By Col R Hariharan (Retd.)
Sri Lanka President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s visit to New Delhi during the month ostensibly to attend the closing ceremony of the 19th Commonwealth Games in New Delhi during the month is of significance. He was the only head of state to be invited by India for the closing ceremony underlining the special status the President and Sri Lanka enjoy in India’s foreign policy perceptions. The visit has to be seen in the overall context of growing relations between the two countries in three dimensions – internal politics, external dimension, and long term relations.
Internal political dimension
There is a strong internal political dimension both in India and Sri Lanka on the Sri Lankan Tamil issue. While Rajapaksa has politically strengthened himself in Sri Lanka giving him a free hand, Dr Manmohan Singh does not have this luxury. Despite the Congress party’s success in the last parliamentary election, the ruling United Progressive Alliance is conditioned by the fortunes of its close ally in Tamil Nadu – the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) led by its octogenarian leader and Tamil Nadu chief minister M Karunanidhi. President Rajapaksa had never been popular in Chennai both because of the Eelam War and after that due to his seemingly indifferent attitude in providing political space for Tamil minority. New Delhi’s CWG invitation to Rajapaksa came at an inconvenient time for Karunanidhi. The visit provided another handle to some of the opposition parties in Tamil Nadu that have already been castigating “Big Brother” DMK of pandering to New Delhi’s policy of condoning Sri Lanka’s excesses against Tamils during the war.
As Tamil Nadu assembly elections are nearing the two major local political coalitions led by the ruling DMK and its rival the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK) are in the process of being reshaped. It is poised at a delicate stage and there is a lot of political posturing and sparring going on in retaining Congress support for DMK. DMK’s aging leader Karunanidhi’s sons are locked in a succession battle introducing an element of uncertainty in the future of the party. To ward off an eruption of internal conflict, Karunanidhi continues to be the chief minister and also lead the party despite incapacitation due to aging. This makes DMK politically more vulnerable than before. And AIADMK chief Ms Jayalalitha is already smelling blood.
Though Sri Lanka issue is not an issue of political mainstream in the state, Karunanidhi’s handling of it during the Eelam War and its aftermath has exposed his political limitations due to his partnership in central coalition. To compensate for this he had frequently been goading New Delhi for action in a bid to show solidarity with the population on the Sri Lanka Tamil issue. And dutifully New Delhi had been echoing his concerns to Colombo. Before Rajapaksa’s latest visit to New Delhi, the Tamil Nadu chief Minister briefly met Ms Sonia Gandhi, the Congress Party chief, during her visit to Chennai and submitted a memorandum seeking her help in ensuring the rehabilitation of internally-displaced Tamils lodged in camps in Sri Lanka. In the memorandum he said “Inasmuch as the hapless Sri Lankan Tamils continue to suffer in the camps for the last 18 months, there must be some firm political commitment to end the sufferings of these people.” So it was not surprising that Indian External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna echoed similar thoughts when he spoke the media on the occasion of Rajapaksa’s visit. He said India felt it was “time to act decisively to win over Tamil-speaking Sri Lankans so that their concerns were taken care of adequately.” Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh also used the opportunity provided by the visit to once again express India’s desire for Sri Lanka to act “decisively” on moving towards a political settlement “to bridge the ethnic divide.”
Though Rajapaksa understands New Delhi’s political compulsions, he does not want to be seen as a ‘follower’ of India as his support base in Sri Lanka is mostly made up of Southern Sinhala voters. This attitude was evident when Sri Lankan Minister for External Affairs GL Peiris commenting on Rajapaksa-Manmohan Singh meeting tried to downplay the issue. He said “It was a very cordial meeting. No issue was discussed at length, but India wanted to know our plans. We indicated that we want to talk to a broader spectrum of stakeholders. That is the only way to do this, to get their ideas and to build a consensus.” In his interview to the Hindu, he said “The Tamils' response has been good. They are coming on board.” Though there had been some progress on this count, it is not wholly correct to say the Tamil minorities are coming on board. Though the Tamil National Alliance (TNA), former political allies of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), leader P Sampanthan and other Tamil MPs had met the President twice and discussed the political issues, their active participation in political mainstream remains an open question.
President Rajapaksa has also gone back on his earlier promise to India on implementing 13th amendment of Sri Lanka constitution to devolve powers to provinces after the war. The 13th amendment came into being after India and Sri Lanka signed a pact in 1987 under which Colombo agreed to devolve powers to provinces to satisfy restive minorities, mainly Tamils. Though 13th amendment has largely lost its relevance in the present Sri Lankan political context, Sri Lanka stand has placed New Delhi in piquant situation. Despite this, Sri Lanka would like to do it on its own terms. During his Delhi visit the Sri Lankan Foreign Minister was categorical on the subject: "It is impossible to talk of exact time frame for implementing the 13th amendment, it is a great mistake to do because if you talk of timeframe and then you are not able to complete the process, it is bound to be conjecture, speculative, then there is erosion of credibility." This shows the lack of credibility in Sri Lanka’s promises.
If these signals are read collectively, in plain terms, India is not at all happy at the snail’s pace at which Sri Lanka was handling the Tamil issue. The Indian foreign minister is now scheduled to visit Colombo on November 25. This issue will probably figure again on top of his agenda when he takes part in the India-Sri Lanka Joint Commission (ISJC) meeting scheduled on November 26 and 27. The decision to revive the ISJC meetings was taken during the President’s latest meeting with Indian Prime Minister. The meetings, interrupted during the war years, provide a formal forum to thrash out vexing issues between the two countries.
External dimensions
Apart from internal political compulsions, Indo-Sri Lanka relations also have a context in India’s increasing concern at the growing Chinese presence in South Asia particularly its assertive stance and presence in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir. Colombo is aware of Indian sensitivity on the subject, which was probably once again stressed at Rajspaksa’s meeting in New Delhi.
Sri Lanka-China relations are growing fast due to aggressive Chinese diplomacy as well as Colombo’s economic compulsions. So Colombo is probably being cautious in every action relating to China lest it affects its close relationship with India. This could be the reason for Sri Lanka to put a clamp on all information on Chinese activity in Sri Lanka including the number of Chinese workers, or details of progress on the projects the Chinese have taken up. Usually such information is freely available; it seems all government departments including Customs and Immigration appear to have been advised to keep mum on the subject.
At the same time Rajapaksa would like to continue to builder better relations with China as a strategic ploy to balance Indian dominance as well as for the economic largesse China had been dishing out to Sri Lanka. Close on the heels of October visit to India, Rajapaksa made a three-day visit to Beijing and met with Premier Wen Jiabao. According to media, Chinese Premier pledged to continue all development assistance to Sri Lanka. The two leaders discussed the progress of development projects currently being carried out with the assistance of the Chinese Government. Wen also promised China's assistance to develop infrastructure, particularly the highway network and bridges. They also discussed on the Hambantota port development project, the largest project in Sri Lanka carried out with Chinese funding.
Sri Lanka also needs continued Indian diplomatic support in handling its international relations which has run into a lot of opposition for its poor human rights record and for ignoring international allegations of war crimes. The Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) constituted by the President to partially satisfy the international outcry has not met with large scale acceptance. This was highlighted during the month when three major INGOs - Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and International Crisis Group rejected Sri Lanka’s invitation to testify before the Commission. In a joint letter they contended the commission would not operate independently as some of its members were government servants during the war and it had no real mandate to probe alleged war crimes in the last stages of the Eelam War.
According to the United Nations, more than 7,000 civilians were killed in the last five months of the conflict. In June, the U.N. appointed a three-member panel to look into alleged violations of human rights and humanitarian laws. The US has also said the LLRC should identify those responsible for the serious violation of international humanitarian laws that occurred during the conflict. Sri Lanka has continued to ignore the issue claiming international moves as interference in its internal affairs. Significantly India has maintained a silent stance on the issue. This has encouraged Sri Lanka to maintain its hard stand.
Long term relationship
Already the two nations enjoy close political relations at international level and their relations in trade, investment, infrastructural linkages and defence cooperation are improving. There is a general, broad-based improvement across all sectors of the relationship.
India has also taken a number of initiatives to further cement India-Sri Lanka relations in the long term. This has a strong security aspect; building military to military relations, particularly between the two navies and the Indian Coast Guard is expected to remain a key part of it. This was evident when the Indian army and naval chiefs visited Sri Lanka recently. The Commander of the Sri Lanka Navy, Vice Admiral Thisara Samarasinghe, made an eight-day official visit to India commencing in October 2010. During his visit he observed a fleet exercise in the Indian Navy’s Eastern Naval Command at Vishakapatnam. Four ships of the training squadron of the Indian Navy including INS Tir, INS Shardul, INS Tarangini and Coast Guard vessel Varuna visited Sri Lanka in October. About 150 Sri Lanka Navy personnel were provided an opportunity to train onboard Indian ships. These activities would indicate the sustained effort at building bonds between the two navies.
India has continued to maintain vigilance in ensuring that it does not become a cockpit of either revival of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) or the take off point for escaping LTTE fellow travellers seeking refuge in Canada and Australia. The arrest of four persons including Sakthivel, the Pondichery DMK municipal Councilor and Logu Ayyappan, Puduchery Periyar Dravida Kazhagam President during the month for in a ring for illegally transporting Sri Lankan refugees from Pondicherry coast to Australia is a case in point.
Apart from Indian participation in infrastructure projects, India is involved in the proposed Indian aided coal-fired power plant at Sampur, an ambitious project to build 50,000 housing units at a cost of $ 300 million with Indian grant for the war displaced families. Already an Indian project to provide 55 buses to local bodies, schools and other institutions a cost SL Rs. 92.95 million has been launched. The visiting Indian external affairs will be launching a pilot project to build 1,000 housing units in the Vanni on November 25; this is part of the mega housing project being undertaken in the region. These are some of the significant Indian steps to broaden its relevance to Sri Lanka while building a close relationship.
Conclusion
President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s political consolidation and the growing Chinese presence in Sri Lanka have circumscribed India’s current political leverages in Sri Lanka. At the same time, historical and geographical realities of the Indian Ocean region and India’s strategic strength dictate that in its own interest Sri Lanka should sustain its friendly relations with India. India also appears to have realised the need to build a win-win relationship with its island neighbour for the same reasons.
The growth of a win-win relationship can be affected under three circumstances: (1) if the Sri Lanka’s actions are perceived as affecting India’s national security, (2) the public mood in Tamil Nadu becomes strident if and when Sri Lankan Tamils become restive once again over their long pending grievances, and (c) Chinese and Pakistani influence over Sri Lanka grows at India’s expense. In the near term, chances of any one of the three prospects turning into reality appear remote. So given the political and public goodwill existing in both countries for each other, the relations are poised for further growth, despite occasional hiccups over specific issues.
October 31, 2010
Courtesy: South Asia Security Security Trends Vol 4 No 10
www.security-risks.com
No comments:
Post a Comment