The importance of being Prabhakaran

By R. Hariharan

The media blaze created by the news of Prabhakaran, the leader of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), sustaining minor injury in a Sri Lankan air-strike in Wanni recently has underlined the importance of Prabhakaran to the fate of the conflict in Sri Lanka. Coming after the death of S.P. Tamilchelvan, the LTTE political head, in a similar air-strike in Kilinochchi a few months ago, the news about Prabhakaran has reminded us that no leader is invulnerable in a military conflict. The report of his injury found indirect corroboration when his wife Mathivathani made her first-ever public appearance to inaugurate "Anbuchcholai," a home for elders in Kilinochchi. As a matter of policy, Prabhakaran's family always had an invisible public and media presence; so the publicity given in the LTTE media to the news with her photographs indicated a change in Prabhakaran's policy.

As it happens to all the news concerning Prabhakaran, the media had been debating a number of issues connected with the LTTE leader - the nature of Prabhakaran's injury, his possible successor for leadership, future of the Sri Lanka war, and so on. And the representatives of the Sri Lanka government had also been triumphantly airing their views on the subject.

With Sri Lankan security forces riding the crest of operational successes for some time now, the news about Prabhakaran's injury came as a bonus to them. Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka, Sri Lanka Army commander, in his reaction, expected the LTTE to crumble after Prabhakaran, because the LTTE was a "one-man show." This reaction, surprisingly, is similar to that of Prabhakaran's own "admirers" everywhere, who feel the Tamil cause would have no "protector" in his absence. These inferences are based either because of the historical baggage of the ethnic confrontation or without understanding the "cause" of LTTE's existence. In the absence of a political solution in the horizon, the Tamil cause continues to remain as relevant to Tamils as before, LTTE or no LTTE.

There is no doubt that the LTTE would not be the same fighting force unless Prabhakaran is there to lead it. However, any assessment on its future under a different leader has to be contextualised in the sea change that has taken place in the political and security environment in the island since the undeclared Eelam War 4 started in December 2005. Prabhakaran's ruthlessness and legendary charisma have enabled him to create and run with an iron hand a complex war machine. Succeeding him will not be an easy task for anyone else. No other leader in the LTTE has demonstrated leadership capabilities that would come anywhere near Prabhakaran.

On top of it, the security forces' operations have now reached a critical stage in the north. Having lost control of Tamil areas in the east, the LTTE is locked in a creeping Sri Lankan offensive eating its way into LTTE territory in the north, particularly in areas west of A9 and north of Vavuniya-Mannar axis. In this operational situation, any successor to Prabhakaran has a very difficult and uphill task of sustaining the LTTE as a viable operational outfit in the face of a ruthless foe determined to militarily eliminate it.

Many appear to assume that the leadership succession in the LTTE would be an automatic process, with the mantle falling on Pottu Amman (Shanmugaligam Sivashanker), the number two man in the pecking order. He also heads the LTTE's all-powerful and secretive intelligence wing, as well as the Black Tigers, the sword arm of the LTTE. Apart from his position of power, most importantly, he has the ear of the leader. He also controls the access to Prabhakaran. This has ensured the physical security of Prabhakaran, and insulated him from the day-to-day problems of the organisation. However, at the same time, it has prevented other senior leaders gaining direct access to Prabhakaran. This has not endeared him to other leaders. Moreover, Prabhakaran does not appear to have nominated Pottu Amman as his successor. This would indicate that he had not yet made up his mind on this issue.

Pottu Amman has demonstrated a strong determination and power assertion to get things done his way in the organisation. But being no Prabhakaran, to successfully lead the LTTE, he needs the cooperation, if not acceptance, of veteran commanders like Soosai, the Sea Tiger commander, and the area commanders. Even if that happens, with external intelligence agencies of many hues in action to create dissent and to lure dissidents, two things can happen. A more acceptable claimant to the throne can appear in the horizon. Equally, the possibility of the LTTE breaking up into regional groups should not be ruled out. That increases the nuisance value of the LTTE as a guerrilla force, even if it loses a conventional war. Political settlement will become more amorphous, and that would encourage the reassertion of Sinhala chauvinism.

However, all this might not happen in the immediate future as the security forces are yet to hit the heartland of the LTTE, and main battles for control of the north are yet to take place. But for formulating long-term national policies, a possible change in the LTTE leadership has to be considered, as it will have far reaching implications not only for Sri Lanka but also for India, as ties between the two countries are closer and more complex than ever before.

As far as India is concerned, a change in the LTTE leadership after a disastrous exit of Prabhakaran could create some sharp ripples in Tamil Nadu. The Dravidian parties, particularly Vaiko's Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, might drum up support for the LTTE to prevent its dissipation. In the absence of Prabhakaran, even the AIADMK might re-examine its hostile attitude to the LTTE if popular support for it in Tamil Nadu grows.

Prabhakaran's strategic blunder in masterminding the assassination of former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi had been a roadblock for the LTTE to regain political legitimacy and support in India. Even a move like lifting the ban on the LTTE in India could effect major changes in its military fortunes as access to supplies from Tamil Nadu would become easy. However, these developments would depend upon how the people Tamil Nadu respond. Given the public preoccupation in furthering their fortunes, in a booming economy, resurrecting political support for the LTTE would not be an easy task. But in coalition politics, with its eyes solely on vote banks, anything is possible.

To prevent such unhealthy revival, India should strongly put pressure on Sri Lanka to implement a reasonable devolution structure without any further delay. That would marginalise the relevance of LTTE for the Tamil struggle.

With the end of the monsoon, the Sri Lanka war is likely to heat up in the coming months. And the risk for Prabhakaran will increase as the war enters Vanni. On the whole, Sri Lanka's political and security environment is poised for a paradigm shift. And that is linked to the fortunes of Prabhakaran in the coming year.