Monday, October 26, 2009

Dynamics of Arming Conflict & Unregulated Arms Trade

By Col R Hariharan

[This article is based on a presentation made by the author at a round table conference organised by the Control Arms Foundation of India in collaboration with United Nations Information Office, New Delhi on "Armaments, Disarmament & Non-Proliferation" on 23 & 24 September 2009 at New Delhi.]

Introduction

Thanks to the three revolutions – knowledge, technology, and communication – during the last three decades new global paradigms are emerging with far reaching effects on the lives of nations and peoples. Positive effects include economic liberalisation, improved global networking of peoples, emergence of information technology as change agent, and increasing global awareness among people. Negative fall outs include changes in the nature, scope and intensity of conflicts, increasing consumerism, erosion of family values and increasing criminalisation of societies.

These changes have also enlarged the classical perception of national security as relating to territorial security and domination. It now includes security issues relating to trade and commerce, energy resources, human development and well being, and the new genre of cyber security. Effects of these changes are as follows:

• Scope of conflicts: The traditional progression of conflicts from local to national to regional to international spheres has been short circuited. As a result even local conflicts can draw international attention and influence. The Eelam war in Sri Lanka is a case in point.
Enlarging conflict domains: More countries than ever before have demonstrated nuclear capability. Similarly increased membership of space club imparting spread of rocket and space technology. Space has become the fourth dimension of conflict apart from land, sea and air. This has resulted in expanding areas of interest and influence of nations.
Increasing intensity of warfare at subunit level: Weapon and armament developments are focused on conquering new areas of communication, firepower, design, portability and mobility to acquire, reach and destroy targets faster. As a result weapons of high destructive capability like thermobaric weapons are available at the infantryman’s level. Remote battlefield reconnaissance capability has given the ability to destroy targets from command posts located well away from the battle zone.
Diffusion of military power: Modern technology has enabled smaller nations to assert their power increasing the areas of potential conflict. North Korea’s nuclear weapons development is a typical example.
Terrorism: Terrorism has become a cost effective assertion of power by weak non state actors to take on powerful states. This was demonstrated by the 9/11 Al Qaeda terrorists strike in the U.S., and the 26/11 Lashkar e-Tayyaba attacks in Mumbai. Terrorists have availed benefits of increase in fire power, mobility and target acquisition capabilities of modern armies to their benefit

Responding to dynamics of change – A Sri Lanka case study


Sri Lanka had been battling the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), a Tamil ethnic separatist insurgent group in a series of Eelam Wars for the last two decades. The LTTE had refined the use of suicide terrorism as a weapon to strengthen its strategic posture. In its three decades existence the Tamil Tigers had grown to a formidable force with a conventional army capable of waging war in land, air and sea. About 80,000 people are estimated to have lost their lives in these conflicts. Of these about 35000 people were LTTE cadres and followers.

Recently Sri Lanka armed forces succeeded in crushing the military might of the LTTE in the fourth episode of the war that lasted for nearly three years.
The Tamil Tigers, who had become the world’s most powerful non state actor, provide an interesting case study on the existing weaknesses in national and international policies in control, trade and trafficking of arms. It also highlights the global linkages between international arms trafficking and other criminal activity money laundering, piracy, human trafficking etc. Its assets overseas are estimated to yield millions of dollars as regular income.

Even a partial list of arms captured from the LTTE after the war gives an idea of the real dimensions of its arms procurement and trafficking operations. It included assorted artillery pieces -76, infantry mortars – 768, multi-barrel rocket launchers -45, SAMs -11, anti-aircraft guns -91, assorted machine guns -291, small arms (automatic) -14,413. It also procured eight light aircraft, modern night vision devices and GPS equipment for its military use.

LTTE strategies for growth and war

Creation of expatriate support network: In the absence of a political settlement of Tamil grievances, after 1983 there was large scale exodus of Tamil refugees from Sri Lanka. The LTTE either took over or created new support networks among nearly 800,000 Tamil expatriates the world over. It used them for providing financial, material and motivational support to help LTTE’s growth and sustain it in war and peace.

Creation of front organisations: It successfully managed to infiltrate and takeover existing expatriate cultural and social organisations and places of worship. It created NGO fronts which performed relief work and collected funds for such work. These funds were regularly siphoned off to progress war. Some of them gained legitimacy by networking with other recognised global bodies.

Lobbying and political support: The LTTE managed to exploit to its advantage the sympathy among expatriate concentrations for the cause of Tamil minority in Sri Lanka. It influenced strong pro-Tamil lobbies within overseas political parties (i.e., UK, Canada, India) to garner international political support and to carryout psywar and propaganda. Although the LTTE in Sri Lanka is in total disarray, these assets continue to exist even now.

Arms procurement and logistic network: LTTE sympathisers in tandem with LTTE cells procured illegal weapons and modern arms technology globally. LTTE procured most of its arms from Asia, Africa, Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean. The list of countries include China, North Korea, Hong Kong, Cambdia, Thailand, Vietnam, Myanmar, Afghanistan, and Pakistan in Asia: Ukraine; Bulgaria in Eastern Europe; Lebanon: Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey in the Mediterranean and Eritrea, Nigeria, South Africa and Zimbabwe in Africa. It also organised a captive shipping network of 12 merchant ships to transport them.

Subversion of peace process: LTTE illegally brought in most of its weapons during the ceasefire period when an international peace process was in force. It exploited the desire of nations to assist Sri Lanka to end the conflict to its advantage. It is clear that weaknesses of international monitoring were fully exploited by the LTTE.

Action areas

To sum up, the LTTE had demonstrated how the existing international protocols can be subverted to its advantage using existing assets in the form of NGOs, criminal elements, and loopholes in systems of transnational administration for controlling sale and transporting of arms by non state agents. It is clear that it is not enough if nations ratify international arms trade treaty. Nations will have to coordinate their concepts, policy making and implementation of all issues relating to arms trade and traffic on a holistic basis.

Insurgent groups are more modern and powerful now than ever before because they use the advantages offered by globalisation that enables speedier communication and provide real time information on modern military thought and technology. To combat them collective action of nations is required in the following areas to make international arms trade treaty effective –

• International cooperation required both inside and outside the UN orbit. Help and support of India, China, Pakistan, the US and the EU enabled Sri Lanka to militarily defeat the LTTE.
• The nexus of criminals-elements of state– arms traders both nationally and internationally has to be broken.
• Synergy required in fighting money laundering and to curb illegal transfers and trafficking in arms, people and drugs.
• Need for sustained campaign for control of proliferation and trade of arms.
• Greater international attention to defuse and disarm potential areas of conflicts.

Sunday, October 25, 2009

A Chief Minister who was an intelligence man

In the context of the ongoing war of words between China and India, it is interesting to note that Dorjee Khandu, the new chief minister of Arunachal Pradesh had served in the Intelligence Corps of the Army for more than seven years. [Although the Intelligence Corps is a small one, I have not come across him during my long years of service.] The news report says that he had received a gold medal for his meritorious intelligence services during the Bangladesh War.


The 54-year old chief minister belongs to the Monpa tribe, who live in Kameng Division of Arunachal Pradesh in which Tawang District is located. Monpas are a pastoral people who follow Tibetan Buddhism. They consider the Dalai Lama as their spiritual leader. In the heat created by China’s loud objections to the proposed visit of the Dalai Lama to the Tawang monastery because they consider it a part of “Southern Tibet” it is good to have a chief minister hailing from the region. This is in marked contrast to the status of Monpa tribesmen who also live in Tibetan region across the Mc Mahon Line in Tawan area.

The chief minister was reported to have taken keen interest in social activity of villagers of Tawang district. Due to his enthusiastic efforts, cultural and co-operative societies were established in Tawang. He also served them as the chairman.His interest in cultural activity is evident from the fact that he led the cultural troupe from Arunachal Pradesh to perform at the New Delhi Asian Games. He was also awarded the silver medal.

Dorjee Khandu was elected unopposed to the first Arunachal Legislative Assembly from Thingbu-Mukto constituency in 1990. Five years later he was re-elected to the Assembly from the same constituency. In 1996, he was made the Minister of State for Cooperation and later went on to become a Cabinet Minister for Animal Husbandry, Veterinary and Dairy Development. During his tenure as Minister for Power in 1998, a number of small and medium sized hydel power projects were sanctioned.

Today Khandu is one of the richest politicians of the state. His declared asset is more than Rs 200 million.

It is good we have a chief minister in one of the frontline states who has military knowledge at a critical time in India-China relations. We wish him luck in his new appointment.

Thursday, October 22, 2009

Sri Lanka: Importance of being Fonseka

General Sarath Fonseka, Sri Lanka’s Chief of Defence, has been recently hitting the headlines for reasons other than military. Sections of Colombo media have been speculating on the possibility of the General contesting the 2010 presidential poll as opposition candidate against President Rajapaksa. The speculation has refused to die down despite denials by the General. It will probably gather further momentum as the election storm brews further in the political horizon.

Even during his service as army commander, the much-decorated General had always been a figure of media controversy. A man who relished hands-on action than sophistry, General Fonseka’s was known for his off-the cuff, and at times inept, “politically incorrect,” remarks. Often, they raised a lot of dust in their wake. Calling the Tamil Nadu politicians “a bunch of jokers” typified his style. As army commander, his “rough and ready” methods focusing only on results and ignoring hierarchy, adopted during the war did not endear him to some of the officers.

During the war he also tread on a lot of toes not only in the armed forces but also in the corridors of power. He had little patience with critics. He did not take kindly to media that questioned his style or methods and even branded them as unpatriotic.

General Fonseka also showed a Sinhala nationalist streak that endeared him to the Sinhala right wing elements. This came out in clear terms in an interview to Canada’s National Post in September 2008. The General said “I strongly believe that this country belongs to the Sinhalese but there are minority communities and we treat them like our people…We being the majority of the country 75%, we will never give in and we have the right to protect this country…We are also a strong nation.” His said other communities “can live in this country with us. But they must not try to, under the pretext of being a minority, demand undue things.” This remark cut at the very basis of President Rajapaksa’s thesis portraying his government as an equitable option for everyone including the Sinhalas and minorities.

There had been a great deal of public adulation of General Fonseka for his significant contribution in leading the armed forces to victory against the LTTE. A first rate professional soldier, he did not change his style even in picking his successor. He recommended Lt Genearl Jagat Jayasuriya as army commander, superseding seven other generals. President Rajapaksa elevated him as chief of defence staff in recognition of his valuable contribution in winning the Eeelam War IV. However, as CDS he had a grandiose vision. Though the LTTE had been routed and the government had regained full control of all the territories held by the Tamil insurgents, the General spoke of adding 100,000 more soldiers to build an army of 300,000 to wage peace.

The rapidly growing public personality of the General probably overawed political leaders, who were increasingly feeling marginalised. This must have set the alarm bells ringing among them as they were hoping to garner full credit for the victory in the Eelam War. They were getting wary of too much credit going to the apolitical General.

In any case, the war was over and the political rat race was on. So the politicians have started questioning the relevance of General Fonseka’s presence as a popular public personality outside the political spectrum. Second rung leaders of the ruling coalition have started making oblique statements sidelining the contribution of the General in the Eelam War.

From his recent statements, one could make out that the developing environment within the government is not to the General's liking. The army expansions the General spoke of have not come through and his tenure is ending by December 2009. The crowning irony was the offer to appoint him the secretary in the ministry of sports! No wonder the General did not accept the offer.

After the ruling UPFA coalition mauled the opposition in the series of post war provincial elections, President Rajapaksa plans to hold the parliamentary and presidential elections in early 2010. He appears to be hopeful of securing the vital two-thirds majority in parliament that would give a lot of freedom of action for him. In the progressively marginalised General Fonseka the two major opposition parties - the United National Party (UNP) and the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) - see a potential opposition candidate who can give a run for the money in the presidential poll.

In the opposition’s political calculus probably only General Fonseka has a chance of redeeming their reputation as he has a nation wide appeal. The JVP has spoken of its readiness to back General Fonseka to contest the presidential poll. Media reports indicate the UNP backroom politicians are working overtime to convince the reluctant general to join the presidential race.

However, the General has to agree to be pitted against Rajapaksa as opposition candidate. It is not going to be an easy decision to make. It is going to challenge his strategic acumen, so effective in battlefields, in the political arena that is an entirely different ball game. And President Rajapaksa being an astute politician, who has managed to divide every political party, is likely to take every action to thwart opposition plans and persuade the General with other options.

Despite the General’s immense popularity, there are some difficulties in projecting him as an alternative to Rajapaksa. General Fonseka is one of the three architects (the two Rajapaksa brothers being the other) who under the leadership of President Mahinda Rajapaksa brought an end to the legend of Prabhakaran and the LTTE. In the saluting parade held on May 28, 2009 the General had acknowledged the President’s leadership contribution in winning the war. He said: “This battle victory was largely dependent on leadership of the officers and soldiers who fought on the battleground. President Mahinda Rajapaksa, the Defence Secretary and all those here and abroad who offered leadership and guidance to this fight deserve our tribute and commendation.” So he will have the difficult task of sidelining the President’s contribution and pass of as a better candidate.

Unlike the President, the General is not politically savvy. He has little experience in the rough and tumble of peace time politics. Political horsetrading and doublespeak may not figure in his skill sets. During the war he had made some harsh comments about the UNP and its leadership under Ranil Wickremesinghe. Will he able to motivate them now to support him wholeheartedly is a moot point.

In this election, the UNP should be able to gain the traditional Tamil votes that were denied to it in the last Presidential election. The ruling coalition has probably alienated a large number of Tamil voters by its rigid attitude in handling the 2.5 lakh Tamils displaced due to the war. Thus conditions are more congenial for UNP to woo Tamil votes.

However, Fonseka is very much associated with the whole post war architecture for handling the Vanni IDPs. So its negative fall outs are sure to affect his electoral fortunes as well. Moreover, the General had shown a cavalier attitude to the human rights issues, high on the Tamil agenda. So most of the Tamils may not support the UNP if Fonseka is projected as its candidate. This could make a difference as demonstrated in the last election when Rajapaksa won by a wafer thin majority through Southern Sinhala votes after Tamils did not turn up to vote.

It seems General Fonseka will continue to haunt the columns of media as well as the minds of many politicians. Can the General’s strategic ability that helped him do so well in war help him decide his political dilemma? That is a question only he can answer. And that is the importance of being General Fonseka.
Courtesy: South Asia Analysis Group URL: http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cnotes6%5Cnote548.html

Saturday, October 17, 2009

Sri Lanka: To Colombo from Chennai and After

The 10-member delegation of Tamil Nadu parliamentarians returned to Chennai after a five-day visit to Sri Lanka to gain a first hand understanding of the post war problem of Tamils (if not the plight), particularly of over 250,000 people displaced from their homes during the war and now living in holding camps.

The Tamil Nadu Chief Minister M Karunanidhi had made clear the delegation was not an official one. Three political parties –– the Dravida Munnetra Kazagham (DMK), the Congress party and the Viduthalai Chiruthaikal Katchi (VCK) – who are part of the ruling Congress-led coalition in Delhi, had sent their representatives.


The DMK and VCK apparently attached greater importance to the delegation than the Congress. DMK representatives included senior leader TR Baalu and Ms Kanimozhi, daughter of Chief Minister and DMK leader M Karunanidhi, and a rising star in the party. The VCK leader and sole member of parliament Thol Thirumavalan represented the party. The importance given to the delegation was evident from the presence of Chief Minister Karunanidhi at the airport to receive it on arrival.

Ostensibly, the purpose of the delegation was to show solidarity with Sri Lankan Tamils in the post war period and speed up the return of IDPs to their villages after nearly six months after the end of the war. But the real purpose was probably more political – to reclaim their image tarnished by their failure to meet the expectations of Sri Lanka Tamils in persuading Delhi to bring about a ceasefire in Sri Lanka, particularly in the later stages of Eelam War IV when the LTTE was under siege.

Of course, the VCK tried to have it both ways – as a vituperatively vocal sympathiser of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) as well as a partner in the DMK led united front in the state. Its opportunism did pay off in the parliamentary poll as VCK won a seat in parliament, unlike other pro-LTTE parties like Vaiko’s MDMK which lost the few seats they had held earlier.

Regardless of the political purpose, the visit of the delegation from Tamil Nadu is to be welcomed as it has opened a window of opportunity for Tamil Nadu parties to make a positive contribution in bringing ethnic amity, while ensuring the Tamils get their just dues. After the Sri Lanka Tamil issue dramatically lost public support in the wake of LTTE’s assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, Tamil Nadu politicians made little effort to either help resolve the Tamil autonomy issue or bring about peace in the war torn island nation.

Similarly, their contribution was equally dismal when the peace process 2002 failed due to the LTTE’s egocentric approach and Sri Lanka’s inability to work out a Sinhala political consensus on the issue. Their apathy during the days of the peace process 2002 no doubt contributed to India’s muted role in Sri Lanka in recent years. When the war progressed, most of them failed to see the realities on the ground, probably expecting the LTTE to hold on, if not defeat Sri Lanka security forces.

However, Chief Minister Karunanidhi was more pragmatic despite his latent sympathy for the Eelam cause. He publicly distanced himself from pro-LTTE elements and Prabhakaran from 2007 onwards and steered the DMK through a middle course on this issue to reassert his strength in the parliamentary poll. This had probably emboldened him now to take the politically risky proposition of sending a Tamil Nadu delegation to Colombo.

Though nobody can expect the delegation’s visit to produce dramatic results, it has turned the much needed national focus on this issue in India. It can also claim to have produced a positive result – a promise from President Rajapaksa to ensure 58,000 IDPs would be allowed to return to their homes within the next fortnight. The Sri Lanka government appears to go along with this as it announced the despatch of 2000 IDPs from the camps to their homes in Jaffna a day after the delegation returned to Chennai. It does not really matter that last month the Sri Lanka government had claimed that by October it would able to reduce the number of IDPs in camps to 100,000 from 250,000.

The Asian Tribune quoted Ms Kanimozhi, MP as saying that President Rajapakse had assured them that his government was working on a solution to the ethnic conflict that would meet "not only the legitimate aspirations of members of all communities in Sri Lanka but also the concerns of our neighbour". In this respect, Chief Minister Karunanidhi’s statement at the airport "the Tamils' decades long struggle for equal rights, flagged by Eelam leader S J V Chelvanayakam, will become a reality" is significant.

Though the report of the delegation spoke of the poor living conditions in the IDP camps and shortages faced by the inmates, it has avoided recriminations, which is a positive development. The governments at Chennai and New Delhi should seriously take up the issues raised in the report and regularly follow their progress with Colombo.
Tamils everywhere would now expect more action than rhetoric from both the Sri Lanka President and the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister. We can only hope the Tamil Nadu move was not a flash in the pan; such efforts should continue lest the real issues behind the ethnic animosity in Sri Lanka are wished away by politicians.
Courtesy: http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cnotes6%5Cnote547.html

Thursday, October 8, 2009

Urban Cowboy or Arm of the Law?

The occurrence, and routine acceptability, of extra-judicial killings stem from both politicization and a colonial legacy

by COL R HARIHARAN

AN Ahmedabad metropolitan magistrate has held that the June 2004 encounter in which alleged terrorists – Ishrat Jahan and three others – were killed was stage-managed by the Gujarat police. Another news story from Chennai hinted at the custodial death of Rajan who was caught by the public and handed over to the police after he carried out a daylight killing. The police claimed his death was due to grievous injuries suffered in the hands of the public. However, the post mortem report contradicted this.

These two seemingly different news stories had a common thread – extrajudicial killings by policemen. “Encounter killing” – a euphemism for unlawful killing by policemen – is not rare in India. Usually, when the news story is put out, not only the police but also the state government draws media flak. At times, the ruling party is also drawn into the controversy. Civil society action keeps pace with the media coverage.

Usually, after the noise dies down, the media jumps to hardy perennials – stories on one of the Bollywood Khans or the latest immature act of a “crorepathi” cricketer. The encounter killing is forgotten till it develops into a more juicy one. And the cycle continues – nothing seemingly changes for the police, politicians, governments or even the victims. The media response is neither uniform nor even-handed. In the Ishrat Jahan case, most of the media has already found the BJP-ruled government and its Chief Minister, Narendra Modi, guilty as there has been one too many encounter killings reported from Gujarat.

But it may not be the same for the Tamil Nadu government, which has its own gory record of encounter killings. In 2005, the Justice Sadashiva Committee had indicted the Special Task Force (STF) of Karnataka and Tamil Nadu for killing 66 tribals in “encounters” when they were hunting out Veerappan. But in the Rajan death, Tamil Nadu is a little better placed because he was not termed a terrorist. Moreover, the state is led by the aging M Karunanidhi who keeps the media humoured, despite a few skeletons rattling in his party’s cupboard. So Rajan’s killing may not set the media on fire.

Although many of the deaths in police shootouts and in custody are genuine, in public belief any death in police custody or transit is a cover-up of an extra-judicial killing. In spite of this, there is public inertia in reacting strongly against police misconduct. There is probably a cynical acceptance of unlawful killings by policemen as an inevitable part of the system. The perception appears to be universal. But police forces in the West have in-built structural mechanisms to check police misconduct and punish the culprits. This is not the case in South Asia.

Police forces in colonial parts of South Asia are a legacy of the British Raj. During the Raj, coercive power of the police was a vital instrument of state policy after the Congress party emerged as a political threat to British rule in the 1930s. The police started equating force with authority and made political defiance a crime. This policy orientation bred lack of accountability for police actions. It reinforced the paramilitary character of colonial police.

AFTER the British quit South Asia, India, Pakistan (including its eastern wing) and Sri Lanka retained the colonial administrative, police and judicial structures without the changes essential to meet the needs of an independent nation. Thus their police forces, by and large, retain the repressive character of the colonial police to this day.

The intelligentsia, despite its muted protests, also appears to tacitly accept encounter killings as a necessary evil for controlling rapidly criminalizing society. This attitude has grown out of the seeming inability of rulers to get criminals convicted. Criminals develop political clout as they grow in notoriety. They can bribe their way through. And they can intimidate witnesses from giving evidence against them. Even when witnesses give evidence, they can be “persuaded” to turn hostile. There is no worthwhile witness protection system and rarely does the judiciary penalize witnesses for retracting. In this environment, it is not too difficult for the accused to be acquitted for want of evidence.

So execution of such criminals in police shootouts, whether fake or real, is often silently approved by the public as a mode of delivering speedy justice. That was how the public accepted the wholesale extra-judicial killing of suspected Naxalites in Calcutta in the 1970s, and the encounter killings of Sikh extremists in Punjab in the 1980s. In the late 1990s, the Bombay Police cleaned up the criminal underworld dogging the city in a series of encounter killings. Delhi Police adopted the same method to curb interstate criminal activity in the capital. And, in Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand, there have been frequent reports of encounter killings of Naxalites.

A new genre of “encounter specialists” – yet another phrase of Indian coinage – has emerged in the police. These urban cowboys flaunt their killings in public. Famous encounter specialists basking in the after-glow of anti-heroes include Inspector Pradeep Sharma with a score of 113 kills. Bollywood movie-makers have cashed in on the morbid public fascination with such “encounters” by producing movies woven around the theme of custodial killings.

POLITICAL parties have an opportunistic attitude to aberrations in policing, conditioned by popular perceptions, depending upon whether they are in power or not. The Congress, on coming to power after Independence, had no alternative people- oriented model for replacing the colonial administrative and judicial structure. So, in spite of the liberal democratic character of the Constitution, beyond pious pronunciation, there has been little value addition in redesigning the overall administrative structure. Not only the Congress, but all parties, including the Communists in West Bengal have continued to use the police force as an instrument of power. As a result, systemic improvements have been few in the administration of law and order, and criminal justice.

Two watershed events affected the working of the police. First was the formation of non-Congress state governments in 1967 when the Congress was in power at the Centre. The widening divergence between the Centre and the State triggered the process of politicization of the police. The Centre used its intelligence apparatus for collecting political intelligence in the states. The Union government started to increase the strength of the Central police forces as its intervention in the state for political or other reasons became frequent. The process of politicization of police at the Centre became a reality when the Emergency was imposed. As KS Subramanian noted, “The Police faced the ‘Nuremberg dilemma’ on whether or not to implement illegal orders by persons in political authority.” By the end of the Emergency, politicization of the police was almost complete and there was no going back.

The policemen in the states serve their tenures based on the whims of politicians; police postings for “lucrative” thanas are routinely sold to the highest bidder. In this environment, encounter killings – for that matter, all lawless activities – appear to have a political link. Can committed policemen escape this no-win situation? Union Home Minister P Chidambaram, addressing the annual conference of Directors-General and Inspectors- General of Police on September 14, asked them why they remain silent when arbitrary postings and transfers are made by the state government. The answer is very simple; the DGPs themselves are knocked around like footballs by political masters. If the Home Minister wants results, he should start with Congress-ruled states to enforce his advice on police reforms.

The starting point is freeing law enforcement and administration of criminal justice caught in the politician-corrupt bureaucracy (including policemen)- criminal nexus. Encounter killings will die a natural death when the rule of law is applied uniformly. That requires a society determined to cleanse itself; and it is not impossible. But where is the leadership to motivate and take the people through this process?
Courtesy: GFiles October 2009 issue

Coming to Terms with China’s Presence in South Asia

[Extracts of this article were included in a presentation by the author at a seminar “China in the 21st Century” organised by the VK Krishna Menon Study Centre for International Relations, Trivandrum on October 6, 2009.]

China’s recent actions in the disputed India-Tibet border area and the aggressive tone of state controlled media on India related issues have caused a lot of public outcry. The trust deficit on China created in India after debacle in the border war in 1962 continues to colour Indian perceptions. On the other hand, sections of Indians tend to show a touching, but naive, optimism in issues relating to China. Both the attitudes fail to take into consideration the colossal changes that have taken place in both the countries and in the global environment during the last three decades.

China is a complex country just as India is; and it defies interpretation in simplistic terms. China with a 30-year head start over India in introducing economic reforms and liberalisation has already emerged as a major global economic power. It has outpaced India not only in economic growth but also in infrastructure, productivity, foreign exchange reserves, and nuclear and space technology to grow into world’s third largest economy with a GDP of Yuan 24.95 trillion in 2007. With $ two trillion in reserves China is becoming the banker to the US, the wealthiest nation in the world.

China’s military modernisation programme is adding military prowess to its growing economic clout. By the end of the next decade, China hopes to emerge as a dominant global military power with its missile and naval forces attaining a world-wide reach.

With its economic and military might, China’s ambition to emerge as a global power has also grown. Its export oriented economy’s ever increasing demand for energy and natural resources have compelled it to look beyond its shores. Thus, China’s interests relate not only its trade and commerce, but strategically strengthen its global presence to assert its power and protect its enlarging interests. Understandably the multifaceted growth of China has been watched with some concern by other nations.

The emergence of China as a major power has increased its profile in the international arena including the UN. The U.S. has become extremely careful in dealing with China. Countries like Japan, India, Korea, Vietnam and Russia, who have unpleasant historical experiences have also become cautious. China’s growing relations with the U.S., EU, Japan and ASEAN region have strategic connotations for India and South Asia.

South Asia has a key role to play in China’s global ambitions as the subcontinent dominates maritime trade routes of Indian Ocean. The region can provide direct access to the warm waters of Indian Ocean, by passing South China Sea and Malacca Strait. The emergence of India as a powerful South Asian regional power bordering China’s troubled regions of Xingjiang and Tibet is of specific concern to China. India has provided refuge to Dalai Lama and a large number of Tibetans who fled the country following Chinese occupation of Tibet. It has a long simmering unresolved border dispute with India. Both the issues are potentially explosive. Added to this is the growing India-US strategic convergence with its disturbing connotations for China. The growth of terrorism in the Af-Pak region has increased China’s security concerns as Jihadi terrorism has links with Uighur separatism.

On the other hand growing economies of South Asia, particularly India, offers a huge market. It is a reservoir of natural resources with abundant entrepreneurial talent. This has kindled global interest in the region and it is fast becoming the scene for power play. These developments have made it an attractive destination for China’s export hungry manufacturers.

The global economic downturn triggered by the U.S. has affected China’s economy. China knows it cannot afford to trigger off a war now as it had been a major loser in the global economic downturn due to its export-oriented economy. Moreover, its strong suit is its economic fundamentals buttressed by its continued, but slightly reduced, growth. Globally China appears to have embarked upon a policy of overcoming the impact of economic downslide in the near term, while increasing its economic clout in the long term. At the same time, it has to keep the powder dry to protect its strategic interests.

This is evident from Lt Gen Ma Xiaotian, Deputy Chief of General Staff of the Peoples Liberation Army, statement at the Shangri-La Dialogue in May 2009. He summed up China’s current priorities: “All of the countries in this region share a policy orientation, namely striving for dialogue and cooperation and joining hands to create prosperity and stability. What counts most is confidence, solidarity and cooperation in the face of this rare financial crisis and the unprecedented global challenge.”

At the same time, he also sounded a note of caution to those who might exploit the perils of economic downslide to their own advantage. “Economic depressions throughout history have taught the lesson that the crisis will be only worsened by shifting one’s trouble onto others and launching mutual competition, and some dangerous consequences may even be incurred by transferring domestic troubles on to other countries and confronting each other,” he added.

While these sentiments are logical and wholly admirable, the moot point is how China translates them into action in South Asia. In South Asia, during the last two decades China had adopted a mix of economic, commercial and security strategies in building its relations with India’s neighbours. These were apparently conditioned by China’s national security priorities directly related to India. China’s strategic goals in Pakistan, Myanmar, Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka in India’s neighbourhood appear to-

• Cultivate the regime in power regardless of the nature of regime.
• Broaden its economic and security relations This would act as a check on
India’s increasing strategic influence and soft power in South Asia.
• Help build land and coastal infrastructure in these countries with a view
to help China’s land and sea access. These would meet China’s strategic
needs in times of war and peace. Aid other infrastructure projects that make
a visible impact.
• Build military relationships with sale of arms and military equipment at
subsidised prices. Enrich relationship between PLA and the armed forces of
the country.
• Strengthen bonding with China by extending political support to countries
targeted in the UN and other international forums. Cultivate political
leadership and parties to create a favourable constituency for China.

China’s strategy in India’s neighbourhood over the years has gained it footholds that would come in handy to sustain its influence and in times of any future confrontation with India or its allies. In the long term it could act as change agent in India's relationship with its neighbours.

Its strategic alliances with India’s neighbours hold the potential to destabilise India. Its relations with Pakistan have been a mutually beneficial one. Its nuclear cooperation had played a key role in augmenting Pakistan’s nuclear capability. Similarly Pakistan’s enhanced missile capability owes much to China. Chinese fighter aircraft and naval ships add to Pakistan’s military muscle. Its support to the ruling military junta over the years has created a client regime in Myanmar. Myanmar had been lukewarm to the overtures of India in building a productive strategic alliance. It is trying to build a win-win relationship with Sri Lanka and probably would like to curtail Indian influence there.

China’s assistance in the development of ports and allied infrastructure at Gwadar (in Pakistan) and Hambantota (in Sri Lanka) is well known; these would enhance the reach of Chinese navy in the Indian Ocean. China’s capability to undermine India-Nepal relations has increased with the ascendancy of Maoists as a strong political factor in the country. It had been stoking the latent anti-Indian sentiments in Bangladesh to garner advantage.

In the past, China had been an important source of arms to Indian insurgent groups in the northeast. It still retains the ability to enhance their military capabilities at a time of its choosing. Infrequently, China had been sending strident messages that reiterate its claim over the whole of Arunachal Pradesh (named as South Tibet) by protesting against the visit of even Indian Prime Minister to the Buddhist monastery town of Tawang. Its state controlled media periodically spout anti-Indian sentiments.

However, Indian and South Asian markets are increasingly relevant particularly during global economic stagnation and China would also like to take advantage of India’s growth to build strong trading relations. At the same time, China would like to keep in check India’s strategic presence from spilling over beyond South Asia. As a corollary, we can expect increased assertion of China’s strategic capabilities and influence in India’s neighbourhood in the coming years regardless of the state of India-China relations.

India’s response

Talks on resolving the border dispute that started after Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to Beijing in 1988, has made no tangible progress despite 13 rounds of talks. After the advent of globalisation, the national focus of both countries has shifted to trade and economic development. The visits of Prime Minister Wen Jiabao in 2005 to Delhi and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to Beijing in January 2008 have tried to create a relationship based on mutual respect and avoiding confrontation, rather than resolving contentious issues.

However, the lofty sentiments of “a shared vision for the 21st century” spelled out in the joint declaration of Prime Ministers Manmohan Singh and Wen Jiabao on Jan 14, 2008 are yet to be visibly fleshed out. Although the declaration said the two sides would "continue to build their Strategic and Cooperative Partnership in a positive way,” the confidence levels between the two countries do not appear to have increased.

As long as China stokes anti-Indian forces in India’s neighbourhood and the contentious issues of disputed borders and the presence the Dalai Lama and Tibetan refugees in India remain unresolved, it would be futile to expect any breakthrough in achieving a win-win relationship between India and China.

China appears to be in no hurry to resolve the border issue. The border talks have been through 13 rounds and the Chinese have not handed over their surveyed alignment of border although India had done so last year .Even China's reiteration of claims over Tawang and Arunachal Pradesh is probably connected with Tibetan question. China is determined not to recognise a successor to the present Dalai Lama originating from outside Tibet. If an incarnation to the present Dalai Lama is identified in Tawang (just as the Sixth Dalai Lama was found) it would place China in a tricky situation. So probably China is preparing ground to escalate the issue now itself by loudly laying claim to Tawang.

As negotiation strategies of border dispute appear to have run out of steam, political will on the part of both countries would be required to resolve the dispute. It may not come through in the near future as both seem to relish status quo in their relations. This suits China as it would like to tide over the economic priorities and avoid any military adventure at present. So we may expect nothing beyond a few trespasses along the Mc Mahon Line particularly in contentious spots.
However, it would be strategic suicide for India not to be prepared for the worst contingency because China is more in readiness at present to wage war than we are.

By developing the road, rail and air infrastructure in Tibet, China is in a position to build up offensive forces that could upset status quo. And every day the Chinese military machine is getting more powerful. On the other hand India had not developed infrastructure to access to its own borders in the northeast, making us strategically more vulnerable. This has allso limited our ability to fight only defensive battles. And that could involve sacrificing large chunks of territory.

Given this setting, India would seem to be the overall loser as it has already lost sizeable territory to the Chinese. Its China policy is seen as largely defensive and unsure, rather than confident and cleverly crafted. This is because unlike China, strategically India has not readied itself to militarily challenge the Chinese if required, from a position of strength. So probably it has little choice but to move on the rut of status quo.

More importantly India's China policy has not given confidence to its people. This is because our policy making suffers from lack of transparency and absence of timely dissemination of information to the public. These have compounded in projecting an India that is apologetic in dealing with China, rather than a proactively spelling out its views in clear terms where it is required.

India’s China policy is only a small part of the overall systemic weakness of the nation’s strategic policy making. National foreign and security policies do not appear to be dovetailed, probably because there is no articulated national vision to serve as a beacon. This has pushed overall national interest to the back rows, while “band aid” decision making has taken its place.

Domestic partisan political considerations have warped existing systems. Outdated bureaucratic approach to resolve critical issues have stymied dynamic action. The tardy and delayed defence procurement strategies are very good examples of this. Lack of transparency and absence of public disclosure have eroded the need for responsible decision making and execution. So accountability is largely becoming out of fashion.

As China appears to be cashing on the weaknesses of our system, it will require leadership dynamism to deal with China on equal terms. There is no other choice.
Courtesy: www.southasiaanalysis.org

Wednesday, October 7, 2009

Sri Lanka Minus GSP+

If the EU goes by the adverse report on Sri Lanka on its conformity with EU norms, the country is unlikely to get the extension of GSP+ tariff concessions for a further period from 2009 to 11. The EU report had condemned Sri Lanka armed forces for “perverting the evidence and silencing witnesses, rather than conducting any real investigations” on human rights issues. Unless there is some political horsetrading the chances of its extension appear bleak. If that happens, it would be a very big blow to Sri Lanka which is in an economic logjam after the war, as its exports particularly apparels, destined for EU markets would be priced out. To avoid this, Sri Lankan government’s foreign and commerce ministers were in a last minute scramble to persuade the EU to extend concessions up to 2011.

The concession under which Sri Lanka (among 16 other countries) enjoys duty free export of 7500 items to EU was extended after the tsunami hit the country in 2005. It had expired early this year; however the EU had given one year grace period for Sri Lanka to meet the basic norms set by EU.

The EU norms require the beneficiary to effectively implement 27 specified international conventions in the fields of human rights, good governance, labour standards, and sustainable development.

The issue had been in media focus for sometime now; as it is not all about export business but also showcasing how Sri Lanka responds to international concerns.
The EU had drawn the attention to Sri Lanka’s poor record on adherence to GSP norms, well before the concession was set to expire. However, Sri Lanka, presumably in the euphoria of waging a winning war, appeared confident of handling the issue politically. But when that failed, Sri Lanka appears to consider the report an affront to its dignity rather than tackling the issues raised in it.

Sri Lanka has shown the same hypersensitivity in handling a number of other issues and accusations raised by all and sundry. The slanging match it entered with the British TV Channel 4 which showed a video of alleged Sri Lankan army execution of Tamil militants in custody was typical. The government condemned it as a part of pro-LTTE smear campaign unwittingly achieving the propaganda the pro-LTTE segments wanted to gain from the show.

Worse than all this was the raising of the sordid Monica Lewinsky episode by Prime Minister Ratnasiri Wickramanayaka while taking the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to task for including Sri Lanka among countries where women were raped during war. It was absolutely unwarranted and in bad taste. Is it going to help Sri Lanka in any way on any issue? No way; it is probably going to make things a little more difficult for Sri Lanka in dealing with the US.

It is clear that the issue of EU's extension of GSP+ has now acquired a symbolic connection to condoning of Sri Lanka’s violation of governance and human rights norms. EU cannot ignore the strong public opinion gathering momentum against Sri Lanka’s overall conduct on human rights and humanitarian issues particularly on the resettlement of 250,000 people held in camps against their will for the past five months or so.

Sri Lanka has no choice but to address all the connected issues. Its knee jerk action to ease international pressure as it builds up is not enough. So when it says the screening of approximately 160,000 persons had been completed and would reduce the number of camp inmates to 100,000 by October it has to demonstrate it. It has to come out with a list of LTTE cadres and camp followers in custody so that there is a record of who is where lest further accusations of executions in custody pile up. These are basic norms of good governance and Sri Lanka is expected to adhere to them. These issues are gathering adverse international momentum and nothing convinces international community as visible results.

The US is in consultation with India on this subject as is evident from the recent meeting of the U.S. Ambassador to India Tim Roemer with Chief Minister M Karunanidhi to discuss the IDP situation. The ambassador’s statement after the meeting that the US had invested “close to USD 80 million in 2008 and 2009 to make sure that the process continued in a quick, expeditious humane and just fashion,” is significant. The Government of India is also coming under increasing pressure to act from Tamil Nadu in this regard and time is running out for Sri Lanka to respond positively.
Courtesy: www.southasiaanalysis.org

Sunday, October 4, 2009

Sri Lanka Perspectives – September 2009

Courtesy: Security Trends Volume3 No 9

Worsening export prospects

The month saw further worsening of Sri Lanka’s overall image due to its continued inability to handle international community's concerns on the twin issues of rehabilitation of internally displaced people (IDP) and human rights abuses. The EU report on Sri Lanka compiled on conformity to stipulations for extension of GSP+ tariff concessions is said to condemn Sri Lanka armed forces for “perverting the evidence and silencing witnesses, rather than conducting any real investigations” on human rights issues. The adverse report could affect the extension of the concessions for the period 2009-11.


Sri Lanka is among 16 countries enjoying duty-free access to EU for about 7200 products since December 2005. The concession extended after the Tsunami struck the country is due for extension for the period 2009-11.The EU had given one year reprieve early this year for Sri Lanka to improve its standards of governance. However to qualify for GSP+ concessions, the beneficiaries must also have effectively implemented 27 specified international conventions in the fields of human rights, core labour standards, sustainable development and good governance. This is where Sri Lanka appears to be failing.

If the concession is not extended it could adversely affect competitiveness of Sri Lanka exports to EU, particularly in respect of apparel industry. Other industries likely to be affected are fisheries, gems and jewellery, and rubber products. At least a million people employed directly and indirect are likely to be affected by adverse EU action.

Sri Lanka is unlikely to relent as it sees the issue as affecting its prestige. The government appears to be reconciled to the loss of the EU concession although only in October 2009 the EU is set to take the final decision.

Internally displaced people

The international pressure on Sri Lanka to release and resettle 250,000 people now held in temporary camps mounted during the month. In a bid to ward off such criticism, Sri Lanka has taken action to speed up mine clearance operations, expand rehabilitation programmes for about 10,000 ex-LTTE cadres whose dossiers have been completed, and allow families having relatives who would take them to move out of the camps. About 107 Hindu priests and their families have also been freed. The screening of approximately 160,000 persons had been completed and 110,000 are being issued identity cards. With these measures, the government has claimed by October it would reduce the number of camp inmates to 100,000. It has also decided to set up special courts to clear the backlog of cases against thousands of LTTE suspects including 20,000 cadres who surrendered at the end of the war.

However, these measures have not satisfied the four co-chairs of the peace process 2002, particularly the EU and the U.S. In Tamil Nadu, the simmering public resentment at the treatment meted out to the IDPs is gathering momentum and Chief Minister M Karunanidhi has strongly taken up the issue of providing relief to the displaced people with New Delhi. The Government of India is also coming under increasing pressure to act in this regard.

The US is in consultation with India on this subject as evident from the recent meeting of the U.S. Ambassador to India Tim Roemer with Chief Minister M Karunanidhi to discuss the IDP situation. The ambassador’s statement after the meeting that the US had invested “close to USD 80 million in 2008 and 2009 to make sure that the process continued in a quick, expeditious humane and just fashion,” is significant.

Human rights issues


Sri Lanka government’s hypersensitivity to international criticism of its human rights record came to a pause when it revoked the visa of .James Elder, spokesman for UNICEF in Sri Lanka. It expelled him for alleged spreading information of exaggerated civilian casualties due to Sri Lankan artillery shelling in the final stages of war. UNICEF promptly denied the allegations. Ban Ki Moon, UN secretary-general strongly regretted the decision of Sri Lanka to expel Elder. Relations between the UN agencies in Sri Lanka and the government have been uneasy relations after their strong criticism of Sri Lanka’s handling of human rights and humanitarian issues during the last few years. The expulsion of Elder is likely to further worsen the relations.

The sentencing of Sri Lanka journalist JS Tissanayagam to 20 years hard labour under the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) on charges of defaming the government and rousing racism has drawn severe international criticism. U.S. President Barack Obama in his World Press Freedom Day address in May, had drawn attention to Tissainayagam as the symbol of oppressed media. Similarly, Sri Lanka came down heavily upon the British TV Channel 4 when it showed a video of alleged Sri Lankan army execution of Tamil militants in custody, and condemned it as a part of pro-LTTE smear campaign.

India’s response

With Sri Lanka's exports ot EU in peril, India would gain importance as an export destination for Sri Lanka products. However, there are two riders: Sri Lankan apparels have to face Indian apparel industry and Indian investments could dry up as duty free export from Sri Lanka to EU was a major attraction. Regardless of this, Indian government appears to be showing solidarity with the Rajapaksa regime as it has increased its assistance over a wide area ranging from vocational training to mine clearing to infrastructure development.

As an immediate measure of relief India is providing 5200 tons shelter material to Sri Lanka for the IDPs Out of this 2600 tons have already been delivered. A delegation of the Indian Council of Agriculture Research (ICAR) has already visited Sri Lanka to advice on restoring the agricultural operations in the north. Indian Railways is likely to help Colombo lay at least two rail lines in the areas earlier controlled by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in the north.

India’s increasing profile in Sri Lanka is likely to draw greater Chinese economic involvement in the country as a counterpoise. Probably the moves of the two nations are encouraging Sri Lanka to follow its own course regardless of adverse Western reaction.

Political developments


Buoyed by its success in the local elections in Vavuniya, the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) is trying to gear itself to play a key role in the national and presidential elections scheduled in early 2010. Its leaders had the first ever political meeting with President Rajapaksa; however, nothing concrete appears to have emerged so far. Despite this, we can expect overtures from the President in the coming months to win TNA support for the ruling coalition. The TNA’s priority would probably be to shed its pro-LTTE image acquired in the earlier years and emerge as guardian of the Tamil cause. The ability of its leaders to do some political tight rope walking in this respect is questionable unless they can forge a common platform.
Security

The security forces have continued their search operations in north and east to recover arms caches and arrested a number of former LTTE cadres and officials.
Copyright: Security Trends www.security-risk.com