This article is a summary of answers to questions put by various national and international print and electronic media on January 27, 2010.
President Mahinda Rajapaksa has won a second term as President of Sri Lanka with a handsome margin. Did you expect this victory? Would you take it as peoples’ recognition of his leadership role in the victory against the Tamil Tigers?
Of course President Rajapaksa’s rise in popularity was mainly due to his contribution in designing and orchestrating the actions of the entire government to achieve military victory. While he provided the canvass for the victory, it was Fonseka who led the campaign and made it a reality .So both gained public acclaim after the military victory. According to one assessment the popularity of Rajapaksa and Fonseka on this count was in the ratio of 60:40 respectively.
Many of us had forecast a victory for the President by a narrow margin. In fact he was expected to scrape through. So winning by over 58% plus majority was indeed a surprise. This is a sizeable increase over the 50.3% majority he secured in the 2005 election. Actually a popular poll prediction in the early days of election ring said he would win by 62% and nobody was prepared to believe that. On the other hand, another pollster on January 21 had forecast a lead of 12% for Fonseka. So much for poll predictions.
However, it is too early to carry out a detailed analysis of the polling patterns. We need more inputs to do that. But it is clear that majority of Tamils in the north did not vote and the President was elected by overwhelming Sinhala support.
Do you think the President’s victory came by fair means? How did he achieve it?
Stuffing of ballot boxes is not an uncommon phenomenon in South Asia and in particular in Sri Lanka. Probably there were such cases in this election also. The detailed reports of monitors would surface in due course, I presume.
But there was considerable misuse of state media by the ruling coalition; and government servants campaigned openly against the opposition candidate. The Election Commissioner was so disgusted at the utter disregard shown to his directions that he decided to retire from office before the next parliamentary poll in April. Even while announcing the results of the election, the Elections Commissioner said that though he tried his level best to ensure the polls were conducted in a free and fair manner, it was “largely out of his control to manage, especially in areas like Puttalam, Anuradhapura and Matale.”
In spite of all this, it would be unfair to the voters to trivialise the overwhelming mandate Rajapaksa has secured as solely due to electoral malpractices.
I think President’s victory came about because of overwhelming Sinhala majority support, and large scale abstention of Tamil voters of Northern Province, just as it happened in the 2005 presidential poll. Many Tamils in Vanni have not been able to get back to their normal life savagely destroyed by the war. Many believed there was nothing much to choose between the two main candidates. In their eyes probably both the candidates lacked credibility particularly on the Tamil issue. Though theTamil National Alliance (TNA) had supported General Fonseka, it could influence only those who voted, but not the majority who stayed away from voting. In the end only around 19% of them voted. As a whole it has exposed the lack of credibility of Tamil political class among the public.
At the same time the ruling coalition had generally created a climate of fear and suspicion in the country before the election. There was intimidation, high handedness and muzzling of opposition media. By January 24 there were over 900 incidents of election related misconduct. Five people were killed. In this kind of environment the explosion of a few bombs in Jaffna in the early hours of Election Day probably came as a final straw for the voters not to stir out of their houses.
Rajapaksa’s overwhelming support came from Southern Sinhala voters particularly in rural areas. Apparently, Fonseka had not been able to make a dent in this vote bank. Even Mrs Chandrika Kumaratunga’s belated show of solidarity with Fonseka had only symbolic effect.
General Fonseka had alleged that the troops had surrounded the hotel where he was staying and it was part of a plot to kill him. What are your comments?
“Politics of revenge” became the order of the day in Sri Lanka ever since the ambitious General fell out with the President and his brothers. Its pitch increased when he decided to contest the presidential poll. The General has since moved out of the hotel to his house. The government had said the troops were out there “to protect the opposition leaders” (from whom?) and the search was carried out to apprehend deserters holed up in the hotel. This is hardly a credible story as police can to carry out these tasks.
The General’s accusation of a plot to kill him needs to be substantiated. The allegation was probably a manifestation of the confrontational politics. Presumably, the aggressive act of massing of troops was a continuation of pressure tactics used against Fonseka starting with allegations of corruption and nepotism. The General’s statement also could be to enrol international sympathy for his plight and uncertain future after his defeat.
The General Fonseka led the army to victory in the Eelam War under President Rajapaksa. Despite this he appears to be daggers drawn with the President. What was most important reason for his relationship with the President going wrong?
Basically, the General was an ambitious person. He felt the President had not given the recognition he deserved for his contribution to the military victory that eluded Sri Lanka for 26 years. After the General became the CDS, he spoke of a grandiose vision of building 300,000-strong army. His talk of building a huge and powerful army, when even the 200,000-strong army was becoming redundant after the war, made political classes uneasy.
The President apparently felt uncomfortable in handling him and sidelined him from the mainstream of decision making. This process of “downsizing” reached its low point when he was appointed Secretary of Sports Ministry.
The differences between the President and the General came out in the open and culminated in the fight for presidency. And the opposition parties desperately looking for a suitable candidate to oppose the President, they found a useful foil in Fonseka.
What was India’s equation with the two candidates?
Over the years, President Rajapaksa has built a strong relationship at various levels of Indian leadership. He is quick to acknowledge India’s help and appreciates the political limitations of India in supporting him during the Eelam War. Even though India had harped on activating the 13th amendment to the Constitution on provincial autonomy, it chose to ignore when the President deferred action on it and went to war. India had consistently supported Sri Lanka under his leadership in international forums even on some of the critical issues like human rights violations.
On the other hand, Fonseka was an unknown quantity to Indian leadership. The UNP leader Ranil Wickremesinghe, who is on a good wicket with Indian leaders, had tried to plead for India’s support to the General. Apparently, India was not comfortable with the idea. When he was the army commander, General Fonseka’s pronouncements had smacked of Sinhala nationalism and support to him would at best be controversial.
Moreover, India considered Rajapaksa a safe bet, as it probably expected him to come on top in the election. So probably India favoured his victory although it stand on the subject was never made public.
President Rajapaksa has been elected with a sizeable majority votes for a second term. Do you expect him to be dictatorial in his second term? Will he use the majority Sinhala support he enjoys to crush the Tamils?
I agree there are instances where presidents repeatedly given a democratic mandate tended to be dictatorial. And the executive presidency gives considerable leeway for the president to be dictatorial. But Sri Lanka has an enlightened political class and strong civil society which had become vocal during the election. It had always opposed such tendencies as was seen during the Jayawardane regime. So it would not be easy for the President to behave like a dictator.
Rajapaksa is a seasoned politician who uses existing political instruments to get his writ through. He has demonstrated this a number of times say by splitting political parties in his favour, buying time on the Tamil issue etc.
Tamils are a sizeable minority who can make a difference between the winner and the loser in national elections. So over the years, all major parties have tried to cultivate a Tamil lobby. So I do not expect the revival of vintage anti-Tamil attitude of rabid Sinhala nationalism as a major political force. Already Rajapaksa enjoys huge Sinhala support and he will gain no political advantage by “road rolling” Tamils and their concerns.
There is also the lingering India factor in Sri Lanka, however reluctant India might be to acknowledge it. Rajapaksa knows that across the Palk Straits, Sri Lanka Tamils enjoy considerable empathy and emotional support. This has already been tested during the war. And Tamil Nadu has a big clout in New Delhi in the ruling coalition. So Rajapaksa would always keep India at the back of his mind while dealing with the Tamil issue. India is also likely to come under considerable pressure to bring up the issue with Rajapaksa as Tamil Nadu gets ready for the 2011 assembly polls.
Overall, although the election mandate has boosted Rajapaksa’s power, I expect the President to show a nuanced approach during his second term. However, he could be encouraged by those around him to deviate from this path when pressure builds up against him internally or externally.
It had been reported that the U.S. favoured Fonseka in the presidential poll. What are your comments?
It is true the U.S. had been quite unhappy with the Rajapaksa regime on two counts: its indifference to the U.S. concerns over gross human rights violations, and its contacts with the anti-US club – Venezuela, Iran, Cuba, Myanmar etc. Moreover, considerable anti-U.S. feelings were whipped up in the closing stages of war when the U.S. wanted to extricate the beleaguered Tamil Tigers.
Countries do act at times in strange ways but I do not believe the U.S. ever seriously considered supporting Fonseka, despite its frosty relations with Rajapaksa. I am sure the U.S. is realistic enough to know of Rajapaksa’s strengths as demonstrated in his success against the Tamil Tigers. I am sure this was the reason for Senator John F. Kerry led Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s call for friendlier relations between the U.S. and Sri Lanka in December 2009. Moreover, the U.S. does consult India on key issues relating to Sri Lanka. And India’s lack of enthusiasm for a regime change in Sri Lanka would have definitely discouraged the U.S. from any thought of favouring Fonseka.
When Mrs Indira Gandhi was Prime Minister she reacted strongly to America’s planned foray into Sri Lanka. China has already made an entry into Sri Lanka. As Sri Lanka is in a 1987-like situation now, do you expect Rajapaksa to slowly marginalise Indian influence in the island to accommodate the Chinese?
The Cold War scene of Mrs Gandhi’s time does not exist anymore. The world and this region have changed considerably along with international power equations. China is poised to become a global power; it has become the financier to boost up America’s sagging economy. Its economic influence is spreading the world over and in support its military reach is also growing. This is the reality.
And the Chinese influence in Sri Lanka is a part of this reality. And Sri Lanka would need China’s economic support to build its war ravaged economy as much as it needs India’s support. In spite of this, Sri Lanka had carefully tried to balance the relationship. In fact, it offered the Hambantota project to India first; it went to China only after India failed to respond. On the other hand as China’s foot print increases in Sri Lanka, India’s security concerns would also increase. And India should constantly keep a watch on Chinese activity in Sri Lanka, regardless of its nature.
At the same time, India has also become an important economic power and militarily a strong regional player. It is building its strategic security relationship with the U.S. This is likely to grow in the coming years. As the U.S. sees India as a factor to balance the Chinese power projection in this region, despite India’s reluctance to acknowledge it. So India of today is not the same as it was in 1987.
Sri Lanka-India relations are closer than ever before. It has a fairly successful free trade agreement with India. Indian capital flow to Sri Lanka is poised to increase and this would boost employment and economic opportunities for Sri Lanka. There is considerable similarity of perception on many international issues between the two countries. So it is doubtful whether Rajapaksa would gain any major advantage by enlarging his relationship with China at the cost of India. In fact, it would be strategically risky for him to do so as India is physically too close to Sri Lanka. This is an advantage that China does not enjoy.
The President is politically savvy enough to understand these nuances of the Sri Lanka, India and China triangular relationship. He would probably try to reap maximum advantage for his country from India using the China card.
Courtesy: South Asia Analysis Group
URL http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cnotes6%5Cnote567.html
Thursday, January 28, 2010
Tuesday, January 26, 2010
Old Soldiers in India and Pakistan
As an old soldier I was sorry to read a news item from Lahore headlined "Ex-colonel dies as CS’s car hits bike" reporting the death of a retired colonel - Col Muhammad Ikram (retired)- when the official car of Punjab chief secretary hit the bike he was riding near the old airport on Saturday January 22, 2010. He was on his way to the Allama Iqbal University sub-campus when CS Javed Mahmood’s car hit the two-wheeler. The chief secretary, along with his motorcade, was returning from Lahore airport after seeing PM Yousuf Raza Gilani off. The report said Col Ikram suffered critical injuries and died at the CMH where he was rushed after the accident.
Azam Ikram, son of the deceased, told reporters the family would knock every door to seek justice, the report said.
I was surprised to know the retired colonel was riding a motorcycle. I was under the impression that unlike India, in Pakistan all military officers - retired or serving rode only cars. It seems the fate of old soldiers are the same world over!
Azam Ikram, son of the deceased, told reporters the family would knock every door to seek justice, the report said.
I was surprised to know the retired colonel was riding a motorcycle. I was under the impression that unlike India, in Pakistan all military officers - retired or serving rode only cars. It seems the fate of old soldiers are the same world over!
Political Direction, Military Leadership and Morale
By Lt Gen Vijay Oberoi, PVSM, AVSM, VSM
Former Vice Chief of Army Staff
Preliminaries
Mr. Chairman, Distinguished guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, it is a great honour indeed and a great pleasure to be here this afternoon to participate in the prestigious 4th Netaji Subhash Memorial Lecture and share my ideas on a subject of great importance, not just for the Indian military but also for the nation, the subject being “Political Direction, Military Leadership and Morale.” Since time is at a premium, let me plunge straight into it and first discuss the important aspect of Political Direction.
Political Direction
Ladies and gentlemen, in the early years of our fledgling democracy, Pandit Nehru and other Indian political leaders, barring exceptions like Netaji Subhash Chander Bose, looked at the military with suspicion and distrust.
Thereafter, commencing with the operations launched to save Kashmir in October 1947, to the various wars and conflicts fought to secure the nation, the military should have become the darling of the nation. It undoubtedly is for the common Indian, the Aam Aadmi, but the story is quite different where our governing class is concerned.
Our leaders have reduced the status of the military over the years. It is not just the warrant of precedence, but many important facets. Witness how the budget of the defence forces has been steadily declining, to an all time low of less than two per cent of the GDP. Modernization of all the three services is moving at a snails’ pace, if at all, and shortages of weapons, ammunition and equipment are steadily increasing. There is a grave shortage of officers in all the three services, but it is hurting the army the most, resulting in serious erosion of our capabilities.
Our political leadership has forgotten that it was this very Indian Military, which did yeomen service during the blood bath of partition, saving countless lives. Although time for consolidation was badly needed after Independence, there was none, as the army was operationally committed in Kashmir within two months of Independence. Thereafter, one war followed another and even during the no-war interludes, the army was committed on prolonged internal security tasks. The large numbers of police forces, whose numbers get enhanced every year, continue to be incapable or unwilling to handle internal challenges. Resultantly, the army has been in Nagaland and Manipur; Assam; and J&K for over 50, 30 and 20 years respectively! Despite all these constraints, the achievements of the defence forces are a tribute to the leadership, fighting spirit and patriotic fervour of all ranks.
In democracies the world over, the political leadership of the country makes national policy, as well as the national security strategy. This is done with the active participation of civil and military officials of the country. The Indian military understands this fully, but it seems neither the political leadership nor their civilian advisers understand the nuances of “civil control”.
It is a great pity and a matter of deep regret and concern that in our country the military has been deliberately kept out of the policy formulation loop and even after over six decades of loyal, patriotic and dedicated service to the nation, in both war and peace, it is still not trusted! Yes, I repeat - not trusted. Nothing else explains the reasons for its exclusion from policy formulation; the inability to evolve a viable and comprehensive structure for higher defence; the non-articulation of a national security strategy since Independence; the non-appointment of a CDS, accepted nearly a decade back; no worthwhile joint ness; the non-integration of the Ministry of Defence; and not the least, the muzzling of the three Chiefs, even when they speak on professional matters and say what needs to be said.
There could not be a more improper way of handling the security of the nation than this state of affairs. Let me reinforce what I am stating by only two examples, as time does not permit me to go into many others. Firstly, India is one of the few countries in the world that has no formalized national security strategy. In a statement made in Parliament in April 2006, i.e. nearly four years back, the defence ministry was to have issued one by December last year, but 2009 has also passed into history and we continue with our endless waiting! Secondly, despite over ten years of existence, the government continues to exclude senior military officers from the National Security Council, which is headed and staffed mainly by various types of bureaucrats. No wonder our security systems and formulations lack credibility and we fumble from one crisis to another.
Before I switch to the next topic, let me convey just two points to our opinion makers, some of whom are here. Firstly, do not mistrust your defence forces; they have served the nation with distinction and loyalty - they need to be respected and their counsel taken; otherwise the nation will lose out in its security-related concerns.
Secondly, if the military continues to be treated with suspicion and disdain, let me be blunt and state that if it wants, it can assert itself and in a manner that may be neither palatable for the political leadership nor good for our democracy.
Military Leadership
Let me now shift to the second aspect, which I am required to cover in my talk. That is military leadership.
Leadership is the basic edifice of our defence forces and it is a perennial subject of discussion, instruction and introspection. It would be correct to say that the Indian military lives and breathes leadership.
Waging war today is a complex phenomenon, on account of high technology, the nature of modern war, new threats and challenges, human rights, transparency brought in by the media, globalization and the reality of nuclear weapons in the arsenal of our potential adversaries. Consequently, military leadership assumes even more importance.
In our army, Eighteenth Century authoritarian type of leadership has prevailed for centuries and continues to be practiced by many leaders. This must change, as both society and the battlefield milieu have changed. Increasingly, supportive, rather than authoritarian leaders, are needed in the military, as in other walks of life. Today’s leaders need to lead by the force of their personality and persuasive qualities and not by issuing fiats and crisp orders. The changed milieu demands that leaders address themselves to the followers' wants, needs, and other motivations, as well as to their own.
The majority of our soldiers prefer the guidance and direction of their leaders at practically every step. This is due to many factors, not the least being the societal background of our soldiers, our training systems, regimental upbringing and emphasis on attention to detail. In professional parlance it is known as “The Detailed Orders Command”, with its emphasis on centralized control. This has worked well for us in the past, but it needs to give way now to the “Directive Control” style of command, which is based on the delegation of authority, as the future battlefield is a mix of uncertainty and chaos, requiring decisions without looking back for fresh orders.
In recent years, there has been loose talk that while the young officers of the Indian military are excellent leaders, the senior leadership is not. This type of talk needs to be disabused. This has become a favourite theme of the media after the Kargil War of 1999, where our young officers had not only led from the front but did so with a great deal of bravery and panache. What is not known or appreciated, however, is that this was not a new phenomena; it has always been the norm in our military.
The Indian military could not have achieved victories and successes, as it has in both war and peace, if its senior officers were professionally inadequate or lacked any well known qualities of leadership. We have stringent norms for promotions and only the best get through successfully. Therefore, to say that young officers are uniformly good and the seniors are not, is a far too simplistic a statement. I do agree that amongst the nearly fifty thousand or so serving officers, there would be some whose motivation may have changed over the years, but the numbers are quite small.
Nonetheless, there are areas of concern, which need to be rectified and not pushed under the carpet. The major ones are:
Let me end this part of my presentation with a quote from our second Rashtrapati - Dr S Radhakrishnan, who had said that “The higher a man goes, the fewer are his rights and the more numerous his duties”. Our senior leaders need to remember this.
Morale
I now come to the third and last part of my presentation, dealing with morale. It was Napolean who had said that “Morale is to material as three to one”. High morale and motivation produce offensive spirit, which is essential for soldiers and officers alike.
The credo of our soldiers has just four simple aspects; these are:
“The Safety, Honour and Welfare of the country come first, always and every time. The Honour, Welfare and Comfort of the men you command come next. Your own ease, comfort and safety come last, always and every time”.
These are not merely words, but are adhered to by the officers and soldiers of the entire Indian Military – always and every time!!
The standing of soldiers in a country is dependent on the interplay of a number of dynamic factors like the quality of military leadership; equation with the political leadership; relationship with bureaucracy; and the image created by the media. I have already touched upon military leadership. Let me briefly touch on the relations with the political leadership and the bureaucracy.
Both the political leadership, as well as the bureaucracy of our country unfortunately lack compassion for the military. The important reasons are:-
Fortunately, the public at large still holds the military in high esteem, but it does get influenced adversely by the deliberate attempts to downgrade soldiers and constant exposure by the media of the misdemeanours of a few persons, which are largely half-truths and presumptions.
The effect of low morale of the military translates into the weakening of the security of the country. The political leadership needs to realise that everything else being the same, the morale of the defence forces is the single most important factor that counts between victory and defeat.
The soldier’s dedication to duty, loyalty to the nation and willingness for the supreme sacrifice are driven less by material considerations and more by an overwhelming urge to earn the love and respect of their countrymen, their comrades and their regiments. A grateful nation's recognition of their contribution to national security acts as the strongest motivator. Unfortunately, our nation has not understood this aspect. If this situation persists and the soldiers are not cared for, the country will lose the moral right to expect them to die for its security.
If the government is indifferent, the civil society must act to assuage the feelings of hurt and neglect of the military. Most countries honour their serving soldiers and veterans by nominating a day and sometimes a week, where soldiers who had sacrificed their lives and limbs during wars and conflicts or served with honour, are felicitated by the highest leadership, as well as the citizenry. Their gallantry, tenacity, spirit of sacrifice, contributions to the security and sovereignty of the nation and their selfless spirit are formally lauded.
What do we do in our country, Sir? Nothing at all! Sixty years after Independence, we do not even have a national war memorial for our martyrs. We seem to have no time for such niceties of life. Why can we not declare 16 December, the day when our defence forces brought glory and the biggest victory to the nation in 1971, as the day for honouring our soldiers, both serving and those who have laid down their uniforms? The government should take the lead in this respect, but if it is unable or unwilling, the civil society must do so. If even the civil society throws up its hands, then perhaps the military veterans will have to do it, but what a shame it will be for a nation of over one billion souls!!
Conclusion
The Indian Defence forces have earned a formidable reputation of task accomplishment, usually against heavy odds. They will continue to fight the nation’s battles and wars, giving their best, but the nation must also support them to the maximum extent, meet their aspirations and restore their “izzat”, besides alleviating their concerns and misgivings.
India is now genuinely poised to shine. It cannot do so with a flawed higher defence organization, where the military is deliberately kept out of policy formulations; a media-tarnished military leadership; and a feeble military machine with little modernisation. The need today is for a synergistic and visionary national approach for the strong, purposeful and modern India where the soldier gets his due and the nation remains secure.
[This is the text of a lecture Gen Oberoi delivered on 23 Jan 2010, at the FICCI Auditorium, during the 112th Birth Day Celebrations of Netaji Subhash Chandra Bose.]
Former Vice Chief of Army Staff
Preliminaries
Mr. Chairman, Distinguished guests, Ladies and Gentlemen, it is a great honour indeed and a great pleasure to be here this afternoon to participate in the prestigious 4th Netaji Subhash Memorial Lecture and share my ideas on a subject of great importance, not just for the Indian military but also for the nation, the subject being “Political Direction, Military Leadership and Morale.” Since time is at a premium, let me plunge straight into it and first discuss the important aspect of Political Direction.
Political Direction
Ladies and gentlemen, in the early years of our fledgling democracy, Pandit Nehru and other Indian political leaders, barring exceptions like Netaji Subhash Chander Bose, looked at the military with suspicion and distrust.
Thereafter, commencing with the operations launched to save Kashmir in October 1947, to the various wars and conflicts fought to secure the nation, the military should have become the darling of the nation. It undoubtedly is for the common Indian, the Aam Aadmi, but the story is quite different where our governing class is concerned.
Our leaders have reduced the status of the military over the years. It is not just the warrant of precedence, but many important facets. Witness how the budget of the defence forces has been steadily declining, to an all time low of less than two per cent of the GDP. Modernization of all the three services is moving at a snails’ pace, if at all, and shortages of weapons, ammunition and equipment are steadily increasing. There is a grave shortage of officers in all the three services, but it is hurting the army the most, resulting in serious erosion of our capabilities.
Our political leadership has forgotten that it was this very Indian Military, which did yeomen service during the blood bath of partition, saving countless lives. Although time for consolidation was badly needed after Independence, there was none, as the army was operationally committed in Kashmir within two months of Independence. Thereafter, one war followed another and even during the no-war interludes, the army was committed on prolonged internal security tasks. The large numbers of police forces, whose numbers get enhanced every year, continue to be incapable or unwilling to handle internal challenges. Resultantly, the army has been in Nagaland and Manipur; Assam; and J&K for over 50, 30 and 20 years respectively! Despite all these constraints, the achievements of the defence forces are a tribute to the leadership, fighting spirit and patriotic fervour of all ranks.
In democracies the world over, the political leadership of the country makes national policy, as well as the national security strategy. This is done with the active participation of civil and military officials of the country. The Indian military understands this fully, but it seems neither the political leadership nor their civilian advisers understand the nuances of “civil control”.
It is a great pity and a matter of deep regret and concern that in our country the military has been deliberately kept out of the policy formulation loop and even after over six decades of loyal, patriotic and dedicated service to the nation, in both war and peace, it is still not trusted! Yes, I repeat - not trusted. Nothing else explains the reasons for its exclusion from policy formulation; the inability to evolve a viable and comprehensive structure for higher defence; the non-articulation of a national security strategy since Independence; the non-appointment of a CDS, accepted nearly a decade back; no worthwhile joint ness; the non-integration of the Ministry of Defence; and not the least, the muzzling of the three Chiefs, even when they speak on professional matters and say what needs to be said.
There could not be a more improper way of handling the security of the nation than this state of affairs. Let me reinforce what I am stating by only two examples, as time does not permit me to go into many others. Firstly, India is one of the few countries in the world that has no formalized national security strategy. In a statement made in Parliament in April 2006, i.e. nearly four years back, the defence ministry was to have issued one by December last year, but 2009 has also passed into history and we continue with our endless waiting! Secondly, despite over ten years of existence, the government continues to exclude senior military officers from the National Security Council, which is headed and staffed mainly by various types of bureaucrats. No wonder our security systems and formulations lack credibility and we fumble from one crisis to another.
Before I switch to the next topic, let me convey just two points to our opinion makers, some of whom are here. Firstly, do not mistrust your defence forces; they have served the nation with distinction and loyalty - they need to be respected and their counsel taken; otherwise the nation will lose out in its security-related concerns.
Secondly, if the military continues to be treated with suspicion and disdain, let me be blunt and state that if it wants, it can assert itself and in a manner that may be neither palatable for the political leadership nor good for our democracy.
Military Leadership
Let me now shift to the second aspect, which I am required to cover in my talk. That is military leadership.
Leadership is the basic edifice of our defence forces and it is a perennial subject of discussion, instruction and introspection. It would be correct to say that the Indian military lives and breathes leadership.
Waging war today is a complex phenomenon, on account of high technology, the nature of modern war, new threats and challenges, human rights, transparency brought in by the media, globalization and the reality of nuclear weapons in the arsenal of our potential adversaries. Consequently, military leadership assumes even more importance.
In our army, Eighteenth Century authoritarian type of leadership has prevailed for centuries and continues to be practiced by many leaders. This must change, as both society and the battlefield milieu have changed. Increasingly, supportive, rather than authoritarian leaders, are needed in the military, as in other walks of life. Today’s leaders need to lead by the force of their personality and persuasive qualities and not by issuing fiats and crisp orders. The changed milieu demands that leaders address themselves to the followers' wants, needs, and other motivations, as well as to their own.
The majority of our soldiers prefer the guidance and direction of their leaders at practically every step. This is due to many factors, not the least being the societal background of our soldiers, our training systems, regimental upbringing and emphasis on attention to detail. In professional parlance it is known as “The Detailed Orders Command”, with its emphasis on centralized control. This has worked well for us in the past, but it needs to give way now to the “Directive Control” style of command, which is based on the delegation of authority, as the future battlefield is a mix of uncertainty and chaos, requiring decisions without looking back for fresh orders.
In recent years, there has been loose talk that while the young officers of the Indian military are excellent leaders, the senior leadership is not. This type of talk needs to be disabused. This has become a favourite theme of the media after the Kargil War of 1999, where our young officers had not only led from the front but did so with a great deal of bravery and panache. What is not known or appreciated, however, is that this was not a new phenomena; it has always been the norm in our military.
The Indian military could not have achieved victories and successes, as it has in both war and peace, if its senior officers were professionally inadequate or lacked any well known qualities of leadership. We have stringent norms for promotions and only the best get through successfully. Therefore, to say that young officers are uniformly good and the seniors are not, is a far too simplistic a statement. I do agree that amongst the nearly fifty thousand or so serving officers, there would be some whose motivation may have changed over the years, but the numbers are quite small.
Nonetheless, there are areas of concern, which need to be rectified and not pushed under the carpet. The major ones are:
- The apparent prevalence of a “zero error syndrome” from the top down.
- A sense of “insecurity”, perceived or otherwise, at the senior levels.
- Some leaders insulate themselves, resulting in the inability to “listen” or as we say in Hindi - “sunwai” nahin hoti.
- Sometimes there is a gap between percept and performance.
- In standards of selection of higher leadership, qualities such as integrity, moral strength, intellectual ability and honesty; self-discipline; and social as well as domestic probity or rectitude need to be placed much higher than professional competence.
Let me end this part of my presentation with a quote from our second Rashtrapati - Dr S Radhakrishnan, who had said that “The higher a man goes, the fewer are his rights and the more numerous his duties”. Our senior leaders need to remember this.
Morale
I now come to the third and last part of my presentation, dealing with morale. It was Napolean who had said that “Morale is to material as three to one”. High morale and motivation produce offensive spirit, which is essential for soldiers and officers alike.
The credo of our soldiers has just four simple aspects; these are:
- Firstly - “Namak, Naam Aur Nishan” - Fealty to one’s ‘Salt’, Name & Flag i.e. Nation, Army & Regiment.
- Secondly – “Izzat”- it is the concept of the soldier’s honour.
- Thirdly - “Zubaan” - the inviolability of the spoken word and dependability & trust between comrades.
- Fourthly - “Dharam-Iman” - the soldiers duty & code of honour.
“The Safety, Honour and Welfare of the country come first, always and every time. The Honour, Welfare and Comfort of the men you command come next. Your own ease, comfort and safety come last, always and every time”.
These are not merely words, but are adhered to by the officers and soldiers of the entire Indian Military – always and every time!!
The standing of soldiers in a country is dependent on the interplay of a number of dynamic factors like the quality of military leadership; equation with the political leadership; relationship with bureaucracy; and the image created by the media. I have already touched upon military leadership. Let me briefly touch on the relations with the political leadership and the bureaucracy.
Both the political leadership, as well as the bureaucracy of our country unfortunately lack compassion for the military. The important reasons are:-
- Firstly - The bulk of the political leadership and the bureaucracy do not have even the remotest connection with the Defence Services. In the history of independent India, no political leader or bureaucrat, except the odd one, has sent his progeny to the military. Therefore, they can neither relate to the military nor empathise with their lot.
- Secondly - Our political leadership is inadequately qualified and equipped about ‘matters military’ and security issues. They neither possess military knowledge nor display any desire to educate themselves. Many attempts in the past have met with a studied silence. Inadequacies of the political leadership result in their over dependence on the bureaucrats, who in turn also lack any in-depth knowledge.
- Thirdly - Our political leadership is highly uncomfortable in dealing with the military directly and prefers to let the bureaucracy do so. The military does not like this and hence there is a hiatus between two important organs of a democracy like ours. The loser is the nation.
- Fourthly - From the viewpoint of political leaders, soldiers, not being a worthwhile vote-bank, need not to be cultivated.
- Fifthly - The political leadership does not hesitate to tick off the top military leadership in public, not realizing the negative effect it has on the morale of the defence forces.
- Sixthly - The bureaucracy revels in one-upmanship and loses no chance to denigrate the military, through leaks to the media and/or exerting indirect pressure through their political bosses. They do have plenty of time to do so, if one wag is to be believed; he had stated that “Civil servants make the best husbands; they are not tired when they get home and they have read the newspapers already”.
Fortunately, the public at large still holds the military in high esteem, but it does get influenced adversely by the deliberate attempts to downgrade soldiers and constant exposure by the media of the misdemeanours of a few persons, which are largely half-truths and presumptions.
The effect of low morale of the military translates into the weakening of the security of the country. The political leadership needs to realise that everything else being the same, the morale of the defence forces is the single most important factor that counts between victory and defeat.
The soldier’s dedication to duty, loyalty to the nation and willingness for the supreme sacrifice are driven less by material considerations and more by an overwhelming urge to earn the love and respect of their countrymen, their comrades and their regiments. A grateful nation's recognition of their contribution to national security acts as the strongest motivator. Unfortunately, our nation has not understood this aspect. If this situation persists and the soldiers are not cared for, the country will lose the moral right to expect them to die for its security.
If the government is indifferent, the civil society must act to assuage the feelings of hurt and neglect of the military. Most countries honour their serving soldiers and veterans by nominating a day and sometimes a week, where soldiers who had sacrificed their lives and limbs during wars and conflicts or served with honour, are felicitated by the highest leadership, as well as the citizenry. Their gallantry, tenacity, spirit of sacrifice, contributions to the security and sovereignty of the nation and their selfless spirit are formally lauded.
What do we do in our country, Sir? Nothing at all! Sixty years after Independence, we do not even have a national war memorial for our martyrs. We seem to have no time for such niceties of life. Why can we not declare 16 December, the day when our defence forces brought glory and the biggest victory to the nation in 1971, as the day for honouring our soldiers, both serving and those who have laid down their uniforms? The government should take the lead in this respect, but if it is unable or unwilling, the civil society must do so. If even the civil society throws up its hands, then perhaps the military veterans will have to do it, but what a shame it will be for a nation of over one billion souls!!
Conclusion
The Indian Defence forces have earned a formidable reputation of task accomplishment, usually against heavy odds. They will continue to fight the nation’s battles and wars, giving their best, but the nation must also support them to the maximum extent, meet their aspirations and restore their “izzat”, besides alleviating their concerns and misgivings.
India is now genuinely poised to shine. It cannot do so with a flawed higher defence organization, where the military is deliberately kept out of policy formulations; a media-tarnished military leadership; and a feeble military machine with little modernisation. The need today is for a synergistic and visionary national approach for the strong, purposeful and modern India where the soldier gets his due and the nation remains secure.
[This is the text of a lecture Gen Oberoi delivered on 23 Jan 2010, at the FICCI Auditorium, during the 112th Birth Day Celebrations of Netaji Subhash Chandra Bose.]
Saturday, January 23, 2010
Sri Lanka's Election War and its Bloody Battles
Both President Rajapaksa and General Fonseka appear to be following the strategy of ‘indirect approach’ in their “electoral war.” Sir Basil Liddell Hart, one of the great military thinkers of 20th century propounded this key military concept as early as 1929. In his famous work The Decisive Wars of History he explained the indirect approach as seeking “a strategic situation so advantageous that if it does not of itself produce the decision, its continuation by battle is guaranteed to do so".
Adopted in the election campaign, perhaps unwittingly, this strategy can produce a host of problems not only during the election but in the aftermath also. Unfortunately, violence and thuggery adopted as weapons of electoral war in Sri Lanka will have a bitter aftermath of the election. And that could be a destabilizing development impacting the parliamentary poll due to be held after electing the new president.
The transformation of democratic election into a war is the last thing Sri Lanka needs as it has to rebuild itself first. But it has become a war; that is the impression one gets while reading the latest media note of the Centre from Monitoring Election Violence (CMEV) of Sri Lanka. It shows a definite trend of targeted violence using weapons of war against supporters of the opposition candidate across the country. Already at least four people have been killed.
Nothing illustrates the situation better than the “bomb” attack on the house of Tiran Alles, one time friend of the President and now the Secretary and National Organizer of the SLFP Mahajana Wing rooting for General Sarath Fonseka. Although the bomb did not harm either Alles or his family, it caused “severe” damage to his vehicle and house.” Alles had been hounded in the past also.
The attack came just a day after Mangala Samaraweera, the leader of the SLFP (Mahajana), alleged that the Rajapaksa regime had hatched a plot to assassinate Alles. His allegation appears to have come truer than the predictions of astrologers swarming around politicians.
And attack on Alles was not the only one. Opposition UNP’s Southern Provincial Councilor Gayan Sanjeewa was shot at while traveling in a car and he believed that it was an attempt on his life. Two UNP workers were injured.
A few days back a grenade was thrown near the house of a supporter of Sri Lanka Muslim Council (SLMC) Buhari Mohommed Mubharak in Ottamavadi in Eastern Province. In another shooting incident the UNP North Central Provincial Councilor Prasanna Mahindarathne was targeted. He alleged that miscreants of ruling alliance had fired as many as 30 shots on his home and car in Kalundegama on January 22. According to him, soldiers of nearby army training camp have identified the bullets as those used only by the police.
Significantly, all these acts of violence against the opposition have happened in the last few days.
Of course, other less violent but equally undemocratic misuse of the state machinery including the media had been going on for sometime. Senior government officials have been making partisan statements in favour of the President. In fact the Supreme Court had to intervene to order the state and private media to obey election commissioner's guidelines on such misuse.
The Election Commissioner Dayananda Dissanayake had appointed a Competent Authority to oversee the conduct of state media during election campaigning following complaints from the opposition parties. But their utter disregard for his representative vexed the Election Commissioner so much that he withdrew the officer. He has also announced that he would not be available to conduct the parliamentary election that is to follow the presidential poll.
The increasing incidents of violence and lawless conduct and the tendency of authorities to ignore such aberrations have triggered fears of large scale violence among people as the day of election (January 26, 2010) approaches. There could also be obstruction of voting on the Election Day by lawless elements.
In a joint statement, civil society representatives have called upon both the President and General Fonseka “to jointly issue a statement for a cessation of violence and restoration of law and order with regard to the current election campaign. The government needs to immediately implement this call.” They have also drawn attention to an issue not usually expressed in public - politics of revenge - “the fear that they will become victims of the politics of revenge if they choose to go with the side that does not win.” This factor also might result in people abstaining from voting. Stuffing of ballot boxes is a real possibility in case people abstain from voting.
United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon has expressed concern at the violence during the run-up to the election. He has appealed to all parties to refrain from violence and to avoid provocative acts. As the U.S. ambassador to Sri Lanka Patricia Butenis has cautioned a violent election is sure to tarnish Sri Lanka’s international image. But are the rival candidates in the mood to care for international image?
Unfortunately South Asian elections are increasingly determined by “coercive persuasion” using extreme tactics. But what is happening in Sri Lanka’s pre-election scene of violence and lawlessness, and intimidation and misuse of state apparatus has been unprecedented. As Rajapaksa is in office and in a better position to restore public order and governance, it has affected his reputation more than his rival. By default, the General - never known as a champion of liberalism - is suddenly being looked upon by many to change in a complex mess of authoritarianism, corruption, lawlessness and poor governance that Sri Lanka has become.
Only six months back many people had hailed the President as the great king (maharajanani) for winning the war; but many among them see him as seemingly helpless leader to restore good governance in a period of peace. Why is this? Although poll predictions are far from accurate a recent pre-election poll has predicted a healthy lead for Fonseka. Is this triggering nervous act of violence? Or is it the desire to put the fear of god in the minds of opposition supporters? Whatever be the cause, there is no doubt that each and every act of violence against the opposition brings down the President’s image little by little.
There are only a few days left for the people to decide their choice. To say it is will be a close race is probably an understatement; if we go by the virulent passions the election has unexpectedly generated it has all the makings of a bloody fight. One can only hope the winner would succeed in canalizing this passion into constructive energy to restore confidence in the government and amity between the various ethnic groups. And that is going to be a tall order for either candidate if the election run up is any guide.
Adopted in the election campaign, perhaps unwittingly, this strategy can produce a host of problems not only during the election but in the aftermath also. Unfortunately, violence and thuggery adopted as weapons of electoral war in Sri Lanka will have a bitter aftermath of the election. And that could be a destabilizing development impacting the parliamentary poll due to be held after electing the new president.
The transformation of democratic election into a war is the last thing Sri Lanka needs as it has to rebuild itself first. But it has become a war; that is the impression one gets while reading the latest media note of the Centre from Monitoring Election Violence (CMEV) of Sri Lanka. It shows a definite trend of targeted violence using weapons of war against supporters of the opposition candidate across the country. Already at least four people have been killed.
Nothing illustrates the situation better than the “bomb” attack on the house of Tiran Alles, one time friend of the President and now the Secretary and National Organizer of the SLFP Mahajana Wing rooting for General Sarath Fonseka. Although the bomb did not harm either Alles or his family, it caused “severe” damage to his vehicle and house.” Alles had been hounded in the past also.
The attack came just a day after Mangala Samaraweera, the leader of the SLFP (Mahajana), alleged that the Rajapaksa regime had hatched a plot to assassinate Alles. His allegation appears to have come truer than the predictions of astrologers swarming around politicians.
And attack on Alles was not the only one. Opposition UNP’s Southern Provincial Councilor Gayan Sanjeewa was shot at while traveling in a car and he believed that it was an attempt on his life. Two UNP workers were injured.
A few days back a grenade was thrown near the house of a supporter of Sri Lanka Muslim Council (SLMC) Buhari Mohommed Mubharak in Ottamavadi in Eastern Province. In another shooting incident the UNP North Central Provincial Councilor Prasanna Mahindarathne was targeted. He alleged that miscreants of ruling alliance had fired as many as 30 shots on his home and car in Kalundegama on January 22. According to him, soldiers of nearby army training camp have identified the bullets as those used only by the police.
Significantly, all these acts of violence against the opposition have happened in the last few days.
Of course, other less violent but equally undemocratic misuse of the state machinery including the media had been going on for sometime. Senior government officials have been making partisan statements in favour of the President. In fact the Supreme Court had to intervene to order the state and private media to obey election commissioner's guidelines on such misuse.
The Election Commissioner Dayananda Dissanayake had appointed a Competent Authority to oversee the conduct of state media during election campaigning following complaints from the opposition parties. But their utter disregard for his representative vexed the Election Commissioner so much that he withdrew the officer. He has also announced that he would not be available to conduct the parliamentary election that is to follow the presidential poll.
The increasing incidents of violence and lawless conduct and the tendency of authorities to ignore such aberrations have triggered fears of large scale violence among people as the day of election (January 26, 2010) approaches. There could also be obstruction of voting on the Election Day by lawless elements.
In a joint statement, civil society representatives have called upon both the President and General Fonseka “to jointly issue a statement for a cessation of violence and restoration of law and order with regard to the current election campaign. The government needs to immediately implement this call.” They have also drawn attention to an issue not usually expressed in public - politics of revenge - “the fear that they will become victims of the politics of revenge if they choose to go with the side that does not win.” This factor also might result in people abstaining from voting. Stuffing of ballot boxes is a real possibility in case people abstain from voting.
United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon has expressed concern at the violence during the run-up to the election. He has appealed to all parties to refrain from violence and to avoid provocative acts. As the U.S. ambassador to Sri Lanka Patricia Butenis has cautioned a violent election is sure to tarnish Sri Lanka’s international image. But are the rival candidates in the mood to care for international image?
Unfortunately South Asian elections are increasingly determined by “coercive persuasion” using extreme tactics. But what is happening in Sri Lanka’s pre-election scene of violence and lawlessness, and intimidation and misuse of state apparatus has been unprecedented. As Rajapaksa is in office and in a better position to restore public order and governance, it has affected his reputation more than his rival. By default, the General - never known as a champion of liberalism - is suddenly being looked upon by many to change in a complex mess of authoritarianism, corruption, lawlessness and poor governance that Sri Lanka has become.
Only six months back many people had hailed the President as the great king (maharajanani) for winning the war; but many among them see him as seemingly helpless leader to restore good governance in a period of peace. Why is this? Although poll predictions are far from accurate a recent pre-election poll has predicted a healthy lead for Fonseka. Is this triggering nervous act of violence? Or is it the desire to put the fear of god in the minds of opposition supporters? Whatever be the cause, there is no doubt that each and every act of violence against the opposition brings down the President’s image little by little.
There are only a few days left for the people to decide their choice. To say it is will be a close race is probably an understatement; if we go by the virulent passions the election has unexpectedly generated it has all the makings of a bloody fight. One can only hope the winner would succeed in canalizing this passion into constructive energy to restore confidence in the government and amity between the various ethnic groups. And that is going to be a tall order for either candidate if the election run up is any guide.
Changing The Indian Intelligence Culture
[Vice President Hamid Ansari has recently spoken about the need for accountability and parliamentary oversight for Indian intelligence agencies.I have reproduced here the analysis of the Vice President's speech by seasoned expert on the subject B Raman written in his own inimitable style. As an old MI hand, my comments relating to Military Intellgence in the overall scheme of accountability of intelligence agencies would follow. - R Hariharan]
By B. Raman
In his R.N.Kao Memorial lecture delivered at the headquarters of the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW) on January 19, 2010, Vice-President Hamid Ansari has done well in raising in public issues such as accountability and parliamentary oversight to which the Indian intelligence community is still a stranger.
2. The concept of an accountable and competent intelligence community, which uses the need for secrecy only for protecting its operations and not for covering up its inadequacies and irregularities, has been accepted and implemented by the intelligence agencies of many democracies----parliamentary as well as Presidential types--- of the world during the last three decades. Nobody in those countries has since argued that these concepts have come in the way of the effectiveness of the intelligence process and hence should be re-considered. The overall consensus is that these changes have proved beneficial and hence should be continued and, if necessary, further refined.
3. In India too, these issues have been raised from time to time since the State of Emergency imposed by Indira Gandhi in 1975-77, but follow-up action has been avoided either because of resistance from sections of the intelligence community or because of the reluctance of the political leadership to introduce any changes which might dilute the scope for political misuse of the intelligence machinery for partisan purposes or both.
4. Accountability of intelligence agencies demands, firstly, that they should have a legal existence and, secondly, that they should have a formal charter of their functions and responsibilities. Forty-two years after its formation in 1968, the R&AW still does not have a legal existence. It was set up by a brief executive order issued on behalf of Indira Gandhi in September 1968. Till today, this order has not been accorded parliamentary sanctity by having necessary legislation authorising its creation passed by the Parliament. No Government, which has held office since 1968, has considered it necessary to have an Act passed by the Parliament providing legal legitimacy to the R&AW. No one has raised the question as to how the various Governments have been incurring expenditure on the R&AW year after year without having its creation approved by the Parliament.
5. In the 1980s, when Indira Gandhi was the Prime Minister, a law was enacted by the Parliament banning strikes in the intelligence agencies. To my knowledge, that is the only Act of the Indian Parliament in which there is a reference to the R&AW by name. When that law was passed, nobody in the Parliament thought it fit to ask: What is this R&AW about? When was it created? Who created it? Has its creation been approved by the Parliament?
6. It goes to the credit of A.K.Verma, who headed the R&AW from 1987 to 90 that he took the initiative in drawing the attention of the Governments of Rajiv Gandhi and V.P.Singh to the fact that the R&AW had been functioning without a legal cover and a formal charter. He wanted the Government of the day to do something about it, but nothing was done.
7. The fact that the Intelligence Bureau, which was created by the British before 1947, and the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), which came into existence after 1947, had been functioning without formal charters of their functions and responsibilities, was highlighted by the L.P.Singh Committee, which was set up by the Morarji Desai Government to enquire into the functioning of these two organisations during the State of Emergency. It not only stressed the need for formal charters to prevent their future misuse, but also prepared for the consideration of the Government detailed model charters for adoption. No action was taken on its recommendations by the Indira Gandhi Government which came back to power in 1980 or its successors. The report was consigned to the Archives---seen, but not read and implemented.
8. Shri Atal Behari Vajpayee and Shri Lal Krishna Advani were among those who were in the forefront of those who criticised----- during the election campaign of 1977---- the alleged misuse of the intelligence agencies by the Indira Gandhi Government during the Emergency. When Shri Vajpayee became the Prime Minister and Shri Advani the Home Minister in 1998, one naturally expected them to take the initiative in taking the L.P.Singh Committee report out of the Archives and implement it. The expectations were belied.
9. The Task Force for the revamping of the intelligence apparatus set up by the Vajpayee Government in 2000, which was headed by Shri G.C. Saxena, former head of the R&AW, recommended the acceptance by the Government of the principle of formal charters for the intelligence agencies. To give greater meat to its recommendations, it wanted to have a look at the detailed charters for the IB and the CBI proposed by the L.P.Singh Committee. The Home Ministry, then headed by Shri Advani, avoided making available to the Task Force the entire report of the L.P.Singh Committee. However, the Task Force's recommendation for formal charters was accepted and implemented by the Vajpayee Government. One does not know whether the recommendations of the L.P.Singh Committee were taken into consideration while drafting the charters.
10. The credit for first raising the idea of a parliamentary oversight on the intelligence community should go to Shri Jaswant Singh, who was the Chairman of the Estimates Committee of the Rajya Sabha when Shri V.P.Singh was the Prime Minister. Shri V.P.Singh saw merit in the idea and wanted it to be examined. There was no opposition to the idea from the intelligence professionals then in service including this writer, but when Shri V.P.Singh developed differences with the BJP, he did not pursue it.
11. Since then, none of the political parties has shown interest in making the intelligence agencies accountable for their performance and integrity and in making their professional performance subject to an independent assessment. Secrecy is an important operational principle for an intelligence agency. Unless an intelligence agency is able to ensure the secrecy of its operations, no source or agent will stick his neck out to work for it. Its capability for collecting technical intelligence will also be affected.
12. But secrecy should not be allowed to be used as an excuse for covering inefficiencies in performance and irregularities in functioning and financial management. Irregularities do occur in matters such as the personnel policy and diversion of the resources sanctioned by the Government for operational objectives for non-operational purposes. The public and the Parliament have a right to know to what extent the agencies have been producing results and what are the areas of their non-performance. The Parliament has a right to know what kind of financial controls are in place, who exercises those controls and to what extent they are effective. The Parliament has similarly a right to check whether the principle of secrecy in recruitment is being misused to pack the organisations with unsuitable persons, taken not for their qualifications, but for their connections.
13. It is possible to introduce some of these checks and balances in the functioning of our intelligence community without damaging their operational secrecy. There is reluctance from the political class because it sees the agencies as instruments for partisan exploitation and not for defending national interests. There is reluctance from sections of the intelligence officers themselves because they think that unchecked secrecy gives them an aura of power and influence which they do not want to lose.
14. Ansaris may come and Ansaris may go, but the intelligence agencies will go on functioning in the same manner with the complicity of the political class unless there is sustained public pressure on the political class and the agencies to change the culture of our agencies. I am not very optimistic because I do not see on the horizon any political leader who is genuinely convinced of the need for a change.
15. Every country gets the intelligence community it deserves. We will continue to have the community which we have deserved unless Shri Ansari's call is followed up.
Courtesy: South Asia Analysis Group Paper no. 3616 dated 20-Jan-2010
URL: http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers37%5Cpaper3616.html
By B. Raman
In his R.N.Kao Memorial lecture delivered at the headquarters of the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW) on January 19, 2010, Vice-President Hamid Ansari has done well in raising in public issues such as accountability and parliamentary oversight to which the Indian intelligence community is still a stranger.
2. The concept of an accountable and competent intelligence community, which uses the need for secrecy only for protecting its operations and not for covering up its inadequacies and irregularities, has been accepted and implemented by the intelligence agencies of many democracies----parliamentary as well as Presidential types--- of the world during the last three decades. Nobody in those countries has since argued that these concepts have come in the way of the effectiveness of the intelligence process and hence should be re-considered. The overall consensus is that these changes have proved beneficial and hence should be continued and, if necessary, further refined.
3. In India too, these issues have been raised from time to time since the State of Emergency imposed by Indira Gandhi in 1975-77, but follow-up action has been avoided either because of resistance from sections of the intelligence community or because of the reluctance of the political leadership to introduce any changes which might dilute the scope for political misuse of the intelligence machinery for partisan purposes or both.
4. Accountability of intelligence agencies demands, firstly, that they should have a legal existence and, secondly, that they should have a formal charter of their functions and responsibilities. Forty-two years after its formation in 1968, the R&AW still does not have a legal existence. It was set up by a brief executive order issued on behalf of Indira Gandhi in September 1968. Till today, this order has not been accorded parliamentary sanctity by having necessary legislation authorising its creation passed by the Parliament. No Government, which has held office since 1968, has considered it necessary to have an Act passed by the Parliament providing legal legitimacy to the R&AW. No one has raised the question as to how the various Governments have been incurring expenditure on the R&AW year after year without having its creation approved by the Parliament.
5. In the 1980s, when Indira Gandhi was the Prime Minister, a law was enacted by the Parliament banning strikes in the intelligence agencies. To my knowledge, that is the only Act of the Indian Parliament in which there is a reference to the R&AW by name. When that law was passed, nobody in the Parliament thought it fit to ask: What is this R&AW about? When was it created? Who created it? Has its creation been approved by the Parliament?
6. It goes to the credit of A.K.Verma, who headed the R&AW from 1987 to 90 that he took the initiative in drawing the attention of the Governments of Rajiv Gandhi and V.P.Singh to the fact that the R&AW had been functioning without a legal cover and a formal charter. He wanted the Government of the day to do something about it, but nothing was done.
7. The fact that the Intelligence Bureau, which was created by the British before 1947, and the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), which came into existence after 1947, had been functioning without formal charters of their functions and responsibilities, was highlighted by the L.P.Singh Committee, which was set up by the Morarji Desai Government to enquire into the functioning of these two organisations during the State of Emergency. It not only stressed the need for formal charters to prevent their future misuse, but also prepared for the consideration of the Government detailed model charters for adoption. No action was taken on its recommendations by the Indira Gandhi Government which came back to power in 1980 or its successors. The report was consigned to the Archives---seen, but not read and implemented.
8. Shri Atal Behari Vajpayee and Shri Lal Krishna Advani were among those who were in the forefront of those who criticised----- during the election campaign of 1977---- the alleged misuse of the intelligence agencies by the Indira Gandhi Government during the Emergency. When Shri Vajpayee became the Prime Minister and Shri Advani the Home Minister in 1998, one naturally expected them to take the initiative in taking the L.P.Singh Committee report out of the Archives and implement it. The expectations were belied.
9. The Task Force for the revamping of the intelligence apparatus set up by the Vajpayee Government in 2000, which was headed by Shri G.C. Saxena, former head of the R&AW, recommended the acceptance by the Government of the principle of formal charters for the intelligence agencies. To give greater meat to its recommendations, it wanted to have a look at the detailed charters for the IB and the CBI proposed by the L.P.Singh Committee. The Home Ministry, then headed by Shri Advani, avoided making available to the Task Force the entire report of the L.P.Singh Committee. However, the Task Force's recommendation for formal charters was accepted and implemented by the Vajpayee Government. One does not know whether the recommendations of the L.P.Singh Committee were taken into consideration while drafting the charters.
10. The credit for first raising the idea of a parliamentary oversight on the intelligence community should go to Shri Jaswant Singh, who was the Chairman of the Estimates Committee of the Rajya Sabha when Shri V.P.Singh was the Prime Minister. Shri V.P.Singh saw merit in the idea and wanted it to be examined. There was no opposition to the idea from the intelligence professionals then in service including this writer, but when Shri V.P.Singh developed differences with the BJP, he did not pursue it.
11. Since then, none of the political parties has shown interest in making the intelligence agencies accountable for their performance and integrity and in making their professional performance subject to an independent assessment. Secrecy is an important operational principle for an intelligence agency. Unless an intelligence agency is able to ensure the secrecy of its operations, no source or agent will stick his neck out to work for it. Its capability for collecting technical intelligence will also be affected.
12. But secrecy should not be allowed to be used as an excuse for covering inefficiencies in performance and irregularities in functioning and financial management. Irregularities do occur in matters such as the personnel policy and diversion of the resources sanctioned by the Government for operational objectives for non-operational purposes. The public and the Parliament have a right to know to what extent the agencies have been producing results and what are the areas of their non-performance. The Parliament has a right to know what kind of financial controls are in place, who exercises those controls and to what extent they are effective. The Parliament has similarly a right to check whether the principle of secrecy in recruitment is being misused to pack the organisations with unsuitable persons, taken not for their qualifications, but for their connections.
13. It is possible to introduce some of these checks and balances in the functioning of our intelligence community without damaging their operational secrecy. There is reluctance from the political class because it sees the agencies as instruments for partisan exploitation and not for defending national interests. There is reluctance from sections of the intelligence officers themselves because they think that unchecked secrecy gives them an aura of power and influence which they do not want to lose.
14. Ansaris may come and Ansaris may go, but the intelligence agencies will go on functioning in the same manner with the complicity of the political class unless there is sustained public pressure on the political class and the agencies to change the culture of our agencies. I am not very optimistic because I do not see on the horizon any political leader who is genuinely convinced of the need for a change.
15. Every country gets the intelligence community it deserves. We will continue to have the community which we have deserved unless Shri Ansari's call is followed up.
Courtesy: South Asia Analysis Group Paper no. 3616 dated 20-Jan-2010
URL: http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers37%5Cpaper3616.html
Friday, January 15, 2010
INDIAN ARMY NEW WAR DOCTRINE ANALYSED
By Dr. Subhash Kapila
Introductory Observations
The Indian Army’s enunciation of a New War doctrine was long overdue in the light of India's embattled security environment. The last Indian war doctrine ‘The COLD START War Doctrine" which was a Pakistan-specific war doctrine was formulated nearly five years back. India’s two major adversaries, namely Pakistan and China, have in the last five years lapsed into stronger adversarial postures. A strategic review of India’s military postures and plans was certainly called for at this juncture.
Pakistan today stands externally and internally besieged with distinct possibilities of disintegration and Talibanization and its nuclear weapons falling into the hands of Taliban and Al Qaeda. A Pakistan Army so besieged could be tempted to military adventurism against India to divert Pakistani public’s domestic discontent.
China on the Northern peripheries of India has indulged in military suppression of discontent in Tibet and Xingjian. In relation to Tibet, China has many India-centric fears, hence the growing adversarial stances on India’s borders with Tibet. On a larger plane, China along with its military proxy i.e. Pakistan is intent on keeping India confined within South Asia confines. Hence, the growing adversarial stances of China towards India. In case of both Pakistan and China, the growing strategic cooperation and military-to-military contacts of India with the United States has generated further strategic disquiet.
Contextually therefore, the Indian Army is well within its rights to formulate plans, doctrines and weapon and equipment acquisition plans to meet the enhanced threat profiles from Pakistan and China.
In the last five years, the powers that matter in the global strategic calculus have viewed India as a regional power and a global power in the making; consequently, there are expectations that India should ready itself for a greater strategic reach and out-of area-shouldering of strategic responsibilities.
The Indian Army Chief, General Deepak Kapoor’s enunciation of the major thrust areas of India's New War Doctrine in end-December 2009 needs to be viewed in the context outlined above.
In terms of reactions, there was a marked paranoia at the official levels in Pakistan. Pakistan Foreign Ministry’s reactions were crude and flustered. Pakistan’s military hierarchy ridiculed India's New War Doctrine as delusionary.
Reactions in China were critical and these stand reflected in an earlier SAAG Paper on this Website. In both cases the reactions from Pakistan and China were predictable.
Pakistan Army’s reactions can be attributed to a growing feeling of loss that the military balance in South Asia in slipping away in India's favor and the recognition that US- India strategic cooperation is getting too proximate for Pakistan’s comfort. Further, the uncertainty whether China would go the extra mile in favor of Pakistan in any future India – Pakistan conflict..
It is patently wrong therefore to assert that the New War Doctrine is a manifestation of India's growing proclivity towards military adventurism. India's record is otherwise.
In the estimation of this Author. India's New War Doctrine carries within it more political and strategic signals and implications than military implications.
Accordingly, this Paper’s analysis is set- out in the following order:
Re-arranging the order of the major thrust areas of the New War Doctrine from the order of the Indian Army Chief, these emerge as under:
The New War Doctrine’s enunciation of a “Two-Front War Doctrine” and enhancement of “Strategic Reach and “Out of Area Operations Capabilities” carry immense political and strategic significance in terms of India future strategic directions.
India's New Army War Doctrine: The Political Significance
Whether intended or not, to a strategic analyst, the contextual security environment, the timing of the announcement of the New War Doctrine, and giving it prominence in the public domain, indicate that India and the Indian Army wish to send out some political messages. Therefore India's New War Doctrine announcement has a political significance attendant on it.
The political significance of the New War Doctrine has to be viewed at two levels. The first level pertains to India's political relations with China and Pakistan. The second level pertains to India's strategic preparedness and a closer integration between the Indian Army and the internal security agencies to combat the asymmetric threats.
Politically, in relation to China and Pakistan, India's message is that while India would go out of the way to improve relations with them, but in India's security planning and preparations, China and Pakistan figure as major threat perceptions, and therefore political and strategic prudence demands that India is prepared for all eventualities.
The Indian Army was always formulating contingency plans for simultaneous attacks by China and Pakistan from 1962 onwards. Inclusion of this as top priority in the New Army War Doctrine is politically significant.
The second level pertains to India’s strategic preparedness and a closer integration between the Indian Army and the internal security agencies to meet the asymmetric threats. By placing a ‘Two Front War Strategy’ as top priority of the New War Doctrine there will be henceforth an unambiguous political and military focus on initiating strategic readiness for the same at all levels.
In relation to the Asymmetric Threats, its inclusion as a priority focus would help in initiation of political measures to integrate the internal security mechanisms to bring about integration and synergy with the Indian Army plans to meet such threats.
India's New War Doctrine: New Strategic Directions
The emphasis in the Doctrine or “India’s Strategic Reach and Out-of-Area Operations Capabilities” marks a new direction in India's strategic outlook and strategic preparations.
Significantly it heralds that India is no longer willing to accept being strategically confined to within South Asia limits as China desires and Pakistan as its proxy gives shape to their aims. India's seems to be sending out two significant messages through the public emphasis on this component in the New Army War Doctrine. These are:
India's New Army War Doctrine: Indian Political Leadership’s Sustained Focus Required on Implementation.
India's political leadership has evidently given its approval to Indian Army’s New War Doctrine and its major priorities that have been incorporated. The Indian Army undoubtedly would pursue the fast-track successful implementation of this Doctrine.
However there are areas in India's administrative structures which are not in Indian Army control and which have a critical bearing on Indian Army’s New War Doctrine. The political leadership at the apex level will have to step in strongly and impart a sustained focus in terms of monitoring and oversight.
Major areas that would require top priority focus are:
Concluding Observations
Indian Army’s New War Doctrine ordinarily should have not generated so much interest, as periodic strategic reviews of doctrine are a common feature of all major armies.
However, in case of India's strategic outlook and its war doctrine, the global and regional interest is that much more as India moves up the strategic ladder.
Indian Army’s New War Doctrine has appeared in the public domain in its barest outlines. Yet even within that restricted framewor,. India has given ample notice of its strategic directions and doctrinal priorities.
The message for the China-Pakistan strategic nexus is clear. And that is, that India is preparing itself adequately to meet their simultaneous threats effectively. Defensive timidity is no longer going to be the Indian hallmark to meet the threats posed. India will poise itself for offensive-defense which is distinct from military adventurism.
The message for the international community is that India is gradually gearing itself to shoulder regional and extended strategic responsibilities befitting the stature of an aspiring global power. Such gearing-up is not aimed at military adventurism but to ready itself to shoulder strategic responsibilities as a responsible stake-holder in regional and global affairs.
(The author is an International Relations and Strategic Affairs analyst. He is the Consultant, Strategic Affairs with South Asia Analysis Group. Email: drsubhashkapila.007@gmail.com)
Courtesy: http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers37%5Cpaper3606.html
Introductory Observations
The Indian Army’s enunciation of a New War doctrine was long overdue in the light of India's embattled security environment. The last Indian war doctrine ‘The COLD START War Doctrine" which was a Pakistan-specific war doctrine was formulated nearly five years back. India’s two major adversaries, namely Pakistan and China, have in the last five years lapsed into stronger adversarial postures. A strategic review of India’s military postures and plans was certainly called for at this juncture.
Pakistan today stands externally and internally besieged with distinct possibilities of disintegration and Talibanization and its nuclear weapons falling into the hands of Taliban and Al Qaeda. A Pakistan Army so besieged could be tempted to military adventurism against India to divert Pakistani public’s domestic discontent.
China on the Northern peripheries of India has indulged in military suppression of discontent in Tibet and Xingjian. In relation to Tibet, China has many India-centric fears, hence the growing adversarial stances on India’s borders with Tibet. On a larger plane, China along with its military proxy i.e. Pakistan is intent on keeping India confined within South Asia confines. Hence, the growing adversarial stances of China towards India. In case of both Pakistan and China, the growing strategic cooperation and military-to-military contacts of India with the United States has generated further strategic disquiet.
Contextually therefore, the Indian Army is well within its rights to formulate plans, doctrines and weapon and equipment acquisition plans to meet the enhanced threat profiles from Pakistan and China.
In the last five years, the powers that matter in the global strategic calculus have viewed India as a regional power and a global power in the making; consequently, there are expectations that India should ready itself for a greater strategic reach and out-of area-shouldering of strategic responsibilities.
The Indian Army Chief, General Deepak Kapoor’s enunciation of the major thrust areas of India's New War Doctrine in end-December 2009 needs to be viewed in the context outlined above.
In terms of reactions, there was a marked paranoia at the official levels in Pakistan. Pakistan Foreign Ministry’s reactions were crude and flustered. Pakistan’s military hierarchy ridiculed India's New War Doctrine as delusionary.
Reactions in China were critical and these stand reflected in an earlier SAAG Paper on this Website. In both cases the reactions from Pakistan and China were predictable.
Pakistan Army’s reactions can be attributed to a growing feeling of loss that the military balance in South Asia in slipping away in India's favor and the recognition that US- India strategic cooperation is getting too proximate for Pakistan’s comfort. Further, the uncertainty whether China would go the extra mile in favor of Pakistan in any future India – Pakistan conflict..
It is patently wrong therefore to assert that the New War Doctrine is a manifestation of India's growing proclivity towards military adventurism. India's record is otherwise.
In the estimation of this Author. India's New War Doctrine carries within it more political and strategic signals and implications than military implications.
Accordingly, this Paper’s analysis is set- out in the following order:
- India's New Army War Doctrine: The Major Thrust Areas
- India's New Army War Doctrine: The Political Significance
- India's New War Doctrine: New Strategic Directions
- India's New Army War Doctrine: Indian Political Leadership’s Sustained Focus Required on Implementation.
Re-arranging the order of the major thrust areas of the New War Doctrine from the order of the Indian Army Chief, these emerge as under:
- Two-Front War Doctrine: This will be the mainstay of India's New War Doctrine, based on the reality that India should expect and be prepared to effectively meet simultaneous threats from China on the Northern borders and Pakistan on the Western borders.
- India Strategic Reach and Out-of Areas Operations Capabilities: The New War Doctrine would incorporate enhancement of India's capabilities. Both are related to India's aspirations as a regional power and a global power.
- Tri-Service Operational Synergy: This is a logical top priority focus of India's New War Doctrine. It is analyzed that the New War Doctrine envisages short and shift military operations. With a nuclear overhang with both Pakistan and China, the Indian military operations to neutralize the Chinese and Pakistani threats has to be fast paced facilitated by a high degree of synergy between the Indian Army, Indian Navy and the Indian Air Force.
- Asymmetric Warfare and Sub-Conventional Threats: Focus on Operational Capabilities to Neutralize Such Threats: Emphasis seems to have been laid in the Doctrine because both Pakistan and China can be expected to use these instruments as force multipliers. India focus on intense fast-paced operations can be slowed down by such threats both in forward areas and rear areas.
- Military Technological Dominance Over Adversaries: This encompasses the entire spectrum of Network-Centric warfare, Information Warfare, Cyber Warfare all integrated to facilitate speedy decision making and exploitation of fleeting tactical opportunities.
The New War Doctrine’s enunciation of a “Two-Front War Doctrine” and enhancement of “Strategic Reach and “Out of Area Operations Capabilities” carry immense political and strategic significance in terms of India future strategic directions.
India's New Army War Doctrine: The Political Significance
Whether intended or not, to a strategic analyst, the contextual security environment, the timing of the announcement of the New War Doctrine, and giving it prominence in the public domain, indicate that India and the Indian Army wish to send out some political messages. Therefore India's New War Doctrine announcement has a political significance attendant on it.
The political significance of the New War Doctrine has to be viewed at two levels. The first level pertains to India's political relations with China and Pakistan. The second level pertains to India's strategic preparedness and a closer integration between the Indian Army and the internal security agencies to combat the asymmetric threats.
Politically, in relation to China and Pakistan, India's message is that while India would go out of the way to improve relations with them, but in India's security planning and preparations, China and Pakistan figure as major threat perceptions, and therefore political and strategic prudence demands that India is prepared for all eventualities.
The Indian Army was always formulating contingency plans for simultaneous attacks by China and Pakistan from 1962 onwards. Inclusion of this as top priority in the New Army War Doctrine is politically significant.
The second level pertains to India’s strategic preparedness and a closer integration between the Indian Army and the internal security agencies to meet the asymmetric threats. By placing a ‘Two Front War Strategy’ as top priority of the New War Doctrine there will be henceforth an unambiguous political and military focus on initiating strategic readiness for the same at all levels.
In relation to the Asymmetric Threats, its inclusion as a priority focus would help in initiation of political measures to integrate the internal security mechanisms to bring about integration and synergy with the Indian Army plans to meet such threats.
India's New War Doctrine: New Strategic Directions
The emphasis in the Doctrine or “India’s Strategic Reach and Out-of-Area Operations Capabilities” marks a new direction in India's strategic outlook and strategic preparations.
Significantly it heralds that India is no longer willing to accept being strategically confined to within South Asia limits as China desires and Pakistan as its proxy gives shape to their aims. India's seems to be sending out two significant messages through the public emphasis on this component in the New Army War Doctrine. These are:
- India's political leadership is getting ready to shoulder extended strategic commitments and that they have shed their inhibitions and apologetic approaches towards exercise of military power.
- India is preparing its Armed Forces in enhancing their strategic reach and create military readiness for out-of-area operations to protect India's geo-political interests.
- Preparations and planning for such strategic roles are already underway. Acquisition of amphibious war ship from USA, air-refueling tankers and the possible purchase of strategic airlift planes are some of the indicators.
India's New Army War Doctrine: Indian Political Leadership’s Sustained Focus Required on Implementation.
India's political leadership has evidently given its approval to Indian Army’s New War Doctrine and its major priorities that have been incorporated. The Indian Army undoubtedly would pursue the fast-track successful implementation of this Doctrine.
However there are areas in India's administrative structures which are not in Indian Army control and which have a critical bearing on Indian Army’s New War Doctrine. The political leadership at the apex level will have to step in strongly and impart a sustained focus in terms of monitoring and oversight.
Major areas that would require top priority focus are:
- Indian’s ICBMs are speedily inducted in our missile arsenal.
- Indian Navy’s ship acquisition plans are put on fast track.
- Deficiency of 126 combat fighter planes is made up by 2012 latest, by dividing the order between Russia. France and USA. These countries should lease out assets from their own Air Forces till such time their production lines roll-out India's orders.
- Construction of strategic road network and military roads in border areas be directly be monitored by Prime Minister Office.
- India's strategic reserves of fuel, logistics needs, and reserves of weapons, spare parts and accessories are made up and optimum levels be maintained to sustain the requirements of the New War Doctrine.
- The success of the New War Doctrine would essentially depend upon an integrated provision of timely strategic and military intelligence by all national intelligence agencies. The Government has to initiate effective steps in this direction.
Concluding Observations
Indian Army’s New War Doctrine ordinarily should have not generated so much interest, as periodic strategic reviews of doctrine are a common feature of all major armies.
However, in case of India's strategic outlook and its war doctrine, the global and regional interest is that much more as India moves up the strategic ladder.
Indian Army’s New War Doctrine has appeared in the public domain in its barest outlines. Yet even within that restricted framewor,. India has given ample notice of its strategic directions and doctrinal priorities.
The message for the China-Pakistan strategic nexus is clear. And that is, that India is preparing itself adequately to meet their simultaneous threats effectively. Defensive timidity is no longer going to be the Indian hallmark to meet the threats posed. India will poise itself for offensive-defense which is distinct from military adventurism.
The message for the international community is that India is gradually gearing itself to shoulder regional and extended strategic responsibilities befitting the stature of an aspiring global power. Such gearing-up is not aimed at military adventurism but to ready itself to shoulder strategic responsibilities as a responsible stake-holder in regional and global affairs.
(The author is an International Relations and Strategic Affairs analyst. He is the Consultant, Strategic Affairs with South Asia Analysis Group. Email: drsubhashkapila.007@gmail.com)
Courtesy: http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers37%5Cpaper3606.html
Thursday, January 14, 2010
Whose Witness, Anyway?
The Indian judicial environment is loaded against those who depose in court against criminals
by COL R HARIHARAN
ON May 5, 2007, a mob of supporters of Alagiri, son of Tamil Nadu Chief Minister M Karunanidhi, torched the Madurai office of a Tamil daily, Dinakaran. Three employees of the newspaper were burnt alive. Police charged “Attack” Pandi, a criminal “history sheeter”, and 16 others with the crime. The case was transferred to the CBI on May 19, 2007. A Deputy Superintendent of Police, Rajaram, was included as an accused for his negligence when the incident occurred. The CBI filed a 32-page chargesheet and 85 witnesses testified before the court during the hearing. The prime witnesses were Sub Inspector Aladiyan, the first eyewitness, and the Dinakaran Deputy News Editor, the second eyewitness. They turned hostile while deposing before the court. On December 9, 2009 the Principal District Sessions Court, Madurai acquitted all the 17 accused for want of eyewitness evidence.
The story had a happy ending when the ruling first family patched up with Karunanidhi’s nephews, Kalanidhi Maran and Dayanidhi Maran, who own the newspaper. As in fairy tales, they are living happily ever after. It did not matter to anyone that the entire incident was telecast live, showing the criminals setting fire to the newspaper office while political bigwigs raised slogans to encourage them. The Dinakaran case was neither unique nor its verdict surprising. There have been scores of instances where those in power have systematically ensured cases against their interests are snuffed out in courts, using the very instruments of governance and law enforcement. The Best Bakery case in which 14 people were killed when a mob torched Best Bakery in Vadodara during the post-Godhra riots in 2002 is a well known example of the state’s misuse of all instruments of governance to obstruct justice. It is an outstanding example of the perils of giving evidence and how witnesses are used as pawns in the game.
There are hundreds of such instances where witnesses backtrack or turn hostile in appeal courts because of criminal intimidation or prosecution pressure. The reality in this country is that rule of law applies only to those who court the wrath of rulers. That is why such cases are ignored by everyone unless they involve prominent individuals. Even then the media is selective as it takes a risk in covering such cases and any muck-raking could be dangerous for them.
In most of these cases, nobody asks why the witnesses turned hostile or why the court did not take any follow-up action against them for perjury. The courts understand that giving evidence against the high and mighty can be a risky proposition. Witnesses’ reluctance to come forward to give evidence has created a thriving “false witness” business. Outside criminal courts, one can engage individuals for a few hundred rupees to depose as witnesses. This cosy arrangement has the connivance of unscrupulous policemen and lawyers. Judges also know this; so in many cases courts do not take the evidence of such witnesses seriously. But where it suits the judges, their evidence would be taken into reckoning.
Every citizen has a social responsibility to give evidence if he witnesses a criminal act. The law construes it as abetting the crime if he does not do so. But if an average citizen is asked, “Will you give evidence?” an emphatic “No” would be the immediate reply. It might be termed socially irresponsible. But in this country, people keep social responsibility for talk shows and use practical wisdom to survive one day at a time. I am not too sure that even I would readily volunteer to give evidence, although I am stepping into the last quarter of life. My instinct for self-preservation might take over. After all, I have only one life to live!
In the current scene of law enforcement and delivery of justice, witnesses probably run more risks than criminals under trial. The enormous number of witnesses turning hostile in appeal courts is testimony to this. Otherwise how do we explain the extraordinary phenomenon of criminals caught on live TV getting away with their crime?
The Indian judicial environment is loaded against witnesses. Witness protection is often proffered as a remedy for this. Witnesses are summoned to the court whether they have money or not. Nobody cares if the witness is the breadwinner of the family and cannot afford to be away from his work. Even if he reaches the court, there is a real possibility of the case being adjourned. And this story is often replayed any number of times as adjournments come one after the other. Meanwhile, he runs the risk of being bribed, intimidated, kidnapped, or even killed. The Supreme Court has aptly summed up the problem in one of its judgments: “A witness has to visit the Court at his own cost, every time the case is deferred for a different date. Nowadays it has become more or less fashionable to repeatedly adjourn a case. Eventually the witness is tired and gives up.”
The judiciary has made efforts to improve the level of protection available to witnesses. In the Nitish Katara murder case, Delhi High Court spelled out witness protection guidelines as early as October 2003. It made the Member Secretary, Delhi Legal Services Authority the competent authority to administer the guidelines. According to the guidelines, the investigating officer has to inform the witness about the new guidelines and the police commissioner is responsible for protection of the witness. Presumably, even these guidelines provide the bare minimum for protection of witnesses; and witnesses deposing against the police hardly get confidence.
Witness protection has become crucial in cases of terrorist attack. Based on their experience in a series of terrorism related cases in Mumbai, the police have formulated a four-point plan which takes witness protection to a new level. The (Mumbai) police plan for witness protection:
• The witness will be transferred from his hometown to another location.
• The witness will be given a new name, identity and passport.
• The government will provide the witness with a job related to his occupation.
• The government will also assume responsibility for security of the witness’ entire family.
But, in the existing environment where politicization of criminals is a reality, can State governments ensure real protection for witnesses? With political considerations, rather than performance, overriding police appointments, the ability of the police to execute foolproof plans for witness protection is questionable. Moreover, with their ever-increasing commitments, at present the police do not have either the manpower or infrastructure to administer an effective witness protection system. And how long can the state provide for protection of a large number of witnesses when courts continue to groan under a huge backlog of cases that drag on for years?
The Indian Evidence Act, 1872, does not contain specific provision for protection of witnesses against threats, intimidation or any inducement that would prevent them telling the truth. This was probably why the Law Commissions had been considering mostly the soft aspects of allowances and administration of witnesses. The National Police Commission Report (1980) did no better. However, in 1996, the Law Commission recognized the need for protection and recommended: “Witnesses should be protected from the wrath of the accused in any eventuality.” However, it did not suggest any measures for physical protection of witnesses. Even after that, the 178th Report of the Law Commission dealt with the issue of witnesses turning hostile but not witness protection though the two are not related.
Courtesy: GFiles Volume 3 Issue 10, January 2010 URL http://gfilesindia.com/title.aspx?title_id=68
by COL R HARIHARAN
ON May 5, 2007, a mob of supporters of Alagiri, son of Tamil Nadu Chief Minister M Karunanidhi, torched the Madurai office of a Tamil daily, Dinakaran. Three employees of the newspaper were burnt alive. Police charged “Attack” Pandi, a criminal “history sheeter”, and 16 others with the crime. The case was transferred to the CBI on May 19, 2007. A Deputy Superintendent of Police, Rajaram, was included as an accused for his negligence when the incident occurred. The CBI filed a 32-page chargesheet and 85 witnesses testified before the court during the hearing. The prime witnesses were Sub Inspector Aladiyan, the first eyewitness, and the Dinakaran Deputy News Editor, the second eyewitness. They turned hostile while deposing before the court. On December 9, 2009 the Principal District Sessions Court, Madurai acquitted all the 17 accused for want of eyewitness evidence.
The story had a happy ending when the ruling first family patched up with Karunanidhi’s nephews, Kalanidhi Maran and Dayanidhi Maran, who own the newspaper. As in fairy tales, they are living happily ever after. It did not matter to anyone that the entire incident was telecast live, showing the criminals setting fire to the newspaper office while political bigwigs raised slogans to encourage them. The Dinakaran case was neither unique nor its verdict surprising. There have been scores of instances where those in power have systematically ensured cases against their interests are snuffed out in courts, using the very instruments of governance and law enforcement. The Best Bakery case in which 14 people were killed when a mob torched Best Bakery in Vadodara during the post-Godhra riots in 2002 is a well known example of the state’s misuse of all instruments of governance to obstruct justice. It is an outstanding example of the perils of giving evidence and how witnesses are used as pawns in the game.
There are hundreds of such instances where witnesses backtrack or turn hostile in appeal courts because of criminal intimidation or prosecution pressure. The reality in this country is that rule of law applies only to those who court the wrath of rulers. That is why such cases are ignored by everyone unless they involve prominent individuals. Even then the media is selective as it takes a risk in covering such cases and any muck-raking could be dangerous for them.
In most of these cases, nobody asks why the witnesses turned hostile or why the court did not take any follow-up action against them for perjury. The courts understand that giving evidence against the high and mighty can be a risky proposition. Witnesses’ reluctance to come forward to give evidence has created a thriving “false witness” business. Outside criminal courts, one can engage individuals for a few hundred rupees to depose as witnesses. This cosy arrangement has the connivance of unscrupulous policemen and lawyers. Judges also know this; so in many cases courts do not take the evidence of such witnesses seriously. But where it suits the judges, their evidence would be taken into reckoning.
Every citizen has a social responsibility to give evidence if he witnesses a criminal act. The law construes it as abetting the crime if he does not do so. But if an average citizen is asked, “Will you give evidence?” an emphatic “No” would be the immediate reply. It might be termed socially irresponsible. But in this country, people keep social responsibility for talk shows and use practical wisdom to survive one day at a time. I am not too sure that even I would readily volunteer to give evidence, although I am stepping into the last quarter of life. My instinct for self-preservation might take over. After all, I have only one life to live!
In the current scene of law enforcement and delivery of justice, witnesses probably run more risks than criminals under trial. The enormous number of witnesses turning hostile in appeal courts is testimony to this. Otherwise how do we explain the extraordinary phenomenon of criminals caught on live TV getting away with their crime?
The Indian judicial environment is loaded against witnesses. Witness protection is often proffered as a remedy for this. Witnesses are summoned to the court whether they have money or not. Nobody cares if the witness is the breadwinner of the family and cannot afford to be away from his work. Even if he reaches the court, there is a real possibility of the case being adjourned. And this story is often replayed any number of times as adjournments come one after the other. Meanwhile, he runs the risk of being bribed, intimidated, kidnapped, or even killed. The Supreme Court has aptly summed up the problem in one of its judgments: “A witness has to visit the Court at his own cost, every time the case is deferred for a different date. Nowadays it has become more or less fashionable to repeatedly adjourn a case. Eventually the witness is tired and gives up.”
The judiciary has made efforts to improve the level of protection available to witnesses. In the Nitish Katara murder case, Delhi High Court spelled out witness protection guidelines as early as October 2003. It made the Member Secretary, Delhi Legal Services Authority the competent authority to administer the guidelines. According to the guidelines, the investigating officer has to inform the witness about the new guidelines and the police commissioner is responsible for protection of the witness. Presumably, even these guidelines provide the bare minimum for protection of witnesses; and witnesses deposing against the police hardly get confidence.
Witness protection has become crucial in cases of terrorist attack. Based on their experience in a series of terrorism related cases in Mumbai, the police have formulated a four-point plan which takes witness protection to a new level. The (Mumbai) police plan for witness protection:
• The witness will be transferred from his hometown to another location.
• The witness will be given a new name, identity and passport.
• The government will provide the witness with a job related to his occupation.
• The government will also assume responsibility for security of the witness’ entire family.
But, in the existing environment where politicization of criminals is a reality, can State governments ensure real protection for witnesses? With political considerations, rather than performance, overriding police appointments, the ability of the police to execute foolproof plans for witness protection is questionable. Moreover, with their ever-increasing commitments, at present the police do not have either the manpower or infrastructure to administer an effective witness protection system. And how long can the state provide for protection of a large number of witnesses when courts continue to groan under a huge backlog of cases that drag on for years?
The Indian Evidence Act, 1872, does not contain specific provision for protection of witnesses against threats, intimidation or any inducement that would prevent them telling the truth. This was probably why the Law Commissions had been considering mostly the soft aspects of allowances and administration of witnesses. The National Police Commission Report (1980) did no better. However, in 1996, the Law Commission recognized the need for protection and recommended: “Witnesses should be protected from the wrath of the accused in any eventuality.” However, it did not suggest any measures for physical protection of witnesses. Even after that, the 178th Report of the Law Commission dealt with the issue of witnesses turning hostile but not witness protection though the two are not related.
Courtesy: GFiles Volume 3 Issue 10, January 2010 URL http://gfilesindia.com/title.aspx?title_id=68
Media Bytes:: Navy's Acquisition of Recce Aircraft
This is an excerpt of an interview given to NDTV-Hindu in the first week of January 2009. The questions raised by NDTV-Hindu reporter are shown in bold letters.
The Indian Navy has signed a $ 2.1 billion deal with Boeing for supply of eight highly sophisticated P8-I Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA). This is said to be the biggest Indian arms deal so far with the United States. Will this tighten our coastal protection to prevent infiltration of terrorists, particularly from Sri Lanka as the war is over there?
Actually, the Boeing deal is part of Indian Navy’s modernization programme. So its purpose is to extend the strategic long range maritime reconnaissance capability of the navy to become truly blue water navy. Their capability is well beyond the limited tactical role of detecting infiltration of terrorists through the sea. In any case the LTTE is no more a powerful entity it was. It is unlikely to be a threat in the near future to Sri Lanka, let alone India.
The new Boeing acquisitions will replace the ageing Tu-142 and IL-38 aircraft now used for long range maritime reconnaissance.
The first Boeing P-8I aircraft is to be delivered by 2012; and the last aircraft by 2015. The P-8I aircraft, based on the Boeing 737 commercial airliner, has been customised to meet Indian Navy’s needs. It is a modified version of the P-8A Poseidon Multi-Mission Maritime Aircraft currently being developed for US Navy.
The P-8I aircraft, with a range of over 600 nautical miles, are expected to plug the large gaps in Navy's maritime reconnaissance capabilities. The P-8I’s weapon systems including torpedoes, depth bombs and anti-ship missiles make it a formidable platform for anti submarine warfare (ASW).
But do we need such huge investments in the navy?
Actually it is not only the navy, but army and air force are also modernising to catch up with the demands of an increasingly technology oriented battlefields of 21st century. The modernisation we had planned for even 20th century warfare has not been completed due to our poor weapon acquisition, research and development systems.
Unless we make investments now, we will never be able to get our armed forces ready to face the challenges that come with our growth as a regional power. New acquisitions are time consuming and expensive. In particular naval ships take time to build and many of the weapons, radars, and electronic warfare systems are procured from different suppliers and fitted.
It is not like buying small arms off the shelf. Countries design weapon systems based upon the requirements for the type of operations they visualise. So when we buy or develop a weapon system it has to be specially modified or designed to suit our specific requirements and theatres of war.
As early as August 2008, the then Navy chief Admiral Sureesh Mehta had described Indian Navy’s vision to become a 160-ship force (at present we probably have 135 ships). He said "By 2022, we plan to have 160-plus ship navy, including three aircraft carriers, 60 major combatants, including submarines and close to 400 aircraft of different types. This will be a formidable three dimensional force with satellite surveillance and networking to provide force multiplication."
The Air Force is also modernising. It is in the process of phasing out MiG 21 fleet and acquiring modern fighters. It has been trying to persuade the Ministry of Defence to procure a new fleet of A330 multi-role tanker transport (MRTT) for mid-air refuelling of fighter aircraft, instead of the Russian Illushin-78 tankers, which are already in use. Mid air refuelling system increases the sphere of operation of the air force.
Similarly Army is also trying to modernise. It has started the process of acquiring network-centric warfare capabilities. As a part of this effort it is “all set to induct a computerised command and control system to integrate its artillery weapon operations. Project Sakthi, the Artillery Combat Command and Control System (ACCCS) will be a major division of the Tactical Command Control Communication and Intelligence (Tac C3I) system. Rocket and missile systems are being modernised increasing their range and fire power.
So the armed forces should be ready for 21st century warfare by end of the next decade?
Far from it; there are formidable obstacles to it. We are trying to use 19th century methodology to modern day defence procurement. Then there are holy cows: defence research and development, and public sector fixation for defence supplies. They are beyond the pale of accountability. The quality of our nuclear weapon systems has become suspect in the eyes of many defence scientists.
The fashion in our defence procurement appears to be to sign a contract and then cancel it,wasting years of work. For instance MoD has cancelled three contracts – two with the EADS for supply of refueling aircraft and Eurocopter deal and one with BAE fo supply of 155 mm artillery guns to the army.
Thus our problem is not for want of ideas but evolving a corruption free system of procurement. Despite paying lip service to private sector, we have mental blocks in bringing in private capital for defence manufacture. Despite a patchwork quilt of measures in all this, I do not expect any great change in mindset of our administrators. So I presume we will plod through the coming decade adopting a Pakistan-centric reactive policy.
The Indian Navy has signed a $ 2.1 billion deal with Boeing for supply of eight highly sophisticated P8-I Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA). This is said to be the biggest Indian arms deal so far with the United States. Will this tighten our coastal protection to prevent infiltration of terrorists, particularly from Sri Lanka as the war is over there?
Actually, the Boeing deal is part of Indian Navy’s modernization programme. So its purpose is to extend the strategic long range maritime reconnaissance capability of the navy to become truly blue water navy. Their capability is well beyond the limited tactical role of detecting infiltration of terrorists through the sea. In any case the LTTE is no more a powerful entity it was. It is unlikely to be a threat in the near future to Sri Lanka, let alone India.
The new Boeing acquisitions will replace the ageing Tu-142 and IL-38 aircraft now used for long range maritime reconnaissance.
The first Boeing P-8I aircraft is to be delivered by 2012; and the last aircraft by 2015. The P-8I aircraft, based on the Boeing 737 commercial airliner, has been customised to meet Indian Navy’s needs. It is a modified version of the P-8A Poseidon Multi-Mission Maritime Aircraft currently being developed for US Navy.
The P-8I aircraft, with a range of over 600 nautical miles, are expected to plug the large gaps in Navy's maritime reconnaissance capabilities. The P-8I’s weapon systems including torpedoes, depth bombs and anti-ship missiles make it a formidable platform for anti submarine warfare (ASW).
But do we need such huge investments in the navy?
Actually it is not only the navy, but army and air force are also modernising to catch up with the demands of an increasingly technology oriented battlefields of 21st century. The modernisation we had planned for even 20th century warfare has not been completed due to our poor weapon acquisition, research and development systems.
Unless we make investments now, we will never be able to get our armed forces ready to face the challenges that come with our growth as a regional power. New acquisitions are time consuming and expensive. In particular naval ships take time to build and many of the weapons, radars, and electronic warfare systems are procured from different suppliers and fitted.
It is not like buying small arms off the shelf. Countries design weapon systems based upon the requirements for the type of operations they visualise. So when we buy or develop a weapon system it has to be specially modified or designed to suit our specific requirements and theatres of war.
As early as August 2008, the then Navy chief Admiral Sureesh Mehta had described Indian Navy’s vision to become a 160-ship force (at present we probably have 135 ships). He said "By 2022, we plan to have 160-plus ship navy, including three aircraft carriers, 60 major combatants, including submarines and close to 400 aircraft of different types. This will be a formidable three dimensional force with satellite surveillance and networking to provide force multiplication."
The Air Force is also modernising. It is in the process of phasing out MiG 21 fleet and acquiring modern fighters. It has been trying to persuade the Ministry of Defence to procure a new fleet of A330 multi-role tanker transport (MRTT) for mid-air refuelling of fighter aircraft, instead of the Russian Illushin-78 tankers, which are already in use. Mid air refuelling system increases the sphere of operation of the air force.
Similarly Army is also trying to modernise. It has started the process of acquiring network-centric warfare capabilities. As a part of this effort it is “all set to induct a computerised command and control system to integrate its artillery weapon operations. Project Sakthi, the Artillery Combat Command and Control System (ACCCS) will be a major division of the Tactical Command Control Communication and Intelligence (Tac C3I) system. Rocket and missile systems are being modernised increasing their range and fire power.
So the armed forces should be ready for 21st century warfare by end of the next decade?
Far from it; there are formidable obstacles to it. We are trying to use 19th century methodology to modern day defence procurement. Then there are holy cows: defence research and development, and public sector fixation for defence supplies. They are beyond the pale of accountability. The quality of our nuclear weapon systems has become suspect in the eyes of many defence scientists.
The fashion in our defence procurement appears to be to sign a contract and then cancel it,wasting years of work. For instance MoD has cancelled three contracts – two with the EADS for supply of refueling aircraft and Eurocopter deal and one with BAE fo supply of 155 mm artillery guns to the army.
Thus our problem is not for want of ideas but evolving a corruption free system of procurement. Despite paying lip service to private sector, we have mental blocks in bringing in private capital for defence manufacture. Despite a patchwork quilt of measures in all this, I do not expect any great change in mindset of our administrators. So I presume we will plod through the coming decade adopting a Pakistan-centric reactive policy.
Sri Lanka Perspectives – December 2009
[Readers may find this assessment written on December 31, 2009 for SOUTH ASIA SECURITY TRENDS slightly dated as subsequent events have overtaken some of the issues.However it is published here for the purpose of record. The blogs on Sri Lanka published in this site during this month cover subsequent developments.]
Presidential election
With the retired Chief of Defence Staff General Sarath Fonseka emerging as the main challenger to President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s bid to win a second term in the presidential election to be held on January 26, 2010 a no-hold barred, nasty election campaign is underway.
Both the candidates’ trump card is their national popularity, largely dependent upon their contribution to the elimination of Velupillai Prabhakaran and the defeat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). So the election campaign’s focus is now has been shifted by the two candidates to claim of sole responsibility for winning the war, while running down the other candidate.
In warding off the Rajapaksa group’s smear campaign, General Fonseka chose to come out with allegations of corruption, highhandedness and nepotism in the conduct of war against the President and the Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa. Some of these allegations are petty. But his allegation that the Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa, by passing the army commander, had ordered Sri Lanka troops to kill senior LTTE leaders, carrying white flags, coming to surrender in the final stages of war will have serious repercussions. It has already caused severe damage to Sri Lanka’s reputation. It provided substance to the same allegation that had been voiced in international forums.
The impact of war crimes allegation on the voters and the army is not clear. But it clearly sidetracked major national issues like economic woes, unemployment, price rise, Tamil autonomy, and the adverse impact of possible EU withdrawal of tariff concessions extended to Sri Lankan exports.
The General’s election promises are largely similar to those of the opposition United National Party (UNP); however, he had been significantly vague on the question of abolition of executive presidency – a lynchpin of UNP manifesto. Similarly his stand on Tamil issue runs counter to the Marxist Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP)’s stand. However, the General continues to remain a strong opponent as he has attracted dissidents from Rajapaksa’s camp and divided the loyalties of Sinhala right wing votes.
But there are a few grey areas in his support. The impact of war crimes allegations against the army on the sizable support he is believed to enjoy among troops is a question mark. It could also adversely affect JVP which had been assiduously cultivating the troops for sometime now. Fonseka’s election promises have been tall; how he hopes to implement them is still sketchy. Moreover, the ruling coalition is in a position to foreclose some of these promises in the run up to the election; for instance the promise to increase soldiers pay has already been offset by the government granting it.
The President managed to retain the support of the Tamil Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP) led by Chandirakanthan alias Pillaiyan, the chief minister of eastern provincial council after he helped to patch up the feud with the erstwhile LTTE leader and current MP Muralitharan alias Karuna. The Ceylon Workers Congress (CWC), the oldest plantation Tamil party and the Upcountry People’s Front (UPF) have also pledged support to support President Rajapaksa.
The weakest link in President’s support chain is winning nearly 300,000 war displaced Tamils’ votes. Although they have been allowed to return to their war ravaged homes in the north, it has come too late and after a lot of humiliation. And many of them are yet to be rehabilitated to be grateful. So they may not heed the call of the Eelam Peoples Democratic Party (EPDP) and the Peoples Liberation Organisation for Taml Eelam (PLOTE) – the two Tamil parties who support the President. The pro-LTTE Tamil National Alliance (TNA), which could swing their votes, is a divided house. The candidacy of Sivajilingam, TNA MP and leader of the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO) has probably caused a minor upset in its bargain capability.
At best he could dissipate some of the Tamil votes that would have gone to Fonseka, even if it is assumed he would be forgiven for his past ‘sins’ from their point of view. Thus it is clear that decisive Tamil votes continue to elude both the main opponents. In view of this we can expect many abstentions among Tamils. The regime is also in a position to make many of them the displaced voters ineligible to vote as they do not have national identity cards. Given this situation, poll prospect as of now continues to be tilted in favour of Rajapaksa.
International developments
The Obama administration appears to be poised to take fresh initiatives to repair its relations with Sri Lanka. This is evident from the recommendations of the powerful bipartisan U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee headed by John F. Kerry for a rethink of U.S. policy in the light of decisive victory over the LTTE and developments thereafter. The U.S.-Sri Lanka relations were mauled during the course of the war when the U.S. tried to pressurise Sri Lanka on humanitarian and human rights issues during the war. The worst phase was when it tried to intervene with an ill-timed plan to send U.S. Marines to war zone evacuate Prabhakaran and the LTTE leadership during the Sri Lanka army’s winning phase in the war.
The increasing Chinese influence in Sri Lanka and the lingering fear of Iran trying to gain a foothold are also un-stated reasons in the U.S. calculus on Sri Lanka. What Indian new initiatives are underway continues to be foggy. Of course, Indian projects like the 285-kilometre power link, including submarine cables over a stretch of 50 km, are making slow headway. Apparently, India’s lukewarm attitude to Fonseka campaigners’ overtures for support is probably part of the ‘hidden’ Indian agenda. Unless India takes dynamic initiatives specifically to reduce Chinese influence and hold the U.S. responses to manageable proportions, it stands to lose its cosy relations with Sri Lanka.
LTTE leftovers
The continued recovery of hidden LTTE weapons and explosives in North and East shows administration’s relentless clean up of the LTTE leftovers in the country. It proposes to charge sheet selected cadres among 12000 captives and other suspects apprehended for their involvement in acts of terrorism. Apparently the Rajapaksa regime is in no mood to ‘forgive and forget’ the LTTE as some of its old camp followers want. This is probably due to the continued strong but silent support from countries like the U.S., Australia, Canada and Singapore to pursue cases involving LTTE gun runners in their own countries to their logical end.
In this context, Sri Lankan navy’s seizure of a merchant vessel ‘Princess Chrisanta’ (navy called it ‘Princess Christina’) from a remote Southeast Asian island shows the dimensions of international support Sri Lanka enjoys in cleaning up the LTTE act. The 93 metre long ship brought to Colombo. was made reportedly on information provided by Kumaran Pathmanathan (KP), former LTTE international affairs head now in captivity.
Media report indicated this was one of the five ships bought through front companies for the LTTE legitimately and registered with Lloyds. Most of them were of Japanese origin. According to the Navy Commander Vice Admiral Thisara Samarasinghe the vessel was used for LTTE’s gun running and human trafficking. He said the vessel tried to rescue the LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran in the final stages of the battle.
During the course of its operations between May 2003 and October 2007crippling, the navy had destroyed ten LTTE ships (seven of them in 2007) the LTTE’s ‘ghost’ fleet of ships that had provided logistic support for the insurgents. But these are fading into pages of history, as the rise of LTTE once again appears more difficult than ever before despite the political blunders of the government in resolving the Tamil issue even during peace.
Courtesy: www.security-risks.com
Presidential election
With the retired Chief of Defence Staff General Sarath Fonseka emerging as the main challenger to President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s bid to win a second term in the presidential election to be held on January 26, 2010 a no-hold barred, nasty election campaign is underway.
Both the candidates’ trump card is their national popularity, largely dependent upon their contribution to the elimination of Velupillai Prabhakaran and the defeat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). So the election campaign’s focus is now has been shifted by the two candidates to claim of sole responsibility for winning the war, while running down the other candidate.
In warding off the Rajapaksa group’s smear campaign, General Fonseka chose to come out with allegations of corruption, highhandedness and nepotism in the conduct of war against the President and the Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa. Some of these allegations are petty. But his allegation that the Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa, by passing the army commander, had ordered Sri Lanka troops to kill senior LTTE leaders, carrying white flags, coming to surrender in the final stages of war will have serious repercussions. It has already caused severe damage to Sri Lanka’s reputation. It provided substance to the same allegation that had been voiced in international forums.
The impact of war crimes allegation on the voters and the army is not clear. But it clearly sidetracked major national issues like economic woes, unemployment, price rise, Tamil autonomy, and the adverse impact of possible EU withdrawal of tariff concessions extended to Sri Lankan exports.
The General’s election promises are largely similar to those of the opposition United National Party (UNP); however, he had been significantly vague on the question of abolition of executive presidency – a lynchpin of UNP manifesto. Similarly his stand on Tamil issue runs counter to the Marxist Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP)’s stand. However, the General continues to remain a strong opponent as he has attracted dissidents from Rajapaksa’s camp and divided the loyalties of Sinhala right wing votes.
But there are a few grey areas in his support. The impact of war crimes allegations against the army on the sizable support he is believed to enjoy among troops is a question mark. It could also adversely affect JVP which had been assiduously cultivating the troops for sometime now. Fonseka’s election promises have been tall; how he hopes to implement them is still sketchy. Moreover, the ruling coalition is in a position to foreclose some of these promises in the run up to the election; for instance the promise to increase soldiers pay has already been offset by the government granting it.
The President managed to retain the support of the Tamil Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP) led by Chandirakanthan alias Pillaiyan, the chief minister of eastern provincial council after he helped to patch up the feud with the erstwhile LTTE leader and current MP Muralitharan alias Karuna. The Ceylon Workers Congress (CWC), the oldest plantation Tamil party and the Upcountry People’s Front (UPF) have also pledged support to support President Rajapaksa.
The weakest link in President’s support chain is winning nearly 300,000 war displaced Tamils’ votes. Although they have been allowed to return to their war ravaged homes in the north, it has come too late and after a lot of humiliation. And many of them are yet to be rehabilitated to be grateful. So they may not heed the call of the Eelam Peoples Democratic Party (EPDP) and the Peoples Liberation Organisation for Taml Eelam (PLOTE) – the two Tamil parties who support the President. The pro-LTTE Tamil National Alliance (TNA), which could swing their votes, is a divided house. The candidacy of Sivajilingam, TNA MP and leader of the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO) has probably caused a minor upset in its bargain capability.
At best he could dissipate some of the Tamil votes that would have gone to Fonseka, even if it is assumed he would be forgiven for his past ‘sins’ from their point of view. Thus it is clear that decisive Tamil votes continue to elude both the main opponents. In view of this we can expect many abstentions among Tamils. The regime is also in a position to make many of them the displaced voters ineligible to vote as they do not have national identity cards. Given this situation, poll prospect as of now continues to be tilted in favour of Rajapaksa.
International developments
The Obama administration appears to be poised to take fresh initiatives to repair its relations with Sri Lanka. This is evident from the recommendations of the powerful bipartisan U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee headed by John F. Kerry for a rethink of U.S. policy in the light of decisive victory over the LTTE and developments thereafter. The U.S.-Sri Lanka relations were mauled during the course of the war when the U.S. tried to pressurise Sri Lanka on humanitarian and human rights issues during the war. The worst phase was when it tried to intervene with an ill-timed plan to send U.S. Marines to war zone evacuate Prabhakaran and the LTTE leadership during the Sri Lanka army’s winning phase in the war.
The increasing Chinese influence in Sri Lanka and the lingering fear of Iran trying to gain a foothold are also un-stated reasons in the U.S. calculus on Sri Lanka. What Indian new initiatives are underway continues to be foggy. Of course, Indian projects like the 285-kilometre power link, including submarine cables over a stretch of 50 km, are making slow headway. Apparently, India’s lukewarm attitude to Fonseka campaigners’ overtures for support is probably part of the ‘hidden’ Indian agenda. Unless India takes dynamic initiatives specifically to reduce Chinese influence and hold the U.S. responses to manageable proportions, it stands to lose its cosy relations with Sri Lanka.
LTTE leftovers
The continued recovery of hidden LTTE weapons and explosives in North and East shows administration’s relentless clean up of the LTTE leftovers in the country. It proposes to charge sheet selected cadres among 12000 captives and other suspects apprehended for their involvement in acts of terrorism. Apparently the Rajapaksa regime is in no mood to ‘forgive and forget’ the LTTE as some of its old camp followers want. This is probably due to the continued strong but silent support from countries like the U.S., Australia, Canada and Singapore to pursue cases involving LTTE gun runners in their own countries to their logical end.
In this context, Sri Lankan navy’s seizure of a merchant vessel ‘Princess Chrisanta’ (navy called it ‘Princess Christina’) from a remote Southeast Asian island shows the dimensions of international support Sri Lanka enjoys in cleaning up the LTTE act. The 93 metre long ship brought to Colombo. was made reportedly on information provided by Kumaran Pathmanathan (KP), former LTTE international affairs head now in captivity.
Media report indicated this was one of the five ships bought through front companies for the LTTE legitimately and registered with Lloyds. Most of them were of Japanese origin. According to the Navy Commander Vice Admiral Thisara Samarasinghe the vessel was used for LTTE’s gun running and human trafficking. He said the vessel tried to rescue the LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran in the final stages of the battle.
During the course of its operations between May 2003 and October 2007crippling, the navy had destroyed ten LTTE ships (seven of them in 2007) the LTTE’s ‘ghost’ fleet of ships that had provided logistic support for the insurgents. But these are fading into pages of history, as the rise of LTTE once again appears more difficult than ever before despite the political blunders of the government in resolving the Tamil issue even during peace.
Courtesy: www.security-risks.com
Making Hijacking More Difficult
Media reports from New Delhi say that a group of ministers headed by the home minister P. Chidambaram has approved a civil aviation ministry proposal to incorporate the death penalty to hijackers in the Anti-Hijacking Act, 1982. It will have to be brought before the Parliament for enactment. The Anti-Hijacking Act, 1982 provides for life imprisonment for hijacking and acts of violence connected with hijacking against any passenger or crew of the aircraft.
According to the news paper report, the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) had cleared the policy five years ago in a bid to make the anti-hijacking law more stringent . While no one doubts the intention of the government, it is not clear why it took ten years to decide to give teeth to the anti hijack law after the infamous December 1999 Kandahar hijack of Indian Airlines flight IC 814? The Kandahar hijack was an event of national shame. That hijack exposed the soft underbelly of the Indian government which buckled under the demand of a handful of Pak hijackers and released Masood Azhar, founder of the notorious Islamist terror group of Jaish-e-Mohammed, and three others in exchange for the hostages.
The abortive attempt by Umar Farouk Abdul Mutallab, a Nigerian Islamist terrorist, who tried to blow an the Northwest Airlines Flight 253 from Amsterdam to Detroit last Christmas-eve probably made the Indian government to sit up and take stock of the existing aviation security situation including anti hijacking measures in our own country.
The new proposal also provides for no negotiations whatsoever with the hijackers on their demands. Is it realistic? Can we enforce such a policy with iron-clad rigidity as Israel does? What happens if the terrorists start killing hostages one by one? Will the government in power be able to resist political and public pressures to negotiate with the hijackers? These are some of the questions that arise on the ‘no negotiation’ policy. Such policy strictly enforced would discourage hijacking. But our government’s decision making process in murky situations is quite suspect. So unless there is clear and unambiguous decision making based on firm self belief, mere enactments will not deter hijacking. It is actions more than enactments that speak loudly of government intention.
The Indian express also reported that in 2005 the government had "unveiled a tough anti-hijack policy under which any hijacked plane, being used as a missile to target vital installations as in the 9/11 terror attack, would be shot down." Enforcement of this policy is not going to be easy; it calls for great sagacity in decision making. Questions raised earlier about ‘no negotiations’ policy also need to be answered on this issue also.
At times the situation in the aircraft is confused and tricky; it is not always clear whether a plane is hijacked because pilots are under duress. In this context, two hijack scares - both IndiGo flights - reported in 2009 are of special interest. On July 23, 2009 Sanjay Malik a passenger on board flight GE-181 from Delhi to Mumbai triggered a mid-air scare claiming there was a bomb on board. He wanted the plane to be diverted to Karachi. However, the crew managed to control the situation and the plane was landed safely. Malik was reported to be mentally deranged. In another incident on February 1, 2009 "threatening behaviour" of a passenger reported by the pilot on a flight from Goa to Delh brought on the NSG commandos to the tarmac and air force fighters were scrambled. On safe landing the unruly passenger was found to be drunk; he and two other passengers were arrested. So decision to shoot down an aircraft full of passengers is not going to be easy. This dilemma has bugged the U.S. also. In any case a determined terrorist could still hijack and crash the aircraft on the target while vital moments are lost in taking the difficult decision to shooting down he aircraft.
Basically, our weakness is not in enactments. It is in evolving systems and in enforcing the existing acts and procedures. Proclaiming a death sentence to a hijacker is not enough. After all over a dozen criminals and terrorists sentenced to death are languishing in death row for over a decade because the government has not been unable to make its mind to carry out the sentence. Amazingly the list includes Afzal Guru who masterminded the attack on Indian Parliament! So how many terrorist hijackers, already brainwashed to die smilingly, would be deterred by the death sentence provided in the Anti-Hijacking Act 1982 is a moot point. Presumably, the amendment is to show the public the determination of the government's determination in fight hijacking than anything else.
Probably the best deterrent to hijacking would to nab the potential hijackers before they board the aircraft. It would require extra effort on the part of intelligence agencies to collect real time information. The back end coordination at the airports wit national security and intelligence agencies aided by adequate and updated technology would make it more difficult for hijacker to seep through the airport security net.
Foolproof preventive security measures in airports would make hijacking a tough and risky proposition. But I am not very confident whether the security measures in minor airports like Trichy, Bhuj or Jorhat are as good or as strict as in major airports like New Delhi, Mumbai or Kolkatta. Moreover, is the state police apparatus well integrated in the whole chain to forewarn and forestall hijack attempts? One can only hope these aspects are getting the attention they deserve.
[Some of the points contained in this article were included in an interview given by the author to the NDTV-Hindu on January 13, 2009.]
Courtesy: http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers37%5Cpaper3605.html
According to the news paper report, the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) had cleared the policy five years ago in a bid to make the anti-hijacking law more stringent . While no one doubts the intention of the government, it is not clear why it took ten years to decide to give teeth to the anti hijack law after the infamous December 1999 Kandahar hijack of Indian Airlines flight IC 814? The Kandahar hijack was an event of national shame. That hijack exposed the soft underbelly of the Indian government which buckled under the demand of a handful of Pak hijackers and released Masood Azhar, founder of the notorious Islamist terror group of Jaish-e-Mohammed, and three others in exchange for the hostages.
The abortive attempt by Umar Farouk Abdul Mutallab, a Nigerian Islamist terrorist, who tried to blow an the Northwest Airlines Flight 253 from Amsterdam to Detroit last Christmas-eve probably made the Indian government to sit up and take stock of the existing aviation security situation including anti hijacking measures in our own country.
The new proposal also provides for no negotiations whatsoever with the hijackers on their demands. Is it realistic? Can we enforce such a policy with iron-clad rigidity as Israel does? What happens if the terrorists start killing hostages one by one? Will the government in power be able to resist political and public pressures to negotiate with the hijackers? These are some of the questions that arise on the ‘no negotiation’ policy. Such policy strictly enforced would discourage hijacking. But our government’s decision making process in murky situations is quite suspect. So unless there is clear and unambiguous decision making based on firm self belief, mere enactments will not deter hijacking. It is actions more than enactments that speak loudly of government intention.
The Indian express also reported that in 2005 the government had "unveiled a tough anti-hijack policy under which any hijacked plane, being used as a missile to target vital installations as in the 9/11 terror attack, would be shot down." Enforcement of this policy is not going to be easy; it calls for great sagacity in decision making. Questions raised earlier about ‘no negotiations’ policy also need to be answered on this issue also.
At times the situation in the aircraft is confused and tricky; it is not always clear whether a plane is hijacked because pilots are under duress. In this context, two hijack scares - both IndiGo flights - reported in 2009 are of special interest. On July 23, 2009 Sanjay Malik a passenger on board flight GE-181 from Delhi to Mumbai triggered a mid-air scare claiming there was a bomb on board. He wanted the plane to be diverted to Karachi. However, the crew managed to control the situation and the plane was landed safely. Malik was reported to be mentally deranged. In another incident on February 1, 2009 "threatening behaviour" of a passenger reported by the pilot on a flight from Goa to Delh brought on the NSG commandos to the tarmac and air force fighters were scrambled. On safe landing the unruly passenger was found to be drunk; he and two other passengers were arrested. So decision to shoot down an aircraft full of passengers is not going to be easy. This dilemma has bugged the U.S. also. In any case a determined terrorist could still hijack and crash the aircraft on the target while vital moments are lost in taking the difficult decision to shooting down he aircraft.
Basically, our weakness is not in enactments. It is in evolving systems and in enforcing the existing acts and procedures. Proclaiming a death sentence to a hijacker is not enough. After all over a dozen criminals and terrorists sentenced to death are languishing in death row for over a decade because the government has not been unable to make its mind to carry out the sentence. Amazingly the list includes Afzal Guru who masterminded the attack on Indian Parliament! So how many terrorist hijackers, already brainwashed to die smilingly, would be deterred by the death sentence provided in the Anti-Hijacking Act 1982 is a moot point. Presumably, the amendment is to show the public the determination of the government's determination in fight hijacking than anything else.
Probably the best deterrent to hijacking would to nab the potential hijackers before they board the aircraft. It would require extra effort on the part of intelligence agencies to collect real time information. The back end coordination at the airports wit national security and intelligence agencies aided by adequate and updated technology would make it more difficult for hijacker to seep through the airport security net.
Foolproof preventive security measures in airports would make hijacking a tough and risky proposition. But I am not very confident whether the security measures in minor airports like Trichy, Bhuj or Jorhat are as good or as strict as in major airports like New Delhi, Mumbai or Kolkatta. Moreover, is the state police apparatus well integrated in the whole chain to forewarn and forestall hijack attempts? One can only hope these aspects are getting the attention they deserve.
[Some of the points contained in this article were included in an interview given by the author to the NDTV-Hindu on January 13, 2009.]
Courtesy: http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers37%5Cpaper3605.html
Monday, January 11, 2010
Sri Lanka Election Hiccups
For President Mahinda Rajapaksa last week was not a happy one. Media predictions show a slow swing in favour of the common opposition candidate General Sarath Fonseka in the January 26 presidential poll. Like all poll predictions they have their limitations; but they were enough to disturb the dovecote of Rajapaksa camp. It was also a week of bad tidings for Rajapaksa on many fronts.
General Fonseka increased his chances of garnering more Tamil votes than the President after the Tamil National Alliance (TNA), announced its decision to support him. The TNA arrived at the decision after talking Fonseka though it had not “signed any agreement, we have come to an agreement,” as its spokesman clarified. According to the media, the TNA announcement came after Fonseka handed over a document pledging to address TNA concerns. These include on lifting the four-year old state of emergency, release of all the persons held in detention without any evidence and grant general amnesty to former LTTE supporters and help their rehabilitation.
The issues are close to the heart of Tamils and no Tamil party can really question these concerns. While it has given the TNA a face saving method of supporting the General, whose war record did not carry the new found convictions. But the moot point is how many Tamil votes would it swung in favour of Fonseka based on TNA recommendations. The TNA is a divided house with an estimated 60% of leaders rooting for the General. There is also the prickly but 'minor' issue of Sivajilingam's candidacy. It is an ironic turn that the TNA, accused of suspect loyalties, is now in a position to become the national king maker; but can it do it? That is a $ 64 question even the TNA would be unable to answer.
President Rajapaksa has limitations in making free wheeling pledges to Tamils as he would not like to antagonise Southern Sinhala vote banks. They had stood by him in the crucial run up in the last presidential poll; he could jeopardize their support if he is seen leaning too much in favour of Tamils, who were till recently supporting the LTTE.
However, Rajapaksa dogged in his beliefs took his campaign to the Tamil heartland in Jaffna. His visit to Jaffna came a week after Fonseka’s trip. The President was seen doing all the right things there, starting with worship at Nallur Kandaswamy kovil. Rajapaksa promised all the things he failed to do in six moths of peace after the war: speed up reconstruction and resettlement of 300,000 Tamils who fled from the battle zone only to be incarcerated in internment camps till end 2009. Later, in Colombo while releasing the 14-point election manifesto of the ruling United Peoples Freedom Alliance (UPFA), the President said he would devote the entire second term to address all the key issues.
But to all those who expected the President to clean up his act, these words sound hollow as his regime had shown remarkable insensitivity to not only to ethnic reconciliation but other issues of governance as well. These relate to corruption, lawlessness, rule of law and lack of accountability. However, if re-elected the politically-savvy President is in a better position to act than the General who has no party base. Fonseka as president is likely to be affected by the pulls and pressures of the United National Front (UNF) and the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), who are in an inconvenient relationship with a negative objective. At the same time, if Rajapaksa is elected solely on Sinhala backing, he may have to tone down his “resolve” to solve the Tamil issue equitably.
The defection of Batticaloa Mayor Sivageetha Prabhakaran to the Fonseka camp also probably sent a minor shock to Rajapaksa camp. She is a former secretary of the Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP) who had joined the ranks of the UPFA to become the mayor. Sivageetha is believed to enjoy the support of both the TMVP and the followers of Karuna Amman, currently a minister in the UPFA government and founder of TMVP. Is Sivageetha’s defection a forerunner of TMVP changing its mind on supporting the President? This is a question that would worry the Rajapaksa camp. The TMVP has the muscle to swing Tamil votes in the Eastern Province. And loss of TMVP support would affect the winning chances of Rajapaksa.
General Fonseka has increased his visibility and articulation of his views both in print and electronic media. A growing belief is that the Americans would like to see Fonseka elected to progress Sri Lanka’s human rights and war crimes cases. This belief finds favour with Rajapaksa’s supporters who see a sinister international conspiracy in all this to malign Sri Lanka and tarnish its war record. The ‘conspiracy’ theory gained ground as a response to criticism of Sri Lanka’s human rights record by Germany, Canada, Britain and the U.S. that had gathered mass during the war. Presumably stung by the criticism, the President got cosy with the anti-American league of Iran, Venezuela, and Myanmar. So it is not surprising the escapist mode of ‘conspiracies’ haunt the minds of President’s supporters.
But now election compulsions appear to be having their effect, despite 'conspiracies'; Tissanayagam the Tamil journalist sentenced to 20-years imprisonment under draconian Prevention of Terrorism Act for his anti-state writing was released on bail pending his appeal. The court had denied this privilege all along.
To add to the President's cup of woes, the UN special rapporteur on extrajudicial killings Philip Alston has also timed his call for carrying out “an impartial investigation into war crimes” in Sri Lanka on the eve of the election. His call came after getting the Channel 4 video showing summary killing of prisoners by soldiers in January 2009 authenticated by three experts. The culpability of Fonseka, the army commander during the war, in these acts is as much as the President, who is the commander in chief of all forces. However, Fonseka vocal criticism of these actions appears to have been accepted as contrition by those demanding action.
It also curious to see many Tamil expatriates, some with strong pro-LTTE history, supporting the General indirectly. While their convoluted reasoning is not clear, their financial support to the Fonseka camp could further grease the axles of anti-Rajapaksa juggernaut to move a little more smoothly.
What about the 'Indian influence' that is usually bandied about in Sri Lanka elections? If it is there it is not visible; Sri Lanka appears to have become truly international with American and Chinese influences whizzing past the lumbering Indian elephant.
In this developing political scene, the reported move of anti-Rajapaksa political parties including the UNP and JVP deciding to contest the forthcoming parliamentary election as a new political front - the United Opposition Alliance - is interesting if not significant. According to the media, this front would reportedly contest with the ‘Swan’ symbol used by Fonseka. While that could happen if Fonseka won, what happens if he lost the election? Usually opportunistic alliances lacking ideological convergence never hold up in defeat. They crumble. So it is probably too early to speculate about a united opposition alliance for the parliamentary poll.
Having said all this, who will win the presidential poll? It is difficult to speculate in South Asian “democratic elections.” Usually money power, political arm twisting and horse-trading override emotions in voting. There are enough emotions rooting for both candidates, so the one who turns the head rather than the heart is likely to win.
Courtesy: http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cnotes6%5Cnote563.html
General Fonseka increased his chances of garnering more Tamil votes than the President after the Tamil National Alliance (TNA), announced its decision to support him. The TNA arrived at the decision after talking Fonseka though it had not “signed any agreement, we have come to an agreement,” as its spokesman clarified. According to the media, the TNA announcement came after Fonseka handed over a document pledging to address TNA concerns. These include on lifting the four-year old state of emergency, release of all the persons held in detention without any evidence and grant general amnesty to former LTTE supporters and help their rehabilitation.
The issues are close to the heart of Tamils and no Tamil party can really question these concerns. While it has given the TNA a face saving method of supporting the General, whose war record did not carry the new found convictions. But the moot point is how many Tamil votes would it swung in favour of Fonseka based on TNA recommendations. The TNA is a divided house with an estimated 60% of leaders rooting for the General. There is also the prickly but 'minor' issue of Sivajilingam's candidacy. It is an ironic turn that the TNA, accused of suspect loyalties, is now in a position to become the national king maker; but can it do it? That is a $ 64 question even the TNA would be unable to answer.
President Rajapaksa has limitations in making free wheeling pledges to Tamils as he would not like to antagonise Southern Sinhala vote banks. They had stood by him in the crucial run up in the last presidential poll; he could jeopardize their support if he is seen leaning too much in favour of Tamils, who were till recently supporting the LTTE.
However, Rajapaksa dogged in his beliefs took his campaign to the Tamil heartland in Jaffna. His visit to Jaffna came a week after Fonseka’s trip. The President was seen doing all the right things there, starting with worship at Nallur Kandaswamy kovil. Rajapaksa promised all the things he failed to do in six moths of peace after the war: speed up reconstruction and resettlement of 300,000 Tamils who fled from the battle zone only to be incarcerated in internment camps till end 2009. Later, in Colombo while releasing the 14-point election manifesto of the ruling United Peoples Freedom Alliance (UPFA), the President said he would devote the entire second term to address all the key issues.
But to all those who expected the President to clean up his act, these words sound hollow as his regime had shown remarkable insensitivity to not only to ethnic reconciliation but other issues of governance as well. These relate to corruption, lawlessness, rule of law and lack of accountability. However, if re-elected the politically-savvy President is in a better position to act than the General who has no party base. Fonseka as president is likely to be affected by the pulls and pressures of the United National Front (UNF) and the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), who are in an inconvenient relationship with a negative objective. At the same time, if Rajapaksa is elected solely on Sinhala backing, he may have to tone down his “resolve” to solve the Tamil issue equitably.
The defection of Batticaloa Mayor Sivageetha Prabhakaran to the Fonseka camp also probably sent a minor shock to Rajapaksa camp. She is a former secretary of the Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP) who had joined the ranks of the UPFA to become the mayor. Sivageetha is believed to enjoy the support of both the TMVP and the followers of Karuna Amman, currently a minister in the UPFA government and founder of TMVP. Is Sivageetha’s defection a forerunner of TMVP changing its mind on supporting the President? This is a question that would worry the Rajapaksa camp. The TMVP has the muscle to swing Tamil votes in the Eastern Province. And loss of TMVP support would affect the winning chances of Rajapaksa.
General Fonseka has increased his visibility and articulation of his views both in print and electronic media. A growing belief is that the Americans would like to see Fonseka elected to progress Sri Lanka’s human rights and war crimes cases. This belief finds favour with Rajapaksa’s supporters who see a sinister international conspiracy in all this to malign Sri Lanka and tarnish its war record. The ‘conspiracy’ theory gained ground as a response to criticism of Sri Lanka’s human rights record by Germany, Canada, Britain and the U.S. that had gathered mass during the war. Presumably stung by the criticism, the President got cosy with the anti-American league of Iran, Venezuela, and Myanmar. So it is not surprising the escapist mode of ‘conspiracies’ haunt the minds of President’s supporters.
But now election compulsions appear to be having their effect, despite 'conspiracies'; Tissanayagam the Tamil journalist sentenced to 20-years imprisonment under draconian Prevention of Terrorism Act for his anti-state writing was released on bail pending his appeal. The court had denied this privilege all along.
To add to the President's cup of woes, the UN special rapporteur on extrajudicial killings Philip Alston has also timed his call for carrying out “an impartial investigation into war crimes” in Sri Lanka on the eve of the election. His call came after getting the Channel 4 video showing summary killing of prisoners by soldiers in January 2009 authenticated by three experts. The culpability of Fonseka, the army commander during the war, in these acts is as much as the President, who is the commander in chief of all forces. However, Fonseka vocal criticism of these actions appears to have been accepted as contrition by those demanding action.
It also curious to see many Tamil expatriates, some with strong pro-LTTE history, supporting the General indirectly. While their convoluted reasoning is not clear, their financial support to the Fonseka camp could further grease the axles of anti-Rajapaksa juggernaut to move a little more smoothly.
What about the 'Indian influence' that is usually bandied about in Sri Lanka elections? If it is there it is not visible; Sri Lanka appears to have become truly international with American and Chinese influences whizzing past the lumbering Indian elephant.
In this developing political scene, the reported move of anti-Rajapaksa political parties including the UNP and JVP deciding to contest the forthcoming parliamentary election as a new political front - the United Opposition Alliance - is interesting if not significant. According to the media, this front would reportedly contest with the ‘Swan’ symbol used by Fonseka. While that could happen if Fonseka won, what happens if he lost the election? Usually opportunistic alliances lacking ideological convergence never hold up in defeat. They crumble. So it is probably too early to speculate about a united opposition alliance for the parliamentary poll.
Having said all this, who will win the presidential poll? It is difficult to speculate in South Asian “democratic elections.” Usually money power, political arm twisting and horse-trading override emotions in voting. There are enough emotions rooting for both candidates, so the one who turns the head rather than the heart is likely to win.
Courtesy: http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cnotes6%5Cnote563.html
Saturday, January 9, 2010
Indian Intervention in Afghanistan: A Reality Check
Recently the question of India stepping into the American shoes in Afghanistan when the U.S. and allies withdraw their troops is being debated by many strategic analysts. In particular Nitin Pai and Rohit Pradhan writing in the Pragati January 2010 issue have made a strong case for Indian military intervention in Afghanistan; Dr. Subhash Kapila writing in www.southasiaanalysis.org has focused on the need for India to evolve contingency plans for what he calls “the day after” when Americans pull out.
My take on this issue is a loud no to sending troops although one can understand the strategic imperatives of such a decision. After a pragmatic look at our current capabilities, Indo-Afghan relations, and likely strategic developments in the region, my findings are as follows:
a. Our armed forces are hardly in a position to implement the recently revised 'cold start' military doctrine which envisages the possibility of a two front war with China and Pakistan. It also includes pre-emptive neutralisation of terrorist bases across the border without holding ground to prevent it from escalating into a nuclear confrontation with Pakistan. These are tall requirements and our force levels are just adequate to meet our current needs. They are not enough to fully implement the cold start concept on two fronts.
b. Our armed forces have huge deficiencies in basic equipment i.e. artillery guns, tanks etc. Even the small arms are obsolete. Such large scale deficiencies could affect the fighting efficiency. Added to this we have 25% shortage in officer strength in the army. These are cumulative effects of years of our bureaucratic military procurement methods and lack of accountability of defence research. These have managed to keep our armed forces with the bare minimum capability to fight a 20th century war, let alone the 21st century one. Even with immediate remedial measures this situation is unlikely to improve before 2013.
c. For meaningful military intervention in Afghanistan we have to plan forcontaining a belligerent Pakistan while fighting Pak-supported Taliban. Even if Pakistan is contained, for a COIN operation against Taliban in Afghanistan we would require at least 100,000 additional troops. That means raising a field army of at least five divisions.
d. It will be a logistic nightmare to support five divisions in Afghanistan as both air lift and shipping would require strategic support of Iran and CIS countries and probably Russia. It would be an enormously costly affair.
e. To weaken our effort Pakistan has the option to heat up proxy war in J and K front or trigger a shooting war on our western front. So whether we like it or not it would be prudent for India to be militarily prepared to face Pakistan as a proxy in Afghanistan and J &K and for a direct confrontation on our western front, if we embark on war in Afghanistan.
f. Given our nebulous internal security situation, it would be strategically prudent for Pakistan to aggravate it through sponsored terrorism. This could add to our internal woes and distract our attention.
Apart from the security aspects discussed above, there are other considerations. Our political parties are well known to play the minority card at the drop of a hat; so how will New Delhi politically sell the idea of sending an expeditionary force to Afghanistan? And Marxist parties would dub any move to send troops to Afghanistan as reactionary response to satisfy the Americans. New Delhi's political style in contentious situations is to strike a compromise. If our experience in Sri Lanka, the only overseas operation of Indian forces,is any guide the coalition in power would try to soften the impact by delaying decision making, and then evolve compromises on force levels and avoid providing clear cut strategic goals to the expeditionary force. This would affect the effectiveness of our forces in prosecuting the war in Afghanistan.
Indo-Afghan relations are age old and if we have to make a strategic move it should be at a time of our choosing based on our specific requirement and not because the U.S. quits or brings pressure on India to face the flak there. Historic milestones of Indo-Afghan relations are as follows:
a. India had always had strong relations with successive governments in Afghanistan except for the short period when Taliban was controlling the nation. Thanks to Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan's leadership, during freedom struggle Congress had the support of Pashtuns who populate both sides of Pak-Af border. In fact Pashtuns led by Khan Sahib had boycotted the referendum on partition. So Pakistan got NWFP by default. However, subsequently when we became independent we failed to maintain the rapport with Pashtuns alive perhaps because it was no more politically relevant.
b. American Cold War response to Soviet occupation provided enough incentives for Pakistan to expand its strategic hold in Afghanistan. Pakistan used Pashtuns and other frontier people who were influenced by Wahabi obscurantism to strengthen Afghan insurgents fighting the Soviets forces supporting the pro-Communist regime in Kabul. It is noteworthy that the Afghan regime in this period had enjoyed India's full support; so in a way Pakistan was indirectly whittling down Indian influence in what it considered as its strategic backyard. When Soviets vacated Pakistan helped the Taliban to occupy this strategic space in the emerging power struggle in Afghanistan after the collapse of the pro-Communist regime there.
c. Indian supported the Northern Alliance (predominantly Uzbek and Tajik militias) which fought the Taliban (composed of mostly of Pakistanis and Pashtuns).But India did not provide any troops though it probably provided arms.
Given this historic backdrop, India’s present non-military involvement in Afghanistan is only a continuation of its policy to keep Afghanistan as a strategic ally. India has constructed some of the strategic border links and rebuilt schools and hospitals in Kabul. Our BRTF men are undertaking the road construction with the limited protection provided by Indian paramilitary. India probably have close intelligence links and liaison with Karzai regime. Although Indian presence is affected by the US sponsored COIN operations it is not part of it. Of course, as India is providing strategic support to Afghanistan in improving vital infrastructure, the U.S and NATO forces are also benefited.
When the US and its allies withdraw and leave Afghanistan to fend for itself Taliban is likely to politically try to gain power. A compromise solution where Taliban share power with Afghan regime is within the realms of possibility. If its cosmetics are right, it could have international support.
But even if there is a compromise arrangement, it is likely to be unstable as there are strong ideological and tribal differences between Taliban and others. So any move by Taliban to militarily usurp power is a strong possibility; it will have the support of Pakistan military and the ISI, though the Pakistan government may play down its direct involvement.
If such hostilities breakout it would be natural for Afghanistan to look for international support. In such a contingency Afghanistan would probably enjoy tacit cooperation and support of Iran (which has its own ideological score to settle with Taliban) and material assistance from the U.S. The Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov, has already given notice of have Russian intentions: “we cannot stand aloof and impartial on what’s going on in the friendly neighbouring countries too.” So Russia could also chip in. But none of them would provide troops.
Of course, there is the China factor. Chinese are making huge investments in Afghanistan and they would probably like a peaceful Afghanistan to consolidate their position. Steve Hynd in his article “China eyes its Afghanistan moves” in Pragati has quotes the deputy general of the China Council for National Policy Studies, Li Qinggong’s view that China would help facilitate “deployment of international peace keeping missions in its land and accelerating its reconstruction process” when the U.S. withdraw military forces. Does this mean Chinese troops could become a part of an international peace keeping force?
If an international force is not constituted, China’s options become limited. China is a strategic ally of Pakistan. So obviously Pakistan could influence the Chinese response. If the Pakistan supported Taliban and India supported Afghan government are in conflict Chinese would be comfortable if Pak-Taliban alliance wins. So China is a factor to contend with in the region, although we may try to wish it away.
India is the regional power that could provide sizable military assistance including troops. While it could easily provide material, political and diplomatic support and probably military equipment to beef up Afghan army to fight Taliban, intervention with Indian troops would not be such an easy task for reasons already discussed.
Beyond providing material assistance and military resources, it is extremely doubtful whether New Delhi would send troops to Afghanistan. If India decides to do so it has to get its act ready in double time. Our "democratic decision making style" is usually to take a plunge and then work out a way to get out of the maze. Such a strategy could be suicidal in Afghanistan if India intervenes without adequate political, military and diplomatic homework.
The moral of the story is simple: anyone getting into the Afghanistan morass will be sucked in as Pakistan, Soviet Union, and the U.S. had experienced. At present India is neither politically nor militarily ready to take the plunge. In spite of it, if India plans to do so it should go with its eyes wide open to bear tremendous human and material cost over at least five years of campaigning. Can we afford this luxury? Any takers?
Courtesy:Chennai Centre for China Studies. URL http://www.c3sindia.org/india/1138
My take on this issue is a loud no to sending troops although one can understand the strategic imperatives of such a decision. After a pragmatic look at our current capabilities, Indo-Afghan relations, and likely strategic developments in the region, my findings are as follows:
a. Our armed forces are hardly in a position to implement the recently revised 'cold start' military doctrine which envisages the possibility of a two front war with China and Pakistan. It also includes pre-emptive neutralisation of terrorist bases across the border without holding ground to prevent it from escalating into a nuclear confrontation with Pakistan. These are tall requirements and our force levels are just adequate to meet our current needs. They are not enough to fully implement the cold start concept on two fronts.
b. Our armed forces have huge deficiencies in basic equipment i.e. artillery guns, tanks etc. Even the small arms are obsolete. Such large scale deficiencies could affect the fighting efficiency. Added to this we have 25% shortage in officer strength in the army. These are cumulative effects of years of our bureaucratic military procurement methods and lack of accountability of defence research. These have managed to keep our armed forces with the bare minimum capability to fight a 20th century war, let alone the 21st century one. Even with immediate remedial measures this situation is unlikely to improve before 2013.
c. For meaningful military intervention in Afghanistan we have to plan forcontaining a belligerent Pakistan while fighting Pak-supported Taliban. Even if Pakistan is contained, for a COIN operation against Taliban in Afghanistan we would require at least 100,000 additional troops. That means raising a field army of at least five divisions.
d. It will be a logistic nightmare to support five divisions in Afghanistan as both air lift and shipping would require strategic support of Iran and CIS countries and probably Russia. It would be an enormously costly affair.
e. To weaken our effort Pakistan has the option to heat up proxy war in J and K front or trigger a shooting war on our western front. So whether we like it or not it would be prudent for India to be militarily prepared to face Pakistan as a proxy in Afghanistan and J &K and for a direct confrontation on our western front, if we embark on war in Afghanistan.
f. Given our nebulous internal security situation, it would be strategically prudent for Pakistan to aggravate it through sponsored terrorism. This could add to our internal woes and distract our attention.
Apart from the security aspects discussed above, there are other considerations. Our political parties are well known to play the minority card at the drop of a hat; so how will New Delhi politically sell the idea of sending an expeditionary force to Afghanistan? And Marxist parties would dub any move to send troops to Afghanistan as reactionary response to satisfy the Americans. New Delhi's political style in contentious situations is to strike a compromise. If our experience in Sri Lanka, the only overseas operation of Indian forces,is any guide the coalition in power would try to soften the impact by delaying decision making, and then evolve compromises on force levels and avoid providing clear cut strategic goals to the expeditionary force. This would affect the effectiveness of our forces in prosecuting the war in Afghanistan.
Indo-Afghan relations are age old and if we have to make a strategic move it should be at a time of our choosing based on our specific requirement and not because the U.S. quits or brings pressure on India to face the flak there. Historic milestones of Indo-Afghan relations are as follows:
a. India had always had strong relations with successive governments in Afghanistan except for the short period when Taliban was controlling the nation. Thanks to Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan's leadership, during freedom struggle Congress had the support of Pashtuns who populate both sides of Pak-Af border. In fact Pashtuns led by Khan Sahib had boycotted the referendum on partition. So Pakistan got NWFP by default. However, subsequently when we became independent we failed to maintain the rapport with Pashtuns alive perhaps because it was no more politically relevant.
b. American Cold War response to Soviet occupation provided enough incentives for Pakistan to expand its strategic hold in Afghanistan. Pakistan used Pashtuns and other frontier people who were influenced by Wahabi obscurantism to strengthen Afghan insurgents fighting the Soviets forces supporting the pro-Communist regime in Kabul. It is noteworthy that the Afghan regime in this period had enjoyed India's full support; so in a way Pakistan was indirectly whittling down Indian influence in what it considered as its strategic backyard. When Soviets vacated Pakistan helped the Taliban to occupy this strategic space in the emerging power struggle in Afghanistan after the collapse of the pro-Communist regime there.
c. Indian supported the Northern Alliance (predominantly Uzbek and Tajik militias) which fought the Taliban (composed of mostly of Pakistanis and Pashtuns).But India did not provide any troops though it probably provided arms.
Given this historic backdrop, India’s present non-military involvement in Afghanistan is only a continuation of its policy to keep Afghanistan as a strategic ally. India has constructed some of the strategic border links and rebuilt schools and hospitals in Kabul. Our BRTF men are undertaking the road construction with the limited protection provided by Indian paramilitary. India probably have close intelligence links and liaison with Karzai regime. Although Indian presence is affected by the US sponsored COIN operations it is not part of it. Of course, as India is providing strategic support to Afghanistan in improving vital infrastructure, the U.S and NATO forces are also benefited.
When the US and its allies withdraw and leave Afghanistan to fend for itself Taliban is likely to politically try to gain power. A compromise solution where Taliban share power with Afghan regime is within the realms of possibility. If its cosmetics are right, it could have international support.
But even if there is a compromise arrangement, it is likely to be unstable as there are strong ideological and tribal differences between Taliban and others. So any move by Taliban to militarily usurp power is a strong possibility; it will have the support of Pakistan military and the ISI, though the Pakistan government may play down its direct involvement.
If such hostilities breakout it would be natural for Afghanistan to look for international support. In such a contingency Afghanistan would probably enjoy tacit cooperation and support of Iran (which has its own ideological score to settle with Taliban) and material assistance from the U.S. The Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov, has already given notice of have Russian intentions: “we cannot stand aloof and impartial on what’s going on in the friendly neighbouring countries too.” So Russia could also chip in. But none of them would provide troops.
Of course, there is the China factor. Chinese are making huge investments in Afghanistan and they would probably like a peaceful Afghanistan to consolidate their position. Steve Hynd in his article “China eyes its Afghanistan moves” in Pragati has quotes the deputy general of the China Council for National Policy Studies, Li Qinggong’s view that China would help facilitate “deployment of international peace keeping missions in its land and accelerating its reconstruction process” when the U.S. withdraw military forces. Does this mean Chinese troops could become a part of an international peace keeping force?
If an international force is not constituted, China’s options become limited. China is a strategic ally of Pakistan. So obviously Pakistan could influence the Chinese response. If the Pakistan supported Taliban and India supported Afghan government are in conflict Chinese would be comfortable if Pak-Taliban alliance wins. So China is a factor to contend with in the region, although we may try to wish it away.
India is the regional power that could provide sizable military assistance including troops. While it could easily provide material, political and diplomatic support and probably military equipment to beef up Afghan army to fight Taliban, intervention with Indian troops would not be such an easy task for reasons already discussed.
Beyond providing material assistance and military resources, it is extremely doubtful whether New Delhi would send troops to Afghanistan. If India decides to do so it has to get its act ready in double time. Our "democratic decision making style" is usually to take a plunge and then work out a way to get out of the maze. Such a strategy could be suicidal in Afghanistan if India intervenes without adequate political, military and diplomatic homework.
The moral of the story is simple: anyone getting into the Afghanistan morass will be sucked in as Pakistan, Soviet Union, and the U.S. had experienced. At present India is neither politically nor militarily ready to take the plunge. In spite of it, if India plans to do so it should go with its eyes wide open to bear tremendous human and material cost over at least five years of campaigning. Can we afford this luxury? Any takers?
Courtesy:Chennai Centre for China Studies. URL http://www.c3sindia.org/india/1138
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