The increasing economic convergence between the US and China can have adverse impact on India's strategic security environment in South Asia. My copyrighted article published May 2009 issue of the GFiles Magazine tries to substantiate this concern. It is reproduced here courtesy GFiles:
Between the dragon and the deep blue sea
THE global economic downslide triggered by the US fiscal crisis has introduced a new paradigm in the international power equation. The West appears to be looking at China, sitting on nearly $2 trillion of Forex reserve, to stabilize their sagging economies. Even in the current economic downturn, despite 25 million job losses due to fall in exports, China has clocked 6.1 per cent growth in the first quarter year on year. This year it is targeting 8 per cent annual growth.
In contrast, the US figures are skewed with an annual deficit of $1.7 trillion, unfunded debt of $11.1 trillion, and unfunded liabilities of at least $43 trillion. So it was not surprising that Chinese President Hu Jintao’s suggestion that possibly IMF special drawing rights should replace the dollar as the main reserve currency dominated the thought process of the latest G20 summit, even before it began. And it seems the Chinese money power is here to stay for some time as the American woes have just begun.
The American dispensation under President Barack Obama is clearly downplaying human rights abuses in China, the perennial hobbyhorse of its China policy, much to the horror of human rights conscience keepers. This was dramatically illustrated in February this year, during Hilary Clinton’s visit to Beijing – her first port of call after assuming office as the US Secretary of State.
Her main concern on this trip was not China’s human rights abuses on which she spoke so critically during her September 1995 visit as the spouse of President Bill Clinton. It was more down to earth: reassuring Beijing about the safety of its large investments in US government securities and keeping the Chinese trade surplus capital flowing to the US.
The signs are clear: the US and China are entering into a marriage of necessity. The Chinese depend upon US consumers for a quick recovery of their export-oriented manufacturing sector while the US depends upon China to continue its purchase of US Treasury Bonds to finance President Obama’s stimulus plan. This symbiotic relationship in the making can influence the US stand on many contentious issues that had confronted its relations with China. And many other Western powers queuing up for Chinese largesse are going to be no different.
Historically, China considered itself the Middle Kingdom – the centre of the world. And it is well on the way to turning this into a modern-day reality. Even before the global economic downturn, China was going about it systematically in three areas – international assertion of power, modernization of the armed forces, and emergence as the number one economic superpower. Now it is leveraging the global economic crisis to enable the process.
China is already a dominant military power in Asia. The Pentagon annual report on Chinese Military Power released on March 25 considers the growth of China’s Navy a source of concern. According to the report, China has the “most active landbased ballistic and cruise missile program in the world”. At the strategic level, this includes the long-range ICBM with a range of almost 7,000 miles – good enough to target any location in the US, let alone Asia. China is also building more Type-094 ballistic missile submarines. It is poised to make a major breakthrough in submarine technology. The development of Hainan naval base has caused both Japan and India concern.
With increasing Chinese political and economic forays in India’s neighbourhood, China will increasingly occupy a large horizon in India’s security spectrum. As the US economic recovery may well last the whole duration of President Obama’s presidency, we can expect some changes in the US policy prescriptions to cater to Chinese sensitivities to affect South Asia.
The American dispensation under President Obama is clearly downplaying human rights abuses in China, the perennial hobbyhorse of its China policy, much to the horror of human rights conscience keepers
How should India respond to this new US-China equation? The new government taking over the reins of power in New Delhi in May may be saddled with this uncomfortable question. During 2008, Chinese strategic analysts have even hinted at the possibility of a limited war with India over the border question! China had been sending mixed signals on its relationship with India. A few illustrations will suffice.
When President Pratibha Patil visited the Buddhist pilgrim town of Tawang in early April, the Chinese Foreign Ministry was not happy about it and conveyed its objections The American dispensation under President Obama is clearly downplaying human rights abuses in China, the perennial hobbyhorse of its China policy, much to the horror of human rights conscience keepers India-China trade has grown from $18 million in 1991 to $38.2 billion in 2007. It is set to grow to $60 billion in 2010 to New Delhi. This is not the first time Beijing has done so. In February, Beijing objected to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s scheduled visit to Arunachal Pradesh (“Southern Tibet”, in Chinese parlance), in particular Tawang. Though the Prime Minister visited Arunachal Pradesh, he avoided going to Tawang! The Chinese reasoning was simple: Tawang is within the territory claimed by China although it had been under Indian rule ever since India became independent.
The Chinese objection came only a month after the two countries had signed “The Shared Vision for 21st Century”, a document jointly affirming far-reaching cooperation between the two countries, during Manmohan Singh’s visit to Beijing. Both nations also signed a Memorandum of Understanding for cooperation in 10 different fields ranging from armed forces to railways, healthcare and rural development.
On October 29 last year, British foreign secretary David Miliband announced that the previous British actions, including the Simla Accord (1913) and thus the McMahon Line, had been an anachronism and a colonial legacy. He apologized to China for not having renounced those actions earlier. The British “apology” knocks down the very basis of India’s stand on the Sino-Indian border dispute. It is unclear what India’s reaction to all this, including Miliband’s statement, was because India never unambiguously expresses its sensitivities on specific issues to the concerned countries. This is so even in the case of Sri Lanka. It is time we started stating our views clearly, if not loudly, when the issues affect us.
Indian policymakers – not merely MEA bureaucrats, but political leaders as well – have to take a hard look at how we handle foreign policy. As R Swaminathan, former Special Secretary, suggests, we should evolve a national foreign policy just as we have a national security policy. The two policies should dovetail each other to reinforce national strategic goals. We should learn to evolve a national political consensus on major foreign policy issues so that other countries we deal with know they are dealing with the nation and “not merely with a transient government”. As a nation, we cannot afford to dither any longer.
There are three fundamental issues relating to China that confront us – the border dispute, increasing Chinese influence in our neighbourhood, and the presence of the Dalai Lama and Tibetan refugees in our midst. Each one of them merits a detailed analysis. But the first two issues are more easily tractable than the Tibetan issue. As far as the border dispute is concerned, both nations can go on “talking” forever, given the Asian penchant to defer rather than resolve uncomfortable issues. It would probably be prudent now to accept the present Line of Actual Control on our border with Tibet and turn it into a “Line of Administrative Control”, as suggested by Swaminathan. The discussions on the border dispute can go on without military confrontation now and then.
South Asia, with a growing economy of over 1.5 billion people, is an enormous market for Chinese goods. China is trying to increase its influence in this region through political, military and economic means. It has made significant progress in trade in this region. It has built strong bonds with Pakistan and Bangladesh, which harbour sanctuaries of terrorist organizations operating against India. It has built a symbiotic relationship with Myanmar’s ruling junta. In Nepal, the Maoist regime is more favourably disposed towards China than India. China’s footprint is increasing in Sri Lanka. These are realities.
However, India has its own strategic and economic advantages in dealing with China as well as its neighbours. India is too big an economic entity for China to ignore. India-China trade has grown from $18 million in 1991 to $38.2 billion in 2007. It is set to grow to $60 billion in 2010. So India needs to take multi-faceted initiatives to leverage its advantages and make it difficult for China to make further inroads in this region. China will continue to flex its military muscle on our borders and extend its presence further in the Indian Ocean.
We need to build our military clout to discourage China. Unfortunately, thanks to bureaucratic red tape, our military modernization is limping. The battle worthiness of the armed forces will be seriously suspect if we do not resolve this perennial problem. In a nutshell, pragmatism rather than politicking need to govern our security and foreign policies. We should clean up our act internally so that we can be powerful externally. There is no other choice.
Copyright: GFiles Magazine, Vol 3, Issue 2 May 2009
http://gfilesindia.com/readmoresubtitle.aspx?subtitle_id=182
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