Col R Hariharan
The Tamil version of this article was published in The Sunday Indian (Tamil)on January 12, 2009.
“Meet this Army officer. He is the man who killed our son,” the middle aged man pointed at me as he introduced me to his wife. My wife was shocked. But I knew his pain, so I was nonchalant. It happened in 1989 in my own home in Chennai. I knew them quite well in Jaffna. In fact, their house was the first one I visited when I set foot on the red earth of Jaffna on August 5, 1987 as part of the Indian Peace Keeping Force. His 18-year old son was also there. The handsome young fellow was a “Tamil Tiger” of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. In Jaffna everybody called them “Boys.”.
When quite unexpectedly our war with the Tigers started a few months later, I learnt the young fellow had gone to Mannar to fight against our troops. So I had told our men to take him alive and not kill him. “He is a Tamil Tiger so he may chew the cyanide capsule. Don’t allow him to do it,” I had warned. But what happened was quite tragic.
When the clash took place, he swallowed the cyanide capsule and dropped dead even before our troops got to him. How can I explain all this to his father in distress? But the boy’s death hurt me like hundred other incidents I faced in Sri Lanka as Military Intelligence chief for three years. As a Tamil I had a professional advantage there, but emotionally it was a torture daily to see innocent Tamil civilians dying in the war. The unhappy experience left deep scars in me. I sympathize with the Tamil struggle for equal rights with majority Sinhalas, but I do not accept taking up arms as the means to gain them.
My involvement with the Indian forces in Sri Lanka came unexpectedly. I was the senior most MI officer among the handful of Tamil MI officers at that time. Some relatives of our extended family lived in Jaffna and Colombo; so I was familiar with the Tamil issue. The Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement was conceived in haste and executed without thinking through a long term strategy. Ostensibly it had two goals – to preserve India’s strategic security interests and to help out Sri Lankan Tamils get their just rights while maintaining the unity of Sri Lanka. These were political and diplomatic goals rather than military one. To top it all, Indian Peace Keeping Force had no written mandate. Some oral instructions went even beyond our goals - we were told to be ready protect Sri Lanka President Jayawardane from possible backlash to the Agreement from Sinhalas and Sri Lanka army!
When I reached Chennai on August 2, 1987 the Southern Army Commander Lt Gen Depinder Singh told me to be ready to go to Jaffna to assist Indian troops tasked with the implementation of the Agreement. Sri Lanka had asked for Indian troops help in disarming the Tamil militants. “You will be required to be there for about 3 days, I guess. Nobody knows. I have no clear cut mandate. But I expect Prabhakaran to follow others and deposit his arms,” He said. That was how I reached Jaffna three days later with two pairs of uniform and nothing else. Gen Depinder could not have been more wrong on both counts. Prabhakaran never fully accepted the Agreement or gave up his goal of creating an independent Tamil Eelam. And I returned formally back to India only after three years. So much for our readiness for war in Sri Lanka!
The first two months were the best period of peace and tranquility we had, though the LTTE was dragging its feet in surrendering arms and accepting the proposed interim administration set up for the Northeast Province. I could see the trouble brewing. Even as we landed in Sri Lanka, Rajendra, our family friend and retired civil servant of Sri Lanka who had served under Jayawardane had warned me. “Rajiv Gandhi is a baby in politics. The wily Jayawardane is going to eat him up for breakfast. His idea is to make you fight the Tigers by October. You just wait and watch.” I passed on his assessment to New Delhi. Rajendra did not live to see his deadly forecast come true when we went to war. He was killed when a bomb burst near his house in Jaffna in the first week of war.
The LTTE confrontation with Indian army reached a new high when Thileepan, one the young LTTE leaders, went on a fast unto death on September 15, 1987 over “India’s failure to implement the Agreement.” The LTTE organized widespread anti-Indian public protests all over Jaffna. New Delhi chose to ignore the worsening situation and left it to the army to handle sensitive political and diplomatic issues for which the army had no competency or expertise. Thileepan never broke his fast and died on September 26, 1987. It only worsened our increasingly bitter relationship with the LTTE.
But the breaking point came on October 3, 1987 when Sri Lanka Navy apprehended senior LTTE leaders Pulendran, Kumarappa and 13 other members when in mid sea off Point Pedro when they were returning from Tamil Nadu coast. The two leaders were found carrying arms. They were kept in custody in Sri Lanka Army base at Palaly. President Jayawardane wanted to fly them to Colombo to face a number of criminal charges pending against them for involvement in some of the major LTTE attacks in which a number of civilians were killed. (Pulendran was accused of masterminding the attack that killed 139 pilgrims in Anuradhapura.) India tried to persuade President Jayawardane to release them as a goodwill gesture to preserve amity. However he did not budge. Probably he saw trying them as a political opportunity to regain some of the lost popularity among Sinhalas. We believed he would never allow them to go back alive.
I was present at the air base on October 5, when the Sri Lanka army decided to forcibly fly them to Colombo. I knew Major General Jayaratne, Jaffna Commander of Sri Lanka, who had done an army course with me in India. He made a last ditch effort to persuade Colombo to hand them over to Indian custody. But he failed; “President says no and out they go” he told us unhappily. The Sri Lankan officer standing next to me said, “My god, it is going to be war all over again.”
We were watching as the Sri Lankan troops dragged the cadres out just as they bit cyanide capsules. The LTTE leader Mahathia had smuggled cyanide capsules when he visited them earlier. They were carried dying, frothing at the mouth and their limbs twitching as the Sri Lankan troops loaded them in ambulances. Some of the soldiers kicked the dying men. It was one of the saddest moments in my life to see them dying so needlessly, when peace was so near, just to satisfy the egos of two leaders. My colleague Capt Chandok had tears in his eyes. I had always felt India’s failure to act strongly in that incident was the point of no return for LTTE’s decision to go to war.
Next day the Sri Lankans handed over the 12 bodies to us. (Three cadres had escaped death thanks to effective first aid.) Senior LTTE leaders Mahathiya and Yogi came to collect the bodies. The atmosphere was gloomy. I saw Koteeswaran, the legal advisor of LTTE, who was known to me with them. I requested him to persuade Prabhakaran not to get into armed confrontation with the army. “We don’t want to fight Tamils; we came to help them. And our army is huge and can fight for the next 20 years. We have been doing it in Nagaland for 30 years. So kindly put some sense in Prabhakaran’s mind,” I added. The able attorney looked sad. “Col sir, you are right but who can talk sense to Thambi,” he said. Mahathiya was grim. “Now you are handing over 12 bodies of our cadres. You will collect 1200 bodies of your own soldiers,” he said as the bodies wrapped in white shroud were loaded in LTTE vans. Mahathiya was so prophetic; we lost 1255 soldiers in our war with the LTTE. Only he could not predict his own death later when Prabhakaran killed him for being a RAW agent. And my friend the soft spoken Koteeswaran was also shot dead by unknown persons before we left. What a waste!
Mankind has always glorified war. They are so depicted in epics. I have seen three major wars and at least ten other insurgency conflicts in India, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. The truth is wars are tragic because death visits us everyday. I have lost so many people known to me in wars during nearly 30 years of my army service. They belonged to different armies and insurgent groups. They fought for a cause and died. But was it worth it? I wonder. I remember Major Gopalakrishna, the only son of a widowed mother from Madurai. Just before the India-Pakistan war he was to be sent to Soviet Union for special training. But war became imminent and he was unloaded from the plane. Next day, two days before the war, he was killed when a single bullet from somewhere hit him when a few of us were moving around the border area.
Once in Trincomalee I got information that the LTTE had sent two assassins to kill Padmanbha, leader of the EPRLF (Eelam Peoples Liberation Front) which was supporting us. I called him at 3 AM to warn him about it. Padmanabha laughed at the information. “Col Sir, don’t wake me up for this. Don’t lose your sleep also over this. I died the day I took up arms to fight for my belief,” he said and went back to sleep. I could not do so. Though he survived then, sadly death in the form of LTTE did not spare him. They killed him in Chennai after the war was over.
I had my own brush with death a few times in wars. In Sri Lanka it was in 1989 I think. I had gone with Lt Gen AS Kalkat, our commander, in a helicopter to visit our troops fighting in a LTTE stronghold in Nithikaikulam in Mullaitivu district. Just as we stepped out of the helicopter, a LTTE rocket whizzed past us and hit the helicopter which burst into a ball of fire. Death missed us by a whisker. We jumped over a bund nearby to take cover as another rocket hit set one more helicopter standing there on fire. Our escort helicopter gunship hovering over us for our protection fired a few rockets at our foes. We were spared our lives. It was on that day that wars lost their glamour for me, not out of fear of my life, but at the utter futility of it all. Why was Gopalakrishna killed by a lone bullet even before the war started? And why we were spared even by rocket fire in the thick of war? I don’t know the answers.
January 6, 2009
courtesy: The Sunday Indian/Tamil January 12, 2009
Friday, January 30, 2009
Wednesday, January 28, 2009
Martyr's widow not allowed into Rashtrapati Bhavan
It is a shame how this nation treats its people - even the widow of a soldier who has been awarded the highest medal on the same day by the President of India!! Shame on you India. Here is the media report:
Wed, Jan 28 02:13 AM
It takes extraordinary valour to win the Ashok Chakra, the country's highest peacetime gallantry award. But that is no guarantee a soldier would get the respect that should accompany that recognition.
On Republic Day, President Pratibha Patil bestowed Shanti Bohra with Havildar Bahadur Singh Bohra's Ashok Chakra (posthumous) in front of the entire nation. But a few hours later, the martyr's 29-year-old wife and her two daughters, aged five and three, were turned away from the gates of the Rashtrapati Bhavan.
Shanti had travelled from Jodhpur to receive the award. Her pleas with Patil's staff that she had no place to leave her daughters behind, fell on deaf ears.
A Rashtrapati Bhavan official, not authorised to speak to the media, said, "At formal functions, children are not allowed. Only those invited by name are allowed for security reasons.
" However, had the matter been brought to the notice of officials, it could have been resolved as it involved a highly decorated soldier's family, he claimed. "Some consideration should have been shown towards the lady.
Where was she supposed to have left her kids?" asked an outraged army officer. Bohra, a squad commander of 10 Para (Special Forces), led an assault team carrying out counter-terrorist operations in Jammu and Kashmir's Lawanz area.
Last September, he engaged a group of heavily armed terrorists and killed three of them despite several gunshot injuries. His citation reads: "Bohra displayed most conspicuous bravery and made supreme sacrifice for the nation.
Wed, Jan 28 02:13 AM
It takes extraordinary valour to win the Ashok Chakra, the country's highest peacetime gallantry award. But that is no guarantee a soldier would get the respect that should accompany that recognition.
On Republic Day, President Pratibha Patil bestowed Shanti Bohra with Havildar Bahadur Singh Bohra's Ashok Chakra (posthumous) in front of the entire nation. But a few hours later, the martyr's 29-year-old wife and her two daughters, aged five and three, were turned away from the gates of the Rashtrapati Bhavan.
Shanti had travelled from Jodhpur to receive the award. Her pleas with Patil's staff that she had no place to leave her daughters behind, fell on deaf ears.
A Rashtrapati Bhavan official, not authorised to speak to the media, said, "At formal functions, children are not allowed. Only those invited by name are allowed for security reasons.
" However, had the matter been brought to the notice of officials, it could have been resolved as it involved a highly decorated soldier's family, he claimed. "Some consideration should have been shown towards the lady.
Where was she supposed to have left her kids?" asked an outraged army officer. Bohra, a squad commander of 10 Para (Special Forces), led an assault team carrying out counter-terrorist operations in Jammu and Kashmir's Lawanz area.
Last September, he engaged a group of heavily armed terrorists and killed three of them despite several gunshot injuries. His citation reads: "Bohra displayed most conspicuous bravery and made supreme sacrifice for the nation.
Killing of Civilians:Hands of Both Govt and LTTE are Tainted
The security forces have captured Mullaitivu, the last bastion of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). This is comes as the icing on the cake of their achievements in the war against one of the toughest insurgent forces in the world, which has no hesitation in using terror tactics. However, the security forces have to address an issue that is disturbing not only to NGOs and UN humanitarian agencies but to many others who are no sympathisers of the LTTE.
In the last few days almost all international news agencies have reported the death of a number of civilians in Sri Lankan air strikes and artillery shelling carried out repeatedly to soften up the LTTE defences in support of the advancing security forces. A report of the Associated Press quoted Sri Lankan health officials saying that at lest 30 civilians were killed in a single day on January 20 due to shelling on a school and a hospital in the newly declared safety zone. The fact that the TamilNet, the pro LTTE website, had been reporting such deaths of civilians almost every day does not minimise the gravity of these incidents. Hundreds of civilians have died in such firing; even Indian newsmen who had been to Mullaittivu have confirmed it. One Indian reporter has spoken of heaps of dead bodies lying outside the makeshift hospital in Mullaittivu.
The death and injury among civilian population used as the human shield of the LTTE is caused when the security forces use artillery fire and air strikes to neutralise the LTTE pockets embedded in the midst of civilians. So it cannot be condoned as inevitable "collateral damage" of war. Such reports are even more serious if death and destruction of civilians come from an area that is supposed to be "safety zone". So it is not surprising that the issue has drawn strong criticism worldwide.
Deaths of civilians and displacement of population from their habitations are perhaps the two most certain events in any war. When a society unleashes war as a solution, such happenings are to be expected. And war is also the biggest violation of citizens' basic right to life and property. The expectation of privation is no consolation to the hapless population struggling just to survive between the foes.
So what both the government and the LTTE do to mitigate their suffering is as important as winning or losing in battlefields.
It is in the nature of air strikes and artillery bombardment to cause death and destruction in areas around the target. Even with all the technology for precision strikes, both air and artillery fire has inherent probability error in hitting the target area. In fact even the most accurate artillery gun has to correct its fire for every target with a couple of salvos before it opens its barrage on the target. This is done to minimise error of shells not hitting the target. Such an area would extend to a radius of at least 100 yards around the target. That is how the damages from 'collateral' causes occur. As it is inherent in the use of artillery fire to call it collateral is absurd. The use of artillery fire and air strikes in civilian areas regardless of compulsions is to be condemned strongly because it is so inhuman.
Unfortunately bombs and bullets do not discriminate between soldiers and "human shields" or hapless civilians trying flee the battlefield. In times of war, displaced population have neither the resources nor energy to take protective measures taken by the troops. Women and children form bulk of such civilian casualties because they cannot run as fast as men to safety.
The security forces are repeatedly told to exercise caution while using their fire power. War is not a cricket match; it is each man fighting not only to save himself, but to kill the enemy to fulfil his commander's mission. That is why soldiers are trained to become part of a gigantic killing machine that armies are. Their principles of war tell them to use superior force with preponderance of fire power while maintaining their objective. Under such compulsions of war, expecting the security forces to enforce a zero civilian casualty policy is extremely difficult if not impossible. So it is for other government agencies to take measures to ameliorate the fall out of battles on civil population well in advance and train them on how to save themselves.
In this regard the hands of both the government and the LTTE are tainted. The security forces have stepped up the use of artillery including multi barrel rocket fire and air power even as the LTTE areas are shrinking every day increasing the density of civilians per square kilometre. And the role of the LTTE is despicable and heartless. Even the UN has critically commented on the LTTE's cynical strategy of not allowing civilian population to get out of the battle zone, even though it knows that it is not going to defend the area unto death of the last of its cadres.
The government run by an elected body of people's representatives cannot absolve its responsibility in this respect by blaming the LTTE. As an organised government its norms are clearly defined and public accountability is an essential part of it. It is expected to perform better than the LTTE which has no pretension of such niceties and has only its leader Prabhakaran's edicts as norms of functioning.
Media is the conscience keeper of society. When the government fails to operate according to the norms of governance, it is the duty of media to report it. This is more so in times of war, when people accept the curbing some of their fundamental freedoms in the national interest. Unfortunately, the Sri Lankan media feels increasingly insecure when they face violence and intimidation directly or indirectly from elements of government or suspected to have close connections with it.
President Rajapaksa had been enjoying better press than his predecessors and most of the other politicians. In spite of this, his repeated reassurances on media freedom have not made much headway because other limbs of the government continue add a new episode to media confrontation almost daily. What is surprising is the government attitude to the media trying to report on the war, when only government is the "authorised source" of information.
The latest in the government's firing line was the BBC Sandeshaya for quoting the civilian casualty figures given by a representative of Mullaittivu hospital in its report. Media men dig for news from any available source when they are denied independent access to the happenings. This is what is happening
Victory in war is a heady thing. It can cloud government's perspectives on fundamental issues of governance. Victories in battlefields would not mean much in the long run if people do not feel secure and trust the government. The opposition Janatha Vimuthi Peramuna leader put it aptly: "These war victories can be meaningful to the people only when democracy is restored." Unfortunately, Sri Lanka is giving the impression that this is not happening.
January 27, 2009
Published in www.southasiaanalysis.org as "SRI LANKA: War and the Humanitarian Crisis in Vanni – Update No. 164"
In the last few days almost all international news agencies have reported the death of a number of civilians in Sri Lankan air strikes and artillery shelling carried out repeatedly to soften up the LTTE defences in support of the advancing security forces. A report of the Associated Press quoted Sri Lankan health officials saying that at lest 30 civilians were killed in a single day on January 20 due to shelling on a school and a hospital in the newly declared safety zone. The fact that the TamilNet, the pro LTTE website, had been reporting such deaths of civilians almost every day does not minimise the gravity of these incidents. Hundreds of civilians have died in such firing; even Indian newsmen who had been to Mullaittivu have confirmed it. One Indian reporter has spoken of heaps of dead bodies lying outside the makeshift hospital in Mullaittivu.
The death and injury among civilian population used as the human shield of the LTTE is caused when the security forces use artillery fire and air strikes to neutralise the LTTE pockets embedded in the midst of civilians. So it cannot be condoned as inevitable "collateral damage" of war. Such reports are even more serious if death and destruction of civilians come from an area that is supposed to be "safety zone". So it is not surprising that the issue has drawn strong criticism worldwide.
Deaths of civilians and displacement of population from their habitations are perhaps the two most certain events in any war. When a society unleashes war as a solution, such happenings are to be expected. And war is also the biggest violation of citizens' basic right to life and property. The expectation of privation is no consolation to the hapless population struggling just to survive between the foes.
So what both the government and the LTTE do to mitigate their suffering is as important as winning or losing in battlefields.
It is in the nature of air strikes and artillery bombardment to cause death and destruction in areas around the target. Even with all the technology for precision strikes, both air and artillery fire has inherent probability error in hitting the target area. In fact even the most accurate artillery gun has to correct its fire for every target with a couple of salvos before it opens its barrage on the target. This is done to minimise error of shells not hitting the target. Such an area would extend to a radius of at least 100 yards around the target. That is how the damages from 'collateral' causes occur. As it is inherent in the use of artillery fire to call it collateral is absurd. The use of artillery fire and air strikes in civilian areas regardless of compulsions is to be condemned strongly because it is so inhuman.
Unfortunately bombs and bullets do not discriminate between soldiers and "human shields" or hapless civilians trying flee the battlefield. In times of war, displaced population have neither the resources nor energy to take protective measures taken by the troops. Women and children form bulk of such civilian casualties because they cannot run as fast as men to safety.
The security forces are repeatedly told to exercise caution while using their fire power. War is not a cricket match; it is each man fighting not only to save himself, but to kill the enemy to fulfil his commander's mission. That is why soldiers are trained to become part of a gigantic killing machine that armies are. Their principles of war tell them to use superior force with preponderance of fire power while maintaining their objective. Under such compulsions of war, expecting the security forces to enforce a zero civilian casualty policy is extremely difficult if not impossible. So it is for other government agencies to take measures to ameliorate the fall out of battles on civil population well in advance and train them on how to save themselves.
In this regard the hands of both the government and the LTTE are tainted. The security forces have stepped up the use of artillery including multi barrel rocket fire and air power even as the LTTE areas are shrinking every day increasing the density of civilians per square kilometre. And the role of the LTTE is despicable and heartless. Even the UN has critically commented on the LTTE's cynical strategy of not allowing civilian population to get out of the battle zone, even though it knows that it is not going to defend the area unto death of the last of its cadres.
The government run by an elected body of people's representatives cannot absolve its responsibility in this respect by blaming the LTTE. As an organised government its norms are clearly defined and public accountability is an essential part of it. It is expected to perform better than the LTTE which has no pretension of such niceties and has only its leader Prabhakaran's edicts as norms of functioning.
Media is the conscience keeper of society. When the government fails to operate according to the norms of governance, it is the duty of media to report it. This is more so in times of war, when people accept the curbing some of their fundamental freedoms in the national interest. Unfortunately, the Sri Lankan media feels increasingly insecure when they face violence and intimidation directly or indirectly from elements of government or suspected to have close connections with it.
President Rajapaksa had been enjoying better press than his predecessors and most of the other politicians. In spite of this, his repeated reassurances on media freedom have not made much headway because other limbs of the government continue add a new episode to media confrontation almost daily. What is surprising is the government attitude to the media trying to report on the war, when only government is the "authorised source" of information.
The latest in the government's firing line was the BBC Sandeshaya for quoting the civilian casualty figures given by a representative of Mullaittivu hospital in its report. Media men dig for news from any available source when they are denied independent access to the happenings. This is what is happening
Victory in war is a heady thing. It can cloud government's perspectives on fundamental issues of governance. Victories in battlefields would not mean much in the long run if people do not feel secure and trust the government. The opposition Janatha Vimuthi Peramuna leader put it aptly: "These war victories can be meaningful to the people only when democracy is restored." Unfortunately, Sri Lanka is giving the impression that this is not happening.
January 27, 2009
Published in www.southasiaanalysis.org as "SRI LANKA: War and the Humanitarian Crisis in Vanni – Update No. 164"
Sri Lanka:Capture of Mullaitivu and the future of LTTE
The capture of Mullaitivu, the last big town under the control of the Liberation of Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), in a way came about as abruptly as Kilinochchi on January 25. But 59 Division of the Sri Lanka security forces which captured Mullaitivu had to fight its way through in some of the worst terrain against well fortified defensive positions.
The fall of Mullaittivu was not unexpected. In fact in my article in the Hindu last week, I had said, "With such a large force confronting them, the LTTE cadres defending Mullathivu are facing a situation that is not dissimilar to what they faced during their defence of Kilinochchi, which crumbled after the government forces broke through the perimeter defences. Mullathivu might face the same fate with the final assault going through as a walk-in into a ghost town."
Only this time around, the approaches to Mullaitivu pulled some surprises with the strong resistance east of Dharmapuram up to Viswamadu-Viswamadukulam. Security forces had reported blasting of the Kalmadukulam tank by the LTTE and flooding the Dharmapuram, Ramanathapuram, and Viswamadu areas to stall the advance f the security forces. According to the media, occupying an area of five square km this tank was the second largest in the north.
However, the LTTE cadres in defending area between Puthukkudiyiruppu and to its south and west have little chance of holding on with approximately five divisions converging on it from three directions. 55 Division advancing along Nagarkovil-Chundikulam axis in the north captured Chundikulam crossing the lagoon of the same name. It plans to link up with 59 Division in Mullaitivu which would close the last bit of free access to the sea between Mullaitivu and Chundikulam to the LTTE.
The chief of LTTE Velupillai Prabhakaran has become elusive even as a lot of hype was built up by the security forces about his presence in Mullaitivu area. As the Sri Lanka expects to rout the LTTE completely by March 2009, Prbhakaran's whereabouts become crucial after Mullaittivu's capture. The LTTE has been silent on speculations about its supreme leader, having lost its tenor due to the fading fortunes of war.
The Sri Lankan army commander Lt Gen Sarath Fonseka has claimed that 95 percent of the LTTE is "finished." Territorially speaking he is probably correct. But I am sure the security forces know that would not be the "real" 95 percent of the LTTE unless most of the cadres are killed or caught and the weapon inventories of the LTTE are accounted for. They also would acknowledge Prabhakaran has to exit the Sri Lanka scene for "finishing" the LTTE finally.
His continued leadership is vital for rebuilding the LTTE to survive another day. He has been the guiding spirit of the LTTE in war and peace all these years and many of the followers would not know what do without his command. More than that, he has not allowed the rise of any other leader to the stature of being his successor. As the LTTE revolves around Prabhakaran his death or apprehension could fold up the LTTE. His fate is also interlinked with the fortunes of his acolytes and fellow travellers both at home and abroad, particularly in Tamil Nadu.
Just before Mullaittivu fell, there had been widespread speculation in Sri Lanka media that he might have gone to Kerala or Tamil Nadu or even Penang State in Malaysia. All the three regions, where pockets of LTTE sympathisers exist, are not in the good books of Sri Lanka. However, at present these stories appear to be more fiction than factual.
With these stories, the Sri Lanka intelligence agencies probably hoped to demoralise the LTTE cadres defending Mullaitivu.
The LTTE cadres at the battle front are out of touch with Prabhakaran. This is not surprising as Prabhakaran normally does not join frontline battles though he keeps close touch with operations. The Tiger leader is also known to change his location frequently even in normal times. These are sensible survival precautions of a paranoid leader who has made too many enemies. And that is how he has survived. The Prabhakaran mystique is built as much on his low visibility and as the high secrecy of his location.
But where is Prabhakaran? Despite inspired stories about his departure to India, Malaysia or elsewhere, he runs the risk of being arrested in most of the 37 countries the have banned the LTTE in some form or other. Only Myanmar, Thailand and Kampuchea could become destinations of a fleeing LTTE leader. Of course, South Africa and Eritrea are touted as two other possibilities. But both are too far and travel would be too risky for the LTTE leader. The LTTE had a history of striking deals with corrupt elements of Myanmar military regime. But its socially downtrodden Tamil ethnic population has little influence and the military regime might sacrifice Prabhakran in adversity. Kampuchea where the LTTE had been buying his arms and Thailand where the LTTE has some clout with powerful Sri Lankan Tamil expatriates appear to be the only possibilities.
But own assessment is that given his doggedness built around the goal of achieving Tamil Eelam, Prabhakaran might not quit Sri Lanka to the comfort of Sri Lanka government. Tamil Nadu and Kerala coasts are the easiest to reach. Tamil Nadu in particular is an attractive destination for Prabhakaran because LTTE has built support assets there. However, it could be extremely risky also. Prabhakaran may welcome Indian coast for the limited use as a transit point before sneaking out to one of the western countries where death sentence does not exist and such leaders do get accommodated. After all Britain still has given refuge to one of the most wanted Chechen terrorist leaders. So Tamil Nadu and Kerala would do well to be on guard as Sri Lankan boats getting abandoned on India coasts have been repeatedly reported since last December.
January 27, 2009
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cnotes5%5Cnote495.html
The fall of Mullaittivu was not unexpected. In fact in my article in the Hindu last week, I had said, "With such a large force confronting them, the LTTE cadres defending Mullathivu are facing a situation that is not dissimilar to what they faced during their defence of Kilinochchi, which crumbled after the government forces broke through the perimeter defences. Mullathivu might face the same fate with the final assault going through as a walk-in into a ghost town."
Only this time around, the approaches to Mullaitivu pulled some surprises with the strong resistance east of Dharmapuram up to Viswamadu-Viswamadukulam. Security forces had reported blasting of the Kalmadukulam tank by the LTTE and flooding the Dharmapuram, Ramanathapuram, and Viswamadu areas to stall the advance f the security forces. According to the media, occupying an area of five square km this tank was the second largest in the north.
However, the LTTE cadres in defending area between Puthukkudiyiruppu and to its south and west have little chance of holding on with approximately five divisions converging on it from three directions. 55 Division advancing along Nagarkovil-Chundikulam axis in the north captured Chundikulam crossing the lagoon of the same name. It plans to link up with 59 Division in Mullaitivu which would close the last bit of free access to the sea between Mullaitivu and Chundikulam to the LTTE.
The chief of LTTE Velupillai Prabhakaran has become elusive even as a lot of hype was built up by the security forces about his presence in Mullaitivu area. As the Sri Lanka expects to rout the LTTE completely by March 2009, Prbhakaran's whereabouts become crucial after Mullaittivu's capture. The LTTE has been silent on speculations about its supreme leader, having lost its tenor due to the fading fortunes of war.
The Sri Lankan army commander Lt Gen Sarath Fonseka has claimed that 95 percent of the LTTE is "finished." Territorially speaking he is probably correct. But I am sure the security forces know that would not be the "real" 95 percent of the LTTE unless most of the cadres are killed or caught and the weapon inventories of the LTTE are accounted for. They also would acknowledge Prabhakaran has to exit the Sri Lanka scene for "finishing" the LTTE finally.
His continued leadership is vital for rebuilding the LTTE to survive another day. He has been the guiding spirit of the LTTE in war and peace all these years and many of the followers would not know what do without his command. More than that, he has not allowed the rise of any other leader to the stature of being his successor. As the LTTE revolves around Prabhakaran his death or apprehension could fold up the LTTE. His fate is also interlinked with the fortunes of his acolytes and fellow travellers both at home and abroad, particularly in Tamil Nadu.
Just before Mullaittivu fell, there had been widespread speculation in Sri Lanka media that he might have gone to Kerala or Tamil Nadu or even Penang State in Malaysia. All the three regions, where pockets of LTTE sympathisers exist, are not in the good books of Sri Lanka. However, at present these stories appear to be more fiction than factual.
With these stories, the Sri Lanka intelligence agencies probably hoped to demoralise the LTTE cadres defending Mullaitivu.
The LTTE cadres at the battle front are out of touch with Prabhakaran. This is not surprising as Prabhakaran normally does not join frontline battles though he keeps close touch with operations. The Tiger leader is also known to change his location frequently even in normal times. These are sensible survival precautions of a paranoid leader who has made too many enemies. And that is how he has survived. The Prabhakaran mystique is built as much on his low visibility and as the high secrecy of his location.
But where is Prabhakaran? Despite inspired stories about his departure to India, Malaysia or elsewhere, he runs the risk of being arrested in most of the 37 countries the have banned the LTTE in some form or other. Only Myanmar, Thailand and Kampuchea could become destinations of a fleeing LTTE leader. Of course, South Africa and Eritrea are touted as two other possibilities. But both are too far and travel would be too risky for the LTTE leader. The LTTE had a history of striking deals with corrupt elements of Myanmar military regime. But its socially downtrodden Tamil ethnic population has little influence and the military regime might sacrifice Prabhakran in adversity. Kampuchea where the LTTE had been buying his arms and Thailand where the LTTE has some clout with powerful Sri Lankan Tamil expatriates appear to be the only possibilities.
But own assessment is that given his doggedness built around the goal of achieving Tamil Eelam, Prabhakaran might not quit Sri Lanka to the comfort of Sri Lanka government. Tamil Nadu and Kerala coasts are the easiest to reach. Tamil Nadu in particular is an attractive destination for Prabhakaran because LTTE has built support assets there. However, it could be extremely risky also. Prabhakaran may welcome Indian coast for the limited use as a transit point before sneaking out to one of the western countries where death sentence does not exist and such leaders do get accommodated. After all Britain still has given refuge to one of the most wanted Chechen terrorist leaders. So Tamil Nadu and Kerala would do well to be on guard as Sri Lankan boats getting abandoned on India coasts have been repeatedly reported since last December.
January 27, 2009
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cnotes5%5Cnote495.html
Friday, January 23, 2009
'Sri Lankan army has damaged the LTTE's military invincibility'
Colonel R Hariharan (retd), who served as the head of intelligence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka 1987 to 1990, analyses the war on the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in an interview to rediff.com's Shobha Warrier.
The question often asked was, after Killinocchi, what? How significant was the fall of Killinocchi?
Killinocchi has three dimensions. Two dimensions are directly relevant to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, and one of these is relevant to the Sri Lankan government.
First, the LTTE dimension. Killinocchi was promoted as the capital of the LTTE, on the basis of which it was trying to be on par with the Sri Lankan government in the 2002 peace talks. That was because they signed the ceasefire agreement and agreed to the peace process under the Oslo agreement. So, in a way the Sri Lankan government recognised indirectly the LTTE as the representative of the Tamil people. There were elected members of Parliament who are Tamils, but they were not there as part of the peace process.
So, the LTTE had built up a huge infrastructure to project Killinocchi as the capital with all the fanfare, judiciary, police, etc. It even had its own civil and criminal procedure courts. But it ignored the fact that they still had to depend on civil supplies from the Sri Lankan government.
The government agents, who are equivalent to our collectors or deputy commissioners, were still there. So, it gave the LTTE and those sections of Tamils who are their supporters a feeling of euphoria; that a Tamil Eelam was just around the corner.
From that perspective, the capture of Killinocchi has come as a sort of a rude awakening.
Would you say it is a big blow to the LTTE?
It is a rude awakening because the thinking until then was that the LTTE was equivalent to the Sri Lankan government. But possessing Killinocchi did not make the LTTE a government. To be a government, you require much bigger things, not just this kind of settings or decoration. So, it is a psychological blow to the LTTE.
Only psychological?
That is the second dimension I am talking about. The psychological aspect is far more important than the military conflict. This psychological blow became aggravated because for a long time, people were calling it Stalingrad and Leningrad and El Alamein. It is a very big blow for the Diaspora that has been supporting the dream of a Tamil Eelam.
Now, let me talk about the military defeat of Killinocchi. The military defeat was actually not a defeat, as the LTTE has been losing the war all along. What it has done now is to progressively withdraw.
When you have to occupy a large area with limited forces, you fight what is called a mobile defence strategy. The LTTE has done that. It involves distributing smaller forces along likely routes of advance of the Sri Lankan army, delay them, inflict casualties, pull back a little further to a second line of defence, and again retreat the same way to a third line of defence.
What has happened here is, all axes have converged at Killinocchi. That is astride the A9 highway axis. It is not only psychologically important but it is the lifeline required to sustain Jaffna. Till now, the Sri Lankan government had to ask the army and navy to ferry supplies and protect them along the long sea route from Trincomalee to Jaffna. That was because the land route was closed, and this was the lifeline.
There is another route along the western Mannar coast. But this requires a ferry crossing, and this ferry has been in disuse though the Sri Lankan army had captured it a couple of months ago. That loss itself was huge for the LTTE.
The fall of Killinocchi aggravated the situation, and it became a strategic blow to the LTTE. The LTTE had given the impression that they were invincible. Now, the Sri Lankan army has damaged this image of the LTTE's military invincibility.
Even before the fall of Killinocchi wasn't the LTTE on the back foot?
Yes, the LTTE had been suffering a lot of causalities even before the fall of Killinocchi. Their fortunes had been on decline. Considering that, pulling out from Killinocchi was the most sensible thing for them to do.
What about the loss of Elephant Pass? How significant was it?
Between Killinocchi and Elephant Pass, there is a place called Paranthan, and that is the most significant place. When the Sri Lankans occupy Paranthan, Killinocchi will be cut off from both the north and the south. And this was exactly what the Sri Lankans did.
So, tactically, it was unsound to place all bets on Killinocchi. The LTTE should have defended Paranthan instead of Killinocchi, from a purely strategic point of view. Perhaps because Killinocchi was touted as the capital, they did it.
Killinocchi also has a big population, and the LTTE's assets are there. At the last moment, they cannot abandon it and go to Paranthan. Paranthan was lost on January 1. After a week, Killinocchi fell.
Do you feel by conquering these three inter-related vital points, the Sri Lankan army has won the war?
The moment Killinocchi and Paranthan fell, the LTTE was finished.
What about Mullaitheevu?
Mullaitheevu is at the easternmost part of Sri Lanka, and is a district headquarters in the middle of a rainforest; a very thick jungle. The population is very low, and much of what there was has trickled out.
In the last two days, nearly 2,000 people have come out from the LTTE's area. The LTTE cannot physically control these people; they require to be fed. Ultimately you will find only the LTTE cadres, and probably their immediate families, left there.
Even if you don't capture Mullaitheevu, you just surround them and the rest of the northern province is open, and you can restore normalcy.
The LTTE is very good at jungle warfare. If LTTE men are inside the jungle and the Sri Lankan army outside, what will be the outcome?
The Sri Lankan army won't remain outside. They want to eliminate the LTTE 100 per cent. So, they will carry on with the operations. The LTTE is somewhat in the same position as they were in when we (the IPKF) left.
From your experience in the IPKF, please tell us how different is it today?
In our time, they never captured Mullaitheevu. And A9 Highway was in our hands. They were occupying Jaffna but they were not occupying the whole of the A9. The other groups were there then. So, it was not easy for the LTTE to keep the A9 closed. They were occupying a tract from Chavakassery to Jaffna, that is, the Jaffna Peninsula.
We drove them from there, and they sort of dispersed to Mullaitheevu. We didn't use artillery or air power then; just restricted ourselves to infantry operations. We had two-and-a-half divisions then, but the Sri Lankans now have a much bigger force. The LTTE was also less powerful then. Their weapons have improved.
It was reported that there were four air strips at Mullaitheevu ...
The Sri Lankan army have found not four, but six air strips, out of which two are very big ones. It was built during the peace process. That means they (the LTTE) were preparing for war. That also shows the LTTE's intention was never peace. Otherwise, they would not have invested so much money in a one-and-a-half km runway.
You mentioned that the LTTE had to employ fewer forces in large areas. Does that mean they are getting fewer and fewer fighters?
Yes. The forces for the LTTE used to come from the Eastern Province because they are less educated, and the population is more intact. In the Northern Province, however, many people have emigrated.
The Sri Lankan army was more severe in the north, and there had been more violent conflicts there in the past. That population reservoir which used to provide recruits on an average of 2,000 to 3,000 a year, has reduced over a period of time. You also have to train them for at least six months to one year.
Do you think the LTTE is losing its popularity among the local population?
It is not merely popularity. It is physically not possible because the supply of recruits from the Eastern Province has dried up.
Secondly, when you are losing territory, people will be hesitant to join you and support you. In 1983, it was different. That generation faced harsh repression at the hands of the Sri Lankan government. That generation has become old. Many leaders have died.
In the last 25 years, the outlook of the Tamils has also changed. This generation's perspective is different. Jaffna society has totally changed. In the colleges, you find only women, and there are no men to study. They have emigrated, joined the LTTE, or are illiterate.
This time, from the early days of the war, the Sri Lankan army claimed victory. As a person who knew the LTTE, the Sri Lankan army and the area, were you expecting this kind of retreat from the LTTE?
As a matter of fact, I had been saying this since two years ago; that strategically the LTTE is poised to lose the war.
Why did you feel so?
Because of two issues. One: international attitudes have changed. It has been branded as a terrorist organisation. Despite that, the US agreed to a peace process. But the LTTE had not been sincere in following the peace process. The Sri Lankan government also did not follow the peace process later. LTTE chief Prabhakaran thus antagonised the international community.
When his hand was suspected in the killing of foreign minister Lakshman Kadirgamar, the international community was very annoyed. The EU (European Union) and Canada banned the LTTE. The Sri Lankan Diaspora in the EU and Canada were two important sources of money and material support for the organisation. The UK is another player.
Terrorism protocol has made it very difficult for LTTE to use international shipping and it was dependent on international shipping for men and material. The LTTE has not been able to overcome the international road blocks this time around. It did not reinvent itself.
The LTTE had not bothered to cultivate India. After Rajiv Gandhi's assassination, it could have followed a middle path because it still had some goodwill in India among some sections. The LTTE overestimated its influence in India, or thought it could bypass India. That was why it was dealing directly with the Sri Lankan government. It didn't bother about India.
It took India for granted. On the other hand, the Sri Lankan government bothered with India.
Do you think Prabhakaran would be hiding inside the jungles?
Of course, he is hiding.
Do you think the Sri Lankan army will capture him?
I don't think Prabhakaran will allow his capture. Either he will fight and die, or bite a capsule. Like Hitler did, he will die. I don't think there is a possibility of capturing him and handing him over to India!
Do you think a resurrection of the LTTE is possible? They have resurrected themselves strongly in the past.
Now we come to where we began, the third aspect, the Sri Lankan aspect. It purely depends upon how Sri Lankans use the success. If success is purely for the ruling party coalition to buttress itself forgetting the basic problem of how LTTE came into being, the end result will be different.
It all started because the Tamils failed to get equal rights from the Sinhalese politically. Has the condition improved? I fear it has not. The 13th Amendment is not being implemented fully.
It looks as if it is back to square one. If such a situation continues, Tamils will take it up politically first and it will continue for some time. If it doesn't succeed, they will revert to militancy. Even those guys who broke away from the LTTE may revert to militancy. A man like (LTTE rebel and now Sri Lankan member of parliament) Karuna also has to be elected by Tamil constituents later.
Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapakse says there will be elections in the Northern Province and there will be a Tamil chief minister. But having a Tamil chief minister without powers is a joke.
There is also a sizeable Muslim segment, which speaks Tamil, and they are politically aware. They are also watching this. They know what happens to Tamils today will happen to them tomorrow.
You mean the end result of 30 years of war is nothing?
After 30 years of struggle, nearly 70,000 Tamils have died, and there is no achievement.
I don't think the Sri Lankan government will allow the LTTE to come up. Militarily they have succeeded. Now it is for the Sri Lankans to sort out their problems. The Sinhalese have to accommodate the Tamils. Otherwise, there will be war again, and war is costly for both.
It has proved that only an arms struggle by the Tamils has not proved beneficial to Tamils. Conversely, only a military solution will not prove beneficial. The country has to politically solve the problem. A prolonged arms struggle has a life period unlike a prolonged political struggle.
Had the LTTE stuck to the India-Sri Lanka accord without fighting India, I feel probably they would have achieved better results.
Interview done on January 17, 2009
Courtesy: www.rediff.com January 23, 2009
The question often asked was, after Killinocchi, what? How significant was the fall of Killinocchi?
Killinocchi has three dimensions. Two dimensions are directly relevant to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, and one of these is relevant to the Sri Lankan government.
First, the LTTE dimension. Killinocchi was promoted as the capital of the LTTE, on the basis of which it was trying to be on par with the Sri Lankan government in the 2002 peace talks. That was because they signed the ceasefire agreement and agreed to the peace process under the Oslo agreement. So, in a way the Sri Lankan government recognised indirectly the LTTE as the representative of the Tamil people. There were elected members of Parliament who are Tamils, but they were not there as part of the peace process.
So, the LTTE had built up a huge infrastructure to project Killinocchi as the capital with all the fanfare, judiciary, police, etc. It even had its own civil and criminal procedure courts. But it ignored the fact that they still had to depend on civil supplies from the Sri Lankan government.
The government agents, who are equivalent to our collectors or deputy commissioners, were still there. So, it gave the LTTE and those sections of Tamils who are their supporters a feeling of euphoria; that a Tamil Eelam was just around the corner.
From that perspective, the capture of Killinocchi has come as a sort of a rude awakening.
Would you say it is a big blow to the LTTE?
It is a rude awakening because the thinking until then was that the LTTE was equivalent to the Sri Lankan government. But possessing Killinocchi did not make the LTTE a government. To be a government, you require much bigger things, not just this kind of settings or decoration. So, it is a psychological blow to the LTTE.
Only psychological?
That is the second dimension I am talking about. The psychological aspect is far more important than the military conflict. This psychological blow became aggravated because for a long time, people were calling it Stalingrad and Leningrad and El Alamein. It is a very big blow for the Diaspora that has been supporting the dream of a Tamil Eelam.
Now, let me talk about the military defeat of Killinocchi. The military defeat was actually not a defeat, as the LTTE has been losing the war all along. What it has done now is to progressively withdraw.
When you have to occupy a large area with limited forces, you fight what is called a mobile defence strategy. The LTTE has done that. It involves distributing smaller forces along likely routes of advance of the Sri Lankan army, delay them, inflict casualties, pull back a little further to a second line of defence, and again retreat the same way to a third line of defence.
What has happened here is, all axes have converged at Killinocchi. That is astride the A9 highway axis. It is not only psychologically important but it is the lifeline required to sustain Jaffna. Till now, the Sri Lankan government had to ask the army and navy to ferry supplies and protect them along the long sea route from Trincomalee to Jaffna. That was because the land route was closed, and this was the lifeline.
There is another route along the western Mannar coast. But this requires a ferry crossing, and this ferry has been in disuse though the Sri Lankan army had captured it a couple of months ago. That loss itself was huge for the LTTE.
The fall of Killinocchi aggravated the situation, and it became a strategic blow to the LTTE. The LTTE had given the impression that they were invincible. Now, the Sri Lankan army has damaged this image of the LTTE's military invincibility.
Even before the fall of Killinocchi wasn't the LTTE on the back foot?
Yes, the LTTE had been suffering a lot of causalities even before the fall of Killinocchi. Their fortunes had been on decline. Considering that, pulling out from Killinocchi was the most sensible thing for them to do.
What about the loss of Elephant Pass? How significant was it?
Between Killinocchi and Elephant Pass, there is a place called Paranthan, and that is the most significant place. When the Sri Lankans occupy Paranthan, Killinocchi will be cut off from both the north and the south. And this was exactly what the Sri Lankans did.
So, tactically, it was unsound to place all bets on Killinocchi. The LTTE should have defended Paranthan instead of Killinocchi, from a purely strategic point of view. Perhaps because Killinocchi was touted as the capital, they did it.
Killinocchi also has a big population, and the LTTE's assets are there. At the last moment, they cannot abandon it and go to Paranthan. Paranthan was lost on January 1. After a week, Killinocchi fell.
Do you feel by conquering these three inter-related vital points, the Sri Lankan army has won the war?
The moment Killinocchi and Paranthan fell, the LTTE was finished.
What about Mullaitheevu?
Mullaitheevu is at the easternmost part of Sri Lanka, and is a district headquarters in the middle of a rainforest; a very thick jungle. The population is very low, and much of what there was has trickled out.
In the last two days, nearly 2,000 people have come out from the LTTE's area. The LTTE cannot physically control these people; they require to be fed. Ultimately you will find only the LTTE cadres, and probably their immediate families, left there.
Even if you don't capture Mullaitheevu, you just surround them and the rest of the northern province is open, and you can restore normalcy.
The LTTE is very good at jungle warfare. If LTTE men are inside the jungle and the Sri Lankan army outside, what will be the outcome?
The Sri Lankan army won't remain outside. They want to eliminate the LTTE 100 per cent. So, they will carry on with the operations. The LTTE is somewhat in the same position as they were in when we (the IPKF) left.
From your experience in the IPKF, please tell us how different is it today?
In our time, they never captured Mullaitheevu. And A9 Highway was in our hands. They were occupying Jaffna but they were not occupying the whole of the A9. The other groups were there then. So, it was not easy for the LTTE to keep the A9 closed. They were occupying a tract from Chavakassery to Jaffna, that is, the Jaffna Peninsula.
We drove them from there, and they sort of dispersed to Mullaitheevu. We didn't use artillery or air power then; just restricted ourselves to infantry operations. We had two-and-a-half divisions then, but the Sri Lankans now have a much bigger force. The LTTE was also less powerful then. Their weapons have improved.
It was reported that there were four air strips at Mullaitheevu ...
The Sri Lankan army have found not four, but six air strips, out of which two are very big ones. It was built during the peace process. That means they (the LTTE) were preparing for war. That also shows the LTTE's intention was never peace. Otherwise, they would not have invested so much money in a one-and-a-half km runway.
You mentioned that the LTTE had to employ fewer forces in large areas. Does that mean they are getting fewer and fewer fighters?
Yes. The forces for the LTTE used to come from the Eastern Province because they are less educated, and the population is more intact. In the Northern Province, however, many people have emigrated.
The Sri Lankan army was more severe in the north, and there had been more violent conflicts there in the past. That population reservoir which used to provide recruits on an average of 2,000 to 3,000 a year, has reduced over a period of time. You also have to train them for at least six months to one year.
Do you think the LTTE is losing its popularity among the local population?
It is not merely popularity. It is physically not possible because the supply of recruits from the Eastern Province has dried up.
Secondly, when you are losing territory, people will be hesitant to join you and support you. In 1983, it was different. That generation faced harsh repression at the hands of the Sri Lankan government. That generation has become old. Many leaders have died.
In the last 25 years, the outlook of the Tamils has also changed. This generation's perspective is different. Jaffna society has totally changed. In the colleges, you find only women, and there are no men to study. They have emigrated, joined the LTTE, or are illiterate.
This time, from the early days of the war, the Sri Lankan army claimed victory. As a person who knew the LTTE, the Sri Lankan army and the area, were you expecting this kind of retreat from the LTTE?
As a matter of fact, I had been saying this since two years ago; that strategically the LTTE is poised to lose the war.
Why did you feel so?
Because of two issues. One: international attitudes have changed. It has been branded as a terrorist organisation. Despite that, the US agreed to a peace process. But the LTTE had not been sincere in following the peace process. The Sri Lankan government also did not follow the peace process later. LTTE chief Prabhakaran thus antagonised the international community.
When his hand was suspected in the killing of foreign minister Lakshman Kadirgamar, the international community was very annoyed. The EU (European Union) and Canada banned the LTTE. The Sri Lankan Diaspora in the EU and Canada were two important sources of money and material support for the organisation. The UK is another player.
Terrorism protocol has made it very difficult for LTTE to use international shipping and it was dependent on international shipping for men and material. The LTTE has not been able to overcome the international road blocks this time around. It did not reinvent itself.
The LTTE had not bothered to cultivate India. After Rajiv Gandhi's assassination, it could have followed a middle path because it still had some goodwill in India among some sections. The LTTE overestimated its influence in India, or thought it could bypass India. That was why it was dealing directly with the Sri Lankan government. It didn't bother about India.
It took India for granted. On the other hand, the Sri Lankan government bothered with India.
Do you think Prabhakaran would be hiding inside the jungles?
Of course, he is hiding.
Do you think the Sri Lankan army will capture him?
I don't think Prabhakaran will allow his capture. Either he will fight and die, or bite a capsule. Like Hitler did, he will die. I don't think there is a possibility of capturing him and handing him over to India!
Do you think a resurrection of the LTTE is possible? They have resurrected themselves strongly in the past.
Now we come to where we began, the third aspect, the Sri Lankan aspect. It purely depends upon how Sri Lankans use the success. If success is purely for the ruling party coalition to buttress itself forgetting the basic problem of how LTTE came into being, the end result will be different.
It all started because the Tamils failed to get equal rights from the Sinhalese politically. Has the condition improved? I fear it has not. The 13th Amendment is not being implemented fully.
It looks as if it is back to square one. If such a situation continues, Tamils will take it up politically first and it will continue for some time. If it doesn't succeed, they will revert to militancy. Even those guys who broke away from the LTTE may revert to militancy. A man like (LTTE rebel and now Sri Lankan member of parliament) Karuna also has to be elected by Tamil constituents later.
Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapakse says there will be elections in the Northern Province and there will be a Tamil chief minister. But having a Tamil chief minister without powers is a joke.
There is also a sizeable Muslim segment, which speaks Tamil, and they are politically aware. They are also watching this. They know what happens to Tamils today will happen to them tomorrow.
You mean the end result of 30 years of war is nothing?
After 30 years of struggle, nearly 70,000 Tamils have died, and there is no achievement.
I don't think the Sri Lankan government will allow the LTTE to come up. Militarily they have succeeded. Now it is for the Sri Lankans to sort out their problems. The Sinhalese have to accommodate the Tamils. Otherwise, there will be war again, and war is costly for both.
It has proved that only an arms struggle by the Tamils has not proved beneficial to Tamils. Conversely, only a military solution will not prove beneficial. The country has to politically solve the problem. A prolonged arms struggle has a life period unlike a prolonged political struggle.
Had the LTTE stuck to the India-Sri Lanka accord without fighting India, I feel probably they would have achieved better results.
Interview done on January 17, 2009
Courtesy: www.rediff.com January 23, 2009
Looks like Prabakaran’s last battle
R. Hariharan
The battle being waged by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) to defend Mullathivu in the face of the Sri Lanka security forces’ onslaught may well be the last conventional military operation by Tamil insurgent leader Velupillai Prabakaran in the two-year-long “Eelam War IV.” Mullathivu is the LTTE’s last bastion, what is left from an original domain of nearly nine districts it had ruled for over a decade. The security forces are building up a four to six division-strong force for what they promise to be the closing call on the LTTE.
After the fall of Kilinochchi and Elephant Pass successively during the early part of January, the LTTE lost control of the Kandy-Jaffna A9 road, and with it lost the ability to have an impact on the lives of most of the people of the Northern Province. The LTTE had dominated the road, considered to be the lifeline for Jaffna, a city that had once flourished as a thriving business hub next only to Colombo. After driving out the LTTE from the A9, the security forces were focussing on three aspects — consolidating their hold on the highway by eliminating LTTE defences east of it, opening the axes of offensive to Mullathivu, and getting ready for a final offensive on Mullathivu.
During the first half of the month, the security forces eliminated the line of LTTE defences along the old Kandy-Jaffna road running parallel to the A9 to its east. With the clearing of the defences aligned from Iranamadu in the south to Vaddakachi and Dharmapuram in the north, the forces marginalised the LTTE’s capability to interfere with the A9. So the forces may well keep up the promise to open the road within a month for civilian traffic, thus providing much needed relief to Jaffna’s beleaguered citizens. Though the LTTE had stoutly defended its strong points such as Iranamadu and Dharmapuram, its intention was probably only to delay the start of the offensive on Mullathivu.
During these operations, the forces captured the LTTE’s main airstrip east of the Iranamadu tank on January 15. This was an important airstrip used by the tiny LTTE air wing for its plucky operations that caused more psychological impact than operational damage. It was built in a clearing of heavy undergrowth, cleverly using the old Kandy-Jaffna road passing through the area. The 1.5-km long and 40-metre wide airstrip was central to a complex of two smaller airstrips located to the north and south of the Iranamadu tank. These were captured in earlier months. Five days earlier, the security forces had captured another battle-ready airstrip west of Mullathivu.
The six LTTE airstrips that have been captured so far go to show the enormous effort the insurgents had put into developing their air capability. Undoubtedly, the ceasefire period during the peace process was put to build up the ground infrastructure for air operations. These are a testimony not only to the LTTE’s technical capability but its relentless effort to build military capability regardless of peace parleys. Significantly, none of the two light aircraft used by it earlier for raids have been found. Presumably they were dismantled and mothballed in hideouts as the operational conditions and the active air and ground surveillance would have made it difficult to fly them out of harm’s way.
Mullathivu town, which is the focal point of the current offensive, is located on a narrow strip on the eastern coast of the Northern Province, flanked by the sea on the east and the Nanthikadal lagoon on the west. Its defence perimeter is made up of a complex of LTTE positions strung up as a crescent along the western edge of the lagoon starting from Puthukkudiyiruppu in the north to Tanniyuttu on the Mankulam-Mullathivu A34 road.
The security forces’ battle plans are built on three broad fronts. 55 Division coming from Jaffna along the northwest has blocked the escape routes through Chundikulam, a key Sea Tiger base. From the same direction, 58 Division is advancing along the A35 road fighting a series of delaying positions. From the west, 57 Division is playing a containing role with the LTTE cadres boxed in the jungles between Iranamadu tank and Mullathivu. The main offensive is being built up from the south with three task forces — which are formations smaller than divisions — and 59 Division. The task forces are combing the jungles while 59 Division is poised for the assault.
With such a large force confronting them, the LTTE cadres defending Mullathivu are facing a situation that is not dissimilar to what they faced during their defence of Kilinochchi, which crumbled after the government forces broke through the perimeter defences. Mullathivu might face the same fate with the final assault going through as a walk-in into a ghost town.
Humanitarian agencies have warned of an impending human tragedy with about 3.5 lakh civilians trapped in the battle zone, and the LTTE is being accused of using them as a cover. However, civilians have started flowing into the area controlled by the security forces in their hundreds, indicating that the LTTE is no more able to exercise tight control over them.
Thus, what is possibly Prabakaran’s last battle is likely to leave him in a position similar to what he was in 1987 — mauled badly and trying to cut his losses and live to fight another day. And, as earlier, the security forces are at his heels to catch or kill him, although the army commander, Lt. General Sarath Fonseka, says the Tiger chief might have fled the island for a safer refuge. After losing the precious lives 24,000 of his followers in nearly three decades of war, Prabakaran is still where he was to pursue his dream of a Tamil Eelam.
Courtesy: Teh Hindu, January 21, 2009
The battle being waged by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) to defend Mullathivu in the face of the Sri Lanka security forces’ onslaught may well be the last conventional military operation by Tamil insurgent leader Velupillai Prabakaran in the two-year-long “Eelam War IV.” Mullathivu is the LTTE’s last bastion, what is left from an original domain of nearly nine districts it had ruled for over a decade. The security forces are building up a four to six division-strong force for what they promise to be the closing call on the LTTE.
After the fall of Kilinochchi and Elephant Pass successively during the early part of January, the LTTE lost control of the Kandy-Jaffna A9 road, and with it lost the ability to have an impact on the lives of most of the people of the Northern Province. The LTTE had dominated the road, considered to be the lifeline for Jaffna, a city that had once flourished as a thriving business hub next only to Colombo. After driving out the LTTE from the A9, the security forces were focussing on three aspects — consolidating their hold on the highway by eliminating LTTE defences east of it, opening the axes of offensive to Mullathivu, and getting ready for a final offensive on Mullathivu.
During the first half of the month, the security forces eliminated the line of LTTE defences along the old Kandy-Jaffna road running parallel to the A9 to its east. With the clearing of the defences aligned from Iranamadu in the south to Vaddakachi and Dharmapuram in the north, the forces marginalised the LTTE’s capability to interfere with the A9. So the forces may well keep up the promise to open the road within a month for civilian traffic, thus providing much needed relief to Jaffna’s beleaguered citizens. Though the LTTE had stoutly defended its strong points such as Iranamadu and Dharmapuram, its intention was probably only to delay the start of the offensive on Mullathivu.
During these operations, the forces captured the LTTE’s main airstrip east of the Iranamadu tank on January 15. This was an important airstrip used by the tiny LTTE air wing for its plucky operations that caused more psychological impact than operational damage. It was built in a clearing of heavy undergrowth, cleverly using the old Kandy-Jaffna road passing through the area. The 1.5-km long and 40-metre wide airstrip was central to a complex of two smaller airstrips located to the north and south of the Iranamadu tank. These were captured in earlier months. Five days earlier, the security forces had captured another battle-ready airstrip west of Mullathivu.
The six LTTE airstrips that have been captured so far go to show the enormous effort the insurgents had put into developing their air capability. Undoubtedly, the ceasefire period during the peace process was put to build up the ground infrastructure for air operations. These are a testimony not only to the LTTE’s technical capability but its relentless effort to build military capability regardless of peace parleys. Significantly, none of the two light aircraft used by it earlier for raids have been found. Presumably they were dismantled and mothballed in hideouts as the operational conditions and the active air and ground surveillance would have made it difficult to fly them out of harm’s way.
Mullathivu town, which is the focal point of the current offensive, is located on a narrow strip on the eastern coast of the Northern Province, flanked by the sea on the east and the Nanthikadal lagoon on the west. Its defence perimeter is made up of a complex of LTTE positions strung up as a crescent along the western edge of the lagoon starting from Puthukkudiyiruppu in the north to Tanniyuttu on the Mankulam-Mullathivu A34 road.
The security forces’ battle plans are built on three broad fronts. 55 Division coming from Jaffna along the northwest has blocked the escape routes through Chundikulam, a key Sea Tiger base. From the same direction, 58 Division is advancing along the A35 road fighting a series of delaying positions. From the west, 57 Division is playing a containing role with the LTTE cadres boxed in the jungles between Iranamadu tank and Mullathivu. The main offensive is being built up from the south with three task forces — which are formations smaller than divisions — and 59 Division. The task forces are combing the jungles while 59 Division is poised for the assault.
With such a large force confronting them, the LTTE cadres defending Mullathivu are facing a situation that is not dissimilar to what they faced during their defence of Kilinochchi, which crumbled after the government forces broke through the perimeter defences. Mullathivu might face the same fate with the final assault going through as a walk-in into a ghost town.
Humanitarian agencies have warned of an impending human tragedy with about 3.5 lakh civilians trapped in the battle zone, and the LTTE is being accused of using them as a cover. However, civilians have started flowing into the area controlled by the security forces in their hundreds, indicating that the LTTE is no more able to exercise tight control over them.
Thus, what is possibly Prabakaran’s last battle is likely to leave him in a position similar to what he was in 1987 — mauled badly and trying to cut his losses and live to fight another day. And, as earlier, the security forces are at his heels to catch or kill him, although the army commander, Lt. General Sarath Fonseka, says the Tiger chief might have fled the island for a safer refuge. After losing the precious lives 24,000 of his followers in nearly three decades of war, Prabakaran is still where he was to pursue his dream of a Tamil Eelam.
Courtesy: Teh Hindu, January 21, 2009
Thursday, January 15, 2009
Hangars, airfields, but where is the Tiger air force?
Sandeep Unnithan New Delhi, January 14, 2009
With the Sri Lankan security forces closing in on the LTTE forces bottled up in Mullativu, questions are being raised on the fate of its tiny two-aircraft air wing.
Last Saturday Sri Lankan forces captured the fourth and longest airstrip which the Tigers used to launch air attacks on Sri Lanka. Also captured near the Mullaitivu jungles were two armoured hangars which the rebels used to store the aircraft. But the airfield, ringed by a 300 metre barbed wire fence, was empty.
Security experts believe the two Czech-built propeller-driven Zlin Z-143 aircraft which the Air Tigers operated could have been dismantled and pulled into the jungles of Mullaitivu where the entire Tiger leadership is boxed in.
"If the Lankan forces start combing the jungles they may discover the aircraft," says Colonel R. Hariharan (retired) former head of military intelligence in the Indian Peace Keeping Force. He noted that the retreating Tigers had pulled roofing off the houses of their erstwhile capital Kilinochi before retreating into the jungle. "It is possible that this roofing is being used for building bunkers and shelters inside the jungles," he says.
The LTTE has used their two-aircraft air wing in eight attacks since March 2007, becoming the world's only guerrilla organisation to field an air wing. Most of the attacks have been of propaganda rather than tactical value and the last attack was reported in October last year.
With the loss of their main airstrip, which at 1.5 km length and 20 metres width is the longest captured so far, the Tiger air wing's future is in doubt. However Hariharan does not rule out the possibility of the Tigers using the A-39 highway, which remains in territory still controlled by them, to launch sorties.
Courtesy: India Today Online
[R. Hariharan comments: Actually one more equally well organised airstrip has been found in the jungles around the Iranamadu lake. This airstrip and Mullaitivu airstrip were the two main airstrips used for operations by the LTTE. However, though the aircraft can possibly use the A39 road, it is unlikely as in the current proactive offensive building up against the Mullaitivu defences it would be suicidal to use the Air Tiger resources.]
With the Sri Lankan security forces closing in on the LTTE forces bottled up in Mullativu, questions are being raised on the fate of its tiny two-aircraft air wing.
Last Saturday Sri Lankan forces captured the fourth and longest airstrip which the Tigers used to launch air attacks on Sri Lanka. Also captured near the Mullaitivu jungles were two armoured hangars which the rebels used to store the aircraft. But the airfield, ringed by a 300 metre barbed wire fence, was empty.
Security experts believe the two Czech-built propeller-driven Zlin Z-143 aircraft which the Air Tigers operated could have been dismantled and pulled into the jungles of Mullaitivu where the entire Tiger leadership is boxed in.
"If the Lankan forces start combing the jungles they may discover the aircraft," says Colonel R. Hariharan (retired) former head of military intelligence in the Indian Peace Keeping Force. He noted that the retreating Tigers had pulled roofing off the houses of their erstwhile capital Kilinochi before retreating into the jungle. "It is possible that this roofing is being used for building bunkers and shelters inside the jungles," he says.
The LTTE has used their two-aircraft air wing in eight attacks since March 2007, becoming the world's only guerrilla organisation to field an air wing. Most of the attacks have been of propaganda rather than tactical value and the last attack was reported in October last year.
With the loss of their main airstrip, which at 1.5 km length and 20 metres width is the longest captured so far, the Tiger air wing's future is in doubt. However Hariharan does not rule out the possibility of the Tigers using the A-39 highway, which remains in territory still controlled by them, to launch sorties.
Courtesy: India Today Online
[R. Hariharan comments: Actually one more equally well organised airstrip has been found in the jungles around the Iranamadu lake. This airstrip and Mullaitivu airstrip were the two main airstrips used for operations by the LTTE. However, though the aircraft can possibly use the A39 road, it is unlikely as in the current proactive offensive building up against the Mullaitivu defences it would be suicidal to use the Air Tiger resources.]
Saturday, January 10, 2009
Sri Lanka: Wining on War Front and Losing on Other Fronts
Victory in the war front
Just a week after the fall of Kilinochchi, the Sri Lanka security forces captured Elephant Pass, the last stronghold of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) on the A9 Kandy-Jaffna highway, the vital lifeline of the Northern Province on January 9. This was not unexpected as Elephant Pass was becoming unviable to defend as the security forces pressed on their offensive after capturing Paranthan in the south on January 1.
According to the defence sources, the final assault on Elephant Pass came with 58 Division entering the Elephant Pass causeway from the south to link up with 53 and 55 divisions advancing from the north, capturing Pallai and Iyakachi one after the other.
As President Mahinda Rajapaksa said, with the fall of Elephant Pass, the entire route from Point Pedro in Jaffna coast to Dondra Head in the southern tip of Sri Lanka is now fully under government control after more than two decades. Regardless of other issues, the President and the security forces have shown what they can achieve if they makes up their mind. It is a creditable military achievement in successfully coordinating a large scale offensive involving a number of formations. There were a few hiccups, but wars are always full of imponderables.
Now the focus of the war is on Mullaitivu where the LTTE hopes to offer major resistance. Probably this was conditioned by the requirement to provide sufficient linear space for disrupting the advance of the security forces towards Mullaitivu with a series of delaying positions. The two major security forces axes of advance are: from the northeast along A35 road from Paranthan-Murasamoddai-Puthukkudiyiruppu-Mullaitivu and from south/southwest on a broad front covered by Oddusuddan-Mulliyavalai-Tanniyuthu. The army commander is said to be concentrating 50,000 troops – that is about four divisions minus – for the offensive, where the LTTE is reported to be having 6000 defenders.
Already 58 Division advancing along A35 axis have encountered the first LTTE position in Murasamoddai which probably extends up to Vaddakachchi to its south. 58 Division claimed recovering 11 bodies of LTTE cadres and some mines and equipment in the area. Similarly troops operating south of Murasamoddai have also come in contact with LTTE. Along the southern axis Task Force 4 and 59 Division are poised to take on Mullaitivu; presumably there will be some coordination of operations on both the axes of advance for finally taking on Puthukkudiyiruppu/Chundikkulam-Mullaitivu where main LTTE assets are likely to be concentrated.
Security Forces will now be facing the major task of keeping the A9 highway safe from LTTE's hit and run attacks for free traffic. Already 61 Division, the holding formation, reported killing four LTTE cadres who had been operating in area Pampaimadu. Probably politically it will be appropriate to open the A9 highway for public use as early as possible. And in all likelihood safe public passage can take place only when at least about three to five-mile stretch on both sides of the entire highway is totally sanitised and kept free of LTTE. We can expect the holding formations and other task forces not actively involved in offensive operations to undertake this task.
The LTTE has reported killing seven people including three air force personnel in a Claymore mine attack between Pankulam and Morawewa (22 km from Trincomalee on the road to Anuradhapura). Similar small scale attacks are likely to increase. So it is not surprising the police are picking up suspicious Tamil youth in smaller towns in vulnerable areas. One can only hope of their organised release after the screening process to lessen the heartburn of the affected families.
Failure on other fronts
If President Rajapaksa's strategy had worked well on the war front, they appear to be not working at all on two fronts vital to sustain the military gains over the long term. These are the political front and the human rights front.
On the political front, just as expected already India, the US, Japan and the EU have asked for starting the political process to resolve the Tamil issues speedily. It is significant that they have accepted the military successes fait accompli as possession is three fourths of law. But they would like to expedite the political process that stands grounded.
The US has probably articulated their view best: "The United States does not advocate that the Government of Sri Lanka negotiate with the LTTE, a group designated by the United States since 1997 as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. However, we do believe that a broad range of other Tamil voices and opinions must be brought into a political process to reach a political solution that Tamils inside and outside of Sri Lanka see as legitimate.
"This will help assure Tamils that their rights are protected, that they have a say over important areas of their lives in geographical areas in which they predominate, and that they are an integral and respected part of an undivided Sri Lanka. At the same time, such as process would further delegitimize and erode the support of the LTTE in Sri Lanka and abroad. made it a point to The U.S. believes that a lasting, sustainable peace can best be achieved if the Sri Lankan Government works now to reach a political solution that addresses the aspirations of all Sri Lankans, including Tamils, Muslims, and Sinhalese."
All that the government can think of is to harp on the All Party Committee to evolve a consensus on the devolution. With most of the major political parties not participating in the APC deliberations, it has become a big joke. The continued inaction on this front is likely to be used by the LTTE to light of the embers of Tamil chauvinism to turn it to its advantage.
The other front where the government is clearly losing is the human rights front. There had been relentless pressure on the media, to crush dissent. All means are being used. Even BBC news is under unannounced censorship despite being hosted by the Sri Lanka Broadcasting Corporation. The latest victim of calculated violence against the media is the brutal killing of Lasantha Wickrematunge shot in broad day light in a busy thoroughfare near Colombo, a city bristling with police checkpoints. In spite of that how two motorcycle borne gunmen who repeatedly shot at the editor and escaped is a mystery. And he is not the first journalist to be killed in Sri Lanka.
Of significance is that Wickrematunge was a vociferous critic of the Rajapaksa regime's policies including the war and governance in the process courting the wrath of the Rajapaksa brothers and Lt Gen Fonseka. There is no confirmation that any government agency was involved in his killing. But what the public perceive is very important and unless a transparent investigation is done and the guilty are brought to book, public suspicion will centre on government agencies. So how the government conducts itself is very important if it is serious about free media which President Rajapaksa has referred to in his condolence message on the killing.
It is difficult to believe that the President cannot achieve success if he makes up his mind to trigger the political process as well as set right the dismal human rights record, just as he has done in his war of "liberation" as he calls it. Otherwise all the talk of war of freedom will be meaningless, not only to Tamils but all Sri Lankans. And after all the sweat and blood of soldiers, that would be a national achievement wasted.
Just a week after the fall of Kilinochchi, the Sri Lanka security forces captured Elephant Pass, the last stronghold of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) on the A9 Kandy-Jaffna highway, the vital lifeline of the Northern Province on January 9. This was not unexpected as Elephant Pass was becoming unviable to defend as the security forces pressed on their offensive after capturing Paranthan in the south on January 1.
According to the defence sources, the final assault on Elephant Pass came with 58 Division entering the Elephant Pass causeway from the south to link up with 53 and 55 divisions advancing from the north, capturing Pallai and Iyakachi one after the other.
As President Mahinda Rajapaksa said, with the fall of Elephant Pass, the entire route from Point Pedro in Jaffna coast to Dondra Head in the southern tip of Sri Lanka is now fully under government control after more than two decades. Regardless of other issues, the President and the security forces have shown what they can achieve if they makes up their mind. It is a creditable military achievement in successfully coordinating a large scale offensive involving a number of formations. There were a few hiccups, but wars are always full of imponderables.
Now the focus of the war is on Mullaitivu where the LTTE hopes to offer major resistance. Probably this was conditioned by the requirement to provide sufficient linear space for disrupting the advance of the security forces towards Mullaitivu with a series of delaying positions. The two major security forces axes of advance are: from the northeast along A35 road from Paranthan-Murasamoddai-Puthukkudiyiruppu-Mullaitivu and from south/southwest on a broad front covered by Oddusuddan-Mulliyavalai-Tanniyuthu. The army commander is said to be concentrating 50,000 troops – that is about four divisions minus – for the offensive, where the LTTE is reported to be having 6000 defenders.
Already 58 Division advancing along A35 axis have encountered the first LTTE position in Murasamoddai which probably extends up to Vaddakachchi to its south. 58 Division claimed recovering 11 bodies of LTTE cadres and some mines and equipment in the area. Similarly troops operating south of Murasamoddai have also come in contact with LTTE. Along the southern axis Task Force 4 and 59 Division are poised to take on Mullaitivu; presumably there will be some coordination of operations on both the axes of advance for finally taking on Puthukkudiyiruppu/Chundikkulam-Mullaitivu where main LTTE assets are likely to be concentrated.
Security Forces will now be facing the major task of keeping the A9 highway safe from LTTE's hit and run attacks for free traffic. Already 61 Division, the holding formation, reported killing four LTTE cadres who had been operating in area Pampaimadu. Probably politically it will be appropriate to open the A9 highway for public use as early as possible. And in all likelihood safe public passage can take place only when at least about three to five-mile stretch on both sides of the entire highway is totally sanitised and kept free of LTTE. We can expect the holding formations and other task forces not actively involved in offensive operations to undertake this task.
The LTTE has reported killing seven people including three air force personnel in a Claymore mine attack between Pankulam and Morawewa (22 km from Trincomalee on the road to Anuradhapura). Similar small scale attacks are likely to increase. So it is not surprising the police are picking up suspicious Tamil youth in smaller towns in vulnerable areas. One can only hope of their organised release after the screening process to lessen the heartburn of the affected families.
Failure on other fronts
If President Rajapaksa's strategy had worked well on the war front, they appear to be not working at all on two fronts vital to sustain the military gains over the long term. These are the political front and the human rights front.
On the political front, just as expected already India, the US, Japan and the EU have asked for starting the political process to resolve the Tamil issues speedily. It is significant that they have accepted the military successes fait accompli as possession is three fourths of law. But they would like to expedite the political process that stands grounded.
The US has probably articulated their view best: "The United States does not advocate that the Government of Sri Lanka negotiate with the LTTE, a group designated by the United States since 1997 as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. However, we do believe that a broad range of other Tamil voices and opinions must be brought into a political process to reach a political solution that Tamils inside and outside of Sri Lanka see as legitimate.
"This will help assure Tamils that their rights are protected, that they have a say over important areas of their lives in geographical areas in which they predominate, and that they are an integral and respected part of an undivided Sri Lanka. At the same time, such as process would further delegitimize and erode the support of the LTTE in Sri Lanka and abroad. made it a point to The U.S. believes that a lasting, sustainable peace can best be achieved if the Sri Lankan Government works now to reach a political solution that addresses the aspirations of all Sri Lankans, including Tamils, Muslims, and Sinhalese."
All that the government can think of is to harp on the All Party Committee to evolve a consensus on the devolution. With most of the major political parties not participating in the APC deliberations, it has become a big joke. The continued inaction on this front is likely to be used by the LTTE to light of the embers of Tamil chauvinism to turn it to its advantage.
The other front where the government is clearly losing is the human rights front. There had been relentless pressure on the media, to crush dissent. All means are being used. Even BBC news is under unannounced censorship despite being hosted by the Sri Lanka Broadcasting Corporation. The latest victim of calculated violence against the media is the brutal killing of Lasantha Wickrematunge shot in broad day light in a busy thoroughfare near Colombo, a city bristling with police checkpoints. In spite of that how two motorcycle borne gunmen who repeatedly shot at the editor and escaped is a mystery. And he is not the first journalist to be killed in Sri Lanka.
Of significance is that Wickrematunge was a vociferous critic of the Rajapaksa regime's policies including the war and governance in the process courting the wrath of the Rajapaksa brothers and Lt Gen Fonseka. There is no confirmation that any government agency was involved in his killing. But what the public perceive is very important and unless a transparent investigation is done and the guilty are brought to book, public suspicion will centre on government agencies. So how the government conducts itself is very important if it is serious about free media which President Rajapaksa has referred to in his condolence message on the killing.
It is difficult to believe that the President cannot achieve success if he makes up his mind to trigger the political process as well as set right the dismal human rights record, just as he has done in his war of "liberation" as he calls it. Otherwise all the talk of war of freedom will be meaningless, not only to Tamils but all Sri Lankans. And after all the sweat and blood of soldiers, that would be a national achievement wasted.
Monday, January 5, 2009
Sri Lanka: The LTTE agenda after loss of Kilinochchi
The often asked but seldom answered question "what after Kilinochchi?" has become more relevant after the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) lost Kilinochchi on January 2 and along with it control over most of its domain in the north. After Kilinochchi, two major actors in the war scene – the government of President Rajapaksa and the LTTE - will be reworking their agendas to suit the emerging environment.
Of course, a third but reluctant player is the Sri Lanka Tamil polity, which had avoided drawing up an agenda so far. For them it is confusion compounded now; and most of them have to put on the thinking cap for a change and think beyond blaming others. They have to take some hard decisions. But they might not be in a hurry to do this.
Though capture of Kilinochchi was expected for quite sometime now, the security forces did it just a day after the fall of Paranthan on January 1.This was faster than I had estimated in Sri Lanka Update No 160 written on the day Paranthan fell. Evidently, Task Force I after capturing Paranthan had maintained its momentum to exploit the pressure building up on at Kilinochchi to capture it in a joint operation with 57 Division.This speaks for the high morale of troops. Though the LTTE had vacated its de facto capital, troops in combat wasted no time and occupied Kilinochchi. So it is not surprising that the security forces are going ahead towards Elephant Pass and Mullaitivu supported by air strikes.
From a tactical point of view, the LTTE took the pragmatic decision to vacate Kilinochchi defences when it became untenable rather than get decimated. This is sensible if we disregard the sense of triumph and achievement among victors and dismay among the LTTE acolytes.
Past experience appears to have clouded the LTTE estimation of the staying power of the security forces in the Eelam War-4. The LTTE is now fighting highly motivated and clearly focused armed forces who are single-mindedly executing the presidential mandate to eliminate the LTTE. Their ability to attack and capture of Kilinochchi even after suffering heavy casualties earlier shows the determination of the security forces. The LTTE will probably rethink its "trusted" strategies because the security forces have disproved their validity in Kilinochchi operation.
LTTE agenda
According to a report from an unknown source in the usually well informed website www.transcurrents.com the LTTE has already started withdrawing from their defences in and around Elephant Pass in the narrow land strip linking Jaffna peninsula with the rest of the country. According to the report the LTTE was preparing to vacate its defences in Eastern Mullaithivu district including Mullaithivu, Oddusuddan and Vatraappalai. Though the report is plausible it is not confirmed by other sources. If the report is correct, it would indicate the tectonic impact the loss of Kilinochchi is having on the LTTE.
The loss of Kilinochchi is a big blow for the LTTE's image. It is also the peak of achievement for the security forces in their process of demystifyig LTTE started in 2006. It comes when LTTE's woes are many: domain is restricted to a district or so, its conventional army has been mauled and left bleeding, use of Sea Tigers curtailed, and the Air Tigers grounded probably for many more months to come. Its international funding, logistic and propaganda machinery has been tampered and merchant supply fleet run aground. So conventional mode is out and guerrilla mode is in for the LTTE.
In the past, the LTTE had always managed to bounce back and come out stronger to take on the State more strongly than before for many reasons. The army commander has announced his intention to continue the war till the LTTE leaders are hunted out. So the environment is going to be even more risky for the LTTE to disengage, regroup and reassert. The security measures in cities have been tightened, often with draconian measures. This time that process is not going to be easy. The global, regional and national environments have changed after 9/11. To bounce back the LTTE will also hav to change.
However the question is not whether the LTTE will bounce back, but how it will try to do so. Prabhakaran's unique strength is his doggedness in pursuit of his goal. So he will put every ounce of strength and talent to bounce back. And that is the worst case scenario for Sri Lanka government. What will be Prabhakaran's agenda now? How he will try to stage a comeback with the LTTE? These questions are more relevant now than "can he stage a comeback."
To recover from the continued onslaught and reassert, the LTTE will have to first extricate itself from battle. This is a tricky operation in itself. Pulling out of Kilinochchi might well be its starting point. Other issues in the LTTE agenda could be – securing assets from further loss, regrouping and reorganising cadres in safe hides, rebuilding the logistic network, and reassert LTTE's power through a graded series of covert and overt actions.
Prabhakaran would have prepared hideouts for mothballing heavy armament and equipment. Assets not required for immediate use like heavy weapons, spare ammunition, and arms would be similarly cached. Other valuables would also need safe keeping. With the loss of Kilinochchi, the LTTE has lost its large infrastructure assets built there over a period of time. The LTTE is also probably facing cash crunch due to the high cost of war and drying up of a number of lucrative income sources like the "toll tax" on vehicles using A9 road, remittances, and local levies following the shrinking domain. Thus recouping financial assets and rebuilding revenue resources would be a top priority in LTTE agenda. It might result in some arm twisting of businessmen in Colombo, Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Jaffna for "donations" and such activity would carry bigger risks than ever before.
Regrouping the cadres for a guerrilla mode after disengagement is not going to be easy either. Unlike earlier Eelam wars, few veteran leaders are available to do this task and they are also aging. There are quite a few other issues. Casualties have to be attended to and treated. (Tamil Nadu could become a refuge for such benign wounded cadres.) Other non-effective members will have to be shed and given shelter in secure conditions. The units have to be re-grouped in smaller subunits and assigned specific responsibilities. Guerrilla operation is executed by small groups or lone individuals in a decentralized fashion. To be successful the guerrilla requires a great deal of self motivation. LTTE's much heralded suicide terrorism has depleted motivated and cadres trained in special skills. In this ambience, burden of motivating the cadres is likely to rest on younger hardcore warriors who fought hard in the war. The success of the LTTE's come back will depend upon them.
Through the years of war and peace, the LTTE had built a strong international network of supporters who had helped it to become one of the top insurgency movements in the world. They had been bankrolling the LTTE war effort. The Tamil expatriates had also provided international propaganda interface for the LTTE's cause and lobbied the governments for support. Their support cannot be taken for granted anymore as the war had been going on for too long and a new generation is emerging.
The LTTE's war has been going on for two decades in which over 25,000 of Tamil youth have lost their lives, without achieving any tangible results. As the LTTE continues to be a listed terrorist organization, the stringent international anti terror protocols (in place after 9/11 terror strike in New York) are not going to make it easy for external support to reach the LTTE. And the governments of 37countries which have banned the LTTE are unlikely to ease the guard or allow their soil to be used for rebuilding LTTE.
Lastly, despite their differences over LTTE's questionable methods, sections of Tamil expatriates had supported its efforts in the hope of realizing their dream of an independent Tamil Eelam. They find their hopes are now turning into a chimera. To broaden its appeal, the LTTE has to change its style of operation to a democratic one and accommodate different shades of Tamil opinion in the decision making process. Prabhakaran's personality does not allow even the thought of such "inclusive strategy." The Tamil National Alliance is a very good example of the still born result of LTTE's last attempt at inclusive strategy. It has merely reduced dignified Tamil politicians into 'yes men' of Prabhakaran and nothing more.
And to reach the reassertion stage, the LTTE will have to successfully go through the first three parts of the agenda discussed earlier.
In the past, the inability of Sri Lanka state to satisfy Tamil aspirations had been the biggest incentive for them to support the LTTE, despite Prabhakaran's repressive style. This had helped the LTTE "bounce back." Tamils had always found a yawning gap between what Sri Lanka government and politicians promise them and what they deliver. So far the doubts of Tamils have only been strengthened by the way President Rajapaksa had indifferently handled the political part of the issues raised by the LTTE and other Tamil politicians. In short, the bounce back of the LTTE will dependent upon how sincere the Sri Lanka government is in implementing an "inclusive strategy" to gain the trust of Tamil people and give them a feeling of security.
Translated into the hard reality of politics that is unlikely to happen merely by holding elections. The success of the LTTE's bounce back process depends upon how the state helps the people to recoup normal lives and avocations of the people battered by years of war. If the President can do it and give the Tamils a sense of ownership in their destiny, the LTTE comeback will not be easy, despite Prabhakaran's best effort. There it is, the answer to the question "after Kilinochchi what?"
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cnotes5%5Cnote492.html
Of course, a third but reluctant player is the Sri Lanka Tamil polity, which had avoided drawing up an agenda so far. For them it is confusion compounded now; and most of them have to put on the thinking cap for a change and think beyond blaming others. They have to take some hard decisions. But they might not be in a hurry to do this.
Though capture of Kilinochchi was expected for quite sometime now, the security forces did it just a day after the fall of Paranthan on January 1.This was faster than I had estimated in Sri Lanka Update No 160 written on the day Paranthan fell. Evidently, Task Force I after capturing Paranthan had maintained its momentum to exploit the pressure building up on at Kilinochchi to capture it in a joint operation with 57 Division.This speaks for the high morale of troops. Though the LTTE had vacated its de facto capital, troops in combat wasted no time and occupied Kilinochchi. So it is not surprising that the security forces are going ahead towards Elephant Pass and Mullaitivu supported by air strikes.
From a tactical point of view, the LTTE took the pragmatic decision to vacate Kilinochchi defences when it became untenable rather than get decimated. This is sensible if we disregard the sense of triumph and achievement among victors and dismay among the LTTE acolytes.
Past experience appears to have clouded the LTTE estimation of the staying power of the security forces in the Eelam War-4. The LTTE is now fighting highly motivated and clearly focused armed forces who are single-mindedly executing the presidential mandate to eliminate the LTTE. Their ability to attack and capture of Kilinochchi even after suffering heavy casualties earlier shows the determination of the security forces. The LTTE will probably rethink its "trusted" strategies because the security forces have disproved their validity in Kilinochchi operation.
LTTE agenda
According to a report from an unknown source in the usually well informed website www.transcurrents.com the LTTE has already started withdrawing from their defences in and around Elephant Pass in the narrow land strip linking Jaffna peninsula with the rest of the country. According to the report the LTTE was preparing to vacate its defences in Eastern Mullaithivu district including Mullaithivu, Oddusuddan and Vatraappalai. Though the report is plausible it is not confirmed by other sources. If the report is correct, it would indicate the tectonic impact the loss of Kilinochchi is having on the LTTE.
The loss of Kilinochchi is a big blow for the LTTE's image. It is also the peak of achievement for the security forces in their process of demystifyig LTTE started in 2006. It comes when LTTE's woes are many: domain is restricted to a district or so, its conventional army has been mauled and left bleeding, use of Sea Tigers curtailed, and the Air Tigers grounded probably for many more months to come. Its international funding, logistic and propaganda machinery has been tampered and merchant supply fleet run aground. So conventional mode is out and guerrilla mode is in for the LTTE.
In the past, the LTTE had always managed to bounce back and come out stronger to take on the State more strongly than before for many reasons. The army commander has announced his intention to continue the war till the LTTE leaders are hunted out. So the environment is going to be even more risky for the LTTE to disengage, regroup and reassert. The security measures in cities have been tightened, often with draconian measures. This time that process is not going to be easy. The global, regional and national environments have changed after 9/11. To bounce back the LTTE will also hav to change.
However the question is not whether the LTTE will bounce back, but how it will try to do so. Prabhakaran's unique strength is his doggedness in pursuit of his goal. So he will put every ounce of strength and talent to bounce back. And that is the worst case scenario for Sri Lanka government. What will be Prabhakaran's agenda now? How he will try to stage a comeback with the LTTE? These questions are more relevant now than "can he stage a comeback."
To recover from the continued onslaught and reassert, the LTTE will have to first extricate itself from battle. This is a tricky operation in itself. Pulling out of Kilinochchi might well be its starting point. Other issues in the LTTE agenda could be – securing assets from further loss, regrouping and reorganising cadres in safe hides, rebuilding the logistic network, and reassert LTTE's power through a graded series of covert and overt actions.
Prabhakaran would have prepared hideouts for mothballing heavy armament and equipment. Assets not required for immediate use like heavy weapons, spare ammunition, and arms would be similarly cached. Other valuables would also need safe keeping. With the loss of Kilinochchi, the LTTE has lost its large infrastructure assets built there over a period of time. The LTTE is also probably facing cash crunch due to the high cost of war and drying up of a number of lucrative income sources like the "toll tax" on vehicles using A9 road, remittances, and local levies following the shrinking domain. Thus recouping financial assets and rebuilding revenue resources would be a top priority in LTTE agenda. It might result in some arm twisting of businessmen in Colombo, Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Jaffna for "donations" and such activity would carry bigger risks than ever before.
Regrouping the cadres for a guerrilla mode after disengagement is not going to be easy either. Unlike earlier Eelam wars, few veteran leaders are available to do this task and they are also aging. There are quite a few other issues. Casualties have to be attended to and treated. (Tamil Nadu could become a refuge for such benign wounded cadres.) Other non-effective members will have to be shed and given shelter in secure conditions. The units have to be re-grouped in smaller subunits and assigned specific responsibilities. Guerrilla operation is executed by small groups or lone individuals in a decentralized fashion. To be successful the guerrilla requires a great deal of self motivation. LTTE's much heralded suicide terrorism has depleted motivated and cadres trained in special skills. In this ambience, burden of motivating the cadres is likely to rest on younger hardcore warriors who fought hard in the war. The success of the LTTE's come back will depend upon them.
Through the years of war and peace, the LTTE had built a strong international network of supporters who had helped it to become one of the top insurgency movements in the world. They had been bankrolling the LTTE war effort. The Tamil expatriates had also provided international propaganda interface for the LTTE's cause and lobbied the governments for support. Their support cannot be taken for granted anymore as the war had been going on for too long and a new generation is emerging.
The LTTE's war has been going on for two decades in which over 25,000 of Tamil youth have lost their lives, without achieving any tangible results. As the LTTE continues to be a listed terrorist organization, the stringent international anti terror protocols (in place after 9/11 terror strike in New York) are not going to make it easy for external support to reach the LTTE. And the governments of 37countries which have banned the LTTE are unlikely to ease the guard or allow their soil to be used for rebuilding LTTE.
Lastly, despite their differences over LTTE's questionable methods, sections of Tamil expatriates had supported its efforts in the hope of realizing their dream of an independent Tamil Eelam. They find their hopes are now turning into a chimera. To broaden its appeal, the LTTE has to change its style of operation to a democratic one and accommodate different shades of Tamil opinion in the decision making process. Prabhakaran's personality does not allow even the thought of such "inclusive strategy." The Tamil National Alliance is a very good example of the still born result of LTTE's last attempt at inclusive strategy. It has merely reduced dignified Tamil politicians into 'yes men' of Prabhakaran and nothing more.
And to reach the reassertion stage, the LTTE will have to successfully go through the first three parts of the agenda discussed earlier.
In the past, the inability of Sri Lanka state to satisfy Tamil aspirations had been the biggest incentive for them to support the LTTE, despite Prabhakaran's repressive style. This had helped the LTTE "bounce back." Tamils had always found a yawning gap between what Sri Lanka government and politicians promise them and what they deliver. So far the doubts of Tamils have only been strengthened by the way President Rajapaksa had indifferently handled the political part of the issues raised by the LTTE and other Tamil politicians. In short, the bounce back of the LTTE will dependent upon how sincere the Sri Lanka government is in implementing an "inclusive strategy" to gain the trust of Tamil people and give them a feeling of security.
Translated into the hard reality of politics that is unlikely to happen merely by holding elections. The success of the LTTE's bounce back process depends upon how the state helps the people to recoup normal lives and avocations of the people battered by years of war. If the President can do it and give the Tamils a sense of ownership in their destiny, the LTTE comeback will not be easy, despite Prabhakaran's best effort. There it is, the answer to the question "after Kilinochchi what?"
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cnotes5%5Cnote492.html
Sunday, January 4, 2009
Army explodes invincible LTTE myth
R Hariharan
With the capture of Kilinochchi, the Sri Lanka security forces have exploded the myth of LTTE’s invincibility. Faith in their strength had created thousands of followers among Sri Lankan Tamil expatriates who supported V. Prabhakaran’s 20-year war to create an independent Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka.
Kilinochchi’s loss is the biggest setback Prabhakaran has faced in the current Eelam war. It also marks the virtual end of the LTTE’s conventional war capability. The LTTE’s last stronghold at Elephant Pass astride the A9 Jaffna-Kandy highway will probably become untenable as two divisions in the north and two divisions in the south are now available to capture it.
More importantly, the victory is a feather in Sri Lanka President Mahinda Rajapakse’s cap. He had made the elimination of the LTTE and “freeing Tamils from its clutches” his main agenda and built all his actions around it. With this in view, he walked out of the ceasefire agreement with the LTTE and discarded the peace process in 2002 when the LTTE offered an opening to take up the military option in 2006, a few months after he assumed office.
The President’s focused agenda had given the Sri Lanka army commander Lt Gen. Sarath Fonseka to plan and conduct his operations with clear goals. The President had given the commander a free hand in the conduct of operations and provided the wherewithal for it. The army commander enjoyed very good personal rapport with the President’s two brothers — Basil and Gotabaya — who were in key appointments to make the presidential agenda a reality.
The President took full advantage of the international environment created in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks to get the LTTE banned in Canada and the EU, two notable sources of political, material and financial support to the LTTE. It also enabled him to gain access to the intelligence resources of the US and India.
In the earlier Eelam wars, the LTTE had always managed to bounce back and come out stronger to fight the armed forces. This time, the army commander had carefully planned his operations cashing in on three advantages he enjoyed.
These were the overwhelming strength of the army built over three years, the full use of air power and imaginative use of the navy to end the LTTE’s domination of the sea around the northern and eastern province. The navy systematically set about to dismantle the marine supply chain of the LTTE. It had a merchant fleet of dozen ships which were used to ferry arms and military equipment that sustained the war. By 2007, the navy systematically hunted and destroyed them.
The operational plan was also aimed at cutting the external access of the LTTE to India through the Gulf of Mannar and to Southeast Asia through the eastern coasts. Unlike his predecessors, the army commander focused on operations on the outer perimeter than tackling the A9 highway dominated by the LTTE.
The Tigers in a guerrilla mode could pose a few problems for Sri Lanka. Over four tonnes of C4 explosives are reported to have been recovered from suspected LTTE caches in Colombo and its suburbs during 2008. This would indicate the ability of the LTTE to create mayhem in Colombo and other towns.
The capture of Kilinochchi will undoubtedly have a fallout on the future of the Tamil people who had been struggling for autonomy and equal treatment with the majority Sinhalese for over three decades.
The LTTE had totally marginalised the Tamil polity to be a mere proxy in the parliament. Few others who resisted the LTTE had to fall back upon the government’s patronage for survival. This equation will change as the LTTE slowly loses relevance in the daily life of the Tamil people.
However, it is doubtful whether the Sri Lanka Tamil polity will immediately seize the opening offered by the LTTE’s falling fortunes. They have to be sure of their personal safety from the LTTE’s dreaded killer squads that had ruthlessly eliminated some of the tallest of Tamil politicians. And that may take time.
President Rajapaksa’s style of governance had ridden roughshod over the norms of human rights and media freedom. Rule of law had taken a downturn with police high-handedness running riot. Activities of NGOs have come under constant scrutiny of the government, curbing their freedom to operate. Media is under selective censorship. Kidnapping and even killing of businessmen and journalists had become rampant.
Overall, this had created unease and a feeling of insecurity among sections of the population. These issues had attracted strong international criticism and Sri Lanka had been taken to task at UN forums also.
Once the war takes a backseat over time, the President will have to tackle these issues more vigorously to avoid more international embarrassment for Sri Lanka.
Rajapaksa will be facing a new set of political dilemmas when normality of sorts is restored. The President is likely to come under tremendous pressure for evolving a political package for solving the Tamil issue. Even if he goes for a national election by leveraging his military success to improve his strength in the parliament, the dilemma of the Tamil issue is likely to continue.
In India, with the general elections in the offing, political equations with Sri Lanka could change as they are dependent upon the shape of coalition dispensation at Delhi.
So the Sri Lanka Tamil issue is likely be in the limelight once again. And that could mean a different play in India-Sri Lanka relations.
Courtesy: The Telegraph, Jan 3, 2009
http://www.telegraphindia.com/section/foreign/index.jsp
With the capture of Kilinochchi, the Sri Lanka security forces have exploded the myth of LTTE’s invincibility. Faith in their strength had created thousands of followers among Sri Lankan Tamil expatriates who supported V. Prabhakaran’s 20-year war to create an independent Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka.
Kilinochchi’s loss is the biggest setback Prabhakaran has faced in the current Eelam war. It also marks the virtual end of the LTTE’s conventional war capability. The LTTE’s last stronghold at Elephant Pass astride the A9 Jaffna-Kandy highway will probably become untenable as two divisions in the north and two divisions in the south are now available to capture it.
More importantly, the victory is a feather in Sri Lanka President Mahinda Rajapakse’s cap. He had made the elimination of the LTTE and “freeing Tamils from its clutches” his main agenda and built all his actions around it. With this in view, he walked out of the ceasefire agreement with the LTTE and discarded the peace process in 2002 when the LTTE offered an opening to take up the military option in 2006, a few months after he assumed office.
The President’s focused agenda had given the Sri Lanka army commander Lt Gen. Sarath Fonseka to plan and conduct his operations with clear goals. The President had given the commander a free hand in the conduct of operations and provided the wherewithal for it. The army commander enjoyed very good personal rapport with the President’s two brothers — Basil and Gotabaya — who were in key appointments to make the presidential agenda a reality.
The President took full advantage of the international environment created in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks to get the LTTE banned in Canada and the EU, two notable sources of political, material and financial support to the LTTE. It also enabled him to gain access to the intelligence resources of the US and India.
In the earlier Eelam wars, the LTTE had always managed to bounce back and come out stronger to fight the armed forces. This time, the army commander had carefully planned his operations cashing in on three advantages he enjoyed.
These were the overwhelming strength of the army built over three years, the full use of air power and imaginative use of the navy to end the LTTE’s domination of the sea around the northern and eastern province. The navy systematically set about to dismantle the marine supply chain of the LTTE. It had a merchant fleet of dozen ships which were used to ferry arms and military equipment that sustained the war. By 2007, the navy systematically hunted and destroyed them.
The operational plan was also aimed at cutting the external access of the LTTE to India through the Gulf of Mannar and to Southeast Asia through the eastern coasts. Unlike his predecessors, the army commander focused on operations on the outer perimeter than tackling the A9 highway dominated by the LTTE.
The Tigers in a guerrilla mode could pose a few problems for Sri Lanka. Over four tonnes of C4 explosives are reported to have been recovered from suspected LTTE caches in Colombo and its suburbs during 2008. This would indicate the ability of the LTTE to create mayhem in Colombo and other towns.
The capture of Kilinochchi will undoubtedly have a fallout on the future of the Tamil people who had been struggling for autonomy and equal treatment with the majority Sinhalese for over three decades.
The LTTE had totally marginalised the Tamil polity to be a mere proxy in the parliament. Few others who resisted the LTTE had to fall back upon the government’s patronage for survival. This equation will change as the LTTE slowly loses relevance in the daily life of the Tamil people.
However, it is doubtful whether the Sri Lanka Tamil polity will immediately seize the opening offered by the LTTE’s falling fortunes. They have to be sure of their personal safety from the LTTE’s dreaded killer squads that had ruthlessly eliminated some of the tallest of Tamil politicians. And that may take time.
President Rajapaksa’s style of governance had ridden roughshod over the norms of human rights and media freedom. Rule of law had taken a downturn with police high-handedness running riot. Activities of NGOs have come under constant scrutiny of the government, curbing their freedom to operate. Media is under selective censorship. Kidnapping and even killing of businessmen and journalists had become rampant.
Overall, this had created unease and a feeling of insecurity among sections of the population. These issues had attracted strong international criticism and Sri Lanka had been taken to task at UN forums also.
Once the war takes a backseat over time, the President will have to tackle these issues more vigorously to avoid more international embarrassment for Sri Lanka.
Rajapaksa will be facing a new set of political dilemmas when normality of sorts is restored. The President is likely to come under tremendous pressure for evolving a political package for solving the Tamil issue. Even if he goes for a national election by leveraging his military success to improve his strength in the parliament, the dilemma of the Tamil issue is likely to continue.
In India, with the general elections in the offing, political equations with Sri Lanka could change as they are dependent upon the shape of coalition dispensation at Delhi.
So the Sri Lanka Tamil issue is likely be in the limelight once again. And that could mean a different play in India-Sri Lanka relations.
Courtesy: The Telegraph, Jan 3, 2009
http://www.telegraphindia.com/section/foreign/index.jsp
Thursday, January 1, 2009
Sri Lanka: Fall of Paranthan, Defence of Kilinochchi and the War in Wanni
Sri Lanka security forces have started the year 2009 with the capture of Paranthan, the key road junction located on the A9 Jaffna-Kandy lifeline between Kilinochchi and Elephant Pass. The fall of Paranthan adds a new dimension to the war because it splits the mutually reinforcing Kilinochchi-Elephant Pass defence complex. It is a moot point now whether the LTTE was right in concentrating on strongly defending Kilinochchi when tactically Paranthan was more vital for this very reason.
As the fall of Paranthan has weakened the defenders of both Kilinochchi and Elephant Pass, the LTTE has to recapture Paranthan, or get eliminated piecemeal from Kilinochchi or Elephant Pass. Even in its present beleaguered condition this possibility cannot be ruled out as Paranthan is only 4.5 km from Kilinochchi.
To prevent any such LTTE initiative, the security forces have to enlarge their gains in Paranthan immediately and break up any move for counterattack. This task might be beyond the capability of Task Force I as it has to hold the ground with the LTTE forces concentrated both in the north and the south. Later in the day on January 1, 57 Division was reported to have captured Iranamadu Junction after inflicting casualties on the LTTE. Defence sources have claimed that after its capture the troops were advancing eastwards, presumably to consolidate the gains.
The falll of Iranamadu also opens yet another approach to Kilinochchi from the southeast. This makes Kilinochchi more vulnerable than ever before. So we can expect the security forces to pump in more forces into Paranthan and follow it up with an all out offensive to capture Kilinochchi Thus operations in Kilinochchi-Pranthan area in the next two weeks are going to be crucial to both sides.
Of course, the security forces have the option to resume the 53 Division’s offensive in the Muhamalai sector to capture Elephant Pass, but without reinforcing Paranthan further it might be risky.
Undoubtedly the security forces had suffered heavy casualties last month in their bid to capture Kilinochchi and Paranthan. While the LTTE is defending Kilinochchi doggedly with its crack forces, the divisions attacking them are probably diluted with fresh recruits inducted as reinforcements. Army’s expansion spree has resulted in large scale recruitment and training for a shorter period of about 12 weeks. Inevitably, shorter training duration would affect the overall fighting capabilities of troops. Probably this had resulted in the higher casualties of the security forces in the Kilinochchi operations. But unlike in the past, the security forces have shown that they can take the casualties in their stride to successfully carry forward the offensive as shown in the Task Force I’s capture of Paranthan. This would indicate a high level of motivation among the fighting formations of the security forces.
Given this tight tactical situation, the LTTE’s fierce defence of Kilinochchi has to be put in perspective; it is neither Stalingrad nor El Alamein. Such rhetoric might sound impressive, but the reality in Kilinochchi is totally different. This is an internal war between the State and insurgents fought in a very small area unlike the world war operations fought in urban setting or a battle of manoeuvres in desert. Such a comparison would also be ignoring the progress of war on other fronts while looking at the Kilinochchi battle. Even if one grants superhuman capabilities to the LTTE, it is so precariously perched in Kilinochchi as it has to survive the battle of the day, every day.
The fall of Paranthan also widens the option of the security forces operating on other fronts as well. Though the security forces were tied in knots in their offensives on Kilinochchi and Paranthan, they made good progress in the Welioya Sector according to the defence sources. They have claimed that 59 Division was eating into 20-km stretch of the A34 Mankulam-Mullaitivu road extending from Oddusuddan to Mulliyavalai- Tanniyuthu. The loss of this section would cut off the command and control of the LTTE forces operating south of the road exposing them to the threat from two task forces and elements of 59 Division from three directions.
The progress of 59 Division would further restrict the limited access the LTTE enjoys to the east coast in Mullaitivu district. This would also drastically reduce the capability of Sea Tigers. This is evident from the failure of repeated attempts of the Sea Tigers trying to take up both offensive and defensive tasks off Alampil-Mullaitivu coast. This would further disrupt the already limping LTTE’s overseas supply lines from the east.
The gains made by the security forces in the year 2008 probably spell the marginalisation of the LTTE’s conventional military power. What will be the impact on Sri Lanka when the LTTE with its never ending quest for an elusive Tamil Eelam turns to guerrilla mode completely? In the last six months there have been fewer LTTE urban terrorist operations in Sri Lanka. Over four tonnes of C4 explosives are reported to have been recovered in Colombo and its suburbs during 2008. If this report is correct, it represents the sizeable failure of LTTE’s effort to enlarge its terrorist activities in the metropolis.
Of course, the LTTE’s failing fortunes of war might be the immediate reason for this. This is also due to Sri Lanka’s tightened internal security measures despite police high handedness and greater public awareness of the nature of terrorist threat. Frequently the public have informed the police on finding suspected explosive devices. This shows that they are not prepared to accept terrorist activity in their midst, regardless of their political inclinations.
The year 2008 would go down as the one in which the LTTE lost the largest chunk of territory held under control, despite suffering a very high casualties. But given the LTTE’s limitations of force level and fire power, it appears to have gone with the plan to defend Kilinochchi-Elephant Pass area with all its strength rather than stretching itself on a wide front. So in the trade off of territory for delaying the offensive on all fronts, the LTTE was making the best out of an operational situation where they are outnumbered, outgunned and probably strategically outwitted.
The high casualty among the partially trained LTTE “freshers” in the delaying actions was inevitable in the LTTE scheme of things. That might not be the way the kith and kin of the dead would look at the LTTE tactics because at the end of the day they have gained nothing except death and destruction and the privations of war.
The military successes are going to create a new set of political dilemmas for the President. If and when the A9 highway is opened and normalcy of sorts is restored, the President is likely to come under tremendous pressure for evolving a political package for solving the Tamil issue. Even if he goes for a national election, riding his military success to improve his hold on the parliament, the dilemma of Tamil issue is likely to continue. In the next six months there will be a new government in power in New Delhi. And its political equations might also be different which could see the Sri Lanka Tamil issue coming to the limelight once again. And that could mean India – Sri Lanka relations becoming a different ball game.
So the politically shrewd President Rajapaksa is probably getting ready to look at all his options. Of course, before any such moves Kilinochchi will have to be captured first and the LTTE evicted from A9 road.
As the fall of Paranthan has weakened the defenders of both Kilinochchi and Elephant Pass, the LTTE has to recapture Paranthan, or get eliminated piecemeal from Kilinochchi or Elephant Pass. Even in its present beleaguered condition this possibility cannot be ruled out as Paranthan is only 4.5 km from Kilinochchi.
To prevent any such LTTE initiative, the security forces have to enlarge their gains in Paranthan immediately and break up any move for counterattack. This task might be beyond the capability of Task Force I as it has to hold the ground with the LTTE forces concentrated both in the north and the south. Later in the day on January 1, 57 Division was reported to have captured Iranamadu Junction after inflicting casualties on the LTTE. Defence sources have claimed that after its capture the troops were advancing eastwards, presumably to consolidate the gains.
The falll of Iranamadu also opens yet another approach to Kilinochchi from the southeast. This makes Kilinochchi more vulnerable than ever before. So we can expect the security forces to pump in more forces into Paranthan and follow it up with an all out offensive to capture Kilinochchi Thus operations in Kilinochchi-Pranthan area in the next two weeks are going to be crucial to both sides.
Of course, the security forces have the option to resume the 53 Division’s offensive in the Muhamalai sector to capture Elephant Pass, but without reinforcing Paranthan further it might be risky.
Undoubtedly the security forces had suffered heavy casualties last month in their bid to capture Kilinochchi and Paranthan. While the LTTE is defending Kilinochchi doggedly with its crack forces, the divisions attacking them are probably diluted with fresh recruits inducted as reinforcements. Army’s expansion spree has resulted in large scale recruitment and training for a shorter period of about 12 weeks. Inevitably, shorter training duration would affect the overall fighting capabilities of troops. Probably this had resulted in the higher casualties of the security forces in the Kilinochchi operations. But unlike in the past, the security forces have shown that they can take the casualties in their stride to successfully carry forward the offensive as shown in the Task Force I’s capture of Paranthan. This would indicate a high level of motivation among the fighting formations of the security forces.
Given this tight tactical situation, the LTTE’s fierce defence of Kilinochchi has to be put in perspective; it is neither Stalingrad nor El Alamein. Such rhetoric might sound impressive, but the reality in Kilinochchi is totally different. This is an internal war between the State and insurgents fought in a very small area unlike the world war operations fought in urban setting or a battle of manoeuvres in desert. Such a comparison would also be ignoring the progress of war on other fronts while looking at the Kilinochchi battle. Even if one grants superhuman capabilities to the LTTE, it is so precariously perched in Kilinochchi as it has to survive the battle of the day, every day.
The fall of Paranthan also widens the option of the security forces operating on other fronts as well. Though the security forces were tied in knots in their offensives on Kilinochchi and Paranthan, they made good progress in the Welioya Sector according to the defence sources. They have claimed that 59 Division was eating into 20-km stretch of the A34 Mankulam-Mullaitivu road extending from Oddusuddan to Mulliyavalai- Tanniyuthu. The loss of this section would cut off the command and control of the LTTE forces operating south of the road exposing them to the threat from two task forces and elements of 59 Division from three directions.
The progress of 59 Division would further restrict the limited access the LTTE enjoys to the east coast in Mullaitivu district. This would also drastically reduce the capability of Sea Tigers. This is evident from the failure of repeated attempts of the Sea Tigers trying to take up both offensive and defensive tasks off Alampil-Mullaitivu coast. This would further disrupt the already limping LTTE’s overseas supply lines from the east.
The gains made by the security forces in the year 2008 probably spell the marginalisation of the LTTE’s conventional military power. What will be the impact on Sri Lanka when the LTTE with its never ending quest for an elusive Tamil Eelam turns to guerrilla mode completely? In the last six months there have been fewer LTTE urban terrorist operations in Sri Lanka. Over four tonnes of C4 explosives are reported to have been recovered in Colombo and its suburbs during 2008. If this report is correct, it represents the sizeable failure of LTTE’s effort to enlarge its terrorist activities in the metropolis.
Of course, the LTTE’s failing fortunes of war might be the immediate reason for this. This is also due to Sri Lanka’s tightened internal security measures despite police high handedness and greater public awareness of the nature of terrorist threat. Frequently the public have informed the police on finding suspected explosive devices. This shows that they are not prepared to accept terrorist activity in their midst, regardless of their political inclinations.
The year 2008 would go down as the one in which the LTTE lost the largest chunk of territory held under control, despite suffering a very high casualties. But given the LTTE’s limitations of force level and fire power, it appears to have gone with the plan to defend Kilinochchi-Elephant Pass area with all its strength rather than stretching itself on a wide front. So in the trade off of territory for delaying the offensive on all fronts, the LTTE was making the best out of an operational situation where they are outnumbered, outgunned and probably strategically outwitted.
The high casualty among the partially trained LTTE “freshers” in the delaying actions was inevitable in the LTTE scheme of things. That might not be the way the kith and kin of the dead would look at the LTTE tactics because at the end of the day they have gained nothing except death and destruction and the privations of war.
The military successes are going to create a new set of political dilemmas for the President. If and when the A9 highway is opened and normalcy of sorts is restored, the President is likely to come under tremendous pressure for evolving a political package for solving the Tamil issue. Even if he goes for a national election, riding his military success to improve his hold on the parliament, the dilemma of Tamil issue is likely to continue. In the next six months there will be a new government in power in New Delhi. And its political equations might also be different which could see the Sri Lanka Tamil issue coming to the limelight once again. And that could mean India – Sri Lanka relations becoming a different ball game.
So the politically shrewd President Rajapaksa is probably getting ready to look at all his options. Of course, before any such moves Kilinochchi will have to be captured first and the LTTE evicted from A9 road.
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