Media representatives raised a few issues to elicit my assessment of some of the current developments in Sri Lanka. My comments given below are based upon analyses of open source information on operational, political and internal developments, examined in the backdrop of past behaviour of stakeholders.
What will be the strategy for intensifying war options in the No Fire Zone?
Problem of fighting in a narrow corridor with a huge civilian population in battle zone is three fold: separate civilians from LTTE to avoid civilian casualties, break through obstacles and at the same time prevent save own troops from getting channelised into killing areas obstacles, and take on the LTTE piecemeal.
Topographically the narrow land boundaries compound the problem for the troops on the offensive. So offensive troops will have to laterally divide the sector and creep forward if heavy weapons are not to be used as promised. Tactics likely to be used are -
• Separate LTTE combatants from civilians using spotters – presumably from captured cadres who can identify them,
• use aerial surveillance with helicopter gun ships to take on fleeing cadres, destroy boats moving in the inshore sea, destroy dumps of ammo, gasoline, etc. Use SBS, RABS to take on fleeing boats in sea.
• Work in small in decentralised sub units - troops, squads, sections etc. Depend upon close quarter weapons for combat. Form hunter killer teams with special forces, armoured cars and infantry
• If the lagoon conditions permit, launch multi-pronged entries across obstacles laterally from the lagoon side and from inshore area to split and divide the population concentrations in the midst of whom LTTE has taken up positions.
The propaganda war between Sri Lanka and LTTE
For Sri Lanka the key strategy is to counter LTTE propaganda on trapped civilians and soften impact of bad press. Some of the useful techniques could be -
• Allow selected media reps to frontline, handover some of the IDP camps to Red Cross and some INGOs for administration,
• Tone down abusive rhetoric about UN, UK and the world at large.
• Play down adverse reaction in Tamil Nadu as it is likely to be scaled down after voting on May 12.
The post-conflict scenario of Tamil leadership and aspirations.
Some the actions likely to take place in the post conflict scene in the North Emerging scene is likely to give rise to -
• President Rajapaka likely to try and prevent Tamil polity from getting united by attracting some of the leaders to SLFP alliance either directly or through floating new political party of Tamils. Karuna and Pillaiyan will be the main tools.
• UNP will also try and fish to net some Tamil leaders and build them up.
• Minister Douglas Devananda is likely to emerge politically at the most advantageous position in the North to strengthen his influence in the North including Jaffna. This could result in further weeding out of pro-0LTTE elements making it difficult for them to stage a comeback. Aid flow is likely to favour the Minister’s preferred projects.
• As Army would not like the remnants of the LTTE to resurface and create fresh problems, its garrisons in North are likely to be increased in numbers. This move is likely to aggravate the problems created by increase in high security zones.
• Displaced Muslim IDPs from Jaffna could be sent back to the North.
• Indian political support for Sri Lanka Tamils could rise provided the support of Tamil Nadu politicians to the survival of the new coalition taking over in New Delhi. However, there could be no major Indian initiative on Sri Lanka from New Delhi for some months to come as the coalition government has to firm in.
• International and Indian development aid to Sri Lanka is likely to be indirectly and directly tied to level of devolution taking place on the ground.
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