The Role of Force in Strategic Affairs

[Text of speech by Mr Shivshankar Menon, National Security Advisor, at National Defence College, New Delhi on October 21,2010.]

I am deeply honoured to have been asked to deliver the keynote address before the seminar on “The Role of Force in Strategic Affairs” to celebrate the golden jubilee of this prestigious institution. The NDC has made outstanding contributions to the spread of strategic thought and the integration of civil and military thinking in India. You have today assembled a galaxy of experts and authorities to discuss this important question. We await your deliberations with great expectations.

Rather than trying to anticipate what your seminar will throw up, I thought I would look at two issues that you will probably consider in much more detail. Is there in an Indian doctrine for the use of force in statecraft? And, how have recent changes in the world and strategic affairs affected the role of force in today’s world?

Is there an Indian doctrine for the use of force in statecraft? This is not a question that one normally expects to ask about a power that is a declared nuclear weapon state with the world’s second largest standing army. But India achieved independence in a unique manner; through a freedom movement dedicated to truth and non-violence, and has displayed both ambiguity and opposition to classical power politics. In the circumstances posing the question is understandable and legitimate.

To answer the question let us look at traditional Indian attitudes to force and the lessons India draws from its own history, and at Indian practice since independence in 1947.

Attitudes to Force and Lessons from History

While India may have achieved independence after a non-violent struggle, it was a struggle that Gandhiji described as non-violence of the strong.

As far back as 1928 Gandhiji wrote, “If there was a national government, whilst I should not take any direct part in any war, I can conceive of occasions when it would be my duty to vote for the military training of those who wish to take it.... It is not possible to make a person or society non-violent by compulsion.”

During the Partition riots at his prayer meeting on 26 September 1947 Gandhiji said that he had always been an opponent of all warfare, but that if there was no other way of securing justice war would be the only alternative left to the government.

Faced with the tribal raiders sent by Pakistan into Kashmir in October 1947, Gandhiji said that it was right for the Union Government to save the fair city by rushing troops to Srinagar. He added that he would rather that the defenders be wiped out to the last man in clearing Kashmir’s soil of the raiders rather than submit.

In saying so, Gandhiji was entirely in keeping with a long Indian tradition which has regarded the use of force as legitimate in certain circumstances, namely, if there is no alternative way of securing justice. This is in essence a doctrine for the defensive use of force, when all other avenues are exhausted.

Our two greatest epics, the Mahabharata and Ramayana are about wars, and treat rivalries as natural and normal. And the two classical expositions on the use of force, the Geeta and Bhishma’s death bed lecture on statecraft in the Mahabharata’s Shantiparva are extended explanations of a unique point of view.

The clearest description of the uses of force in statecraft is in the Arthashastra by Chanakya, which deals with both internal and external uses of force.

The lesson that comes through very clearly in both the major Indian epics, which deal with wars of necessity, is also apparent in Kautilya, the original realist, and in Ashoka, the convert to idealism. Ashoka and Kautilya were both products of a highly evolved and intricate tradition of statecraft which must have preceded them for centuries. A simple reading of the Arthashastra suffices to prove how evolved Indian strategic culture was as early as the third century before Christ, and how the use of force was limited both by practical and moral considerations. This was not a doctrine of “God on our side”, (though that helped, as Krishna proved in the Mahabharata). Nor is it about just wars. In the Indian tradition the use of force is legitimate not just if it is in a good cause and its results will be good. Instead, this was a doctrine that saw force as necessary in certain circumstances, to obtain justice, when all other means are exhausted, and which also recognised that force was not always the most effective or efficient means to this end.

The other lesson that Indian thinkers have consistently drawn from history is of the perils of weakness. The colonial narrative of India’s history, stressing “outside” invasions and rulers had as its corollary the conviction that India must avoid weakness at all costs lest that history be repeated. The Indian quest after 1947 for strategic autonomy and for autonomy in the decision to use or threaten force has a long tradition behind it.

What I am trying to say is that Indian strategic culture has an indigenous construct on the role of force in statecraft, modified by our experience in the last two centuries. War and peace are continuing themes in Indian strategic culture. While not celebrating war the culture treats defensive war as acceptable when good fights evil to secure justice. Indian strategic culture has been comfortable with this contradiction. While Gandhiji shunned the use of force and opposed violence in politics he was politically steely and unyielding, and accepted violence as unavoidable and justified in certain circumstances.

As a result of this acceptance of contradictions, Indian strategic culture supports ethical views that dovetail easily with international norms of conduct, whether legal or on human rights. It is a culture that tends instinctively to pluralism, tolerance of different views and positions, and a reliance on argumentation, diplomacy and law before recourse to the use of force. It is therefore no surprise that it seeks a rule based international order to limit the anarchy among states that is sometimes evident.

This aspect of Indian strategic culture is common to what Kanti Bajpai described as the three streams of Indian strategic culture, namely, “Nehruvians”, neo-liberals and hyper-realists. They might differ on the best means but not on India’s strategic goals . To summarise Bajpai, all three streams agree on the centrality of the sovereign state in international relations and recognise no higher authority; see interests, power and violence as the staples of international relations that states cannot ignore; and think that power comprises both military and economic capabilities at a minimum. Beyond this they differ.

Interestingly all three streams, “Nehruvians”, neoliberals and hyperrealists, believe that nuclear weapons are essential for India’s security in a world that has shown no signs of moving to their abolition and elimination.

In other words, there is substantial agreement on values, on goals and even on means in our policies, despite marked and rapid changes in the external environment in which we have operated. That is why the core traits of our foreign and defence policies have persisted since independence, irrespective of the parties in power.

The Indian Practice since 1947

Let us look at this aspect of Indian strategic culture in action, in other words at Indian practice and policy since independence.

• The defence budget has only exceeded 3% of GDP in one year of the last sixty-three.

• There have been clear limits on the use of force internally. The use of military force for internal security functions has been severely circumscribed, limited to those cases where there is a strong correlation to inimical forces abroad such as Nagaland and J&K.

• The armed forces of the Union have only been used defensively against external aggression in the sixty-three years of the Republic.

• India has never sent troops abroad except for UNPKO or at the express request of the legitimate government of the country concerned. This was true in the Maldives in 1987, in Sri Lanka in 1987 and in Bangladesh in 1971.

• India has also never retained territory taken by force in the wars that she has fought. This is so even for some Indian territory taken back from Pakistan in the Indian state of J&K which was returned to Pakistani control after the 1965 and 1971 wars.

India as a NWS

The Indian nuclear doctrine also reflects this strategic culture, with its emphasis on minimal deterrence, no first use against non-nuclear weapon states and its direct linkage to nuclear disarmament. We have made it clear that while we need nuclear weapons for our own security, it is our goal to work for a world free of nuclear weapons, and that we are ready to undertake the necessary obligations to achieve that goal in a time-bound programme agreed to and implemented by all nuclear weapon and other states.

In sum, there is an Indian way, an Indian view and an Indian practice in the use and role of force. We do not claim that it is better or worse than any other way that other nations adopt. It is a result of our own history and experience, and we feel it best suited to our goals and situation. And it too is evolving, both consciously and unconsciously, as is the world around us. It is time now to consciously build our own concepts and strategic thinking, adapted to today’s realities and India’s environment, including on the role of force.

Force in Today’s World

The other issue that you will be considering is how changes in the world and in strategic affairs have affected the role of force.

It seems to me that the changes we see in world politics and the effects of technology are the two factors that have most affected the strategic calculus of those in the international system who might seek to use force for political purposes.

Consider the global political situation first.

With global and regional balances of power characterised by unequal distributions of power; the interdependence between major powers created by globalisation; the state losing its monopoly of violence in contested hegemonies both internally and externally; and the diversity of values espoused by states, world politics today is in an unprecedented state of flux. It does, however seem that the cost to the major powers of using force in their dealings with each other could prevent the emergence of direct conflict between them.

The effects of technology are harder to describe and predict. In the early fifties, there were those who hoped that the unprecedented power of the atom bomb had made war unthinkable and therefore abolished it! Unfortunately, we now know better. In fact we have seen technology place increasingly lethal power in the hands of non-state actors. Terrorism is technologically enabled and knows no boundaries today, even drawing on support from within state systems. After several centuries, once again the state is not the sole or always the predominant factor in the international system. In some cases, it is businesses and individuals who now determine our technological future and it is these units that a successful policy must now increasingly deal with.

We have also seen technology create new domains for contestation, such as cyber space, where the speed of manoeuvre, premium on offense, and the nature of the battle-space make us rethink traditional concepts of deterrence. As technology has expanded the spectrum, the line between conventional and non-conventional warfare has blurred. The definition of force, the classic marker of power, has now expanded, thus changing the utility of force as traditionally configured.

As we enter a world of multiple powers, with rapidly shifting balances, change alone is certain. Unfortunately, force is the hedge chosen by several powers against heightened uncertainty in the international system. The balance is shifting between force and the other instruments of statecraft. We therefore need to develop a new and different statecraft.

If change alone is certain, and if the utility of force in statecraft is itself changing in fundamental ways, it is all the more necessary that we return to the values in which the use of force must be embedded. Ultimately it is not just the logic of politics or technology but the values and purposes of the state and society that determine the choices that we make of the uses and nature of force.

What India seeks is a new security architecture, an open, balanced and inclusive architecture, to correspond to the new situation that is emerging. The security challenges of the twenty-first century are radically different from those of the twentieth. Nuclear confrontation or war between major powers is not as likely as the threat from derivatives of nuclear deterrence, namely, terrorism and nuclear proliferation, which are being used to subvert the emergence of a plural, secular and democratic international order in the twenty-first century. The challenges of a globalised world cannot be handled by twentieth century military alliances or containment strategies.

Conclusion

So in effect my argument is that in India’s experience the use of force must be governed and circumscribed by the values of state and society. I have also tried to suggest that there may be value in studying the Indian way, the Indian view and Indian practice in the use and role of force in state-craft.

It also seems from recent experience that the utility of force, as traditionally configured and conceived, is of limited value in protecting a society or achieving some policy goals. But one can hardly jump to conclusions about the futility of force when limited war under nuclear conditions remains possible, and when adversaries need to be deterred. This debate will continue.

I wish you success in continuing the debate and in your deliberations.

URL: http://mea.gov.in/mystart.php?id=190016584

Bad days for Armed Forces

Col R Hariharan

Britain has just announced massive cuts in the armed forces. Britain spends $ 38 billion dollars a year on defence; does it need such a luxury when Rule Britannia has been reduced to history books? This is the moot point the nation is trying to answer. The woes of the British military, which once ensured "the Empire on which the sun never sets," appear endless. A Ministry of Defence’s survey of 10,500 Army, Royal Navy and Royal Air Force personnel carried out in 2009 was revealing. Most of them were suffering from low morale and major concerns over the military equipment they used on the frontline in Afghanistan.

Gen Richard Dannat, Chief of General Staff, went public about the state of his troops fighting in Afghanistan. He spoke of poor pay and acute shortages of essential equipment including helicopters for soldiers in operation. Prime Minister Gordon Brown did not take it kindly; his government denied the outspoken General the appointment of the Chief of Defence Staff. The latest job cuts in defence particularly in the Royal Airforce are not going to go down well. And the Royal Navy's legendary aircraft carriers will be starving without aircraft.

But it is not only in Britain the armed forces are going to be unhappy. In general, these are not happy days for armies in the Western world. Already British and French armies are smaller than ever before. Their influence on national policy making is waning as the scope and content of national security is growing well beyond physical security. The process is not uniform and varies with historical military traditions and ethos of different nations.

On one extreme we have Turkey, a later day convert to democracy where the army had been the self appointed of guardian of secularism. In the past, whenever its primacy was threatened, the army came down hard on civilian rulers. But Ankara is fast changing now. A referendum held in September has voted for constitutional reforms to curtail the powers of the military. The package of reforms put up by the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) aims at making the armed forces more accountable to civil courts. This is happening in spite of the army’s well founded suspicion that the AKP is a fellow traveller of Islamic fundamentalists.

At the other end we have countries like Sweden and Norway with armies populated large by short-term compulsory service cadres with only a sprinkling of career soldiers. In the West, as memories of the Cold War fade, most of the armies are leading a hand to mouth existence. As an analyst said the military is now seen in Europe more as an employment programme to keep the number of jobless down, than to maintain military power.While a unified EU force may still be distant dream, many member states are cutting down their force levels.

Involvement of European armies in the conflict in Afghanistan has exposed serious shortages in weaponry and equipment. Many of the ISAF armies found problems of replacement and maintenance dogging them. For instance though both Britain and France claim their armies are technically on par with the U.S., true strength of armies comes from their power to hold on to their dominance on ground and protect it from threats in land, air and sea. And this is what they lack. Strapped military budgets are blunting their sharp edges. French military pride fostered from the days of Napoleon’s Grand Armèe seems to be wearing thin as it has become expensive to maintain a well equipped, fighting fit army. To overcome the problems of funding, President Sarkozy had proposed a unified European military or a well equipped intervention force. British military chiefs were also exploring closer links with the French.

Frederick the Great said “Diplomacy without arms is like music without instruments.” In the coming years Europe would probably be playing its muted diplomatic tunes with only chamber orchestras of armies.

The story was no better with the Russian armed forces till President Putin pulled them out of the morass of low esteem and shortages. In the U.S., the role of military that went up during President George W Bush’s tenure is now being pruned by his successor Barack Obama. In keeping with election promise to pull back troops from Afghanistan, Obama’s national strategic policy 2010 talks of giving diplomacy, rather than the military, a larger role in the U.S.’s global power projection. The President substantiated this by sacking General McChrystal, commander of the U.S. forces in Afghanistan, when the General made public his differences with Washington’s war strategy.

In South Asia most of the countries have used their armies as tools for sustaining governments characterised by poor governance and political corruption. These armies with their colonial baggage had been useful in crushing extremism and insurgencies. The Indian National Congress came to power after its non-violent struggle for freedom under Gandhiji’s leadership succeeded. This has probably coloured the early Indian perception on the role of the army as watchdog of the rulers rather than guardian of national security.

Perhaps, there was also a suspicion about former colonial army’s readiness to function under an elected civilian government. This is probably what prompted Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru to write a letter to General Lockhart, commander in chief, two days before India became independent. He wrote: “In any policy that is to be pursued, in the Army or otherwise, the views of the Government of India and the policy they lay down must prevail. If any person is unable to lay down that policy, he has no place in the Indian Army or in the Indian structure of Government.” While the armed forces have been following this dictum, successive governments failed to lay down policies not only on national security but also on a host of issues related to security forces and their competency.

The progressive downgrading of armed forces officers in the bureaucratic barometer of order of precedence reflects this mindset. The roller coaster downslide has now put the army chief is on par with the chairman of the Union Public Service Commission. This is more than symbolic.

Even in defence policy making. India is perhaps one country where service chiefs are only on listening watch. This is in spite of using the armed forces continuously for six decades in both external and internal wars of many hues. Even now India’s National Security Council (modelled on its U.S counterpart) presided over by the Prime Minister has besides the National Security Advisor, the ministers of Defence, External Affairs, Home, and Finance of the Union government and the Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission as members. Contrast this with President Obama’s National Security Council which has the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a statutory attendee.

So it is not surprising that even issues concerning the combat readiness of the armed forces stagnate for want of timely decision making. It has become routine to recast the recommendations of successive pay commissions (with only civil bureaucrats as members) on armed forces pay and allowances after the service chiefs complain about them. Veterans have been treated shabbily and we see them taking to the streets, returning their medals and burning their artificial limbs to remind the government of unfulfilled promises.

Recently the Supreme Court which sought an independent pay tribunal exclusively for the armed forces, flew into a rage over the “insensitive bureaucracy” at the Centre that was throwing a spanner into the proposal, citing financial constraints. A Bench of Justices Markandey Katju and TS Thakur said,“Sitting somewhere in a plush office in Delhi and finding faults in each proposal is easy. This Defence Secretary must be sent for 10 days to these high altitudes… At least see the conditions in which these people serve.” As the media reports said the judges were critical of the bureaucracy’s apathy towards the armed forces. The Bench noted, “If this was a proposal for the bureaucrats, it would soon be implemented. We don’t expect the bureaucracy to support this proposal…We need to deal with them (armed forces) separately as a distinct class.”

In spite of all this, the armed forces strive hard to meet the near impossible expectations of the rulers and people. People forget that soldiers come from the same society in which corruption, absence of rule of law and human rights violations have become endemic. Twelve months of military training alone cannot completely change the mindset of soldiers coming from rural societies steeped in caste prejudices and politics and human rights violations. Unless there is social change we cannot expect the armed forces to be insulated forever from the pernicious influences.

Added to this is the problem of employing army in counter insurgency operations. In such situations armed forces have become the whipping boys for national maladies mostly because it is convenient. Those who criticise the army of high handedness forget that since 1990 as many as 1,473 of 1,511 cases of human rights violation or abuse levelled against security forces personnel have been proved false after investigation. Traditionally military leaders maintain a low profile unlike politicians or the intellectual class. If the service chiefs comment on vital issues affecting their professional competency or national security, the bureaucracy and politicians get restive and media frowns.

Take the case of New Delhi’s the latest discovery that Armed Forces Special Powers Act, and not inept governance or bankrupt policies, was at the root of the unrest in Srinagar valley. So the government seriously considered the repeal of the Act in parts of unrest in Kashmir to improve the situation. But appears to have taken a more sensible approach to it. But the sad thing is not one political leader of the ruling class had the moral courage to condemn terrorists and political leaders inciting the riotous mobs to carry out intifida – a form of indirect warfare. In the remaining cases 104 personnel were punished. It is easy for policy makers to forget that between 1988 and the first seven months of 2010, 5962 security personnel have lost their lives in Kashmir. But how can the soldiers forget?

So it is no wonder that Indian armed forces are no more a popular career option. I suppose politicians can take consolation that this is the trend world over. With the technology boom triggering growth, better class of people are reluctant to bear the hardship of serving in the Indian army deployed in difficult areas. Huge shortages in officers are affecting the operational capability and overload the officer class which is always expected to "do or die" regardless of problems. This sums up India's military prepardness as we read everyday of new threats in many dimensions developing in South Asian environment.

(The writer is a retired Military Intelligence specialist on South Asia, and associated with the South Asia Analysis Group and the Chennai Centre for China Studies.)

Learning from CWG

Instead of learning from the forces, are we doing to defence what we did to sports?

Vice Admiral (Retd) Suresh Bangara October 15, 2010

If India can organise a Republic Day parade every year with great efficiency, and could recently host successfully World Military Games, why did it mess up the organisation of the Commonwealth Games (CWG)?

What is common to successful mass events is an empowered structure with clear demarcation of responsibility and accountability. The CWG failed due to an absence of a centralised command structure. Responsibilities were not demarcated, there were too many “Indians” and no chiefs, and, what is more, everyone had an excuse not to own up responsibility.

November 13, 2003 was the date on which the Commonwealth Games Federation (CGF) resolved to hand over the Games to Delhi. In accordance with article 10A, the host city contract was inked by the Government of India (GoI), the Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi(GNCTD), the IOA and the CGF. The organisation of the entire event was allotted to the Organising Committee (OC) of the CWG.

* The key delivery partners listed on the website are the CGF, the IOA, the OC CWG, the GNCTD and the GoI in that order. It also states that several ministries of the GoI and several organisations under the GNCTD and others would be involved in execution.

* Even a prima facie analysis of this structure would point to the fact that the coordination of such a complex body cannot be vested with a committee which has no authority over the key delivery partners. In the Indian context, hierarchy and individual egos play a vital role in the smooth functioning of the organisation. At times, collective organisational goals are sacrificed to appease individual aspirations. Presumably, these considerations caused undue delays of about two years before the OC came into existence on February 10, 2005 — a faulty and toothless structure from day one.

Although representatives of all the delivery partners were constituted on the committee, raising alarms at the CWG meetings, when deadline after deadline failed to be met by their parent organisation, is not a practical proposition. Having taken full responsibility for staging the best ever Games, as outlined on the website, the OC perhaps continued at best as a mute spectator to inter-ministerial red tape and embarrassing delays in execution.

What is needed in the globalised, highly competitive and demanding environment is to professionalise our decision-making structures to include experts in negotiations, project management and other niche areas.

A look at the ministry which manages the armed forces of India in the above context would be instructive. The defence ministry has the responsibility to handle the rapidly increasing defence budget, which is more than twice the amount allotted to the CWG, but on a yearly basis. Is it structured to meet all the requirements of the armed forces of India?

First, since 1952, the three chiefs along with their headquarters were removed from the decision-making structure of the GoI. They were designated as the “attached offices” of the ministry. In effect, all communications from the armed forces were to be addressed only to the ministry and no decision-making power and executive power was to reside with the chiefs, save those related to operations. Not even the revenue budget could be operated by the chief to merely run the service as it existed. The chiefs could send their recommendations and plans for modernisation, which effectively rested at the table of some functionary without even an acknowledgement. The ministry continued to be manned by generalists — civil servants who often learnt about the armed forces after they were placed in the chair.

While the authority to take decisions with the concurrence of the minister was vested with the ministry, there were no provisions for accountability. Having been removed from the chain, the chiefs could only make proposals and could not be held accountable. The procurement of Advanced Jet Trainers(AJTs) for the Air Force took over two decades, by which time costs had escalated by 500 per cent. The decision to induct Gorshkov took over a decade, by which time the deteriorating cables of the ship warranted doubling of the original cost. Many thousand crores are surrendered unspent year after year despite the urgent operational needs of the Army. There are no clear-cut penalties for procrastination and opportunity costs incurred thereof. Are these not the ills of the CWG as well?

Second, integration of the ministry with the armed forces by placing uniformed professionals at appropriate desks of the ministry is a successful model practised by other democracies. Similar structures were recommended by the Committee on Defence Management after the Kargil war. Cosmetic changes in nomenclature with no corresponding powers were the only action taken to show compliance.

Thirdly, the Kargil Review Committee did recommend the creation of a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) as a single-point adviser to the defence minister on all matters of planning, acquisition etc. This has been stalled by status quo-ists within and without the armed forces. The result is the continuation of a toothless Chiefs of Staff Committee, which was first recommended in 1924 and which is still in existence only in India. Almost all armed forces of countries that matter have opted for a fully integrated structure with accountability, while we continue to live in denial of a serious structural infirmity.

The CWG 2010 has brought disrepute to the country due to delays in implementation despite seven years to prepare. We can live with it, for soon it will be forgotten. However, continued denial of structural weaknesses in the defence department has the potential to lay our country in the dust. Until then, incapability to modernise, lack of timely decision coupled with conflicting demands of the three services can only be offset by the ability of our officers and soldiers to lay down their lives — even if it is to achieve a pyrrhic victory.

The author is a retired vice admiral of the Indian Navy

Military with no weapons

Ashok K Mehta

Over the next five years, India will spend $ 50 billion on arms purchases, including the daring joint development and production of the fifth generation fighters with Russia. This would suggest that Russia might no longer be in the race for the 126 Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft as defence acquisition involves political balancing. Still 70 per cent of all our equipment and dependency will remain Russian. As Finance Minister, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had promised that once the economy grew, funds for defence modernisation would increase incrementally. That’s what is likely to happen after a two-decade drought in military modernisation.

Given the track record, defence acquisition will be further degraded by the overkill in probity and the Byzantine procedures. On August 25 this year, heads of five defence companies from the US, the UK Germany, France and Canada wrote to Defence Minister AK Antony for better structured and more supplier-friendly defence procurement policy.

The real questions are whether the buying spree will enhance self-reliance, improve deterrence and strengthen India's clout in international affairs. So far, at least, India has underutilised its military capability for a variety of domestic political and cultural reasons, not the least, the lack of strategic thinking.

A new book, Arming Without Aiming: India's Military Modernisation by Stephen Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta of the Brookings Institution has done some excellent mind-reading of Indian policy planning failures to develop military capabilities commensurate with its rising power and also exposed the warts in planning.

It is not surprising that despite terrorist attacks on Parliament and in Mumbai and several lesser strikes across the country over the last two decades, India has not crafted a suitable response to cross-border terrorism. The international community is astonished at the amazing levels of tolerance and military restraint shown by New Delhi — making a virtue of necessity, its strategic restraint and patience. The authors say that India’s rise is welcome (except in Pakistan) as it is not seen as an assertive power.

Is strategic restraint, the term coined by Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh during Operation Parakram, an euphemism for lack of appropriate military capabilities? Twice in that year, India came close to crossing the start line but held back, according to insiders, as neither the Air Force nor the Army was deemed fit or ready for punitive operations. It is the duty of Governments to keep the armed forces in a state of operational preparedness with relevant equipment and technologies. So it may not just be the culture of military restraint but equally the lack of defence planning.

The authors argue that India’s defence acquisition process is ‘amazingly convoluted’ and coupled with its preference to acquire technology and build weapons itself has led to deep problems. The preference is also to add and expand existing structures than engage in reform. This is true as since independence there has been no defence review and the armed forces have continued to operate in a political vacuum virtually decoupled from decision-making. This has resulted in erratic and spasmodic defence modernisation unrelated to developing challenges and their priorities but contingent upon availability of funds.

Commenting on the book, Ashley Tellis of Carnegie Endowment has noted that India’s defence policy was in crisis as there is ‘internal sclerosis’ in India’s internal defence thinking. Despite the Group of Ministers report after Kargil, key reforms like appointing a Chief of Defence Staff, remain in abeyance and integration is only lip-serviced. To this self-explanatory charge can be added that funds for modernisation cannot be utilised in full due to avoidable road blocks. Tellis notes Another profundity from Tellis is that while the Indian state has the money, it does not have the capacity to spend it efficiently.“how civil-military relations restrain military modernisation and this is not accidental but deliberate”.

Every year, an average of Rs5,000 to Rs 8,000 crore is returned to the Finance Ministry months before the end of the fiscal which helps to balance the Government's books. Tongue in cheek every year, the Finance Minister ends his ritual two-line statement on defence allocation with the caveat that “more money will be provided if required”. This is followed by thumping applause!

But no amount of military modernisation will help unless there is new strategic thinking and political will to shape the environment to India’s advantage. For a rising power, a strong military is an asset if it is employed gainfully to promote political and diplomatic objectives. Cohen says: “We don't think that new hardware and weapons will make that much of a difference as diplomacy and new strategic thinking are important.” The challenge for New Delhi is transforming the strategic environment.

Interestingly, the book contains a chapter on Defence Modernisation and Internal Threat. This probably is the most relevant contribution to India’s severe domestic problems ranging from insurgencies in Jammu & Kashmir and the North-East to the Maoist threat which Prime Minister Manmohan Singh first flagged in 2004 and has since repeatedly called the most serious internal security threat facing the country. Unfortunately, we continue to look outwards without addressing cogently, the threats from within, being fixated with Pakistan.

India’s defence budget has shot up astonishingly from nearly Rs50,000 crore in 1999 to Rs1,50,000 crore in 2010 and is growing exponentially at nearly 10 per cent but still remains far below two per cent of the GDP against the prescribed three per cent. Nearly 40 per cent of the budget goes towards military modernisation and maintenance.

Given the recommendations in the book, India must revisit its defence policy, implement outstanding defence reforms, including scrapping the laughable system of Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee, and appointing a Chief of Defence Staff. Despite India’s, in Tellis’s words, “strong cultural impulses towards restraint” the dominant short-term military requirement is creating a credible response to a terrorist strike from Pakistan short of full-scale war. One hopes that Home Minister P Chidambaram’s threat of a ‘swift and decisive response’ transfers into visible military capability embodied as a deterrent.

Diplomacy and deterrence will work best when the military is encouraged in new thinking through useful strategic and political guidance. This must become a two-way street with a free flow of ideas and innovations. Arming Without Aiming is certainly not what the Army teaches its soldiers. It is ek goli ek dushman.
Courtesy: Daily Pioneer, October 13, 2010

Sri Lanka Perspectives - September 2010

Col R Hariharan (Retd.)

President Rajapaksa’s UN address

President Mahinda Rajapaksa in his speech at the UN General Assembly at the UN Headquarters in New York on September 23, 2010 has indicated that Sri Lanka was unlikely to change its stand against allowing any form of international scrutiny of its actions during the war. These include allegations of war crimes and violation of humanitarian laws mainly from the West and the Tamil Diaspora. He sought to vindicate Sri Lanka’s stand saying “such [humanitarian] laws were evolved essentially in response to conflicts waged by forces of legally constituted States, and not terrorist groups.”

Dwelling on his country’s long conflict with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), he said he was elected on a promise to rid the country of the menace of terrorism. He appealed to the international community to examine “the capacity of current international humanitarian law to meet contemporary needs” where legally constituted states had to fight terrorists in asymmetric conflicts.

This argument would have been acceptable if Sri Lanka had cleaned up its act on its own. Unfortunately this is not so. Even the proceedings of the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) constituted to investigate the events leading to Tamil insurgency lack transparency. Its hearings are held in camera. Media coverage of testimonies made at LLRC sittings is selective.

This was evident when most of the media did not report the testimonies made by Tamils at Kilinochchi. Some of them were damaging. For instance, Ananthi Sasitharan, wife of Elilan, former political head of Trincomalee, in an interview to the BBC said she had requested the LLRC to find out about the fate of her husband and other senior leaders of the LTTE (including former LTTE negotiators Yogi and Lawrence Thilakar, and the LTTE political wing deputy chief Thangkan) who had surrendered to the army in her presence. This testimony was not covered in the national media at all. This has reinforced the suspicion of large sections of world community that the government was not sincere in its reconciliation process and the media was working under external pressures. This does not bode well for speedy restoration of ethnic amity in the country.

Sarath Fonseka’s woes

It seems there are no let up in the woes of the Eelam War hero and former Chief of Defence Staff General Sarath Fonseka ever since he entered politics after retirement. A General Court Martial (GCM) on September 17, 2010 found him guilty on four counts of irregularities in military purchases while serving as army commander, favouring his son-in-law’s company. The GCM sentenced him to three years imprisonment. However, the President while confirming the sentence reduced the period of imprisonment to two and a half years.

Only last month another GCM stripped him of his rank and military honours for dabbling in politics while serving as army commander.The treatment meted out to Fonseka sharply contrasts with the handling of LTTE prisoners none of whom have been prosecuted. In fact, even as the President signed confirmation of Fonseka’s jail sentence, 397 Ex-LTTE combatants were released from a rehabilitation camp in Vavuniya after being detained for 16 months. Both the main opposition parties -the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) and the United National Party have condemned Fonseka’s conviction as politics of persecution.

Bottling up human trafficking

The issue of Sri Lankan boat people – mainly Tamils from Sri Lanka – illegally trying to enter Australia and Canada had been a major source of embarrassment and concern for Sri Lanka. To curb such traffic and prevent external assistance from flowing into Sri Lanka that could lead to resurgence of Tamil insurgency once again , Sri Lanka’s has taken a series of measures to prevent illegal use of sea routes to and from the country. The assets of navy and air force are being re-positioned to support ground deployment in coastal areas.

The navy has shifted its North Western Headquarters from Puttalam to Mullikulam. This would facilitate prevention of illegal use of north eastern seas for nefarious purposes ranging from human trafficking to drug and arms trafficking. According to media reports Sri Lanka has already received two Israeli-built Fast Attack Craft (FACs) and four more FACs are expected to join the navy. The US is reported to have increased Sri Lanka’s air surveillance capability by providing sophisticated real time data link system. The system received early this year is mounted on two Beech King Aircraft SMR 2201 and SMR 2202 would obtain real time intelligence.

The illegal fishing by Indian fisherman in Sri Lankan waters off Mannar coast had been a major thorn in Sri Lankan security. There had been frequent seizure of boats from Tamil Nadu and in some instances of Sri Lankan navy had opened fire on them.
Considering the political sensitivity of the issue, the Sri Lankan and Indian navies have agreed to conduct extensive educational programmes for their local fisherman on the issue of maritime boundary between the two countries. This was decided recently at a meeting between senior officers of the two navies on board INS Kukri, an offshore patrol vessel, at the International Maritime Boundary Line near Point Calimere. They also discussed ways of ending the illegal activities of drug trafficking and human smuggling through improved surveillance methods.

Representatives of the Sri Lanka Navy Headquarters and the East, North and North-Central Naval Commands took part in the meeting. Indian navy was represented by Commodore Rajiv Girotra, Naval Officer In-Charge, Tamil Nadu and Pondicherry.
Therese measures are of security interest to India as an increasing number of instances of Sri Lankan Tamils fleeing from the country using India as a take off point have come to notice. Recently Tamil Nadu police searched a lodge in Courtallam and rounded up 53 Lankan Tamils some of whom had promised to pay up to Rs 300,000 to Chandrakanthan, a Sri Lankan refugee in Chennai for smuggling them to Australia and Canada. Police have arrested Chandrakanthan.

Sri Lanka economy

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has forecasted “strong growth” of Sri Lanka economy this year while commenting on its 8.5 percent growth during the second quarter of 2010 as against 7.1 percent growth in the first quarter.

The government statistics office reported growth of agriculture sector by 5.1 percent, manufacturing by 8.9 percent, and services by 8.8 percent over last year’s figures. The IMF said the country’s fiscal performance so far “remains consistent with achieving the government's full-year deficit target of 8 percent.”
Written on September 30, 2010

© South Asia Security Trends, October 2010, Vol 4 No 9
www.security-risks.com

Looking for alibis, not action

The political leadership is seized of a marked somnolence in tackling difficult situations across the country

by Col R Hariharan

I am no great admirer of Henry Kissinger. But his pithy remark, “America needs a strategy, not an alibi,” in a recent article on the US operations in Afghanistan sums up the situation. If you substitute India for America it would aptly describe the desperate straits of New Delhi in handling our own internal situation across the country, whether it is Kashmir or the Maoist and Northeastern extremists. Kashmir is in an undeclared “intifada” with the disgruntled youth indulging in “stone warfare” against the police and paramilitary forces. It does not require the World Cup Nostradamus – octopus Paul – to guess the hidden hand of jihadists in whipping up emotions there. They have now done more damage to upset the state apparatus than the terrorists ever achieved. Both the ruling and opposition political parties are dithering. And Srinagar and New Delhi appear to favour the fire fighting measure of deploying the Army rather than taking concrete action to put out the fire.

The Home Minister’s much publicized “war” against Maoists appears to be going awry. The grim scorecard of the police and paramilitary losing lives at the hands of Maoists is going up. They continue to flout elementary rules of insurgency warfare despite the Home Ministry spouting data about their special training. The Ministry tried to get the Army into action though Army men come from a similar background as the Central police troops. Veteran cop EN Rammohan, who investigated the Dantewada incident, calls the CRPF a “lathi force”. If that is so, why offer them as sacrificial goats?


New Delhi still appears to be confused as it gropes for a common strategy. At the Chief Ministers’ meeting on July 14 in New Delhi, dissonant voices of some of the worst-affected States showed the Home Minister’s problem is far from over. Four worst-hit states – Chhattisgarh, Orissa, West Bengal and Jharkhand – agreed to form unified commands for anti-Naxal operations modelled after those existing in Jammu and Kashmir, and Assam.
In spite of the Maoists fighting the state in over 170 districts, the government recently

objected to a UN report calling it an “armed conflict” though the Home Minister has called it a “war”. The report, produced by the office of Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and submitted to the Security Council, had highlighted the recruitment and use of children by the Maoist armed group in some districts of Chhattisgarh.

The core issue is, do we want to fight the Maoists or not? Or do we want to carry party politics down to the State level and carry on a slanging match on television? If not, why is there lack of professionalism in all avenues from planning to action? Clearly, there is something seriously wrong in the handling of the issue and nobody knows who is responsible.

It seems the somnolence in managing the internal situation is everywhere. Take the case of the Manipur blockade. Over two million people of the State were held to ransom for two months when the All Naga Student Association of Manipur (ANSAM) established road blocks at entry points into the State. The blockade was “suspended temporarily” at the “request” of the Prime Minister and Union Home Minister. Of course, the media, quoting government sources, reported that Central paramilitary forces “lifted” the blockade.

The ANSAM blockade was ostensibly against the ban on the visit of Th Muivah, the leader of the National Socialist Council of Nagalim – Isak Muivah (NSCN-IM) to his hometown of Somdal in Manipur. But, as the Manipur government has pointed out, the real reason was the NSCN-IM’s opposition to the holding of autonomous district council elections in Manipur.
This is a direct consequence of New Delhi’s inability to reconcile Muivah’s demand for Naga sovereignty and “greater Nagalim” with the conflicting interests of neighbouring states. This is after New Delhi’s 56 rounds of talks for the past 13 years with Muivah! The only gainer seems to be Muivah, who is calling the shots. He has established his armed followers in the heart of Nagaland in “peace camps”. They have become fat cats thriving on extortion. With this kind of governance, how can Manipuris feel they are part of this country when the state cannot ensure their right to normal life?

Not only internal security, but governance as a whole appears to be in slow motion. For instance, government inaction for political reasons has empowered khap panchayats to pass the death sentence! But the worst example is the Bhopal tragedy. Twentysix years after the disaster, a GoM deliberates on the issue for a few hours and discovers that it needs to prosecute Anderson, the then CEO of Union Carbide in the US.

IT would be charitable to describe the decision-making process as lethargic; it is best described as poodlefaking. The public is equally guilty in allowing the government to get away with it time and again. It is time we started meaning what we say and do what we mean.
The US has not covered itself with glory in the war in Afghanistan against the Taliban and Al Qaeda terrorists. It has poured in money – over $80 billion – and its Army continues to suffer casualties. All it has to show there now is a democratically elected government steeped in corruption, controlling barely 21 per cent of the country. But, even in the midst of all this adversity, in the US there is a sense of urgency of thought and action. The people held President George W Bush responsible for the failure and elected a Democrat as President. There is free airing of opinions and fixing of responsibility.

President Barack Obama continues to monitor performance of his generals. He does not hesitate to sack General McChrystal, the chief executive of operations, and appoint General Petraeus in his place. So, though Kissinger may suggest strategy rather than alibi, at least the US government shows it is alive to the situation.

Though American operations in Afghanistan are not worth emulating, the Indian government can take a cue from them on maintaining clear focus on the core issue. And that is what we are not doing. We are only looking for alibis and not action. There is not even knee-jerk reaction anymore, only paralytic spasm. At best we can hope for another Group of Ministers to sit, discuss and debate this issue. If that happens we will be where we started.


Courtesy: GFiles magazine, October, 2010
URL:http://www.gfilesindia.com/title.aspx?title_id=183