INDIAN ARMY NEW WAR DOCTRINE ANALYSED

By Dr. Subhash Kapila

Introductory Observations

The Indian Army’s enunciation of a New War doctrine was long overdue in the light of India's embattled security environment. The last Indian war doctrine ‘The COLD START War Doctrine" which was a Pakistan-specific war doctrine was formulated nearly five years back. India’s two major adversaries, namely Pakistan and China, have in the last five years lapsed into stronger adversarial postures. A strategic review of India’s military postures and plans was certainly called for at this juncture.

Pakistan today stands externally and internally besieged with distinct possibilities of disintegration and Talibanization and its nuclear weapons falling into the hands of Taliban and Al Qaeda. A Pakistan Army so besieged could be tempted to military adventurism against India to divert Pakistani public’s domestic discontent.

China on the Northern peripheries of India has indulged in military suppression of discontent in Tibet and Xingjian. In relation to Tibet, China has many India-centric fears, hence the growing adversarial stances on India’s borders with Tibet. On a larger plane, China along with its military proxy i.e. Pakistan is intent on keeping India confined within South Asia confines. Hence, the growing adversarial stances of China towards India. In case of both Pakistan and China, the growing strategic cooperation and military-to-military contacts of India with the United States has generated further strategic disquiet.

Contextually therefore, the Indian Army is well within its rights to formulate plans, doctrines and weapon and equipment acquisition plans to meet the enhanced threat profiles from Pakistan and China.

In the last five years, the powers that matter in the global strategic calculus have viewed India as a regional power and a global power in the making; consequently, there are expectations that India should ready itself for a greater strategic reach and out-of area-shouldering of strategic responsibilities.

The Indian Army Chief, General Deepak Kapoor’s enunciation of the major thrust areas of India's New War Doctrine in end-December 2009 needs to be viewed in the context outlined above.

In terms of reactions, there was a marked paranoia at the official levels in Pakistan. Pakistan Foreign Ministry’s reactions were crude and flustered. Pakistan’s military hierarchy ridiculed India's New War Doctrine as delusionary.

Reactions in China were critical and these stand reflected in an earlier SAAG Paper on this Website. In both cases the reactions from Pakistan and China were predictable.

Pakistan Army’s reactions can be attributed to a growing feeling of loss that the military balance in South Asia in slipping away in India's favor and the recognition that US- India strategic cooperation is getting too proximate for Pakistan’s comfort. Further, the uncertainty whether China would go the extra mile in favor of Pakistan in any future India – Pakistan conflict..

It is patently wrong therefore to assert that the New War Doctrine is a manifestation of India's growing proclivity towards military adventurism. India's record is otherwise.

In the estimation of this Author. India's New War Doctrine carries within it more political and strategic signals and implications than military implications.

Accordingly, this Paper’s analysis is set- out in the following order:

• India's New Army War Doctrine: The Major Thrust Areas
• India's New Army War Doctrine: The Political Significance
• India's New War Doctrine: New Strategic Directions
• India's New Army War Doctrine: Indian Political Leadership’s Sustained Focus Required on Implementation.
  

India's New Army War Doctrine: The Major Thrust Areas

Re-arranging the order of the major thrust areas of the New War Doctrine from the order of the Indian Army Chief, these emerge as under:

• Two-Front War Doctrine: This will be the mainstay of India's New War Doctrine, based on the reality that India should expect and be prepared to effectively meet simultaneous threats from China on the Northern borders and Pakistan on the Western borders.
• India Strategic Reach and Out-of Areas Operations Capabilities: The New War Doctrine would incorporate enhancement of India's capabilities. Both are related to India's aspirations as a regional power and a global power.
• Tri-Service Operational Synergy: This is a logical top priority focus of India's New War Doctrine. It is analyzed that the New War Doctrine envisages short and shift military operations. With a nuclear overhang with both Pakistan and China, the Indian military operations to neutralize the Chinese and Pakistani threats has to be fast paced facilitated by a high degree of synergy between the Indian Army, Indian Navy and the Indian Air Force.
• Asymmetric Warfare and Sub-Conventional Threats: Focus on Operational Capabilities to Neutralize Such Threats: Emphasis seems to have been laid in the Doctrine because both Pakistan and China can be expected to use these instruments as force multipliers. India focus on intense fast-paced operations can be slowed down by such threats both in forward areas and rear areas.
• Military Technological Dominance Over Adversaries: This encompasses the entire spectrum of Network-Centric warfare, Information Warfare, Cyber Warfare all integrated to facilitate speedy decision making and exploitation of fleeting tactical opportunities.
  

Of the five major priority thrusts in the New War Doctrine, the first two are the most significant, the last three thrust areas form an essential part of doctrines of all modern war-fighting.

The New War Doctrine’s enunciation of a “Two-Front War Doctrine” and enhancement of “Strategic Reach and “Out of Area Operations Capabilities” carry immense political and strategic significance in terms of India future strategic directions.

India's New Army War Doctrine: The Political Significance

Whether intended or not, to a strategic analyst, the contextual security environment, the timing of the announcement of the New War Doctrine, and giving it prominence in the public domain, indicate that India and the Indian Army wish to send out some political messages. Therefore India's New War Doctrine announcement has a political significance attendant on it.

The political significance of the New War Doctrine has to be viewed at two levels. The first level pertains to India's political relations with China and Pakistan. The second level pertains to India's strategic preparedness and a closer integration between the Indian Army and the internal security agencies to combat the asymmetric threats.

Politically, in relation to China and Pakistan, India's message is that while India would go out of the way to improve relations with them, but in India's security planning and preparations, China and Pakistan figure as major threat perceptions, and therefore political and strategic prudence demands that India is prepared for all eventualities.

The Indian Army was always formulating contingency plans for simultaneous attacks by China and Pakistan from 1962 onwards. Inclusion of this as top priority in the New Army War Doctrine is politically significant.

The second level pertains to India’s strategic preparedness and a closer integration between the Indian Army and the internal security agencies to meet the asymmetric threats. By placing a ‘Two Front War Strategy’ as top priority of the New War Doctrine there will be henceforth an unambiguous political and military focus on initiating strategic readiness for the same at all levels.

In relation to the Asymmetric Threats, its inclusion as a priority focus would help in initiation of political measures to integrate the internal security mechanisms to bring about integration and synergy with the Indian Army plans to meet such threats.

India's New War Doctrine: New Strategic Directions

The emphasis in the Doctrine or “India’s Strategic Reach and Out-of-Area Operations Capabilities” marks a new direction in India's strategic outlook and strategic preparations.

Significantly it heralds that India is no longer willing to accept being strategically confined to within South Asia limits as China desires and Pakistan as its proxy gives shape to their aims. India's seems to be sending out two significant messages through the public emphasis on this component in the New Army War Doctrine. These are:

• India's political leadership is getting ready to shoulder extended strategic commitments and that they have shed their inhibitions and apologetic approaches towards exercise of military power.
• India is preparing its Armed Forces in enhancing their strategic reach and create military readiness for out-of-area operations to protect India's geo-political interests.
• Preparations and planning for such strategic roles are already underway. Acquisition of amphibious war ship from USA, air-refueling tankers and the possible purchase of strategic airlift planes are some of the indicators.
  

India's New Army War Doctrine: Indian Political Leadership’s Sustained Focus Required on Implementation.

India's political leadership has evidently given its approval to Indian Army’s New War Doctrine and its major priorities that have been incorporated. The Indian Army undoubtedly would pursue the fast-track successful implementation of this Doctrine.

However there are areas in India's administrative structures which are not in Indian Army control and which have a critical bearing on Indian Army’s New War Doctrine. The political leadership at the apex level will have to step in strongly and impart a sustained focus in terms of monitoring and oversight.

Major areas that would require top priority focus are:

• Indian’s ICBMs are speedily inducted in our missile arsenal.
• Indian Navy’s ship acquisition plans are put on fast track.
• Deficiency of 126 combat fighter planes is made up by 2012 latest, by dividing the order between Russia. France and USA. These countries should lease out assets from their own Air Forces till such time their production lines roll-out India's orders.
• Construction of strategic road network and military roads in border areas be directly be monitored by Prime Minister Office.
• India's strategic reserves of fuel, logistics needs, and reserves of weapons, spare parts and accessories are made up and optimum levels be maintained to sustain the requirements of the New War Doctrine.
• The success of the New War Doctrine would essentially depend upon an integrated provision of timely strategic and military intelligence by all national intelligence agencies. The Government has to initiate effective steps in this direction.
  

The Indian Army and the Indian Armed Forces will not let down the country in gearing themselves to put into effect Indian Army New War Doctrine. By the same token Indian’s political leadership should not let down the Indian Army by allowing preparations to this end lapse into somnolence by bureaucratic tangles and lethargy.

Concluding Observations

Indian Army’s New War Doctrine ordinarily should have not generated so much interest, as periodic strategic reviews of doctrine are a common feature of all major armies.

However, in case of India's strategic outlook and its war doctrine, the global and regional interest is that much more as India moves up the strategic ladder.

Indian Army’s New War Doctrine has appeared in the public domain in its barest outlines. Yet even within that restricted framewor,. India has given ample notice of its strategic directions and doctrinal priorities.

The message for the China-Pakistan strategic nexus is clear. And that is, that India is preparing itself adequately to meet their simultaneous threats effectively. Defensive timidity is no longer going to be the Indian hallmark to meet the threats posed. India will poise itself for offensive-defense which is distinct from military adventurism.

The message for the international community is that India is gradually gearing itself to shoulder regional and extended strategic responsibilities befitting the stature of an aspiring global power. Such gearing-up is not aimed at military adventurism but to ready itself to shoulder strategic responsibilities as a responsible stake-holder in regional and global affairs.

(The author is an International Relations and Strategic Affairs analyst. He is the Consultant, Strategic Affairs with South Asia Analysis Group. Email: drsubhashkapila.007@gmail.com)
Courtesy: http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers37%5Cpaper3606.html