By Col TN Raman (Retd.)
In Army career, we come across various incidents. Apart from the battle field, the emotions expressed by the characters involved are typically human and that also peculiar to our own soil. In this series, I want to bring out some such tales. They may look like fiction, but are true.
The year was 1979.
This is the story of Gunner Sardhool Singh form Punjab and Havildar Abdul Hameed from Chennai, Tamilnadu. Sardhool Singh was from Artillery and Abdul Hameed was from Army Service Corps. They met each other in tragic circumstances. They were travelling in a 3-ton vehicle, which was part of a convoy from Srinagar to Jammu. Both were proceeding on their annual leave. Short of Udhampur, their vehicle skidded in the snow and plunged into a deep ravine, 300 feet down. Most of the occupants of the vehicle died. But both the characters mentioned above survived and were evacuated to Miltary Hospital, Chandigarh, by helicopter.
Sardhool had both eyes damaged and escaped with slight bruises. But, Hameed was in a precarious state. At the Hospital he was placed in DI List, admitted in the ICU. By mid night, he came to his senses and asked the nursing sister attending him as to the fate of “the tall handsome Sardar Gunner”. She told him that he was out of danger but both his eyes were damaged. Out of curiosity she asked him as to how he knew him. Hameed said, “while travelling, that boy was quite anxious to get home fast, because he told me that he was married just six months back. He wanted to present his wife with the Pashmina shawl he bought in Leh.” After some thought, he requested the Sister to kindly let him know of his condition in the morning.
After two nights, Sister Anasuya Theresa, was on duty again in the ICU. Hameed’s condition had further deteriorated. He was in life support system. With great difficulty, he gestured her to remove his mask so that he could speak. The Sister placed her ear close to his mouth. Hameed told her that he wanted to donate his eyes to the ‘Handsome Sardar’ if that could help him getting his vision back. The sister immediately rushed to the Office Cub board and came back with a form. He signed it. Then he made one more request. He wanted to meet Sardhool immediately. The Sister, knowing from her experience that this might be the last wish of the patient, brought Sardool in a wheel Chair. Sardhool was overwhelmed and tears were pouring from his bandaged eyes. Hameed was quite composed, like most of the human beings who reach their final moments. “ Sardhool, I had an ambition to make a pilgrimage to Haj, in my life time. Now it is impossible. Though you will have my eyes, being a non Muslim you cannot make it either. But, try and visit Nagoor Dargha once, any time convenient to you”.
Years rolled by. Indira Gandhi was assassinated in 1984. The anti Sikh sentiment led to many meaningless violence across the nation, reverberating even in the South as far as Coimbatore . The surgeons could save one of Sardhool's eyes, with the other getting partial vision. In December 1988, Sardhool decided to fulfil the ambition of his benefactor. He found out about the Nagoor Dargha, which is visited by the people of all faiths. He reached Chennai by train. Colonel Sarma, who was his Battery Commander in 1979, was in Chennai, with the IPKF. Learning from Sardhool, who was a Havildar by now, the purpose of his visit, he immediately arranged for his onward journey.
Sardhool returned from his trip looking emancipated. Sarma called him over for a dinner at his flat. After a couple of drinks, Sardhool opened up.
“Saheb, after the accident, I felt that I also should have died instead of living as a blind man. Suddenly the Sister in the Hospital told me about the offer made by Havildar Hameed, whom I befriended only during our short journey together. I could only hear his voice. I felt that it was not Hameed but one of our own Gurus speaking. His last wish was so simple and practical, considering the great sacrifice he was making. Till I today revere him as my 11th Guru. To me it was not a request. It was a command from our own Guru.
"But, it had taken me nearly 10 years to fulfil his request. I am really ashamed. The visit to Nagoor Dargha taught me many great lessons. In every religion, there are outstanding men, who live a normal, ordinary life, but full of pure thoughts. The man who is devoted to his own religion will never dare to insult other religions. In Nagoor I saw people from all faiths paying their homage, but none sacrificed his own faith. I went around the Dargha four or five times, as if showing Hameed through his own eyes, the place he revered so much".
Sarma was impressed by his narration. Simple but great truth coming from a Sikh Soldier. “Okay, Sardhool, what have you resolved after your visit to the Dargha? Every one who visits the Dargha, I am told, takes a vow”.
“Saheb, I have taken two vows. First, to follow the footsteps of Hameed in helping others”.
“That is commendable. What about the Second Vow?”
“Saheb, I will never trim my beard in future”.
Col TN Raman is a retired artillery officer. He is probably the Col Sarma who figures in this tale.
Saturday, July 31, 2010
Thursday, July 29, 2010
Looking back at the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord
By R. Hariharan
It is 23 years since the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement was signed on July 29, 1987. The agreement is popularly referred to as the Rajiv-Jayewardene Accord, after its architects — Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and President J.R. Jayewardene.
Unfortunately, the event is today remembered only for its unpleasant fallout after India unwittingly got entangled in a counter-insurgency war with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) from 1987 to 1990. After sacrificing the lives of over 1,200 of its soldiers, India felt cheated when President Ranasinghe Premadasa joined hands with the LTTE to send the Indian troops out of Sri Lanka before they had completed their job.
But India had an even worse experience after the troops were pulled out: in 1991, an LTTE suicide-bomber killed Rajiv Gandhi at the venue of a public meeting near Chennai. The killing, masterminded by LTTE chief V. Prabakaran, had more than a symbolic impact. It ended the popular support Tamil militants had enjoyed in Tamil Nadu. India scaled down its active involvement in Sri Lanka, and adopted a passive approach to the Sri Lankan Tamil issue. Prabakaran's strategic blunder ultimately cost him his life: Sri Lanka, helped by India, crushed the LTTE in the fourth round of the war in 2009.
The Rajiv-Jayewardene Accord was perhaps too ambitious in its scope as it sought to collectively address all the three contentious issues between India and Sri Lanka: strategic interests, people of Indian origin in Sri Lanka and Tamil minority rights in Sri Lanka. Its success depended on sustained political support from both the countries. So the Accord got sidelined when political leaders who were unhappy with the Accord came to power in both countries almost at the same time. As a result, the Tamil minorities, who had put their faith in it, were in limbo. These unsavoury developments have clouded the understanding of the positive aspects of the Accord. After all, it was the Accord that enabled Sri Lankan Tamils to gain recognition for some of their demands in Sri Lankan politics and in the Sri Lankan Constitution.
The Accord was unique as it marked a new beginning with respect to India's articulation of power, never exercised after India's war with Pakistan in 1971 that helped the birth of Bangladesh. India's Sri Lanka operation was more complex than the Bangladesh war on a few counts. The operation had to be carried out in an island-nation; this imposed severe strategic constraints. It was an unconventional war waged against a Tamil insurgent group with strong connections in Tamil Nadu. And, India's vague articulation of its military intervention in support of the Accord triggered an emotional backlash against it in both countries.
The focus of the Accord, signed in the waning years of the Cold War era, was undoubtedly strategic. It aimed to keep Americans from gaining a foothold in Sri Lanka. This was a departure from India's traditional policy that was fixated largely on two issues — the status of people of Indian origin in Sri Lanka, and the Tamil minority's quest for democratic rights. India's new-found articulation of military power in Sri Lanka, though halting and probably unintentional, sent a strong message to its neighbours and global powers. This was further reinforced in 1989 when India sent a military contingent in response to a request from the government of Maldives — another island neighbour — and crushed an attempted coup there.
India's military intervention also demonstrated the country's readiness to fulfil its commitments to its neighbours. Significantly, it delineated India's strategic zone of influence in the Indian Ocean region. Since then, India has expanded its real-time naval capability. This was seen during the December 2004 tsunami strike: an Indian naval ship was at the scene on the Sri Lankan coast within a matter of hours to bring succour to the affected people.
India's strategic strength in this part of Indian Ocean is now recognised by the major powers. Perhaps this influenced the U.S. decision to build its strategic security relationship with India. India's keenness to find a lasting solution to Sri Lanka's Tamil issue was again demonstrated during the international peace process in Sri Lanka in 2002. Though India was not actively involved in it, the sponsor-nations, notably the U.S. and Norway, regularly sought India's counsel during the implementation phase. It is a pity that India failed to use its influence to ensure the success of the peace process.
India's military foray into Sri Lanka also proved to be a unique learning experience for the Indian armed forces in conducting operations across the seas. It brought home the nitty-gritty of joint operations command for smooth overseas operations. Carrying out counter-insurgency operations that had political ramifications both at home and abroad highlighted the limitations of New Delhi's decision-making process. The absence of a structure at the top to coordinate political and security decision-making did affect India's campaign. These lessons have greater relevance for India now as global and South Asian regional strategic security architectures change rapidly.
India had consistently affirmed its support for a unified Sri Lanka and opposition to the creation of an independent Tamil Eelam. At the same time, India was sympathetic to the Tamil quest for equitable rights in Sri Lanka. Even the Rajiv-Jayewardene Accord had its roots in India's effort to give form and substance to it. The strong sympathy of the people of Tamil Nadu for their brethren in Sri Lanka was an important factor in shaping India's policy on this issue. Sri Lanka had to reckon with this factor in its strategic calculus in its three military campaigns against the Tamil militant group.
However, India's benign Sri Lanka posture after its ill-fated military intervention and gory aftermath enabled Sri Lanka to build bridges with India. Wisely, India also did not allow the frictions of the intervening decades to come in the way and reciprocated Sri Lanka's efforts. Both countries have adopted a win-win strategy to build upon the positives of their relationship. These efforts culminated in the signing of India's first-ever free trade agreement with Sri Lanka in 2000. As a result, India-Sri Lanka relations now have a unique status in South Asia.
Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa was elected President in 2005; his campaign focus was on defeating the LTTE and crushing Tamil separatism. The advantages of close relations with India came in handy when he decided to clip the LTTE's wings after the peace process of 2002 failed to make progress even in three years. Though India was not a significant arms-supplier during Eelam War 2006, it had helped train the Sri Lankan armed forces and provided valuable intelligence inputs on the LTTE's intricate international logistic and support network. Sri Lanka managed to dismantle this apparatus and crippled the Tigers, paving the way for their defeat. More than all this, the governments in New Delhi and Chennai together managed the tricky fallout of the Eelam war in Tamil Nadu and saw to it that things did not get out of hand. This thwarted the efforts of the pro-LTTE parties and supporters in Tamil Nadu to create a pro-Tiger upsurge.
As a result, the LTTE could neither use Tamil Nadu as a logistic and support base nor influence India's political decisions during the war. India's own bitter experience with the LTTE probably shaped its public posture during Sri Lanka's war. At the same time, perhaps India realised that it would be untenable to allow the LTTE, which had grown into one of the world's strongest insurgent groups, to operate as a loose cannon in its strategic neighbourhood. This was perhaps one of the reasons for India's hands-off attitude as the Sri Lankan Army relentlessly pursued and ultimately crushed the LTTE.
Unfortunately, India was unable to significantly influence the Sri Lankan government in the aftermath of war. Even a year after the war ended, a political solution to meet the Tamil minority's demands has not been evolved. Normal life has not been restored to a sizeable population affected by the war in the Northern Province. They are yet to recover from the trauma of war as the pace of reconstruction is not consistent with their colossal needs.
It is people, not treaties, which make relations between nations meaningful. Unless India makes a difference in the lives of the people of both countries, its relations with Sri Lanka will not address the broader aspects of strategic security. This is the important takeaway as we look at the Rajiv-Jayewardene Accord after over two decades.
Courtesy: The Hindu, July 29, 2010
It is 23 years since the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement was signed on July 29, 1987. The agreement is popularly referred to as the Rajiv-Jayewardene Accord, after its architects — Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and President J.R. Jayewardene.
Unfortunately, the event is today remembered only for its unpleasant fallout after India unwittingly got entangled in a counter-insurgency war with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) from 1987 to 1990. After sacrificing the lives of over 1,200 of its soldiers, India felt cheated when President Ranasinghe Premadasa joined hands with the LTTE to send the Indian troops out of Sri Lanka before they had completed their job.
But India had an even worse experience after the troops were pulled out: in 1991, an LTTE suicide-bomber killed Rajiv Gandhi at the venue of a public meeting near Chennai. The killing, masterminded by LTTE chief V. Prabakaran, had more than a symbolic impact. It ended the popular support Tamil militants had enjoyed in Tamil Nadu. India scaled down its active involvement in Sri Lanka, and adopted a passive approach to the Sri Lankan Tamil issue. Prabakaran's strategic blunder ultimately cost him his life: Sri Lanka, helped by India, crushed the LTTE in the fourth round of the war in 2009.
The Rajiv-Jayewardene Accord was perhaps too ambitious in its scope as it sought to collectively address all the three contentious issues between India and Sri Lanka: strategic interests, people of Indian origin in Sri Lanka and Tamil minority rights in Sri Lanka. Its success depended on sustained political support from both the countries. So the Accord got sidelined when political leaders who were unhappy with the Accord came to power in both countries almost at the same time. As a result, the Tamil minorities, who had put their faith in it, were in limbo. These unsavoury developments have clouded the understanding of the positive aspects of the Accord. After all, it was the Accord that enabled Sri Lankan Tamils to gain recognition for some of their demands in Sri Lankan politics and in the Sri Lankan Constitution.
The Accord was unique as it marked a new beginning with respect to India's articulation of power, never exercised after India's war with Pakistan in 1971 that helped the birth of Bangladesh. India's Sri Lanka operation was more complex than the Bangladesh war on a few counts. The operation had to be carried out in an island-nation; this imposed severe strategic constraints. It was an unconventional war waged against a Tamil insurgent group with strong connections in Tamil Nadu. And, India's vague articulation of its military intervention in support of the Accord triggered an emotional backlash against it in both countries.
The focus of the Accord, signed in the waning years of the Cold War era, was undoubtedly strategic. It aimed to keep Americans from gaining a foothold in Sri Lanka. This was a departure from India's traditional policy that was fixated largely on two issues — the status of people of Indian origin in Sri Lanka, and the Tamil minority's quest for democratic rights. India's new-found articulation of military power in Sri Lanka, though halting and probably unintentional, sent a strong message to its neighbours and global powers. This was further reinforced in 1989 when India sent a military contingent in response to a request from the government of Maldives — another island neighbour — and crushed an attempted coup there.
India's military intervention also demonstrated the country's readiness to fulfil its commitments to its neighbours. Significantly, it delineated India's strategic zone of influence in the Indian Ocean region. Since then, India has expanded its real-time naval capability. This was seen during the December 2004 tsunami strike: an Indian naval ship was at the scene on the Sri Lankan coast within a matter of hours to bring succour to the affected people.
India's strategic strength in this part of Indian Ocean is now recognised by the major powers. Perhaps this influenced the U.S. decision to build its strategic security relationship with India. India's keenness to find a lasting solution to Sri Lanka's Tamil issue was again demonstrated during the international peace process in Sri Lanka in 2002. Though India was not actively involved in it, the sponsor-nations, notably the U.S. and Norway, regularly sought India's counsel during the implementation phase. It is a pity that India failed to use its influence to ensure the success of the peace process.
India's military foray into Sri Lanka also proved to be a unique learning experience for the Indian armed forces in conducting operations across the seas. It brought home the nitty-gritty of joint operations command for smooth overseas operations. Carrying out counter-insurgency operations that had political ramifications both at home and abroad highlighted the limitations of New Delhi's decision-making process. The absence of a structure at the top to coordinate political and security decision-making did affect India's campaign. These lessons have greater relevance for India now as global and South Asian regional strategic security architectures change rapidly.
India had consistently affirmed its support for a unified Sri Lanka and opposition to the creation of an independent Tamil Eelam. At the same time, India was sympathetic to the Tamil quest for equitable rights in Sri Lanka. Even the Rajiv-Jayewardene Accord had its roots in India's effort to give form and substance to it. The strong sympathy of the people of Tamil Nadu for their brethren in Sri Lanka was an important factor in shaping India's policy on this issue. Sri Lanka had to reckon with this factor in its strategic calculus in its three military campaigns against the Tamil militant group.
However, India's benign Sri Lanka posture after its ill-fated military intervention and gory aftermath enabled Sri Lanka to build bridges with India. Wisely, India also did not allow the frictions of the intervening decades to come in the way and reciprocated Sri Lanka's efforts. Both countries have adopted a win-win strategy to build upon the positives of their relationship. These efforts culminated in the signing of India's first-ever free trade agreement with Sri Lanka in 2000. As a result, India-Sri Lanka relations now have a unique status in South Asia.
Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa was elected President in 2005; his campaign focus was on defeating the LTTE and crushing Tamil separatism. The advantages of close relations with India came in handy when he decided to clip the LTTE's wings after the peace process of 2002 failed to make progress even in three years. Though India was not a significant arms-supplier during Eelam War 2006, it had helped train the Sri Lankan armed forces and provided valuable intelligence inputs on the LTTE's intricate international logistic and support network. Sri Lanka managed to dismantle this apparatus and crippled the Tigers, paving the way for their defeat. More than all this, the governments in New Delhi and Chennai together managed the tricky fallout of the Eelam war in Tamil Nadu and saw to it that things did not get out of hand. This thwarted the efforts of the pro-LTTE parties and supporters in Tamil Nadu to create a pro-Tiger upsurge.
As a result, the LTTE could neither use Tamil Nadu as a logistic and support base nor influence India's political decisions during the war. India's own bitter experience with the LTTE probably shaped its public posture during Sri Lanka's war. At the same time, perhaps India realised that it would be untenable to allow the LTTE, which had grown into one of the world's strongest insurgent groups, to operate as a loose cannon in its strategic neighbourhood. This was perhaps one of the reasons for India's hands-off attitude as the Sri Lankan Army relentlessly pursued and ultimately crushed the LTTE.
Unfortunately, India was unable to significantly influence the Sri Lankan government in the aftermath of war. Even a year after the war ended, a political solution to meet the Tamil minority's demands has not been evolved. Normal life has not been restored to a sizeable population affected by the war in the Northern Province. They are yet to recover from the trauma of war as the pace of reconstruction is not consistent with their colossal needs.
It is people, not treaties, which make relations between nations meaningful. Unless India makes a difference in the lives of the people of both countries, its relations with Sri Lanka will not address the broader aspects of strategic security. This is the important takeaway as we look at the Rajiv-Jayewardene Accord after over two decades.
Courtesy: The Hindu, July 29, 2010
Wednesday, July 28, 2010
Speaking from the heart
By Col R Hariharan
[A review of the book “Courage My Companion” by RV Rajan, published by Productivity & Quality Pubishing Pvte Ltd, Chennai-600017, 2009. Price: Rs 295]
Rural India continues to remain a conundrum for everyone – the administrator, businessman, and the social activists. Most of us brought up in urban environment with its self-centred lifestyles find it difficult to unravel rural India. Advertising to the rural audience becomes a difficult proposition. Veteran ad man RV Rajan created a niche for himself as a pioneer in this field. “Courage my companion” the book under review is a candid memoir of Rajan’s journey through life.* It is not merely the story of an advertiser but of a boy from lower middle class background in Bombay growing up on his own strengths to found his own premier ad agency “Anugrah.”
Writing memoir is a difficult art. Authors of memoirs generally suffer from two ailments. One: they become ‘I’ specialists flogging the use of first person singular ‘I’ to death. This makes very dull reading for others. The second is inability to look at ourselves objectively. Will Rogers described this characteristic beautifully; he said “When you put down the good things you ought to have done, and leave out the bad ones you did do well, that's Memoirs..” However, Rajan’s book does not suffer form these common ailments.
The memoir follows the story teller’s mode, cruising chrono-logically rather than jumping from spectacular episode to episode. The advantage of the method is it is not all about advertising and how Rajan grew up to be a whiz kid in the ad world. He comes out as humble human being looking at himself with humour, particularly while talking of his early days. It contains his successes and failures, from his calf love to married life and family to early days in ad world, rise in Clarion and finally the growth of Anugrah into Anugrah-Madison.
His style of writing is direct and style is simple one-to-one narrative. This comes as a surprise because generally ad guys who use words as stock in trade. His simple honesty is so patent in his writing when he describes a few instances, like the problem with Clarion union or his marital problem when he failed to empower his wife. The tongue in cheek humour is interspersed throughout the book. His tribute to his ‘gurus’ for teaching the craft shows lack of ego when he writes about his successes.
There are very few books written by advertising practitioners in India. And that makes it Rajan’s memoir a welcome addition to this niche among business and management books.
I have only two observations on the book. One is the title “Courage my companion,” personally I would have preferred “Speaking from heart” as it reflects Rajan’s approach to memoir writing. Second is about part II – My parallel life. Undoubtedly Rajan is a man of many talents and he brought them to bear upon on many other social activities not connected with his profession. Part II is all about this aspect - life other than as an ad man. It is about his participation in the Round Table and Rotary Inter-national movements as well as in national and international ad forums. The activities are so varied and with a little tighter editing they would have knitted better.
Notwithstanding the above, the book is good value for money. After both Bill and Hillary Clinton published their memoirs American stand up comedian Jay Leno said: “Is’t this amazing? Clinton is getting $8M for his memoir. Hillary got $8M for her memoir. That is $16M for two people who for eight years couldn’t remember anything.” You cannot fault Rajan on this count. At Rs 295 in his book you get everything from life in Matunga in the 60s to his great faith in God to see him through business problems at 63.
[A review of the book “Courage My Companion” by RV Rajan, published by Productivity & Quality Pubishing Pvte Ltd, Chennai-600017, 2009. Price: Rs 295]
Rural India continues to remain a conundrum for everyone – the administrator, businessman, and the social activists. Most of us brought up in urban environment with its self-centred lifestyles find it difficult to unravel rural India. Advertising to the rural audience becomes a difficult proposition. Veteran ad man RV Rajan created a niche for himself as a pioneer in this field. “Courage my companion” the book under review is a candid memoir of Rajan’s journey through life.* It is not merely the story of an advertiser but of a boy from lower middle class background in Bombay growing up on his own strengths to found his own premier ad agency “Anugrah.”
Writing memoir is a difficult art. Authors of memoirs generally suffer from two ailments. One: they become ‘I’ specialists flogging the use of first person singular ‘I’ to death. This makes very dull reading for others. The second is inability to look at ourselves objectively. Will Rogers described this characteristic beautifully; he said “When you put down the good things you ought to have done, and leave out the bad ones you did do well, that's Memoirs..” However, Rajan’s book does not suffer form these common ailments.
The memoir follows the story teller’s mode, cruising chrono-logically rather than jumping from spectacular episode to episode. The advantage of the method is it is not all about advertising and how Rajan grew up to be a whiz kid in the ad world. He comes out as humble human being looking at himself with humour, particularly while talking of his early days. It contains his successes and failures, from his calf love to married life and family to early days in ad world, rise in Clarion and finally the growth of Anugrah into Anugrah-Madison.
His style of writing is direct and style is simple one-to-one narrative. This comes as a surprise because generally ad guys who use words as stock in trade. His simple honesty is so patent in his writing when he describes a few instances, like the problem with Clarion union or his marital problem when he failed to empower his wife. The tongue in cheek humour is interspersed throughout the book. His tribute to his ‘gurus’ for teaching the craft shows lack of ego when he writes about his successes.
There are very few books written by advertising practitioners in India. And that makes it Rajan’s memoir a welcome addition to this niche among business and management books.
I have only two observations on the book. One is the title “Courage my companion,” personally I would have preferred “Speaking from heart” as it reflects Rajan’s approach to memoir writing. Second is about part II – My parallel life. Undoubtedly Rajan is a man of many talents and he brought them to bear upon on many other social activities not connected with his profession. Part II is all about this aspect - life other than as an ad man. It is about his participation in the Round Table and Rotary Inter-national movements as well as in national and international ad forums. The activities are so varied and with a little tighter editing they would have knitted better.
Notwithstanding the above, the book is good value for money. After both Bill and Hillary Clinton published their memoirs American stand up comedian Jay Leno said: “Is’t this amazing? Clinton is getting $8M for his memoir. Hillary got $8M for her memoir. That is $16M for two people who for eight years couldn’t remember anything.” You cannot fault Rajan on this count. At Rs 295 in his book you get everything from life in Matunga in the 60s to his great faith in God to see him through business problems at 63.
Sunday, July 18, 2010
Is Afghanistan heading for partition?
Is Afghanistan heading for partition, as President Karzai tries to mend fences with the Taliban and the Americans want to wind up their longest ever foreign military campaign? It would appear so. If it happens it will have far reaching strategic implications for South Asian security, particularly for India and Pakistan. Another round of civil war between the Pashto dominant and Pakistan supported Taliban and the other minority tribals is also likely putting the clock back on Afghanistan's perilous experiment with Western democratic practice.
Actually, it was former US ambassador to India Robert D Blackwill set the ball rolling with his article 'A de facto partition for Afghanistan' after which a series of analytical articles on the topic have appeared. A selection of such articles is given below:
Ethnic divide threatens Afghanistan by Laura King
In Los Angeles Times, July 17, 20019
URL http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-afghan-ethnic-tension-20100717,0,7025054,print.story
Needed: A new political order in the Hindu-Kush region: Time has come to accept the de facto partition of Afghanistan by Brahma Chellaney
In The Sunday Guardian, July 18, 2010
URL http://chellaney.spaces.live.com/blog/cns!4913C7C8A2EA4A30!1227.entry
End of the game by K Subhrahmanyam
In Indian Express, July 13, 2010
URL http://www.indianexpress.com/news/end-of-the-game/645627/0
A de facto partition for Afghanistan by Robert D. Blackwill
July7,2010
URL http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0710/39432.html
Actually, it was former US ambassador to India Robert D Blackwill set the ball rolling with his article 'A de facto partition for Afghanistan' after which a series of analytical articles on the topic have appeared. A selection of such articles is given below:
Ethnic divide threatens Afghanistan by Laura King
In Los Angeles Times, July 17, 20019
URL http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-afghan-ethnic-tension-20100717,0,7025054,print.story
Needed: A new political order in the Hindu-Kush region: Time has come to accept the de facto partition of Afghanistan by Brahma Chellaney
In The Sunday Guardian, July 18, 2010
URL http://chellaney.spaces.live.com/blog/cns!4913C7C8A2EA4A30!1227.entry
End of the game by K Subhrahmanyam
In Indian Express, July 13, 2010
URL http://www.indianexpress.com/news/end-of-the-game/645627/0
A de facto partition for Afghanistan by Robert D. Blackwill
July7,2010
URL http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0710/39432.html
Sri Lanka’s Credibility Gap
By Col R Hariharan
Though Sri Lanka finished the Eelam War in triumph a year back, its battle with the international community does not appear to be over. It was joined in right earnest last week when the maverick Sri Lankan minister and ‘revolutionary’ turned politician Wimal Weerawansa spearheaded a siege of the UN office in Colombo. He was demanding the withdrawal of the UN expert panel appointed to advise the U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon on Sri Lanka’s human rights and humanitarian record during the war.
But Weerawansa added more spice to the protest when he went on “fast unto death.” The National Freedom Front leader being no Mahatma Gandhi nobody expected him to die a martyr. Though theatricals of the protest were overdone, it was more than a publicity gimmick or a photo opportunity for Weerawansa because it had official blessing. President Mahinda Rajapaksa showed his solidarity with the minister’s action by visiting the fasting minister and ‘persuaded’ him to break his fast on the second day.
If paralysing work at the UN office was the objective of the protest, the minister’s mission was eminently successful. Work at the UN office was paralysed and the UN asked its staffers not to come out. The UNDP Regional Centre in Colombo was shut down. The UN Resident Coordinator in Colombo, Neil Buhne was called back to New York.
Buhne is going back now after the UN clearly articulated its expectations from Colombo: better treatment of the U.N. family in Sri Lanka, progress of commitments covered in the Joint Statement of May 2009 including resettlement of internally displaced persons, political reconciliation and accountability. So the minister’s protest has not only failed, but also appears to have firmed up the UN Secretary General’s resolve to go ahead with the work of UN experts’ panel.
As Sri Lanka considers the action of the UN Secretary General an infringement of national sovereignty, its ire is understandable. But the way it is being handled as a populist ploy than through diplomatic moves makes one suspect the intentions. Is it part of President’s strategy to milk the issue for internal political gains? Although, his overwhelming public support was confirmed in the recent presidential and parliamentary polls, the protests focusing on outsider interference does put opposition on the defensive to temper their criticism of the government.
Ban Ki-moon was well within his powers to appoint a panel of experts to advise him on the issue. The Secretary General’s action would have provided a safe option to Sri Lanka to defer the issue from adverse limelight. It would also have given inkling on the follow up action likely at the UN Security Council or the UN Human Rights Commission.
But why Sri Lanka has chosen to do have a confrontation with the UN? Obviously it does not want any external body to investigate allegations of human rights violations. The second explanation is the fear that allowing experts’ panel would lead to probe into war crimes allegations against Sri Lanka army during the last phase of war. Sri Lanka’s prickly reaction only strengthens suspicions of its conduct. The relentless efforts of influential international NGOs and diehard Tamil Diaspora Eelam lobby to bring Sri Lanka to the dock on this count are likely to continue regardless of Sri Lanka stand on UN panel.
Sri Lanka’s objection should be viewed in the backdrop of its long term skirmish with “foreign interference.” It started with its bitter experience of the way the Monitoring Mission of the peace process 2002 functioned. And international role in Sri Lanka’s conflict became a contentious issue in the presidential poll 2005. Its attitude hardened in 2006 after a disastrous experience with an international panel of eminent persons’ inquiry into alleged killings carried out by security men which was given up midway due to lack of cooperation from Sri Lankan side. And its international reputation had been on the down slide even before the war started when scores of people ‘disappeared' and media men were hounded.
The common thread running in the UN action as well as the European Union’s suspension of the GSP+ export tariff concessions is the trust deficit in Sri Lanka’s words. And to dismiss as international prejudice or conspiracy to belittle Sri Lanka’s triumph against terrorism would be foolhardy. More situations of a similar kind are in the making.
Tamil Nadu Chief Minister M. Karunanidhi has suggested to the Indian government to assess the situation in the affected areas in Sri Lanka and the progress of rehabilitation measures undertaken by the Sri Lankan government for internally displaced Tamils. Though he has left the option of who will carry out this task to Dr Manmohan Singh, unless a special envoy is sent the issue would hang fire in Tamil Nadu. And both the leaders cannot afford it as the state is getting ready for assembly poll. The chief minister was only reflecting public opinion and what the Indian government had been asking Colombo in private. How Sri Lanka is going to handle this ‘foreign interference’ is the moot question?
This time around nobody can accuse the TN chief minister of being anti-Sinhalese. Around the same time, he had arrested Seeman, the Kollywood director turned leader of the pro-LTTE Naam Tamilar party, under the National Security Act for ‘inciting the public’ against Sinhalese in Chennai.
Whatever be the President’s internal agenda, he urgently needs to repair fractured international credibility. And regardless of Sri Lanka’s own opinion, its waning credibility will expose it to more and more international criticism. The NAM (non aligned movement) lobby at the UN has already shown to be an unreliable forum to plead for Sri Lanka. China, Russia and India – considered as friends of Sri Lanka – cannot be expected repeatedly to bale out Sri Lanka in the face of strong international line up.
The reason is not merely the demand for greater international accountability of nations, but also greater global awareness of rights of people and citizens. So the issue cannot be wished away; the President is bound to be questioned locally and internationally till their credibility gap is bridged with reasoning.
Sri Lanka’s credibility is directly related to three issues: its human rights record and accountability, rehabilitation issues of displaced Tamils, and vintage grievances of Tamil population. Actions like holding the cabinet meeting in Kilinochi, or providing better connectivity from North do not convince the public when people in villages around are destitute and there is lack of security and trust in government.
For its own good Sri Lanka should seriously look at human rights record and improve it. It is not India or the international community, but almost all opposition parties, media, and President Rajapaksa’s erstwhile chief of defence staff have complained of serious human rights violations. And many of them continue to do so. The emergency regulations are still haunting the public; even now Tamils in Wellawatte are asked to register with the police as pointed out by the National Peace Council.
The strategy to ward off international intrusion in what governments do is simple: be proactive and develop systems to be so. This helps the nation to look beyond playing sleight of hand competition in international forums as Sri Lanka is doing now. And it also enables the nation build its value systems, a great asset in forging ethnic amity. But this is more easily said than done, particularly if those in power want to make political capital out of problems. Even in such an agenda improving leader’s credibility is never a liability.
Courtesy: Southasia Analysis Group July 18, 2010
URL http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cnotes6%5Cnote591.html
Though Sri Lanka finished the Eelam War in triumph a year back, its battle with the international community does not appear to be over. It was joined in right earnest last week when the maverick Sri Lankan minister and ‘revolutionary’ turned politician Wimal Weerawansa spearheaded a siege of the UN office in Colombo. He was demanding the withdrawal of the UN expert panel appointed to advise the U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon on Sri Lanka’s human rights and humanitarian record during the war.
But Weerawansa added more spice to the protest when he went on “fast unto death.” The National Freedom Front leader being no Mahatma Gandhi nobody expected him to die a martyr. Though theatricals of the protest were overdone, it was more than a publicity gimmick or a photo opportunity for Weerawansa because it had official blessing. President Mahinda Rajapaksa showed his solidarity with the minister’s action by visiting the fasting minister and ‘persuaded’ him to break his fast on the second day.
If paralysing work at the UN office was the objective of the protest, the minister’s mission was eminently successful. Work at the UN office was paralysed and the UN asked its staffers not to come out. The UNDP Regional Centre in Colombo was shut down. The UN Resident Coordinator in Colombo, Neil Buhne was called back to New York.
Buhne is going back now after the UN clearly articulated its expectations from Colombo: better treatment of the U.N. family in Sri Lanka, progress of commitments covered in the Joint Statement of May 2009 including resettlement of internally displaced persons, political reconciliation and accountability. So the minister’s protest has not only failed, but also appears to have firmed up the UN Secretary General’s resolve to go ahead with the work of UN experts’ panel.
As Sri Lanka considers the action of the UN Secretary General an infringement of national sovereignty, its ire is understandable. But the way it is being handled as a populist ploy than through diplomatic moves makes one suspect the intentions. Is it part of President’s strategy to milk the issue for internal political gains? Although, his overwhelming public support was confirmed in the recent presidential and parliamentary polls, the protests focusing on outsider interference does put opposition on the defensive to temper their criticism of the government.
Ban Ki-moon was well within his powers to appoint a panel of experts to advise him on the issue. The Secretary General’s action would have provided a safe option to Sri Lanka to defer the issue from adverse limelight. It would also have given inkling on the follow up action likely at the UN Security Council or the UN Human Rights Commission.
But why Sri Lanka has chosen to do have a confrontation with the UN? Obviously it does not want any external body to investigate allegations of human rights violations. The second explanation is the fear that allowing experts’ panel would lead to probe into war crimes allegations against Sri Lanka army during the last phase of war. Sri Lanka’s prickly reaction only strengthens suspicions of its conduct. The relentless efforts of influential international NGOs and diehard Tamil Diaspora Eelam lobby to bring Sri Lanka to the dock on this count are likely to continue regardless of Sri Lanka stand on UN panel.
Sri Lanka’s objection should be viewed in the backdrop of its long term skirmish with “foreign interference.” It started with its bitter experience of the way the Monitoring Mission of the peace process 2002 functioned. And international role in Sri Lanka’s conflict became a contentious issue in the presidential poll 2005. Its attitude hardened in 2006 after a disastrous experience with an international panel of eminent persons’ inquiry into alleged killings carried out by security men which was given up midway due to lack of cooperation from Sri Lankan side. And its international reputation had been on the down slide even before the war started when scores of people ‘disappeared' and media men were hounded.
The common thread running in the UN action as well as the European Union’s suspension of the GSP+ export tariff concessions is the trust deficit in Sri Lanka’s words. And to dismiss as international prejudice or conspiracy to belittle Sri Lanka’s triumph against terrorism would be foolhardy. More situations of a similar kind are in the making.
Tamil Nadu Chief Minister M. Karunanidhi has suggested to the Indian government to assess the situation in the affected areas in Sri Lanka and the progress of rehabilitation measures undertaken by the Sri Lankan government for internally displaced Tamils. Though he has left the option of who will carry out this task to Dr Manmohan Singh, unless a special envoy is sent the issue would hang fire in Tamil Nadu. And both the leaders cannot afford it as the state is getting ready for assembly poll. The chief minister was only reflecting public opinion and what the Indian government had been asking Colombo in private. How Sri Lanka is going to handle this ‘foreign interference’ is the moot question?
This time around nobody can accuse the TN chief minister of being anti-Sinhalese. Around the same time, he had arrested Seeman, the Kollywood director turned leader of the pro-LTTE Naam Tamilar party, under the National Security Act for ‘inciting the public’ against Sinhalese in Chennai.
Whatever be the President’s internal agenda, he urgently needs to repair fractured international credibility. And regardless of Sri Lanka’s own opinion, its waning credibility will expose it to more and more international criticism. The NAM (non aligned movement) lobby at the UN has already shown to be an unreliable forum to plead for Sri Lanka. China, Russia and India – considered as friends of Sri Lanka – cannot be expected repeatedly to bale out Sri Lanka in the face of strong international line up.
The reason is not merely the demand for greater international accountability of nations, but also greater global awareness of rights of people and citizens. So the issue cannot be wished away; the President is bound to be questioned locally and internationally till their credibility gap is bridged with reasoning.
Sri Lanka’s credibility is directly related to three issues: its human rights record and accountability, rehabilitation issues of displaced Tamils, and vintage grievances of Tamil population. Actions like holding the cabinet meeting in Kilinochi, or providing better connectivity from North do not convince the public when people in villages around are destitute and there is lack of security and trust in government.
For its own good Sri Lanka should seriously look at human rights record and improve it. It is not India or the international community, but almost all opposition parties, media, and President Rajapaksa’s erstwhile chief of defence staff have complained of serious human rights violations. And many of them continue to do so. The emergency regulations are still haunting the public; even now Tamils in Wellawatte are asked to register with the police as pointed out by the National Peace Council.
The strategy to ward off international intrusion in what governments do is simple: be proactive and develop systems to be so. This helps the nation to look beyond playing sleight of hand competition in international forums as Sri Lanka is doing now. And it also enables the nation build its value systems, a great asset in forging ethnic amity. But this is more easily said than done, particularly if those in power want to make political capital out of problems. Even in such an agenda improving leader’s credibility is never a liability.
Courtesy: Southasia Analysis Group July 18, 2010
URL http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cnotes6%5Cnote591.html
Monday, July 12, 2010
Special powers for armed forces : We need clarity, not emotions
by Lt-Gen Vijay Oberoi (retd)
The Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958, better known as AFSPA, has been brought out of wraps at various opportune times – opportune for those who have either something to gain, i.e. the insurgents in Jammu and Kashmir, political parties always ready to fish in troubled waters, with an eye on electoral gains or those who are regular establishment-baiters, who have made it a habit to take the plunge headlong in any controversy with the belief that if it is against an organ of the government, it needed to be opposed!
Many have called AFSPA a draconian law and have vehemently supported its repeal, but having read quite a few of their views and watched them pontificating on TV, I am convinced that most lack even a rudimentary, let alone in-depth knowledge on the subject. This Act has been in force for over five decades because it was essential for the conduct of smooth counter-insurgency operations by the army. It will continue to be needed as long as the army is employed on counter-insurgency/ terrorism tasks.
The Act was promulgated on September 11, 1958. The rationale for bringing the Act on the statute book needs to be appreciated. When the army was first employed on counter-insurgency tasks in Nagaland in the 1950s, two aspects came to the fore immediately. First, unlike in the case of maintenance of law and order, when the army is called out in ‘aid to the civil authority’, where time is available to employ the police before committing the army, operations against insurgents are entirely of a different genre, as the insurgents do not give any time for such niceties.
The insurgents we are fighting today are heavily armed, they act speedily, commit heinous crimes and disappear. Unless the army counters such actions with speed and not wait for orders from higher civil or military authorities, nothing would be achieved.
Secondly, the soldiers and officers of the army had to be protected from prosecution for consequential action taken against insurgents in good faith as part of their operations. Here too, the Act does contain the important caveat that the army personnel can be prosecuted with the Centre’s sanction, if their actions warrant it. There is, therefore, no blanket immunity from the laws of the land.
Over the years, some army personnel have indeed been prosecuted where a prima facie case existed. However, it is also true that due to the exceptional care which all army commanders take when their troops are employed against insurgents, such cases are few and far between.
After the initial employment in Nagaland, the employment of the army on counter-insurgency tasks continued increasing, till it was progressively employed in all the north-eastern states for such tasks. Along with such employment, AFSPA was also invoked in all affected states.
When insurgency erupted in Srinagar in 1990, the Act was extended to the Valley. Later, as the activities of the insurgents spread, first to the Poonch-Rajauri area, then to Doda and Bhadarwah and finally to the whole state, the entire state was brought under the Act’s purview in stages. It can thus be seen that AFSPA was invoked progressively only when the situation required the deployment of the army.
The army is designed and structured for fighting external enemies of the nation. Consequently, they are not given any police powers. However, when the nation wants the army to conduct counter-insurgency and counter-terrorist operations, then they must be given the legal authority to conduct their operations without the impediment of getting clearances from the higher authorities.
If this is not done, they would be unable to function efficiently and defeat the insurgents and terrorists at their own game. It is for this reason that the Act gives four powers to army personnel. These are for ‘enter and search’, ‘arrest without warrant’, ‘destroy arms dumps or other fortifications’ and ‘fire or use force after due warning where possible’. Once again, there is a safeguard in the Act, which stipulates that the arrested person(s) will be handed over speedily to the nearest police station.
The law stipulates that AFSPA can be imposed only after the area in question is declared a ‘disturbed area’ by the state government concerned. When this writer was the Director-General Military Operations (DGMO) and the army was asked to deploy in the Doda-Bhadarwah area, we requested for the invocation of the Act. The state government was reluctant to do so on account of political considerations, but we did not commence operations till the Act was invoked.
Clearly, the Army has no desire to get embroiled in counter-insurgency tasks. It is not the army’s job. However, despite over 50 years of insurgency in our country, the state police as well as the central police forces (CPOs) have not been made capable of tackling insurgency. Consequently, in each case the army was inducted to carry out counter insurgency/ terrorist operations. If the national leadership tasks the army for conducting such non-military operations, then it is incumbent on the leadership to provide the legal wherewithal to all army personnel employed on such tasks.
It is only then that the operations will be conducted in the usual efficient manner of the army and would be result-oriented. They also must be legally protected. It is because these two aspects have been catered for that the army has been neutralising the insurgents and terrorists, so that normalcy is restored and the political leaders and officials can restart governing.
The writer is a former Vice-Chief of the Indian Army
The Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958, better known as AFSPA, has been brought out of wraps at various opportune times – opportune for those who have either something to gain, i.e. the insurgents in Jammu and Kashmir, political parties always ready to fish in troubled waters, with an eye on electoral gains or those who are regular establishment-baiters, who have made it a habit to take the plunge headlong in any controversy with the belief that if it is against an organ of the government, it needed to be opposed!
Many have called AFSPA a draconian law and have vehemently supported its repeal, but having read quite a few of their views and watched them pontificating on TV, I am convinced that most lack even a rudimentary, let alone in-depth knowledge on the subject. This Act has been in force for over five decades because it was essential for the conduct of smooth counter-insurgency operations by the army. It will continue to be needed as long as the army is employed on counter-insurgency/ terrorism tasks.
The Act was promulgated on September 11, 1958. The rationale for bringing the Act on the statute book needs to be appreciated. When the army was first employed on counter-insurgency tasks in Nagaland in the 1950s, two aspects came to the fore immediately. First, unlike in the case of maintenance of law and order, when the army is called out in ‘aid to the civil authority’, where time is available to employ the police before committing the army, operations against insurgents are entirely of a different genre, as the insurgents do not give any time for such niceties.
The insurgents we are fighting today are heavily armed, they act speedily, commit heinous crimes and disappear. Unless the army counters such actions with speed and not wait for orders from higher civil or military authorities, nothing would be achieved.
Secondly, the soldiers and officers of the army had to be protected from prosecution for consequential action taken against insurgents in good faith as part of their operations. Here too, the Act does contain the important caveat that the army personnel can be prosecuted with the Centre’s sanction, if their actions warrant it. There is, therefore, no blanket immunity from the laws of the land.
Over the years, some army personnel have indeed been prosecuted where a prima facie case existed. However, it is also true that due to the exceptional care which all army commanders take when their troops are employed against insurgents, such cases are few and far between.
After the initial employment in Nagaland, the employment of the army on counter-insurgency tasks continued increasing, till it was progressively employed in all the north-eastern states for such tasks. Along with such employment, AFSPA was also invoked in all affected states.
When insurgency erupted in Srinagar in 1990, the Act was extended to the Valley. Later, as the activities of the insurgents spread, first to the Poonch-Rajauri area, then to Doda and Bhadarwah and finally to the whole state, the entire state was brought under the Act’s purview in stages. It can thus be seen that AFSPA was invoked progressively only when the situation required the deployment of the army.
The army is designed and structured for fighting external enemies of the nation. Consequently, they are not given any police powers. However, when the nation wants the army to conduct counter-insurgency and counter-terrorist operations, then they must be given the legal authority to conduct their operations without the impediment of getting clearances from the higher authorities.
If this is not done, they would be unable to function efficiently and defeat the insurgents and terrorists at their own game. It is for this reason that the Act gives four powers to army personnel. These are for ‘enter and search’, ‘arrest without warrant’, ‘destroy arms dumps or other fortifications’ and ‘fire or use force after due warning where possible’. Once again, there is a safeguard in the Act, which stipulates that the arrested person(s) will be handed over speedily to the nearest police station.
The law stipulates that AFSPA can be imposed only after the area in question is declared a ‘disturbed area’ by the state government concerned. When this writer was the Director-General Military Operations (DGMO) and the army was asked to deploy in the Doda-Bhadarwah area, we requested for the invocation of the Act. The state government was reluctant to do so on account of political considerations, but we did not commence operations till the Act was invoked.
Clearly, the Army has no desire to get embroiled in counter-insurgency tasks. It is not the army’s job. However, despite over 50 years of insurgency in our country, the state police as well as the central police forces (CPOs) have not been made capable of tackling insurgency. Consequently, in each case the army was inducted to carry out counter insurgency/ terrorist operations. If the national leadership tasks the army for conducting such non-military operations, then it is incumbent on the leadership to provide the legal wherewithal to all army personnel employed on such tasks.
It is only then that the operations will be conducted in the usual efficient manner of the army and would be result-oriented. They also must be legally protected. It is because these two aspects have been catered for that the army has been neutralising the insurgents and terrorists, so that normalcy is restored and the political leaders and officials can restart governing.
The writer is a former Vice-Chief of the Indian Army
Nuclear capability of India and China: an analysis
By Col. R. Hariharan
A comparison of nuclear capability of India and China cannot be made in isolation. It has to be derived in the backdrop of their strategic vision, global ambitions and political and social ethos that condition their perceptions. Their strategic vision dictates the development of their nuclear capability (including nuclear policy, concepts, weapons capability and delivery systems) appropriate to the geo-strategic environment.
Strategic setting
Ever since the global economic downturn started around 2008, China’s economic clout had been increasing. And the Obama administration soon after it came to power made special efforts to woo China to seek help in stemming its own economic decline. Apparently China’s global ambitions were strengthened by this. So it was not surprising that it showed reluctance to play ball with Obama administration’s efforts to turn it into a partner in international affairs.
However, one of the important reasons for Chinese reluctance is the suspicion about the U.S. intentions in Asia, where the U.S. had been developing strategic convergence in its relations with India. This was made clear in China’s Defence White Paper 2008 that spoke of ‘increasing US military presence in Asia-Pacific.’ China is wary of a US sponsored creation of an anti-Chinese axis extending from India to Japan. Though this was not referred to by General Ma Xiaotian, the Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the PLA, while speaking at the Shangri La Dialogue 2010 he said “we believe that maintaining security in the Asia-Pacific region serves China's interest, and it is also China's responsibility.” Apparently, the Chinese Navy’s increasingly assertive posture in South China Sea is only an affirmation of this policy.
This power assertion has strong strategic connotations to its ASEAN neighbours in particular as China is likely to be embedded in their security architecture inn the coming years as indicated by Professor Zhuang Jian Zhong, Standing Vice Director, Center for National Strategic Studies, Shanghai Jiaotong University, at the Shangri La Dialogue 2010.
After the Indo-US civilian nuclear bill became a reality, US-India economic relations were poised to grow fast. However, this did not happen as Obama administration had its own hangups on India. However, US-India relations have recently been warming up for the first time after President Obama came to power. The reality is that this has come about only after the impasse in the US-China relations. Now US-India economic relations are poised to grow rapidly only because Indian economy, less dependant upon export market than China, is clocking a steady 8 % growth.
Moreover, even if the US pulls out of Afghanistan, it would perhaps like to retain Pakistan a strategic ally in the region. The Army is likely to continue to decide Pakistan’s strategic posture in the coming years. Perhaps this is the underlying reason for the $ 10 billion U.S. assistance to the Pakistan army. It should not be forgotten that Pakistan, a close ally of China, achieved its nuclear capability aided and abetted by China. These considerations are likely to influence the US form encouraging India to play a major strategic role in Afghanistan and beyond in the west. With such considerations, in the US foreign relations horizon China would continue to occupy a larger space than India in the coming years, regardless the ups and downs of US-China relations.
India dominates South Asian region physically and economically. Soft power of Indian culture spills over the region as well. During the cold war era, it had built strong relationship with Soviet Union, which still has a large residual content in Russia, particularly as a supplier of defence equipment and weaponry. India’s geographic location enables it to be a dominant power in the Indian Ocean region. So it is not surprising that China had been cultivating India’s smaller neighbours who have latent fear of Indian domination. China’s close relation with Pakistan is well known. Nepal and Sri Lanka are increasingly coming under Chinese influence. Except for Pakistan, present emphasis of China’s relationship-building with other neighbours of India appears to have more political and economic than military content.
Nuclear setting
Given India’s comparatively smaller economic and military clout, unlike China, India appears to nurse only regional ambitions. Unlike China, which signed the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a recognised nuclear weapons state, though India did not sign NPT, its nuclear capability got recognition only after it tested nuclear weapons in 1998. So India has fundamental limitations in augmenting its nuclear weapons capability although it is said to have enriched Uranium stockpile to produce another 30 warheads. India’s nuclear arsenal is estimated between 40 and 80 warheads. This is less than the number of warheads Pakistan has and probably one fifth of China’s holdings. Moreover, with limited nuclear tests carried out, questions about their operational performance have been raised.
But the main limitation of India lies in is weak nuclear delivery capability. India at present has only short and intermediate range ballistic missiles. Its naval missile development is aimed at refining its intermediate range capability only. Its first-ever nuclear submarine INS Arihant, now undergoing sea trials, is likely to become operational in 2012, if it keeps to its schedule. Thus at present it has no operational ballistic missile submarine. Its submarine fleet is aging and due to stilted naval procurement programme its fleet is likely to be reduced to half according to one estimate. So India’s nuclear weapon delivery at present is limited to nuclear-capable aircraft and surface ships of the navy only. At present this restricts the reach of India’s nuclear capability to South Asia and Tibet.
After its nuclear tests in 1998, India adopted a "no first use policy." But according to its nuclear policy even though there will be no first-use of nuclear weapons by India, "nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage." But how far these words can be given form remains to be seen. With India’s limited missile capability, second strike capability will have to be based upon its air force and surface ships. Thus India will continue to be vulnerable nuclear missile strikes beyond the intermediate range.
Only in 2003, India established the Strategic Nuclear Command. This join services organisation is responsible for holding all of India’s nuclear weapons, missiles and other assets. It has also executive responsibility for enforcing nuclear policy. However, it is the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) under the Prime Minister that will authorise response to any nuclear strike. Quick decision making under pressure had never been the strong point of CCS. Whether it can do so in real time to order a retaliatory nuclear strike is a moot question.
India’s key weakness is not only in strategic decision making process but tardy implementation of decisions. India has failed to use time as an irreplaceable resource. Thus the state controlled defence research and development programmes regularly fail to keep up their schedules. Defence procurement had become a hotbed of corruption and the bureaucratic procedure appears to be more focused on stemming corruption than on timely procurement of weapon systems. This has not improved despite the complaints of service chiefs; this has considerably weakened the modernisation of armed forces.
On the other hand, China has developed a clearly articulated long term vision for improving its strategic capability in conformity with its global ambitions. It has developed its large scale weapons research, development and manufacturing capability. It has become a major weapon producer and this gives it a powerful clout to favourably spread its influence.
China adopted No First Use nuclear policy well before India in 1964, with the affirmation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons “at any time or under any circumstances.” Though China has reaffirmed its NFU policy in 2009, China’s credibility to do so is low. For instance, there were reports that China had considered nuclear strikes against the Soviet Union in the event of a conventional Soviet attack. It has capability to deliver nuclear weapons from air craft, surface ships and submarines as well as missiles.
Its military modernisation programme is well on the way with focused development to improve its missile and naval capability while turning the huge PLA into a modern force with better mobility and fire power.
China is reported to hold the lowest number of nuclear warheads among the five nuclear weapons states. Though exact number of China’s nuclear arsenal is not known, the figure of around 130 nuclear warheads deployed in missiles and aircraft as given by the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists is probably correct. Probably 70 more are in storage. China has a variety of indigenously developed ICBMs including DF -5 ICBM which has a range of about 15000 Km has been in service since 1980. About 80 warheads are deployed in the ballistic missiles of DF-3, DF-4, DF-5 and DF-21. Of these China is estimated to have 25 DF-5 missiles. Under the military modernization programme, China is improving the missile portability, and performance capability. It has the potential to develop multiple warhead carrying capability in some of the missiles as well.
Though the PLA navy is ranked as the third largest in the world, it had only a defensive capability limited to its coastal region with only brown water capability. However as a result of modernisation efforts, it has now attained green water capability. That would mean it has offensive capability limited to about a thousand miles from its shores. It continues to suffer from weaknesses command C4 systems.
In keeping with increased strategic priorities Chinese navy is in the process of transforming into a blue water navy, though it is still a long way to go. It has developed Type 094 ballistic submarines armed with JL 2 SLBMs with a range of 8000 Km; this would make the western hemisphere within its range. It has developed a large submarine base in Hainan which has been cause of concern to the U.S. and India.
Since the last decade, Chinese naval presence in international waters has been on the rise. It has carried out joint exercises with over a dozen countries including India and Pakistan. In its first international foray, it is operating a flotilla on anti piracy duties in Gulf of Aden. Probably in during the coming decade we will be seeing large scale power assertion of Chinese navy in Indian Ocean region.
Chinese has been instrumental in contributing to the development of Pakistan’s nuclear and missile capabilities, flouting international agreements. The two countries have close strategic links. This could result in the further growth of Pakistan’s nuclear capability in the future. The recent Chinese announcement to give two more nuclear power stations to Pakistan ostensibly under a 1991 contract is a case in point. Though the Bush administration had objected to it earlier, the US appears to have chosen to ignore it now due to political expediency dictated by its Pak-Af posture. Thus China enjoys enormous advantage with its proxy presence in Pakistan.
Conclusion
China enjoys definite advantage over India in three key aspects of exercising nuclear capability: decision making process weapons systems, and delivery options. However, Chinese capability is mostly based on its ICBM systems operating from both land and sea. Its green water capability is being augmented with the development of 094 ballistic submarines armed with SLBMs. This could overcome its limitations in blue water operations. Thus China’s nuclear capability is in tandem with its global ambitions.
Comparatively, India’s nuclear capability is circumscribed by the limits of its regional ambitions. This situation is unlikely to change unless India improves its ability to handle strategic security challenges. To give form to it, better nuclear weapons and missile capabilities are essential. In particular, it has to develop a strong anti-missile capability. India has a long way to go in doing so. India’s strength would depend upon building a win-win relationship with China; at the same time India has to develop closer strategic relations with the US without sacrificing its regional interests. Indo-Russian relations, a little stagnant at present, also need to be nurtured. More than all this it has to speed up modernisation of armed forces. In the coming years, Indian Ocean region is likely to become the scene of power assertion. This would imply the need for making Indian navy a powerful entity so that India does not lose its strategic advantage in the region.
Courtesy: South Asia Analysis Group July 12, 2010
URL: http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers40%5Cpaper3920.html
A comparison of nuclear capability of India and China cannot be made in isolation. It has to be derived in the backdrop of their strategic vision, global ambitions and political and social ethos that condition their perceptions. Their strategic vision dictates the development of their nuclear capability (including nuclear policy, concepts, weapons capability and delivery systems) appropriate to the geo-strategic environment.
Strategic setting
Ever since the global economic downturn started around 2008, China’s economic clout had been increasing. And the Obama administration soon after it came to power made special efforts to woo China to seek help in stemming its own economic decline. Apparently China’s global ambitions were strengthened by this. So it was not surprising that it showed reluctance to play ball with Obama administration’s efforts to turn it into a partner in international affairs.
However, one of the important reasons for Chinese reluctance is the suspicion about the U.S. intentions in Asia, where the U.S. had been developing strategic convergence in its relations with India. This was made clear in China’s Defence White Paper 2008 that spoke of ‘increasing US military presence in Asia-Pacific.’ China is wary of a US sponsored creation of an anti-Chinese axis extending from India to Japan. Though this was not referred to by General Ma Xiaotian, the Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the PLA, while speaking at the Shangri La Dialogue 2010 he said “we believe that maintaining security in the Asia-Pacific region serves China's interest, and it is also China's responsibility.” Apparently, the Chinese Navy’s increasingly assertive posture in South China Sea is only an affirmation of this policy.
This power assertion has strong strategic connotations to its ASEAN neighbours in particular as China is likely to be embedded in their security architecture inn the coming years as indicated by Professor Zhuang Jian Zhong, Standing Vice Director, Center for National Strategic Studies, Shanghai Jiaotong University, at the Shangri La Dialogue 2010.
After the Indo-US civilian nuclear bill became a reality, US-India economic relations were poised to grow fast. However, this did not happen as Obama administration had its own hangups on India. However, US-India relations have recently been warming up for the first time after President Obama came to power. The reality is that this has come about only after the impasse in the US-China relations. Now US-India economic relations are poised to grow rapidly only because Indian economy, less dependant upon export market than China, is clocking a steady 8 % growth.
Moreover, even if the US pulls out of Afghanistan, it would perhaps like to retain Pakistan a strategic ally in the region. The Army is likely to continue to decide Pakistan’s strategic posture in the coming years. Perhaps this is the underlying reason for the $ 10 billion U.S. assistance to the Pakistan army. It should not be forgotten that Pakistan, a close ally of China, achieved its nuclear capability aided and abetted by China. These considerations are likely to influence the US form encouraging India to play a major strategic role in Afghanistan and beyond in the west. With such considerations, in the US foreign relations horizon China would continue to occupy a larger space than India in the coming years, regardless the ups and downs of US-China relations.
India dominates South Asian region physically and economically. Soft power of Indian culture spills over the region as well. During the cold war era, it had built strong relationship with Soviet Union, which still has a large residual content in Russia, particularly as a supplier of defence equipment and weaponry. India’s geographic location enables it to be a dominant power in the Indian Ocean region. So it is not surprising that China had been cultivating India’s smaller neighbours who have latent fear of Indian domination. China’s close relation with Pakistan is well known. Nepal and Sri Lanka are increasingly coming under Chinese influence. Except for Pakistan, present emphasis of China’s relationship-building with other neighbours of India appears to have more political and economic than military content.
Nuclear setting
Given India’s comparatively smaller economic and military clout, unlike China, India appears to nurse only regional ambitions. Unlike China, which signed the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a recognised nuclear weapons state, though India did not sign NPT, its nuclear capability got recognition only after it tested nuclear weapons in 1998. So India has fundamental limitations in augmenting its nuclear weapons capability although it is said to have enriched Uranium stockpile to produce another 30 warheads. India’s nuclear arsenal is estimated between 40 and 80 warheads. This is less than the number of warheads Pakistan has and probably one fifth of China’s holdings. Moreover, with limited nuclear tests carried out, questions about their operational performance have been raised.
But the main limitation of India lies in is weak nuclear delivery capability. India at present has only short and intermediate range ballistic missiles. Its naval missile development is aimed at refining its intermediate range capability only. Its first-ever nuclear submarine INS Arihant, now undergoing sea trials, is likely to become operational in 2012, if it keeps to its schedule. Thus at present it has no operational ballistic missile submarine. Its submarine fleet is aging and due to stilted naval procurement programme its fleet is likely to be reduced to half according to one estimate. So India’s nuclear weapon delivery at present is limited to nuclear-capable aircraft and surface ships of the navy only. At present this restricts the reach of India’s nuclear capability to South Asia and Tibet.
After its nuclear tests in 1998, India adopted a "no first use policy." But according to its nuclear policy even though there will be no first-use of nuclear weapons by India, "nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage." But how far these words can be given form remains to be seen. With India’s limited missile capability, second strike capability will have to be based upon its air force and surface ships. Thus India will continue to be vulnerable nuclear missile strikes beyond the intermediate range.
Only in 2003, India established the Strategic Nuclear Command. This join services organisation is responsible for holding all of India’s nuclear weapons, missiles and other assets. It has also executive responsibility for enforcing nuclear policy. However, it is the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) under the Prime Minister that will authorise response to any nuclear strike. Quick decision making under pressure had never been the strong point of CCS. Whether it can do so in real time to order a retaliatory nuclear strike is a moot question.
India’s key weakness is not only in strategic decision making process but tardy implementation of decisions. India has failed to use time as an irreplaceable resource. Thus the state controlled defence research and development programmes regularly fail to keep up their schedules. Defence procurement had become a hotbed of corruption and the bureaucratic procedure appears to be more focused on stemming corruption than on timely procurement of weapon systems. This has not improved despite the complaints of service chiefs; this has considerably weakened the modernisation of armed forces.
On the other hand, China has developed a clearly articulated long term vision for improving its strategic capability in conformity with its global ambitions. It has developed its large scale weapons research, development and manufacturing capability. It has become a major weapon producer and this gives it a powerful clout to favourably spread its influence.
China adopted No First Use nuclear policy well before India in 1964, with the affirmation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons “at any time or under any circumstances.” Though China has reaffirmed its NFU policy in 2009, China’s credibility to do so is low. For instance, there were reports that China had considered nuclear strikes against the Soviet Union in the event of a conventional Soviet attack. It has capability to deliver nuclear weapons from air craft, surface ships and submarines as well as missiles.
Its military modernisation programme is well on the way with focused development to improve its missile and naval capability while turning the huge PLA into a modern force with better mobility and fire power.
China is reported to hold the lowest number of nuclear warheads among the five nuclear weapons states. Though exact number of China’s nuclear arsenal is not known, the figure of around 130 nuclear warheads deployed in missiles and aircraft as given by the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists is probably correct. Probably 70 more are in storage. China has a variety of indigenously developed ICBMs including DF -5 ICBM which has a range of about 15000 Km has been in service since 1980. About 80 warheads are deployed in the ballistic missiles of DF-3, DF-4, DF-5 and DF-21. Of these China is estimated to have 25 DF-5 missiles. Under the military modernization programme, China is improving the missile portability, and performance capability. It has the potential to develop multiple warhead carrying capability in some of the missiles as well.
Though the PLA navy is ranked as the third largest in the world, it had only a defensive capability limited to its coastal region with only brown water capability. However as a result of modernisation efforts, it has now attained green water capability. That would mean it has offensive capability limited to about a thousand miles from its shores. It continues to suffer from weaknesses command C4 systems.
In keeping with increased strategic priorities Chinese navy is in the process of transforming into a blue water navy, though it is still a long way to go. It has developed Type 094 ballistic submarines armed with JL 2 SLBMs with a range of 8000 Km; this would make the western hemisphere within its range. It has developed a large submarine base in Hainan which has been cause of concern to the U.S. and India.
Since the last decade, Chinese naval presence in international waters has been on the rise. It has carried out joint exercises with over a dozen countries including India and Pakistan. In its first international foray, it is operating a flotilla on anti piracy duties in Gulf of Aden. Probably in during the coming decade we will be seeing large scale power assertion of Chinese navy in Indian Ocean region.
Chinese has been instrumental in contributing to the development of Pakistan’s nuclear and missile capabilities, flouting international agreements. The two countries have close strategic links. This could result in the further growth of Pakistan’s nuclear capability in the future. The recent Chinese announcement to give two more nuclear power stations to Pakistan ostensibly under a 1991 contract is a case in point. Though the Bush administration had objected to it earlier, the US appears to have chosen to ignore it now due to political expediency dictated by its Pak-Af posture. Thus China enjoys enormous advantage with its proxy presence in Pakistan.
Conclusion
China enjoys definite advantage over India in three key aspects of exercising nuclear capability: decision making process weapons systems, and delivery options. However, Chinese capability is mostly based on its ICBM systems operating from both land and sea. Its green water capability is being augmented with the development of 094 ballistic submarines armed with SLBMs. This could overcome its limitations in blue water operations. Thus China’s nuclear capability is in tandem with its global ambitions.
Comparatively, India’s nuclear capability is circumscribed by the limits of its regional ambitions. This situation is unlikely to change unless India improves its ability to handle strategic security challenges. To give form to it, better nuclear weapons and missile capabilities are essential. In particular, it has to develop a strong anti-missile capability. India has a long way to go in doing so. India’s strength would depend upon building a win-win relationship with China; at the same time India has to develop closer strategic relations with the US without sacrificing its regional interests. Indo-Russian relations, a little stagnant at present, also need to be nurtured. More than all this it has to speed up modernisation of armed forces. In the coming years, Indian Ocean region is likely to become the scene of power assertion. This would imply the need for making Indian navy a powerful entity so that India does not lose its strategic advantage in the region.
Courtesy: South Asia Analysis Group July 12, 2010
URL: http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers40%5Cpaper3920.html
Wednesday, July 7, 2010
Sri Lanka Perspectives - June 2010
By Col R Hariharan
India-Sri Lanka relations
India and Sri Lanka signed seven agreements during President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s visit to New Delhi from June 8 to 11, 2010. The maiden visit after his re-election may be considered a success for the President as India barely touched upon sensitive issues like the UN advisory panel on human rights violations during the war and devolution of powers to Tamil minority in the interactions with the President and his delegation.
Indian Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh’s statement that “a meaningful devolution package, building upon the 13th Amendment, would create the necessary conditions for a lasting political settlement” showed by and large India had accepted the Rajapaksa approach. India’s stress on rehabilitation issues of Tamils would indicate that its continued focus on this aspect rather than on resuming a dialogue on ethnic issues. The allocation of Rs 1000 crores as assistance to build 50,000 houses for people displaced due to the war and other assistance to improve communication and other infrastructure illustrate this.
In a bid to build closer relations both countries agreed upon taking a number of steps. These include improving interconnectivity with the introduction of Colombo-Tuticorin, Talaimannar-Rameswaram ferry services, Indian assistance to improve Palaly Airport and Kankesanthurai Harbour, and conducting a feasibility study for linking electricity grids of the two countries. India has also offered to extend the bandwidth to set up satellite-interactive terminals in Sri Lanka.
The joint statement issued after the meeting between the President and Indian Prime Minister indicated some cautious steps taken to build closer strategic relations. These include: India’s assurance to examine a Sri Lankan suggestion for establishing a joint information mechanism on the likely oil and gas fields straddling India- Sri Lanka maritime boundary; promotion of dialogue on security and defence issues including an annual defence dialogue; and promoting the use of space technology for a variety of services. The Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance on Criminal Matters and Agreement on Transfer of Sentenced Prisoners signed during the visit would provide for structural improvement to security and legal framework.
The Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) proposal was not mentioned in the joint statement, although measures for developing “a framework for sustainable economic partnership and addressing outstanding issues” of the Free Trade Agreement found a place in the joint statement. This would indicate that CEPA would come up sooner than later. The agreement on establishing Indian consular presence in Jaffna and in Hambantota also should be viewed in the context of furthering trading interests rather than strategic linkages.
China-Sri Lanka agreements
Chinese Vice-Premier, Zhang Dejiang led a 30-member delegation to Sri Lanka on a three-day official trip close on the heels of President Rajapaksa's visit to India. It showed Sri Lanka’s careful balancing of relations between India and China.
During the visit Sri Lanka signed six agreements for enhanced cooperation in highways development, information technology and communications, development of maritime ports and the second phase of the Hambantota Port Development project (for which China has offered financial assistance of US$ 200 million) and maintenance of the Bandaranaike Memorial International Conference Hall built by China.
Vice Premier Zhang, when he met President Rajapaksa on June 12, also discussed the progress of projects including the Norochcholai Coal Power Project, the Hambantota Port Development and the Mattala International Airport.
International issues
Sri Lanka has reacted angrily to UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon’s appointment of an expert panel to advise him on human rights violations in the final stage of the island’s civil war. The UN panel announced on June 22 is headed by former Indonesian Attorney General Marzuki Darusman, with Ms Yasmin Sooka, a former member of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission and Steven Ratner, an American law professor, as members. According to a UN spokesperson the advisory panel’s mandate was limited to advising the secretary general and it was “not a fact-finding or investigative body.”
President Rajapaksa rejected the UN move, and the External affairs minister G.L. Peiris called it “an unnecessary interference” and said the government should be given “a free space to make its own findings.” The government has also said it would not issue visa for the UN panel members to visit Sri Lanka. China, Japan, India and Russia had been generally supportive of Sri Lanka government move to investigate the human rights aberrations on its own while the West, particularly the EU and the United States had been for an international panel.
Although the issue has whipped up national sentiments among the people, both General Sarath Fonseka, army commander during the war who is under arrest now, and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam’s US based activist and a member of the Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam Rudrakumaran have offered to co-operate with the UN panel. This is likely to further embarrass the Sri Lanka government who see an international conspiracy to demean the country’s achievement in these moves.
As though to confirm this conjecture, the EU also announced on June 22 that it would extend GSP+ tariff concessions to Sri Lanka after August 15 for “a limited additional period, subject to a clear and written commitment” to undertake 15 specific actions it considered as related to human rights within a six-month period from July.
The 15 areas for action included implementation of the Sri Lankan constitution’s 17th Amendment, the repeal of emergency regulations, co-operation with UN human rights bodies, release of a list of detained LTTE combatants and other suspects, and an end to harassment of journalists.
Prof GL Peiris, External Affairs Minister, rejecting the conditions said the government would not “surrender decision making powers, very sensitive and crucial matters to any foreign government.”
This does not augur well for Sri Lankan exports, particularly ready made garments which are heavily dependent upon EU markets. In the coming months we can expect Sri Lanka government to scale down its rhetoric and take some action repair its international relations.
National budget
Sri Lanka budget for the current year, already delayed by seven months, aims to reduce the budget deficit to 8% as against last year’s 9.9% deficit. This would represent the biggest reduction in deficit in recent times. With a view to spur growth targeted at 7% this year the government halved the import tax on cars and cut levies on electronics goods in the run up to the budget. The government hopes to increase tax revenue to at least 17 percent of GDP over the medium term, from 14.5 percent in 2009.
However, its meagre increase in wages for government servants and levy of additional taxes on food articles are likely to stir up public protests.
Sri Lanka’s budget plans are apparently in conformity with the International Monetary Fund’s conditional loan to replenish Sri Lanka’s foreign exchange reserves. Under the IMF’s $2.5 billion loan programme, during the month the fund approved the release of fifth tranche of $ 408 million. This would indicate the IMF is satisfied with the government’s measures to tighten fiscal discipline.
Political moves
The government appears to have taken some action to use Kumaran Pathmanathan known better as KP, former international representative of the Tamil Tigers held in captivity, to build better relations with pro-LTTE Diaspora. In a carefully orchestrated move it allowed KP to visit North with a Diaspora delegation ostensibly to consider some rehabilitation project. In the coming months its political impact could be far reaching.
June 30, 2010
South Asia Security Trends Vol 4 No 6
Courtesy: www.security-risks.com
India-Sri Lanka relations
India and Sri Lanka signed seven agreements during President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s visit to New Delhi from June 8 to 11, 2010. The maiden visit after his re-election may be considered a success for the President as India barely touched upon sensitive issues like the UN advisory panel on human rights violations during the war and devolution of powers to Tamil minority in the interactions with the President and his delegation.
Indian Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh’s statement that “a meaningful devolution package, building upon the 13th Amendment, would create the necessary conditions for a lasting political settlement” showed by and large India had accepted the Rajapaksa approach. India’s stress on rehabilitation issues of Tamils would indicate that its continued focus on this aspect rather than on resuming a dialogue on ethnic issues. The allocation of Rs 1000 crores as assistance to build 50,000 houses for people displaced due to the war and other assistance to improve communication and other infrastructure illustrate this.
In a bid to build closer relations both countries agreed upon taking a number of steps. These include improving interconnectivity with the introduction of Colombo-Tuticorin, Talaimannar-Rameswaram ferry services, Indian assistance to improve Palaly Airport and Kankesanthurai Harbour, and conducting a feasibility study for linking electricity grids of the two countries. India has also offered to extend the bandwidth to set up satellite-interactive terminals in Sri Lanka.
The joint statement issued after the meeting between the President and Indian Prime Minister indicated some cautious steps taken to build closer strategic relations. These include: India’s assurance to examine a Sri Lankan suggestion for establishing a joint information mechanism on the likely oil and gas fields straddling India- Sri Lanka maritime boundary; promotion of dialogue on security and defence issues including an annual defence dialogue; and promoting the use of space technology for a variety of services. The Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance on Criminal Matters and Agreement on Transfer of Sentenced Prisoners signed during the visit would provide for structural improvement to security and legal framework.
The Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) proposal was not mentioned in the joint statement, although measures for developing “a framework for sustainable economic partnership and addressing outstanding issues” of the Free Trade Agreement found a place in the joint statement. This would indicate that CEPA would come up sooner than later. The agreement on establishing Indian consular presence in Jaffna and in Hambantota also should be viewed in the context of furthering trading interests rather than strategic linkages.
China-Sri Lanka agreements
Chinese Vice-Premier, Zhang Dejiang led a 30-member delegation to Sri Lanka on a three-day official trip close on the heels of President Rajapaksa's visit to India. It showed Sri Lanka’s careful balancing of relations between India and China.
During the visit Sri Lanka signed six agreements for enhanced cooperation in highways development, information technology and communications, development of maritime ports and the second phase of the Hambantota Port Development project (for which China has offered financial assistance of US$ 200 million) and maintenance of the Bandaranaike Memorial International Conference Hall built by China.
Vice Premier Zhang, when he met President Rajapaksa on June 12, also discussed the progress of projects including the Norochcholai Coal Power Project, the Hambantota Port Development and the Mattala International Airport.
International issues
Sri Lanka has reacted angrily to UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon’s appointment of an expert panel to advise him on human rights violations in the final stage of the island’s civil war. The UN panel announced on June 22 is headed by former Indonesian Attorney General Marzuki Darusman, with Ms Yasmin Sooka, a former member of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission and Steven Ratner, an American law professor, as members. According to a UN spokesperson the advisory panel’s mandate was limited to advising the secretary general and it was “not a fact-finding or investigative body.”
President Rajapaksa rejected the UN move, and the External affairs minister G.L. Peiris called it “an unnecessary interference” and said the government should be given “a free space to make its own findings.” The government has also said it would not issue visa for the UN panel members to visit Sri Lanka. China, Japan, India and Russia had been generally supportive of Sri Lanka government move to investigate the human rights aberrations on its own while the West, particularly the EU and the United States had been for an international panel.
Although the issue has whipped up national sentiments among the people, both General Sarath Fonseka, army commander during the war who is under arrest now, and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam’s US based activist and a member of the Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam Rudrakumaran have offered to co-operate with the UN panel. This is likely to further embarrass the Sri Lanka government who see an international conspiracy to demean the country’s achievement in these moves.
As though to confirm this conjecture, the EU also announced on June 22 that it would extend GSP+ tariff concessions to Sri Lanka after August 15 for “a limited additional period, subject to a clear and written commitment” to undertake 15 specific actions it considered as related to human rights within a six-month period from July.
The 15 areas for action included implementation of the Sri Lankan constitution’s 17th Amendment, the repeal of emergency regulations, co-operation with UN human rights bodies, release of a list of detained LTTE combatants and other suspects, and an end to harassment of journalists.
Prof GL Peiris, External Affairs Minister, rejecting the conditions said the government would not “surrender decision making powers, very sensitive and crucial matters to any foreign government.”
This does not augur well for Sri Lankan exports, particularly ready made garments which are heavily dependent upon EU markets. In the coming months we can expect Sri Lanka government to scale down its rhetoric and take some action repair its international relations.
National budget
Sri Lanka budget for the current year, already delayed by seven months, aims to reduce the budget deficit to 8% as against last year’s 9.9% deficit. This would represent the biggest reduction in deficit in recent times. With a view to spur growth targeted at 7% this year the government halved the import tax on cars and cut levies on electronics goods in the run up to the budget. The government hopes to increase tax revenue to at least 17 percent of GDP over the medium term, from 14.5 percent in 2009.
However, its meagre increase in wages for government servants and levy of additional taxes on food articles are likely to stir up public protests.
Sri Lanka’s budget plans are apparently in conformity with the International Monetary Fund’s conditional loan to replenish Sri Lanka’s foreign exchange reserves. Under the IMF’s $2.5 billion loan programme, during the month the fund approved the release of fifth tranche of $ 408 million. This would indicate the IMF is satisfied with the government’s measures to tighten fiscal discipline.
Political moves
The government appears to have taken some action to use Kumaran Pathmanathan known better as KP, former international representative of the Tamil Tigers held in captivity, to build better relations with pro-LTTE Diaspora. In a carefully orchestrated move it allowed KP to visit North with a Diaspora delegation ostensibly to consider some rehabilitation project. In the coming months its political impact could be far reaching.
June 30, 2010
South Asia Security Trends Vol 4 No 6
Courtesy: www.security-risks.com
Sunday, July 4, 2010
The Grateful Dead
This is not about any rock band of the same name as the title. I have been writing about the way people have chosen to ignore the war dead in this country. Many Indian soldiers in the heavens of warriors must be grateful they are dead. They have been spared of the ignominy politicians have been heaping upon soldiers, insulting the memories of their dead comrades. This piece is bout one more such instance.
In Bangalore, or Bengaluru to be politically correct, the Karnataka government has suddenly dropped the project for national memorial for war heroes - after completing 80% if earth work in work order if Rs 12.62 crores -that is about Rs 9 crores.
As the media reports said the government has taken a sudden U-turn on the decision to build a memorial to the 1971 Bangladesh war heroes at the Indira Gandhi Musical Fountain Park.
It had earlier resisted the pleas of residents of the Krishna Apartment Owners’ Association (KAOA) who were against the constuction as they felt it was eating into the "green lung" of the park in their midst. When the government refused to budge they approached the Karnataka High Court. However, after the High Court allowed the work to proceed, the Association had taken the issue to the Supreme Court. The apex court had scheduled the next hearing on the case on July 26.
The memorial was to be maintained by a trust chaired by the Chief Minister, with highranking army officers as its members.
Rajeev Chandrasekhar, MP and chairman of the National Military Memorial Committee, commenting on the latest government move said “The decision could have been taken much earlier by the CM. This would have spared tremendous cost, money and time spent by many people of our city, and most importantly, spared the many families of martyrs and veterans the humiliation and trauma of this unseemly controversy.” But who cares for such niceties, Mr Chandrasekhar?
Apologising to the families of martyrs and veterans for "this unseemly and unfortunate controversy," he said he had been "subjected to many personal attacks during this whole episode by some socalled elite citizens of our city." But is it any surprise, with elitism creeping in the midst of political-bureaucracy-business mafia in power everywhere? Every issue is being used to exercise power and not achieve results. Chandrasekhar went on to "reassure families of these martyrs that a large majority of citizens have the greatest regard and respect for them and their loved ones...” We are delighted to hear such words; but with due apologies to him, they sound hollow when they are uttered in the wake of one more act of ignominy.
The Times News Network had speculated whether the cause for the government volte face was Rajeev Chandrasekhar’s recent outbursts against the Yeddyurappa government on the Lokayukta and tardy flood relief works. I will not be surprised if this is true. He would not be the first chief minister to do so to settle political scores.
Chief Minister B S Yeddyurappa has promised the legislative council to "look for new space far better than the present one." So we can expect the charade to continue for another two to three years before a site is selected. And the same people who took the botched decision earlier are supposed to act on this!
The work on the ground for the memorial has stopped at Indira Gandhi Musical Fountain Park. According to media reports the project engineer had said that all civil works were almost done. They quoted him as saying “We will have to pay as per the tenders finalized for the earth work completed till date." That is at least Rs 9 crores of public money down the drain. But who cares about public money, when the public themselves don't bother?
The KAOA secretary had some advice to the memorial committe. He asked it to identify "a bigger, better, non-controversial site in a place that’s accessible to all, taking the local residents along for their valuable suggestions and support." That is a lofty thought never applied to the way things are done in this country. As he said the process "most importantly, it should be transparent." Is he talking about government decision making in India? Opaqueness is the life blood of politicians and bureaucracy in this country.
I have always wondered why the government has to build memorials for the war dead in this country? Where is the civil society? They should take a look at the Matthew Hickley's 20 September 2007 report in the Daily Mail, UK.
Or they may take a look at the decision of the Westminster Council to permit the construction of an open style pavilion costing £ 3.5 million pounds for a memorial to the war dead of Bomber Command at the Piccadilly entrance to Green Park. The memorial, to be built by 2012, will commemorate the 55,573 crew of Bomber Command, with an average age of 22, who were killed in World War II.
But then, we are not living in the UK. The reality here is to forget the war dead and pander the nethas by making cut outs and statues out of public money. I suppose that is our culture.
In Bangalore, or Bengaluru to be politically correct, the Karnataka government has suddenly dropped the project for national memorial for war heroes - after completing 80% if earth work in work order if Rs 12.62 crores -that is about Rs 9 crores.
As the media reports said the government has taken a sudden U-turn on the decision to build a memorial to the 1971 Bangladesh war heroes at the Indira Gandhi Musical Fountain Park.
It had earlier resisted the pleas of residents of the Krishna Apartment Owners’ Association (KAOA) who were against the constuction as they felt it was eating into the "green lung" of the park in their midst. When the government refused to budge they approached the Karnataka High Court. However, after the High Court allowed the work to proceed, the Association had taken the issue to the Supreme Court. The apex court had scheduled the next hearing on the case on July 26.
The memorial was to be maintained by a trust chaired by the Chief Minister, with highranking army officers as its members.
Rajeev Chandrasekhar, MP and chairman of the National Military Memorial Committee, commenting on the latest government move said “The decision could have been taken much earlier by the CM. This would have spared tremendous cost, money and time spent by many people of our city, and most importantly, spared the many families of martyrs and veterans the humiliation and trauma of this unseemly controversy.” But who cares for such niceties, Mr Chandrasekhar?
Apologising to the families of martyrs and veterans for "this unseemly and unfortunate controversy," he said he had been "subjected to many personal attacks during this whole episode by some socalled elite citizens of our city." But is it any surprise, with elitism creeping in the midst of political-bureaucracy-business mafia in power everywhere? Every issue is being used to exercise power and not achieve results. Chandrasekhar went on to "reassure families of these martyrs that a large majority of citizens have the greatest regard and respect for them and their loved ones...” We are delighted to hear such words; but with due apologies to him, they sound hollow when they are uttered in the wake of one more act of ignominy.
The Times News Network had speculated whether the cause for the government volte face was Rajeev Chandrasekhar’s recent outbursts against the Yeddyurappa government on the Lokayukta and tardy flood relief works. I will not be surprised if this is true. He would not be the first chief minister to do so to settle political scores.
Chief Minister B S Yeddyurappa has promised the legislative council to "look for new space far better than the present one." So we can expect the charade to continue for another two to three years before a site is selected. And the same people who took the botched decision earlier are supposed to act on this!
The work on the ground for the memorial has stopped at Indira Gandhi Musical Fountain Park. According to media reports the project engineer had said that all civil works were almost done. They quoted him as saying “We will have to pay as per the tenders finalized for the earth work completed till date." That is at least Rs 9 crores of public money down the drain. But who cares about public money, when the public themselves don't bother?
The KAOA secretary had some advice to the memorial committe. He asked it to identify "a bigger, better, non-controversial site in a place that’s accessible to all, taking the local residents along for their valuable suggestions and support." That is a lofty thought never applied to the way things are done in this country. As he said the process "most importantly, it should be transparent." Is he talking about government decision making in India? Opaqueness is the life blood of politicians and bureaucracy in this country.
I have always wondered why the government has to build memorials for the war dead in this country? Where is the civil society? They should take a look at the Matthew Hickley's 20 September 2007 report in the Daily Mail, UK.
Or they may take a look at the decision of the Westminster Council to permit the construction of an open style pavilion costing £ 3.5 million pounds for a memorial to the war dead of Bomber Command at the Piccadilly entrance to Green Park. The memorial, to be built by 2012, will commemorate the 55,573 crew of Bomber Command, with an average age of 22, who were killed in World War II.
But then, we are not living in the UK. The reality here is to forget the war dead and pander the nethas by making cut outs and statues out of public money. I suppose that is our culture.
Saturday, July 3, 2010
Tamil blog on Eelam Tamil issue
My e-mail interview in Tamil on Sri Lanka Tamil issue given to the Eelam Nation News website on June 29, 2010 has been uploaded in my Tamil blog at http://hariharanalasal.blogspot.com/
To access it kindly click on . Of course the interview is available at the website of the Eelam Nation News at www.eelamnationnews.com
To access it kindly click on . Of course the interview is available at the website of the Eelam Nation News at www.eelamnationnews.com
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