By Seema Mustafa and Rahul Bedi
The train from Beijing to Tibet reaches strategically sensitive heights. Packed with local Chinese and a handful of foreigners, it weaves its way through breathtaking unexplored territory, even as hacks like us stare out of the windows for a glimpse of military movement. We are not disappointed. With this railway line and a network of excellent roads extending almost till the Indian border, China has increased its capacity to move troops and materiel to the Line of Actual Control in 25 days as against the earlier six months.
China’s ongoing two-month-long Stride-2009 exercises involving over 50,000 soldiers from four major regional commands demonstrate its capability to mobilise large forces to Tibet using civilian air and rail links as well. China has billed these exercises as the PLA’s extended force projection capability. The PLA’s Rapid Reaction Forces, known locally as Resolving Emergency Mobile Combat Forces, are also capable of a 24-48-hour response to emergencies. Analysts said this implies that Beijing is capable of moving up to four divisions, or over 200,000 troops, swiftly to the Indian border if the need arises either in response to a threat or, in all likelihood, to flaunt power. The Chinese also have nine airfields in the Tibetan Autonomous Region, including four at Lhasa to facilitate the PLA’s rapid mobilisation.
Talk in New Delhi of the “China threat” — which visibly agitates Beijing — has resurfaced once again, with the 13th round of discussions on the border issue between Special Representatives M.K. Narayanan and Dai Bingguo registering little movement forward. A Chinese media offensive questioning Indian policy towards China has further alarmed India’s strategic community, with the military stepping in to suggest that the wisest course would be to focus on “quality” improvement in operational capability, instead of erring, as always, on the side of numbers.
Retired Indian Navy [IN] Chief, Admiral Sureesh Mehta clarified his earlier remarks by telling Covert that he had at no stage suggested that India could not confront China, but had at a lecture pointed out that since “in both conventional and non-conventional military terms Delhi cannot match Beijing force-for-force” Indian strategy should focus on “lean and mean” capacity building. “We can, for instance, have far better ships than the Chinese have and technologically beat them at their own game,” Admiral Mehta added.
There is no sense of this realisation in India’s political establishment that remains in a state of denial over China. From occasional alarmist statements to deliberate efforts to underplay the situation to being downright supine, the Government has failed miserably in developing a strategic line of action in keeping with the fast pace of military development across India’s borders. Former Vice Chief of Army Staff, Lt. Gen. Vijay Oberoi said it was unfortunate that “policymakers cannot take hard decisions, and are responsible for the perception that we are a soft state and so can succumb to pressure”.
COL. R. HARIHARAN from the Chennai Centre of China Studies said that most of India’s neighbours perceive it as a “soft state”. Perception is what makes beliefs and they come from how India conducts itself both internally and externally. “Most of our security related problems — inability to develop a long-term national vision, inability to use time as a resource, unresolved land and maritime border disputes, mending relations with neighbours, effectively handling homegrown insurgencies — in short failure to walk the talk — has contributed to this negative image,” according to Hariharan who played an active role with the Indian Peacekeeping Force in Sri Lanka in the late 1980s.
Three “moments” to exhibit this resolve for hard action that were not seized by the Government in recent years are acknowledged by the military and strategic establishment as, not striking Pakistani assets during Kargil, not launching punitive strikes against Islamabad after the December 2001 Parliament terror attack and again after last year’s Mumbai terror attacks.
Former Deputy National Security Advisor Satish Chandra said that just after the Kargil occupation became known there was a strong view in the NDA Government that the best option to avoid multiple casualties in trying to re-occupy the heights would be to cross the border and seize territory that could then be traded for a Pakistani pullout from the occupied heights. The then Army Chief, General Ved Prakash Malik reportedly opposed this, maintaining that the Army was neither equipped nor ready for what could erupt into a full-fledged war. He was backed by the two other Service Chiefs, who were equally full of trepidation over the consequences of extending the theatre of conflict.
The second opportunity for hard action came with the attack on Parliament, but after mounting the longest ever mobilisation of its armed forces in December 2001 lasting ten months, the NDA Government withdrew its troops without either firing a single shot or, for that matter, deterring Pakistan in any noteworthy manner. Most Army officers share the view of former Army Chief Gen. S. Padmanabhan, who claimed in an interview at the time that a political decision to go to war could have resulted in significant military gains in January 2002 when the Pakistani military was still to mobilise. He did not agree with the view that at least limited air strikes on specific targets in Pakistan should have been carried out, saying, “If you really want to punish someone for something very terrible he has done, you smash him. You destroy his weapons and capture his territory.” But he stressed that there had to be a policy, a mandate decreed by the political rulers. The third opportunity, of course, was after the Mumbai attacks when the military was keen to go across the border and “hit any target to show that such a strike on a civilian target was not to be tolerated”. But the Government balked at the prospect and the “moment” passed. Chandra tersely pointed out that Pakistan and the international community are well aware that India will not take decisive military action, meekly accepting “whatever comes its way as we blunder along from one disaster to another”.
“India’s problem is that we have never imposed a price on any nation for action taken against us,” Chandra said. “We keep silent and accept whatever comes our way. Whenever there is the question of national interest being at stake, Governments must be prepared to take the consequences, and not emerge as the soft state we have become,” he added.
A CASE FOR strategic action is China, according to experts, but the Government has done little to contain or counter the spread of Chinese influence in the region. China’s “string of pearls”, as US analysts describe it, of stitching up military, diplomatic and economic alliances with all of India’s neighbours like Pakistan, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bangladesh and even the Maldives is deftly placing a strategic garrotte around it.
China is developing Sri Lanka’s Hambantota port in the south of the island republic, which will give it access to the Indian Ocean Region [IOR], an area of strategic influence it is seeking to dominate by developing the PLA Navy [PLAN] into a formidable blue water force, with task forces spearheaded by nuclear powered ballistic submarines. Interestingly, Sri Lanka first offered this project to India, but the usual New Delhi vacillation made it turn to China.
China also supplied the Sri Lankan military a varied range of armaments, including anti-aircraft guns, in its fight against the Tamil Tiger rebels, earning in the process Colombo’s undying gratitude for its “steadfast support”. Sri Lankan defence secretary and President Mahinda Rajapakse’s brother, Gotabaya Rajapakse told the Indian authorities, including National Security Advisor M.K. Narayanan in Delhi that “security compulsions” were driving Colombo to seek military equipment from China, Pakistan and other suppliers.
China remains a long standing military and nuclear ally of Pakistan and has extended nuclear energy pacts with Bangladesh, which, in turn, has granted Beijing exploration rights for developing its coal and natural gas fields. China’s economic and diplomatic footprint is also expanding incrementally across Nepal, shifting its support from the deposed King to the Maoists, unlike India that remained on shaky ground throughout the transition of the Himalayan kingdom into a republic. Its palpable presence is in evidence in Myanmar, helping it to modernise its naval bases at Akyab, the Cocos Islands, Hainggyi, Khaukphyu, Kyun, Mergui and Zadetkyi, by building radar, refit and refuelling facilities capable of, eventually, supporting Chinese submarine operations in the Andaman Sea and the IOR.
China has also reportedly established a signals intelligence [SIGINT] facility on the Cocos Islands, 30 nautical miles from the Andamans, reportedly to monitor Indian missile test firings from the eastern Orissa coast: an activity that has proliferated since its 1998 nuclear tests. In August 2008 Indian security officials were alarmed by reports of China’s plans to “upgrade” communication and helipad facilities on the Cocos Islands as part of what it believes is Beijing’s strategy of “encircling” its neighbouring nuclear rival. Official military sources in Delhi said the apprehensions follow the unpublicised 25 June 2008 visit to the Cocos, contiguous to India’s Andaman island territory in the Bay of Bengal, by a Chinese naval delegation led by Col. Chi Ziong Feng.
IN A TANDEM effort to “ring” India, nuclear rival and Beijing-ally Pakistan has also supplied Myanmar with several shiploads of ordnance and military hardware over the past decade. Pakistan also trains Myanmar’s soldiers to operate Chinese tanks, fighter aircraft and artillery, while its officers attend Pakistani defence training institutions. Since 2001 a permanent Pakistan defence attaché has also been posted at Yangon.
Beijing, meanwhile, has made clear to India its heightened sensitivities about Tibet and Arunachal Pradesh, losing no opportunity to attack Delhi through the official and non-official channels on these prickly issues. It doggedly opposed an Asian Development Bank loan to India because a portion of it was for the development of Arunachal Pradesh, refused to give visas to a visiting delegation of Indian officials because it included an official from the “disputed territory”. The Chinese media too has been particularly critical of India recently, with several officially-sponsored articles questioning its intent vis-à-vis Beijing, a criticism triggered by Delhi clinching a civilian nuclear deal with the US and becoming Washington’s close strategic and military ally.
Other possible future events that could have a serious and unpredictable impact on Indian national security calculations include internal developments in China, in particular those relating to the deification of the next Dalai Lama. Similar changes could result from any rapid moves towards military engagement between the US, Japan and India, which appear to be growing, albeit have slowed somewhat under the Obama administration.
Simmering Sino-Indian political, diplomatic and military tensions had also proliferated over the past two years, with the number of PLA incursions along the bilaterally disputed 4,057 km long Line of Actual Control increasing to 203 in 2008 from 170 the previous year, many of them adjoining “disputed” Arunachal Pradesh. Military officers said, in the endless cat-and-mouse game China was calculatedly “testing” India’s response to their transgressions, confident that they controlled the levers of escalation.
Militarily, India has only just started responding to the Chinese, even though, as Lt. Gen. Oberoi said, the Army has been urging New Delhi to develop its infrastructure for enhanced accessibility. After decades of neglect and diffidence, India has started constructing roads, upgrading and constructing new airstrips as well as numerous bridges to keep pace with the Chinese infrastructure. However, the military is clear that it will be at least 15 years before India can hope to catch up with China on this. Army units deployed in the region since the 1962 war remain dependent on animal transport and airdrops for supplies. Soldiers have to trek for 15 days to reach posts, as compared to China where soldiers are serviced by all weather roads.
Delhi has also cleared the raising of two Army divisions, or around 50,000 troops, for the Chinese frontier and begun stationing two Sukhoi 30 MK1 squadrons or around 36 fighter aircraft at Tezpur. The runway at Tezpur — a MiG 21 base till recently — has been renovated alongside an infrastructure upgrade to house the “air dominance” Su 30 MKIs capable of striking targets deep inside China.
TIMIDITY AND A sense of denial plague Indian decision-making, but apart from this, the military is facing systemic problems that prevent it from adopting a sustained approach to threats from across the borders. Service rivalries, ambiguous policies and vacillation in decision making are some of the roadblocks preventing India’s military modernisation and strategic nimbleness.
Defence Minister A.K. Antony recently lamented the “shameful and dangerous” situation in which the country was impelled to import 70% of its military requirements, despite repeated governmental declarations of becoming self-reliant. “We had set up the goal of self reliance 50 years ago. But it is unfortunate that we are importing 70% of our defence equipment. It is both shameful and dangerous,” he told Parliament. However, Antony is as much responsible for this as are his predecessors in office. Decisions are not taken, or delayed inordinately, defence officers pointed out. “There are many shortages, procurements are cancelled, our tanks are still without night vision equipment, negotiations for Admiral Gorshkov have still not been concluded, the aircraft carrier out of dry dock does not have any aircraft to fly,” Lt. Gen. Oberoi said, adding that the “defence sector has been badly neglected, with the Government unable to decide between the ‘butter’ and the ‘gun’.”
Admiral Mehta wondered at the tendency to ban defence companies at the drop of a hat, and mostly on complaints filed by rivals in the business. He said that conglomerates had been banned from supplying much needed weaponry to India for flimsy reasons, resulting in major losses to the country. He cited the instance of the HDW submarine saying that the purchase in the 1980s was part of a larger agreement to manufacture two submarines indigenously, and “set up a line”. He said that the decision to blacklist HDW set the industry back by over 15 years and “we are still struggling to start a line, being way behind other countries”.
“Allocation of money [for defence] has never been a problem,” Antony declared breezily. Rather, the issue has been the timely and judicious utilisation of the money allocated, he added in an ironic and unbelievably naïve censure of his own performance and inadequacy as the Defence Minister, now for a second term. In financial year 2008-09 the Ministry Of Defence [MoD] returned Rs 7,000 cr of the Rs 48,000 cr earmarked for capital or acquisition expenditure to the Central exchequer due to delayed decision making.
The Defence Minister’s five-year operational directive is invariably outdated — the last one was issued in 2002 after a 15-year hiatus and a fresh one is overdue. The appointment of a Chief of Defence Staff [CDS] has been stymied by inter-service turf wars as well as bureaucratic and political machinations. The CDS was to function as a crucial “interface” between the defence, civilian and political establishments to help reorder archaic procurement and operational procedures.
As a compromise the Government created the “watered down” Integrated Defence Staff [IDS] in October 2001, for greater “synergy” between the Services and the MoD. The strategic force command [SFC], formalised earlier this year, India’s only tri-service command on the Andaman and Nicobar island-territory off the east coast, and the Defence Intelligence Agency [DIA], were all to come under the CDS. The IDS now reports to the Chief of Staff Committee [CoSC] that has been reduced to just a “clearing house” for individual service requirements, with no authority over final procurements or asset commitments in war. Corruption and transparency in defence procurement remains an issue. As Col. Hariharan pointed out, “Defence procurement should be more transparent. There is no accountability for delays in procurement or losses due to poor staff work.”
AS FAR AS national security is concerned, we should not hand over the fate of decision making exclusively to the domain of babudom and politicians. Defence chiefs should have hands on accountability to national security decisions. After all, how many heads have rolled for Kargil except for middle level Army officers? Aggravating matters is the generalist, civilian-dominated MoD that has no stakes in developing India’s military capability in consonance with national security requirements. It remains a disinterested overseer and stern book-keeper with complete financial powers but little operational responsibility. Differences between the military and the bureaucracy continue to affect decision-making, with even the recommendations of the Sixth Pay Commission for the defence services being watered down by the Finance Ministry. The discrimination in status as well as pay with civil servants had the defence chiefs “fighting a long battle from behind”, and although some issues have been addressed, the anger and resentment remain. Col. Hariharan pointed out that several suggestions had been made by the military to overcome the present shortage of soldiers and officers, to boost morale and to attract new talent to the services. “But vested interests in babudom are benefiting from the existing system and are blocking changes in the status quo. I don’t expect any radical change in our attitude of using the soldiers as karipatta, use and throw,” he regretted. Simple proposals for a war museum and a cenotaph for the unknown soldier remain in cold storage, an indicator of bureaucratic stubbornness.
Lt. Gen. Oberoi pointed out that neither the political leaders concerned nor the bureaucracy give two hoots about national security. “Put a policeman on the top and he can only send evidence to Pakistan,” he said with a laugh. Ambassador Chandra said, “Our problem is that we have never imposed a price on any nation for action taken against us, we keep silent and accept whatever comes our way. When there is the question of India’s interests being at stake, Governments must be prepared to take the consequences.”
Courtesy: COVERT Magazine http://www.covertmagazine.com/cover.htm
Saturday, September 26, 2009
Thursday, September 10, 2009
SRI LANKA: Brief Comments on Happenings
Col R Hariharan
Battling Channel 4:
It appears Sri Lanka is not in a mood to allow the ‘Channel 4 execution video’ controversy to die down. An official briefing was organised for diplomats to prove the video was a doctored one with malefide intentions. The diplomatic briefing was carried in the www.defence.lk official website of the defence ministry with the ominous caption “Rebut or Regret.” While the government was said to be thinking of suing Channel 4, the TV channel also appeared to be in no mood to relent. On September 7 it screen on yet another video allegedly taken by mobile phone camera showing the appalling conditions in which the displaced Tamils are living in the temporary camps in Vanni. The video said to have been taken by a group calling itself War Without Witness is likely to further heat up the confrontation.
Moreover, this confrontation could add fuel to the continuing polemical relations between Sri Lanka and UK. The deteriorating state of relations was evident when the media reported that Dr Palitha Kohona, Foreign Secretary, was not issued a visa by the British High Commission in Colombo for reasons not known. According to the report, the British wanted the Foreign Secretary to come in person to collect the visa!
International ripples on Tissanayagam conviction
As expected the conviction of Tissanayagam has continued to cause adverse international reaction particularly in India and the western world. The pressmen in Chennai had protested against the conviction and wanted him released. Guardian and the Boston Globe have written about it; the UN has also made noises about it. Arrest and subsequent release of three journalists of the pro-JVP ‘Lanka’ on bail has further focused on the perilous state of media men. They also face possible terrorism charges.
However, no change is visible in the mood of the government and the Tissanayagam story is likely to be kept alive. And Sri Lanka appears to be in no mood to change its hostile attitude towards free press. This has also highlighted the continued use of draconian provisions of Prevention of Terrorism Act against media men although the war is over.
Parliamentary elections (amendment) Bill:
The Supreme Court has ruled that some clauses in the Parliamentary elections (amendment) Bill would require to be passed by parliament with a two thirds majority. The opposition UNP, TNA, and the SLMC had challenged the Bill which, proposes to outlaw parties signifying religious or communal identity, in the Supreme Court. The court had held that sub section 7(5) (6) and the words that signify ‘any religion or community’ in sub section 7 (6) and 9 (3) of the Bill in their present form were inconsistent with the Constitution.
After the end of 20 years of shooting war, ethnic reconciliation process is yet to start. In this environment the proposed enactment is likely to face two problems. Increase in the feeling of insecurity of minorities, who want structural changes in the constitution not implemented so far; The provisions of new bill are likely to affect parties with large minority following than large national parties which also have an ethnic veneer under the skin. Secondly, the ruling UPFA coalition does not enjoy two thirds majority and opposition parties are unlikely to extend their support to see the bill through. So the UPFA coalition has the option of keeping it in suspended animation to pass the bill in its present form when it musters adequate support in a new house or amend the bill as directed by the Supreme Court.
Continuing stand off with UN
Sri Lanka revoked the visa of .James Elder, spokesman for UNICEF in Sri Lanka and expelled him for what the Foreign Secretary Palitha Kohona termed as spreading Tamil Tiger propaganda. UNICEF promptly denied the allegations. During the final stages of the war, Elder was accused of spreading news of exaggerated casualties among people trapped in the war zone due to Sri Lankan artillery shelling.
Ban Ki Moon, UN secretary-general strongly regretted the decision of Sri Lanka to expel Elder. According to U.N. spokesman Ban would raise the issue with Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa at the earliest opportunity. This is only the latest episode in the on going stand off between UN agencies in Sri Lanka and the government. It came about due to the UN agencies’ strong criticism of Sri Lanka’s handling of human rights and humanitarian issues during the last few years.
Death of Prabhakaran & Pottu Amman:
Sri Lanka has not yet issued the death certificates of Prabhakaran and Pottu Amman to India which had requested for them. The two were indicted in the Rajiv Gandhi assassination case and the death certificates would enable the removal of their names from the list of absconding accused.
In this context it is significant that on September 9 the Colombo High Court has allowed the dropping of the names of Prabhakaran and Pottu Amman from the indictment in the Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar assassination case.
(Col. R Hariharan (retired) is associated with the South Asia Analysis Group and the Chennai Centre for China Studies. E-mail: colhari@yahoo.com )
Courtesy: www.southasiaanalysis.org
Battling Channel 4:
It appears Sri Lanka is not in a mood to allow the ‘Channel 4 execution video’ controversy to die down. An official briefing was organised for diplomats to prove the video was a doctored one with malefide intentions. The diplomatic briefing was carried in the www.defence.lk official website of the defence ministry with the ominous caption “Rebut or Regret.” While the government was said to be thinking of suing Channel 4, the TV channel also appeared to be in no mood to relent. On September 7 it screen on yet another video allegedly taken by mobile phone camera showing the appalling conditions in which the displaced Tamils are living in the temporary camps in Vanni. The video said to have been taken by a group calling itself War Without Witness is likely to further heat up the confrontation.
Moreover, this confrontation could add fuel to the continuing polemical relations between Sri Lanka and UK. The deteriorating state of relations was evident when the media reported that Dr Palitha Kohona, Foreign Secretary, was not issued a visa by the British High Commission in Colombo for reasons not known. According to the report, the British wanted the Foreign Secretary to come in person to collect the visa!
International ripples on Tissanayagam conviction
As expected the conviction of Tissanayagam has continued to cause adverse international reaction particularly in India and the western world. The pressmen in Chennai had protested against the conviction and wanted him released. Guardian and the Boston Globe have written about it; the UN has also made noises about it. Arrest and subsequent release of three journalists of the pro-JVP ‘Lanka’ on bail has further focused on the perilous state of media men. They also face possible terrorism charges.
However, no change is visible in the mood of the government and the Tissanayagam story is likely to be kept alive. And Sri Lanka appears to be in no mood to change its hostile attitude towards free press. This has also highlighted the continued use of draconian provisions of Prevention of Terrorism Act against media men although the war is over.
Parliamentary elections (amendment) Bill:
The Supreme Court has ruled that some clauses in the Parliamentary elections (amendment) Bill would require to be passed by parliament with a two thirds majority. The opposition UNP, TNA, and the SLMC had challenged the Bill which, proposes to outlaw parties signifying religious or communal identity, in the Supreme Court. The court had held that sub section 7(5) (6) and the words that signify ‘any religion or community’ in sub section 7 (6) and 9 (3) of the Bill in their present form were inconsistent with the Constitution.
After the end of 20 years of shooting war, ethnic reconciliation process is yet to start. In this environment the proposed enactment is likely to face two problems. Increase in the feeling of insecurity of minorities, who want structural changes in the constitution not implemented so far; The provisions of new bill are likely to affect parties with large minority following than large national parties which also have an ethnic veneer under the skin. Secondly, the ruling UPFA coalition does not enjoy two thirds majority and opposition parties are unlikely to extend their support to see the bill through. So the UPFA coalition has the option of keeping it in suspended animation to pass the bill in its present form when it musters adequate support in a new house or amend the bill as directed by the Supreme Court.
Continuing stand off with UN
Sri Lanka revoked the visa of .James Elder, spokesman for UNICEF in Sri Lanka and expelled him for what the Foreign Secretary Palitha Kohona termed as spreading Tamil Tiger propaganda. UNICEF promptly denied the allegations. During the final stages of the war, Elder was accused of spreading news of exaggerated casualties among people trapped in the war zone due to Sri Lankan artillery shelling.
Ban Ki Moon, UN secretary-general strongly regretted the decision of Sri Lanka to expel Elder. According to U.N. spokesman Ban would raise the issue with Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa at the earliest opportunity. This is only the latest episode in the on going stand off between UN agencies in Sri Lanka and the government. It came about due to the UN agencies’ strong criticism of Sri Lanka’s handling of human rights and humanitarian issues during the last few years.
Death of Prabhakaran & Pottu Amman:
Sri Lanka has not yet issued the death certificates of Prabhakaran and Pottu Amman to India which had requested for them. The two were indicted in the Rajiv Gandhi assassination case and the death certificates would enable the removal of their names from the list of absconding accused.
In this context it is significant that on September 9 the Colombo High Court has allowed the dropping of the names of Prabhakaran and Pottu Amman from the indictment in the Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar assassination case.
(Col. R Hariharan (retired) is associated with the South Asia Analysis Group and the Chennai Centre for China Studies. E-mail: colhari@yahoo.com )
Courtesy: www.southasiaanalysis.org
Answers to Questionnaire on China
D.S.Rajan,
(Courtesy Sahara Time)
For quite sometime now activities of China in India's neighbourhood, particularly in Sri Lanka, had been watched by many with alarm. However, there is a need to understand the nuances of the developing relationship between India and China in perspective, rather than go into hysterical polemics. I am reproducing here an article by the well known China analyst Mr DS Rajan, Director, Chennai Centre for China Studies, published in the website http://www.c3sindia.org on September 10, 2009. In this e-mail interview to Sahara Time, New Delhi he has lucidly analysed some of the major issues of India-China relations and his takes on some of key concerns of India.
The following are comments given by Mr.D.S.Rajan to questions emailed by Mr.Surajit Talukdar, correspondent of Sahara Time, New Delhi:
Question 1: Bharat Verma, editor of the Indian Defence Review, recently said, “China will launch an attack on India before 2012. There are multiple reasons for a desperate Beijing to teach India the final lesson, thereby ensuring Chinese supremacy in Asia in this century.” How do you assess the present complexities of the India-China relations regarding the ‘disputed’ territory of Arunachal Pradesh in the northeastern region of India? Do you think a low intensity war may break out in the near future between the two countries?
Answer 1: I do not think a war, even a low intensity one, may break out in near future between China and India. China should be aware that such a war would go against its strategic interests. Its top priority goal now is modernisation; by 2020, it wants to quadruplicate the GDP of 2000 and by 2050, it aims to become a medium-level advanced nation in the world. To achieve the goal, China has set for itself two preconditions – a stable international environment and a peaceful periphery. Beijing knows that a war with India would damage its ‘peaceful periphery’ pre-requisite; this, coupled with Beijing’s awareness of implications for the country’s international image if it launches a war against India, would compel China to move very carefully on the border issue with India, with no place for use of force.
On the complexities in Sino-Indian relations on the Arunachal issue, note needs to be taken about the diametrically opposite positions being taken by each side in support of their claims—Beijing firmly rejects the McMahon line while New Delhi finds a legitimate basis in the McMahon line for a border solution. With perceptions fundamentally differing, the settlement of the Sino-Indian border issue may take a long time. In the present stage, the continuing bilateral talks on finalisation of a framework to settle the issue on the basis of ‘political parameters’ agreement of 2005, without any tangible result so far, reflect the depth of Sino-Indian perceptional differences. At the same time, the willingness being shown by both the sides to develop bilateral relations looking beyond the border dispute augurs well for their current ties. ‘The Shared Vision’ Document signed jointly by India and China recently, is an example. The ongoing jump in the bilateral trade volume resulting in China becoming the biggest trade partner of India, holding joint military exercises etc are other positive points.
India’s recent dispatch of additional troops to and deployment of SU-30 fighter aircraft in the Eastern Sector, along with New Delhi’s efforts to upgrade the infrastructure in the border regions, are being looked upon with unconcealed hostility by the State-controlled media in China. Some strategic journals have even discussed the possibilities of a partial border war with India. Such ‘conservative’ and ‘nationalistic’ approaches by some constituencies in China, obviously in contrast to Beijing’s diplomatic warmth towards India, need to be understood properly. The fact is that both represent China’s voices; the difference may perhaps be that Beijing feels free and unburdened in firmly conveying to New Delhi through its strategic journals and media, its sensitivity on certain topics like the border, connected with China’s core interests of ‘sovereignty and territorial integrity’.
Question 2: We are all aware of the 1962 war when the Chinese troops advanced into territory in India’s north-east but retreated subsequently. Beijing continues to lay claim to around 90,000 square kilometers of territory in India. Indian military experts argue that control over Arunachal will enable China militarily overrun the northeastern India. Others have claimed that China seeks control over Arunachal and specifically Tawang to consolidate its hold over Tibet. In your opinion, what is the actual reason behind China’s claim over Arunachal when the former is well aware of the fact that Arunachal is an integral part of India and New Delhi will never succumb to the Chinese pressure and full scale war is also not a feasible option for both the countries to settle the dispute? What will China actually gain from such a demand? Or, what is China’s game plan?
Answer 2: Beijing’s claim over Arunachal Pradesh needs to be studied in the context of China’s traditional territorial position. The idea of ‘territory’ occupies no position in China’s tradition, which is based on the ‘Tianxia’ (All Under Heaven) concept. The concept provides that all the people and the areas, in which they live, belong to China’s Emperor, who is the Son of God. China’s past references to historical loss of territories centuries back as well as Mao’s “Five fingers” terminology (calling for liberation of Tibet and its five fingers of Nepal, Ladakh, Sikkim, Bhutan and NEFA) appear to have been influenced by the concept. Beijing however now admits that it recognizes and accepts international principles giving up the ‘Tianxia’ concept and says that it does not lay claims to ‘historically lost’ territories. China’s changed stand is good, but what should be borne in mind is that under its strong traditional weight, China may not feel guilty in claiming territories of other nations.
Arunachal Pradesh, called Southern Tibet by Beijing, is not considered by China as a historically lost territory. As Beijing sees, it is a territory snatched away by the British regime in 1914, with India inheriting the British legacy. In making demands on Arunachal, China is neither gaining nor losing. It is only continuing its claims in order to keep the issue alive and solve it to its advantage at a suitable time in future. The case is similar to that of China’s disputes over islands in the South China Sea and the East China Sea. With the littoral nations in the latter, China is maintaining its territorial claims over the concerned islands, many in the resource-rich region. But its ‘harmonious world” international concept demands friendship with such nations and hence the formula of Beijing to “shelve the differences and work for joint development”. China appears to be applying the same formula towards India; it has said that a solution to its border issue with India may not be immediate and that in the meanwhile bilateral ties can be promoted.
The strategic advantage to China, coming from any realisation of its claim over Arunachal, can be another factor in the Chinese minds. Possession of Arunachal can in particular help China in guaranteeing its consolidation of hold over Tibet, a region which witnessed challenges to the same in March 2008 in the form of ethnic riots. Also, the argument that India’s North East will become vulnerable if China realizes its claims over Arunachal Pradesh, appears to be correct.
Question 3: India has decided to step up defence preparedness on its border with China. Four Sukhoi combat aircrafts have recently been sent to its base in Assam’s Tezpur and the Centre plans to increase this to squadron strength of 18, deploy two army divisions along Indian border in Arunachal Pradesh, and start other development works in the border areas of the state. Do you think India’s recent move in Arunachal will prove to be a deterrent to the Chinese aggression in the north-east given the fact that Beijing is militarily more capable than India?
Answer 3: Yes, India has taken right steps albeit with delay, to defend Arunachal. However it remains to be seen whether India can match the Chinese military strength already built up across the border. It may take some time, but the beginning is welcome.
Question 4:. Several issues remain unresolved in the India-China relations: Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government in exile in India; China’s non-recognition of Sikkim’s merger with India; the nuclear tests by India in 1998; and India’s allegation that China is arming Pakistan and China was occupying about 33,000 square kilometres of its territory in the Aksai Chin region of Ladakh. This is a list of claims and counter claims. Is China performing diplomatically much better than India in convincing the world about its claims? Is India doing the same like China? Who has an upper edge in the game of diplomacy concerning the boundary dispute and why is it so?
Answer 4: China is a global player now. Its economic integration with the West particularly with the US remains strong but I do not think that China is taking the border issue with India to international levels now; that was seen in the aftermath of the 1962 war. There are also no reports about China’s taking up with the other countries specific cases like Indian additional troops to the border areas. As such, any visualisation of a diplomatic competition between India and China on the border issue may not be correct.
Question 5: There has been a lot of reports of Chinese intrusions in Arunachal Pradesh. But the government and security establishments always deny such reports. What is the truth? Who are actually intruding the Indian territory – Chinese soldiers or the grazers? How much serious are such intrusions and why? Do you have any data?
Answer 5: As the perceptions of China and India on the border differ, intrusions on either side can happen. The Indian government and security establishments have indeed noted such intrusions into the perceived Indian territory. The Chinese of course deny this. We had seen a pattern in the past revealing the Chinese use of intrusions as a mean to reiterate their territorial claims, particularly at the times of exchanges of visits by VVIPs of both the nations. As for available data from the Indian side, there have been 270 cases of “intrusions” by the Chinese during 2008, compared to the figure of 60 in 2007 (The Tribune, 7 July 2009).
Question 6: 46 years later, India has repaired its relationship with the Chinese to some extent, but those wounds have not been forgotten. Excuses have been thrown up for the military debacle, India was ill prepared, it believed in non-violence, it trusted the Chinese……….But few know the real story of what happened, what went wrong. Successive governments have refused to release the Henderson-Brooks report that investigated the lapses of 1962 India-China war. Do you think India was responsible for its own defeat in 1962 and losing influence in the eastern sector? What were India’s pitfalls? Has India regained its influence now?
Answer 6: From all records, it appears that India was unprepared for the 1962 war in which China claims to have acted in self-defence. Whether or not India faced a debacle is difficult to judge in the absence of any relevant Indian official open records. The Chinese withdrew from the border for their own reasons particularly due to international factors; since then, India has been gradually nurturing its military presence in the Eastern sector, though the process has picked up momentum only recently.
Question 7: China has long been covertly supporting Pakistan in destabilizing India. Is China helping some anti-India forces to foment trouble in the northeastern region of India and if yes, why is it doing so? Please, give an elaborate answer in this regard.
Answer 7: The China-Pakistan nexus at the cost of India is not a new thing. However, Beijing has been following a ‘balanced’ South Asia policy for quite some years now, in conformity with its changed foreign policy priorities. For e.g Beijing no longer calls for the self-determination of Kashmir and favours a solution to the issue through India-Pakistan talks; even on the Kargil conflict, its position had not been sympathetic to Pakistan. Despite this, China is continuing to develop a close political, economic and military relationship with Pakistan for the reason that the latter is the gateway for the oil-rich Central Asia. China has a unique friendship treaty with Pakistan which, among other things, binds both the nations to come to the help of each other at the time of crisis. New Delhi needs to carefully monitor the emerging Sino-Pakistan ties, for their strategic implications for India.
China had supported insurgency movements in India’s North East in the past. This situation no longer exists. There were some reports about Chinese training to ULFA etc but there is no concrete proof about a change in China’s policy towards the insurgents on the Indian side.
Question 8: India is supporting the Tibet cause. How does China see India’s support to Tibet? Does Delhi’s support to the Tibet cause cast an impact on the border negotiations between the two countries? What do you think?
Answer 8: India has made its position on the Dalai Lama clear – the spiritual leader and their followers will not be allowed to indulge in any anti-China activities from the Indian soil. Beijing remains satisfied with this position. On some occasions however, the Chinese media have criticised India’s “Right wing” politicians for their alleged sympathy for the Tibet cause. Beijing and Dharamsala are conducting their own negotiations, which are continuing. India can give indirect support to such negotiation process.
The Sino-Indian border issue and the Dalai Lama issue are different. The Chinese media have tried to link the two issues in their own way, for e.g. they criticised the statement of the Dalai Lama made during his visit to Arunachal Pradesh last year, acknowledging that Arunachal Pradesh is a part of India. The criticism specifically was that the Dalai Lama “sold out” Chinese territory to India.
Question 9: China has friendly and business relations with Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Myanmar and Sri Lanka. The stated objectives of China include developing strategic missile and space based assets and rapidly advancing navy to conduct operations in distant waters. This will have an effect on India and Beijing will certainly influence these countries to gather their support in case of a conflict with India. What is Delhi practically doing in this present scenario when China is quite ‘friendly’ with our ‘unfriendly’ neighbours? Don’t you think India has a less influence than China in Asia – everybody fears China and nobody takes India’s threats seriously?
Answer 9: The Chinese policy towards India’s neighbourhood has been critically commented upon in length in India- as a Chinese attempt to strategically encircle India. The Chinese have officially denied the same. At the same time, China’s military and port facilities in countries like Myanmar, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka need to be noted by India for their military potentials. These facilities of course seem to be perceived important by China from the point of view of its energy security, but Beijing needs to address India’s concerns in this regard. I think this issue can be tackled through friendly negotiations between China and India. India on its part is giving importance to improving relations with its neighbours. It is reaching out to Bangladesh and Myanmar. Its Look East Policy has paid good dividends to the country.
Question 10: How China sees the India-US current relations? Will it help India to an extent in the border negotiations? Please, give your view.
Answer 10: The Indo-US Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, New Delhi-Washington defence relations and holding of the four nation joint military exercise (Japan, US, Australia and India) were all described by the Chinese media as efforts to contain China. India’s “wishes” to take part in such a containment has been especially noted in the People’s Daily. To what extent Beijing has taken up these issues officially with New Delhi is not known but China’s apprehensions have come out clear. At present, Beijing is developing its ties with Washington through holding economic and strategic dialogue. The huge dependence of the US on the Chinese financial investment has even made Washington to toe a soft line towards China on issues like Tibet and human rights. The growing Indo-US relations, in my opinion, is independent of the Sino-Indian border negotiations.
Question 11: Let’s talk about border economic diplomacy. It includes creation of intensive infrastructural links and establishment of trans-border sub-regional mechanism. India has lately woken up to China’s aggressive road building along the China-India border. Though India has now started building infrastructural links, do you think India’s measures are adequate if compared to the Chinese measures? How much is India’s current progress in this regard? Will only developing the border areas by India along its eastern sector put China on the back foot?
Answer 11: Building infrastructure by India in the Eastern border is a significant step towards improving the economic conditions in the concerned provinces. It also helps the economic integration of these regions including Arunachal Pradesh with the rest of India. Compared to this, the Chinese have been more successful given their success in linking Tibet with the mainland through rail, road and air network. China will continue to develop its border areas irrespective of what India does in its Eastern sector. There will be no ‘back foot’ by China.
Question 12: India has banned Chinese mobile sets, chocolates and milk products. Beijing has also threatened to ban import of seafood and other food products from India if New Delhi continues to restrict import of milk products from China. Do you think such trade embargos have some relations with the border dispute between the two Asian giants or these are just routine trading measures? Has the reopening of Nathula Pass linking Sikkim with Tibet and neighbouring areas of China brought any change in the India-China relation?
Answer 12: I think trade embargos by India have no relation to its border dispute with China. Both are different matters and in economic field, each country has to act in its self-interest. Opening of Nathula Pass is indeed a positive development, which signifies China’s de-facto recognition of Sikkim as part of India. Such programmes will help in promoting border trade, benefiting peoples in the boundary regions of both the nations.
Question 13: What should India do diplomatically to defeat China in the issue of border dispute? Give your opinion.
Answer 13: Both the governments of India and China have realised that a solution to the border issue is not going to be immediate; statements from top leaders from both sides have signaled their desire to develop bilateral relations looking beyond the border dispute. Twelve rounds of talks between the two special representatives have taken place so far on the border issue but a framework for a solution on the basis of political parameters agreed in 2005, is yet to be reached. Both China and India should continue their diplomatic efforts; there is no question of one ‘defeating’ other diplomatically.
Replies were given by Mr.D.S.Rajan, Director, Chennai Centre for China Studies. email: dsrajan@gmail.com
Courtesy: Chennai Centre for China Studies
C3S Paper No.355 September 10, 2009
(Courtesy Sahara Time)
For quite sometime now activities of China in India's neighbourhood, particularly in Sri Lanka, had been watched by many with alarm. However, there is a need to understand the nuances of the developing relationship between India and China in perspective, rather than go into hysterical polemics. I am reproducing here an article by the well known China analyst Mr DS Rajan, Director, Chennai Centre for China Studies, published in the website http://www.c3sindia.org on September 10, 2009. In this e-mail interview to Sahara Time, New Delhi he has lucidly analysed some of the major issues of India-China relations and his takes on some of key concerns of India.
The following are comments given by Mr.D.S.Rajan to questions emailed by Mr.Surajit Talukdar, correspondent of Sahara Time, New Delhi:
Question 1: Bharat Verma, editor of the Indian Defence Review, recently said, “China will launch an attack on India before 2012. There are multiple reasons for a desperate Beijing to teach India the final lesson, thereby ensuring Chinese supremacy in Asia in this century.” How do you assess the present complexities of the India-China relations regarding the ‘disputed’ territory of Arunachal Pradesh in the northeastern region of India? Do you think a low intensity war may break out in the near future between the two countries?
Answer 1: I do not think a war, even a low intensity one, may break out in near future between China and India. China should be aware that such a war would go against its strategic interests. Its top priority goal now is modernisation; by 2020, it wants to quadruplicate the GDP of 2000 and by 2050, it aims to become a medium-level advanced nation in the world. To achieve the goal, China has set for itself two preconditions – a stable international environment and a peaceful periphery. Beijing knows that a war with India would damage its ‘peaceful periphery’ pre-requisite; this, coupled with Beijing’s awareness of implications for the country’s international image if it launches a war against India, would compel China to move very carefully on the border issue with India, with no place for use of force.
On the complexities in Sino-Indian relations on the Arunachal issue, note needs to be taken about the diametrically opposite positions being taken by each side in support of their claims—Beijing firmly rejects the McMahon line while New Delhi finds a legitimate basis in the McMahon line for a border solution. With perceptions fundamentally differing, the settlement of the Sino-Indian border issue may take a long time. In the present stage, the continuing bilateral talks on finalisation of a framework to settle the issue on the basis of ‘political parameters’ agreement of 2005, without any tangible result so far, reflect the depth of Sino-Indian perceptional differences. At the same time, the willingness being shown by both the sides to develop bilateral relations looking beyond the border dispute augurs well for their current ties. ‘The Shared Vision’ Document signed jointly by India and China recently, is an example. The ongoing jump in the bilateral trade volume resulting in China becoming the biggest trade partner of India, holding joint military exercises etc are other positive points.
India’s recent dispatch of additional troops to and deployment of SU-30 fighter aircraft in the Eastern Sector, along with New Delhi’s efforts to upgrade the infrastructure in the border regions, are being looked upon with unconcealed hostility by the State-controlled media in China. Some strategic journals have even discussed the possibilities of a partial border war with India. Such ‘conservative’ and ‘nationalistic’ approaches by some constituencies in China, obviously in contrast to Beijing’s diplomatic warmth towards India, need to be understood properly. The fact is that both represent China’s voices; the difference may perhaps be that Beijing feels free and unburdened in firmly conveying to New Delhi through its strategic journals and media, its sensitivity on certain topics like the border, connected with China’s core interests of ‘sovereignty and territorial integrity’.
Question 2: We are all aware of the 1962 war when the Chinese troops advanced into territory in India’s north-east but retreated subsequently. Beijing continues to lay claim to around 90,000 square kilometers of territory in India. Indian military experts argue that control over Arunachal will enable China militarily overrun the northeastern India. Others have claimed that China seeks control over Arunachal and specifically Tawang to consolidate its hold over Tibet. In your opinion, what is the actual reason behind China’s claim over Arunachal when the former is well aware of the fact that Arunachal is an integral part of India and New Delhi will never succumb to the Chinese pressure and full scale war is also not a feasible option for both the countries to settle the dispute? What will China actually gain from such a demand? Or, what is China’s game plan?
Answer 2: Beijing’s claim over Arunachal Pradesh needs to be studied in the context of China’s traditional territorial position. The idea of ‘territory’ occupies no position in China’s tradition, which is based on the ‘Tianxia’ (All Under Heaven) concept. The concept provides that all the people and the areas, in which they live, belong to China’s Emperor, who is the Son of God. China’s past references to historical loss of territories centuries back as well as Mao’s “Five fingers” terminology (calling for liberation of Tibet and its five fingers of Nepal, Ladakh, Sikkim, Bhutan and NEFA) appear to have been influenced by the concept. Beijing however now admits that it recognizes and accepts international principles giving up the ‘Tianxia’ concept and says that it does not lay claims to ‘historically lost’ territories. China’s changed stand is good, but what should be borne in mind is that under its strong traditional weight, China may not feel guilty in claiming territories of other nations.
Arunachal Pradesh, called Southern Tibet by Beijing, is not considered by China as a historically lost territory. As Beijing sees, it is a territory snatched away by the British regime in 1914, with India inheriting the British legacy. In making demands on Arunachal, China is neither gaining nor losing. It is only continuing its claims in order to keep the issue alive and solve it to its advantage at a suitable time in future. The case is similar to that of China’s disputes over islands in the South China Sea and the East China Sea. With the littoral nations in the latter, China is maintaining its territorial claims over the concerned islands, many in the resource-rich region. But its ‘harmonious world” international concept demands friendship with such nations and hence the formula of Beijing to “shelve the differences and work for joint development”. China appears to be applying the same formula towards India; it has said that a solution to its border issue with India may not be immediate and that in the meanwhile bilateral ties can be promoted.
The strategic advantage to China, coming from any realisation of its claim over Arunachal, can be another factor in the Chinese minds. Possession of Arunachal can in particular help China in guaranteeing its consolidation of hold over Tibet, a region which witnessed challenges to the same in March 2008 in the form of ethnic riots. Also, the argument that India’s North East will become vulnerable if China realizes its claims over Arunachal Pradesh, appears to be correct.
Question 3: India has decided to step up defence preparedness on its border with China. Four Sukhoi combat aircrafts have recently been sent to its base in Assam’s Tezpur and the Centre plans to increase this to squadron strength of 18, deploy two army divisions along Indian border in Arunachal Pradesh, and start other development works in the border areas of the state. Do you think India’s recent move in Arunachal will prove to be a deterrent to the Chinese aggression in the north-east given the fact that Beijing is militarily more capable than India?
Answer 3: Yes, India has taken right steps albeit with delay, to defend Arunachal. However it remains to be seen whether India can match the Chinese military strength already built up across the border. It may take some time, but the beginning is welcome.
Question 4:. Several issues remain unresolved in the India-China relations: Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government in exile in India; China’s non-recognition of Sikkim’s merger with India; the nuclear tests by India in 1998; and India’s allegation that China is arming Pakistan and China was occupying about 33,000 square kilometres of its territory in the Aksai Chin region of Ladakh. This is a list of claims and counter claims. Is China performing diplomatically much better than India in convincing the world about its claims? Is India doing the same like China? Who has an upper edge in the game of diplomacy concerning the boundary dispute and why is it so?
Answer 4: China is a global player now. Its economic integration with the West particularly with the US remains strong but I do not think that China is taking the border issue with India to international levels now; that was seen in the aftermath of the 1962 war. There are also no reports about China’s taking up with the other countries specific cases like Indian additional troops to the border areas. As such, any visualisation of a diplomatic competition between India and China on the border issue may not be correct.
Question 5: There has been a lot of reports of Chinese intrusions in Arunachal Pradesh. But the government and security establishments always deny such reports. What is the truth? Who are actually intruding the Indian territory – Chinese soldiers or the grazers? How much serious are such intrusions and why? Do you have any data?
Answer 5: As the perceptions of China and India on the border differ, intrusions on either side can happen. The Indian government and security establishments have indeed noted such intrusions into the perceived Indian territory. The Chinese of course deny this. We had seen a pattern in the past revealing the Chinese use of intrusions as a mean to reiterate their territorial claims, particularly at the times of exchanges of visits by VVIPs of both the nations. As for available data from the Indian side, there have been 270 cases of “intrusions” by the Chinese during 2008, compared to the figure of 60 in 2007 (The Tribune, 7 July 2009).
Question 6: 46 years later, India has repaired its relationship with the Chinese to some extent, but those wounds have not been forgotten. Excuses have been thrown up for the military debacle, India was ill prepared, it believed in non-violence, it trusted the Chinese……….But few know the real story of what happened, what went wrong. Successive governments have refused to release the Henderson-Brooks report that investigated the lapses of 1962 India-China war. Do you think India was responsible for its own defeat in 1962 and losing influence in the eastern sector? What were India’s pitfalls? Has India regained its influence now?
Answer 6: From all records, it appears that India was unprepared for the 1962 war in which China claims to have acted in self-defence. Whether or not India faced a debacle is difficult to judge in the absence of any relevant Indian official open records. The Chinese withdrew from the border for their own reasons particularly due to international factors; since then, India has been gradually nurturing its military presence in the Eastern sector, though the process has picked up momentum only recently.
Question 7: China has long been covertly supporting Pakistan in destabilizing India. Is China helping some anti-India forces to foment trouble in the northeastern region of India and if yes, why is it doing so? Please, give an elaborate answer in this regard.
Answer 7: The China-Pakistan nexus at the cost of India is not a new thing. However, Beijing has been following a ‘balanced’ South Asia policy for quite some years now, in conformity with its changed foreign policy priorities. For e.g Beijing no longer calls for the self-determination of Kashmir and favours a solution to the issue through India-Pakistan talks; even on the Kargil conflict, its position had not been sympathetic to Pakistan. Despite this, China is continuing to develop a close political, economic and military relationship with Pakistan for the reason that the latter is the gateway for the oil-rich Central Asia. China has a unique friendship treaty with Pakistan which, among other things, binds both the nations to come to the help of each other at the time of crisis. New Delhi needs to carefully monitor the emerging Sino-Pakistan ties, for their strategic implications for India.
China had supported insurgency movements in India’s North East in the past. This situation no longer exists. There were some reports about Chinese training to ULFA etc but there is no concrete proof about a change in China’s policy towards the insurgents on the Indian side.
Question 8: India is supporting the Tibet cause. How does China see India’s support to Tibet? Does Delhi’s support to the Tibet cause cast an impact on the border negotiations between the two countries? What do you think?
Answer 8: India has made its position on the Dalai Lama clear – the spiritual leader and their followers will not be allowed to indulge in any anti-China activities from the Indian soil. Beijing remains satisfied with this position. On some occasions however, the Chinese media have criticised India’s “Right wing” politicians for their alleged sympathy for the Tibet cause. Beijing and Dharamsala are conducting their own negotiations, which are continuing. India can give indirect support to such negotiation process.
The Sino-Indian border issue and the Dalai Lama issue are different. The Chinese media have tried to link the two issues in their own way, for e.g. they criticised the statement of the Dalai Lama made during his visit to Arunachal Pradesh last year, acknowledging that Arunachal Pradesh is a part of India. The criticism specifically was that the Dalai Lama “sold out” Chinese territory to India.
Question 9: China has friendly and business relations with Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Myanmar and Sri Lanka. The stated objectives of China include developing strategic missile and space based assets and rapidly advancing navy to conduct operations in distant waters. This will have an effect on India and Beijing will certainly influence these countries to gather their support in case of a conflict with India. What is Delhi practically doing in this present scenario when China is quite ‘friendly’ with our ‘unfriendly’ neighbours? Don’t you think India has a less influence than China in Asia – everybody fears China and nobody takes India’s threats seriously?
Answer 9: The Chinese policy towards India’s neighbourhood has been critically commented upon in length in India- as a Chinese attempt to strategically encircle India. The Chinese have officially denied the same. At the same time, China’s military and port facilities in countries like Myanmar, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka need to be noted by India for their military potentials. These facilities of course seem to be perceived important by China from the point of view of its energy security, but Beijing needs to address India’s concerns in this regard. I think this issue can be tackled through friendly negotiations between China and India. India on its part is giving importance to improving relations with its neighbours. It is reaching out to Bangladesh and Myanmar. Its Look East Policy has paid good dividends to the country.
Question 10: How China sees the India-US current relations? Will it help India to an extent in the border negotiations? Please, give your view.
Answer 10: The Indo-US Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, New Delhi-Washington defence relations and holding of the four nation joint military exercise (Japan, US, Australia and India) were all described by the Chinese media as efforts to contain China. India’s “wishes” to take part in such a containment has been especially noted in the People’s Daily. To what extent Beijing has taken up these issues officially with New Delhi is not known but China’s apprehensions have come out clear. At present, Beijing is developing its ties with Washington through holding economic and strategic dialogue. The huge dependence of the US on the Chinese financial investment has even made Washington to toe a soft line towards China on issues like Tibet and human rights. The growing Indo-US relations, in my opinion, is independent of the Sino-Indian border negotiations.
Question 11: Let’s talk about border economic diplomacy. It includes creation of intensive infrastructural links and establishment of trans-border sub-regional mechanism. India has lately woken up to China’s aggressive road building along the China-India border. Though India has now started building infrastructural links, do you think India’s measures are adequate if compared to the Chinese measures? How much is India’s current progress in this regard? Will only developing the border areas by India along its eastern sector put China on the back foot?
Answer 11: Building infrastructure by India in the Eastern border is a significant step towards improving the economic conditions in the concerned provinces. It also helps the economic integration of these regions including Arunachal Pradesh with the rest of India. Compared to this, the Chinese have been more successful given their success in linking Tibet with the mainland through rail, road and air network. China will continue to develop its border areas irrespective of what India does in its Eastern sector. There will be no ‘back foot’ by China.
Question 12: India has banned Chinese mobile sets, chocolates and milk products. Beijing has also threatened to ban import of seafood and other food products from India if New Delhi continues to restrict import of milk products from China. Do you think such trade embargos have some relations with the border dispute between the two Asian giants or these are just routine trading measures? Has the reopening of Nathula Pass linking Sikkim with Tibet and neighbouring areas of China brought any change in the India-China relation?
Answer 12: I think trade embargos by India have no relation to its border dispute with China. Both are different matters and in economic field, each country has to act in its self-interest. Opening of Nathula Pass is indeed a positive development, which signifies China’s de-facto recognition of Sikkim as part of India. Such programmes will help in promoting border trade, benefiting peoples in the boundary regions of both the nations.
Question 13: What should India do diplomatically to defeat China in the issue of border dispute? Give your opinion.
Answer 13: Both the governments of India and China have realised that a solution to the border issue is not going to be immediate; statements from top leaders from both sides have signaled their desire to develop bilateral relations looking beyond the border dispute. Twelve rounds of talks between the two special representatives have taken place so far on the border issue but a framework for a solution on the basis of political parameters agreed in 2005, is yet to be reached. Both China and India should continue their diplomatic efforts; there is no question of one ‘defeating’ other diplomatically.
Replies were given by Mr.D.S.Rajan, Director, Chennai Centre for China Studies. email: dsrajan@gmail.com
Courtesy: Chennai Centre for China Studies
C3S Paper No.355 September 10, 2009
Tuesday, September 8, 2009
The great Indian NON-SPEAK
India does not have a strategy on how to handle the Myanmarese people’s struggle for democracy while maintaining functional relations with the military regime
by COL. R HARIHARAN
INDIA’S signing of the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with ASEAN, the country’s fourth largest trading partner, on August 13 should be considered a major success of the “Look East Policy”. The FTA, coming into force from 2010, will dismantle trade barriers over the next six years and boost two way trade with the region considered by China as its backyard. It could also strengthen our strategic ties with Singapore, Japan and Vietnam.
At the same time, another seemingly unconnected event in ASEAN – in Myanmar – exposed the soft underbelly of India’s foreign policy. On August 11, a Yangon court sentenced Aung San Suu Kyi, the iconic leader of Myanmar’s struggle for restoration of democracy, to three years hard labour for allowing a mentally deranged American intruder to stay in her home. The court ignored her plea that she had no control over the security of the house where she had been under house arrest for nearly 14 years. However, Senior General Than Shwe, head of the ruling military junta, in an act lauded by the state media as a humanitarian gesture, reduced the sentence to 18 months of house arrest!
The conviction of Suu Kyi was clearly another perverse act of the military junta to keep her from participating in the general election proposed to be held in 2010 under the country’s new Constitution. The Suu Kyi-led National League for Democracy (NLD) swept the last election in 1990, nearly ending the military rule. The junta did not allow the civilian government to take over. The latest sentencing of Suu Kyi only confirms that it had no intention of allowing a government under her leadership even after the 2010 election.
The conviction of Suu Kyi was universally condemned except for China, which has been the chief patron of the military regime. Even ASEAN, led by Thailand, sought her release and participation in the elections. India’s reaction was muted, apologetic and inane.
The Ministry of External Affairs spokesman did not even voice India’s disappointment, let alone condemnation of the conviction. He only said, “We have seen reports of the sentencing of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi in Myanmar for a period of 18 months….India has emphasized to the Government of Myanmar the need to expedite their political reform and national reconciliation process and has noted the various steps taken so far by the Government of Myanmar in this direction.”
The Ministry of External Affairs spokesman did not even voice India’s disappointment, let alone condemnation of the conviction. He only said, ‘….India has emphasized to the Government of Myanmar the need to expedite their political reform and national reconciliation process and has noted the various steps taken so far...’
What does this kind of “non-speak” (I suppose the coinage will do, like “non-paper”) mean? India does not have a proactive strategy on how to handle the Myanmarese people’s struggle for restoration of democracy while maintaining functional relations with the military regime.
The xenophobic founder of military rule, General Ne Win, turned the nation into an international recluse during his regime from 1962 to 1988. However, his successors had to come to terms with the changes in global environment at the end of the Cold War and ushering in of economic liberalization. After the 1990 elections, the junta cracked down on the people to prevent restoration of civilian rule. An international outcry resulted. To ward off this and to retain its hold on power, the junta had to find support, particularly from its neighbours and in Southeast Asia. This prompted Myanmar’s joining ASEAN and developing strong relations with its neighbours.
The military regime has successfully weathered international sanctions, internal and international protests, insurgencies and international media hostility for over two decades. Its survival strategy is based on tackling threats coming from three quarters: restoration of democracy, ethnic insurgency and the international community helping the opposition. Its three neighbours – China, India and Thailand – have been mustered to play a key role in the junta’s survival.
GEO-STRATEGIC realities have compelled the three neighbours to evolve their own strategies in handling the military regime. While China is wholly supportive of the military rulers, Thailand and India have adopted “constructive cooperation” with the regime in the hope that persuasive methods rather than sanctions will help restoration of democracy.
The regime has also been facing economic sanctions and embargos imposed by the US and the EU. To reduce their impact, it has leveraged Myanmar’s oil, gas and mineral resources to advantage by creating a network of supportive nations like Japan, Korea, India and ASEAN, apart from China. This has also helped the regime to divide and weaken the anti-junta lobby in the UN.
Strategically, there are three imperatives to be considered. The army, well entrenched in power, with a strength of over 430,000 troops, is the second biggest in Southeast Asia. It is unlikely to give up power in the near term; even the 2008 Constitution provides for a permanent over lordship of the army in the multiparty democracy. There is also a distinct possibility of Myanmar emerging as a potential nuclear power like North Korea, if the military rule continues for another decade.
Second, China has established a stranglehold. Its influence permeates the strategic, economic, and social facets of the country. China considers Myanmar an important part of its strategic domain. China has better and easier land access to Myanmar than India. The country’s abundant natural resources, including oil and gas, are important to China. It also provides China direct access to the Indian Ocean bypassing the bottleneck at the Malacca Strait. Most important, Myanmar provides a direct approach to India’s vulnerable Northeast directly from mainland China. China has assiduously cultivated the military regime and, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, saved the military junta by blocking international action against it. Given this setting, with two decades of a head start, China’s influence is likely to continue over Myanmar even after a civilian government comes to power.
LASTLY, the nation’s experience in multiparty democracy in the initial 14 years after independence was disastrous. Corruption, groupism, warlordism and inept political leadership gave rise to political instability and encouraged the spread of powerful ethnic insurgencies, particularly of Karnes, Shans and Kachins as well as Communists. It paved the way for military takeover. Nearly 40 years of military rule has prevented emergence of competent political leadership. Suu Kyi is probably the only charismatic leader to unite and lead the splintered political parties. These destabilizing elements will be very much there even when democracy is restored.
India’s Myanmar policy is an outcrop of its Look East Policy. So it tends to see Myanmar in the context of ASEAN with emphasis on economic and developmental issues. Strategic objectives in Myanmar appear to be limited to reducing Chinese influence and eliminating sanctuaries of insurgents from India’s Northeast. Thus Myanmar appears to have been reduced to a marginal role in India’s national security matrix. Given these shortcomings, its policy has floundered in satisfying neither India nor Myanmar.
If India aspires to be even a regional power it has to build sustainable valuable- based relations with Myanmar with a strategic content. It has to go beyond perpetuating the military regime, and invest in the people. It has to project itself as a worthy partner who can help Myanmar in its well-being and long-term growth. So far, India’s well meaning efforts in Myanmar have been limited to developing infrastructure as part of improving access to the ASEAN region. Even these efforts have been tardy and slow.
The basic problem of our policymakers appears to lie in articulation of power with all our neighbours. It is good to remember Prof Morgenthau’s prescription on handling power: “Power may comprise anything that establishes and maintains the control of man over man. Thus power covers all social relationships which serve that end, from physical violence to the most subtle psychological ties by which one mind controls the other…For if we look at all nations, our own included, as political entities pursuing their respective interests defined in terms of power, we are able to do justice to all of them…we are then capable of pursuing policies that respect the interests of other nations, while protecting and promoting our own.” [Politics Among Nations, pp 9-11]. Are we articulating this kind of power?
In this context, what the maverick Marxist historian, Professor DD Kosambi, wrote about making the buffalo rather than the tiger our national animal comes to mind. In his book on the history of India, he said the buffalo is thick-skinned, revels in muck and anybody can milk it (or words to this effect).
Courtesy: GFiles VOL.3 | Issue 6 | SEPTEMBER 2009
http://www.gfilesindia.com/title.aspx?title_id=5
by COL. R HARIHARAN
INDIA’S signing of the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with ASEAN, the country’s fourth largest trading partner, on August 13 should be considered a major success of the “Look East Policy”. The FTA, coming into force from 2010, will dismantle trade barriers over the next six years and boost two way trade with the region considered by China as its backyard. It could also strengthen our strategic ties with Singapore, Japan and Vietnam.
At the same time, another seemingly unconnected event in ASEAN – in Myanmar – exposed the soft underbelly of India’s foreign policy. On August 11, a Yangon court sentenced Aung San Suu Kyi, the iconic leader of Myanmar’s struggle for restoration of democracy, to three years hard labour for allowing a mentally deranged American intruder to stay in her home. The court ignored her plea that she had no control over the security of the house where she had been under house arrest for nearly 14 years. However, Senior General Than Shwe, head of the ruling military junta, in an act lauded by the state media as a humanitarian gesture, reduced the sentence to 18 months of house arrest!
The conviction of Suu Kyi was clearly another perverse act of the military junta to keep her from participating in the general election proposed to be held in 2010 under the country’s new Constitution. The Suu Kyi-led National League for Democracy (NLD) swept the last election in 1990, nearly ending the military rule. The junta did not allow the civilian government to take over. The latest sentencing of Suu Kyi only confirms that it had no intention of allowing a government under her leadership even after the 2010 election.
The conviction of Suu Kyi was universally condemned except for China, which has been the chief patron of the military regime. Even ASEAN, led by Thailand, sought her release and participation in the elections. India’s reaction was muted, apologetic and inane.
The Ministry of External Affairs spokesman did not even voice India’s disappointment, let alone condemnation of the conviction. He only said, “We have seen reports of the sentencing of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi in Myanmar for a period of 18 months….India has emphasized to the Government of Myanmar the need to expedite their political reform and national reconciliation process and has noted the various steps taken so far by the Government of Myanmar in this direction.”
The Ministry of External Affairs spokesman did not even voice India’s disappointment, let alone condemnation of the conviction. He only said, ‘….India has emphasized to the Government of Myanmar the need to expedite their political reform and national reconciliation process and has noted the various steps taken so far...’
What does this kind of “non-speak” (I suppose the coinage will do, like “non-paper”) mean? India does not have a proactive strategy on how to handle the Myanmarese people’s struggle for restoration of democracy while maintaining functional relations with the military regime.
The xenophobic founder of military rule, General Ne Win, turned the nation into an international recluse during his regime from 1962 to 1988. However, his successors had to come to terms with the changes in global environment at the end of the Cold War and ushering in of economic liberalization. After the 1990 elections, the junta cracked down on the people to prevent restoration of civilian rule. An international outcry resulted. To ward off this and to retain its hold on power, the junta had to find support, particularly from its neighbours and in Southeast Asia. This prompted Myanmar’s joining ASEAN and developing strong relations with its neighbours.
The military regime has successfully weathered international sanctions, internal and international protests, insurgencies and international media hostility for over two decades. Its survival strategy is based on tackling threats coming from three quarters: restoration of democracy, ethnic insurgency and the international community helping the opposition. Its three neighbours – China, India and Thailand – have been mustered to play a key role in the junta’s survival.
GEO-STRATEGIC realities have compelled the three neighbours to evolve their own strategies in handling the military regime. While China is wholly supportive of the military rulers, Thailand and India have adopted “constructive cooperation” with the regime in the hope that persuasive methods rather than sanctions will help restoration of democracy.
The regime has also been facing economic sanctions and embargos imposed by the US and the EU. To reduce their impact, it has leveraged Myanmar’s oil, gas and mineral resources to advantage by creating a network of supportive nations like Japan, Korea, India and ASEAN, apart from China. This has also helped the regime to divide and weaken the anti-junta lobby in the UN.
Strategically, there are three imperatives to be considered. The army, well entrenched in power, with a strength of over 430,000 troops, is the second biggest in Southeast Asia. It is unlikely to give up power in the near term; even the 2008 Constitution provides for a permanent over lordship of the army in the multiparty democracy. There is also a distinct possibility of Myanmar emerging as a potential nuclear power like North Korea, if the military rule continues for another decade.
Second, China has established a stranglehold. Its influence permeates the strategic, economic, and social facets of the country. China considers Myanmar an important part of its strategic domain. China has better and easier land access to Myanmar than India. The country’s abundant natural resources, including oil and gas, are important to China. It also provides China direct access to the Indian Ocean bypassing the bottleneck at the Malacca Strait. Most important, Myanmar provides a direct approach to India’s vulnerable Northeast directly from mainland China. China has assiduously cultivated the military regime and, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, saved the military junta by blocking international action against it. Given this setting, with two decades of a head start, China’s influence is likely to continue over Myanmar even after a civilian government comes to power.
LASTLY, the nation’s experience in multiparty democracy in the initial 14 years after independence was disastrous. Corruption, groupism, warlordism and inept political leadership gave rise to political instability and encouraged the spread of powerful ethnic insurgencies, particularly of Karnes, Shans and Kachins as well as Communists. It paved the way for military takeover. Nearly 40 years of military rule has prevented emergence of competent political leadership. Suu Kyi is probably the only charismatic leader to unite and lead the splintered political parties. These destabilizing elements will be very much there even when democracy is restored.
India’s Myanmar policy is an outcrop of its Look East Policy. So it tends to see Myanmar in the context of ASEAN with emphasis on economic and developmental issues. Strategic objectives in Myanmar appear to be limited to reducing Chinese influence and eliminating sanctuaries of insurgents from India’s Northeast. Thus Myanmar appears to have been reduced to a marginal role in India’s national security matrix. Given these shortcomings, its policy has floundered in satisfying neither India nor Myanmar.
If India aspires to be even a regional power it has to build sustainable valuable- based relations with Myanmar with a strategic content. It has to go beyond perpetuating the military regime, and invest in the people. It has to project itself as a worthy partner who can help Myanmar in its well-being and long-term growth. So far, India’s well meaning efforts in Myanmar have been limited to developing infrastructure as part of improving access to the ASEAN region. Even these efforts have been tardy and slow.
The basic problem of our policymakers appears to lie in articulation of power with all our neighbours. It is good to remember Prof Morgenthau’s prescription on handling power: “Power may comprise anything that establishes and maintains the control of man over man. Thus power covers all social relationships which serve that end, from physical violence to the most subtle psychological ties by which one mind controls the other…For if we look at all nations, our own included, as political entities pursuing their respective interests defined in terms of power, we are able to do justice to all of them…we are then capable of pursuing policies that respect the interests of other nations, while protecting and promoting our own.” [Politics Among Nations, pp 9-11]. Are we articulating this kind of power?
In this context, what the maverick Marxist historian, Professor DD Kosambi, wrote about making the buffalo rather than the tiger our national animal comes to mind. In his book on the history of India, he said the buffalo is thick-skinned, revels in muck and anybody can milk it (or words to this effect).
Courtesy: GFiles VOL.3 | Issue 6 | SEPTEMBER 2009
http://www.gfilesindia.com/title.aspx?title_id=5
Friday, September 4, 2009
Sri Lanka Perspectives – August 2009
Local elections in the North
The month saw the first move towards normalcy in the war torn Northern Province with conduct of largely trouble free elections for the Jaffna Municipality and the Vavuniya Urban Council on August 8. Though these elections were only local, they were an indicator of post war Tamil perceptions. The success of the elections proved that remnants of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) had neither the will nor the capacity to interfere with the process.
Though only 20% of the total of 100,000 voters was polled in Jaffna, according to observers it actually worked out to 40% of available voters as many did not receive their voting cards. The ruling United People's Freedom Alliance (UPFA) spearheaded by the Eelam Peoples Democratic Party (EPDP), its anti-LTTE Tamil coalition partner, won 13 of the 23 seats of the municipal council paving for the election of its nominee as the mayor.
On the other hand, in Vavuniya the voter turnout was 52%. However, the ruling coalition had a rude jolt when the pro-LTTE coalition - the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) - came out as the largest party winning five of the 11 seats while the moderate Peoples Democratic Front (PDF) came second. The verdict indicates strong support to the two issues propagated by the TNA - preservation of Tamil identity and demand for autonomy. It was also a public disapproval of the government policy of detaining 300,000 war displaced Tamils of Vanni in temporary camps instead of allowing them to return to their homes. The President can be expected to make plans for realignment of his support base among Tamil political parties to ensure he gains Tamil votes in the next presidential as it could become crucial.
However, in the elections for the Uva Provincial Council in the south held at the same time, the UPFA came out on top polling 72% of the votes and securing 25 of the 34 seats. The main opposition United National Party (UNP) polled only 22% of the votes and won only seats. The Leftist Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) was routed. It polled only 2% of the votes polled and secured only one seat. This indicates the strong support the President is enjoying in the south, following his victory against the LTTE.
Continuing woes of displaced people
The international criticism of Sri Lanka’s performance in handling humanitarian and human rights issues gathered further momentum as monsoon rains flooded some of the camps added to the misery of displaced people detained there. Both the U.S. and the UK came out with strong statements asking Sri Lanka to rehabilitate them speedily.
The government and the UN agencies were blaming each other for establishing the camps in low lying areas and providing poor infrastructure facilities. There appear to be differences within the government on the issue of repatriation the displaced people to their villages. The Defence Secretary had made it clear that unless the inmates were screened for identifying LTTE elements in their midst, they would not be allowed to go. On the other hand other ministries have been trying to soft pedal the issue citing the need to complete the mine clearance operations going on in many parts of Northern Province. It was clear that the government was dragging its feet over the issue perhaps due to internal differences.
However, perhaps in deference to Sri Lanka’s promises to India and the mounting international criticism probably one third of the inmates are likely to be released during September. Further delay in this respect is likely to embarrass the Indian government which could come under public pressure in Tamil Nadu.
Human rights issues
The President expressed his concern over growing high handed behaviour of police and ministers which reached a new high during the month. One minister was arrested for freeing an arrested person from a police station. A senior police officer and his wife are being prosecuted for kidnapping, torturing and killing three students. A crackdown against police corruption and misconduct is under way. According to the head of police as many as 189 policemen were under investigation during the month. However, there is a strong nexus between politicians and corrupt police elements and the cleansing operation is unlikely to yield satisfactory results in the near future.
Sri Lanka army plans
The Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), General Sarath Fonseka, in his first public appearance in nearly three months speaking on ‘Winning Military Strategies - Lessons for Managers,’ said the Sri Lanka Army’s strategy of acting like guerrilla organisation, restructuring of the Army, ending corruption, increasing its strength and firepower and organizing a direct chain of command that went from the top to grass root levels as the key elements that ended the LTTE terrorism. It is significant that he had touched upon corruption – an issue that had plagued armed forces for a long time. He also said that most of the targets engaged by the air force and navy were based upon the revamped military intelligence.
General Fonseka’s emergence as a strong leader has had its ripples on politics as well. He has disowned an e-mail containing a statement purported to have been issued by him which had been circulating. The statement containing extremely right wing views and Indian slant was highly critical of present political leadership as a whole. Though the e-mail lacked credibility it appears to have created ripples in political circles.
LTTE’s survival pains
The tentative efforts made to rebuild the leadership-less LTTE with the installation of Kumaran Pathmanathan (KP), its senior most surviving leader and international representative as General Secretary, collapsed after his dramatic arrest in Kuala Lumpur and rendition to Colombo on August 6. Sri Lankan intelligence in coordination with Malaysia and Thailand carried out the operation and took him into custody when he had gone to Kuala Lumpur for a meeting with two Sri Lanka Tamils related to the late Nadesan, political head of the LTTE. KP was flown to Colombo via Bangkok in a special Sri Lankan aircraft.
There had been lots of speculation about the circumstances of his apprehension. They range from involvement of foreign intelligence agencies in the operation, some LTTE blacklegs turning informers, and the hands of expatriate Tamils turning against KP. Whatever be the truth behind the arrest, it was a remarkable achievement of Sri Lanka intelligence. With KP’s arrest, the LTTE’s succession struggle is likely to start all over again and the process may not be smooth. Sivaparan alias Nediyavan, related to the late LTTE political wing leader Tamilchelvan, and who opposed the rise of KP earlier, was tipped as successor. The Norwegian police are reported to be keeping a watch on Nediyawan who is living in exile there.
The Sri Lankans have made a number of arrests and recovered sizeable quantities of arms from caches in Colombo and Vanni based upon information given by KP. India will undoubtedly welcome the arrest of KP who is suspected to have been involved in Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination plot and other cases of gun running in India.
[This analysis of activities in Sri Lanka during Aug 2008 was written on August 31, 2009 for South Asia Security Trends published by www.security-risks.com who hold the copy right.]
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