Is the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) easing its rigid stand on talking peace in the last few days? It would seem so from the political head of the LTTE, Balasingam Nadesan’s e-mail interview published in the Sunday Times, London on March 22. He spoke of the insurgent group’s readiness for talks with the government “without pre-conditions.”
The Sri Lanka government was quick to turn down the offer. Its defence spokesman Keheliya Rambukwella said the government was not prepared for any ceasefire talks with a terrorist organization banned in Sri Lanka; but if the LTTE wanted some kind of response from the government the rebels would have to first let the trapped civilians go. However, significantly he added, “We are not asking the LTTE to surrender or lay down arms at this time. We will take care of that later.” This was also a positive sign, a slight departure from earlier Sri Lankan stand.
But given the complexity of the issue, it would be too early to draw any conclusion. Apart from the LTTE’s overflowing cup of misery, developments in the international environment notably in the UN Security council (UNSC), USA, UK and India, could have “persuaded” the Tamil insurgents to respond more positively to the question of peace talks. To be realistic, even if there is some progress after mediation efforts, it might be too late to save the 100,000 to 150,000 (depending upon whose statistics one goes by) civilians in the LTTE’s 26 sq km domain as the Sri Lanka security forces close in further.
The war situation could not be worse for the LTTE. Sri Lanka military machine is moving forward relentlessly regardless of casualties. In fact the inevitability of end results is making more sacrifices of LTTE lives futile. Apparently this gloomy scenario had caused the LTTE chief Prabhakaran to briefly appear in public to boost up the morale of Tamils under fire.
The LTTE had been under heavy flak from the UN agencies during the last two months for its inhuman attitude to the plight of civilians in the war zone. It is no consolation that Sri Lanka had also come under fire for the same reasons because it is the LTTE that is losing the war. The civilians in the area of LTTE control have been getting restive and are trickling out in larger numbers. Sea Tigers efforts to prevent them have not been successful due to navy’s domination of the seas.
The members of the Tamil National Alliance (TNA), the pro-LTTE group into parliament, are already having second thoughts on their continued support the LTTE, which is rapidly losing its clout and muscle power. Things in Tamil Nadu are no better for the LTTE. After the parliament elections have been announced, the major parties which are no friends of the LTTE, have seized the Sri Lanka card from the minor pro-LTTE parties. And the minor parties are in a scramble for winning the support of the big brothers to get a few berths in the elections. So regardless of who wins, fortunes of the LTTE are unlikely to improve greatly in the state.
Under these adverse circumstances, there had been some encouraging international developments for Sri Lanka Tamils, who had been agitating for action to save their Sri Lankan brethren suffering in Wanni. In UK, though the government had been lukewarm to the idea, the Tamil issue was coming up before the House of Commons. (In fact, Nadesan’s interview was published on the eve of the Commons debate.)
In the recent months, the US had been trying to find ways to get the trapped civilians out of the war zone in Wanni. Last month it wanted to employ the Marines to carry out a “consensual evacuation” of the civilians; but dropped the move when even India did not support the idea. In any case it would have found no takers on both the warring sides for different reasons. President Barack Obama had built up a lot of expectations among the Tamil expatriates on the US policy on the Sri Lanka war and plight of Tamils. And they had been lobbying for a discussion in the UNSC on the issue of civilian killings in the war in Wanni. These appear to have borne fruit at last.
The US has come out in strong support when three non-permanent members of the UNSC - Austria, Mexico, and Costa Rica started trying for an “informal briefing” of the issue in the UNSC. The US envoy to the UN Ms Susan Rice supporting the move said, "The United States feels strongly, and concerned, about Sri Lanka, and we support the provision of it to the Council -- a full and updated information on the humanitarian situation.” But nothing may come out of the move as the UNSC is divided over the issue and China has expressed its strong objections to such a discussion. But that does not matter because the Sri Lanka Tamil issue has already been brought to the international limelight putting Sri Lanka on the defensive.
Moreover, Ms Navaneetham Pillay, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, had come down heavily on both the Sri Lanka government and the LTTE on the death of civilians in the war zone. She had also said some of their actions could constitute violations of international human rights and humanitarian law. Ms Pillay’s pronouncements have come at an inconvenient time for Sri Lanka as the issue was already threatening to spill over to the UNSC. Moreover, some Tamil expatriates have been exploring ways to take Sri Lanka before the International Criminal Court for acts of genocide. So not surprisingly, Sri Lanka has reacted strongly to her statement.
In this environment, it would be logical for the LTTE to help the Tamil expatriates and pro-LTTE lobbies everywhere by taking some positive action. And Nadesan’s Sunday Times interview was probably meant to meet this immediate international need. However, at the same time it does provide a small opening for bringing the two sides to the peace table, though Sri Lanka may put the whole issue in the cold storage till the LTTE is driven out of its last toehold and loses its bargaining capacity.
Sri Lanka government is sitting pretty awaiting the LTTE to run out of blood to shed in the battlefields. But the more the “final victory” is delayed the more is its discomfort as the war is an expensive proposition and the economy is creaking dangerously close to a halt. However, the government has managed to get the International Monetary Fund to agree to lend $ 1.8 billion. Politically, the President Rajapaksa basking under the glow of military victories seems to be comfortable, as he appears to face no major challenge in the near horizon. The main opposition party - the United National Party (UNP) - is having pains of a rebirth to make itself strong to face the ruling coalition. The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) mauled in the recent provincial elections is also largely on the defensive.
The ruling party’s efforts to win over individual members of the TNA who are in a survival dilemma appear to have met with some success. President Rajapaksa’s invitation to them for talks has met with positive response of some responsible members of the TNA. This raises some hopes of a possible political rapprochement between the Tamil and Sinhala polity.
The political churning up in India before the general election has prevented the Indian government from taking any major initiative on critical and time bound developments in Sri Lanka although the issue did figure in discussions between the US Secretary of State and the secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs. Thus India has painted itself into irrelevance in Sri Lanka, probably much to the comfort of the latter. This will make the job of redemption and building up of India’s relations with Sri Lanka a little more difficult, particularly if an unviable coalition comes to power in New Delhi. Sri Lanka is probably hoping that its “final victory” would be a fact of life by the time a new government is sworn in New Delhi. So for the time being the India factor is put to sleep, except for the genre of Sri Lanka politicians hunting for imaginary Indian designs on Sri Lanka.
But the international glare of publicity on Sri Lanka’s poor human rights record appears to have offended the nation strongly. So its propaganda arms are systematically running down international NGOs accusing them of colluding with the terrorists. This is not the first time the LTTE had used the gullibility of INGOs in handling terrorism related issues and organisations to its advantage. In the past, the LTTE had infiltrated such bodies with some success even overseas. And it will continue to do so because it is fighting a war of survival. Despite this the Sri Lanka government appears to be taking the steps to improve its falling credits on the human rights scorecard. It has agreed to ease its restrictions on the entry of INGOs in the North. Till now only UN and ICRC relief agencies have been permitted entry. When the A9 road is opened fully for public traffic, the restrictions on them are likely to be progressively eased further.
Sri Lanka government appears to have been shaken up at the possibility of the Sri Lanka human rights issue coming up before the UNSC even as an “informal discussion.” China’s strong, timely support to Sri Lanka in the UNSC is sure to improve its standing in Sri Lanka. And it is likely to positively impact the relations between the two countries over the long term. In similar circumstances in the past, China had baled out Sudan and Myanmar in the UN, and the bonding of their relations with China had become even stronger. This is a strategic development that India would be watching carefully.
Sri Lanka can permanently keep the human rights issue from the unsavoury international attention by taking proactive measures to improve its standards, and they are closely connected with good governance. With the war nearing a close, the sooner Sri Lanka starts on this exercise the better. It would be welcomed not only by Tamils but all sections of Sri Lanka society.
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cnotes6%5Cnote503.html
Related blogs:
Sri Lanka: War and the politics of peace
Sri Lanka: War gets dangerously close for trapped civilians
Thursday, March 26, 2009
Saturday, March 14, 2009
LTTE: missteps, misdeeds, and 33 years later
Interview with Col. R Hariharan, a retired Military Intelligence specialist on South Asia, served as the head of intelligence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka 1987-90.
By Udara Soysa March 13, Chennai, Sri Lanka Guardian
1. What do you think the main difference between the operational realities between current Eelam War and the IPKF conducted war against the LTTE?
There is no comparison between the two situations except that we were fighting the same opponent. Indian army was fighting for an objective that was not clear in a foreign country. India's goals had international influence. So it was primarily not a war against the LTTE or Sri Lanka. The war was thrust upon the army by political leadership who could not think through the problem. So our war did not enjoy broad political support in the home country and courted a lot of suspicion in Sri Lanka. In fact, the Indian operation in Sri Lanka became a victim of the political divide among three major political entities - a waning Congress, a rising BJP in league with other opposition groups, and rising regional satraps who had no common agenda on Sri Lanka. It finally led to the establishment coalition politics in New Delhi giving a big clout to the regional parties in national mainstream that continues to this day.
The LTTE was learning its craft, trying out various methods of fighting and survival with nascent conventional capability. It realised the value of Sri Lanka Tamil expatriates to build up its movement as other Tamil militant groups had become political parties. The LTTE also benefited from Tamils' disappointment when India failed to deliver as per their high expectations. The LTTE also cashed in on the downgrading of Indian influence among Tamils. LTTE was less ambitious and more realistic in those days; and probably listened to international community more intently to win their sympathy.
Military operations were less modern as Indian army did not use air force to its full potential. Similarly Navy was employed purely to support logistics as the LTTE naval wing was in infancy. Considering that our operations were the first ever in a foreign country after independence, they had the hall marks of hasty planning at Army HQ. It was a good learning opportunity for the services as a whole on planning and conduct of operations overseas. Troops at ground level did achieve results over a period of 18 months of intense counter insurgency operations for which they were not primed initially. But politically it left India confused.
2. How do you see the current military balance in Sri Lanka?
I confess I have inadequate inputs on both sides' performance and current status to assess "military balance." It is difficult to assess the military balance between a regular armed force and a insurgent force that has probably lost its conventional capability. As the LTTE is probably revamping itself into unconventional mode we need to see how the SLSF responds to the LTTE in the coming months when LTTE steps up its guerrilla attacks and suicide bombings after the current spell of war is over. But as of now the LTTE appears to be terribly weakened by the SF; the LTTE's future will depend up how the Sri Lanka government regains the trust of Tamil population which is feeling insecure at present.
3. What were the key factors that affects and affected the current military balance ? Can you comment particularly on international, military, political and leadership factors?
This will require a major assessment exercise for which adequate inputs are not available with me. It will take some more time when the background information surfaces. After that only we can evolve a reasonably accurate picture. But few things stand out even now: President Rajapaksa's solid political support to the armed forces, Gen Fonseka's flexible approach to planning and conduct of war while sticking to end goals, and the limitations of international community to influence wars in South Asia when the rulers dig their heels and stand firm. It holds valuable lessons for South Asian nations on national mobilisation for war and its fall out on fundamental freedoms of citizens.
Basically, LTTE failed to strategise on its unconventional strengths by its grandiose dreams of having a conventional capability. Non state actors require national commitment from another country to build a conventional capability. Taml insurgency in Sri Lanka requires at least a neutral India, if not support, to succeed but Prabhakaran burnt his boats when he plotted to kill Rajiv Gandhi. That act hurt India's pride.
4. How do you see the current LTTE strength ?
Inadequate inputs makes the guess hazardous. I wonder whether Prabhakaran himself will have a clear and accurate idea of LTTE strength in numbers as it is in a state of flux. If the body counts are honest, I presume the LTTE strength will be around 3000 cadres dispersed all over; you may add a few hundreds to a thousand in and around their area of control.
5. What was the biggest mistake LTTE did during the current Eelam war?
The LTTE's mistake was made before the war in not correctly assessing the changed mindset of Sri Lanka national and military leadership. Probably, it was difficult becausethe national leadership probably evolved a clear cut vision on future course only after its (unexpected?) military success in the east. So the LTTE was probably lulled into complacency in not reading the dynamic situation.
6. How was your experience in the ground during the IPKF operation times in late 1980's?
Question is not very clear. IPKF experience was not the first war experience for me. From a soldier's point of view all wars are the same. But Sri Lanka experience was the first time I saw the armed forces frustrated as the national leadership palmed off its responsibility to the army to tackle non military issues at which it was a novice. It was the only war where political expediency at the home country and the host country took our army for a ride. I hope our army has become wiser now.
7. Can you comment on Prabhakarans personality and his contributions to the LTTEs augment of power over the decades?
This is the subject for a book which I do not propose to write now. He is still a powerful personality influencing a lot of Tamils - both combatants and non combatants; that is how suicide bombers are still motivated to die to fulfil his command.
8. How do you see the current situation in Eastern Sri Lanka?
Loss of a good opportunity given to the government to show the Tamils that they would be better off in peace and tranquility which are yet to gain a firm foothold in the east. It is a discouragement for Tamil leaders who would like to wholeheartedly join the national mainstream. It reinforces the suspicion of sections of Tamils who doubt the "ulterior motive" of the political leadership in Colombo in waging war.
9. Do you believe that the current war can end within this year? If so, what can Sri Lankans expect after the end of the war?
It will end in its present form and after some time come up perhaps on a much smaller scale in other forms. To determine the time frame for this, much depends on how the leadership on both sides play the scene after the end game.
10. What type of political solution do you think is ideal for Sri Lanka?
No one can really lay down a magic formula. Ideally the right political solution will have to be "owned" by most of the people where they see a part of their aspirations are met and one which has the largest chances of ushering in peace. Considering this, adequate ldevolution of powers (I know it is a bad word for some Sri Lanka politicians) to the provinces will be a good idea where people not only pay taxes but also have a say in the development of their own areas. And it can do with a less visible presence of the military.
By Udara Soysa March 13, Chennai, Sri Lanka Guardian
1. What do you think the main difference between the operational realities between current Eelam War and the IPKF conducted war against the LTTE?
There is no comparison between the two situations except that we were fighting the same opponent. Indian army was fighting for an objective that was not clear in a foreign country. India's goals had international influence. So it was primarily not a war against the LTTE or Sri Lanka. The war was thrust upon the army by political leadership who could not think through the problem. So our war did not enjoy broad political support in the home country and courted a lot of suspicion in Sri Lanka. In fact, the Indian operation in Sri Lanka became a victim of the political divide among three major political entities - a waning Congress, a rising BJP in league with other opposition groups, and rising regional satraps who had no common agenda on Sri Lanka. It finally led to the establishment coalition politics in New Delhi giving a big clout to the regional parties in national mainstream that continues to this day.
The LTTE was learning its craft, trying out various methods of fighting and survival with nascent conventional capability. It realised the value of Sri Lanka Tamil expatriates to build up its movement as other Tamil militant groups had become political parties. The LTTE also benefited from Tamils' disappointment when India failed to deliver as per their high expectations. The LTTE also cashed in on the downgrading of Indian influence among Tamils. LTTE was less ambitious and more realistic in those days; and probably listened to international community more intently to win their sympathy.
Military operations were less modern as Indian army did not use air force to its full potential. Similarly Navy was employed purely to support logistics as the LTTE naval wing was in infancy. Considering that our operations were the first ever in a foreign country after independence, they had the hall marks of hasty planning at Army HQ. It was a good learning opportunity for the services as a whole on planning and conduct of operations overseas. Troops at ground level did achieve results over a period of 18 months of intense counter insurgency operations for which they were not primed initially. But politically it left India confused.
2. How do you see the current military balance in Sri Lanka?
I confess I have inadequate inputs on both sides' performance and current status to assess "military balance." It is difficult to assess the military balance between a regular armed force and a insurgent force that has probably lost its conventional capability. As the LTTE is probably revamping itself into unconventional mode we need to see how the SLSF responds to the LTTE in the coming months when LTTE steps up its guerrilla attacks and suicide bombings after the current spell of war is over. But as of now the LTTE appears to be terribly weakened by the SF; the LTTE's future will depend up how the Sri Lanka government regains the trust of Tamil population which is feeling insecure at present.
3. What were the key factors that affects and affected the current military balance ? Can you comment particularly on international, military, political and leadership factors?
This will require a major assessment exercise for which adequate inputs are not available with me. It will take some more time when the background information surfaces. After that only we can evolve a reasonably accurate picture. But few things stand out even now: President Rajapaksa's solid political support to the armed forces, Gen Fonseka's flexible approach to planning and conduct of war while sticking to end goals, and the limitations of international community to influence wars in South Asia when the rulers dig their heels and stand firm. It holds valuable lessons for South Asian nations on national mobilisation for war and its fall out on fundamental freedoms of citizens.
Basically, LTTE failed to strategise on its unconventional strengths by its grandiose dreams of having a conventional capability. Non state actors require national commitment from another country to build a conventional capability. Taml insurgency in Sri Lanka requires at least a neutral India, if not support, to succeed but Prabhakaran burnt his boats when he plotted to kill Rajiv Gandhi. That act hurt India's pride.
4. How do you see the current LTTE strength ?
Inadequate inputs makes the guess hazardous. I wonder whether Prabhakaran himself will have a clear and accurate idea of LTTE strength in numbers as it is in a state of flux. If the body counts are honest, I presume the LTTE strength will be around 3000 cadres dispersed all over; you may add a few hundreds to a thousand in and around their area of control.
5. What was the biggest mistake LTTE did during the current Eelam war?
The LTTE's mistake was made before the war in not correctly assessing the changed mindset of Sri Lanka national and military leadership. Probably, it was difficult becausethe national leadership probably evolved a clear cut vision on future course only after its (unexpected?) military success in the east. So the LTTE was probably lulled into complacency in not reading the dynamic situation.
6. How was your experience in the ground during the IPKF operation times in late 1980's?
Question is not very clear. IPKF experience was not the first war experience for me. From a soldier's point of view all wars are the same. But Sri Lanka experience was the first time I saw the armed forces frustrated as the national leadership palmed off its responsibility to the army to tackle non military issues at which it was a novice. It was the only war where political expediency at the home country and the host country took our army for a ride. I hope our army has become wiser now.
7. Can you comment on Prabhakarans personality and his contributions to the LTTEs augment of power over the decades?
This is the subject for a book which I do not propose to write now. He is still a powerful personality influencing a lot of Tamils - both combatants and non combatants; that is how suicide bombers are still motivated to die to fulfil his command.
8. How do you see the current situation in Eastern Sri Lanka?
Loss of a good opportunity given to the government to show the Tamils that they would be better off in peace and tranquility which are yet to gain a firm foothold in the east. It is a discouragement for Tamil leaders who would like to wholeheartedly join the national mainstream. It reinforces the suspicion of sections of Tamils who doubt the "ulterior motive" of the political leadership in Colombo in waging war.
9. Do you believe that the current war can end within this year? If so, what can Sri Lankans expect after the end of the war?
It will end in its present form and after some time come up perhaps on a much smaller scale in other forms. To determine the time frame for this, much depends on how the leadership on both sides play the scene after the end game.
10. What type of political solution do you think is ideal for Sri Lanka?
No one can really lay down a magic formula. Ideally the right political solution will have to be "owned" by most of the people where they see a part of their aspirations are met and one which has the largest chances of ushering in peace. Considering this, adequate ldevolution of powers (I know it is a bad word for some Sri Lanka politicians) to the provinces will be a good idea where people not only pay taxes but also have a say in the development of their own areas. And it can do with a less visible presence of the military.
Sunday, March 8, 2009
Sri Lanka: War gets dangerously close for trapped civilians:
The battlefronts of the Eelam War IV in Sri Lanka is dangerously getting close to civilians trapped in the war zone as well as the narrow strip of safety zone on the coast where some of them have taken refuge. The Human Rights Watch (HRW) warning on March 4, 2009 that 150,000 civilians there were in desperate need of help right now has not come a day too soon. Human Rights Watch’s statement also said that more than 2,000 civilians have been killed in the conflict and thousands more injured. And the numbers would only grow bigger if urgent action is not taken to get them out as the war is growing in intensity.
The security forces claimed killing around 100 LTTE cadres in the last 48 hours as the LTTE was marshalling its strength to breakthrough the frontline. Though the security forces’ casualties were not officially released but it would be high, considering that the LTTE did make an initial breakthrough at least in one case in its desperate bid to stem the Sri Lankan onslaught. However, this minor breakthrough north of Puthukkudiyiruppu was broken up later.
According to the defence sources, the increasingly constricting battlefront around has now reduced the LTTE area to a tiny 50 sq km. The frontline now extends from Palamathalam on the northern edge of the safety zone, to north of Puthukkudiyiruppu, and across to the western edge of Mullaitivu lagoon. The security forces have built a formidable line up for the “final kill” – 55 Division north of Palamathalam, 58 Division north of Puthukkudiyiruppu, 53 Division west of Puthukkudiyiruppu, Task Force-8 west of the lagoon and 59 Division in Mullaittivu. And more task forces and divisions are in depth.
The security forces have made steady progress with vital gains along the coast south of Chalai virtually limiting the coastal strip available for the LTTE to make a “final” get away through the sea. Already the navy is deployed off Mullaitivu coast to intercept fleeing LTTE boats. 55 Division had claimed sinking 10 Sea Tiger boats when it thwarted an attack by 20 Sea Tiger boats under Soosai on February 27, 2009. Since then the LTTE had repeatedly been trying to make offensive forays along the battlefront.
This would indicate the LTTE’s dogged mindset to fight on till the bitter end, regardless of civilian casualties. Considering this, the defence report that the LTTE was using area four km south of Puthumathalam as launching pad for its offensive action is likely to be correct. But the danger is that the LTTE has sited its mortar and artillery batteries within the safety zone in the midst of dense civilian concentration. The lives of these civilians are totally in the hands of the LTTE and the security forces who would suffer casualties if they do not take retaliatory action to silence the LTTE batteries.
Unlike over 20,000 combatant casualties of the war, civilian deaths during the last few months were avoidable if only both sides had shown more compassion and humanitarian considerations. But the totally militarized environment has given way to cynicism and callousness on both sides. Inevitably military priorities are overriding humanitarian considerations as the security forces are tightening the noose around the LTTE which is fighting a life and death battle.
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which has successfully ferried some 2,400 civilians from the war zone during the last three weeks, has also called for the evacuation of all civilians. The ICRC head of operations for South Asia, Jacques de Maio, has described the Vanni situation as "one of the most disastrous" he had experienced. In his view it would be possible to avoid further unnecessary suffering and death by allowing civilians who want to leave to get out of the area. He has also asked for more aid to be allowed to reach the civilians.
Sri Lanka had been facing mounting pressure and criticism of on this issue from international community. Many countries including the U.S., UK and India have called for a ceasefire to save the civilians. In India, the jerrybuilt ruling coalition applecart is being rocked severely with the Tamil population’s strident demand for a ceasefire in Sri Lanka. Had these calls come before the LTTE came embarrassingly close to defeat, they would not be suspect in the eyes of Sri Lanka. So it is no surprise that Sri Lanka rejected the calls for ceasefire outright; however, it reiterated its offer to call a halt to the war if the LTTE laid down arms.
Of course, even if Sri Lanka does not accede to such calls for halting the war, its problem on this count is unlikely to diminish. The only saving grace in Sri Lanka’s action so far is that despite huge superiority in numbers, the security forces are not rushing through the final offensive apparently to enable more civilians to escape the LTTE gauntlet. In the coming days the security forces will be using less and less of artillery fire as they neutralise LTTE pockets of resistance set amidst teeming civilians one by one. As the battle spills more and more among civilians, casualties will increase dramatically. Ultimately when the military juggernaut moves in for the final battle, even if it wants it would not be able to distinguish between the LTTE and civilians.
The LTTE is an insurgent force that had repeatedly used terrorist tools with little consideration for civilian lives even when it was not fighting a war. So it is unlikely to make saving of human lives as its first priority. Nothing shows this than the cavalier way the LTTE political wing head B Nadesan handled the call of Indian Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee to the Sri Lanka government to seize the opportunity offered by the LTTE’s readiness for a ceasefire as an opportunity to evacuate the civilians from the war zone. Significantly, in this particular statement the Foreign Minister did not include his earlier call to the LTTE to lay down arms. Yet Nadesan rejected the call outright because evacuation of civilians was unacceptable to the LTTE.
Why is the LTTE not allowing the civilians to exit from the battle zone? There are a few reasons for this. Many of the civilians there have family connections with the LTTE or its hard core supporters. There would also be LTTE casualties of war. Moreover, there are also LTTE’s administrative auxiliaries who are helping out the frontline cadres as well as the families. All of them have legitimate fears about their fate if they go over to the areas under the control of “Sinhala” armed forces as they see it. Inevitably, they will have to be screened to exclude potential LTTE killers infiltrating along with them or escaping the battle. So the security forces have to exercise vigilance and control in some form or other over them when they are held in temporary camps. Unless their future safety is guaranteed by a neutral agency, these civilians are unlikely to walk out even if a safe passage is arranged to get out of the combat zone.
Of course, there must be civilians among them who do not fall under these categories. And the LTTE would not allow them to leave as it could induce an uncontrollable urge in everyone to escape.
So what the LTTE wants is a ceasefire, with no changes in its agenda. That means the LTTE essentially wants to continue as an independent armed military entity with control over its domain. It is this attitude of the LTTE that makes its calls for the international community’s help the trapped civilians suspect. In short, it wants everyone to forget the physical, geographical and political changes that have been wrought in Sri Lanka in the last three years of war. The LTTE, which is quite savvy in international ways, knows this is not a realistic expectation. But yet the LTTE wants India to go the extra mile to do so! If the LTTE expectation from India is to help it survive, it would find few takers despite all the emotions stirred up in Tamil Nadu.
The anguished cry of Tamils all over the world on this issue is not getting the unbiased attention it deserves thanks to the LTTE’s continued callousness and the Sri Lanka state’s reluctance to change its stance. In this bleak scenario, the arrival of Indian medical team in Sri Lanka to help the civilians in the north is welcome news. But it looks too little considering the magnitude of the problem. The mute point is can the international community do anything to get the people out of this logjam?
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cnotes6%5Cnote501.html
The security forces claimed killing around 100 LTTE cadres in the last 48 hours as the LTTE was marshalling its strength to breakthrough the frontline. Though the security forces’ casualties were not officially released but it would be high, considering that the LTTE did make an initial breakthrough at least in one case in its desperate bid to stem the Sri Lankan onslaught. However, this minor breakthrough north of Puthukkudiyiruppu was broken up later.
According to the defence sources, the increasingly constricting battlefront around has now reduced the LTTE area to a tiny 50 sq km. The frontline now extends from Palamathalam on the northern edge of the safety zone, to north of Puthukkudiyiruppu, and across to the western edge of Mullaitivu lagoon. The security forces have built a formidable line up for the “final kill” – 55 Division north of Palamathalam, 58 Division north of Puthukkudiyiruppu, 53 Division west of Puthukkudiyiruppu, Task Force-8 west of the lagoon and 59 Division in Mullaittivu. And more task forces and divisions are in depth.
The security forces have made steady progress with vital gains along the coast south of Chalai virtually limiting the coastal strip available for the LTTE to make a “final” get away through the sea. Already the navy is deployed off Mullaitivu coast to intercept fleeing LTTE boats. 55 Division had claimed sinking 10 Sea Tiger boats when it thwarted an attack by 20 Sea Tiger boats under Soosai on February 27, 2009. Since then the LTTE had repeatedly been trying to make offensive forays along the battlefront.
This would indicate the LTTE’s dogged mindset to fight on till the bitter end, regardless of civilian casualties. Considering this, the defence report that the LTTE was using area four km south of Puthumathalam as launching pad for its offensive action is likely to be correct. But the danger is that the LTTE has sited its mortar and artillery batteries within the safety zone in the midst of dense civilian concentration. The lives of these civilians are totally in the hands of the LTTE and the security forces who would suffer casualties if they do not take retaliatory action to silence the LTTE batteries.
Unlike over 20,000 combatant casualties of the war, civilian deaths during the last few months were avoidable if only both sides had shown more compassion and humanitarian considerations. But the totally militarized environment has given way to cynicism and callousness on both sides. Inevitably military priorities are overriding humanitarian considerations as the security forces are tightening the noose around the LTTE which is fighting a life and death battle.
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which has successfully ferried some 2,400 civilians from the war zone during the last three weeks, has also called for the evacuation of all civilians. The ICRC head of operations for South Asia, Jacques de Maio, has described the Vanni situation as "one of the most disastrous" he had experienced. In his view it would be possible to avoid further unnecessary suffering and death by allowing civilians who want to leave to get out of the area. He has also asked for more aid to be allowed to reach the civilians.
Sri Lanka had been facing mounting pressure and criticism of on this issue from international community. Many countries including the U.S., UK and India have called for a ceasefire to save the civilians. In India, the jerrybuilt ruling coalition applecart is being rocked severely with the Tamil population’s strident demand for a ceasefire in Sri Lanka. Had these calls come before the LTTE came embarrassingly close to defeat, they would not be suspect in the eyes of Sri Lanka. So it is no surprise that Sri Lanka rejected the calls for ceasefire outright; however, it reiterated its offer to call a halt to the war if the LTTE laid down arms.
Of course, even if Sri Lanka does not accede to such calls for halting the war, its problem on this count is unlikely to diminish. The only saving grace in Sri Lanka’s action so far is that despite huge superiority in numbers, the security forces are not rushing through the final offensive apparently to enable more civilians to escape the LTTE gauntlet. In the coming days the security forces will be using less and less of artillery fire as they neutralise LTTE pockets of resistance set amidst teeming civilians one by one. As the battle spills more and more among civilians, casualties will increase dramatically. Ultimately when the military juggernaut moves in for the final battle, even if it wants it would not be able to distinguish between the LTTE and civilians.
The LTTE is an insurgent force that had repeatedly used terrorist tools with little consideration for civilian lives even when it was not fighting a war. So it is unlikely to make saving of human lives as its first priority. Nothing shows this than the cavalier way the LTTE political wing head B Nadesan handled the call of Indian Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee to the Sri Lanka government to seize the opportunity offered by the LTTE’s readiness for a ceasefire as an opportunity to evacuate the civilians from the war zone. Significantly, in this particular statement the Foreign Minister did not include his earlier call to the LTTE to lay down arms. Yet Nadesan rejected the call outright because evacuation of civilians was unacceptable to the LTTE.
Why is the LTTE not allowing the civilians to exit from the battle zone? There are a few reasons for this. Many of the civilians there have family connections with the LTTE or its hard core supporters. There would also be LTTE casualties of war. Moreover, there are also LTTE’s administrative auxiliaries who are helping out the frontline cadres as well as the families. All of them have legitimate fears about their fate if they go over to the areas under the control of “Sinhala” armed forces as they see it. Inevitably, they will have to be screened to exclude potential LTTE killers infiltrating along with them or escaping the battle. So the security forces have to exercise vigilance and control in some form or other over them when they are held in temporary camps. Unless their future safety is guaranteed by a neutral agency, these civilians are unlikely to walk out even if a safe passage is arranged to get out of the combat zone.
Of course, there must be civilians among them who do not fall under these categories. And the LTTE would not allow them to leave as it could induce an uncontrollable urge in everyone to escape.
So what the LTTE wants is a ceasefire, with no changes in its agenda. That means the LTTE essentially wants to continue as an independent armed military entity with control over its domain. It is this attitude of the LTTE that makes its calls for the international community’s help the trapped civilians suspect. In short, it wants everyone to forget the physical, geographical and political changes that have been wrought in Sri Lanka in the last three years of war. The LTTE, which is quite savvy in international ways, knows this is not a realistic expectation. But yet the LTTE wants India to go the extra mile to do so! If the LTTE expectation from India is to help it survive, it would find few takers despite all the emotions stirred up in Tamil Nadu.
The anguished cry of Tamils all over the world on this issue is not getting the unbiased attention it deserves thanks to the LTTE’s continued callousness and the Sri Lanka state’s reluctance to change its stance. In this bleak scenario, the arrival of Indian medical team in Sri Lanka to help the civilians in the north is welcome news. But it looks too little considering the magnitude of the problem. The mute point is can the international community do anything to get the people out of this logjam?
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cnotes6%5Cnote501.html
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