I have been writing a monthly assessment of the Sri Lanka situation for 'Security Trends' a strategic security journal published from New Delhi. They reflect my ability to assess the future course of events in Sri Lanka. These are written at the end of each month and contain an assessment on future trends. They are published here with the permission of the publishers. For copyright reasons the articles in this series may be reproduced with the permission of the publishers available at www.security-risks.com
NATIONAL LEADERSHIP IN SRI LANKA’S FOURTH EELAM WAR
The Fourth Eelam War in Sri Lanka has been going on now for more than two and a half years. This episode of the war is unique in some respects. For the first time, the state and the security forces have shown a rare convergence of purpose that was absent earlier. Shorn of all rhetoric surrounding political pronouncements, it is clear the objective of the Sri Lanka State is elimination of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) as a powerful insurgent and terrorist entity. Sri Lanka President Mahinda Rajapaksa in his election manifesto Mahinda Chintana had considered nation building as his priority unlike his predecessors who had focused on ending the Tamil insurgency. Yet his actions after assuming office as President, has shown clearly his intention was to use the fight against the LTTE as the centre piece of his strategy to emerge as a modern day Dutta Gamunu, the legendary Sinhala king who vanquished his Tamil opponent.
The manifesto had denounced the Norwegian mediated peace process and the idea of a federal Sri Lanka as the basis for negotiated peace with the warring militants. It also did not subscribe to the claim of the northeast being the “Tamil homeland.” These views strike at the root of two of the four Tamil beliefs vocalised in the Vaddukottai resolution, which gained credence after the signing of the India –Sri Lanka Agreement 1987. Thus it was clear that another round of the Eelam war was inevitable when he assumed office. And it manifested sooner than later after Rajapaksa was sworn in as President.
In keeping with the agenda of the President, Sri Lanka’s abdication of its ceasefire agreement with the LTTE marginalising the peace process, and elimination of LTTE hold in eastern province came as logical follow up actions. Thus for the first time President Rajapaksa has given the nation the clear goal of dismantling the LTTE which had been pursuing its leader Velupillai Prabhakaran’s single minded objective of creating an independent Tamil Eelam despite paying lip service to the peace process. Prabhakaran -the immovable object - appears to have met his match in President Rajapaksa - the irresistible force.
What does this mean to the people of Sri Lanka? The chance of ushering in peace through negotiations has become near zero. Either the LTTE is to be reduced to a non-entity, or the state has to give up war after getting tired of pursuing the elusive enemy before peace can have a chance. And in the armed conflict in progress, as of now the state under Rajapaksa is calling the shots while Prabhakaran is fighting with his back to the wall. While one can sympathise with the plight of the people in war ravaged areas, the President’s actions as head of state had very good reasons to go to war with LTTE rather than chasing a nebulous peace process.
Prabhakaran has always put more faith in achieving his goal through armed might. This is reflected in the LTTE’s weak political structure and lack of clear cut ideology or vision for the Tamil Eelam. Thus Prabhakaran, the military strategist, is not as confident in handling political strategies. That would explain his strong anti-intellectual bias, and paranoia about Tamil politicians. He has systematically eliminated many Tamil intellectuals, Tamil politicians, and leaders of rival militant groups. Even when the LTTE participated in the peace process and Prabhakaran grudgingly allowed Tamil politicians who switched allegiance to him to be elected to the parliament, he has not allowed them to take any political initiative whatsoever. Functioning as the Tamil National Alliance, these members have been able to by and large function only as a mouthpiece of LTTE’s in the parliament.
The LTTE has always used political ploys to gain nothing more than military advantage. Its conduct in the early years of Norwegian peace process 2002 was typical of such tactic. The LTTE used the period to systematically eliminate the intelligence assets of security forces who were not allowed to retaliate by the government. While talking peace, the LTTE cashed on the Sinhala polity’s inability to come together, repeatedly violated the peace process with impunity. It established all the trappings of a de-facto government, imported arms to enrich its arsenal, sent out delegations abroad, turned its kangaroo courts into high sounding judicial establishments, and laid claims on Sri Lankan territorial waters claiming parity status with the elected government of Sri Lanka. These acts showed that it was keen to preserve its image as an invincible entity, in peace or war. And all this was done under the benign eyes of the international mediators.
President Rajapaksa unlike his predecessors has destabilised Prabhakaran by regaining both political and military initiatives. He knocked out the three props that were enabling the LTTE to run a state within a state from 2002 to 2005. The first prop was the peace process 2002 underwritten by an international consortium of nations which ran out of steam when both sides wanted to pursue it on their own terms. The second was the state’s readiness to find a negotiated solution within a federal format. Lastly most of the Sri Lankans believed that the LTTE was invincible. He made his intentions to take on these three issues head on during his campaign for presidential poll. He considered his election as President as the peoples mandate for action. So he ignored two elusive perennials of Sri Lanka: Southern Sinhala consensus on the Tamil issue, and evolving a political solution acceptable to all parties. The marginalisation of the peace process automatically reduced the say of international powers on resolving the Tamil issue.
Once this was done, Rajapaksa moved to convert the existing internal political roadblocks in dealing with the LTTE. His predecessors had floundered in their attempts to evolve a political methodology to handle the LTTE. Avoiding such a strategy, Rajapaksa simply bypassed the issue by converting the political process into a military one where Sri Lanka had the advantage of numbers and firepower. Even when the peace process was in force, on coming to office the President allowed the security forces to strikes whenever the LTTE’s violent acts gave an opening. The security forces grabbed the opportunity with both hands and the President’s supporters acclaimed the small military successes that followed initially. These successes had a snowballing of public support to the President. They were happy to see a decisive President in action after ineffective and clumsy government performance earlier in the face of shocking LTTE acts of violence.
Prabhakaran probably failed to see through the complex politico-military strategy of President Rajapaksa. This could be due to the death of his trusted political aide Anton Balasingham some time back. In fact Prabhakaran directly played into the President’s hands at least on three occasions to legitimise Rajapaksa’s taking up arms against the LTTE.
First was the LTTE’s short sighted boycott of the presidential poll in areas under its control, after striking a murky deal with political brokers. This enabled Rajapaksa to win the Presidential poll with a thin majority, after the Tamil votes destined to his opponent Ranil Wickremesinghe did not materialise due to the boycott. Then there were the LTTE’s mindless attacks on the army commander and his senior deputies. These attacks had come a few months after the LTTE faced international condemnation for killing Sri Lanka’s Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar. The last straw was the LTTE inspired closure of Mavilaru sluice gates which gave a political handle for the President to use the army in strength. This operation was enlarged to ultimately evict the LTTE from the east. These events also reduced the influence of international peace lobby in shaping Sri Lanka’s policy and helped the President to pursue the war.
The armed forces buoyed by the presidential action-agenda appear to have justified Rajapaksa’s confidence in them. They had done their homework well. The Army Commander Lt Gen Sarath Fonseka showed a good understanding of the LTTE tactics and modified his style of operations to exploit their weakness. At the same time he has tried to overcome army’s weaknesses of the past. He opted for creeping offensives to progressively reduce the domain of LTTE rather than carry out large scale operations. The offensive operations became stronger as the force levels increased with the raising of three new divisions. The timing of operations was mostly dictated by military considerations rather than politics as in the past..
The higher direction of war has shown marked improvement particularly in handling of multiple formations and use of air and naval power. The Special Forces have been used to assist main offensives. Navy’s performance had been imaginative; it broke up the strategic marine logistic supply chain of the LTTE before the war reached the LTTE’s main defences in Vanni. The air force for its part has been carrying out regular air strikes despite LTTE’s repeated sneak air raids by the Air Tigers and suicide attacks on Anuradhapura air base. The air force’s had a hand in eliminating at least one important leader of the LTTE – Tamil Chelvan, the political head of the insurgents.
All the achievements of security forces would not have been possible without the strong national leadership for war provided by the President Rajapaksa. Lt Gen Fonseka had a few chinks in his armour. He carried out promotions based upon performance rather than seniority, which did not go down well with the senior ranks. His attitude towards the media had not been very friendly and this drew sharp criticisms. However, the President has stood by the side of the army commander despite this. Thus Rajapaksa and Lt Gen Fonseka appear to have built a symbiotic relationship which forms an important part of the President’s overall strategy.
Democracies always have a problem in fighting insurgents as the ruling political elite invariably take decisions with an eye on the ballot box. President Rajapaksa is no exception to this. But he has tried to use military achievements to strengthen his political constituency. Historically the two major political parties - the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and the United National Party (UNP) - have always tried to prevent each other from evolving a cohesive strategy to tackle the Tamil issue. Rajapaksa has tried to breakaway from this trend by imposing his views through some questionable political strategies and unsavoury methods in utter disregard to international opinion. He is yet to address the crunch issue of ending the terror regime of LTTE from the national scene and resolve the Tamil issue to everyone’s satisfaction including India. Though these are major obstacles to Rajapaksa’s final agenda, he appears confident of carrying through his strategy. If he succeeds it would be for the first time an elected leader in South Asia has shown how to fight terrorism from the front and succeed.
September 30, 2008
Copyright: Security Trends
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