By Col R Hariharan (Retd.)
Coming to terms with each other
During the last three decades the global security environment has drastically changed, ushering in greater cooperation and convergence among nations. Both China and India have taken advantage of the significant changes in world economic order following the liberalisation of global trade. This process has been helped by rapid advances in information technology and networked communication. China had a head start of a decade and a half over India in revamping its economy and clocked double digit growth during this period. China’s domestic saving rate of over 50 percent has enabled it to develop extensive infrastructure. These advantages have helped it emerge as global manufacturing hub. However, its economy is largely dependent upon exports.
India despite waking up to a late start is also on the high growth path. Though not as spectacular as China, Indian economy is also growing at a steady rate of above eight percent. India has emerged as world leader in IT based services. Blessed with a large English knowing population, it has become a source of managerial and engineering talent for multi national companies. Indian entrepreneurs are investing globally more than ever before; they have acquired more overseas enterprises than the Chinese. Despite poor infrastructure, its manufacturing industry is clawing its way to be on par with more advanced economies of the world. Unlike China, its economy is dependent more upon domestic consumption than exports. In short, Indian economy has become too big for China to ignore, just as India finds China.
Setting aside the contentious issues of long gestation for routine consideration, both China and India countries have been pragmatic in trying to build better political, economic and trade relations. China-India trade, though weighted heavily in favour of China, which was at $ 38.2 billion in 2007, is estimated to have reached $ 32 billion million mark in the first six months of 2010! After Prime Minister Dr Man Mohan Singh visited Beijing and met with Chinese Wen Jiabao in January 2008, the two countries came out with a vision statement titled “a shared vision for the 21st century.” Like all vision statements it painted a rosy future of shared perceptions and projections. Its progress had been slow and measured with both countries opting for safe options rather than looking for out of the box ideas.
Managing the global financial crisis
Both China and India appear to have managed cope up with the global financial crisis struck it in their own fashion, despite differences in their political systems and processes. However, the export dependent Chinese manufacturing economy suffered more though Indian service industry dependent upon the U.S. and European markets also faltered.
Though a number of Western analysts are sceptical of China’s economic recovery, the International Monetary Fund’s July 2010 review is more kind. It said, “China was hit hard by the global financial crisis. However, the authorities’ quick, determined, and effective policy response has helped mitigate the impact on the economy and ensured that China has led the global recovery.” [1]
Despite millions of job losses due to fall in exports, China clocked 6.1 per cent growth in the first quarter of 2009 to achieve a growth of over 9 per cent at the end of the year. It is targeting a growth of 10.5 per cent this year. The IMF further added: “China’s recovery had significant positive spillovers to the region and the global economy, initially through increased demand for commodities—contributing to an upswing in global commodity prices—and later through higher imports of capital goods. The balance of payments saw a dramatic shift with the current account falling quickly as exports slowed and imports surged. Despite the lower current account, reserve accumulation has continued to be rapid.”
Not only that; China with a foreign exchange reserve of around $2 trillion took full advantage of the U.S. fiscal crisis to create a space for itself in the international power equation. The West has come to look to China for stabilizing their sagging economies. The impact of these moves is evident in the subtle changes in the way the U.S. and the West had been looking at China. The U.S. started downplaying its perennial complaints about human rights abuses in China. It has recognised the role China can play in keeping the military regime in Myanmar in leash.
United Kingdom had already gone a step further. Even as early as October 29, 2008 British foreign secretary David Miliband had apologized to China for not having renounced those actions British actions in the past, including the Simla Accord (1913) and thus the McMahon Line, describing them an anachronism and colonial legacy.[2] The British “apology” used as a political expediency has probably knocked down the fundamental basis of India’s stand on the Sino-Indian border dispute.
The global financial downturn has underlined two things. Firstly, China has to maintain its world leadership status in manufacturing and that would imply meeting the increasing demand for raw material and energy resources. It has to open up new markets for Chinese products while keeping the competitive economies of Asia and America at bay. Though this might be viewed as an exercise in international trade, it has to be driven by international relations backed by strategic defence capability. Secondly, China appears to have understood the all encompassing nature of strategic security and economic security as one of its key drivers. This appears to have been missed out by other major powers including the U.S.
Strategic perceptions
China’s present strategy appears to focus on managing the external environment to ensure conditions conducive to its economic development. China’s manufacturing industry has increasingly huge appetite for petroleum and raw material inputs sourced from all over the world including Africa and Latin America. Chinese goods are finding their way the world over. China’s international relations appear to be mainly focused on retaining its status as a global economic power with the PLA safeguarding such interests. It has shown little hesitation in dealing with ‘rogue regime’ like Sudan and Myanmar to serve its purpose.
As China looks increasingly to outside world for its growth and prosperity, and for an increasing role in the global power structure, its vulnerability increases. So from a nation drawing its strength land based forces, China is working to increasing its maritime capability. Protecting the ‘sea lines of communication’ (SLOC), improving port infrastructure in Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Pakistan etc. along the SLOC and keeping the seas free of piracy in choke points are all important for China’s maritime security. To fulfil these obligations, we can expect Chinese naval presence in international waters to increase in the coming years.
A second aspect is the Chinese perception of threats to national unity and internal stability. China’s Defence White Paper 2008 makes a pointed reference to “Separatist forces working for "Taiwan independence," "East Turkistan independence" and "Tibet independence" pose threats to China's unity and security.[3] China’s promotion of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) started with special focus on terrorist threat originating in the Central Asian and Afghan regions has relevance to this perception. Significantly the White Paper also talks of damages caused by increasing non-traditional security threats like terrorism, natural disasters, economic insecurity, and information insecurity showing a clear understanding strategic security threats in the modern context.
In consonance with these perceptions, the Pentagon Report 2010 “Military and Security Development Involving the People’s Republic of China” identifies three components of PLA mission.[4] These are providing guarantee of strength for the CCP to consolidate its rule, provide security guarantee for safeguarding the period of opportunity for national development and providing powerful strategic support. The PLA modernisation which is going for a decade now has to be understood in this context.
China continues to be wary of US intentions in the Asia-Pacific region including in South Asia. Beijing’s Defence White Paper 2008 had described the ‘increasing US military presence in Asia-Pacific’ as China’s ‘security concern.’[5] China’s opposition to the US-led ‘exclusive bilateral alliances in Asia – Pacific region, all left over by the cold war’ was highlighted by Lt. Gen Ma Xiaotian the Chinese delegate to the Shangrila 2009 Dialogue.[6] The Pentagon Report 2010 “Military and Security Development Involving the People’s Republic of China” presented to the U.S. Congress has expressed its concern on this count, particularly with reference to development of China’s navy, missile and nuclear capabilities. So India’s growing strategic convergence with the U.S. and the signing of Indo-US civilian nuclear agreement has increased Chinese suspicions of India.
Frozen attitudes
Based on its historical experience, China is highly sensitive to its territorial integrity. It considers it as a “unitary whole and inviolable.” It will not tolerate foreign intrusions into China, creation of concessions, or any coercive seizure of territory from Chinese control (e.g., Hong Kong and Taiwan). As analyst Dean Cheng puts it “In the South Asian context, from the perspective of the CCCP leadership, Tibet, like Taiwan, is part of China, and any threat to Chinese control is wholly unacceptable.”[7]
China is not prepared to accept borders that were demarcated in the past by foreign powers. In order to “correct” border issues, China had used force to strengthen its stance both against the Soviet Union (1969) and India (1962). Now that China is economically and militarily stronger than ever before, it has the capability and leadership to do it again if the need arises. Whether China would indulge in this luxury when it is trying to assert its international status as a responsible power would probably be dictated by the global environment.
India’s military defeat in 1962, when the Chinese Premier Chou En-Lai decided to “teach a lesson to India,” has left a legacy of suspicion and distrust on all things Chinese. In a way the 1962 war was a culmination of India’s failure to read the Chinese correctly and take timely action in the years preceding the war. As veteran leader of freedom struggle JB Kripalani said even before the war, India had lost “12,000 square miles of our territory without striking a single blow.”[8] He was referring to the Aksai Chin area in Eastern Ladakh through which the Chinese had built a road linking Tibet with Xingjian in 1957-58. And India took note of Chinese intrusion only in 1959!
Though the 1962 Sino-Indian war was smaller in scale than India’s later day wars with Pakistan, it had far reaching effects in both countries. It was a big loss of face for India, which was a founder leader of the Non Aligned Movement in the seventies. But probably more lasting damage was done to India’s self confidence in dealing with China on an equal footing. Even after nearly five decades of the 1962 war, many in India consider the Chinese not trustworthy and nurture deep animosity.
On the other hand, the war reinforced Chinese suspicions of India’s intentions in Tibet. No doubt this was coloured due to the continued presence of Dalai Lama and a large number of Tibetan refugees in India, who aspire for freedom. The resounding success in the war probably encouraged China to believe that India could be browbeaten with an aggressive stance.
As the Dalai Lama is aging, the issue of his succession remains a potential source of internal unrest in Tibet. Its effect could make it an explosive issue among the Tibetan refugees in India. This is an issue in which India can do little, unless both the Dalai Lama and China want it. The future is unclear and only time can tell how the Tibetan issue will pan out.
Shaping of India policy
China considers India as the most important nation in South Asia. India has the largest population next only to China. Indian economy is growing at a fast pace and Indian goods and services dominate South Asian markets. Indian armed forces are undergoing modernisation. India has developed its own medium and short range missiles and its air force has acquired Russian made Sukhoi30MK I combat aircraft which is superior to the ones supplied to China. Indian navy is also getting an aircraft carrier from Russia. India is building its own nuclear submarine which is facilitated by its experience with nuclear submarine leased from Russia.
Ever since the Chinese occupation of Tibet in 1950, the contentious issues of un-demarcated India-Tibet border and its claims in Aksai Chin and South Tibet (Arunachal Pradesh) have become strategically important for China for reasons of both stability and internal security.
According the Pentagon Report 2010, to improve the PLA capability in the region the liquid fuelled CSS-3 IRBMs (intermediate range ballistic missiles) have been replaced with more advanced solid fuelled CSS-5 MRBMs (medium range ballistic missiles) and developing infrastructure in a big way. The Report also states that China was investing in road development along the Sino-Indian border “primarily to facilitate development in Western China; improved roads would also support PLA border defence operations.” It also speaks about possible contingency plan to induct airborne troops in this region.
The strategic sensitivity of Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh claimed by the Chinese has grown since 1962 for controlling the restive populations of Xingjian and Tibet and integrate them. As Pakistan and Nepal could influence the sensitive underbelly of these regions building strategic relations is imperative for China. For developing a major Chinese conventional or unconventional threat against India their geographical location can be handy.
China has leveraged Pakistan’s animosity to India to its advantage to build multifaceted relationship with Pakistan. Over the years it has been the main supplier of weapons systems and air and naval combat craft. Pakistan is one of the few countries where China is co-producing K8 trainer aircraft and JF17 fighter aircraft. China has also supplied Pakistan with M-11 SRBM (short range ballistic missiles). It was also involved in helping Pakistan develop technology to produce nuclear weapons. This bonding is growing and ultimately. The development of road, rail and gas pipeline infrastructure between China and Pakistan through the Gilgit-Baltistan region as well as port facilities in Gwadar have a large strategic context for both China and Pakistan. While China’s remote Xingjian gains direct access to the major sea routes, the rail and road communications would provide for better development of the region. It will also enable China to strength its strategic presence in this troubled region.
Nepal’s social, cultural and economic activity had been dominated by India for centuries. However, the Chinese shadow has been growing over the country for sometime now. The rise of Maoists in Nepal’s power structure gives China greater ability to influence government policy. There is a sizeable segment in Nepal which would like to wean away the country from overwhelming Indian influence. Greater interaction and trade and commerce with China would find support from this segment.
Even otherwise, the Nepalese government would welcome improved infrastructure link with Tibet. Prime Minister Madhav Kumar Nepal had requested China to extend the Beijing-Lhasa railway line to Kathmandu at a Chinese cultural festival in Kathmandu on October 10, 2009. He said: "The economic ties between Nepal and China could be taken to a new height if the railway line that has reached up to Lhasa from mainland China could be extended up to Kathmandu, and economic infrastructure could be developed on the Himalayan transit points between Nepal and China."[9] While Nepal would benefit by the railway link, it will have far reaching strategic significance for India. In any future Indian confrontation with China it would help faster build up of Chinese forces against, particularly when China completes the construction a network of six railway lines in Tibet by 2020.
Periodic tensions and growing uneasiness
Despite the increasing political and trade links, India China relations continue to be shaken up by periodic turbulence. There are a number of reasons for this.
India has generally been playing down China’s periodic needling in a bid to keep its fall out within manageable proportions so that functional relations are not damaged. As a result, India has given the impression of a passive partner in its interactions with China. It has taken little action to erase this popular impression.
This has only reinforced the general belief that India has given up on the issue of Chinese occupation of the Aksai Chin region accepting it as a fact of life. Even the issue of finding an alignment acceptable to both countries to delineate the 4,057 km border has made little progress despite 13 rounds of talks. So in times of turbulence these hardy perennial issues always surface among the people.
In February 2009 barely a year after the joint vision statement, there was an escalation of tension between the two countries. The Chinese objected to the visit of Indian Prime Minister Dr Man Mohan Singh to Arunachal Pradesh. The Chinese Foreign Ministry conveyed similar objections when President Pratibha Patil visited Tawang in early April. India played down these aberrations, and dealt with the issue at the government level.
However, the Chinese did not allow their objections to be dismissed as another instance of Chinese ambivalence in handling of foreign relations.[10] The Chinese started issuing visas stapled to passports in the case of Indian citizens of Kashmir origin. The issue came to a head when China refused to issue a visit to a serving officer of the army - Lt General Jamwal who had commanded troops in Kashmir. New Delhi has reacted strongly an issued a demarche to Beijing. India is also reported to have reciprocated by refusing visas to Chinese PLA officers including one who was to attend a course at the National Defence College in India. For the time being, India had suspended other military interactions with China.
The situation got further heated up when Selig S. Harrison in an article in the New York Times of August 27, 2010 said “…reports from a variety of foreign intelligence sources, Pakistani journalists and Pakistani human rights workers reveal two important new developments in Gilgit-Baltistan: a simmering rebellion against Pakistani rule and the influx of an estimated 7,000 to 11,000 soldiers of the People’s Liberation Army.”[11] B Raman commenting on the report said: Selig’s wake-up call should not have been a surprise to intelligence sources and policy-makers in India and the US. They were aware of the high level of involvement of the PLA of China and its nuclear establishment in the construction and maintenance of high-altitude roads in Gilgit-Baltistan. The PLA was interested in infrastructure development and maintenance in Gilgit-Baltistan because of its strategic importance for possible use by the PLA in the event of another military conflict with India. China’s nuclear establishment was interested because it wanted to use the PLA-constructed Karakoram Highway as an overland route for the movement of missiles and spare parts to Pakistan.”[12]
Apparently alarmed at the increasing collaboration between China and Pakistan, Prime Minister Dr Man Mohan Singh in one of his rare public comments on China cautioned the nation about the changing attitude of China. He told the Times of India, “China would like to have a foothold in South Asia and we have to reflect on this reality, we have to be aware of this. There is a new assertiveness among the Chinese. It is difficult to tell which way it will go. So it's important to be prepared” The news report said the Prime Minister also cautioned that China could use India's “soft underbelly” of Kashmir, a region disputed with Pakistan, “to keep India in low level equilibrium.”[13]
Getting out of the gridlock
China has achieved big power status conferred by its booming economy and military strength. In keeping with this, it will continue to expand its presence in South Asia just as it had already done with ASEAN countries. A significant feature of China’s trade relations is it does not allow contentious and unsettled political issues with other nations to interfere in developing trading relations with them. Japan and Taiwan are two good examples of this policy. China is doing the same in India where it has emerged as the largest trading partner.
As Dr Man Mohan Singh had said the world is large enough for India and China to “cooperate and compete”. However, South Asia is India’s area of influence and dominance. So when China makes forays into South Asia it will increasingly compete with India in gaining political, social and economic influence in South Asian countries. As China’s strategic security perceptions are closely interwoven with economic and energy security, all Chinese moves will have a strategic content.
In the case of Pakistan it has already built close strategic relations. It has invested in Afghanistan in copper mining and it is also involved in infrastructure projects there. As already discussed China is increasing its infrastructure and political links with Nepal. China is also in the process of building closer relations with Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. It has given liberal loans and assistance to develop land and port infrastructure in the two countries. Both Bangladesh and Sri Lanka governments and armed forces have developed fraternal relations over the years. China will attempt to build even closer relations with these two countries when the PLA navy graduates into blue water league in the coming decade and make their presence in strength in the Indian Ocean region.
We have to get out of the shrill rhetoric that flows from populist perceptions of China. India has to recognise the realities of Chinese presence in South Asia. To manage this development, our strategic foreign policy formulation on China has to be holistic and not piecemeal. At present our national leadership and security watchdogs do not appear to be ready to embark upon such a visionary approach. Thus as a nation we are reconciled to pedestrian strategies. So it is not surprising our China policy comes alive only in the form of reactive responses rather than strategic initiatives. If strategic initiatives are in existence, their visibility is low and their articulation is not audible.
Former Indian Ambassador to China Salman Haider’s remark “We are stuck in an unproductive course” aptly sums up the mental gridlock in which we find ourselves while dealing with China.[14] How long are we going to continue with endless talks at the level of bureaucracy? People who have had career long exposure to China like R Swaminathan have stressed the need to look for out of the box ideas to resolve at least the issues which are manageable by both sides - the boundary question and Chinese claims on Indian territory.[15] We have enough expertise to give form to such solutions. But political leadership has to get out of the mental block on China to make a break through. Ultimately it all boils down to visionary national leadership. Do we have it? That is the moot point.
(Col. R Hariharan, a retired Military Intelligence officer is associated with the South Asia Analysis Group, and the Chennai Centre for China Studies. E-mail:colhari@yahoo.com Website: www.colhariharan.org)
Written on October 6, 2010 for www.cnfworldfocus.org
[2] Times of India, January 9, 2010 http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/UK-stand-on-McMahon-Line-bolstering-Beijings- claims/articleshow/5426009.cms
[3] China’s National Defense in 2008, Beijing January 2009 http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/2008DefenseWhitePaper_Jan2009.pdf
[4] Department of Defense, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2010_CMPR_Final.pdf
[5] China’s National Defense in 2008, Beijing January 2009
[6] Shangrila Dialogue 2009: 2nd Plenary Session 30 May 2009
[7] China’s view of South Asia and Indian Ocean, 31 August, 2010 http://www.heritage.org/Research/Lecture/China-s-View-of-South-Asia-and-the-Indian-Ocean
[8] Lok Sabha Debates 11 April 1961
[9] Quoted by B Raman, China: India’s Strategic Strangulation South Asia Analysis Group Paper no. 4069 dated 28 September, 2010 www.southasiaanalysis.org
[10] This is one of the frequent themes of analysts who look for differences within the leadership or between the foreign minis try and the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) in foreign policy decision making.
[11] http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/27/op...20china&st=cse
[12] South Asia Analysis Group paper No. 4042 September 15, 2009 “
[15] SAAG Paper no. 2569 29-Jan.-2008 Indian Prime Minister’s Visit to China – Jan. 2008 www.southasiaanalysis.org
