
We must also be seen far away from our shores, working with friendly nations and shaping perceptions, in furtherance of India's foreign policy. Quite evidently, the navy would lead efforts of military diplomacy, given the medium in which it operates and the distinctive characteristics of its platforms. If we pursue a meaningful foreign policy to advance national objectives -- as we do -- then the military instrument can complement this collective endeavour.
Coping with China
It is quite evident that coping with China will certainly be one of our primary challenges in the years ahead. China is in the process of 'consolidating' its comprehensive national power and creating formidable military capabilities.
Once that is done, China is likely to be more assertive on its claims, especially in its immediate neighbourhood. Our 'trust deficit' with China can never be liquidated unless our boundary problems are resolved. China's known propensity for 'intervention in space' and 'cyber-warfare' would also be major planning considerations in our strategic and operational thinking.
Common sense dictates that cooperation with China would be preferable to competition or conflict, as it would be foolhardy to compare India and China as equals. China's GDP is more than thrice that of ours and its per capita GDP is 2.2 times our own. China's early steps to liberalise its economy and invest heavily to modernise its physical infrastructure gave it a substantial edge over India, and made China a more preferred destination for FDI.
India's annual defence expenditure (approximately $30 billion for 2008-2009) is less than half of what China spends on defence. China's official figure is under $40 billion, but it is widely believed that China actually spends more than twice as much. Studies by US think-tanks peg China's defence spending to be anything between $70 billion to $200 billion.
Whether in terms of GDP, defence spending or any other economic, social or development parameters, the gap between the two is just too wide to bridge (and getting wider by the day). In military terms, both conventional and non-conventional, we neither have the capability nor the intention to match China, force for force. These are indeed sobering thoughts and therefore our strategy to deal with China would need to be in consonance with these realities.
The economic penalties resulting from a military conflict would have grave consequences for both nations. It would therefore, undoubtedly be in both our interests, to cooperate with each other in mutually beneficial endeavours, and ensure that the potential for conflict is minimised. This would require pro-active economic, diplomatic, cultural and people-to-people engagement. Our relations with other major powers, notably the USA, Russia, Japan and other East Asian nations need to be nurtured and leveraged to this end.
Our growing relations with South East and East Asian countries would increase opportunities for cooperative engagement with China as well. Since resolution of the border problems, autonomy of Tibet, the China-Pakistan connection, competition for strategic space in the Indian Ocean and management of water resources would be the prime causative factors for any potential tension with China, our diplomatic focus on these issues would have to be maintained.
On the military front, our strategy to deal with China must include reducing the military gap and countering the growing Chinese footprint in the Indian Ocean region. The traditional or 'attritionist' approach of matching 'division for division' must give way to harnessing modern technology for developing high situational awareness and creating a reliable stand-off deterrent.
The non-State actors
Today, we have come to live in an era characterised by the rise of sinister non-State forces which have redefined security responses the world over.
We have witnessed an even more worrying phenomenon of the occasional coalescing of the 'State' with some 'non-State' entities which has created an evil-hybrid. This hybrid, to my mind, has been at the very root of the tragic events in Mumbai in November 2008.
Where should we direct our security efforts? Towards the State-sponsor or the non-State entity? How do we expose the linkages, if any? We have been grappling with this problem for some time now with no satisfactory solution emerging.
Asia today, is witnessing the historical and simultaneous rise of at least four major powers namely, India, China, Japan and the ten countries of ASEAN. Even in these recessionary times, the economic performances of India, China and Indonesia are quite impressive.
On the other hand, Asia is also the ideological crucible of some of the world's ominous non-State forces. Maintaining economic growth, social development and harmony in the face of such disruptive forces will be a thorny problem for many years to come.
Responses to threats
This is a formidable challenge and no country, however large or powerful, has the wherewithal to insulate itself from such omnipresent threats, of which terrorism stoked by distorted religious radicalism is the latest and most grotesque manifestation.
Other universal concerns include threats from traffickers of drugs, arms, human beings, organised poachers, ships that clandestinely discharge oil and toxic cargo into the sea or onto the shores of unsuspecting and ill-informed States, mercenaries and modern-day pirates. In addition, there are several 'non-traditional security threats' as well.
These common challenges can only be faced through the common resolve of like-minded States, facilitated through multilateral structure as well as opportunities and mechanisms for constructive engagement. It will need a transformation in the way we think, and in the way we look at one another. It would also require those nations which have the necessary resources and wherewithal to take the lead in ensuring all forms of security to life, trade and property.
Concerted efforts at capability-enhancement and capacity-building of the smaller countries of the region, through active assistance of larger neighbours would be crucial to such efforts in the long term.
Shaping our immediate neighbourhood
Specifically, we have to be mindful of the need to assist our smaller neighbours in helping themselves. Our capability-enhancement and capacity-building initiatives with Sri Lanka, Seychelles, Maldives and Mauritius could be enhanced to a much greater degree, without the need for any kind of 'quid pro quo'.
I am convinced that as India grows in economic and military stature, it would have to take upon itself, the role of further enabling its neighbours in ways that would not only enhance their own security, but contribute positively to regional stability as well.
On the navy-to-navy level, the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium or IONS, which was launched in February last year, is a significant military maritime construct to bring together regional navies and aimed at addressing common concerns. Our diplomatic utterances with regard to our maritime neighbours must be backed by cohesive engagement.
This requires much greater integration of thought and action between the ministries of external affairs, defence and the Indian armed forces. Our maritime neighbours are the gateways to our strategic frontiers. We need to engage them as much as they need our presence and support. It would be imprudent of us to leave voids in this strategic neighbourhood and watch others extend their influence in our backyard.
Securing our maritime borders
A word on coordination of maritime security closer to our coast. Preventing ingress of terrorists from the sea is an abiding challenge. Our long and porous coastline and several island territories, many of which are uninhabited, offer avenues for infiltration of men and material into our heartland, as well as safe havens for clandestine activities.
Intrusions via the sea are extremely difficult to prevent with our current state of material and organisational preparedness, as we were rudely shocked to realise, when the perpetrators of the Mumbai terror attacks breached the shores with impunity.
With a host of ministries and agencies being stake holders in the maritime arena, any attempt at coastal security will warrant a serious 'whole-of-government' approach, and robust coordination.
The entire sequence of surveillance extending out well beyond our Exclusive Economic Zone, suspicion indication, risk and threat assessments and finally investigation and prosecution is a very complex process, demanding a high level of situational awareness, rapid response and total synergy between all concerned enforcement agencies.
This kind of a capability is also technology-intensive, and obviously very expensive to set up and maintain. However, it must be done in the interest of national security, if we are to prevent intrusions and attacks through the sea route.
Our acute consciousness of 'turf guarding' must give way to a more synergistic way of functioning. A modest beginning has been made, which has to be sustained through concerted efforts of all stake holders, adequate funding and most of all, public awareness.
Internal security
I also need to flag our growing involvement in internal security tasks. Over the past decade-and-a-half, 'internal security' requirements have grown phenomenally. There are unrests of various shades and hues in different states of our country, borne out of equally diverse causative factors.
The addressing of these causes and maintenance of order are, nearly in all cases, a matter of internal governance and therefore, squarely within the purview of the civil administration and the police forces.
The rampant spread of left-wing extremism is particularly worrying and tackling the problem requires a well-thought out strategy.
However, the increasing demand on the armed forces to assume 'law and order' responsibilities is clearly an undesirable trend. While 'aid to civil authority' is a mandated role of the armed forces and they will deliver whenever ordered, this must always be a 'last resort' and 'temporary' measure to be expeditiously withdrawn when the critical need is met.
The armed forces must never be seen as being used 'against' our own population -- the irreversible damage of such action is there for all of us to see in our neighbourhood.
Intelligence
Much has also been reported about our handling of intelligence in the past and also in the aftermath of the 1999 Kargil war and more recently, the Mumbai terror attacks. Our intelligence agencies need to be more focussed towards long term intelligence forecasting and therefore, must direct efforts towards anticipatory security planning -- predicated on actionable intelligence inputs, in addition to immediate and short-term requirements.
Cohesion amongst intelligence agencies and sharing of intelligence in a far more integrated manner is an operational necessity. Integration between all organs of government dealing with intelligence and seamless acquisition, processing of strategic, operational and tactical intelligence and its timely dissemination is of essence.
Information exchange mechanisms with other friendly countries also need to be facilitated to enhance domain awareness in different arenas.
Cyber Warfare and Web Espionage
One field, in which awareness is, at best, nebulous, is cyber warfare. The annual Virtual Criminology Report of 2007, authored by McAfee, warned that international cyber espionage was set to be the biggest single threat to national security in 2008. It claimed that some 120 plus countries are already on the web espionage bandwagon.
Primary targets include critical national infrastructure network systems with electricity, air traffic control, financial markets and government computer networks taking centre-stage. Reports suggest that the USA, Russia and China have acquired considerable capability in this domain.
The Indian armed forces are increasingly investing in networked operations, both singly and a joint fashion. We cannot, therefore, afford to be vulnerable to cyber attacks.
Information Technology is our country's known strength and it would be in our interest to leverage this strength in developing a formidable 'offensive' and 'defensive' cyber warfare capability. Harnessing the gene pool available in academia, private industry and the younger generation of talented individuals is imperative.
Nuclear Issues
Just a brief mention of nuclear issues Speaking at the launch of our first indigenously designed and built nuclear-powered submarine 'Arihant' on July 26, Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh said: 'We do not have any aggressive designs nor do we seek to threaten anyone. We seek an external environment in our region and beyond, that is conducive to our peaceful development and the protection of our value systems. Nevertheless it is incumbent upon us to take all measures necessary to safeguard our country and to keep pace with technological advancements worldwide. It has rightly been said that eternal vigilance is the price of liberty.'
We have had a well-thought our nuclear policy from the 1980s. India is committed to building a capability that will serve her interests and despite several attempts to 'isolate' us in the field of nuclear technology, especially post-1998, we have walked the path alone and created a capability that is recognised today, albeit grudgingly.
We have a draft nuclear doctrine in place, which is restrained, in keeping with our traditional national culture.
Our efforts at achieving credible deterrence are not just about weapons and platforms but also include well-thought out strategies, policies, targetting plans, command and control structures as well as an occasional demonstration of capability.
Our increasing forays in the nuclear field, both military and civilian, would require the highest assurances of nuclear surety and security within the country. This calls for substantial investments in safety and security procedures, testing of environmental parameters, accident prevention and disaster control as well as management.
It also requires a very high degree of awareness and public transparency in proving that our nuclear assets and establishments do not pose a hazard in any way to the population at large
The culture of strategic thinking
I will now return to two somewhat larger issues. Firstly, a word about the intellectual framework to support our National Security Planning. Any coherent National Security Strategy is the outcome of a long-term vision. Envisioning any long-term perspective calls for a deep and involved thought process. In other words, a culture of strategic thinking. John F Kennedy had once remarked: 'Too often... we enjoy the comfort of opinion without the discomfort of thought'.
Strategic decision-making cannot be guided by 'opinion' but by serious 'thought' -- but the reverse is sometimes true. It is unfortunate that discussions on national security in our country have been left largely to think-tanks and academics, and whilst they may do some valuable work in this direction, they lack the executive powers to put thought into action.
For a country of our size and stature, institutionalised strategic thinking mechanism within and outside government is woefully inadequate.
In several established democracies, specialist think-tanks have access to government information on a graded basis. They are often given contracts for studies to be done for the government departments.
In India, we often, jealously guard information, even if it may be required by other government agencies in the execution of their legitimate official duties. Our media too, barring honourable exceptions, has very few people who specialise in defence, though of late a welcome start has been made.
We have to develop much greater mutual interaction between think-tanks, the government, its agencies and the media. In a democracy, the media must be critical -- it is intrinsic to the profession -- but not needlessly adversarial, which is often the case in our country.
Thursday, August 13, 2009
Revisiting India's Sri Lanka Policy Options
[This article written on July 8, 2009 has been published in DIALOGUE quarterly journal Volume 10 No 5 July-September 2009 issue. It is reproduced here courtesy DIALOGUE (www.asthabharati.org) who hold the copyright.]
By Col R Hariharan
INTRODUCTION
The Sri Lanka’s security forces’ remarkable success in inflicting a crushing defeat on the Tamil separatist insurgents of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Tigers (LTTE) in the Eelam War IV in May 2009 has wide implications not only for the struggle of minority Tamil population for autonomy but also in the context of India – Sri Lanka relations.
In the course of their three years of war, the security forces have regained control of nearly 16,000 square km of territory which was dominated by the LTTE. They have also eliminated at least 15,000 LTTE cadres and captured or destroyed millions of rupees worth of LTTE’s arms and military equipment. Another 9000 cadres have been captured or surrendered. With the elimination of Velupillai Prabhakaran, the heart and soul of the LTTE, along with most of the key leaders in the last few days of war, the security forces have minimised the chances of a military revival of the Tamil insurgent group making a comeback. And the security forces plan to be present in the Tamil areas for an indefinite period to carry out operations to prevent resurgence of the LTTE.
India and Sri Lanka, though unequal in size, population, economic strength and international clout, have generally had healthy and cordial relations. The strong ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious links between the two countries have resulted in the development of close – almost umbilical – relationship at the people to people level. One reason for this is the people of Sri Lanka – including Sinhalas, Tamils and Muslims – consider India as the ‘Mother Country.’
However, there had been ups and downs in the relationship between the two nations mainly due to the ebb tides of their differing perceptions on local, national and international priorities. Issues relating to geo-strategic security, and status of people of Indian origin in Sri Lanka were the two main issues that had dominated the relationship between the two countries till the 'Black July pogrom' of July 1983 and the developments in its aftermath started occupying prominent space in India’s relations with Sri Lanka.
Sri Lanka’s problem with Tamil minority population is over half a century old. The Tamils clamouring for equal rights from 1956 onwards when Sinhala nationalism emerged a major factor in politics, with increased dominance of Sinhala language and culture, leading to progressive alienation of Tamils from the national mainstream.. The Tamil political confrontation progressively degenerated with the state’s increasing use of force to handle the Tamil agitators.
As Tamils politicians lost their credibility to remedy the situation popular support for a new breed of militants increased. Prabhakaran and the LTTE came into limelight in July 1983 when he led an ambush of Sri Lanka army convoy in which 13 soldiers were killed. In retribution violent mobs instigated by the state and Sinhala leaders carried out a pogrom against Tamils. In the unprecedented violence hundreds of Tamils were killed and thousands fled the country.
When thousands of Tamil refugees including militants poured into Tamil Nadu in the wake of the riots there was a huge wave of public sympathy. Mrs Indira Gandhi, prime minister of India, had a sympathetic understanding of the plight of Sri Lanka Tamils and it suited her geo-political strategy to take active interest in Sri Lanka affairs from 1983 onwards. It also offered a political opportunity for her party – the Congress party – to strengthen itself in Tamil Nadu.
As a result New Delhi helped the Tamil militant groups with arms and military training. A large number of LTTE cadres were also among the Tamil militants of various groups trained in India. Sri Lanka security forces launched a major offensive against the militants in 1983.
From 1983 to 87 the objective of India's active engagement with Sri Lanka was two fold. India wanted to help Sri Lanka government and the Tamils to evolve a workable solution to the Tamil problem as it was wary of the emergence of an independent Tamil Eelam nation out of Sri Lanka. At the same time, India also wanted to prevent Sri Lanka turning into cockpit of American domination intruding in India's sphere of influence.
India’s Sri Lanka policy has always had strategic considerations as lynchpin as Sri Lanka is the vanguard of India’s peninsular and Indian Ocean security. As a corollary any external influence in the island nation is of security concern to India. It was this strategic concern that guided India’s policy of active intervention in Sri Lanka from 1987 to 90. Sri Lanka also recognised India’s concerns when it signed the India-Sri Lanka Agreement in 1987.
The agreement had two major goals. The first was the strategic consideration of preventing entry of external powers gaining a foothold in Sri Lanka was also one of the reasons for India’s steadfast support for a united Sri Lanka, within India’s area of influence. Strategic consideration had also dictated India’s consistent opposition to the creation of an independent Tamil Eelam as demanded by sections of Tamil minority.
The second major aim which had both strategic and political elements was to ensure the Sri Lankan Tamil quest for equity and autonomy was resolved amicably within a united Sri Lanka. It was in India’s strategic interest to ensure that there was no internal turbulence within its close neighbour. The large Tamil speaking population segment within India also wanted India to help their brethren across the Palk Strait to get their just rights. India's political efforts earlier at Thimphu talks to bring the two sides to work out a solution at failed; however, it was Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's relentless pursuit to find a solution that saw the signing of the India-Sri Lanka Agreement in 1987.
The agreement paved the way for grant of limited autonomy for Tamils and the creation of a united northeast province for Tamils. As a part of the deal, all Tamil militant groups, including the LTTE, had initially agreed to conform to the agreement. However, the LTTE refused to give up its arms because it doubted the sincerity of India as well as Sri Lanka’s intentions to adhere to the agreement. Moreover, the agreement fell short of the LTTE’s goal of creating an independent state of Tamil Eelam.
As a consequence, the Indian Peace Keeping Force sent to Sri Lanka to assist the implementation of the 1987 agreement made a bid to disarm the LTTE resulting in a prolonged. India pulled out the troops in 1990 after the Sri Lanka President Premadasa and the LTTE leader Prabhakaran colluded to show India out of the country. The LTTE’s assassination of former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Sri Lankan Tamil leaders taking refuge in India in Indian soil resulted in the banning of the LTTE as a terrorist organisation in India in 1992. The public sympathy for Tamil militants in Tamil Nadu, particularly for the LTTE, took a nosedive thereafter. After these acts of double jeopardy, India had scrupulously avoided active or direct involvement in Sri Lanka.
INDIA -SRI LANKA RELATIONS AFTER 1992
Development of India-Sri Lanka relations after 1992 has undergone a contextual change in tandem with changes in India’s foreign policy perceptions.
After the end of the cold war and the emergence of the U.S. as the sole super power, India's foreign policy perceptions have also changed. In keeping with the changing global economic and trade scenario, India's strategic priorities in Indian Ocean Region have also undergone a change during the last two decades. India’s national security perceptions have now been enlarged to include economic security, free trade and commerce, energy security, and social security of the population in addition to territorial integrity.
Building better India - U.S relations has become an important component of India's strategic linkages to globally safeguard its interests. The Indo-US civil nuclear agreement and the growing strategic convergence between the two countries are part of the changes taking place that would have a direct consequence in the region. The U.S. engaged in the global war on terror sees India as an important ally because India bridges the Islamic world and the rest of Asia.
In a bid to expand India's commercial reach India in East Asia it is trying to build close relations with ASEAN countries. It has signed a Free Trade Agreement with Thailand as a part of this policy. India is also trying to improve its relations with Myanmar. India is developing infrastructure through Myanmar to develop physical links with the ASEAN region. India hopes to use it as a gateway for trade with ASEAN for the troubled India's northeast.
There is increasing Chinese presence in South Asia among India’s neighbouring countries. While this is part of China’s desire to emerge as a global power, may see India as a counterpoise to check the assertion of Chinese power in South Asia. While this is partly true, India would like to develop a friendly rather than confrontational relation with China.
At the same time, India will have to safeguard its interests particularly in the Indian Ocean region. The sea-lanes of Indian Ocean have become vital for India's expanding global trade. They carry fossil fuels so vital for India's ever increasing energy needs. Indian navy's development as a blue water navy is underway to protect its maritime and economic interests.
The changes in global fiscal, economic and trading relationships and the emergence of Islamist terrorism as a major international threat have also brought about a number of changes in international relationships. India-Sri Lanka relations have also developed in keeping with these changes.
India's shift in relationship with Sri Lanka has to be understood in this broad strategic context, than in the background of its historical baggage. India’s Sri Lanka relations are now broad based with economic agenda as a priority followed by strategic considerations. India's strategic interest in Sri Lanka has been enlarged to protect and project India's strategic and economic interests by building strong bonds with Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka was the first country with which India signed a Free Trade Agreement; the trade between the two countries is expected to grow to $ 4 billion by the year 2010. There is greater appreciation between the two countries of the other's problems and perceptions.
Inevitably the changes in India's strategic perception were reflected in its present approach to Sri Lanka’s wars against the LTTE, particularly after the failure of the peace process 2002. Its role had been limited as an advisor and counsellor not only to Sri Lanka but to the four co-chairs - the European Union, Japan, Norway and the U.S - who promoted the peace process. The experience of India’s active intervention between the years 1983-91 appears to have brought about two realisations in India’s Sri Lanka policy making:
• India's strategic involvement in Sri Lanka should be broad based. It should have a firm foundation based upon long-term engagement avoiding reactive intervention.
• As far as the vexing issue of Tamil rights, India should facilitate rather than force the Sri Lanka government and the Tamils to achieve a durable solution.
India had scrupulously kept out of Sri Lanka’s war with the LTTE despite strong internal political pressure from coalition partners in Tamil Nadu. India’s agenda for Sri Lanka had mainly focused on strategic security cooperation and building of trade linkages. In fact, India declined to accept President Rajapaksa’s invitation to India to join the peace process extended soon after he took over as President in 2006.
Perhaps an un-stated reason for India’s laid back profile in Sri Lanka affairs was emergence of the LTTE as the sole arbiter of Tamil struggle after 1992. After Indian troops left Sri Lanka shores in 1990, LTTE cleverly used the anti Indian sentiments created due to the IPKF war, to strengthen its power base among sections of Tamil Diaspora. This enabled the LTTE to build its fire power, financial and logistic resources network with the help of the Diaspora to fight its wars from 1992 to the very end in 2009.
The LTTE’s self assumed role as the sole spokesman of Sri Lanka Tamils got a tacit international recognition when it signed the Oslo Accord with Sri Lanka in 2002. As per the Accord the two sides agreed to enter a peace process to find a federal solution to meet the Tamil aspirations. In the Norwegian mediated peace process it was the LTTE that represented Tamil interests in the talks with Sri Lanka. This perhaps precluded India’s direct participation in the peace process under the leadership of the four co-chairs.
IMPACT OF EELAM WAR IN SRI LANKA
The Eelam War IV and its aftermath have wrought quite a few changes in Sri Lanka which will have to be taken into India’s foreign policy prescriptions of the future. Some of them are strategic issues while others are political.
Perhaps for the first time there was minimal Indian influence in Sri Lanka’s military success. This would indicate India consciously refraining from using the ethnic conflict to its strategic advantage in sharp contrast to India’s high profile involvement in Sri Lanka’s Sinhala-Tamil confrontation since Mrs Indira Gandhi’s times. In its new equation with Sri Lanka, India did not substantially contribute not only to either the peace process 2002 or the war that followed its collapse. This ‘hands off’ attitude is likely to be a precedence and condition India-Sri Lanka relationship in the future.
EMERGENCE OF A STRONG SRI LANKA
The resounding success of Sri Lanka against the LTTE was mainly due to the strong leadership of President Mahinda Rajapaksa. He had provided the impetus to focus the whole national effort on the sole objective of eliminating the LTTE as a power centre confronting the state. He has considered achieving military success as the only national priority disregarding to international allegations of human rights violations, curtailment of freedom of expression, and absence of rule of law. In order to build his political power base to carry on his mission he has not hesitated to split almost all the political parties. His two brothers – Basil and Gotabaya Rajapakse had been the architects of translating his goal into achievement. Along with the Army Commander General Sarath Fonseka, this triumvirate probably exercise strong influence on the President’s policy making.
Thus President Rajapaksa is emerging as an unchallenged leader with enormous powers conferred by the executive presidency. In all likelihood, President Rajapaksa will be re-elected for a second six-year presidential term ending only in 2018.
The Sri Lanka security armed forces including the police force are now 340,000 strong. The armed forces strength has grown to 200,000. Despite some limitations they have emerged after the war as a well knitted professionally competent, battle tested fighting force. According to the Army Commander General Sarath Fonseka, the army is to be expanded into a force of 300,000. In actual terms it would be bigger than some of the armies of Europe – Britain, Germany, Italy or France. Thanks to their military success, the security forces, riding the crest of popularity, are likely to emerge as another power centre in Sri Lanka in the coming years. Oversized armed forces in a small country like Sri Lanka could wield influence in policy making at national level. They could also put political leadership under pressure.
DEVOLUTION OF POWERS TO TAMILS
The India-Sri Lanka Agreement 1987 has been tardily implemented. In fact, the partial powers of autonomy promised through the 13th amendment to the Sri Lanka constitution that came in the wake of the Agreement, it has not been implemented. The 14th amendment which recognised Tamil as a national language is far from in its rightful place. India continued to adopt low profile diplomatic channels to take up the implementation of the 13th amendment without significant results.
This issue assumes significance as Tamil aspirations for autonomy remain unfulfilled despite the promise of the President. Even the small beginning made with the 13th amendment and the creation of the provincial councils have not been taken to its logical conclusion to devolve powers to Tamil speaking minority. This has been demonstrated in the case of eastern province where the elections were held last year with a lot of fanfare and rhetoric on empowering the first-ever Tamil chief minister of eastern province.
The absence of Prabhakaran and the exit of the LTTE as a power centre from the scene have created a vacuum in Sri Lanka Tamil political leadership. Marginalisation of Tamil politicians during the active years of LTTE dominance from 1991 onwards have left them without organisational reach at the grass root level in the north and east. In their scramble for power are in a scramble for power, they are neither united nor clearly goal oriented. With the overwhelming presence of President Rajapaksa at the helm, distinct identity of Tamil politicians are likely to be limited to the traditional Tamil “vote banks” only. Thus President Rajapaksa is in a position to decide what is good for Tamils, rather than what Tamils demand or desire.
The war has left nearly 300,000 Tamils as internally displaced persons living in camps under the control of the army. They have minimal facilities and are not allowed to move freely. They are being screened to weed out the LTTE elements among them. It is unlikely they would be allowed to return to their homes within next six months, though Sri Lanka has promised the international community to do so. The army also proposes to pursue its operations against the LTTE and for this purpose nearly four divisions of troops are proposed to be stationed in permanent garrisons in the north. This is likely to increase the uneasiness among the population as the troops are predominantly Sinhala.
In any case villages are mostly ravaged by war and their livelihoods non existent. The first priority of Tamil politicians should be to get them back to their villages so that they start their normal avocations. As Tamil polity has little leverage, Sri Lanka is likely to act only under international pressure, particularly from India.
In the President’s sweeping style of governance there has been a lot of disconnect between promises and actions, not only relating to the Tamil issue but other issues as well. In view of this, unless there is an external pressure the President is likely to take up the implementation of 13th amendment at his own pace. Tamil aspirations are unlikely to be satisfied with the political dispensation offered to them. Thus the potential of Tamil discontent turning into militancy in the distant future is very much there.
CHANGES IN STRATEGIC PRESENCE
China has become a valuable partner of Sri Lanka in the pursuit of its military option. Thus China has partly filled the vacuum created by India’s reluctance to actively participate in Sri Lanka’s war effort. While India had been constrained due to political compulsions from supplying the weapons Sri Lanka needed, China filled in the gap with liberal supply of a wide variety armaments. Timely help rendered during the war has enabled China to gain a lot of strategic space and credibility in Sri Lanka.
Coupled with economic assistance and aid extended to Sri Lanka, China has become a critical partner in Sri Lanka’s economic survival particularly in the face of strong Western threat to curtail economic aid in retaliation for Sri Lanka’s failure in the human rights front. The Chinese are constructing a commercial port complex in Hambantota in the south and thus their presence in Sri Lanka is likely to be firmed in. In the coming years, Chinese influence in Sri Lanka can be expected not only to increase but become more assertive.
The U.S. has also been an active player in Sri Lanka both in promoting the peace process 2002 and later in supporting Sri Lanka’s war effort. However, on issues relating to Sri Lanka, the U.S. had been maintaining close contact with India, its ‘strategic ally’ in the region. This was also maintained during the war despite differences on some key issues between the two countries. It is evident that the U.S. values India has unique geographic and strategic advantage in Sri Lanka; this relationship is likely to be strengthened to balance the increasing Chinese profile in the region. The U.S. is also probably wary of Iran’s moves in Sri Lanka after it has extended a billion dollars in aid.
Pakistan also emerged as a significant arms supplier to Sri Lanka during the war. However, despite this Pakistan’s activity is likely to be circumscribed for the time being due to its internal political preoccupations of the government as well as its actions to come to terms with the Taliban and Al Qaeda terrorism politically as well as militarily. However, Sri Lanka is likely to emerge as an alternate hub for Pakistan intelligence agencies to eavesdrop on India and carry out its intelligence operations.
INDIA’S POLICY PRESCRIPTION
Sri Lanka has emerged as a strong and more powerful nation after the success in the Eelam war. Of course, it has to sustain it with appropriate political dispensation to prevent the resurgence of Tamil militancy once again. However, during the course of the war, it had also become a scene of global power play as part of Indian Ocean security. In the coming years we can expect this to continue with the increasing presence and influence of both China and the U.S.
India has to evolve a new paradigm to handle the emerging strategic setting in Sri Lanka with its impact on Indian Ocean security. India will have to work out an integrated strategy to make itself more relevant to Sri Lanka than other powers. There is a need to take measures to remove Sri Lanka’s latent fear of India’s overwhelming influence subsuming its national interests. This can be achieved only by building mutual confidence in the long term.
Greater cooperation and coordination in political, military and diplomatic fields can lead to better strategic understanding. This would involve integrating its political, economic and military strategies with adequate sensitivity to Sri Lanka’s new found pride. India has to be persuasive but persistent in following up the Tamil issue to take its logical end of meeting their just demands for equity. India needs to display more involvement to actively participate in matters relating to relief and rehabilitation in the war torn area.
India and Sri Lanka have a long history of military cooperation. The existing asset of goodwill on this count should be built upon for evolving greater strategic convergence. One option could be to formalise the India-Sri Lanka defence treaty now held in suspended animation.
Sri Lanka can be a strategic asset for India only if there is peace and stability in the country. However, to achieve this India will have to play a more prominent role on two fronts: help to get out of the ravages of war, and to politically resolve the Tamil-Sinhala ethnic divide.
Sri Lanka needs massive reconstruction and rehabilitation effort to quickly produce results. India has already allocated Rs 500 crores for Sri Lanka’s reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts. This might not prove adequate. India with its huge pool of skilled workforce can take up this challenge, jointly with private-public sector participation from both countries. The local people in north and east face a number of problems in housing, health and sanitation facilities and educational institutions to get out of the trauma of war. The region also requires a lot of de-mining effort. India has the expertise and ability to assist in all these fields. The first priority would be to make the infrastructure functional as early as possible to enable the displaced people resume their normal lives. Indian investment can create job opportunities in the troubled north and wean away youth from recourse to militancy.
As regards the Tamil-Sinhala divide, the healing process is likely to take a long time. Tamil population feel a lack of security and trust in the Sri Lanka government to meet their just demands. The government’s lack of urgency in implementing 13th amendment despite promises to do so has not increased its credibility. Tamils feel that India had not done enough to ensure its speedy implementation. They also feel that India is not pressurising the Sri Lanka government to improve the handling of 300,000 displaced Tamils held in camps and speedily complete their screening process. India needs to forcefully take up both the issues with Colombo.
India will have to take steps to increase people to people contact with Sri Lanka. Sri Lankans should be enabled to freely travel in India to broaden their vistas and see how ethnic amity works. Indian technical education institutions should be thrown open to Sri Lanka students.
There are a few other contentious issues dogging the relations between the two countries like the traditional fishing rights of fisherman in each others waters. Joint mechanisms have to be evolved to handle such issues on a regular basis.
As coalition politics has come to stay in New Delhi, the reaction of Tamil Nadu will always be an important factor influencing India’s Sri Lanka policy. The Sri Lanka Tamil issue was never the main piece of Tamil Nadu public or political agenda. But it has remained a key issue. This was amply demonstrated in the recent parliamentary poll, when the pro-LTTE political entities in Tamil Nadu did not succeed despite flogging the issue of war in Sri Lanka. The issue stands downgraded in Tamil Nadu at present. Greater transparency and taking the people into confidence in evolving the policy can help New Delhi increase its credibility among the people of Tamil Nadu. They will be the first to appreciate India’s efforts to help the Sri Lanka Tamils to gain their just demands.
By Col R Hariharan
INTRODUCTION
The Sri Lanka’s security forces’ remarkable success in inflicting a crushing defeat on the Tamil separatist insurgents of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Tigers (LTTE) in the Eelam War IV in May 2009 has wide implications not only for the struggle of minority Tamil population for autonomy but also in the context of India – Sri Lanka relations.
In the course of their three years of war, the security forces have regained control of nearly 16,000 square km of territory which was dominated by the LTTE. They have also eliminated at least 15,000 LTTE cadres and captured or destroyed millions of rupees worth of LTTE’s arms and military equipment. Another 9000 cadres have been captured or surrendered. With the elimination of Velupillai Prabhakaran, the heart and soul of the LTTE, along with most of the key leaders in the last few days of war, the security forces have minimised the chances of a military revival of the Tamil insurgent group making a comeback. And the security forces plan to be present in the Tamil areas for an indefinite period to carry out operations to prevent resurgence of the LTTE.
India and Sri Lanka, though unequal in size, population, economic strength and international clout, have generally had healthy and cordial relations. The strong ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious links between the two countries have resulted in the development of close – almost umbilical – relationship at the people to people level. One reason for this is the people of Sri Lanka – including Sinhalas, Tamils and Muslims – consider India as the ‘Mother Country.’
However, there had been ups and downs in the relationship between the two nations mainly due to the ebb tides of their differing perceptions on local, national and international priorities. Issues relating to geo-strategic security, and status of people of Indian origin in Sri Lanka were the two main issues that had dominated the relationship between the two countries till the 'Black July pogrom' of July 1983 and the developments in its aftermath started occupying prominent space in India’s relations with Sri Lanka.
Sri Lanka’s problem with Tamil minority population is over half a century old. The Tamils clamouring for equal rights from 1956 onwards when Sinhala nationalism emerged a major factor in politics, with increased dominance of Sinhala language and culture, leading to progressive alienation of Tamils from the national mainstream.. The Tamil political confrontation progressively degenerated with the state’s increasing use of force to handle the Tamil agitators.
As Tamils politicians lost their credibility to remedy the situation popular support for a new breed of militants increased. Prabhakaran and the LTTE came into limelight in July 1983 when he led an ambush of Sri Lanka army convoy in which 13 soldiers were killed. In retribution violent mobs instigated by the state and Sinhala leaders carried out a pogrom against Tamils. In the unprecedented violence hundreds of Tamils were killed and thousands fled the country.
When thousands of Tamil refugees including militants poured into Tamil Nadu in the wake of the riots there was a huge wave of public sympathy. Mrs Indira Gandhi, prime minister of India, had a sympathetic understanding of the plight of Sri Lanka Tamils and it suited her geo-political strategy to take active interest in Sri Lanka affairs from 1983 onwards. It also offered a political opportunity for her party – the Congress party – to strengthen itself in Tamil Nadu.
As a result New Delhi helped the Tamil militant groups with arms and military training. A large number of LTTE cadres were also among the Tamil militants of various groups trained in India. Sri Lanka security forces launched a major offensive against the militants in 1983.
From 1983 to 87 the objective of India's active engagement with Sri Lanka was two fold. India wanted to help Sri Lanka government and the Tamils to evolve a workable solution to the Tamil problem as it was wary of the emergence of an independent Tamil Eelam nation out of Sri Lanka. At the same time, India also wanted to prevent Sri Lanka turning into cockpit of American domination intruding in India's sphere of influence.
India’s Sri Lanka policy has always had strategic considerations as lynchpin as Sri Lanka is the vanguard of India’s peninsular and Indian Ocean security. As a corollary any external influence in the island nation is of security concern to India. It was this strategic concern that guided India’s policy of active intervention in Sri Lanka from 1987 to 90. Sri Lanka also recognised India’s concerns when it signed the India-Sri Lanka Agreement in 1987.
The agreement had two major goals. The first was the strategic consideration of preventing entry of external powers gaining a foothold in Sri Lanka was also one of the reasons for India’s steadfast support for a united Sri Lanka, within India’s area of influence. Strategic consideration had also dictated India’s consistent opposition to the creation of an independent Tamil Eelam as demanded by sections of Tamil minority.
The second major aim which had both strategic and political elements was to ensure the Sri Lankan Tamil quest for equity and autonomy was resolved amicably within a united Sri Lanka. It was in India’s strategic interest to ensure that there was no internal turbulence within its close neighbour. The large Tamil speaking population segment within India also wanted India to help their brethren across the Palk Strait to get their just rights. India's political efforts earlier at Thimphu talks to bring the two sides to work out a solution at failed; however, it was Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's relentless pursuit to find a solution that saw the signing of the India-Sri Lanka Agreement in 1987.
The agreement paved the way for grant of limited autonomy for Tamils and the creation of a united northeast province for Tamils. As a part of the deal, all Tamil militant groups, including the LTTE, had initially agreed to conform to the agreement. However, the LTTE refused to give up its arms because it doubted the sincerity of India as well as Sri Lanka’s intentions to adhere to the agreement. Moreover, the agreement fell short of the LTTE’s goal of creating an independent state of Tamil Eelam.
As a consequence, the Indian Peace Keeping Force sent to Sri Lanka to assist the implementation of the 1987 agreement made a bid to disarm the LTTE resulting in a prolonged. India pulled out the troops in 1990 after the Sri Lanka President Premadasa and the LTTE leader Prabhakaran colluded to show India out of the country. The LTTE’s assassination of former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Sri Lankan Tamil leaders taking refuge in India in Indian soil resulted in the banning of the LTTE as a terrorist organisation in India in 1992. The public sympathy for Tamil militants in Tamil Nadu, particularly for the LTTE, took a nosedive thereafter. After these acts of double jeopardy, India had scrupulously avoided active or direct involvement in Sri Lanka.
INDIA -SRI LANKA RELATIONS AFTER 1992
Development of India-Sri Lanka relations after 1992 has undergone a contextual change in tandem with changes in India’s foreign policy perceptions.
After the end of the cold war and the emergence of the U.S. as the sole super power, India's foreign policy perceptions have also changed. In keeping with the changing global economic and trade scenario, India's strategic priorities in Indian Ocean Region have also undergone a change during the last two decades. India’s national security perceptions have now been enlarged to include economic security, free trade and commerce, energy security, and social security of the population in addition to territorial integrity.
Building better India - U.S relations has become an important component of India's strategic linkages to globally safeguard its interests. The Indo-US civil nuclear agreement and the growing strategic convergence between the two countries are part of the changes taking place that would have a direct consequence in the region. The U.S. engaged in the global war on terror sees India as an important ally because India bridges the Islamic world and the rest of Asia.
In a bid to expand India's commercial reach India in East Asia it is trying to build close relations with ASEAN countries. It has signed a Free Trade Agreement with Thailand as a part of this policy. India is also trying to improve its relations with Myanmar. India is developing infrastructure through Myanmar to develop physical links with the ASEAN region. India hopes to use it as a gateway for trade with ASEAN for the troubled India's northeast.
There is increasing Chinese presence in South Asia among India’s neighbouring countries. While this is part of China’s desire to emerge as a global power, may see India as a counterpoise to check the assertion of Chinese power in South Asia. While this is partly true, India would like to develop a friendly rather than confrontational relation with China.
At the same time, India will have to safeguard its interests particularly in the Indian Ocean region. The sea-lanes of Indian Ocean have become vital for India's expanding global trade. They carry fossil fuels so vital for India's ever increasing energy needs. Indian navy's development as a blue water navy is underway to protect its maritime and economic interests.
The changes in global fiscal, economic and trading relationships and the emergence of Islamist terrorism as a major international threat have also brought about a number of changes in international relationships. India-Sri Lanka relations have also developed in keeping with these changes.
India's shift in relationship with Sri Lanka has to be understood in this broad strategic context, than in the background of its historical baggage. India’s Sri Lanka relations are now broad based with economic agenda as a priority followed by strategic considerations. India's strategic interest in Sri Lanka has been enlarged to protect and project India's strategic and economic interests by building strong bonds with Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka was the first country with which India signed a Free Trade Agreement; the trade between the two countries is expected to grow to $ 4 billion by the year 2010. There is greater appreciation between the two countries of the other's problems and perceptions.
Inevitably the changes in India's strategic perception were reflected in its present approach to Sri Lanka’s wars against the LTTE, particularly after the failure of the peace process 2002. Its role had been limited as an advisor and counsellor not only to Sri Lanka but to the four co-chairs - the European Union, Japan, Norway and the U.S - who promoted the peace process. The experience of India’s active intervention between the years 1983-91 appears to have brought about two realisations in India’s Sri Lanka policy making:
• India's strategic involvement in Sri Lanka should be broad based. It should have a firm foundation based upon long-term engagement avoiding reactive intervention.
• As far as the vexing issue of Tamil rights, India should facilitate rather than force the Sri Lanka government and the Tamils to achieve a durable solution.
India had scrupulously kept out of Sri Lanka’s war with the LTTE despite strong internal political pressure from coalition partners in Tamil Nadu. India’s agenda for Sri Lanka had mainly focused on strategic security cooperation and building of trade linkages. In fact, India declined to accept President Rajapaksa’s invitation to India to join the peace process extended soon after he took over as President in 2006.
Perhaps an un-stated reason for India’s laid back profile in Sri Lanka affairs was emergence of the LTTE as the sole arbiter of Tamil struggle after 1992. After Indian troops left Sri Lanka shores in 1990, LTTE cleverly used the anti Indian sentiments created due to the IPKF war, to strengthen its power base among sections of Tamil Diaspora. This enabled the LTTE to build its fire power, financial and logistic resources network with the help of the Diaspora to fight its wars from 1992 to the very end in 2009.
The LTTE’s self assumed role as the sole spokesman of Sri Lanka Tamils got a tacit international recognition when it signed the Oslo Accord with Sri Lanka in 2002. As per the Accord the two sides agreed to enter a peace process to find a federal solution to meet the Tamil aspirations. In the Norwegian mediated peace process it was the LTTE that represented Tamil interests in the talks with Sri Lanka. This perhaps precluded India’s direct participation in the peace process under the leadership of the four co-chairs.
IMPACT OF EELAM WAR IN SRI LANKA
The Eelam War IV and its aftermath have wrought quite a few changes in Sri Lanka which will have to be taken into India’s foreign policy prescriptions of the future. Some of them are strategic issues while others are political.
Perhaps for the first time there was minimal Indian influence in Sri Lanka’s military success. This would indicate India consciously refraining from using the ethnic conflict to its strategic advantage in sharp contrast to India’s high profile involvement in Sri Lanka’s Sinhala-Tamil confrontation since Mrs Indira Gandhi’s times. In its new equation with Sri Lanka, India did not substantially contribute not only to either the peace process 2002 or the war that followed its collapse. This ‘hands off’ attitude is likely to be a precedence and condition India-Sri Lanka relationship in the future.
EMERGENCE OF A STRONG SRI LANKA
The resounding success of Sri Lanka against the LTTE was mainly due to the strong leadership of President Mahinda Rajapaksa. He had provided the impetus to focus the whole national effort on the sole objective of eliminating the LTTE as a power centre confronting the state. He has considered achieving military success as the only national priority disregarding to international allegations of human rights violations, curtailment of freedom of expression, and absence of rule of law. In order to build his political power base to carry on his mission he has not hesitated to split almost all the political parties. His two brothers – Basil and Gotabaya Rajapakse had been the architects of translating his goal into achievement. Along with the Army Commander General Sarath Fonseka, this triumvirate probably exercise strong influence on the President’s policy making.
Thus President Rajapaksa is emerging as an unchallenged leader with enormous powers conferred by the executive presidency. In all likelihood, President Rajapaksa will be re-elected for a second six-year presidential term ending only in 2018.
The Sri Lanka security armed forces including the police force are now 340,000 strong. The armed forces strength has grown to 200,000. Despite some limitations they have emerged after the war as a well knitted professionally competent, battle tested fighting force. According to the Army Commander General Sarath Fonseka, the army is to be expanded into a force of 300,000. In actual terms it would be bigger than some of the armies of Europe – Britain, Germany, Italy or France. Thanks to their military success, the security forces, riding the crest of popularity, are likely to emerge as another power centre in Sri Lanka in the coming years. Oversized armed forces in a small country like Sri Lanka could wield influence in policy making at national level. They could also put political leadership under pressure.
DEVOLUTION OF POWERS TO TAMILS
The India-Sri Lanka Agreement 1987 has been tardily implemented. In fact, the partial powers of autonomy promised through the 13th amendment to the Sri Lanka constitution that came in the wake of the Agreement, it has not been implemented. The 14th amendment which recognised Tamil as a national language is far from in its rightful place. India continued to adopt low profile diplomatic channels to take up the implementation of the 13th amendment without significant results.
This issue assumes significance as Tamil aspirations for autonomy remain unfulfilled despite the promise of the President. Even the small beginning made with the 13th amendment and the creation of the provincial councils have not been taken to its logical conclusion to devolve powers to Tamil speaking minority. This has been demonstrated in the case of eastern province where the elections were held last year with a lot of fanfare and rhetoric on empowering the first-ever Tamil chief minister of eastern province.
The absence of Prabhakaran and the exit of the LTTE as a power centre from the scene have created a vacuum in Sri Lanka Tamil political leadership. Marginalisation of Tamil politicians during the active years of LTTE dominance from 1991 onwards have left them without organisational reach at the grass root level in the north and east. In their scramble for power are in a scramble for power, they are neither united nor clearly goal oriented. With the overwhelming presence of President Rajapaksa at the helm, distinct identity of Tamil politicians are likely to be limited to the traditional Tamil “vote banks” only. Thus President Rajapaksa is in a position to decide what is good for Tamils, rather than what Tamils demand or desire.
The war has left nearly 300,000 Tamils as internally displaced persons living in camps under the control of the army. They have minimal facilities and are not allowed to move freely. They are being screened to weed out the LTTE elements among them. It is unlikely they would be allowed to return to their homes within next six months, though Sri Lanka has promised the international community to do so. The army also proposes to pursue its operations against the LTTE and for this purpose nearly four divisions of troops are proposed to be stationed in permanent garrisons in the north. This is likely to increase the uneasiness among the population as the troops are predominantly Sinhala.
In any case villages are mostly ravaged by war and their livelihoods non existent. The first priority of Tamil politicians should be to get them back to their villages so that they start their normal avocations. As Tamil polity has little leverage, Sri Lanka is likely to act only under international pressure, particularly from India.
In the President’s sweeping style of governance there has been a lot of disconnect between promises and actions, not only relating to the Tamil issue but other issues as well. In view of this, unless there is an external pressure the President is likely to take up the implementation of 13th amendment at his own pace. Tamil aspirations are unlikely to be satisfied with the political dispensation offered to them. Thus the potential of Tamil discontent turning into militancy in the distant future is very much there.
CHANGES IN STRATEGIC PRESENCE
China has become a valuable partner of Sri Lanka in the pursuit of its military option. Thus China has partly filled the vacuum created by India’s reluctance to actively participate in Sri Lanka’s war effort. While India had been constrained due to political compulsions from supplying the weapons Sri Lanka needed, China filled in the gap with liberal supply of a wide variety armaments. Timely help rendered during the war has enabled China to gain a lot of strategic space and credibility in Sri Lanka.
Coupled with economic assistance and aid extended to Sri Lanka, China has become a critical partner in Sri Lanka’s economic survival particularly in the face of strong Western threat to curtail economic aid in retaliation for Sri Lanka’s failure in the human rights front. The Chinese are constructing a commercial port complex in Hambantota in the south and thus their presence in Sri Lanka is likely to be firmed in. In the coming years, Chinese influence in Sri Lanka can be expected not only to increase but become more assertive.
The U.S. has also been an active player in Sri Lanka both in promoting the peace process 2002 and later in supporting Sri Lanka’s war effort. However, on issues relating to Sri Lanka, the U.S. had been maintaining close contact with India, its ‘strategic ally’ in the region. This was also maintained during the war despite differences on some key issues between the two countries. It is evident that the U.S. values India has unique geographic and strategic advantage in Sri Lanka; this relationship is likely to be strengthened to balance the increasing Chinese profile in the region. The U.S. is also probably wary of Iran’s moves in Sri Lanka after it has extended a billion dollars in aid.
Pakistan also emerged as a significant arms supplier to Sri Lanka during the war. However, despite this Pakistan’s activity is likely to be circumscribed for the time being due to its internal political preoccupations of the government as well as its actions to come to terms with the Taliban and Al Qaeda terrorism politically as well as militarily. However, Sri Lanka is likely to emerge as an alternate hub for Pakistan intelligence agencies to eavesdrop on India and carry out its intelligence operations.
INDIA’S POLICY PRESCRIPTION
Sri Lanka has emerged as a strong and more powerful nation after the success in the Eelam war. Of course, it has to sustain it with appropriate political dispensation to prevent the resurgence of Tamil militancy once again. However, during the course of the war, it had also become a scene of global power play as part of Indian Ocean security. In the coming years we can expect this to continue with the increasing presence and influence of both China and the U.S.
India has to evolve a new paradigm to handle the emerging strategic setting in Sri Lanka with its impact on Indian Ocean security. India will have to work out an integrated strategy to make itself more relevant to Sri Lanka than other powers. There is a need to take measures to remove Sri Lanka’s latent fear of India’s overwhelming influence subsuming its national interests. This can be achieved only by building mutual confidence in the long term.
Greater cooperation and coordination in political, military and diplomatic fields can lead to better strategic understanding. This would involve integrating its political, economic and military strategies with adequate sensitivity to Sri Lanka’s new found pride. India has to be persuasive but persistent in following up the Tamil issue to take its logical end of meeting their just demands for equity. India needs to display more involvement to actively participate in matters relating to relief and rehabilitation in the war torn area.
India and Sri Lanka have a long history of military cooperation. The existing asset of goodwill on this count should be built upon for evolving greater strategic convergence. One option could be to formalise the India-Sri Lanka defence treaty now held in suspended animation.
Sri Lanka can be a strategic asset for India only if there is peace and stability in the country. However, to achieve this India will have to play a more prominent role on two fronts: help to get out of the ravages of war, and to politically resolve the Tamil-Sinhala ethnic divide.
Sri Lanka needs massive reconstruction and rehabilitation effort to quickly produce results. India has already allocated Rs 500 crores for Sri Lanka’s reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts. This might not prove adequate. India with its huge pool of skilled workforce can take up this challenge, jointly with private-public sector participation from both countries. The local people in north and east face a number of problems in housing, health and sanitation facilities and educational institutions to get out of the trauma of war. The region also requires a lot of de-mining effort. India has the expertise and ability to assist in all these fields. The first priority would be to make the infrastructure functional as early as possible to enable the displaced people resume their normal lives. Indian investment can create job opportunities in the troubled north and wean away youth from recourse to militancy.
As regards the Tamil-Sinhala divide, the healing process is likely to take a long time. Tamil population feel a lack of security and trust in the Sri Lanka government to meet their just demands. The government’s lack of urgency in implementing 13th amendment despite promises to do so has not increased its credibility. Tamils feel that India had not done enough to ensure its speedy implementation. They also feel that India is not pressurising the Sri Lanka government to improve the handling of 300,000 displaced Tamils held in camps and speedily complete their screening process. India needs to forcefully take up both the issues with Colombo.
India will have to take steps to increase people to people contact with Sri Lanka. Sri Lankans should be enabled to freely travel in India to broaden their vistas and see how ethnic amity works. Indian technical education institutions should be thrown open to Sri Lanka students.
There are a few other contentious issues dogging the relations between the two countries like the traditional fishing rights of fisherman in each others waters. Joint mechanisms have to be evolved to handle such issues on a regular basis.
As coalition politics has come to stay in New Delhi, the reaction of Tamil Nadu will always be an important factor influencing India’s Sri Lanka policy. The Sri Lanka Tamil issue was never the main piece of Tamil Nadu public or political agenda. But it has remained a key issue. This was amply demonstrated in the recent parliamentary poll, when the pro-LTTE political entities in Tamil Nadu did not succeed despite flogging the issue of war in Sri Lanka. The issue stands downgraded in Tamil Nadu at present. Greater transparency and taking the people into confidence in evolving the policy can help New Delhi increase its credibility among the people of Tamil Nadu. They will be the first to appreciate India’s efforts to help the Sri Lanka Tamils to gain their just demands.
Wednesday, August 12, 2009
MYANMAR: Suu Kyi’s Conviction & India’s Shameful Silence
The conviction and sentencing of democratic opposition leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, to additional 18 months house arrest by a Yangon court at Yangon’s notorious Insein prison on August 11, has once again shown how the Myanmar’s ruling military junta was determined to stop her participation in the elections to be held in 2010. The 18- month sentence slapped on her would effectively do that.
The Nobel Peace laureate was found guilty of hosting a mentally disturbed American tourist John William Yettaw (53) who broke into her home on May 3 where she had been held under house arrest for nearly 14 years out of the past 19 years. It did not matter to the court that it was the security forces that controlled access to the house. In an act of “benevolence” the military regime commuted the court’s original three-year hard labour sentence handed out to her to 18 months house arrest.
In the last elections held in 1990 she led the National Democratic League (NLD) from the front and romped home with a thumping majority. Although the military regime never transferred powers to the NLD led civilian government it would not want to take a chance with her participation in the elections. Though the elections are to be held under the new constitution, weighted heavily in its favour, apparently Aung Saan Suu Kyi’s participation would make a difference.
The intention of the junta was very clear when it turned down the request of the UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon to meet with Ms Suu Kyi when he visited Myanmar in July. As he described, Myanmar wasted a “unique opportunity” to turn a new leaf and usher in a new era of political openness.
Aung San Suu Kyi’s conviction has drawn universal condemnation. The U.S. President Obama demanded her immediate release while British Prime Minister Gordon Brown called for a U.N. embargo on all arms exports to Burma. President Nicolas Sarkozy of France sought fresh restrictions on Myanmar's two important export items - rubies and hardwood.
Thailand, chairman of the ASEAN alliance in which Myanmar is a member, was even more explicit. It urged Myanmar to immediately free Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest to allow her to play a role in next year's general election. It reiterated the demand made at the16th ASEAN Regional Forum held last month for the immediate release of all political prisoners in Myanmar, including Aung San Suu Kyi.
The U.N. Security Council meeting in a closed door session to discuss the issue failed to reach agreement on a statement that would condemn Myanmar and demand Suu Kyi’s release. China - the military junta’s patron - held to its stand that the UNSC had no business to interfere in Mynamar court’s action, while Russia among other members expressed its reservations.
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu said in a statement that it was time not for criticism but for dialogue with Myanmar. “This not only accords with Myanmar's interests, it is also beneficial to regional stability,” she added. She said the international society should fully respect Myanmar's judicial sovereignty.
The UNSC meetings on Myanmar had been effectively reduced to a charade by China’s firm support to the Myanmar’s military rulers. The global economic downturn has strengthened China’s global economic and as a corollary political clout. At present there is no incentive for China to change its stand on Myanmar; even if a civilian government of sorts comes to power in Myanmar, after the 2010 elections. Working under the benevolent eye of the army, it is doubtful whether a civilian government would be able to reduce Chinese influence in the country even if it wants to.
The Chinese are simply too well entrenched in Myanmar’s military, economy, trade and commerce. And the geo-strategy of Myanmar confers special advantage on China to intervene militarily in the shortest time than any other nation. As a veto-wielding permanent member of the UNSC, China is positioned better to bale out the military regime than any other Asian country including India.
Under such circumstances, India’s reaction to the conviction of Aung San Suu Kyi was shameful to say the least. It had not one word of condemnation or even ‘disappointment.’ The spokesman of the Ministry of External Affairs on questioning would only say, “We have seen reports of the sentencing of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi in Myanmar for a period of eighteen months.
India has emphasised to the Government of Myanmar the need to expedite their political reform and national reconciliation process and have noted the various steps taken so far by the Government of Myanmar in this direction.
We have maintained that this process should be broad based, including the various ethnic groups. In this context, the issue of release of political prisoners will no doubt receive due attention.”
What do these words mean? How can the sentencing Suu Kyi to 18-month house arrest be construed as part of the national reconciliation process? If past experience is any indication, it would be business as usual for India. Would the 12-member Indian Parliamentarians' Forum for Democracy in Burma, started in April, look into this and turn it into some meaningful positive action?
India’s soft pedaling of issues of global sensitivity is unlikely to affect either Myanmar’s cozy relations with China or build India as its preferred partner. On the contrary, Myanmar’s relations to India– particularly as long as the army holds the upper hand – would always be under close Chinese scrutiny.
It is time India re-examined its ‘Look East policy’ to make it more vibrant and meaningful. And Myanmar is a key player no doubt; but India needs to be proactive and not conditioned by China’s attitudes.
In this context the BBC report that India had abandoned plans to reopen the Stillwell road, a World War II entity, is of strategic significance. The road connects Ledo in Arunachal Pradesh with Yunnan Province in China after traversing through Kachin State of Myanmar. The opening of the road would have opened up India’s northeast for trade with ASEAN countries and provided a direct access from India to China from India without intruding into Tibet. What is disturbing is the announcement has come a few days after 13th round of India-China border talks. Is there a connection between India’s decision not to reopen the road and the border talks? Are we sacrificing Indian interests to appease the Chinese? Will the government take the public into confidence and explain?
Col R Hariharan, C3S Paper No.330 dated August 12, 2009
Courtesy: http://www.c3sindia.org/eastasia/731
The Nobel Peace laureate was found guilty of hosting a mentally disturbed American tourist John William Yettaw (53) who broke into her home on May 3 where she had been held under house arrest for nearly 14 years out of the past 19 years. It did not matter to the court that it was the security forces that controlled access to the house. In an act of “benevolence” the military regime commuted the court’s original three-year hard labour sentence handed out to her to 18 months house arrest.
In the last elections held in 1990 she led the National Democratic League (NLD) from the front and romped home with a thumping majority. Although the military regime never transferred powers to the NLD led civilian government it would not want to take a chance with her participation in the elections. Though the elections are to be held under the new constitution, weighted heavily in its favour, apparently Aung Saan Suu Kyi’s participation would make a difference.
The intention of the junta was very clear when it turned down the request of the UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon to meet with Ms Suu Kyi when he visited Myanmar in July. As he described, Myanmar wasted a “unique opportunity” to turn a new leaf and usher in a new era of political openness.
Aung San Suu Kyi’s conviction has drawn universal condemnation. The U.S. President Obama demanded her immediate release while British Prime Minister Gordon Brown called for a U.N. embargo on all arms exports to Burma. President Nicolas Sarkozy of France sought fresh restrictions on Myanmar's two important export items - rubies and hardwood.
Thailand, chairman of the ASEAN alliance in which Myanmar is a member, was even more explicit. It urged Myanmar to immediately free Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest to allow her to play a role in next year's general election. It reiterated the demand made at the16th ASEAN Regional Forum held last month for the immediate release of all political prisoners in Myanmar, including Aung San Suu Kyi.
The U.N. Security Council meeting in a closed door session to discuss the issue failed to reach agreement on a statement that would condemn Myanmar and demand Suu Kyi’s release. China - the military junta’s patron - held to its stand that the UNSC had no business to interfere in Mynamar court’s action, while Russia among other members expressed its reservations.
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu said in a statement that it was time not for criticism but for dialogue with Myanmar. “This not only accords with Myanmar's interests, it is also beneficial to regional stability,” she added. She said the international society should fully respect Myanmar's judicial sovereignty.
The UNSC meetings on Myanmar had been effectively reduced to a charade by China’s firm support to the Myanmar’s military rulers. The global economic downturn has strengthened China’s global economic and as a corollary political clout. At present there is no incentive for China to change its stand on Myanmar; even if a civilian government of sorts comes to power in Myanmar, after the 2010 elections. Working under the benevolent eye of the army, it is doubtful whether a civilian government would be able to reduce Chinese influence in the country even if it wants to.
The Chinese are simply too well entrenched in Myanmar’s military, economy, trade and commerce. And the geo-strategy of Myanmar confers special advantage on China to intervene militarily in the shortest time than any other nation. As a veto-wielding permanent member of the UNSC, China is positioned better to bale out the military regime than any other Asian country including India.
Under such circumstances, India’s reaction to the conviction of Aung San Suu Kyi was shameful to say the least. It had not one word of condemnation or even ‘disappointment.’ The spokesman of the Ministry of External Affairs on questioning would only say, “We have seen reports of the sentencing of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi in Myanmar for a period of eighteen months.
India has emphasised to the Government of Myanmar the need to expedite their political reform and national reconciliation process and have noted the various steps taken so far by the Government of Myanmar in this direction.
We have maintained that this process should be broad based, including the various ethnic groups. In this context, the issue of release of political prisoners will no doubt receive due attention.”
What do these words mean? How can the sentencing Suu Kyi to 18-month house arrest be construed as part of the national reconciliation process? If past experience is any indication, it would be business as usual for India. Would the 12-member Indian Parliamentarians' Forum for Democracy in Burma, started in April, look into this and turn it into some meaningful positive action?
India’s soft pedaling of issues of global sensitivity is unlikely to affect either Myanmar’s cozy relations with China or build India as its preferred partner. On the contrary, Myanmar’s relations to India– particularly as long as the army holds the upper hand – would always be under close Chinese scrutiny.
It is time India re-examined its ‘Look East policy’ to make it more vibrant and meaningful. And Myanmar is a key player no doubt; but India needs to be proactive and not conditioned by China’s attitudes.
In this context the BBC report that India had abandoned plans to reopen the Stillwell road, a World War II entity, is of strategic significance. The road connects Ledo in Arunachal Pradesh with Yunnan Province in China after traversing through Kachin State of Myanmar. The opening of the road would have opened up India’s northeast for trade with ASEAN countries and provided a direct access from India to China from India without intruding into Tibet. What is disturbing is the announcement has come a few days after 13th round of India-China border talks. Is there a connection between India’s decision not to reopen the road and the border talks? Are we sacrificing Indian interests to appease the Chinese? Will the government take the public into confidence and explain?
Col R Hariharan, C3S Paper No.330 dated August 12, 2009
Courtesy: http://www.c3sindia.org/eastasia/731
Monday, August 10, 2009
Defeat of the LTTE and the Future of Tamil Militancy
[This article written on July 13, 2009 and published in the journal "World Focus" Volume XXX Number 7 - July 2009 is reproduced here -sans footnotes - kind courtesy World Focus, who hold the copyright.]
Col R Hariharan
INTRODUCTION
The death of Velupillai Prabhakaran, the charismatic founder-leader of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), along with almost the entire first and second line leadership in the last lap of the Eelam War IV in May 2009 represents a milestone in the history of Tamil militancy in Sri Lanka.
Sri Lanka’s war against Tamil extremism in all its forms had been going on for the last three decades. Out of the 38 insurgent groups that came into being in this period barring the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), the Sinhala Marxist insurgency, all others were of Tamil origin fighting against what they perceived as Sinhala oppression. Almost all Tamil groups considered the carving out of an independent Tamil nation – the Tamil Eelam – out of Sri Lanka’s traditional Tamil inhabited areas as the only path of redemption for Tamils to preserve their language, culture and identity.
Only the LTTE had managed to survive the military onslaught of Sri Lanka state against Tamil insurgent groups from 1983 on wards till 2009. It had also weathered the active Indian political and military intervention in Sri Lanka between 1983 and 1990. In its bid to emerge as the sole standard bearer of the cause of Tamil Eelam, the LTTE did not hesitate to eliminate thousands of militants and leaders of rival Tamil groups. In his bid to emerge as the unchallenged leader of Tamils, Prabhakaran eliminated important Tamil political leaders including Appapillai Amirthalingam and Dr Nilan Thiruchelvam of the Tamil United Liberation to emerge as the only viable Tamil organisation with political and military clout.
Sri Lanka Security Forces (SLSF) could not achieve decisive results against the LTTE in the three rounds of war from 1983 to 2002. However, in their victorious Eelam War IV, the SLSF had killed as many as 15,000 LTTE cadres and destroyed or captured millions of rupees worth military and civil assets of the insurgent group. In addition to this the SLSF is holding 9000 cadres in captivity.
It is going to be extremely difficult for the LTTE to stage a comeback as a viable force in the near future. The financial, material and political support from sections of the 800,000-strong Sri Lanka Tamil expatriates had been an important factor in the LTTE’s growth and sustenance all these years. With their support the LTTE had built a strong logistic support network abroad to sustain the organisation in Sri Lanka in both peace and war. This support network, though disrupted, is by and large in tact, though leaderless at the moment.
The SLSF which had built the armed forces to about 200,000 to fight the war is acutely aware of the possibility of the LTTE staging a comeback in the near future. In order to prevent such an eventuality, the Army Commander General Sarath Fonseka plans to build a strong force of 300,000. And he proposes to ensure continued presence of the security forces in the Tamil predominant north and east to nip any resurgence of Tamil militancy in the bud.
The exit of the LTTE from the Sri Lanka scene as a power centre has raised a question mark over not only the future of Tamil militancy, but also the durability of the Tamil struggle for an independent state of Tamil Eelam. The possibility of LTTE’s revival and the future of Tamil militancy are closely interlinked issues.
Revival of Tamil militancy requires a few favourable factors: strong motivation for the Tamil Eelam cause, a committed leadership, an environment that provides for the growth of militancy, and external support. These have to be sustained in the face of Sri Lanka state’s response to its resurgence, and coordinated action of international community which is now united in its action against organisations listed terrorist bodies.
THE CAUSE
The cause of an independent Tamil Eelam state had provided the motive force Tamil youth to take up arms. It was the culmination of Tamil minority’s political quest to protect their identity, culture, and integrity of areas considered as its homeland. This process took at least two decades of traverse through the establishment of Tamil identity and another two decades for its transformation into Tamil nationalism.
Sri Lanka despite sharing a lot of cultural, religious and ethnic traditions with the Indian subcontinent has slightly different socio-political history. Unlike India, there had been no major caste, communal or ethnic conflicts in Sri Lanka (then known as Ceylon) during the British colonial days barring the anti Muslim riots of 1911. The broad division of identities of Sri Lanka’s Sinhala speaking, largely Buddhist majority, Tamil speaking Hindu and Christian communities identified as Tamils, and Muslims (mostly Tamil speaking and referred to as Moors) came about with the introduction of universal franchise in Sri Lanka (then known as Ceylon) in 1931.
While Indian polity fought the British and struggled to gain independence, Sri Lanka gained independence in 1948 without any serious struggle. In the words of Dr Devanesan Nesiah, “Unlike other South Asian leaders, those of pre-independence Sri Lanka remained in good standing with the colonial rulers.” While India’s struggle for independence fostered a national identity despite the differences within the community, Sri Lanka did not undergo this process of melding its divided identities into a single Sri Lankan national identity at the time of independence.
During the British colonial rule, Tamils had played a dominant role in Sri Lanka. Unlike the Sinhalas, Tamils adapted to English education and became useful to the colonial administration. The progressive alienation of the Tamil minority population from Sri Lanka’s national mainstream started only after the country attained independence in 1948.
From then onwards, the assertion of Tamil identity had been a factor in national politics. However, the process of transformation of Tamil identity and its crystallization into Tamil nationalism took nearly two decades from 1956 onwards. In this period resurgent Sinhala nationalism made its appearance as a political force with the Sinhala majority asserting its distinct linguistic, religious and ethnic identity as true national identity.
Four watershed events pushed the Tamils from uniting in their struggle against the Sinhala state and taking up arms to fight it. These were the introduction of 'Sinhala only' policy making it the national language, adoption of a new Constitution of 1972, the 1977 parliamentary elections and the 1980 anti Tamil pogrom.
The introduction of Sinhala as the sole national language and the state sponsorship of Buddhism and its symbols did not enhance the feeling of nationhood among the Tamils and other minorities.
The 1972 Constitution gave a Sinhala character to Sri Lanka triggering minorities’ fear of marginalisation under the new dispensation. This made the Tamils to change their earlier demand for balanced representation into a demand for a Federal State. The state driven by its new found Sinhala nationalism, did not politically respond to meet the minority demands.
This caused disillusionment among moderate Tamil 'Federal' leaders like Dr Chelvanayagam. They began to talk aloud about the creation of an independent state of Tamil Eelam in 1975.[6] By 1976 Tamil demand for Federalism gave way for creation of an independent Tamil Eelam. The overwhelming success of the TULF, a political omnibus of many shades of Tamil opinion, in the 1977 elections with a demand for an independent 'Tamil Eelam' gave it credence. The state showed singular lack of sensitivity to the strong Tamil sentiments and responded with brute force against political agitations on the issue. As Tamil politicians were rendered helpless against the highhandedness of the government, small extremist groups of Tamils started indulging in minor acts of militancy.
The ethnic estrangement, growing with its historical grievances, nurtured by Sinhala and Tamil political vested interests grew. It became a conflict after the LTTE militants led by Prabhakaran killed 13 soldiers in an ambush of two military vehicles at Tirunelveli in Jaffna on July 23, 1983. The public outrage in the rest of Sri Lanka at the killing of the Sinhala soldiers was used by Sinhala politicians to let loose a pogrom against Tamil population in Colombo and other places. The government failed to take any action even as a few thousand Tamils were killed and their properties destroyed.
Overnight the Tamil struggle gained global sympathy when thousands of Tamil refugees fled the country. Nearly 100,000 of them sought refuge in Tamil Nadu, in South India, which has traditional links with Sri Lanka Tamils. The pogrom in Sri Lanka created such a terror that over the years 700,000 Tamils are estimated to have immigrated to other countries The widespread public anger in Tamil Nadu grew as more and more Tamil refugees from Sri Lanka arrived there. Tamil insurgent groups fleeing the island were welcomed to the shores of Tamil Nadu. They were given arms and shelter.
Then onwards the Tamil issue became a critical one in Indian political scene as well. Inevitably India actively intervened in Sri Lanka from 1983 to 1990 politically, diplomatically and militarily to bring about ethnic peace. Indian efforts at mediation also crystallised the critical demands of Tamil nationalism at the Thimphu conference convened in July 1985 to reconcile the differences between the Sri Lanka government and the Tamils.
A united delegation of Tamil militant groups and politicians summed up the Tamil demands in the ‘Thimphu Declaration.’ The four Tamils demands were: recognition of Sri Lanka Tamils as a nation, recognition of the existence of an identified homeland for the Tamils of Sri Lanka, recognition of the right of self determination of the Tamil nation, and recognition of the right to citizenship and the fundamental rights of all Tamils of Sri Lanka.
At the initiative of Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, Sri Lanka President JR Jayawardane showed his readiness to build bridges with India and the two countries signed the India-Sri Lanka Agreement (ISLA) in 1987. As per the Agreement, Sri Lanka State agreed to devolve limited autonomy to a united northeast province - the traditional Tamil region considered as their homeland, provided India helped to end Tamil militancy and disarm the militants. The demand for right to citizenship for all Tamils was also accepted. Thus barring the demand for recognition of Tamils as a nation, the Agreement met all the demands of Tamils made in the Thimpu.
The 13th amendment of Sri Lanka constitution enacted in 1988 has given a limited amount of autonomy to the provincial councils including the Tamil-predominant northern and eastern provinces. The 14th amendment has given Tamil the status of national language, though it may not be on par with Sinhala. Thus the Tamil demands which articulated the cause of Tamil Eelam stand partly dissipated.
The post 1983 events – wars and peace efforts – and the abortive Indian direct military intervention from 1987 to 1990 have changed not only the demographics of Sri Lanka but the mindset of the next generation of Sinhalas and Tamils as well. It is more than two decades since Black July, and a whole new generation of Tamils has been brought up overseas in diverse surroundings – many of them in different countries with different languages and cultures.
Many of the Tamils have moved out of traditional areas of habitation into many parts of Central and Southern Sri Lanka and settled in the midst of Sinhala population due to the unending insurgency wars of LTTE in the north and east during the last two decades. The moot point is whether the cause of Tamil Eelam for the Tamils at home and abroad still holds the same attraction as in 1983?
THE ENVIRONMENT
South Asian environment
The international environment in the 80s and early 90s was the golden era of insurgency movements. The Cold War confrontation found the use of non-state actors a convenient handle to slow bleed the opponent. Soviet Union helped a pro Communist regime to seize power in Afghanistan after monarchy was toppled, much to the discomfort of the U.S. The Americans found a willing ally in Pakistan to support Islamist insurgents fight the communist regime in Afghanistan. The spill over of this confrontation into South Asia was limited to the introduction of Cold War power play with Pakistan and India drawn on opposite sides. Pakistan and to a certain extent China had been providing support and sanctuary to insurgents movements from India’s northeast.
Given this background, India was wary of increasing in American influence in its neighbourhood particularly after the strategic convergence of the U.S. and Pakistan in Afghanistan. So India found a strategic reason to keep Sri Lanka free from the increasing U.S. influence in the region.
The 1980 anti-Tamil pogrom created a strong wave of political sympathy for Tamils in India, particularly in Tamil Nadu. Prime Minister Mrs Indira Gandhi was sympathetic to the Tamil struggle for equity, though she did not support the idea of an independent Tamil Eelam. She also offered covert support to Tamil militants. When Sri Lanka President JR Jaywardane tried to gain the support of the U.S. and Pakistan to counter Indian pressure, India intervened actively from 1983 to 90 both politically and militarily. The ISLA was the outcome of this phase of India-Sri Lanka relations. India had to pull out its troops rather ignominiously in 1990 when Sri Lanka President Premadasa and Prabhakaran colluded to send them out of the island.
Since India's last active intervention in Sri Lanka, global power equation has changed. India and the U.S. enjoy a close relationship due to the convergence of their strategic security interests in the Indian Ocean region and Sri Lanka. India's trading interests are now global as its economy is galloping at a fast clip. These changes have created subtle shifts in India's perceptions. Now India's security perceptions of Sri Lanka are no more local. They are now global as Sri Lanka is viewed as the vanguard of India in the South, dominating the Indian Ocean.
As the biggest regional power in South Asia, India has the ability to alter the balance of power in Sri Lanka just as it did in 1987-90. India is the only country capable of underwriting any long-term solution to Sri Lanka's problem. However, this will be constrained by internal political considerations discussed earlier, and tie down its freedom of action in Sri Lanka.
India was the first country to ban the LTTE as a terrorist organisation. It had been consistent in taking action against any LTTE activity in its soil. So India had no hesitation in supplying non-lethal weapons and extending intelligence support to Sri Lanka in its conflict with the LTTE. Unlike the 80s India-Sri Lanka relations are multifaceted involving trade, commerce, economic relations and international cooperation. India has large investments in Sri Lanka and both countries have entered into a Free Trade Agreement and India-Sri Lanka trade is likely to clock $ 4 billion. Indian political and material support for the Tamil cause had been an important for growth of Tamil militancy during 1983-87. India is unlikely to extend that kind of support now for the revival of Tamil militancy.
The global war on terror orchestrated by the U.S. after the 9/11 Al Qaeda terrorist attacks in the U.S have changed international perceptions on insurgency movements using terror tactics. As the LTTE has been included in the U.S. list of foreign terrorist organisations, it has become quite easy and legitimate for Sri Lanka to draw upon the support of the U.S. for its war against the LTTE. This support is likely to continue in case Tamil militancy revives.
A number of international protocols in shipping, money transfer and movement of people have been introduced to curb terrorists from using international networks. The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) announced by the U.S. President Bush in 2003 has paved the way for greater international cooperation and action to prevent proliferation of weapons to or from nation states and non-state actors. Though the PSI is accepted only by 11 countries, 49 other nations have agreed to adhere to PSI principles. The PSI protocols provide for interdiction of WMD shipments in international waters.
Despite their differences over the poor human rights record of Sri Lanka, the European Union understands the compulsions which had forced Sri Lanka to wage war against the LTTE, banned as a terrorist organisation in among its member countries. So the EU is also unlikely to permit the LTTE or any other Tamil militant organisational activity on their soil.
The Sri Lanka Tamil expatriates had been a major source of support for Tamil militancy particularly the LTTE. The LTTE had established a strong global supply and logistic support network to keep its war machines going. This organization helped in sustaining the insurgency operations in three ways: financial support, international lobbying and public relations, and procurement of arms and military equipment. LTTE representatives at key centers located in Canada, Norway, U.K., Australia, France, Denmark, Switzerland, Thailand, USA, and South Africa coordinate the worldwide network. It has created a lot of hidden assets overseas and runs a number of front organisations of Tamils.
The LTTE is a banned organisation in 32 countries including Canada, the European Union, India, Malaysia and U.S.A. Though not banned, its activities are curbed in few other countries. Even during the Eelam War IV (2006-09) the governments in most of these countries had come down heavily on LTTE activists. They had also cooperated with the Sri Lanka government and with each other in busting the LTTE’s fund collection and arms procurement activities and made a number of arrests. Given these constraints revival of the LTTE or promotion of any other Tamil militant group is not going to be easy.
Internal environment
Initially, during their political struggle the Federal party leaders and subsequently the TULF were able to forge unity among Tamil speaking people including Muslims for the cause of Tamil identity. However, the increasing awareness of eastern Muslims and the differences over the perception of an independent Tamil Eelam paved the way for Muslims going their own way. The LTTE’s anti-Muslim policies including the eviction of nearly 100,000 Muslims from the north as well its massacre of Muslims a number of times in the east have alienated Muslims from supporting Tamil militants, perhaps forever, though they speak Tamil and have similar problems as a minority.
There are subtle differences in culture and perception between the Tamil populations living in north and east. From 1976 onwards the Tamils of north and east were united in their political stand and support to militancy. This was further strengthened with the signing of the India-Sri Lanka Agreement 1987 which saw the formation of a united north-eastern province. However, the LTTE’s opposition to the ISLA divided Tamil polity and militancy. It left the LTTE as the only armed militant group as the other militant groups had surrendered their weapons in terms of ISLA. The LTTE’s war against the Indian troops further divided the Tamils.
After the exit of Indian troops in 1990, the LTTE started the process of consolidation with the snuffing out other Tamil groups and marginalising Tamil political leaders. The rise of the LTTE made anti-LTTE Tamil groups to seek the protection of the Sri Lanka government. As a result the Thimphu declaration remains largely a political propaganda tool with the divided and weakened Tamil polity.
The better educated northern ‘Jaffna’ Tamils, living in a majority Tamil ambience have been spearheading the Tamil Cause as leaders; on the other hand the easterners, who share the province with nearly equal strength of Sinhalas and Muslims, have been providing the foot soldiers for Tamil militancy. However, this equation was destroyed when Karuna, the LTTE leader of Batticaloa broke away from the parent body in 2002, alleging the exploitation of easterners within the LTTE.
This had destroyed the homogeneity within the militant ranks. This had been one of the major reasons for the defeat of the LTTE in the Eelam War IV. Now new political alignments have emerged among eastern Tamils. Karuna’s position was strengthened when the Supreme Court set aside in 2006 the merger of northern and eastern provinces as one united entity. After the defeat of the LTTE, a Tamil chief minister is in office in the east. Karuna is now a minister in the Rajapaksa regime and has become a vocal supporter of a united Sri Lanka.
Sinhala’s lack of sensitivity to the Tamil aspirations had been an important trigger for the Tamils to unite in their fight against the government. However, after India’s massive intervention and the introduction of 13th amendment giving limited autonomy to Tamils, there had been generally a growing awareness of the Tamil problem among Sinhala intelligentsia. It is significant that during the three years of Eelam War IV there had been very few acts of retaliatory Sinhala public anger against Tamil population in their midst despite a number of LTTE bombs attacks that killed a few hundred civilians.
Though the government had been slow in enforcing many of its policies like the introduction Tamil in the government and recruitment of Tamils in police etc., it has made a beginning and over a period of time these efforts are likely to make some headway. Cumulatively, the Sinhala chauvinist image of the 80s has been improved; this is unlikely to go unnoticed by Tamils.
Given these changes in the environment, it is doubtful whether the cause of Tamil Eelam will evoke the same enthusiastic response as in 1983, particularly after the total defeat of the LTTE in the latest Eelam War after sacrificing atleast 30,000 cadres in the wars. There is a general weariness of the war among Tamils in Sri Lanka. Even though sections of Tamil Diaspora might be enthusiastic about supporting another war against the Sri Lanka state, the foot soldiers for it had to be found among Sri Lankan Tamils in the country.
LEADERSHIP
While many Tamil militant organizations emerged in the early 90s, only the LTTE had kept the Tamil armed struggle alive. This was solely due to its leader Prabhakaran’s single minded orientation to the goal of fighting for an independent Tamil Eelam. He introduced a number of innovations in tactical warfare fully using the real time advantage given by modern technology innovations. He showed remarkable ability motivate his followers to die for the cause. It manifested in the form of Black Tiger suicide warriors. Their tactics were used imaginatively by Sea Tigers to launch attacks in the high seas against the navy. The LTTE also refined the use propaganda as force multiplier and built up a global support network among the Tamil Diaspora that came in handy to prosecute the war. No doubt he had a number of flaws including his inability to understand political strategy and cleverly use it for furthering military objectives. He was anti intellectual and did not believe in collective leadership. He had a ruthless streak in his personality that clouded balanced judgement.
Any leader now trying to revive the LTTE or start a new Tamil militant movement has to live up to the larger than life image of Prabhakaran created in public mind. Otherwise he will not be able to motivate his followers and build up the organization. Secondly, Prabhakaran’s strength of conviction enabled him to build one of the strongest insurgent organisation in the world in a span of two decades. So any leader undertaking the task now will have to sustain his conviction for at least one to two decades.
Though he understood tactical operations better, Prabhakaran’s major shortcoming had been his inability to respond to political demands with finesse. The chances of success of any potential leader to revive militancy will increase only if he is politically savvy.
It is not only the potential of the leader that is important. It was largely the environment that shaped Prabhakaran’s mind to become a committed leader to his cause and build a strong organization. And both the internal and international environments have become more unfriendly than ever before to the idea of secession.
So a charismatic and responsive leader to revive Tamil militancy is like to emerge only when the environment turns extremely repressive and hostile to Tamil population at large. With greater awareness among the population and India acting as a subtle but continuous pressure point on Sri Lanka on the issue of devolution of equitable rights to Tamils, such “pressure cooker” situation is unlikely to develop. Thus even in a decadal time frame, the opportunity for emergence of such a leader may never come through.
CONCLUSION
The defeat of the LTTE in the just concluded Eelam War IV represents a major setback for the cause of an independent Tamil Eelam. The LTTE under V Prabhakaran had built one of the strongest insurgency organizations in the world with military capability in land, air and sea.
In spite of building such a powerful organization, supported by a global network of Tamil Diaspora to further its capability, the LTTE failed due to a number of reasons. The local and international environments that enabled the LTTE insurgency to thrive have changed since 1983. A new generation of Tamil youth driven from their homes in the north and east due to prolonged war has been exposed to different cultures and environment. It is doubtful whether they could be motivated to take up arms once again for the cause of Tamil Eelam.
India as a powerful neighbour with a large Tamil population can wield a strong influence in Sri Lanka including the future of Tamil militancy. India as a regional power is unlikely to allow easy passage for the rise of Tamil militancy afresh for reasons of strategic security. The changed international environment with low tolerance limits for the activities of non-state actors will make it difficult for the use of overseas soil for the growth of Tamil militancy. International protocols introduced to curb terrorism have come in handy to curb LTTE’s international activity. These are likely to inhibit the revival or resurgence of Tamil militancy.
However, Tamil militancy can stage a comeback if there is a strong support from another nation for its own reasons. Even then to flourish in Sri Lanka, it will require a strong anti-Tamil regime to create an environment of hostility to Sinhalas. With a powerful Sri Lanka army in place, even if the environment is suitable for militancy it will require strong and motivated leadership with committed followers who can sustain their presence for at least a decade.
Under the circumstances, Tamil militancy is likely to be restricted to acts of sabotage, occasional shoot outs and acts of assassinations by small bands. As and when Tamil population joins the mainstream of Sri Lanka through enlightened national leadership, such small group activities also might become extinct. And it would be up to Sri Lanka leadership to decide on how quickly and how comfortably they can give the feeling security and trust back to the Tamil population.
Copyright: World Focus (www.cnfworldfocus.org)
Col R Hariharan
INTRODUCTION
The death of Velupillai Prabhakaran, the charismatic founder-leader of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), along with almost the entire first and second line leadership in the last lap of the Eelam War IV in May 2009 represents a milestone in the history of Tamil militancy in Sri Lanka.
Sri Lanka’s war against Tamil extremism in all its forms had been going on for the last three decades. Out of the 38 insurgent groups that came into being in this period barring the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), the Sinhala Marxist insurgency, all others were of Tamil origin fighting against what they perceived as Sinhala oppression. Almost all Tamil groups considered the carving out of an independent Tamil nation – the Tamil Eelam – out of Sri Lanka’s traditional Tamil inhabited areas as the only path of redemption for Tamils to preserve their language, culture and identity.
Only the LTTE had managed to survive the military onslaught of Sri Lanka state against Tamil insurgent groups from 1983 on wards till 2009. It had also weathered the active Indian political and military intervention in Sri Lanka between 1983 and 1990. In its bid to emerge as the sole standard bearer of the cause of Tamil Eelam, the LTTE did not hesitate to eliminate thousands of militants and leaders of rival Tamil groups. In his bid to emerge as the unchallenged leader of Tamils, Prabhakaran eliminated important Tamil political leaders including Appapillai Amirthalingam and Dr Nilan Thiruchelvam of the Tamil United Liberation to emerge as the only viable Tamil organisation with political and military clout.
Sri Lanka Security Forces (SLSF) could not achieve decisive results against the LTTE in the three rounds of war from 1983 to 2002. However, in their victorious Eelam War IV, the SLSF had killed as many as 15,000 LTTE cadres and destroyed or captured millions of rupees worth military and civil assets of the insurgent group. In addition to this the SLSF is holding 9000 cadres in captivity.
It is going to be extremely difficult for the LTTE to stage a comeback as a viable force in the near future. The financial, material and political support from sections of the 800,000-strong Sri Lanka Tamil expatriates had been an important factor in the LTTE’s growth and sustenance all these years. With their support the LTTE had built a strong logistic support network abroad to sustain the organisation in Sri Lanka in both peace and war. This support network, though disrupted, is by and large in tact, though leaderless at the moment.
The SLSF which had built the armed forces to about 200,000 to fight the war is acutely aware of the possibility of the LTTE staging a comeback in the near future. In order to prevent such an eventuality, the Army Commander General Sarath Fonseka plans to build a strong force of 300,000. And he proposes to ensure continued presence of the security forces in the Tamil predominant north and east to nip any resurgence of Tamil militancy in the bud.
The exit of the LTTE from the Sri Lanka scene as a power centre has raised a question mark over not only the future of Tamil militancy, but also the durability of the Tamil struggle for an independent state of Tamil Eelam. The possibility of LTTE’s revival and the future of Tamil militancy are closely interlinked issues.
Revival of Tamil militancy requires a few favourable factors: strong motivation for the Tamil Eelam cause, a committed leadership, an environment that provides for the growth of militancy, and external support. These have to be sustained in the face of Sri Lanka state’s response to its resurgence, and coordinated action of international community which is now united in its action against organisations listed terrorist bodies.
THE CAUSE
The cause of an independent Tamil Eelam state had provided the motive force Tamil youth to take up arms. It was the culmination of Tamil minority’s political quest to protect their identity, culture, and integrity of areas considered as its homeland. This process took at least two decades of traverse through the establishment of Tamil identity and another two decades for its transformation into Tamil nationalism.
Sri Lanka despite sharing a lot of cultural, religious and ethnic traditions with the Indian subcontinent has slightly different socio-political history. Unlike India, there had been no major caste, communal or ethnic conflicts in Sri Lanka (then known as Ceylon) during the British colonial days barring the anti Muslim riots of 1911. The broad division of identities of Sri Lanka’s Sinhala speaking, largely Buddhist majority, Tamil speaking Hindu and Christian communities identified as Tamils, and Muslims (mostly Tamil speaking and referred to as Moors) came about with the introduction of universal franchise in Sri Lanka (then known as Ceylon) in 1931.
While Indian polity fought the British and struggled to gain independence, Sri Lanka gained independence in 1948 without any serious struggle. In the words of Dr Devanesan Nesiah, “Unlike other South Asian leaders, those of pre-independence Sri Lanka remained in good standing with the colonial rulers.” While India’s struggle for independence fostered a national identity despite the differences within the community, Sri Lanka did not undergo this process of melding its divided identities into a single Sri Lankan national identity at the time of independence.
During the British colonial rule, Tamils had played a dominant role in Sri Lanka. Unlike the Sinhalas, Tamils adapted to English education and became useful to the colonial administration. The progressive alienation of the Tamil minority population from Sri Lanka’s national mainstream started only after the country attained independence in 1948.
From then onwards, the assertion of Tamil identity had been a factor in national politics. However, the process of transformation of Tamil identity and its crystallization into Tamil nationalism took nearly two decades from 1956 onwards. In this period resurgent Sinhala nationalism made its appearance as a political force with the Sinhala majority asserting its distinct linguistic, religious and ethnic identity as true national identity.
Four watershed events pushed the Tamils from uniting in their struggle against the Sinhala state and taking up arms to fight it. These were the introduction of 'Sinhala only' policy making it the national language, adoption of a new Constitution of 1972, the 1977 parliamentary elections and the 1980 anti Tamil pogrom.
The introduction of Sinhala as the sole national language and the state sponsorship of Buddhism and its symbols did not enhance the feeling of nationhood among the Tamils and other minorities.
The 1972 Constitution gave a Sinhala character to Sri Lanka triggering minorities’ fear of marginalisation under the new dispensation. This made the Tamils to change their earlier demand for balanced representation into a demand for a Federal State. The state driven by its new found Sinhala nationalism, did not politically respond to meet the minority demands.
This caused disillusionment among moderate Tamil 'Federal' leaders like Dr Chelvanayagam. They began to talk aloud about the creation of an independent state of Tamil Eelam in 1975.[6] By 1976 Tamil demand for Federalism gave way for creation of an independent Tamil Eelam. The overwhelming success of the TULF, a political omnibus of many shades of Tamil opinion, in the 1977 elections with a demand for an independent 'Tamil Eelam' gave it credence. The state showed singular lack of sensitivity to the strong Tamil sentiments and responded with brute force against political agitations on the issue. As Tamil politicians were rendered helpless against the highhandedness of the government, small extremist groups of Tamils started indulging in minor acts of militancy.
The ethnic estrangement, growing with its historical grievances, nurtured by Sinhala and Tamil political vested interests grew. It became a conflict after the LTTE militants led by Prabhakaran killed 13 soldiers in an ambush of two military vehicles at Tirunelveli in Jaffna on July 23, 1983. The public outrage in the rest of Sri Lanka at the killing of the Sinhala soldiers was used by Sinhala politicians to let loose a pogrom against Tamil population in Colombo and other places. The government failed to take any action even as a few thousand Tamils were killed and their properties destroyed.
Overnight the Tamil struggle gained global sympathy when thousands of Tamil refugees fled the country. Nearly 100,000 of them sought refuge in Tamil Nadu, in South India, which has traditional links with Sri Lanka Tamils. The pogrom in Sri Lanka created such a terror that over the years 700,000 Tamils are estimated to have immigrated to other countries The widespread public anger in Tamil Nadu grew as more and more Tamil refugees from Sri Lanka arrived there. Tamil insurgent groups fleeing the island were welcomed to the shores of Tamil Nadu. They were given arms and shelter.
Then onwards the Tamil issue became a critical one in Indian political scene as well. Inevitably India actively intervened in Sri Lanka from 1983 to 1990 politically, diplomatically and militarily to bring about ethnic peace. Indian efforts at mediation also crystallised the critical demands of Tamil nationalism at the Thimphu conference convened in July 1985 to reconcile the differences between the Sri Lanka government and the Tamils.
A united delegation of Tamil militant groups and politicians summed up the Tamil demands in the ‘Thimphu Declaration.’ The four Tamils demands were: recognition of Sri Lanka Tamils as a nation, recognition of the existence of an identified homeland for the Tamils of Sri Lanka, recognition of the right of self determination of the Tamil nation, and recognition of the right to citizenship and the fundamental rights of all Tamils of Sri Lanka.
At the initiative of Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, Sri Lanka President JR Jayawardane showed his readiness to build bridges with India and the two countries signed the India-Sri Lanka Agreement (ISLA) in 1987. As per the Agreement, Sri Lanka State agreed to devolve limited autonomy to a united northeast province - the traditional Tamil region considered as their homeland, provided India helped to end Tamil militancy and disarm the militants. The demand for right to citizenship for all Tamils was also accepted. Thus barring the demand for recognition of Tamils as a nation, the Agreement met all the demands of Tamils made in the Thimpu.
The 13th amendment of Sri Lanka constitution enacted in 1988 has given a limited amount of autonomy to the provincial councils including the Tamil-predominant northern and eastern provinces. The 14th amendment has given Tamil the status of national language, though it may not be on par with Sinhala. Thus the Tamil demands which articulated the cause of Tamil Eelam stand partly dissipated.
The post 1983 events – wars and peace efforts – and the abortive Indian direct military intervention from 1987 to 1990 have changed not only the demographics of Sri Lanka but the mindset of the next generation of Sinhalas and Tamils as well. It is more than two decades since Black July, and a whole new generation of Tamils has been brought up overseas in diverse surroundings – many of them in different countries with different languages and cultures.
Many of the Tamils have moved out of traditional areas of habitation into many parts of Central and Southern Sri Lanka and settled in the midst of Sinhala population due to the unending insurgency wars of LTTE in the north and east during the last two decades. The moot point is whether the cause of Tamil Eelam for the Tamils at home and abroad still holds the same attraction as in 1983?
THE ENVIRONMENT
South Asian environment
The international environment in the 80s and early 90s was the golden era of insurgency movements. The Cold War confrontation found the use of non-state actors a convenient handle to slow bleed the opponent. Soviet Union helped a pro Communist regime to seize power in Afghanistan after monarchy was toppled, much to the discomfort of the U.S. The Americans found a willing ally in Pakistan to support Islamist insurgents fight the communist regime in Afghanistan. The spill over of this confrontation into South Asia was limited to the introduction of Cold War power play with Pakistan and India drawn on opposite sides. Pakistan and to a certain extent China had been providing support and sanctuary to insurgents movements from India’s northeast.
Given this background, India was wary of increasing in American influence in its neighbourhood particularly after the strategic convergence of the U.S. and Pakistan in Afghanistan. So India found a strategic reason to keep Sri Lanka free from the increasing U.S. influence in the region.
The 1980 anti-Tamil pogrom created a strong wave of political sympathy for Tamils in India, particularly in Tamil Nadu. Prime Minister Mrs Indira Gandhi was sympathetic to the Tamil struggle for equity, though she did not support the idea of an independent Tamil Eelam. She also offered covert support to Tamil militants. When Sri Lanka President JR Jaywardane tried to gain the support of the U.S. and Pakistan to counter Indian pressure, India intervened actively from 1983 to 90 both politically and militarily. The ISLA was the outcome of this phase of India-Sri Lanka relations. India had to pull out its troops rather ignominiously in 1990 when Sri Lanka President Premadasa and Prabhakaran colluded to send them out of the island.
Since India's last active intervention in Sri Lanka, global power equation has changed. India and the U.S. enjoy a close relationship due to the convergence of their strategic security interests in the Indian Ocean region and Sri Lanka. India's trading interests are now global as its economy is galloping at a fast clip. These changes have created subtle shifts in India's perceptions. Now India's security perceptions of Sri Lanka are no more local. They are now global as Sri Lanka is viewed as the vanguard of India in the South, dominating the Indian Ocean.
As the biggest regional power in South Asia, India has the ability to alter the balance of power in Sri Lanka just as it did in 1987-90. India is the only country capable of underwriting any long-term solution to Sri Lanka's problem. However, this will be constrained by internal political considerations discussed earlier, and tie down its freedom of action in Sri Lanka.
India was the first country to ban the LTTE as a terrorist organisation. It had been consistent in taking action against any LTTE activity in its soil. So India had no hesitation in supplying non-lethal weapons and extending intelligence support to Sri Lanka in its conflict with the LTTE. Unlike the 80s India-Sri Lanka relations are multifaceted involving trade, commerce, economic relations and international cooperation. India has large investments in Sri Lanka and both countries have entered into a Free Trade Agreement and India-Sri Lanka trade is likely to clock $ 4 billion. Indian political and material support for the Tamil cause had been an important for growth of Tamil militancy during 1983-87. India is unlikely to extend that kind of support now for the revival of Tamil militancy.
The global war on terror orchestrated by the U.S. after the 9/11 Al Qaeda terrorist attacks in the U.S have changed international perceptions on insurgency movements using terror tactics. As the LTTE has been included in the U.S. list of foreign terrorist organisations, it has become quite easy and legitimate for Sri Lanka to draw upon the support of the U.S. for its war against the LTTE. This support is likely to continue in case Tamil militancy revives.
A number of international protocols in shipping, money transfer and movement of people have been introduced to curb terrorists from using international networks. The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) announced by the U.S. President Bush in 2003 has paved the way for greater international cooperation and action to prevent proliferation of weapons to or from nation states and non-state actors. Though the PSI is accepted only by 11 countries, 49 other nations have agreed to adhere to PSI principles. The PSI protocols provide for interdiction of WMD shipments in international waters.
Despite their differences over the poor human rights record of Sri Lanka, the European Union understands the compulsions which had forced Sri Lanka to wage war against the LTTE, banned as a terrorist organisation in among its member countries. So the EU is also unlikely to permit the LTTE or any other Tamil militant organisational activity on their soil.
The Sri Lanka Tamil expatriates had been a major source of support for Tamil militancy particularly the LTTE. The LTTE had established a strong global supply and logistic support network to keep its war machines going. This organization helped in sustaining the insurgency operations in three ways: financial support, international lobbying and public relations, and procurement of arms and military equipment. LTTE representatives at key centers located in Canada, Norway, U.K., Australia, France, Denmark, Switzerland, Thailand, USA, and South Africa coordinate the worldwide network. It has created a lot of hidden assets overseas and runs a number of front organisations of Tamils.
The LTTE is a banned organisation in 32 countries including Canada, the European Union, India, Malaysia and U.S.A. Though not banned, its activities are curbed in few other countries. Even during the Eelam War IV (2006-09) the governments in most of these countries had come down heavily on LTTE activists. They had also cooperated with the Sri Lanka government and with each other in busting the LTTE’s fund collection and arms procurement activities and made a number of arrests. Given these constraints revival of the LTTE or promotion of any other Tamil militant group is not going to be easy.
Internal environment
Initially, during their political struggle the Federal party leaders and subsequently the TULF were able to forge unity among Tamil speaking people including Muslims for the cause of Tamil identity. However, the increasing awareness of eastern Muslims and the differences over the perception of an independent Tamil Eelam paved the way for Muslims going their own way. The LTTE’s anti-Muslim policies including the eviction of nearly 100,000 Muslims from the north as well its massacre of Muslims a number of times in the east have alienated Muslims from supporting Tamil militants, perhaps forever, though they speak Tamil and have similar problems as a minority.
There are subtle differences in culture and perception between the Tamil populations living in north and east. From 1976 onwards the Tamils of north and east were united in their political stand and support to militancy. This was further strengthened with the signing of the India-Sri Lanka Agreement 1987 which saw the formation of a united north-eastern province. However, the LTTE’s opposition to the ISLA divided Tamil polity and militancy. It left the LTTE as the only armed militant group as the other militant groups had surrendered their weapons in terms of ISLA. The LTTE’s war against the Indian troops further divided the Tamils.
After the exit of Indian troops in 1990, the LTTE started the process of consolidation with the snuffing out other Tamil groups and marginalising Tamil political leaders. The rise of the LTTE made anti-LTTE Tamil groups to seek the protection of the Sri Lanka government. As a result the Thimphu declaration remains largely a political propaganda tool with the divided and weakened Tamil polity.
The better educated northern ‘Jaffna’ Tamils, living in a majority Tamil ambience have been spearheading the Tamil Cause as leaders; on the other hand the easterners, who share the province with nearly equal strength of Sinhalas and Muslims, have been providing the foot soldiers for Tamil militancy. However, this equation was destroyed when Karuna, the LTTE leader of Batticaloa broke away from the parent body in 2002, alleging the exploitation of easterners within the LTTE.
This had destroyed the homogeneity within the militant ranks. This had been one of the major reasons for the defeat of the LTTE in the Eelam War IV. Now new political alignments have emerged among eastern Tamils. Karuna’s position was strengthened when the Supreme Court set aside in 2006 the merger of northern and eastern provinces as one united entity. After the defeat of the LTTE, a Tamil chief minister is in office in the east. Karuna is now a minister in the Rajapaksa regime and has become a vocal supporter of a united Sri Lanka.
Sinhala’s lack of sensitivity to the Tamil aspirations had been an important trigger for the Tamils to unite in their fight against the government. However, after India’s massive intervention and the introduction of 13th amendment giving limited autonomy to Tamils, there had been generally a growing awareness of the Tamil problem among Sinhala intelligentsia. It is significant that during the three years of Eelam War IV there had been very few acts of retaliatory Sinhala public anger against Tamil population in their midst despite a number of LTTE bombs attacks that killed a few hundred civilians.
Though the government had been slow in enforcing many of its policies like the introduction Tamil in the government and recruitment of Tamils in police etc., it has made a beginning and over a period of time these efforts are likely to make some headway. Cumulatively, the Sinhala chauvinist image of the 80s has been improved; this is unlikely to go unnoticed by Tamils.
Given these changes in the environment, it is doubtful whether the cause of Tamil Eelam will evoke the same enthusiastic response as in 1983, particularly after the total defeat of the LTTE in the latest Eelam War after sacrificing atleast 30,000 cadres in the wars. There is a general weariness of the war among Tamils in Sri Lanka. Even though sections of Tamil Diaspora might be enthusiastic about supporting another war against the Sri Lanka state, the foot soldiers for it had to be found among Sri Lankan Tamils in the country.
LEADERSHIP
While many Tamil militant organizations emerged in the early 90s, only the LTTE had kept the Tamil armed struggle alive. This was solely due to its leader Prabhakaran’s single minded orientation to the goal of fighting for an independent Tamil Eelam. He introduced a number of innovations in tactical warfare fully using the real time advantage given by modern technology innovations. He showed remarkable ability motivate his followers to die for the cause. It manifested in the form of Black Tiger suicide warriors. Their tactics were used imaginatively by Sea Tigers to launch attacks in the high seas against the navy. The LTTE also refined the use propaganda as force multiplier and built up a global support network among the Tamil Diaspora that came in handy to prosecute the war. No doubt he had a number of flaws including his inability to understand political strategy and cleverly use it for furthering military objectives. He was anti intellectual and did not believe in collective leadership. He had a ruthless streak in his personality that clouded balanced judgement.
Any leader now trying to revive the LTTE or start a new Tamil militant movement has to live up to the larger than life image of Prabhakaran created in public mind. Otherwise he will not be able to motivate his followers and build up the organization. Secondly, Prabhakaran’s strength of conviction enabled him to build one of the strongest insurgent organisation in the world in a span of two decades. So any leader undertaking the task now will have to sustain his conviction for at least one to two decades.
Though he understood tactical operations better, Prabhakaran’s major shortcoming had been his inability to respond to political demands with finesse. The chances of success of any potential leader to revive militancy will increase only if he is politically savvy.
It is not only the potential of the leader that is important. It was largely the environment that shaped Prabhakaran’s mind to become a committed leader to his cause and build a strong organization. And both the internal and international environments have become more unfriendly than ever before to the idea of secession.
So a charismatic and responsive leader to revive Tamil militancy is like to emerge only when the environment turns extremely repressive and hostile to Tamil population at large. With greater awareness among the population and India acting as a subtle but continuous pressure point on Sri Lanka on the issue of devolution of equitable rights to Tamils, such “pressure cooker” situation is unlikely to develop. Thus even in a decadal time frame, the opportunity for emergence of such a leader may never come through.
CONCLUSION
The defeat of the LTTE in the just concluded Eelam War IV represents a major setback for the cause of an independent Tamil Eelam. The LTTE under V Prabhakaran had built one of the strongest insurgency organizations in the world with military capability in land, air and sea.
In spite of building such a powerful organization, supported by a global network of Tamil Diaspora to further its capability, the LTTE failed due to a number of reasons. The local and international environments that enabled the LTTE insurgency to thrive have changed since 1983. A new generation of Tamil youth driven from their homes in the north and east due to prolonged war has been exposed to different cultures and environment. It is doubtful whether they could be motivated to take up arms once again for the cause of Tamil Eelam.
India as a powerful neighbour with a large Tamil population can wield a strong influence in Sri Lanka including the future of Tamil militancy. India as a regional power is unlikely to allow easy passage for the rise of Tamil militancy afresh for reasons of strategic security. The changed international environment with low tolerance limits for the activities of non-state actors will make it difficult for the use of overseas soil for the growth of Tamil militancy. International protocols introduced to curb terrorism have come in handy to curb LTTE’s international activity. These are likely to inhibit the revival or resurgence of Tamil militancy.
However, Tamil militancy can stage a comeback if there is a strong support from another nation for its own reasons. Even then to flourish in Sri Lanka, it will require a strong anti-Tamil regime to create an environment of hostility to Sinhalas. With a powerful Sri Lanka army in place, even if the environment is suitable for militancy it will require strong and motivated leadership with committed followers who can sustain their presence for at least a decade.
Under the circumstances, Tamil militancy is likely to be restricted to acts of sabotage, occasional shoot outs and acts of assassinations by small bands. As and when Tamil population joins the mainstream of Sri Lanka through enlightened national leadership, such small group activities also might become extinct. And it would be up to Sri Lanka leadership to decide on how quickly and how comfortably they can give the feeling security and trust back to the Tamil population.
Copyright: World Focus (www.cnfworldfocus.org)
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