The often asked but seldom answered question "what after Kilinochchi?" has become more relevant after the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) lost Kilinochchi on January 2 and along with it control over most of its domain in the north. After Kilinochchi, two major actors in the war scene – the government of President Rajapaksa and the LTTE - will be reworking their agendas to suit the emerging environment.
Of course, a third but reluctant player is the Sri Lanka Tamil polity, which had avoided drawing up an agenda so far. For them it is confusion compounded now; and most of them have to put on the thinking cap for a change and think beyond blaming others. They have to take some hard decisions. But they might not be in a hurry to do this.
Though capture of Kilinochchi was expected for quite sometime now, the security forces did it just a day after the fall of Paranthan on January 1.This was faster than I had estimated in Sri Lanka Update No 160 written on the day Paranthan fell. Evidently, Task Force I after capturing Paranthan had maintained its momentum to exploit the pressure building up on at Kilinochchi to capture it in a joint operation with 57 Division.This speaks for the high morale of troops. Though the LTTE had vacated its de facto capital, troops in combat wasted no time and occupied Kilinochchi. So it is not surprising that the security forces are going ahead towards Elephant Pass and Mullaitivu supported by air strikes.
From a tactical point of view, the LTTE took the pragmatic decision to vacate Kilinochchi defences when it became untenable rather than get decimated. This is sensible if we disregard the sense of triumph and achievement among victors and dismay among the LTTE acolytes.
Past experience appears to have clouded the LTTE estimation of the staying power of the security forces in the Eelam War-4. The LTTE is now fighting highly motivated and clearly focused armed forces who are single-mindedly executing the presidential mandate to eliminate the LTTE. Their ability to attack and capture of Kilinochchi even after suffering heavy casualties earlier shows the determination of the security forces. The LTTE will probably rethink its "trusted" strategies because the security forces have disproved their validity in Kilinochchi operation.
LTTE agenda
According to a report from an unknown source in the usually well informed website www.transcurrents.com the LTTE has already started withdrawing from their defences in and around Elephant Pass in the narrow land strip linking Jaffna peninsula with the rest of the country. According to the report the LTTE was preparing to vacate its defences in Eastern Mullaithivu district including Mullaithivu, Oddusuddan and Vatraappalai. Though the report is plausible it is not confirmed by other sources. If the report is correct, it would indicate the tectonic impact the loss of Kilinochchi is having on the LTTE.
The loss of Kilinochchi is a big blow for the LTTE's image. It is also the peak of achievement for the security forces in their process of demystifyig LTTE started in 2006. It comes when LTTE's woes are many: domain is restricted to a district or so, its conventional army has been mauled and left bleeding, use of Sea Tigers curtailed, and the Air Tigers grounded probably for many more months to come. Its international funding, logistic and propaganda machinery has been tampered and merchant supply fleet run aground. So conventional mode is out and guerrilla mode is in for the LTTE.
In the past, the LTTE had always managed to bounce back and come out stronger to take on the State more strongly than before for many reasons. The army commander has announced his intention to continue the war till the LTTE leaders are hunted out. So the environment is going to be even more risky for the LTTE to disengage, regroup and reassert. The security measures in cities have been tightened, often with draconian measures. This time that process is not going to be easy. The global, regional and national environments have changed after 9/11. To bounce back the LTTE will also hav to change.
However the question is not whether the LTTE will bounce back, but how it will try to do so. Prabhakaran's unique strength is his doggedness in pursuit of his goal. So he will put every ounce of strength and talent to bounce back. And that is the worst case scenario for Sri Lanka government. What will be Prabhakaran's agenda now? How he will try to stage a comeback with the LTTE? These questions are more relevant now than "can he stage a comeback."
To recover from the continued onslaught and reassert, the LTTE will have to first extricate itself from battle. This is a tricky operation in itself. Pulling out of Kilinochchi might well be its starting point. Other issues in the LTTE agenda could be – securing assets from further loss, regrouping and reorganising cadres in safe hides, rebuilding the logistic network, and reassert LTTE's power through a graded series of covert and overt actions.
Prabhakaran would have prepared hideouts for mothballing heavy armament and equipment. Assets not required for immediate use like heavy weapons, spare ammunition, and arms would be similarly cached. Other valuables would also need safe keeping. With the loss of Kilinochchi, the LTTE has lost its large infrastructure assets built there over a period of time. The LTTE is also probably facing cash crunch due to the high cost of war and drying up of a number of lucrative income sources like the "toll tax" on vehicles using A9 road, remittances, and local levies following the shrinking domain. Thus recouping financial assets and rebuilding revenue resources would be a top priority in LTTE agenda. It might result in some arm twisting of businessmen in Colombo, Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Jaffna for "donations" and such activity would carry bigger risks than ever before.
Regrouping the cadres for a guerrilla mode after disengagement is not going to be easy either. Unlike earlier Eelam wars, few veteran leaders are available to do this task and they are also aging. There are quite a few other issues. Casualties have to be attended to and treated. (Tamil Nadu could become a refuge for such benign wounded cadres.) Other non-effective members will have to be shed and given shelter in secure conditions. The units have to be re-grouped in smaller subunits and assigned specific responsibilities. Guerrilla operation is executed by small groups or lone individuals in a decentralized fashion. To be successful the guerrilla requires a great deal of self motivation. LTTE's much heralded suicide terrorism has depleted motivated and cadres trained in special skills. In this ambience, burden of motivating the cadres is likely to rest on younger hardcore warriors who fought hard in the war. The success of the LTTE's come back will depend upon them.
Through the years of war and peace, the LTTE had built a strong international network of supporters who had helped it to become one of the top insurgency movements in the world. They had been bankrolling the LTTE war effort. The Tamil expatriates had also provided international propaganda interface for the LTTE's cause and lobbied the governments for support. Their support cannot be taken for granted anymore as the war had been going on for too long and a new generation is emerging.
The LTTE's war has been going on for two decades in which over 25,000 of Tamil youth have lost their lives, without achieving any tangible results. As the LTTE continues to be a listed terrorist organization, the stringent international anti terror protocols (in place after 9/11 terror strike in New York) are not going to make it easy for external support to reach the LTTE. And the governments of 37countries which have banned the LTTE are unlikely to ease the guard or allow their soil to be used for rebuilding LTTE.
Lastly, despite their differences over LTTE's questionable methods, sections of Tamil expatriates had supported its efforts in the hope of realizing their dream of an independent Tamil Eelam. They find their hopes are now turning into a chimera. To broaden its appeal, the LTTE has to change its style of operation to a democratic one and accommodate different shades of Tamil opinion in the decision making process. Prabhakaran's personality does not allow even the thought of such "inclusive strategy." The Tamil National Alliance is a very good example of the still born result of LTTE's last attempt at inclusive strategy. It has merely reduced dignified Tamil politicians into 'yes men' of Prabhakaran and nothing more.
And to reach the reassertion stage, the LTTE will have to successfully go through the first three parts of the agenda discussed earlier.
In the past, the inability of Sri Lanka state to satisfy Tamil aspirations had been the biggest incentive for them to support the LTTE, despite Prabhakaran's repressive style. This had helped the LTTE "bounce back." Tamils had always found a yawning gap between what Sri Lanka government and politicians promise them and what they deliver. So far the doubts of Tamils have only been strengthened by the way President Rajapaksa had indifferently handled the political part of the issues raised by the LTTE and other Tamil politicians. In short, the bounce back of the LTTE will dependent upon how sincere the Sri Lanka government is in implementing an "inclusive strategy" to gain the trust of Tamil people and give them a feeling of security.
Translated into the hard reality of politics that is unlikely to happen merely by holding elections. The success of the LTTE's bounce back process depends upon how the state helps the people to recoup normal lives and avocations of the people battered by years of war. If the President can do it and give the Tamils a sense of ownership in their destiny, the LTTE comeback will not be easy, despite Prabhakaran's best effort. There it is, the answer to the question "after Kilinochchi what?"
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cnotes5%5Cnote492.html
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