By Col R Hariharan
For General Sarath Fonseka who revamped a demoralised Sri Lanka army and led it to final victory in the nearly three-decade long campaign against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in May 2009, its aftermath had not been peaceful. His woes appear to be mounting after an army court martial found him guilty of dabbling in politics while in uniform and recommended his cashiering. And President Mahinda Rajapaksa promptly confirmed the harsh sentence, stripping his rank and hard earned military honours and medals. The hapless General is facing a few more court martial that would haunt him in the coming years.
It will be difficult for non-military minds to understand the ignominy of cashiering. It is much more than stripping of rank and medals of General Fonseka (I do not have the heart to drop his rank and call him Mister Fonseka, although this is what has been reduced to now). It is the negation of the contribution of a person who served the army for 38 years to become the first-ever chief of defence staff. And in the history of Sri Lanka his victory against the Tamil insurgents will always be hyphenated with his cashiering. Only four years back he was lucky enough to escape (with serious injuries) a LTTE suicide bomber assassination attempt him in 2006. It seems the perils of politics have proved more deadly to the General than the Tamil Tiger assassin.
As I am not privy to Fonseka’s court martial proceedings or judgement I am unable to comment on its legality. Even if his political contacts were substantive as decided by the court, Fonseka was neither the first Sri Lankan army officer to do so nor will he be the last. The history of Sri Lanka’s three decades of war against the LTTE is strewn with examples of army officers either favoured or discarded by political masters, not necessarily for reasons of military competency. So it will be reasonable to conclude the Fonseka episode has its seeds in politics of power; after all the government has not shown the same alacrity shown in prosecuting the General to put on the dock even a single hardened LTTE leader held in custody for over a year.
This is evident if we see the sequence of events after the war ended and General Fonseka was hailed as a national hero, sharing the victory banners alongside the President. Politicians were a little unnerved at the soaring popularity of the General after the war and a subdued campaign sideline his contribution in the Eelam War was launched.
The campaign within the government against the General gained more decibels when he spoke of his plans to expand the army, making the politicians even more nervous. Though his plan was not accepted, the government’s mind on his future became clear when it decided not to extend his tenure as Chief of Staff after December 2009 when it ended. The process of cutting down the war hero to size was truly in place when the government offered him the job of secretary in the ministry of sports after his retirement!
The point of no return was probably reached when he developed political ambitions and decided to throw his gauntlet against President Mahinda Rajapaksa seeking his second term as president. The situation was further aggravated when the deeply divided opposition rallied together to put him up as their common candidate against Rajapaksa. In the run up to the presidential poll, Fonseka’s campaign threw a scare, though ultimately he polled fewer votes than Ranil Wickremesinghe did in the presidential election 2005.
The presidential election campaign saw the transformation of the General, generally considered a Sinhala hawk, into a champion of Tamil problem. And it was anachronistic to see that elements of Tamil Diaspora that had supported the LTTE, which tried to kill him, were his election bedfellows! Even as the pre-election campaign gathered momentum, political screws against the General were tightened. Conspiracy theories of military coup and take over abounded, Gajaba regiment troops deployed for his security were withdrawn for suspected personal loyalty to the General and serving officers considered loyal to Fonseka were given the walking papers. Even the retired servicemen who supported him were not spared. And in a clear break from the past even some elements of army joined the tar brush brigade to paint Fonseka as a villain during the election campaign. The smear campaign had three parts; prosecution of the General on the legal cases relating to three aspects.
The army and civil intelligence sleuths have "discovered" a whole range of offences committed by the General during his tenure as army commander. Presumably there was a prima facie case at least in some of them. But their inaction in showing the same diligence they later displayed when he became political loose cannon is rather intriguing.
Thus in an oblique way it was the General’s rapid rise in national popularity charts that did him in. It led him to the bogs of party politics and he quickly got entangled in its culture of intrigues and character assassination. Otherwise he would have probably ended up enjoying his well earned retirement, expanding on his concept of counter terrorism warfare in haloed portals of military learning everywhere.
But his prosecution has shown the weakness of Sri Lankan system in action where checks and balances of government action appear to have been sacrificed to serve political interest. While this is inevitable in party-politics it is detrimental to the long term interest of healthy growth of democracy. At present Sri Lanka is involved in a serious exercise of revising its constitution. A key dilemma is the changeover of the present presidential system to a Westminster type parliamentary democracy, limiting the powers of executive president. A compromise is likely to be struck - to have the cake and eat it in typical South Asian style - by retaining the presidential system while clipping his powers. But constitution largely remains a document in parchment unless political parties and the people are able to exercise full powers guaranteed to them in the constitution. Will they be allowed to do this or become victims of maelstrom of power? This question has to be confronted not only by politicians and the civil society but the intelligentsia as well. Otherwise mere changes in constitutional structure will be a cosmetic surgery that does not cure the underlying maladies.
Courtesy: South Asia Analysis Group, August 29, 2010
URL: http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cnotes6%5Cnote598.html
Sunday, August 29, 2010
Building a meaningful strategic relationship with China
By Col R Hariharan
The recent India-China stand-off over the issue of a Chinese visa for Lt General BS Jaswal, a serving commander of Northern Command, has highlighted the tenuous nature of existing ties between the two countries. This incident has shown the limitations in building a military relationship with China, in the absence of greater and closer strategic relationship between the two countries. At present the military relationship in a nascent stage limited to goodwill visit of senior officers and naval ships. There had been a few low level exercises with the participation of sub units of armies of both the countries.
It also raises the fundamental question whether India can build a meaningful military relationship at all with China? Both the countries have no choice to build a strategic relationship in which military relationship would be an important segment. So far India-China relationship building had been a halting process, despite appreciable growth in mutual trade largely to the advantage of China. So building a military relationship is going to be a long haul filled with minefields of petty misunderstandings and minor confrontations.
Building a military relationship is inextricably intertwined with a number of strategic issues in which the two countries have conflicting interests – China’s territorial claims in India’s border areas, presence of sizeable Tibetan refugees who refuse to accept Chinese rule in Tibet, China’s growing relations with India’s close neighbours, growth of integrated strategic defence ties between China and Pakistan, and China’s increasing presence in the Indian Ocean region. These issues have gained new dimensions after the US economic downturn and Washington’s efforts to scale down its strategic moves to contain China. China’s rapid progress in military modernisation – particularly naval and missile capability – have strengthened and made its ambitions to become a global super power a little more realistic.
India had been bending over backwards to accommodate China’s periodic aberrations in its fragile relations. It had always played down even reports of Chinese border intrusions and protests over Indian prime minister’s visits to Arunachal Pradesh. However, New Delhi has reacted strongly in the case of Lt General Jamwal’s visa to China. Apart from issuing a demarche to Beijing, India has reciprocated by refusing visas to Chinese PLA officers including one to attend a course at the National Defence College in India. It has also suspended other military interactions with China, at least for the time being.
If we go by India’s defence minister AK Antony’s reaction the following day, New Delhi appears to have had second thoughts on the issue and tried to play down the whole thing, even as the media went gewgaw over the incident. Answering a media question on the incident, he said "We have close ties with China. There may be some short term problems (emphasis added) but they will not come in the country’s overall approach towards our neighbour." Does this mean the defence minister, who gives form to India’s national defence, has failed to read the strategic signal Beijing has sent with this incident? After all India has gulped down similar rebuffs from Canada to its serving and retired army officers in denying visa for private visits on even more specious grounds. Then why raise the ante in the first place, when China poses a problem over visas?
As B Raman has pointed out in his recent article " Dealing with China’s machinations in J and K" (available at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers41%5Cpaper4004.html) there appears to be a distinct shift in Chinese policy regarding the status of J and K. This is probably in keeping with China’s revised strategic security perceptions. The first relates to Xinjiang – the region troubled by Uighur revolt - on its south-western flank. The potential for Uighur revolt increases when the strategic environment of the Taliban dominated areas along Pakistan-Afghan border changes for the worse as and when American military power is scaled down over the next year.
A second aspect, related to earlier issue, is the likelihood of Pakistan increasing its clout in this region when the muscle power of Taliban increases after American exit. So it would be in China’s interest to further consolidate its strategic relations with Pakistan over the long term. It would also serve China’s global interests: improve China’s access to the Arabian Sea and its energy security. Of course, an added incentive is a militarily more reliable and stronger Pakistan would keep India busy on its western flank. China would then be able to leverage it to its advantage both in negotiations and confrontations with India.
India has always had a problem in rationalising its policy making to meet the needs of national interests in a changing strategic environment. Even on other issues that require real time action, there is a lot of foot dragging and uncertainty to the detriment of national interest both in internal and external policy making. As a direct consequence even manageable issues like Kashmir unrest, Naga insurgency, and Maoist upsurge have become hardy perennials. While these issues have a large internal content, it has also affected foreign policy making with a lack of clarity and definition. India will have to be proactive in building relations with other nations, with clear and visible demarcation of its own interests where it would not make compromises. This is essential in dealing with countries like China who see their own interest in clearly defined terms in every move they make and action they take. The Chinese have made good use of India’s weakness in this respect to needle India as and when it suits them.
Any improvement in this regard requires a change in national mindset. It is doubtful whether the present Indian national leadership, including the political community as a whole, is ready to take charge, instead of deferring decisions and debating the frivolous. Unless this is done, it is going to be increasingly difficult to deal with China. India has to foster a win-win relationship with China. It is essential for handling contentious issues that are often in conflict with national security interests of both the countries. Otherwise as national security interests gather more form and content, India would be the loser. And we cannot afford to do that
Courtesy: South Asia Analysis Group, August 29, 2010
URL: http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers41%5Cpaper4005.html
The recent India-China stand-off over the issue of a Chinese visa for Lt General BS Jaswal, a serving commander of Northern Command, has highlighted the tenuous nature of existing ties between the two countries. This incident has shown the limitations in building a military relationship with China, in the absence of greater and closer strategic relationship between the two countries. At present the military relationship in a nascent stage limited to goodwill visit of senior officers and naval ships. There had been a few low level exercises with the participation of sub units of armies of both the countries.
It also raises the fundamental question whether India can build a meaningful military relationship at all with China? Both the countries have no choice to build a strategic relationship in which military relationship would be an important segment. So far India-China relationship building had been a halting process, despite appreciable growth in mutual trade largely to the advantage of China. So building a military relationship is going to be a long haul filled with minefields of petty misunderstandings and minor confrontations.
Building a military relationship is inextricably intertwined with a number of strategic issues in which the two countries have conflicting interests – China’s territorial claims in India’s border areas, presence of sizeable Tibetan refugees who refuse to accept Chinese rule in Tibet, China’s growing relations with India’s close neighbours, growth of integrated strategic defence ties between China and Pakistan, and China’s increasing presence in the Indian Ocean region. These issues have gained new dimensions after the US economic downturn and Washington’s efforts to scale down its strategic moves to contain China. China’s rapid progress in military modernisation – particularly naval and missile capability – have strengthened and made its ambitions to become a global super power a little more realistic.
India had been bending over backwards to accommodate China’s periodic aberrations in its fragile relations. It had always played down even reports of Chinese border intrusions and protests over Indian prime minister’s visits to Arunachal Pradesh. However, New Delhi has reacted strongly in the case of Lt General Jamwal’s visa to China. Apart from issuing a demarche to Beijing, India has reciprocated by refusing visas to Chinese PLA officers including one to attend a course at the National Defence College in India. It has also suspended other military interactions with China, at least for the time being.
If we go by India’s defence minister AK Antony’s reaction the following day, New Delhi appears to have had second thoughts on the issue and tried to play down the whole thing, even as the media went gewgaw over the incident. Answering a media question on the incident, he said "We have close ties with China. There may be some short term problems (emphasis added) but they will not come in the country’s overall approach towards our neighbour." Does this mean the defence minister, who gives form to India’s national defence, has failed to read the strategic signal Beijing has sent with this incident? After all India has gulped down similar rebuffs from Canada to its serving and retired army officers in denying visa for private visits on even more specious grounds. Then why raise the ante in the first place, when China poses a problem over visas?
As B Raman has pointed out in his recent article " Dealing with China’s machinations in J and K" (available at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers41%5Cpaper4004.html) there appears to be a distinct shift in Chinese policy regarding the status of J and K. This is probably in keeping with China’s revised strategic security perceptions. The first relates to Xinjiang – the region troubled by Uighur revolt - on its south-western flank. The potential for Uighur revolt increases when the strategic environment of the Taliban dominated areas along Pakistan-Afghan border changes for the worse as and when American military power is scaled down over the next year.
A second aspect, related to earlier issue, is the likelihood of Pakistan increasing its clout in this region when the muscle power of Taliban increases after American exit. So it would be in China’s interest to further consolidate its strategic relations with Pakistan over the long term. It would also serve China’s global interests: improve China’s access to the Arabian Sea and its energy security. Of course, an added incentive is a militarily more reliable and stronger Pakistan would keep India busy on its western flank. China would then be able to leverage it to its advantage both in negotiations and confrontations with India.
India has always had a problem in rationalising its policy making to meet the needs of national interests in a changing strategic environment. Even on other issues that require real time action, there is a lot of foot dragging and uncertainty to the detriment of national interest both in internal and external policy making. As a direct consequence even manageable issues like Kashmir unrest, Naga insurgency, and Maoist upsurge have become hardy perennials. While these issues have a large internal content, it has also affected foreign policy making with a lack of clarity and definition. India will have to be proactive in building relations with other nations, with clear and visible demarcation of its own interests where it would not make compromises. This is essential in dealing with countries like China who see their own interest in clearly defined terms in every move they make and action they take. The Chinese have made good use of India’s weakness in this respect to needle India as and when it suits them.
Any improvement in this regard requires a change in national mindset. It is doubtful whether the present Indian national leadership, including the political community as a whole, is ready to take charge, instead of deferring decisions and debating the frivolous. Unless this is done, it is going to be increasingly difficult to deal with China. India has to foster a win-win relationship with China. It is essential for handling contentious issues that are often in conflict with national security interests of both the countries. Otherwise as national security interests gather more form and content, India would be the loser. And we cannot afford to do that
Courtesy: South Asia Analysis Group, August 29, 2010
URL: http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers41%5Cpaper4005.html
Saturday, August 14, 2010
President’s clear vision, key factor in eradicating terrorism
By Shanika Siriyananda
* Gotabaya - one of three leaders who crushed LTTE
* Lanka’s successful strategy - a valuable lesson
* Arrest of KP, a great success
* Indo-Lanka Accord had lots of loose ends
A specialist on South Asian military intelligence, Colonel R. Hariharan said that apart from lack of international support, including India to the LTTE to survive the final battle, the prime factor for the demise of the LTTE was President Rajapaksa’s clear political determination to eliminate Prabhakaran and the LTTE.
In an interview with the Sunday Observer Col. Hariharan, who served as the Head of the intelligence for the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka between 1987 and 1990, said President Rajapaksa’s political leadership had geared the entire government machinery to achieve the single goal - annihilation of the LTTE.
“In brief, he provided the critical support needed for the success of military operations the national leadership”, he said.
The military intelligence specialist said that Sri Lanka’s successful war strategy would definitely provide many valuable lessons for all nations.
Col. Hariharan said Kumaran Pathmanathan’s (KP) arrest was a great success for Sri Lanka’s efforts to curb the resurgence of LTTE internationally and would have a big impact on the future of overseas LTTE operations.
According to Col. Hariharan, though the LTTE remnants are trying to ‘stage’ a come back, it will not be a reality as the internationally activated pro-LTTE groups are split into two factions - political and military.
He said that though there were some LTTE sympathizers who appreciate its militancy, it was doubtful that they have the capability of mastering the support of the Tamil Nadu’s mainstream politics.
Following are the excerpts of the interview:
Q: The government is credited for annihilating the LTTE. What were the main factors that contributed to the victory?
A: I have written extensively on this. I would summarize my reasons as follows, not necessarily in the order of priority:
1. President Rajapaksa’s clarity of objective - to eliminate Prabhakaran and the LTTE and providing leadership support to combine policy making, planning and executing actions not only the armed forces or the ministry of defence but the entire government machinery to achieve this goal. This enabled the government to cash in on the weaknesses of the LTTE not only on the military front but also politically and internationally. In brief, he provided the critical support needed for the success of military operations, the - national leadership.
President Rajapaksa’s efforts to transform the armed forces into fighting machines should not be ignored. To reach his goal he created a politico-administrative structure to help the armed forces achieve their military objectives, unmindful of its enormous cost in terms of finance, manpower, governance and international relations. He also provided the much needed political support for the armed forces.
2. Maintaining close relations with India and thereby ensuring that the LTTE does not gain either large scale political or other clandestine support from India, interfering politically or otherwise both internally and internationally to affect the Sri Lanka government actions or operations.
3. Allowing the armed forces to plan and execute their operations without political interference is achieved. Providing all out support to them to maintain military superiority all through the operations. This enabled the armed forces to build adequate fire power and carry out its offensive successfully.
4. Making full use of the global anti-terror environment to fight the LTTE. This made it possible to gain valuable international support - notably from the U.S. to conduct military operations, though there were critical moments towards the end of the war due to their human rights concerns.
The President in a strategic ploy identified his campaign against the LTTE as part of the global war against terrorism. India and the U.S. started providing regular intelligence inputs and technical support on the movement of LTTE’s shipping logistics. The LTTE was banned in 32 countries particularly after the assassination of Sri Lankan foreign minister Lakshman Kadirgamar. Consequently the foreign assistance to Sri Lanka in its war against the LTTE gained legitimacy.
5. Mounting a high profile information and publicity campaign on the war, which the LTTE could never match. This enabled to garner large scale public support for the war which was lacking in earlier campaigns as the LTTE propaganda organs were more effective.
Q: Where do you think was the turning point of the LTTE’s fall?
A: As a military analyst, I think the LTTE lost the war, when they could not break the army’s stranglehold of Elephant Pass-Paranthan-Kilnochchi area that started after the logistic shipping support was destroyed. The LTTE could not launch any sizeable counter attacks to break the investment.
Q: What went wrong for the LTTE?
A: Before the war the lack of political strategy was LTTE’s problem. In 2002, they were controlling most of what they called the ‘Tamil Eelam’, yet they could not take advantage of the peace process and strike a win-win deal with Sri Lanka. Similarly they never made up with India, where they were dependent upon weak political parties for support.
During the conflict LTTE choice of fighting a conventional war instead of fighting an insurgency battle which is their strength, was a big strategic error. They just did not have the numbers or fire power to fight a conventional battle with Sri Lanka, particularly after they lost recruiting bases in Tamil areas in the East when Karuna broke away. When they were overwhelmed by army, they did not have a responsive strategy in place.
Q: Still the LTTE’s remnants are trying to show that they are alive. Can they make an impact in the present environment?
A: I doubt very much that they can carry out any spectacular terrorist attack within Sri Lanka in their present state. However, they may have the capability to do something more visible overseas. We should remember it took Prabhakaran two decades to build the LTTE into a powerful force. They have neither a leader like Prabhakaran to lead them nor a global environment that would help them as it did in the 90s to stage a powerful comeback.
Q: What is your comment on post-war Sri Lanka?
A: While military success has been achieved, the charged atmosphere built up during the war needs to be defused. This would require people affected by the conflict resuming normal life as early as possible. While this is a huge national challenge, it has to produce more visible results. Modern governance demands ensuring people enjoy fundamental freedoms. As it is a notion in the minds of people, it is they who should feel a sense of security and trust in the government.
Q: What do you have to say about President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s military strategy?
A:Military strategy is only a part of national strategy when a nation goes to war. This was provided by President Rajapaksa and he gave enough space to armed forces to come into full bloom to carry out their campaign.
Q: The force behind the entire military manoeuvre was Defence Secretary, Gotabhaya Rajapaksa. How do you see his commitment?
A: Of course, he was fully committed to achieve the President’s objectives; that was why he was appointed for the job. The President had always been the supreme commander of the three services. While Basil Rajapaksa provided the political interface for the war, Gotabaya Rajapaksa provided the government interface for military operations. But as Defence Secretary he provided vital interface between the national leadership and military leadership so that the entire campaign was conducted smoothly. I am sure his military background was a great help in this. So I would rate him as one of the three key leaders who helped Sri Lanka win the war.
Q: Out of 11,000 ex-LTTE cadres, over 8,000 are still in state custody undergoing rehabilitation. How best do you think the government can train them to become useful citizens?
A:They should find a place in society to live a meaningful life without fear of deprivation. This requires more than a few months of training. It requires an environment where they can look forward to the future rather than go back to the past.
Q: How do you see the arrest of KP? Did it make a huge impact on the LTTE’s future in the international sphere?
A:It is a great success for Sri Lanka’s efforts to curb the resurgence of LTTE internationally. Yes, it will have a big impact on the future of overseas LTTE.
Q: How vital is his contribution to the post conflict Sri Lanka?
A:It is too early to assess.
Q: What is your assessment of the LTTE’s international network?
A: It is not united but split into two major groups the ideologues of Eelam who want to politically keep the Eelam struggle alive and the militant elements. I don’t know whether they will join together in the near term.
Q: What are your observations on the LTTE’s activities in Tamil Nadu and how do you view the pro-LTTE views expressed by certain politicians and sympathizers of the outfit?
A:The LTTE activities in Tamil Nadu are neither visible nor assertive. There are some LTTE sympathizers who appreciate its militancy. But the Eelam issue has a wider appeal. The plight of Tamils in war zones affects a very large number of people. There are issues which some of the political parties are trying to cash in. But I doubt whether they have the capability to make a strong on Tamil Nadu’s mainstream politics.
Q: Do you agree that India made a blunder by grooming LTTE in early 80s?
A: I am against arming any insurgent groups either locally or internationally. I had made this clear in my own military channels in the 80s, though army was not involved in the training of Tamil militants.
Q: How vital was the India’s stance on defeating the LTTE and do you agree that Prabhakaran had much hopes that the international community including India would save him at the last minute?
A: I think India’s intelligence, political and international support was one of the winning factors for Sri Lanka. I believe Prabhakaran overestimated the readiness of the international community to bail him out. Of course, political support in India for him was not sufficiently strong to do this job. Apparently he failed to realize this.
Q: Why did he fail to convince them? What went wrong?
A:Three things in his conduct were instrumental in losing international credibility over a time: killing Rajiv Gandhi, willful disregard for international efforts to make the peace process a success, and global war on terror after 9/11 the world was not prepared to accept terrorism as a tool to fight for ethnic or other rights.
Q: Did the IPKF fail in defeating the LTTE?
A:The IPKF was not sent to defeat LTTE. It was to help Sri Lanka government to enforce the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement in which the disarming of Tamil militants was provided for. That was how it got embroiled in war with LTTE.
Q: What were the difficulties the IPKF faced in dealing with the LTTE?
A:I can only give a strategic analyst’s perspective but it might disappoint those expecting political brownie points. The IPKF at the beginning faced three problems - lack of role clarity, inadequate information, and security forces’ own structural snags.
The Indian army had very little warning to prepare for its overseas deployment. Nobody was very clear what its role in Sri Lanka would be because the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord had a lot of loose ends. India was signing a third party undertaking to do its bit for an internal problem of Sri Lanka. So it was bristled with uncertainties as the two signing powers and the Tamil militants who were non-signatories had to conform to the Accord to make it a success. So the troops were initially sent only as a token force to show solidarity with Sri Lanka rather than fight a pitched battle with the LTTE.
Secondly, the Indian security forces had very little information available on Sri Lanka’s political and militancy problems. This might be surprising as many accuse India of plotting the whole thing. This is far from true. So the Indian army went there without adequate preparation.
It had obsolete maps and an inadequate knowledge of Sri Lanka. To top it all, it was supposed to meet the continuous demands of Sinhalese and Tamils who had built high expectations. Military Intelligence had a few assets - both information and sources - when it landed. (Information sharing among intelligence agencies in all nations is minimal for fear of compromise of sources.)
Structurally, when the war started, a joint services command had to be created to conduct an insurgency operation in a foreign country. This was totally a new experience for the three services. Troops had to be flown in and they were not familiar with either the terrain or ground situation when they were put directly from Jaffna airport to join the operations. However, the three services rose to the occasion and improvised command and control structure and improved it as operations progressed.
Q: Do you think the LTTE became stronger with the withdrawal of the IPKF?
A:The LTTE was at its weakest when the IPKF left. It was confined to a small space in Vanni. It had suffered heavy casualties - losing most of the junior leaders. That was why it desperately built bridges with President Premadasa which resulted in the pull out of the IPKF at a crucial stage for LTTE. In fact, it provided the oxygen the LTTE needed for survival and stage a comeback in the North and parts of East where it massacred a few hundred policemen. So it became stronger by default.
Q: Who were the main LTTE leaders who came across during your stay in Sri Lanka? How do you see Prabhakaran’s militant mind?
A:When we were in talking terms initially in August 1987, I have seen all the top leaders of the LTTE including Prabhakaran, Kittu, and Mahatthaya etc. I had no rapport with them but they knew who I was. Prabhakaran as a militant believed in the overwhelming power of the gun to achieve his goals. This led to his downfall as he failed to seize the opportunities the peace process offered in 2002.
Q: How do you recollect your three -year stay in Sri Lanka as the intelligence head of the IPKF?
A: As a Tamil, Sri Lanka was never a foreign country for me. So it pained me more to see the great human tragedy that was turning the country - one of the most beautiful ones I had seen - into a battleground. I found the people of Sri Lanka - Tamils, Sinhalese, Muslims and everyone warm hearted and more easy-going than Indians. When I visited Colombo I was amazed everyone revelling as though they had nothing to do with the war in the North!
Q: Sri Lanka’s military strategy that ended the Asia’s longest civil war will be a case study for other nations threatened with internal conflicts?
A:Of course; even failed operations teach us many things. So a successful war like Sri Lanka’s definitely provides many valuable lessons for all nations.
Q: The Maoists and the Naxalites have increased their attacks in India. Do you think the LTTE cadres who are believed to have escaped from Sri Lanka are supporting them?
A: No. There were some marginal contacts between Maoists and the LTTE when the latter was powerful. To my knowledge, even these were commercial deals between two ‘fraternal’ organizations. Now there are safer pastures for fleeing LTTE elements to seek refuge than the hotbeds of Maoist violence in India.
Q: Where are these safer pastures for fleeing LTTEers?
A: I can only conclude that they would mix with families fleeing Sri Lanka as refugees; of course that does not make all those refugees LTTEers. I am sure Canadian and Australian intelligence also some of the countries like Indonesia would be doing this.
Q: No doubt, intelligence played a vital role in defeating the LTTE. How vital is strengthening the intelligence networks locally and in the post conflict era?
A:Intelligence is a silent shield. It does not distinguish between war time and peace time. At all times it has to be functional. As it provides foreknowledge, it is vital to prevent wars as much as to win them.
Courtesy: Sunday Observer, August 15, 2010
URL:http://www.sundayobserver.lk/2010/08/15/sec03.asp
* Gotabaya - one of three leaders who crushed LTTE
* Lanka’s successful strategy - a valuable lesson
* Arrest of KP, a great success
* Indo-Lanka Accord had lots of loose ends
A specialist on South Asian military intelligence, Colonel R. Hariharan said that apart from lack of international support, including India to the LTTE to survive the final battle, the prime factor for the demise of the LTTE was President Rajapaksa’s clear political determination to eliminate Prabhakaran and the LTTE.
In an interview with the Sunday Observer Col. Hariharan, who served as the Head of the intelligence for the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka between 1987 and 1990, said President Rajapaksa’s political leadership had geared the entire government machinery to achieve the single goal - annihilation of the LTTE.
“In brief, he provided the critical support needed for the success of military operations the national leadership”, he said.
The military intelligence specialist said that Sri Lanka’s successful war strategy would definitely provide many valuable lessons for all nations.
Col. Hariharan said Kumaran Pathmanathan’s (KP) arrest was a great success for Sri Lanka’s efforts to curb the resurgence of LTTE internationally and would have a big impact on the future of overseas LTTE operations.
According to Col. Hariharan, though the LTTE remnants are trying to ‘stage’ a come back, it will not be a reality as the internationally activated pro-LTTE groups are split into two factions - political and military.
He said that though there were some LTTE sympathizers who appreciate its militancy, it was doubtful that they have the capability of mastering the support of the Tamil Nadu’s mainstream politics.
Following are the excerpts of the interview:
Q: The government is credited for annihilating the LTTE. What were the main factors that contributed to the victory?
A: I have written extensively on this. I would summarize my reasons as follows, not necessarily in the order of priority:
1. President Rajapaksa’s clarity of objective - to eliminate Prabhakaran and the LTTE and providing leadership support to combine policy making, planning and executing actions not only the armed forces or the ministry of defence but the entire government machinery to achieve this goal. This enabled the government to cash in on the weaknesses of the LTTE not only on the military front but also politically and internationally. In brief, he provided the critical support needed for the success of military operations, the - national leadership.
President Rajapaksa’s efforts to transform the armed forces into fighting machines should not be ignored. To reach his goal he created a politico-administrative structure to help the armed forces achieve their military objectives, unmindful of its enormous cost in terms of finance, manpower, governance and international relations. He also provided the much needed political support for the armed forces.
2. Maintaining close relations with India and thereby ensuring that the LTTE does not gain either large scale political or other clandestine support from India, interfering politically or otherwise both internally and internationally to affect the Sri Lanka government actions or operations.
3. Allowing the armed forces to plan and execute their operations without political interference is achieved. Providing all out support to them to maintain military superiority all through the operations. This enabled the armed forces to build adequate fire power and carry out its offensive successfully.
4. Making full use of the global anti-terror environment to fight the LTTE. This made it possible to gain valuable international support - notably from the U.S. to conduct military operations, though there were critical moments towards the end of the war due to their human rights concerns.
The President in a strategic ploy identified his campaign against the LTTE as part of the global war against terrorism. India and the U.S. started providing regular intelligence inputs and technical support on the movement of LTTE’s shipping logistics. The LTTE was banned in 32 countries particularly after the assassination of Sri Lankan foreign minister Lakshman Kadirgamar. Consequently the foreign assistance to Sri Lanka in its war against the LTTE gained legitimacy.
5. Mounting a high profile information and publicity campaign on the war, which the LTTE could never match. This enabled to garner large scale public support for the war which was lacking in earlier campaigns as the LTTE propaganda organs were more effective.
Q: Where do you think was the turning point of the LTTE’s fall?
A: As a military analyst, I think the LTTE lost the war, when they could not break the army’s stranglehold of Elephant Pass-Paranthan-Kilnochchi area that started after the logistic shipping support was destroyed. The LTTE could not launch any sizeable counter attacks to break the investment.
Q: What went wrong for the LTTE?
A: Before the war the lack of political strategy was LTTE’s problem. In 2002, they were controlling most of what they called the ‘Tamil Eelam’, yet they could not take advantage of the peace process and strike a win-win deal with Sri Lanka. Similarly they never made up with India, where they were dependent upon weak political parties for support.
During the conflict LTTE choice of fighting a conventional war instead of fighting an insurgency battle which is their strength, was a big strategic error. They just did not have the numbers or fire power to fight a conventional battle with Sri Lanka, particularly after they lost recruiting bases in Tamil areas in the East when Karuna broke away. When they were overwhelmed by army, they did not have a responsive strategy in place.
Q: Still the LTTE’s remnants are trying to show that they are alive. Can they make an impact in the present environment?
A: I doubt very much that they can carry out any spectacular terrorist attack within Sri Lanka in their present state. However, they may have the capability to do something more visible overseas. We should remember it took Prabhakaran two decades to build the LTTE into a powerful force. They have neither a leader like Prabhakaran to lead them nor a global environment that would help them as it did in the 90s to stage a powerful comeback.
Q: What is your comment on post-war Sri Lanka?
A: While military success has been achieved, the charged atmosphere built up during the war needs to be defused. This would require people affected by the conflict resuming normal life as early as possible. While this is a huge national challenge, it has to produce more visible results. Modern governance demands ensuring people enjoy fundamental freedoms. As it is a notion in the minds of people, it is they who should feel a sense of security and trust in the government.
Q: What do you have to say about President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s military strategy?
A:Military strategy is only a part of national strategy when a nation goes to war. This was provided by President Rajapaksa and he gave enough space to armed forces to come into full bloom to carry out their campaign.
Q: The force behind the entire military manoeuvre was Defence Secretary, Gotabhaya Rajapaksa. How do you see his commitment?
A: Of course, he was fully committed to achieve the President’s objectives; that was why he was appointed for the job. The President had always been the supreme commander of the three services. While Basil Rajapaksa provided the political interface for the war, Gotabaya Rajapaksa provided the government interface for military operations. But as Defence Secretary he provided vital interface between the national leadership and military leadership so that the entire campaign was conducted smoothly. I am sure his military background was a great help in this. So I would rate him as one of the three key leaders who helped Sri Lanka win the war.
Q: Out of 11,000 ex-LTTE cadres, over 8,000 are still in state custody undergoing rehabilitation. How best do you think the government can train them to become useful citizens?
A:They should find a place in society to live a meaningful life without fear of deprivation. This requires more than a few months of training. It requires an environment where they can look forward to the future rather than go back to the past.
Q: How do you see the arrest of KP? Did it make a huge impact on the LTTE’s future in the international sphere?
A:It is a great success for Sri Lanka’s efforts to curb the resurgence of LTTE internationally. Yes, it will have a big impact on the future of overseas LTTE.
Q: How vital is his contribution to the post conflict Sri Lanka?
A:It is too early to assess.
Q: What is your assessment of the LTTE’s international network?
A: It is not united but split into two major groups the ideologues of Eelam who want to politically keep the Eelam struggle alive and the militant elements. I don’t know whether they will join together in the near term.
Q: What are your observations on the LTTE’s activities in Tamil Nadu and how do you view the pro-LTTE views expressed by certain politicians and sympathizers of the outfit?
A:The LTTE activities in Tamil Nadu are neither visible nor assertive. There are some LTTE sympathizers who appreciate its militancy. But the Eelam issue has a wider appeal. The plight of Tamils in war zones affects a very large number of people. There are issues which some of the political parties are trying to cash in. But I doubt whether they have the capability to make a strong on Tamil Nadu’s mainstream politics.
Q: Do you agree that India made a blunder by grooming LTTE in early 80s?
A: I am against arming any insurgent groups either locally or internationally. I had made this clear in my own military channels in the 80s, though army was not involved in the training of Tamil militants.
Q: How vital was the India’s stance on defeating the LTTE and do you agree that Prabhakaran had much hopes that the international community including India would save him at the last minute?
A: I think India’s intelligence, political and international support was one of the winning factors for Sri Lanka. I believe Prabhakaran overestimated the readiness of the international community to bail him out. Of course, political support in India for him was not sufficiently strong to do this job. Apparently he failed to realize this.
Q: Why did he fail to convince them? What went wrong?
A:Three things in his conduct were instrumental in losing international credibility over a time: killing Rajiv Gandhi, willful disregard for international efforts to make the peace process a success, and global war on terror after 9/11 the world was not prepared to accept terrorism as a tool to fight for ethnic or other rights.
Q: Did the IPKF fail in defeating the LTTE?
A:The IPKF was not sent to defeat LTTE. It was to help Sri Lanka government to enforce the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement in which the disarming of Tamil militants was provided for. That was how it got embroiled in war with LTTE.
Q: What were the difficulties the IPKF faced in dealing with the LTTE?
A:I can only give a strategic analyst’s perspective but it might disappoint those expecting political brownie points. The IPKF at the beginning faced three problems - lack of role clarity, inadequate information, and security forces’ own structural snags.
The Indian army had very little warning to prepare for its overseas deployment. Nobody was very clear what its role in Sri Lanka would be because the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord had a lot of loose ends. India was signing a third party undertaking to do its bit for an internal problem of Sri Lanka. So it was bristled with uncertainties as the two signing powers and the Tamil militants who were non-signatories had to conform to the Accord to make it a success. So the troops were initially sent only as a token force to show solidarity with Sri Lanka rather than fight a pitched battle with the LTTE.
Secondly, the Indian security forces had very little information available on Sri Lanka’s political and militancy problems. This might be surprising as many accuse India of plotting the whole thing. This is far from true. So the Indian army went there without adequate preparation.
It had obsolete maps and an inadequate knowledge of Sri Lanka. To top it all, it was supposed to meet the continuous demands of Sinhalese and Tamils who had built high expectations. Military Intelligence had a few assets - both information and sources - when it landed. (Information sharing among intelligence agencies in all nations is minimal for fear of compromise of sources.)
Structurally, when the war started, a joint services command had to be created to conduct an insurgency operation in a foreign country. This was totally a new experience for the three services. Troops had to be flown in and they were not familiar with either the terrain or ground situation when they were put directly from Jaffna airport to join the operations. However, the three services rose to the occasion and improvised command and control structure and improved it as operations progressed.
Q: Do you think the LTTE became stronger with the withdrawal of the IPKF?
A:The LTTE was at its weakest when the IPKF left. It was confined to a small space in Vanni. It had suffered heavy casualties - losing most of the junior leaders. That was why it desperately built bridges with President Premadasa which resulted in the pull out of the IPKF at a crucial stage for LTTE. In fact, it provided the oxygen the LTTE needed for survival and stage a comeback in the North and parts of East where it massacred a few hundred policemen. So it became stronger by default.
Q: Who were the main LTTE leaders who came across during your stay in Sri Lanka? How do you see Prabhakaran’s militant mind?
A:When we were in talking terms initially in August 1987, I have seen all the top leaders of the LTTE including Prabhakaran, Kittu, and Mahatthaya etc. I had no rapport with them but they knew who I was. Prabhakaran as a militant believed in the overwhelming power of the gun to achieve his goals. This led to his downfall as he failed to seize the opportunities the peace process offered in 2002.
Q: How do you recollect your three -year stay in Sri Lanka as the intelligence head of the IPKF?
A: As a Tamil, Sri Lanka was never a foreign country for me. So it pained me more to see the great human tragedy that was turning the country - one of the most beautiful ones I had seen - into a battleground. I found the people of Sri Lanka - Tamils, Sinhalese, Muslims and everyone warm hearted and more easy-going than Indians. When I visited Colombo I was amazed everyone revelling as though they had nothing to do with the war in the North!
Q: Sri Lanka’s military strategy that ended the Asia’s longest civil war will be a case study for other nations threatened with internal conflicts?
A:Of course; even failed operations teach us many things. So a successful war like Sri Lanka’s definitely provides many valuable lessons for all nations.
Q: The Maoists and the Naxalites have increased their attacks in India. Do you think the LTTE cadres who are believed to have escaped from Sri Lanka are supporting them?
A: No. There were some marginal contacts between Maoists and the LTTE when the latter was powerful. To my knowledge, even these were commercial deals between two ‘fraternal’ organizations. Now there are safer pastures for fleeing LTTE elements to seek refuge than the hotbeds of Maoist violence in India.
Q: Where are these safer pastures for fleeing LTTEers?
A: I can only conclude that they would mix with families fleeing Sri Lanka as refugees; of course that does not make all those refugees LTTEers. I am sure Canadian and Australian intelligence also some of the countries like Indonesia would be doing this.
Q: No doubt, intelligence played a vital role in defeating the LTTE. How vital is strengthening the intelligence networks locally and in the post conflict era?
A:Intelligence is a silent shield. It does not distinguish between war time and peace time. At all times it has to be functional. As it provides foreknowledge, it is vital to prevent wars as much as to win them.
Courtesy: Sunday Observer, August 15, 2010
URL:http://www.sundayobserver.lk/2010/08/15/sec03.asp
Monday, August 9, 2010
Sri Lanka’s Diaspora Strategies
By Col R Hariharan
Sri Lanka appears to be following Hindu philosophy’s four ways of dealing with people - Sama, Dana, Bheda and Dand - in defusing the Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora’s potential to incubate separatist militancy of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) kind.
While Sama uses logical reasoning and common sense to explain one’s position, Dana is the classical carrot ploy of offering incentives – as Americans say ‘if you can’t win them, buy them.’ Bheda the third option is the one that politicians indulge all the time – create a split to win over a section. Dand, the last resort is to use force (or the stick, the other half of the proverbial carrot ploy).
The recent high profile public projection of the former LTTE international affairs representative and a high security prisoner Kumaran Pathmanathan (KP) is apparently a part of Sri Lanka’s Bheda strategy. It fits in well with the larger Sri Lankan game plan to handle the Tamil Diaspora. Already it seems to have worked as a few known personalities of the Tamil Diaspora (who had supported the LTTE in the past) have agreed to join hands with KP and participate in the reconstruction process in the North.
KP had confirmed this in a series of media interviews recently. According to him his newly formed NGO outfit ‘The North-East Rehabilitation and Development Organisation' (NERDO) located in Vavuniya, was preparing to play a key role in the rehabilitation, reconstruction and resettlement processes. With years of overseas exposure in his LTTE days, KP had built influential Diaspora connections. While all of them may not join KP’s efforts, he seems to have thrown a spanner in the works of sections of the Diaspora to rebuild a unified organisation to carry forward the LTTE cause. Of course, hard boiled LTTE acolytes would now find justification to call him a quisling.
Justifying his action to collaborate with the government, KP said it was essential for Tamils to realise the ground realities in a post-LTTE era in the island nation and review its strategy to meet the new challenges. His said he was only “concerned about the welfare of the people, particularly children, though some seek fresh funding to cause mayhem. People are fed up with war and every effort should be made to alleviate their suffering without playing politics with a purely humanitarian motive.” This is so true. Logical reasoning with LTTE supporters had never worked successfully in the past when the LTTE’s flag was flying high. But words coming from a senior leader like KP in times of adversity would definitely create at least second thoughts in their minds.
In his interview, KP comes out as a man of sound common sense and pragmatism. He attributed the defeat of the LTTE to the change in global political leaders’ attitude to the LTTE after the 9/11 al Qaeda attack and the US led war on Jihadi terrorism in its wake. Prabhakaran did not realise the urgent need to change the LTTE strategy to suit the new environment. KP’s observation “there is a new world order today, which does not tolerate armed campaigns and that is the hard reality,” showed a realism much needed by those still voicing LTTE slogans.
The increasing public projection of KP in spite of his detention has caused uneasiness among Tamil politicians who consider it as Rajapaksa’s ploy to destabilise them. This fear is probably justified as KP is no ordinary prisoner. Normally as a member of the inner cabinet of Prabhakaran he should be cooling his heels in the Sri Lankan version of the Guantanamo Bay, where his former colleagues are awaiting prosecution. His arrest in Malaysia and rendition and rendition was the biggest story of the year after the defeat of the LTTE.
But even before KP completed his first year of imprisonment, rumours are thick that the elusive former chief arms procurer of the LTTE, may rise like the proverbial phoenix from the ashes of Tamil militancy to join the political mainstream. And if the media space he is already hogging, even as a prisoner, is any indication the process for his political anointment has already started. It fits in well with a series of stories that started with his much publicised visit to Vanni in the company of Tamil Diaspora leaders to look at the state of rehabilitation and the formation of a NGO for canalising contributions from the Diaspora thereafter.
KP’s candid interviews bearing his views not only on the LTTE’s defeat and Tamils suffering but also his favourable comments on the Defence Secretary and the President came as icing on the cake of his publicity blitz. There is no doubt that KP’s privileged public access is part of a Sri Lankan game plan. However, his political rehabilitation may come through only after his evidence as a crown witness is fully milked during the prosecution of 737 LTTE hard core cadres in custody. This process could take a year to complete unless special courts are set up. If this surmise is correct, probably KP is slated to occupy a place in the political firmament in 2011.
Even before the war, Sri Lanka had embarked upon an effort to make it difficult for LTTE to retain its foothold in many countries. The President, prime minister, and the foreign minister in the past had stressed this aspect in their international visits and appearances. Apart from these efforts, Sri Lanka said it was launching with the help of INTERPOL a coordinated effort to dismantle LTTE’s international network. These efforts got a big push when Sri Lankan military intelligence recently unearthed highly classified documents and diaries of Castro, former head of the LTTE's international wing, at Viswamadu. These documents have provided details of LTTE international activists engaged in human trafficking, arms smuggling and financial bases in East Asia, Western Europe, Canada and Africa.
In this context it is interesting to note that the Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa touched upon this aspect while addressing the Galle dialogue on maritime security conference over the week end. He said, “no matter how powerful we are individually, so long as we act in isolation, we will be ineffective against threats arising from the trans-national operations of non-state actors.”
Can Sri Lanka wean over the Tamil Diaspora from the Eelam cause and support to resurrection of Tamil militancy?
To answer yes to this question would be oversimplifying a complex problem compounded by uneven composition of the Diaspora. And it would also be ignoring the historical realities of how the Tamil Diaspora became the main supporters of Tamil militancy. The Tamil Diaspora is neither uniform nor clearly segmented in their support to the Eelam cause.
Basically they act in two planes. One is on the emotional plane based upon their own bitter experience over the years, having lost their kith and kin. Their inability to directly go the aid of their kin when they are still suffering makes them angry now. Swayed by emotions on happenings in Sri Lanka the majority probably belong to this category. The Sri Lankan strategies aided by KP would probably work on this segment, provided political initiatives are also taken in tandem.
The other segment has a much deeper ideological belief in preserving the Tamil identity and creation the Tamil Eelam as the only process to do it. This segment has its origins even before the LTTE was born. This segment is deeply suspicious of majority Sinhalese’s political intentions due to historical experience. And it had been the fountainhead of separatism. It would probably be never wholly won over by the reasoning of the type KP dispenses. However, he may make a dent in its system of beliefs.
This segment needs political solutions to disprove their ingrained beliefs. These have not been forthcoming for the last three decades from successive Sri Lankan governments. And even now little has been done, other than talking about implementing even a half way house solution like the 13th amendment to the constitution.
Prof Rohan Gunaratne, Sri Lanka’s own high profile terrorism analyst of international repute, touched upon this home truth while speaking on post war challenges of Sri Lanka in Colombo last week. He said “failure of Sri Lankan leaders to govern a multi-ethnic and a multi-religious society since independence precipitated Sri Lanka ’s ethno-political conflict. Sri Lanka ’s political masters compromised Sri Lanka’s long term national and strategic interests for short term political gain. Unless Sri Lankan politicians build the understanding to never again to play ethnic and religious based politics, poison the ground by radicalizing its youth, and reinforce ethnic and religious divisions, the country is likely to suffer a repetition of its unfortunate past.”
The Sri Lanka government and the national leadership would do well to heed his words of caution as there is no indication they are attending to this vital aspect of political confidence building.
Unless this is attended to mere Machiavellian strategies in handling the Diaspora would not provide a satisfactory solution.
Courtesy: South Asia Analysis Group
www.southasiaanalysis.org
Sri Lanka appears to be following Hindu philosophy’s four ways of dealing with people - Sama, Dana, Bheda and Dand - in defusing the Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora’s potential to incubate separatist militancy of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) kind.
While Sama uses logical reasoning and common sense to explain one’s position, Dana is the classical carrot ploy of offering incentives – as Americans say ‘if you can’t win them, buy them.’ Bheda the third option is the one that politicians indulge all the time – create a split to win over a section. Dand, the last resort is to use force (or the stick, the other half of the proverbial carrot ploy).
The recent high profile public projection of the former LTTE international affairs representative and a high security prisoner Kumaran Pathmanathan (KP) is apparently a part of Sri Lanka’s Bheda strategy. It fits in well with the larger Sri Lankan game plan to handle the Tamil Diaspora. Already it seems to have worked as a few known personalities of the Tamil Diaspora (who had supported the LTTE in the past) have agreed to join hands with KP and participate in the reconstruction process in the North.
KP had confirmed this in a series of media interviews recently. According to him his newly formed NGO outfit ‘The North-East Rehabilitation and Development Organisation' (NERDO) located in Vavuniya, was preparing to play a key role in the rehabilitation, reconstruction and resettlement processes. With years of overseas exposure in his LTTE days, KP had built influential Diaspora connections. While all of them may not join KP’s efforts, he seems to have thrown a spanner in the works of sections of the Diaspora to rebuild a unified organisation to carry forward the LTTE cause. Of course, hard boiled LTTE acolytes would now find justification to call him a quisling.
Justifying his action to collaborate with the government, KP said it was essential for Tamils to realise the ground realities in a post-LTTE era in the island nation and review its strategy to meet the new challenges. His said he was only “concerned about the welfare of the people, particularly children, though some seek fresh funding to cause mayhem. People are fed up with war and every effort should be made to alleviate their suffering without playing politics with a purely humanitarian motive.” This is so true. Logical reasoning with LTTE supporters had never worked successfully in the past when the LTTE’s flag was flying high. But words coming from a senior leader like KP in times of adversity would definitely create at least second thoughts in their minds.
In his interview, KP comes out as a man of sound common sense and pragmatism. He attributed the defeat of the LTTE to the change in global political leaders’ attitude to the LTTE after the 9/11 al Qaeda attack and the US led war on Jihadi terrorism in its wake. Prabhakaran did not realise the urgent need to change the LTTE strategy to suit the new environment. KP’s observation “there is a new world order today, which does not tolerate armed campaigns and that is the hard reality,” showed a realism much needed by those still voicing LTTE slogans.
The increasing public projection of KP in spite of his detention has caused uneasiness among Tamil politicians who consider it as Rajapaksa’s ploy to destabilise them. This fear is probably justified as KP is no ordinary prisoner. Normally as a member of the inner cabinet of Prabhakaran he should be cooling his heels in the Sri Lankan version of the Guantanamo Bay, where his former colleagues are awaiting prosecution. His arrest in Malaysia and rendition and rendition was the biggest story of the year after the defeat of the LTTE.
But even before KP completed his first year of imprisonment, rumours are thick that the elusive former chief arms procurer of the LTTE, may rise like the proverbial phoenix from the ashes of Tamil militancy to join the political mainstream. And if the media space he is already hogging, even as a prisoner, is any indication the process for his political anointment has already started. It fits in well with a series of stories that started with his much publicised visit to Vanni in the company of Tamil Diaspora leaders to look at the state of rehabilitation and the formation of a NGO for canalising contributions from the Diaspora thereafter.
KP’s candid interviews bearing his views not only on the LTTE’s defeat and Tamils suffering but also his favourable comments on the Defence Secretary and the President came as icing on the cake of his publicity blitz. There is no doubt that KP’s privileged public access is part of a Sri Lankan game plan. However, his political rehabilitation may come through only after his evidence as a crown witness is fully milked during the prosecution of 737 LTTE hard core cadres in custody. This process could take a year to complete unless special courts are set up. If this surmise is correct, probably KP is slated to occupy a place in the political firmament in 2011.
Even before the war, Sri Lanka had embarked upon an effort to make it difficult for LTTE to retain its foothold in many countries. The President, prime minister, and the foreign minister in the past had stressed this aspect in their international visits and appearances. Apart from these efforts, Sri Lanka said it was launching with the help of INTERPOL a coordinated effort to dismantle LTTE’s international network. These efforts got a big push when Sri Lankan military intelligence recently unearthed highly classified documents and diaries of Castro, former head of the LTTE's international wing, at Viswamadu. These documents have provided details of LTTE international activists engaged in human trafficking, arms smuggling and financial bases in East Asia, Western Europe, Canada and Africa.
In this context it is interesting to note that the Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa touched upon this aspect while addressing the Galle dialogue on maritime security conference over the week end. He said, “no matter how powerful we are individually, so long as we act in isolation, we will be ineffective against threats arising from the trans-national operations of non-state actors.”
Can Sri Lanka wean over the Tamil Diaspora from the Eelam cause and support to resurrection of Tamil militancy?
To answer yes to this question would be oversimplifying a complex problem compounded by uneven composition of the Diaspora. And it would also be ignoring the historical realities of how the Tamil Diaspora became the main supporters of Tamil militancy. The Tamil Diaspora is neither uniform nor clearly segmented in their support to the Eelam cause.
Basically they act in two planes. One is on the emotional plane based upon their own bitter experience over the years, having lost their kith and kin. Their inability to directly go the aid of their kin when they are still suffering makes them angry now. Swayed by emotions on happenings in Sri Lanka the majority probably belong to this category. The Sri Lankan strategies aided by KP would probably work on this segment, provided political initiatives are also taken in tandem.
The other segment has a much deeper ideological belief in preserving the Tamil identity and creation the Tamil Eelam as the only process to do it. This segment has its origins even before the LTTE was born. This segment is deeply suspicious of majority Sinhalese’s political intentions due to historical experience. And it had been the fountainhead of separatism. It would probably be never wholly won over by the reasoning of the type KP dispenses. However, he may make a dent in its system of beliefs.
This segment needs political solutions to disprove their ingrained beliefs. These have not been forthcoming for the last three decades from successive Sri Lankan governments. And even now little has been done, other than talking about implementing even a half way house solution like the 13th amendment to the constitution.
Prof Rohan Gunaratne, Sri Lanka’s own high profile terrorism analyst of international repute, touched upon this home truth while speaking on post war challenges of Sri Lanka in Colombo last week. He said “failure of Sri Lankan leaders to govern a multi-ethnic and a multi-religious society since independence precipitated Sri Lanka ’s ethno-political conflict. Sri Lanka ’s political masters compromised Sri Lanka’s long term national and strategic interests for short term political gain. Unless Sri Lankan politicians build the understanding to never again to play ethnic and religious based politics, poison the ground by radicalizing its youth, and reinforce ethnic and religious divisions, the country is likely to suffer a repetition of its unfortunate past.”
The Sri Lanka government and the national leadership would do well to heed his words of caution as there is no indication they are attending to this vital aspect of political confidence building.
Unless this is attended to mere Machiavellian strategies in handling the Diaspora would not provide a satisfactory solution.
Courtesy: South Asia Analysis Group
www.southasiaanalysis.org
Saturday, August 7, 2010
Tales of Honour and Uniform-2
By Col TN Raman (retd.)
1964-65
The role of the Commanding Officer (CO) in moulding the psyche of Young Officers (YO) in a unit is extremely important. After they are commissioned, the young lads replace their own fathers in their mind set, to that of their CO. In their subsequent career, these Officers often replicate the behaviour, style & man management techniques adopted by their COs. No wonder, the CO is always referred to as the old man. Not to ridicule him, but an honest expression of the void filled in their young lives by the absence of their own fathers. They trust their CO. If the CO reciprocates that trust, the unit does wonders. That is the essential difference between the regiments or the battalions, when we categorise them as good, bad or ugly.
Sarma had the good fortune of serving under some great COs, none of them made to the rank beyond that of a brigadier (in those days the rank to a Lt Col was a brigadier), barring only one. When Sarma joined one of the Artillery’s elite units, the CO looked like a constipated chap. But the lessons he taught them during the informal interactions like the mess parties or briefings before an exercise, were worth their weight in Gold.
He used to say, “Well boys, tomorrow we are leaving for Babina for our Annual Training Camp. The road journey is more than 8 hours. While you are sitting in your jeep, keep talking to the driver as well as the members of your detachment. You will develop an intimacy with them by knowing their back ground, about their village, about their family and above all their personal problems. This simple act will go a long way in telling them that you really care for them”.
On another occasion he advised the YOs to care for their sahayaks (orderlies). “You need not tip him every day with a peg of rum. Just present him with a shirt or a sweater when he goes home on annual leave. If he has children, buy suitable presents for them also; if nothing else a box of sweets. Make him realize that your gifts are in appreciation of his care for you and how grateful you are for his indulgence.”
In 1964, Sarma’s regiment had some veterans of Second World War also. Out of them, two were unforgettable. The first was, Nb Sub Chhotelal. He always boasted that he was the second driver of Field Marshal (FM) Slim, during the Burma Campaign. One evening the YOs were just making jovial comments about his boasts in the field mess during an exercise. The CO present was also laughing. After some time, he asked the youngsters, “How many of you are confident in getting selected as ADCs to Generals or the President. Here is a JCO who as a Havildar was selected to be FM Slim’s driver. Just imagine. The Army would have called for suitable candidates from more than 15 divisions. Each divisional commander would have personally interviewed the selected candidates of their own division. Finally at the Army level the Chief of Staff (COS) would have interviewed the few whetted ones. Chhotelal had crossed all these obstacles and became the driver. Is it not a credit worthy achievement for a NCO?” If he boasts about it is there any thing wrong”.
There was a pin drop silence. But the CO did not want to leave the youngsters in a sullen mood. “Boys, cheer up. The next drink is on me. By the way, if any of you volunteer to become my ADC, you will have just one hurdle. That is your 2 IC (second in command).”
The next Character was Subedar Kashmira Singh. He always used to wear a pair of leather glows during winter. Sarma asked him about it. His story was unique.
“Sahib, in 1939 I was part of the British Indian Army. In 1941, I was part of a Line Laying Party, in Burma. The Japanese surrounded us suddenly. None of us knew as to where from they came. They took us to a camp, where Netaji Subash Chandra Bose addressed all the Indian soldiers of the British Indian Army. He exalted us to join the INA (Indian National Army). There was no choice. The Japanese soldiers were there and were looking menacing.
"We were marched to some camp on the shores of Irrawaddy River, and were given ill fitting uniforms of the INA. While we were preparing for an assault on a British company position, the British troops surprised us in an ambush. There was some gas attack and my eyes got affected. We were taken to a British PW (prisoner of war) Camp. While in British PW Camp, some International Red Cross volunteers saw my condition and evacuated me to France by a ship. I was given treatment and luckily my eyes were cured. Unfortunately, by that time France was over run by Germany and once again I was taken as PW by the Germans. But my ID from INA saved me further harassment by the Germans. In the hospital I was presented with these gloves. In 1944, after the end of the War, I was repatriated to India, again to become a PW of the British.
"In 1946, a team of lawyers under Jawaharlal Nehru pleaded for amnesty to all the former INA soldiers. I was one of the lucky ones to be released.
In1947, when India got its Independence, I joined the Army again. And I am Sub (Assistant Inspector of Gunnery) now. Sir, I may be the only soldier to have been taken as PW by all the three warring parties. First the Japanese, second the British and the third time by the Germans."
Sarma’s head was already reeling with so much of military history. Finally, he asked Kashmira Singh, “ Sab, you must be happy to have joined our Army again”.
He said: “Yes Sir, but a lot of injustice had been done to me. Mind you in all the four years of war, I never fired a single round from my rifle. Still, I had to see three PW Camps!!”
1964-65
The role of the Commanding Officer (CO) in moulding the psyche of Young Officers (YO) in a unit is extremely important. After they are commissioned, the young lads replace their own fathers in their mind set, to that of their CO. In their subsequent career, these Officers often replicate the behaviour, style & man management techniques adopted by their COs. No wonder, the CO is always referred to as the old man. Not to ridicule him, but an honest expression of the void filled in their young lives by the absence of their own fathers. They trust their CO. If the CO reciprocates that trust, the unit does wonders. That is the essential difference between the regiments or the battalions, when we categorise them as good, bad or ugly.
Sarma had the good fortune of serving under some great COs, none of them made to the rank beyond that of a brigadier (in those days the rank to a Lt Col was a brigadier), barring only one. When Sarma joined one of the Artillery’s elite units, the CO looked like a constipated chap. But the lessons he taught them during the informal interactions like the mess parties or briefings before an exercise, were worth their weight in Gold.
He used to say, “Well boys, tomorrow we are leaving for Babina for our Annual Training Camp. The road journey is more than 8 hours. While you are sitting in your jeep, keep talking to the driver as well as the members of your detachment. You will develop an intimacy with them by knowing their back ground, about their village, about their family and above all their personal problems. This simple act will go a long way in telling them that you really care for them”.
On another occasion he advised the YOs to care for their sahayaks (orderlies). “You need not tip him every day with a peg of rum. Just present him with a shirt or a sweater when he goes home on annual leave. If he has children, buy suitable presents for them also; if nothing else a box of sweets. Make him realize that your gifts are in appreciation of his care for you and how grateful you are for his indulgence.”
In 1964, Sarma’s regiment had some veterans of Second World War also. Out of them, two were unforgettable. The first was, Nb Sub Chhotelal. He always boasted that he was the second driver of Field Marshal (FM) Slim, during the Burma Campaign. One evening the YOs were just making jovial comments about his boasts in the field mess during an exercise. The CO present was also laughing. After some time, he asked the youngsters, “How many of you are confident in getting selected as ADCs to Generals or the President. Here is a JCO who as a Havildar was selected to be FM Slim’s driver. Just imagine. The Army would have called for suitable candidates from more than 15 divisions. Each divisional commander would have personally interviewed the selected candidates of their own division. Finally at the Army level the Chief of Staff (COS) would have interviewed the few whetted ones. Chhotelal had crossed all these obstacles and became the driver. Is it not a credit worthy achievement for a NCO?” If he boasts about it is there any thing wrong”.
There was a pin drop silence. But the CO did not want to leave the youngsters in a sullen mood. “Boys, cheer up. The next drink is on me. By the way, if any of you volunteer to become my ADC, you will have just one hurdle. That is your 2 IC (second in command).”
The next Character was Subedar Kashmira Singh. He always used to wear a pair of leather glows during winter. Sarma asked him about it. His story was unique.
“Sahib, in 1939 I was part of the British Indian Army. In 1941, I was part of a Line Laying Party, in Burma. The Japanese surrounded us suddenly. None of us knew as to where from they came. They took us to a camp, where Netaji Subash Chandra Bose addressed all the Indian soldiers of the British Indian Army. He exalted us to join the INA (Indian National Army). There was no choice. The Japanese soldiers were there and were looking menacing.
"We were marched to some camp on the shores of Irrawaddy River, and were given ill fitting uniforms of the INA. While we were preparing for an assault on a British company position, the British troops surprised us in an ambush. There was some gas attack and my eyes got affected. We were taken to a British PW (prisoner of war) Camp. While in British PW Camp, some International Red Cross volunteers saw my condition and evacuated me to France by a ship. I was given treatment and luckily my eyes were cured. Unfortunately, by that time France was over run by Germany and once again I was taken as PW by the Germans. But my ID from INA saved me further harassment by the Germans. In the hospital I was presented with these gloves. In 1944, after the end of the War, I was repatriated to India, again to become a PW of the British.
"In 1946, a team of lawyers under Jawaharlal Nehru pleaded for amnesty to all the former INA soldiers. I was one of the lucky ones to be released.
In1947, when India got its Independence, I joined the Army again. And I am Sub (Assistant Inspector of Gunnery) now. Sir, I may be the only soldier to have been taken as PW by all the three warring parties. First the Japanese, second the British and the third time by the Germans."
Sarma’s head was already reeling with so much of military history. Finally, he asked Kashmira Singh, “ Sab, you must be happy to have joined our Army again”.
He said: “Yes Sir, but a lot of injustice had been done to me. Mind you in all the four years of war, I never fired a single round from my rifle. Still, I had to see three PW Camps!!”
SRI LANKA PERSPECTIVES - JULY 2010
Col R Hariharan (Retd.)
Initiatives to win over Diaspora
Sri Lanka appears to have scored a major success in winning over a section of the Tamil Diaspora that had actively supported the LTTE to participate in the reconstruction process in the Tamil areas. This was confirmed in a newspaper interview by Kumaran Pathmanathan (KP) who was the LTTE’s international affairs representative now in Sri Lankan custody. His newly formed outfit ‘The North-East Rehabilitation and Development Organisation' (NERDO) located in Vavuniya, was preparing to play a key role in the rehabilitation, reconstruction and resettlement processes in the war ravaged areas. He expected the support for the move from the Tamil Diaspora. KP had influential connections in the Diaspora in his LTTE days.
Justifying his action to collaborate with the government, he said it was essential for Tamils to realise the ground realities in a post-LTTE era in the island nation and review its strategy to meet the new challenges. His said he was only “concerned about the welfare of the people, particularly children, though some seek fresh funding to cause mayhem. People are fed up with war and every effort should be made to alleviate their suffering without playing politics with a purely humanitarian motive.” His effort could find favour with sections of Diaspora who are still suspicious of Sri Lanka government moves.
In his interview, KP attributed the defeat of the LTTE to the change in global political leaders’ attitude to the LTTE prompted by the 9/11 al Qaeda attack and the US led war on al Qaeda. Prabhakaran did not realise the urgent need to change the LTTE strategy accordingly. KP’s observation “there is a new world order today, which does not tolerate armed campaigns and that is the hard reality,” showed a lot of pragmatism.
Apart from these efforts, Sri Lanka with the help of INTERPOL has launched a coordinated effort to dismantle LTTE’s international network using information gathered by the Sri Lankan military intelligence from captured documents. In particular the recent unearthing of highly classified documents and diaries of Castro, former head of the LTTE's international wing, at Viswamadu has given details of LTTE international activists engaged in human trafficking, arms smuggling and financial bases in East Asia, Western Europe, Canada and Africa. This carrot and stick method could induce more Diaspora to support KP’s rehabilitation effort as many sections of Diaspora who consider rehabilitation as the priority.
The increasing public projection of KP in spite of his detention has caused jitters among Tamil politicians who consider it as Rajapaksa’s ploy to destabilise them by allowing KP to participate in politics.
LTTE prisoners
The Commissioner General of Rehabilitation in a media interview has said that 7,948 former LTTE combatants, including about 1,100 females were still undergoing rehabilitation. He said 700 of the 1,100 females were now working in the garment trade. About 400 are being trained as Montessori teachers while others were learning English, IT and drama ‘therapy’. He said families of detained persons were regularly allowed to visit them.
When the war ended last year the army held 11,686 LTTE cadres, including members of the suicide squad as prisoners. They were kept in more than 20 detention centres after the war. Now only 12 such centres, including two meant for women, were operational. All ex-LTTE child soldiers have been handed over to their parents after undergoing rehabilitation training.
Among the detainees 737 hardcore elements have been identified and charge sheets are being prepared to prosecute them.
Conditions in Northern Province
The Ceylon Communist Party has come out with a detailed field report on the prevailing conditions in war ravaged Northern Province. The report has said though the government’s massive physical infrastructure programme was going on, many old and new issues in the environment have denied the people any sense of liberation. On the contrary, they felt betrayed both by the LTTE and the State though both had promised them liberation. People were in a confused, disillusioned, abandoned and demoralized state of mind.
The physical reconstruction programme was focusing on basic infrastructure such as roads and telecommunication. Reconstructed government departments, modernized urban commercial centres and towns were active and flourishing with 15 major banks and financial agencies opening offices in Jaffna. However, vast majority of the population were leading a life below subsistence level.
Army was present everywhere along the roads, in villages and towns. In many areas landmine clearance has been undertaken. Army’s continued presence, reinforcement and expansion of the security forces have become a cause for concern for the people. People were anxious about role of the security forces in controlling and monitoring their social, cultural and religious activities for fear of reprisals. However, incidence of abductions, rape and torture and generalized abuse has drastically come down.
The report said the government simply lacked the political will for undertaking an accelerated, comprehensive and integrated process of resettlement, rehabilitation, reconstruction and development. The rehabilitation effort was pitiful, since the general public and civil society of the country was not being mobilized in the relief process. The government gave permission to only a selected few of them to operate in the Province.
Attack on media network
A dozen men armed with assault rifles and petrol bombs attacked the offices of privately owned Voice of Asia Network in the early hours of July 30. The network controls three FM stations including Vettri FM, a Tamil one. According to the management said in the attack its studios, control room and library were destroyed. Two persons were injured.
The owners had backed the main opposition candidate, ex-army chief Sarath Fonseka, in the last presidential election. Another journalist Eknaligoda, a critic of the government and supporter of Fonseka, who disappeared two days before the election in January has still not been traced. The attacks have not enhanced Sri Lanka’s reputation as a state where media criticism is not tolerated.
Increasing Chinese footprint
Zhang Ze - Deputy Director of the Department of treaty of and Law of the Foreign Affairs Ministry of China and ten Chinese army officers including senior colonels, lieutenant colonels and majors were on a visit northern and eastern provinces East including Kilinochchi, Mannar and Mullaitivu to advise on use of de-mining equipment supplied by the Chinese and to provide knowledge on de-mining tasks.
China has also assisted the army re-deployment process in the north after the war.
Chinese pre-fabricated technology was being used in permanent buildings constructed for the forces. Already the army has established the 68 Division headquarters at Sugandirapuram, Puthukudirippu east of the Kandy-Jaffna A9 road. According to the army commander, although the Jaffna peninsula had seen the largest concentration of forces before Eelam war IV, today the biggest deployment was in the Vanni. With permanent buildings coming up for army in government land, the army hopes to vacate private buildings and land occupied by them.
EU tariff concessions
The European Union has officially announced that Sri Lanka would lose the GSP+ trade concessions in August after it failed to respond to a set of conditions laid down by the Commission. However it was open for negotiations with the Sri Lankan government despite the decision.
The EU also expressed regretted Sri Lanka’s decision to remain silent on the proposals by the EU for Sri Lanka to obtain a temporary extension of the trade tariff benefits by meeting some conditions. In June the EU had offered to delay the suspension of GSP+ trade concessions by six months if Sri Lanka responded to its questions on tangible progress on shortcomings in its implementation of three UN human rights conventions a number of outstanding issues. However, the government had firmly rejected the EU conditional offer.
31 July 2010
Courtesy: South Asia Security Trends,Vol 4 No 6 July 2010
www.security-risks.com
Initiatives to win over Diaspora
Sri Lanka appears to have scored a major success in winning over a section of the Tamil Diaspora that had actively supported the LTTE to participate in the reconstruction process in the Tamil areas. This was confirmed in a newspaper interview by Kumaran Pathmanathan (KP) who was the LTTE’s international affairs representative now in Sri Lankan custody. His newly formed outfit ‘The North-East Rehabilitation and Development Organisation' (NERDO) located in Vavuniya, was preparing to play a key role in the rehabilitation, reconstruction and resettlement processes in the war ravaged areas. He expected the support for the move from the Tamil Diaspora. KP had influential connections in the Diaspora in his LTTE days.
Justifying his action to collaborate with the government, he said it was essential for Tamils to realise the ground realities in a post-LTTE era in the island nation and review its strategy to meet the new challenges. His said he was only “concerned about the welfare of the people, particularly children, though some seek fresh funding to cause mayhem. People are fed up with war and every effort should be made to alleviate their suffering without playing politics with a purely humanitarian motive.” His effort could find favour with sections of Diaspora who are still suspicious of Sri Lanka government moves.
In his interview, KP attributed the defeat of the LTTE to the change in global political leaders’ attitude to the LTTE prompted by the 9/11 al Qaeda attack and the US led war on al Qaeda. Prabhakaran did not realise the urgent need to change the LTTE strategy accordingly. KP’s observation “there is a new world order today, which does not tolerate armed campaigns and that is the hard reality,” showed a lot of pragmatism.
Apart from these efforts, Sri Lanka with the help of INTERPOL has launched a coordinated effort to dismantle LTTE’s international network using information gathered by the Sri Lankan military intelligence from captured documents. In particular the recent unearthing of highly classified documents and diaries of Castro, former head of the LTTE's international wing, at Viswamadu has given details of LTTE international activists engaged in human trafficking, arms smuggling and financial bases in East Asia, Western Europe, Canada and Africa. This carrot and stick method could induce more Diaspora to support KP’s rehabilitation effort as many sections of Diaspora who consider rehabilitation as the priority.
The increasing public projection of KP in spite of his detention has caused jitters among Tamil politicians who consider it as Rajapaksa’s ploy to destabilise them by allowing KP to participate in politics.
LTTE prisoners
The Commissioner General of Rehabilitation in a media interview has said that 7,948 former LTTE combatants, including about 1,100 females were still undergoing rehabilitation. He said 700 of the 1,100 females were now working in the garment trade. About 400 are being trained as Montessori teachers while others were learning English, IT and drama ‘therapy’. He said families of detained persons were regularly allowed to visit them.
When the war ended last year the army held 11,686 LTTE cadres, including members of the suicide squad as prisoners. They were kept in more than 20 detention centres after the war. Now only 12 such centres, including two meant for women, were operational. All ex-LTTE child soldiers have been handed over to their parents after undergoing rehabilitation training.
Among the detainees 737 hardcore elements have been identified and charge sheets are being prepared to prosecute them.
Conditions in Northern Province
The Ceylon Communist Party has come out with a detailed field report on the prevailing conditions in war ravaged Northern Province. The report has said though the government’s massive physical infrastructure programme was going on, many old and new issues in the environment have denied the people any sense of liberation. On the contrary, they felt betrayed both by the LTTE and the State though both had promised them liberation. People were in a confused, disillusioned, abandoned and demoralized state of mind.
The physical reconstruction programme was focusing on basic infrastructure such as roads and telecommunication. Reconstructed government departments, modernized urban commercial centres and towns were active and flourishing with 15 major banks and financial agencies opening offices in Jaffna. However, vast majority of the population were leading a life below subsistence level.
Army was present everywhere along the roads, in villages and towns. In many areas landmine clearance has been undertaken. Army’s continued presence, reinforcement and expansion of the security forces have become a cause for concern for the people. People were anxious about role of the security forces in controlling and monitoring their social, cultural and religious activities for fear of reprisals. However, incidence of abductions, rape and torture and generalized abuse has drastically come down.
The report said the government simply lacked the political will for undertaking an accelerated, comprehensive and integrated process of resettlement, rehabilitation, reconstruction and development. The rehabilitation effort was pitiful, since the general public and civil society of the country was not being mobilized in the relief process. The government gave permission to only a selected few of them to operate in the Province.
Attack on media network
A dozen men armed with assault rifles and petrol bombs attacked the offices of privately owned Voice of Asia Network in the early hours of July 30. The network controls three FM stations including Vettri FM, a Tamil one. According to the management said in the attack its studios, control room and library were destroyed. Two persons were injured.
The owners had backed the main opposition candidate, ex-army chief Sarath Fonseka, in the last presidential election. Another journalist Eknaligoda, a critic of the government and supporter of Fonseka, who disappeared two days before the election in January has still not been traced. The attacks have not enhanced Sri Lanka’s reputation as a state where media criticism is not tolerated.
Increasing Chinese footprint
Zhang Ze - Deputy Director of the Department of treaty of and Law of the Foreign Affairs Ministry of China and ten Chinese army officers including senior colonels, lieutenant colonels and majors were on a visit northern and eastern provinces East including Kilinochchi, Mannar and Mullaitivu to advise on use of de-mining equipment supplied by the Chinese and to provide knowledge on de-mining tasks.
China has also assisted the army re-deployment process in the north after the war.
Chinese pre-fabricated technology was being used in permanent buildings constructed for the forces. Already the army has established the 68 Division headquarters at Sugandirapuram, Puthukudirippu east of the Kandy-Jaffna A9 road. According to the army commander, although the Jaffna peninsula had seen the largest concentration of forces before Eelam war IV, today the biggest deployment was in the Vanni. With permanent buildings coming up for army in government land, the army hopes to vacate private buildings and land occupied by them.
EU tariff concessions
The European Union has officially announced that Sri Lanka would lose the GSP+ trade concessions in August after it failed to respond to a set of conditions laid down by the Commission. However it was open for negotiations with the Sri Lankan government despite the decision.
The EU also expressed regretted Sri Lanka’s decision to remain silent on the proposals by the EU for Sri Lanka to obtain a temporary extension of the trade tariff benefits by meeting some conditions. In June the EU had offered to delay the suspension of GSP+ trade concessions by six months if Sri Lanka responded to its questions on tangible progress on shortcomings in its implementation of three UN human rights conventions a number of outstanding issues. However, the government had firmly rejected the EU conditional offer.
31 July 2010
Courtesy: South Asia Security Trends,Vol 4 No 6 July 2010
www.security-risks.com
Friday, August 6, 2010
Darkness at Noon
Does the Supreme Court ban on brain mapping and narcoanalysis deny interrogators scientific tools?
by Col R Hariharan
A half-naked man is hung upside down and a police officer is beating him with an iron rod. Though this typical movie scene is often over-dramatized, it is not far from the truth. The police regularly uses violence and torture to extract “confessions” from suspects despite knowing full well it is illegal. They have even evolved “special techniques” to ensure the bodily damage is not visible. Even as I write, a TV news channel is telecasting live the scene of a policeman beating a 75-yearold suspected thief hung upside down from a tree.
The use of violent methods, including torture and deprivation, has always been accepted by society as an inevitable part of interrogation. The lack of professionalism among law enforcers and interrogators is the main reason.
In South Asia, the callousness associated with increasing politicization of crime is also responsible. Politicization is throttling both the rule of law and the administration of criminal justice, and allowing criminals to operate beyond the pale of law. In the process of foisting guilt on an innocent person, torture becomes a handy tool to obtain a “confession”.
However, law enforcement and intelligence agencies have to get at the facts rather than relying on “confessions” to bust crime and defuse security threats. So, not all interrogation depends on torture. Investigative bodies regularly use physical and mental stress induced in the subject to gain cooperation.
After carrying out a few hundred intelligence interrogations in both war and peacetime, I have found violence an overrated instrument of interrogation. Often, it is counterproductive because the suspect, in fear of pain, agrees to sign on the dotted line.
The suspect or prisoner is in shock at the time of his arrest or captivity. And the fear of the unknown is his enemy during interrogation. I have found that leveraging this fear rather than using violence can yield quick results.
The methods that leverage fear have a number of variations – from taking the suspect to a dummy burial ground (created with mounds of earth) and asking him to dig his own grave before he is buried alive to what Lt Col Oreste Pinto (the Dutch counterintelligence officer of “Spy Catcher” of World War II fame) practised. To create bonhomie, he offered the suspect plenty of beer but did not allow him to use a toilet. I once tried it out on a Pakistani Lt Col and it worked beautifully! But there are limitations in using such interrogation methods. They are not torture in the classical sense but, as psychological torture, are equally condemned by human rights activists now.
So it has become common for investigative agencies like the CBI to use modern forensic tools like brain mapping (Brain Electrical Activation Profile), the polygraph (popularly known as the lie detector test), and narcoanalysis as aids to interrogation of suspects. Though these tests may not yield 100 per cent accurate results, they do provide useful pointers in gathering vital evidence.
However, the Abu Ghraib prison scandal, when US intelligence personnel subjected Iraqi prisoners to physical and psychological torture and degradation in 2004, raised a furore worldwide. As a fall out, the CIA’s use of questionable physical and psychological methods came under legislative scrutiny. Its political impact was demonstrated in the 2004 US presidential poll. It also triggered a revision of the CIA’s interrogation techniques.
Thereafter, this issue has been taken up by human rights activists everywhere. Even the traditional physical and psychological stress methods like sleep deprivation, restricted diet and solitary confinement are now becoming passé. So it was not surprising when India’s Supreme Court recently ruled that compulsory brain mapping, polygraph tests and narcoanalysis violated Articles 20(3) and 21 of the Constitution.
Article 20(3) says: “No person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself” while Article 21 guarantees that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except under the procedure established by law. The court has held that a person’s right to make a statement or remain silent involves the exercise of the right to privacy.
These tests have been challenged in court in the past. In a 2006 judgement, the Madras High Court held that subjecting an accused to narcoanalysis is not tantamount to testimony by compulsion. In 2004, the Bombay High Court had ruled in the Telgi multicrore-rupee fake stamp paper case that subjecting an accused to tests like narcoanalysis does not violate the fundamental right against self-incrimination.
However, now the three-member Supreme Court Bench rejected the argument of “compelling public interest”, especially against terror suspects, as reason enough for employing these tests. The Supreme Court order is in conformity with the increasing awareness of human rights and humanitarian concerns worldwide. This awareness is overtaking national security imperatives in handling and interrogation of prisoners and suspects.
CBI Director Ashwani Kumar has called the Supreme Court verdict a setback for forensic science. In a media interview, he agreed with the verdict on the intrusive nature of narcoanalysis but suggested that Parliament be persuaded to allow non-intrusive tests such as polygraph tests and brain mapping.
His point is valid. Unless we use all the available forensic tools in crime investigation, law enforcement will not be able to perform at its best. The fat cats of the criminal world will get away and the politico-criminal nexus will only grow. National security could run the risk of compromise.
The interrogation process is becoming a minefield of sorts for the interrogator. On the one hand, he has to extract information from a suspect unwilling to part with it while, on the other, he has to be wary of legal restrictions that deny him modern tools to fulfil his task.
Undoubtedly, the interrogation methods of law enforcement agencies have to be brought within the ambit of legality. A methodology has to be evolved that will be fair to the interests of the state without curtailing the individual’s basic rights. Knowing our system, it might be years before such changes are put into practice. In the meanwhile, if the interrogator is prevented from using scientific aids how does he successfully conduct an interrogation? I am glad I am retired now.
Courtesy: GFiles India, August 2010
URL: http://gfilesindia.com/title.aspx?title_id=155
by Col R Hariharan
A half-naked man is hung upside down and a police officer is beating him with an iron rod. Though this typical movie scene is often over-dramatized, it is not far from the truth. The police regularly uses violence and torture to extract “confessions” from suspects despite knowing full well it is illegal. They have even evolved “special techniques” to ensure the bodily damage is not visible. Even as I write, a TV news channel is telecasting live the scene of a policeman beating a 75-yearold suspected thief hung upside down from a tree.
The use of violent methods, including torture and deprivation, has always been accepted by society as an inevitable part of interrogation. The lack of professionalism among law enforcers and interrogators is the main reason.
In South Asia, the callousness associated with increasing politicization of crime is also responsible. Politicization is throttling both the rule of law and the administration of criminal justice, and allowing criminals to operate beyond the pale of law. In the process of foisting guilt on an innocent person, torture becomes a handy tool to obtain a “confession”.
However, law enforcement and intelligence agencies have to get at the facts rather than relying on “confessions” to bust crime and defuse security threats. So, not all interrogation depends on torture. Investigative bodies regularly use physical and mental stress induced in the subject to gain cooperation.
After carrying out a few hundred intelligence interrogations in both war and peacetime, I have found violence an overrated instrument of interrogation. Often, it is counterproductive because the suspect, in fear of pain, agrees to sign on the dotted line.
The suspect or prisoner is in shock at the time of his arrest or captivity. And the fear of the unknown is his enemy during interrogation. I have found that leveraging this fear rather than using violence can yield quick results.
The methods that leverage fear have a number of variations – from taking the suspect to a dummy burial ground (created with mounds of earth) and asking him to dig his own grave before he is buried alive to what Lt Col Oreste Pinto (the Dutch counterintelligence officer of “Spy Catcher” of World War II fame) practised. To create bonhomie, he offered the suspect plenty of beer but did not allow him to use a toilet. I once tried it out on a Pakistani Lt Col and it worked beautifully! But there are limitations in using such interrogation methods. They are not torture in the classical sense but, as psychological torture, are equally condemned by human rights activists now.
So it has become common for investigative agencies like the CBI to use modern forensic tools like brain mapping (Brain Electrical Activation Profile), the polygraph (popularly known as the lie detector test), and narcoanalysis as aids to interrogation of suspects. Though these tests may not yield 100 per cent accurate results, they do provide useful pointers in gathering vital evidence.
However, the Abu Ghraib prison scandal, when US intelligence personnel subjected Iraqi prisoners to physical and psychological torture and degradation in 2004, raised a furore worldwide. As a fall out, the CIA’s use of questionable physical and psychological methods came under legislative scrutiny. Its political impact was demonstrated in the 2004 US presidential poll. It also triggered a revision of the CIA’s interrogation techniques.
Thereafter, this issue has been taken up by human rights activists everywhere. Even the traditional physical and psychological stress methods like sleep deprivation, restricted diet and solitary confinement are now becoming passé. So it was not surprising when India’s Supreme Court recently ruled that compulsory brain mapping, polygraph tests and narcoanalysis violated Articles 20(3) and 21 of the Constitution.
Article 20(3) says: “No person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself” while Article 21 guarantees that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except under the procedure established by law. The court has held that a person’s right to make a statement or remain silent involves the exercise of the right to privacy.
These tests have been challenged in court in the past. In a 2006 judgement, the Madras High Court held that subjecting an accused to narcoanalysis is not tantamount to testimony by compulsion. In 2004, the Bombay High Court had ruled in the Telgi multicrore-rupee fake stamp paper case that subjecting an accused to tests like narcoanalysis does not violate the fundamental right against self-incrimination.
However, now the three-member Supreme Court Bench rejected the argument of “compelling public interest”, especially against terror suspects, as reason enough for employing these tests. The Supreme Court order is in conformity with the increasing awareness of human rights and humanitarian concerns worldwide. This awareness is overtaking national security imperatives in handling and interrogation of prisoners and suspects.
CBI Director Ashwani Kumar has called the Supreme Court verdict a setback for forensic science. In a media interview, he agreed with the verdict on the intrusive nature of narcoanalysis but suggested that Parliament be persuaded to allow non-intrusive tests such as polygraph tests and brain mapping.
His point is valid. Unless we use all the available forensic tools in crime investigation, law enforcement will not be able to perform at its best. The fat cats of the criminal world will get away and the politico-criminal nexus will only grow. National security could run the risk of compromise.
The interrogation process is becoming a minefield of sorts for the interrogator. On the one hand, he has to extract information from a suspect unwilling to part with it while, on the other, he has to be wary of legal restrictions that deny him modern tools to fulfil his task.
Undoubtedly, the interrogation methods of law enforcement agencies have to be brought within the ambit of legality. A methodology has to be evolved that will be fair to the interests of the state without curtailing the individual’s basic rights. Knowing our system, it might be years before such changes are put into practice. In the meanwhile, if the interrogator is prevented from using scientific aids how does he successfully conduct an interrogation? I am glad I am retired now.
Courtesy: GFiles India, August 2010
URL: http://gfilesindia.com/title.aspx?title_id=155
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