1. ‘Frankensteinistan foretold by Dhiren Barot’ describes how lone Jihadist of Hindu origin and subsequent neo-convert to Islam Dhiren Barot (currently languishing in a British Jail for having planned attacks on New York city) saw Pakistan state’s role in Jihadi terrorism way back in 1999.
URL http://offstumped.wordpress.com/2010/05/29/frankensteinistan-foretold-by-dhiren-barot/
2. ‘Why India must swing’ by Nitin Pai explains why despite an alignment of interests, India must not always side with the United States. It must swing.
URL http://in.news.yahoo.com/columnist/nitin_pai/2/why-india-must-swing
3. ‘Sen. Tom Coburn: America’s Fiscal Defense Crisis’ U.S. Senator Tom Coburn analyses the woes of U.S. armed forces; most of the problems are faced by Indian armed forces also.
URL: http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/Sen-Tom-Coburn-Americas-Fiscal-Defense-Crisis-06412/
Friday, May 28, 2010
Intelligence: No More Co-Ordination Czar?
By B. Raman
The “Times of India” has reported (May 28,2010) that the Government of India is contemplating the setting up under the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) of a coordination committee on all matters concerning security and intelligence. This committee will initially comprise the National Security Adviser (NSA), the Cabinet Secretary and the Union Home Secretary.
2. If this proposal is approved and comes into being, it could mean the retention of the co-ordination responsibility in the PMO, but with the NSA, who is part of the PMO, sharing that responsibility with the Cabinet Secretary and the Home Secretary,instead of exercising that responsibility exclusively as has been the practice till now.
3. The Task Force for the Revamping of the Intelligence Apparatus set up in 2000 under the chairmanship of Shri G.C.Saxena, former head of the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW) and the then Governor of Jammu & Kashmir, had recommended a two-tier mechanism for co-ordination---- the first consisting of all intelligence agencies and the second in respect of technical intelligence. It recommended that the Principal Secretary to the PM, in his concurrent capacity as the NSA, should head both. Shri Brajesh Mishra thus became the Co-ordination Czar of the then Government of Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee.
4. Shri J.N.Dixit, who succeeded Shri Mishra as the NSA in 2004, and Shri M.K. Narayanan, who succeeded Shri Dixit after his death in January 2005, continued to exercise exclusively the responsibility for co-ordination with the Principal Secretary to the PM having no responsibility in the matter. While the intelligence agencies were not quite comfortable with Shri Dixit inheriting this role, they were quite happy with Shri Narayanan, a former head of the Intelligence Bureau and a former Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, exercising this responsibility.
5. Ever since Shri P.Chidambaram took over as the Home Minister after the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai, there were indications that he was not happy over the marginalization of the role of his Ministry in the co-ordination of the functioning of the intelligence community. It was apparent from his 22nd Intelligence Bureau Centenary Endowment Lecture at New Delhi on December 23, 2009, that he wanted his role and that of his Ministry in matters relating to internal security management to be strengthened. His desire for a more participatory and active role for the MHA in the co-ordination of the functioning of the TECHINT agencies became clear during his intervention in the Lok Sabha at the time of the recent debate over allegations of phone-tapping by the National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO).
6. If Shri Chidambaram has his way it would dilute the role of the PMO in general and the new NSA, Shri Shiv Shankar Menon, in particular in the co-ordination of the functioning of the intelligence and security agencies. If the TOI report is correct, the PMO is trying to find a new mechanism under which the PMO will continue to exercise the co-ordination responsibilities through the NSA, while at the same time partly satisfying the desire of Shri Chidambaram by making the NSA share this responsibility with the Cabinet Secretary and the Home Secretary.
7. Before 2000, the responsibility for co-ordination was being exercised by the Secretaries’ Committee chaired by the Cabinet Secretary and consisting of the Home, Defence and Foreign Secretaries and the Principal Secretary to the PM. This collective responsibility for co-ordination, which was replaced in 2000 by the exclusive responsibility of the NSA, is now sought to be revived in a modified form under which the NSA will still be responsible for co-ordination but with his powers shared with the Home Secretary and the Cabinet Secretary. Shri Menon will not be an intelligence and security Czar as his predecessors were.
8. Nor will Shri Chidambaram be the Co-ordination Czar. He will have a more important role than his predecessors since 2000, but not as important as he would have liked it to be.
9. This may please be read in continuation of my earlier article of December 24, 2009, titled “the Internal Security Czar” (reproduced below).
Courtesy: South Asia Analysis Group, May 28, 2010
URL:http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers39%5Cpaper3832.html
Revamping of The Internal Security Machinery
By B. Raman
In a detailed interview to Shri Vir Sanghvi, telecast by the CNBC-TV 18 channel, Shri P.Chidambaram, Minister for Home Affairs of the Government of India, has spoken, inter alia, of how in his view the counter-terrorism machinery of the Government of India should work. Relevant extracts from the interview are annexed.
2. Two important points emerge from the interview---- the exclusive responsibility of the Home Minister to exercise political oversight over the internal security machinery and the limited executive role of the National Security Adviser (NSA) in internal security management.
3. The principle of the exclusive responsibility of the Home Minister for internal security management had been observed right from the days of Jawaharlal Nehru as the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister of the day depended on the Home Minister for ensuring that internal security was effectively maintained. For this purpose, the Home Minister had under his administrative and operational control the Intelligence Bureau and the various central police organizations or para-military forces. He also had the responsibility for guiding and co-ordinating the work of the State Police forces.
4. The line of responsibility for political oversight was very clear with no room for doubt till the assassination of Indira Gandhi in October, 1984. After her assassination, this clear line of responsibility got increasingly diluted or blurred due to various reasons such as the following:
• The creation of new agencies for security-related duties such as the Special Protection Group (SPG) for the security of the incumbent and past Prime Ministers and their families and the National Security Guards (NSGs) as a special intervention force against terrorism. Rajiv Gandhi, the then Prime Minister, decided that the SPG and the NSG should work under the political oversight of the Prime Minister and the operational oversight of the Cabinet Secretary.
• Terrorism assuming international dimensions necessitating co-operation with the counter-terrorism and homeland security agencies of other countries. Diplomacy assumed an important role in counter-terrorism particularly against State sponsors of terrorism. The US created a counter-terrorism division in the State Department to deal with these international and diplomatic dimensions. It continues to function even after the creation of the Department of Homeland Security in 2004. Some other countries followed the US model. Under Shri Atal Behari Vajpayee, this international and diplomatic dimension was given greater importance than under the predecessor Governments. A number of Joint Counter-Terrorism Working Groups with different countries came into existence and joint counter-terrorism exercises were organized with interested countries, including the US and China. While the responsibility for the co-ordination of the international and diplomatic dimensions was given to the Ministry of External Affairs, the Ministry of Defence exercised the co-ordination responsibilities in respect of joint counter-terrorism exercises.
• With terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda and its associates acquiring or attempting to acquire specialized capabilities for what came to be known as catastrophic terrorism such as terrorism involving the use of weapons of mass destruction material, terrorism in the cyber space to disrupt or destroy critical infrastructure, aviation terrorism, maritime terrorism etc, the need for the State acquiring specialized counter-capabilities was realized. For meeting these needs, the role of the Ministry of Defence, the Armed Forces and the various science and technology institutions naturally got enhanced.
5. The problems we face in India arise from the fact that whereas terrorism has increasingly assumed new dimensions and new frontiers, no attempt has been made to work out a comprehensive approach to deal with terrorism in its classical form, terrorism in its post-9/11 form and likely forms of terrorism of the future as well as with State-sponsors of terrorism such as Pakistan and other States failing to act against terrorism such as Bangladesh. While the threat posed by terrorism of different hues continues to evolve, our concepts to deal with it has not been keeping pace with the threat.
6. In working out a comprehensive approach to internal security management in general and counter-terrorism in particular, the National Security Adviser (NSA) has to play an important role as an ideas man, who looks beyond the day-to-day nuts and bolts aspect of counter-terrorism. Shri Chidambaram is right when he says that the NSA should have little executive role in internal security management. The executive role has to be that of the Home Minister. However, the NSA has to play an active role in evolving concepts which take into account the international and specialized dimensions of the new terrorism of today. He would also be the right person for co-ordinating and supervising the evolving machinery to facilitate India taking advantage of the growing international co-operation against terrorism.
7. The concept of intelligence co-ordination has also been evolving. The role of intelligence in internal security management has many components:
• Intelligence collection within our frontiers.
• Trans-border intelligence collection.
• Intelligence collection in foreign countries.
• Use of technical gadgets for the collection of intelligence specifically required for internal security management.
• Use of technical gadgets for the collection of intelligence of relevance to internal as well as external security.
8. Presently, there is no single Ministry or Department capable of co-ordinating all these roles. Is it necessary to create a single nodal point in the Prime Minister’s office to co-ordinate these roles in the form of a National Intelligence Adviser? This question has been posed by different analysts from time to time since the Kargil conflict of 1999, but has not been addressed seriously. It is time to address it as part of an exercise to revamp our security machinery----internal as well as external.
9. In India, the concept of an intelligence community has not evolved. Similarly, the concept of leadership roles in security-related matters has not received attention. In the US, under the Intelligence Community Act, all agencies are required to function as an organic whole. There is a consolidated intelligence budget for the community as a whole, which is prepared and got approved by the Congress by the Director, National Intelligence. After the Congressional approval, he makes the individual allocations to different agencies. The leadership role in respect of counter-intelligence is with the FBI, in respect of counter-terrorism with the National Counter-Terrorism Centre, in respect of Homeland Security with the Department of Homeland Security and in respect of covert actions with the CIA. The designated leaders coordinate the follow-up action.
10. In Israel, the leadership role in respect of internal security is that of Shin Bet, the security agency, in respect of external security that of Mossad, the external intelligence Agency, and in respect of trans-border security that of the military intelligence agency. We dot not have such clearly-defined leadership roles.
11. From a perusal of Shri Chidambaram’s address of December 23, 2009, in the Intelligence Bureau, and his latest interview to Shri Vir Sanghvi, it is apparent that he has been approaching the exercise for the revamping of our security machinery essentially from the point of view of the Home Ministry. This is a very important aspect, but it is equally important to give the exercise a larger dimension in order to evolve a comprehensive security machinery with clearly laid down concepts, carefully defined leadership roles and a workable co-ordination drill. In such a larger exercise, the NSA has to play an active role not only as an adviser to the Prime Minister, but also to the Cabinet as a whole in matters relating to national security.
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)
ANNEXURE
EXTRACTS FROM THE INTERVIEW OF SHRI P.CHIDAMBARAM, HOME MINISTER OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, BY SHRI VIR SANGHVI FOR THE CNBC-TV 18 CHANNEL
Vir Sanghvi: The other thing that is said is that the first thing you did apparently when you took over as Home Minister is you instituted a meeting at apparently noon every day at which the chiefs of intelligence agencies came and you had a look at what the situation on the ground was and that the National Security Advisor also started coming to these meetings. There is a suggestion that you were given as part of your brief the job of bringing the security agencies within the ambit of the home ministry, is this accurate?
P Chidambaram: No that is a job I wrote for myself.
Vir Sanghvi: It was completely your own job description?
P Chidambaram: Yes but then when I took over, the Prime Minister graciously said, you will have a free hand because time is very limited, and if there is any problem, come back to me. When I thought about my job that weekend, I said, the first thing is we must bring everybody together, because I had to learn and act and change and deliver all in five months.
Vir Sanghvi: You know the background which is it is being posited by many people that you took away a lot of jobs that Narayanan use to do – your answer is always been look you people are making too much of this we have been friends for years – but let us leave friendship out of this. On purely functional terms you did take over a lot of the job didn’t you?
P Chidambaram: No. I did not take away any of his responsibilities. I did not take over any of his responsibilities. All I said was that whoever is doing whatever, it must be under political oversight. I happened to be the person providing the political oversight and therefore everybody accepted it.
Vir Sanghvi: Which is a departure from what had happened before? In Mr Advani’s time it did not happen, Mr Shivraj Patil’s time it didn’t happen. So in that sense the home ministry did assert itself over the national security advisor.
P Chidambaram: That is how it should be isn’t it.
Vir Sanghvi: I personally agree that is how it should be but it wasn’t how it was?
P Chidambaram: It wasn’t for whatever reason I do not know. But if I was going to be responsible as I was made responsible on that day then I was going to make sure that I knew it was going on. The only way that I could know what was going on what happen and what did not happen was to exercise political oversight over every agency that was concerned with security.
Vir Sanghvi: My question to you therefore is what is the role of national security advisor should he be an intelligence overload to whom the chief of intelligence’s report should he be an advisor to the Prime Minister?
P Chidambaram: Essentially I think he is an advisor to the Prime Minister, advisor to the National Security Council. He heads a very important body, the NSES, the Secretariat, which combines not only intelligence from internal security matters but a number of other things - Diplomatic intelligence, external intelligence, nuclear command authority etc.
So he brings all the strands together and then advises the Prime Minister. Surely he must be in the loop as far as internal security is concerned, who can he not be in the loop, he has to be in the loop. But whether he should have executive responsibility given the pressures of work and time I think is an open question.
My personal view is that he should have very few executive responsibilities as far as internal security is concerned. That should be given to other professionals.
Vir Sanghvi: That leads me to the question of where Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW) reports because R&AW cannot report to the home ministry by definition because it is an external agency, of course you have said that when it comes to terrorism the R&AW chief must be involved because there has to be a nodal point on terrorism. But what happens to R&AW, it is a bit fatherless, isn’t it in the current system?
P Chidambaram: R&AW reports to the Prime Minister now. But I think there is broad agreement that so far as counter terrorism is concerned, I don't think anybody has a serious objection that R&AW would have to report to the Home Minister.
Vir Sanghvi: Let me now go back to 26/11, do you think one of the reasons we were so ill-prepared for what happened was because mechanisms like these were not in place?
P Chidambaram: Yes, of course. There should have been one point where everything converged, all information converged. Today it converges in a group of about six-seven people who meet everyday. That is how it should be which is what the National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) will be.
It will be an institutional mechanism rather than an individual-headed mechanism. And the response will be an institutional response rather than an individual driven response.
Vir Sanghvi: You have seen the evidence that there was a fair amount of intelligence pointing to 26/11 which was ignored. Do you think it was inevitable that would have been ignored or if there had been a system like this in place we would have acted on it?
P Chidambaram: The system in this place would have surely connected the dots. There were three separate pieces of information, they were not connected.
Vir Sanghvi: So there was a failure?
P Chidambaram: I said so.
Vir Sanghvi: There were two aspect to 26/11, one was that 26/11 happened without us knowing because we didn’t connect the dots as you said. The second was our response which was surely inadequate and took too long to put together, so would that happen again?
P Chidambaram: I don’t think so. If god forbids anything like 26/11 happens, we will respond in a much swifter passion. We have a much better command and control system here and our people will respond very quickly.
Vir Sanghvi: What about state police forces, one of the problems of 26/11 was that they now know were the problems within the Bombay Police, and it’s the same?
P Chidambaram: That’s not correct, they are getting better every day, the capacity is better, response time is quicker. We have set out SOPs now and when we sent the NSG or the Central Paramilitary force what will be the command and control structure. They can command any plane, why their own plane.
Vir Sanghvi: Which they were allowed to under the NSG act any how?
P Chidambaram: Because no body had been authorized to do that.
Vir Sanghvi: It was as simple as that?
P Chidambaram: I think so. I am not going into the past I didn’t decide that I will issue but I issued authority and they can take over any plane now.
The “Times of India” has reported (May 28,2010) that the Government of India is contemplating the setting up under the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) of a coordination committee on all matters concerning security and intelligence. This committee will initially comprise the National Security Adviser (NSA), the Cabinet Secretary and the Union Home Secretary.
2. If this proposal is approved and comes into being, it could mean the retention of the co-ordination responsibility in the PMO, but with the NSA, who is part of the PMO, sharing that responsibility with the Cabinet Secretary and the Home Secretary,instead of exercising that responsibility exclusively as has been the practice till now.
3. The Task Force for the Revamping of the Intelligence Apparatus set up in 2000 under the chairmanship of Shri G.C.Saxena, former head of the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW) and the then Governor of Jammu & Kashmir, had recommended a two-tier mechanism for co-ordination---- the first consisting of all intelligence agencies and the second in respect of technical intelligence. It recommended that the Principal Secretary to the PM, in his concurrent capacity as the NSA, should head both. Shri Brajesh Mishra thus became the Co-ordination Czar of the then Government of Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee.
4. Shri J.N.Dixit, who succeeded Shri Mishra as the NSA in 2004, and Shri M.K. Narayanan, who succeeded Shri Dixit after his death in January 2005, continued to exercise exclusively the responsibility for co-ordination with the Principal Secretary to the PM having no responsibility in the matter. While the intelligence agencies were not quite comfortable with Shri Dixit inheriting this role, they were quite happy with Shri Narayanan, a former head of the Intelligence Bureau and a former Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, exercising this responsibility.
5. Ever since Shri P.Chidambaram took over as the Home Minister after the 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai, there were indications that he was not happy over the marginalization of the role of his Ministry in the co-ordination of the functioning of the intelligence community. It was apparent from his 22nd Intelligence Bureau Centenary Endowment Lecture at New Delhi on December 23, 2009, that he wanted his role and that of his Ministry in matters relating to internal security management to be strengthened. His desire for a more participatory and active role for the MHA in the co-ordination of the functioning of the TECHINT agencies became clear during his intervention in the Lok Sabha at the time of the recent debate over allegations of phone-tapping by the National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO).
6. If Shri Chidambaram has his way it would dilute the role of the PMO in general and the new NSA, Shri Shiv Shankar Menon, in particular in the co-ordination of the functioning of the intelligence and security agencies. If the TOI report is correct, the PMO is trying to find a new mechanism under which the PMO will continue to exercise the co-ordination responsibilities through the NSA, while at the same time partly satisfying the desire of Shri Chidambaram by making the NSA share this responsibility with the Cabinet Secretary and the Home Secretary.
7. Before 2000, the responsibility for co-ordination was being exercised by the Secretaries’ Committee chaired by the Cabinet Secretary and consisting of the Home, Defence and Foreign Secretaries and the Principal Secretary to the PM. This collective responsibility for co-ordination, which was replaced in 2000 by the exclusive responsibility of the NSA, is now sought to be revived in a modified form under which the NSA will still be responsible for co-ordination but with his powers shared with the Home Secretary and the Cabinet Secretary. Shri Menon will not be an intelligence and security Czar as his predecessors were.
8. Nor will Shri Chidambaram be the Co-ordination Czar. He will have a more important role than his predecessors since 2000, but not as important as he would have liked it to be.
9. This may please be read in continuation of my earlier article of December 24, 2009, titled “the Internal Security Czar” (reproduced below).
Courtesy: South Asia Analysis Group, May 28, 2010
URL:http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers39%5Cpaper3832.html
Revamping of The Internal Security Machinery
By B. Raman
In a detailed interview to Shri Vir Sanghvi, telecast by the CNBC-TV 18 channel, Shri P.Chidambaram, Minister for Home Affairs of the Government of India, has spoken, inter alia, of how in his view the counter-terrorism machinery of the Government of India should work. Relevant extracts from the interview are annexed.
2. Two important points emerge from the interview---- the exclusive responsibility of the Home Minister to exercise political oversight over the internal security machinery and the limited executive role of the National Security Adviser (NSA) in internal security management.
3. The principle of the exclusive responsibility of the Home Minister for internal security management had been observed right from the days of Jawaharlal Nehru as the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister of the day depended on the Home Minister for ensuring that internal security was effectively maintained. For this purpose, the Home Minister had under his administrative and operational control the Intelligence Bureau and the various central police organizations or para-military forces. He also had the responsibility for guiding and co-ordinating the work of the State Police forces.
4. The line of responsibility for political oversight was very clear with no room for doubt till the assassination of Indira Gandhi in October, 1984. After her assassination, this clear line of responsibility got increasingly diluted or blurred due to various reasons such as the following:
• The creation of new agencies for security-related duties such as the Special Protection Group (SPG) for the security of the incumbent and past Prime Ministers and their families and the National Security Guards (NSGs) as a special intervention force against terrorism. Rajiv Gandhi, the then Prime Minister, decided that the SPG and the NSG should work under the political oversight of the Prime Minister and the operational oversight of the Cabinet Secretary.
• Terrorism assuming international dimensions necessitating co-operation with the counter-terrorism and homeland security agencies of other countries. Diplomacy assumed an important role in counter-terrorism particularly against State sponsors of terrorism. The US created a counter-terrorism division in the State Department to deal with these international and diplomatic dimensions. It continues to function even after the creation of the Department of Homeland Security in 2004. Some other countries followed the US model. Under Shri Atal Behari Vajpayee, this international and diplomatic dimension was given greater importance than under the predecessor Governments. A number of Joint Counter-Terrorism Working Groups with different countries came into existence and joint counter-terrorism exercises were organized with interested countries, including the US and China. While the responsibility for the co-ordination of the international and diplomatic dimensions was given to the Ministry of External Affairs, the Ministry of Defence exercised the co-ordination responsibilities in respect of joint counter-terrorism exercises.
• With terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda and its associates acquiring or attempting to acquire specialized capabilities for what came to be known as catastrophic terrorism such as terrorism involving the use of weapons of mass destruction material, terrorism in the cyber space to disrupt or destroy critical infrastructure, aviation terrorism, maritime terrorism etc, the need for the State acquiring specialized counter-capabilities was realized. For meeting these needs, the role of the Ministry of Defence, the Armed Forces and the various science and technology institutions naturally got enhanced.
5. The problems we face in India arise from the fact that whereas terrorism has increasingly assumed new dimensions and new frontiers, no attempt has been made to work out a comprehensive approach to deal with terrorism in its classical form, terrorism in its post-9/11 form and likely forms of terrorism of the future as well as with State-sponsors of terrorism such as Pakistan and other States failing to act against terrorism such as Bangladesh. While the threat posed by terrorism of different hues continues to evolve, our concepts to deal with it has not been keeping pace with the threat.
6. In working out a comprehensive approach to internal security management in general and counter-terrorism in particular, the National Security Adviser (NSA) has to play an important role as an ideas man, who looks beyond the day-to-day nuts and bolts aspect of counter-terrorism. Shri Chidambaram is right when he says that the NSA should have little executive role in internal security management. The executive role has to be that of the Home Minister. However, the NSA has to play an active role in evolving concepts which take into account the international and specialized dimensions of the new terrorism of today. He would also be the right person for co-ordinating and supervising the evolving machinery to facilitate India taking advantage of the growing international co-operation against terrorism.
7. The concept of intelligence co-ordination has also been evolving. The role of intelligence in internal security management has many components:
• Intelligence collection within our frontiers.
• Trans-border intelligence collection.
• Intelligence collection in foreign countries.
• Use of technical gadgets for the collection of intelligence specifically required for internal security management.
• Use of technical gadgets for the collection of intelligence of relevance to internal as well as external security.
8. Presently, there is no single Ministry or Department capable of co-ordinating all these roles. Is it necessary to create a single nodal point in the Prime Minister’s office to co-ordinate these roles in the form of a National Intelligence Adviser? This question has been posed by different analysts from time to time since the Kargil conflict of 1999, but has not been addressed seriously. It is time to address it as part of an exercise to revamp our security machinery----internal as well as external.
9. In India, the concept of an intelligence community has not evolved. Similarly, the concept of leadership roles in security-related matters has not received attention. In the US, under the Intelligence Community Act, all agencies are required to function as an organic whole. There is a consolidated intelligence budget for the community as a whole, which is prepared and got approved by the Congress by the Director, National Intelligence. After the Congressional approval, he makes the individual allocations to different agencies. The leadership role in respect of counter-intelligence is with the FBI, in respect of counter-terrorism with the National Counter-Terrorism Centre, in respect of Homeland Security with the Department of Homeland Security and in respect of covert actions with the CIA. The designated leaders coordinate the follow-up action.
10. In Israel, the leadership role in respect of internal security is that of Shin Bet, the security agency, in respect of external security that of Mossad, the external intelligence Agency, and in respect of trans-border security that of the military intelligence agency. We dot not have such clearly-defined leadership roles.
11. From a perusal of Shri Chidambaram’s address of December 23, 2009, in the Intelligence Bureau, and his latest interview to Shri Vir Sanghvi, it is apparent that he has been approaching the exercise for the revamping of our security machinery essentially from the point of view of the Home Ministry. This is a very important aspect, but it is equally important to give the exercise a larger dimension in order to evolve a comprehensive security machinery with clearly laid down concepts, carefully defined leadership roles and a workable co-ordination drill. In such a larger exercise, the NSA has to play an active role not only as an adviser to the Prime Minister, but also to the Cabinet as a whole in matters relating to national security.
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)
ANNEXURE
EXTRACTS FROM THE INTERVIEW OF SHRI P.CHIDAMBARAM, HOME MINISTER OF THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, BY SHRI VIR SANGHVI FOR THE CNBC-TV 18 CHANNEL
Vir Sanghvi: The other thing that is said is that the first thing you did apparently when you took over as Home Minister is you instituted a meeting at apparently noon every day at which the chiefs of intelligence agencies came and you had a look at what the situation on the ground was and that the National Security Advisor also started coming to these meetings. There is a suggestion that you were given as part of your brief the job of bringing the security agencies within the ambit of the home ministry, is this accurate?
P Chidambaram: No that is a job I wrote for myself.
Vir Sanghvi: It was completely your own job description?
P Chidambaram: Yes but then when I took over, the Prime Minister graciously said, you will have a free hand because time is very limited, and if there is any problem, come back to me. When I thought about my job that weekend, I said, the first thing is we must bring everybody together, because I had to learn and act and change and deliver all in five months.
Vir Sanghvi: You know the background which is it is being posited by many people that you took away a lot of jobs that Narayanan use to do – your answer is always been look you people are making too much of this we have been friends for years – but let us leave friendship out of this. On purely functional terms you did take over a lot of the job didn’t you?
P Chidambaram: No. I did not take away any of his responsibilities. I did not take over any of his responsibilities. All I said was that whoever is doing whatever, it must be under political oversight. I happened to be the person providing the political oversight and therefore everybody accepted it.
Vir Sanghvi: Which is a departure from what had happened before? In Mr Advani’s time it did not happen, Mr Shivraj Patil’s time it didn’t happen. So in that sense the home ministry did assert itself over the national security advisor.
P Chidambaram: That is how it should be isn’t it.
Vir Sanghvi: I personally agree that is how it should be but it wasn’t how it was?
P Chidambaram: It wasn’t for whatever reason I do not know. But if I was going to be responsible as I was made responsible on that day then I was going to make sure that I knew it was going on. The only way that I could know what was going on what happen and what did not happen was to exercise political oversight over every agency that was concerned with security.
Vir Sanghvi: My question to you therefore is what is the role of national security advisor should he be an intelligence overload to whom the chief of intelligence’s report should he be an advisor to the Prime Minister?
P Chidambaram: Essentially I think he is an advisor to the Prime Minister, advisor to the National Security Council. He heads a very important body, the NSES, the Secretariat, which combines not only intelligence from internal security matters but a number of other things - Diplomatic intelligence, external intelligence, nuclear command authority etc.
So he brings all the strands together and then advises the Prime Minister. Surely he must be in the loop as far as internal security is concerned, who can he not be in the loop, he has to be in the loop. But whether he should have executive responsibility given the pressures of work and time I think is an open question.
My personal view is that he should have very few executive responsibilities as far as internal security is concerned. That should be given to other professionals.
Vir Sanghvi: That leads me to the question of where Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW) reports because R&AW cannot report to the home ministry by definition because it is an external agency, of course you have said that when it comes to terrorism the R&AW chief must be involved because there has to be a nodal point on terrorism. But what happens to R&AW, it is a bit fatherless, isn’t it in the current system?
P Chidambaram: R&AW reports to the Prime Minister now. But I think there is broad agreement that so far as counter terrorism is concerned, I don't think anybody has a serious objection that R&AW would have to report to the Home Minister.
Vir Sanghvi: Let me now go back to 26/11, do you think one of the reasons we were so ill-prepared for what happened was because mechanisms like these were not in place?
P Chidambaram: Yes, of course. There should have been one point where everything converged, all information converged. Today it converges in a group of about six-seven people who meet everyday. That is how it should be which is what the National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) will be.
It will be an institutional mechanism rather than an individual-headed mechanism. And the response will be an institutional response rather than an individual driven response.
Vir Sanghvi: You have seen the evidence that there was a fair amount of intelligence pointing to 26/11 which was ignored. Do you think it was inevitable that would have been ignored or if there had been a system like this in place we would have acted on it?
P Chidambaram: The system in this place would have surely connected the dots. There were three separate pieces of information, they were not connected.
Vir Sanghvi: So there was a failure?
P Chidambaram: I said so.
Vir Sanghvi: There were two aspect to 26/11, one was that 26/11 happened without us knowing because we didn’t connect the dots as you said. The second was our response which was surely inadequate and took too long to put together, so would that happen again?
P Chidambaram: I don’t think so. If god forbids anything like 26/11 happens, we will respond in a much swifter passion. We have a much better command and control system here and our people will respond very quickly.
Vir Sanghvi: What about state police forces, one of the problems of 26/11 was that they now know were the problems within the Bombay Police, and it’s the same?
P Chidambaram: That’s not correct, they are getting better every day, the capacity is better, response time is quicker. We have set out SOPs now and when we sent the NSG or the Central Paramilitary force what will be the command and control structure. They can command any plane, why their own plane.
Vir Sanghvi: Which they were allowed to under the NSG act any how?
P Chidambaram: Because no body had been authorized to do that.
Vir Sanghvi: It was as simple as that?
P Chidambaram: I think so. I am not going into the past I didn’t decide that I will issue but I issued authority and they can take over any plane now.
Thursday, May 27, 2010
News Snippets
Army's Kargilgate:
Dont miss Praveen Swami's stories on this sordid tale in yesterday's and today's The Hindu. 'Military tribunal slams Kargil war leadership' at URL http://www.hindu.com/2010/05/27/stories/2010052762611000.htm
and 'Kargil cases point to disturbing command failures' at URL http://www.hindu.com/2010/05/28/stories/2010052861481400.htm
Spy story:
Chand Kumar Prasad, 24, posted in the Navy's Aircraft Maintenance Unit in Mumbai has been arrested on charges of spying for Pakistan. Police claimed to have recovered some "secret and sensitive" documents from him. These include photograph of the Hindan Air Base and map of Meerut Cantonment.Delhi Police's Special Cell from New Delhi Railway Station carried out the arrest on May 27. police sources said. Police alleged that Prasad was passing on classified information to a Pakistan High Commission official through another person.
Is China changing its policy on minorities?
The Dalai Lama sees some change. See The Hindu's Patna datelined news item 'Signs of change emanating within China: Dalai Lama' on the visit of the Dalai Lama for more. URL: http://www.hindu.com/2010/05/28/stories/2010052861681600.htm
Dont miss Praveen Swami's stories on this sordid tale in yesterday's and today's The Hindu. 'Military tribunal slams Kargil war leadership' at URL http://www.hindu.com/2010/05/27/stories/2010052762611000.htm
and 'Kargil cases point to disturbing command failures' at URL http://www.hindu.com/2010/05/28/stories/2010052861481400.htm
Spy story:
Chand Kumar Prasad, 24, posted in the Navy's Aircraft Maintenance Unit in Mumbai has been arrested on charges of spying for Pakistan. Police claimed to have recovered some "secret and sensitive" documents from him. These include photograph of the Hindan Air Base and map of Meerut Cantonment.Delhi Police's Special Cell from New Delhi Railway Station carried out the arrest on May 27. police sources said. Police alleged that Prasad was passing on classified information to a Pakistan High Commission official through another person.
Is China changing its policy on minorities?
The Dalai Lama sees some change. See The Hindu's Patna datelined news item 'Signs of change emanating within China: Dalai Lama' on the visit of the Dalai Lama for more. URL: http://www.hindu.com/2010/05/28/stories/2010052861681600.htm
Thursday, May 20, 2010
Sri Lanka: Lessons to be learnt and unlearnt
President Mahinda Rajapaksa has appointed the much awaited ‘Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission’ (LLRC). The Island newspaper in its editorial ‘Some V-day thoughts’ voiced the pertinent question, “Why should we expend our time and energy to reinvent the wheel?”
The appointment of the commission had been in incubation for nearly a year. Actually Sri Lanka’s Permanent Representative in the UN had spoken about his government initiating a mechanism for fact finding and reconciliation at the UN Security Council Interactive Briefing in June 2009. And after taking so long, why did President Rajapaksa choose the ‘Victory Day’ eve to appoint the commission?
Apparently, Sri Lanka after trying other methods to ward off the flak at the UN on the issue of Sri Lanka’s human rights violations during the war for more than a year has adopted the face saving way of appointing the LLRC. Things came to a boil when the UN Secretary General Ban ki-Moon persisted with his proposal to appointment a panel of experts to look at the issue. Of course, Sri Lanka had tried all means including a botched attempt at getting the NAM representatives to pass a resolution against the UN Secretary General’s move. Significantly, India -Sri Lanka’s closest ally in the sub continent – did not vote for Sri Lanka at the NAM representatives meeting. Did Sri Lanka take a hint? I do not think so.
Since it went to war Sri Lanka government had tied itself in knots over issues of violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms. This had been cause of great concern to civil society both at home and abroad. The state of emergency and the Prevention of Terrorism Act energized during the war came down heavily on any criticism of the government. The sentencing of veteran journalist and columnist J.S. Tissainayagam, sentenced to 20 years of rigorous imprisonment under the anti-terror law was a typical act that put Sri Lanka in the black book of global media. The case attracted so much attention that even the U.S. President Barrack Obama had expressed his concern about it.
The adverse international reaction became worse when the issue of war crimes, particularly as allegations of death of thousands of civilians in the closing stages of war due to army shelling, gathered more mass. The voices at the UN became more strident and critical of Sri Lanka. And Ban ki-Moon’s move was the culmination of these rumblings in Sri Lanka.
Logically, immediately after the victorious war with the elimination of the Tamil Tigers leadership, Sri Lanka should have unshackled all the restrictions imposed during the war. That would have partly met the just demands of civil society; it would have had the advantage of improving the credibility levels of Sri Lanka. But it has not happened so far.
However, it appears President Rajapaksa is trying to tackle this issue by taking small measures to reduce the pressure at a time of his choosing. Tissainayagam was released on bail on the eve of the recent elections. And after the return of the President from the SAARC Summit at Thimphu, early this month the newly appointed Minister of External Affairs Prof GL Peiris announced the President had pardoned the journalist. Did his talks with the Indian Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh during the Summit influence the decision? To be charitable to India, we can think so. If we look at the timing of the appointment of the LLRC it would appear to be so as coincidentally India’s Secretary for External Affairs Ms Nirupama Rao had touched upon the fringe of issues in Sri Lanka that are of concern to India.
If local and international political expediency was behind the appointment of the Commission, it is a little too late as the issues have been ignored for over a year and the critics have gained considerable mileage. In any case, a UN official in New York has clarified that it was not going to stop Ban ki-Moon from appointing an expert panel. According to a media report, the UN official said President Rajapaksa’s commission and the UN Chief’s expert panel were two different concepts due to which Ban Ki Moon would not reconsider appointing his panel. And the UN Secretary General would send his Under Secretary General for Political Affairs Lynn Pascoe to Sri Lanka as soon as clearance is given by the government there.
The UN official’s observations appear correct if we look at the terms of reference of the Commission given in media reports. These are to examine and report on the following aspects:
(a) The facts and circumstances which led to the failure of the ceasefire agreement and the sequence of events that followed thereafter up to May 19 2009
(b) Whether any person, group, or institutions directly or indirectly bear responsibility in this regard.
(c) Lessons learnt from these events in order to ensure that there will be no recurrence.
The wording of the terms of reference is vague and general, rather than specific and pointed. So even if the commission completes its job, it provides sufficient room for endless legal quibbling to delay any action. They will be subject to interpretation whether they cover major issues of civil society concern.
The International Crisis Group has just come out with a detailed report on the war crimes committed by the armed forces and the LTTE. Channel 4 has kindled the fire of war crimes with more inputs. And General Fonseka had brought parliamentary focus on the issue of war crimes. Sri Lanka has to face these issues and take action. International donors who had been supporting Sri Lanka are already weary of its attitude. According to the UN, the country has received only 24% of the total funds ($ 337 million) required for continuing the humanitarian operations. So the appointment of the LLRCis not going to quell strident voices against Sri Lanka. Nor is it going to improve Sri Lanka’s international credibility.
The Commissioners appointed under provisions of Section 2 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act (Chapter 393) has eight prominent personalities as members including at least three with Foreign Service background. Among them is HMGS Palihakkara, former foreign secretary, considered a man of high integrity.
But the issue here is not much as what the LLRC does or finds, but whether its efforts would produce useful results to increase the credibility of the President and the government. After all there had been many commissions in the past which had faced endless obstacles and delaying tactics from the administration. So we can expect the LLRC to make only limping progress in the coming years as every point is debated.
Such squabbling is not unknown. Statutory commissions like the Election Commission, Public Service Commission, Police Commission, Human Rights Commission and the Bribery and Corruption Commission have suffered as appointments to them were mired in political controversy. This has literally ground them to halt and the President is likely to propose amendment to the constitution to enable him to go ahead with the appointment of chairmen and members of these commissions.
Sri Lanka government should ponder over the Island’s original question: “Why should we expend our time and energy to reinvent the wheel?” The newspaper has justified its question aptly: “Lessons that all of us have already learnt and have yet to learn from thirty years of fighting are fairly well known. Some of them are: no community can or must try to suppress another; violence does not pay; this country does not belong to any particular community; all communities belong to it; it is too small to be divided among different communities but certainly large enough for all communities to live in peacefully.”
What has been happening in Sri Lanka brings to mind what Arthur Miller said in The Crucible: “a political party is equated with moral right, and opposition to it with diabolical malevolence. Once such an equation is effectively made, society becomes a congerie of plots and counterplots, and the main role of government changes from that of the arbiter to that of the scourge of God.”
Time is an irredeemable resource and Sri Lanka has already wasted over 20 precious years in debating what was obvious. Why waste time on more meaningless commissions? It is time to get on with positive action, now that the war is over. And to get going Sri Lanka needs an attitudinal change. That is the lesson number one to be learnt.
Courtesy: South Asia Analysis Group
URL: http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cnotes6%5Cnote585.html
The appointment of the commission had been in incubation for nearly a year. Actually Sri Lanka’s Permanent Representative in the UN had spoken about his government initiating a mechanism for fact finding and reconciliation at the UN Security Council Interactive Briefing in June 2009. And after taking so long, why did President Rajapaksa choose the ‘Victory Day’ eve to appoint the commission?
Apparently, Sri Lanka after trying other methods to ward off the flak at the UN on the issue of Sri Lanka’s human rights violations during the war for more than a year has adopted the face saving way of appointing the LLRC. Things came to a boil when the UN Secretary General Ban ki-Moon persisted with his proposal to appointment a panel of experts to look at the issue. Of course, Sri Lanka had tried all means including a botched attempt at getting the NAM representatives to pass a resolution against the UN Secretary General’s move. Significantly, India -Sri Lanka’s closest ally in the sub continent – did not vote for Sri Lanka at the NAM representatives meeting. Did Sri Lanka take a hint? I do not think so.
Since it went to war Sri Lanka government had tied itself in knots over issues of violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms. This had been cause of great concern to civil society both at home and abroad. The state of emergency and the Prevention of Terrorism Act energized during the war came down heavily on any criticism of the government. The sentencing of veteran journalist and columnist J.S. Tissainayagam, sentenced to 20 years of rigorous imprisonment under the anti-terror law was a typical act that put Sri Lanka in the black book of global media. The case attracted so much attention that even the U.S. President Barrack Obama had expressed his concern about it.
The adverse international reaction became worse when the issue of war crimes, particularly as allegations of death of thousands of civilians in the closing stages of war due to army shelling, gathered more mass. The voices at the UN became more strident and critical of Sri Lanka. And Ban ki-Moon’s move was the culmination of these rumblings in Sri Lanka.
Logically, immediately after the victorious war with the elimination of the Tamil Tigers leadership, Sri Lanka should have unshackled all the restrictions imposed during the war. That would have partly met the just demands of civil society; it would have had the advantage of improving the credibility levels of Sri Lanka. But it has not happened so far.
However, it appears President Rajapaksa is trying to tackle this issue by taking small measures to reduce the pressure at a time of his choosing. Tissainayagam was released on bail on the eve of the recent elections. And after the return of the President from the SAARC Summit at Thimphu, early this month the newly appointed Minister of External Affairs Prof GL Peiris announced the President had pardoned the journalist. Did his talks with the Indian Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh during the Summit influence the decision? To be charitable to India, we can think so. If we look at the timing of the appointment of the LLRC it would appear to be so as coincidentally India’s Secretary for External Affairs Ms Nirupama Rao had touched upon the fringe of issues in Sri Lanka that are of concern to India.
If local and international political expediency was behind the appointment of the Commission, it is a little too late as the issues have been ignored for over a year and the critics have gained considerable mileage. In any case, a UN official in New York has clarified that it was not going to stop Ban ki-Moon from appointing an expert panel. According to a media report, the UN official said President Rajapaksa’s commission and the UN Chief’s expert panel were two different concepts due to which Ban Ki Moon would not reconsider appointing his panel. And the UN Secretary General would send his Under Secretary General for Political Affairs Lynn Pascoe to Sri Lanka as soon as clearance is given by the government there.
The UN official’s observations appear correct if we look at the terms of reference of the Commission given in media reports. These are to examine and report on the following aspects:
(a) The facts and circumstances which led to the failure of the ceasefire agreement and the sequence of events that followed thereafter up to May 19 2009
(b) Whether any person, group, or institutions directly or indirectly bear responsibility in this regard.
(c) Lessons learnt from these events in order to ensure that there will be no recurrence.
The wording of the terms of reference is vague and general, rather than specific and pointed. So even if the commission completes its job, it provides sufficient room for endless legal quibbling to delay any action. They will be subject to interpretation whether they cover major issues of civil society concern.
The International Crisis Group has just come out with a detailed report on the war crimes committed by the armed forces and the LTTE. Channel 4 has kindled the fire of war crimes with more inputs. And General Fonseka had brought parliamentary focus on the issue of war crimes. Sri Lanka has to face these issues and take action. International donors who had been supporting Sri Lanka are already weary of its attitude. According to the UN, the country has received only 24% of the total funds ($ 337 million) required for continuing the humanitarian operations. So the appointment of the LLRCis not going to quell strident voices against Sri Lanka. Nor is it going to improve Sri Lanka’s international credibility.
The Commissioners appointed under provisions of Section 2 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act (Chapter 393) has eight prominent personalities as members including at least three with Foreign Service background. Among them is HMGS Palihakkara, former foreign secretary, considered a man of high integrity.
But the issue here is not much as what the LLRC does or finds, but whether its efforts would produce useful results to increase the credibility of the President and the government. After all there had been many commissions in the past which had faced endless obstacles and delaying tactics from the administration. So we can expect the LLRC to make only limping progress in the coming years as every point is debated.
Such squabbling is not unknown. Statutory commissions like the Election Commission, Public Service Commission, Police Commission, Human Rights Commission and the Bribery and Corruption Commission have suffered as appointments to them were mired in political controversy. This has literally ground them to halt and the President is likely to propose amendment to the constitution to enable him to go ahead with the appointment of chairmen and members of these commissions.
Sri Lanka government should ponder over the Island’s original question: “Why should we expend our time and energy to reinvent the wheel?” The newspaper has justified its question aptly: “Lessons that all of us have already learnt and have yet to learn from thirty years of fighting are fairly well known. Some of them are: no community can or must try to suppress another; violence does not pay; this country does not belong to any particular community; all communities belong to it; it is too small to be divided among different communities but certainly large enough for all communities to live in peacefully.”
What has been happening in Sri Lanka brings to mind what Arthur Miller said in The Crucible: “a political party is equated with moral right, and opposition to it with diabolical malevolence. Once such an equation is effectively made, society becomes a congerie of plots and counterplots, and the main role of government changes from that of the arbiter to that of the scourge of God.”
Time is an irredeemable resource and Sri Lanka has already wasted over 20 precious years in debating what was obvious. Why waste time on more meaningless commissions? It is time to get on with positive action, now that the war is over. And to get going Sri Lanka needs an attitudinal change. That is the lesson number one to be learnt.
Courtesy: South Asia Analysis Group
URL: http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cnotes6%5Cnote585.html
Monday, May 17, 2010
Recommended Reading
1. Argumentative Chinese step forward by Sreeram Chaulia, Asian Times, May 18, 2010.
URL: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/LE18Ad01.html
2. From sea to shining sea by Admiral Arun Prakash, Indian Express, May 18, 2010.
URL: http://www.indianexpress.com/story-print/620207/
3. Star war meets reality? Military testing laser weapons by Dan Vergano, USA Today, May 14. 2010.
URL: http://www.usatoday.com/tech/science/2010-05-14-1Adeathray14_CV_N.htm?csp=34
URL: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/LE18Ad01.html
2. From sea to shining sea by Admiral Arun Prakash, Indian Express, May 18, 2010.
URL: http://www.indianexpress.com/story-print/620207/
3. Star war meets reality? Military testing laser weapons by Dan Vergano, USA Today, May 14. 2010.
URL: http://www.usatoday.com/tech/science/2010-05-14-1Adeathray14_CV_N.htm?csp=34
Sri Lanka: need to restore trust
It is one year since Velupillai Prabakaran, founder leader of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, died with his aides in the final stage of the Eelam War. What is happening in Sri Lanka? Read my leader page article in today's The Hindu.
URL: http://www.hindu.com/2010/05/18/stories/2010051855271200.htm
URL: http://www.hindu.com/2010/05/18/stories/2010051855271200.htm
Sunday, May 16, 2010
Recommended Reading
I heartily recommend the following articles for insights on China's geopolitics and strategy as it grows into a challenger of the U.S. supremacy; many points are relevant to India's strategic security:
1.The Geography of Chinese Power by Robert Kaplan
URL: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66205/robert-d-kaplan/the-geography-of-chinese-power
2.How the Chinese dragon is gobbling up the Sri Lankan lion by Policy Research Group
URL: http://transcurrents.com/tc/2010/05/how_the_chinese_dragon_is_gobb.html
3.Q&A With Robert Kaplan on China, May 7, 2010
URL:http://www.foreignaffairs.com/discussions/interviews/qa-with-robert-kaplan-on-china
1.The Geography of Chinese Power by Robert Kaplan
URL: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66205/robert-d-kaplan/the-geography-of-chinese-power
2.How the Chinese dragon is gobbling up the Sri Lankan lion by Policy Research Group
URL: http://transcurrents.com/tc/2010/05/how_the_chinese_dragon_is_gobb.html
3.Q&A With Robert Kaplan on China, May 7, 2010
URL:http://www.foreignaffairs.com/discussions/interviews/qa-with-robert-kaplan-on-china
Wednesday, May 12, 2010
Why do we ignore our war dead?
A small news item in a well known weekly of Colombo on the eve of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's visit to Colombo in August 2008 to attend the SAARC summit meeting caught my eye.
The Sunday Times, Colombo, said: "Questions are being asked as to who will unveil a monument in memory of Indian soldiers killed during their peacekeeping operation in Sri Lanka after plans to get it opened by Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh during the SAARC summit failed." That memorial has still not been opened and lies in a state of neglect. As one who actively participated in the much maligned Indian Peace Keeping Force operations in Sri Lanka from 1987 to 1990, I felt very hurt at the way we treat the memory of our war dead.
After all 1,255 soldiers of the IPKF died in a foreign soil fighting a war nobody bothered about in this country. I wonder why the prime minister found no 'time' in his Colombo itinerary for a small task that would have taken him a few minutes only. Apparently the Sri Lanka government had taken up the proposal for its inauguration by Dr Manmohan Singh well in advance as reported in Sri Lanka media.
Who shot down the proposal? Evidently it must be one of the political 'advisors' or bureaucrat who had a hand in drawing the PM's schedule. There could be only two reasons -- opening the memorial would not be either 'politically correct' or the memorial for the dead soldiers did not 'deserve' the PM to open it.
Whatever be the reason, the bottom line is the nation's prime minister could not find time to open the only memorial ever built for his soldiers by the grateful Sri Lankans. The memorial is now a monument to our national indifference to the war dead. To those of us who personally knew many of those who died in Sri Lanka, it remains a slap in the face.
If I sound emotional on this issue, there is a background to it. After my retirement, I tried to get a memorial put up for the soldiers who died in Sri Lanka operations. I went about in the cynical way we make things work in this country. I found a media man I knew from my Sri Lanka days. He had good political access to the late G K Moopanar, senior Congress leader, who wielded a big clout in New Delhi.
The Congress was then allied with the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazagham which was ruling Tamil Nadu. And Chief Minister J Jayalalitha was a known supporter of Indian intervention, just like her mentor MGR. So when I met Moopanar, the Congress leader was quite open to the idea of a memorial in Chennai for the IPKF war dead. He saw no problem in putting in a word both at the Centre and state level, provided the army also took up a case for erecting a memorial in Chennai.
I wrote to army bigwigs. I got a polite letter from the local army formation headquarters asking me to put up a statement of case as per the relevant army instruction for erecting war memorials. Apparently they had decided it was not their job. Of course, knowing I am a retired guy they were kind enough to send me the relevant form for filling up. I was shocked at the indifference of my own brethren still in service. That brought home the truth that bureaucrats are the same whether in uniform or otherwise. And indifference is their hallmark.
My proposal had a dismal end when Congress and AIADMK alliance broke up after a few months. And my media friend told me we could still take up through other public organisations and asked me to suggest a design. I had neither the energy nor mindset to start all over as my cup of bitterness was full.
I suggested a giant closet in which if you pull the chain and the names of the 1,255 dead would appear electronically, flow into the flush and vanish. It would be a fitting design for a memorial for the war dead whose memory has been flushed away in the national bilge. I still believe it would be a realistic, if not appropriate, memorial.
We should have observed the 60th anniversary of the Armed Forces Flag Day on December 7, 2009. But the nation 'forgot' about it. But it was a logical sequence to our approach to Flag Day. I presume the burden of observing flag day falls on the hapless district collector, already burdened with demands of political minions. And it is done in the same way as any other flag day is 'handled': as a chance to collect money from public for a cause nobody understands.
My friend Lieutenant Colonel C R Sundar drew my attention to a Chennai Tamil daily of November 26, 2009 which showed a photograph of the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister M Karunanidhi [ Images ] contributing to the `Flag Day' with the Chennai Collector standing nearby. The caption said the contribution was for the `national unity and religious understanding. This is a travesty of its original purpose.
The idea of Armed Forces Flag Day was to honour the valiant dead, and salute the brave veterans as per the decision taken by the Defence Committee of the Cabinet on August 28, 1949 to observe (instead of celebrate) Armed Forces Flag Day on December 7.
In fact, independent India replaced the Armistice Day observed on November 11 in the British Commonwealth with the Armed Forces Flag Day. The Armistice Day came to be observed after the end of World War I that had caused untold misery and innumerable deaths. It is also known as the Poppy Day in a tribute to the soldiers on whose graves poppy flowers bloomed.
Last year, I saw British Prime Minister George Brown appearing with a paper poppy on his lapel in a commemoration news clip on the BBC. The newscasters were all wearing a poppy.
We learned so many things from the British but never learned how to honour our war dead. Even the war graves in India are maintained spick and span by the Commonwealth Graves Commission till this day.
The British also remembered the memory of Indians who died for the empire. It is a national shame that the current memorial, the Amar Jawan Jyoti, in the national capital is only an appendage to the India Gate, an imposing 42-metre high British structure, built in 1921, to honour the 90,000 Indian soldiers who died in the First World War.
India even after 65 years of independence finds it bothersome to build a memorial for the Unknown Soldier in the national capital. The army's request to suitably commemorate those who fell in service of the republic has not yet found favour in Lutyens Delhi.
We as a nation are notorious how we treat our dead. The filth and disorder common in our cremation grounds and cemeteries bear testimony to our indifference. So why commemorate the war dead, one may ask. The answer is simple: the soldiers died so that we may live. And the least we can do is to remember them.
Courtesy: www.rediff.com May 12, 2010
URL: http://news.rediff.com/column/2010/may/12/why-do-we-ignore-our-war-dead.htm
The Sunday Times, Colombo, said: "Questions are being asked as to who will unveil a monument in memory of Indian soldiers killed during their peacekeeping operation in Sri Lanka after plans to get it opened by Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh during the SAARC summit failed." That memorial has still not been opened and lies in a state of neglect. As one who actively participated in the much maligned Indian Peace Keeping Force operations in Sri Lanka from 1987 to 1990, I felt very hurt at the way we treat the memory of our war dead.
After all 1,255 soldiers of the IPKF died in a foreign soil fighting a war nobody bothered about in this country. I wonder why the prime minister found no 'time' in his Colombo itinerary for a small task that would have taken him a few minutes only. Apparently the Sri Lanka government had taken up the proposal for its inauguration by Dr Manmohan Singh well in advance as reported in Sri Lanka media.
Who shot down the proposal? Evidently it must be one of the political 'advisors' or bureaucrat who had a hand in drawing the PM's schedule. There could be only two reasons -- opening the memorial would not be either 'politically correct' or the memorial for the dead soldiers did not 'deserve' the PM to open it.
Whatever be the reason, the bottom line is the nation's prime minister could not find time to open the only memorial ever built for his soldiers by the grateful Sri Lankans. The memorial is now a monument to our national indifference to the war dead. To those of us who personally knew many of those who died in Sri Lanka, it remains a slap in the face.
If I sound emotional on this issue, there is a background to it. After my retirement, I tried to get a memorial put up for the soldiers who died in Sri Lanka operations. I went about in the cynical way we make things work in this country. I found a media man I knew from my Sri Lanka days. He had good political access to the late G K Moopanar, senior Congress leader, who wielded a big clout in New Delhi.
The Congress was then allied with the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazagham which was ruling Tamil Nadu. And Chief Minister J Jayalalitha was a known supporter of Indian intervention, just like her mentor MGR. So when I met Moopanar, the Congress leader was quite open to the idea of a memorial in Chennai for the IPKF war dead. He saw no problem in putting in a word both at the Centre and state level, provided the army also took up a case for erecting a memorial in Chennai.
I wrote to army bigwigs. I got a polite letter from the local army formation headquarters asking me to put up a statement of case as per the relevant army instruction for erecting war memorials. Apparently they had decided it was not their job. Of course, knowing I am a retired guy they were kind enough to send me the relevant form for filling up. I was shocked at the indifference of my own brethren still in service. That brought home the truth that bureaucrats are the same whether in uniform or otherwise. And indifference is their hallmark.
My proposal had a dismal end when Congress and AIADMK alliance broke up after a few months. And my media friend told me we could still take up through other public organisations and asked me to suggest a design. I had neither the energy nor mindset to start all over as my cup of bitterness was full.
I suggested a giant closet in which if you pull the chain and the names of the 1,255 dead would appear electronically, flow into the flush and vanish. It would be a fitting design for a memorial for the war dead whose memory has been flushed away in the national bilge. I still believe it would be a realistic, if not appropriate, memorial.
We should have observed the 60th anniversary of the Armed Forces Flag Day on December 7, 2009. But the nation 'forgot' about it. But it was a logical sequence to our approach to Flag Day. I presume the burden of observing flag day falls on the hapless district collector, already burdened with demands of political minions. And it is done in the same way as any other flag day is 'handled': as a chance to collect money from public for a cause nobody understands.
My friend Lieutenant Colonel C R Sundar drew my attention to a Chennai Tamil daily of November 26, 2009 which showed a photograph of the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister M Karunanidhi [ Images ] contributing to the `Flag Day' with the Chennai Collector standing nearby. The caption said the contribution was for the `national unity and religious understanding. This is a travesty of its original purpose.
The idea of Armed Forces Flag Day was to honour the valiant dead, and salute the brave veterans as per the decision taken by the Defence Committee of the Cabinet on August 28, 1949 to observe (instead of celebrate) Armed Forces Flag Day on December 7.
In fact, independent India replaced the Armistice Day observed on November 11 in the British Commonwealth with the Armed Forces Flag Day. The Armistice Day came to be observed after the end of World War I that had caused untold misery and innumerable deaths. It is also known as the Poppy Day in a tribute to the soldiers on whose graves poppy flowers bloomed.
Last year, I saw British Prime Minister George Brown appearing with a paper poppy on his lapel in a commemoration news clip on the BBC. The newscasters were all wearing a poppy.
We learned so many things from the British but never learned how to honour our war dead. Even the war graves in India are maintained spick and span by the Commonwealth Graves Commission till this day.
The British also remembered the memory of Indians who died for the empire. It is a national shame that the current memorial, the Amar Jawan Jyoti, in the national capital is only an appendage to the India Gate, an imposing 42-metre high British structure, built in 1921, to honour the 90,000 Indian soldiers who died in the First World War.
India even after 65 years of independence finds it bothersome to build a memorial for the Unknown Soldier in the national capital. The army's request to suitably commemorate those who fell in service of the republic has not yet found favour in Lutyens Delhi.
We as a nation are notorious how we treat our dead. The filth and disorder common in our cremation grounds and cemeteries bear testimony to our indifference. So why commemorate the war dead, one may ask. The answer is simple: the soldiers died so that we may live. And the least we can do is to remember them.
Courtesy: www.rediff.com May 12, 2010
URL: http://news.rediff.com/column/2010/may/12/why-do-we-ignore-our-war-dead.htm
Sunday, May 9, 2010
Hope, Grit, Determination
ON a summer afternoon in 1967, I went to swim at the army club in Pune (then known as Poona ). I found a powerful swimmer doing quite a few lengths in a methodical crawl and could not match his stamina. But, when he climbed out of the pool, I got the shock of my life – both his legs were missing!
That was the first time I saw Pankaj Shivram Joshi, who recently passed away. A graduate of the National Defence Academy, Joshi was commissioned in 8 Gurkha Rifles. He retired as Lieutenant General and was decorated a number of times. The honours included PVSM, AVSM and VSM. His is a saga of courage and determination to overcome adversity. He lost both his legs at barely 24, stepping on a land mine in an operational area in Sikkim.
In 1967, the newly formed Artificial Limb Centre (ALC) at Pune provided a glimmer of hope for Armymen who had lost their limbs. There were many such cases in the 1965 India-Pakistan war. I would see them limping across to our unit canteen, trying out their newly acquired legs. One of my most poignant memories is of meeting my drill instructor from my cadet days – Kartar Singh, a JCO from the Jat Regiment. On seeing me, Kartar broke down. “Saabji, I was good only as a drill instructor. Without my leg, my life is finished,” he said. I had no words to console him because in those days Army personnel who lost their limbs were sent home with a disability pension.
But Joshi, who too was fitted with artificial limbs at the ALC, was of different mettle. From day one, he never gave up. He fought every inch to overcome his handicap. He came to the swimming pool riding a bicycle. His friends said he was on the dance floor within a month of getting the artificial legs. Fortunately for him, the Army changed its medical categorization rules in 1978. Physical capability rather than physical condition became the determining factor for retention of physically handicapped personnel. Joshi’s grit and willpower enabled him to achieve what was seemingly impossible when a special medical board examined him.
His physical capability was found to be on a par with any officer’s. Years later, when I attended the Senior Command course, I saw Joshi as an instructor at the War College, Mhow. Nobody spoke of his handicap as we saw him climbing high ground with us. I heard a number of stories of his achievements: his participation in the Himalayan Car Rally as part of the Army team and his cycling 40 km in a cycle expedition. There was no stopping him as he went on to command a battalion, brigade and corps. So we were not surprised when he was made Commander of the Central Command with Lt General rank.
Joshi’s life is reminiscent of Britain’s World War II hero – Group Captain Douglas Robert Steuart Bader of the Royal Air Force. He was commissioned in 1931. A flamboyant personality, he lost both legs in an air crash while attempting a low-level slow roll in response to a dare. He was retired on medical grounds in 1933, but relentlessly overcame his limitations and showed the RAF he could still fly a fighter aircraft. When World War II broke out, the RAF took him back. He flew many fighter missions and took part in the operations in Dunkirk and the Battle of Britain. He made 22 “kills” of German aircraft. Bader was taken prisoner when he baled out after his aircraft was shot down during a mission over occupied France in 1941. He escaped in August 1942 only to be recaptured and sent to Colditz Castle, a prisoner of war camp for those who made repeated attempts to escape. He impressed even the German ace pilot, Adolf Galland, who became his friend. When the war ended, the RAF refused his request for continued service and he retired in early 1946.
The legend of Bader still lives in British memory. He remains a visible manifestation of the nation’s proud “never say die” attitude. Like Bader, Gen Joshi was an ideal role model for young people. Unfortunately, he was born in a nation that lauds only filmstars or cricket players as role models. The others who hog media headlines are politicians who kindle the worst divisive instincts among the public. Little wonder that Joshi’s passing away went unnoticed by the mainstream media.
YET the armed forces will continue to produce more Joshis. Recently, there came heart warming news of the Army deciding to promote Brigadier SK Razdan, a paratrooper paralysed from the waist down, to Major General. Fifteen years ago, Razdan suffered a spinal injury in a fire fight in Kashmir where he saved the lives of 14 women. He has been confined to a wheelchair since. He won the Kirti Chakra, the second highest award for peacetime gallantry.
The media report of Razdan’s promotion said, “Razdan would often tell his friends about how he had cheated death, but sometimes he regretted not being a martyr.” There must be many more Razdans in other walks of life who are not as lucky. They push on but their grit and leadership qualities go unrecognized. The nation is the loser as the flock has no role models worth the name.
Courtesy:GFiles Magazine, May 2010
URL:http://gfilesindia.com/title.aspx?title_id=117
That was the first time I saw Pankaj Shivram Joshi, who recently passed away. A graduate of the National Defence Academy, Joshi was commissioned in 8 Gurkha Rifles. He retired as Lieutenant General and was decorated a number of times. The honours included PVSM, AVSM and VSM. His is a saga of courage and determination to overcome adversity. He lost both his legs at barely 24, stepping on a land mine in an operational area in Sikkim.
In 1967, the newly formed Artificial Limb Centre (ALC) at Pune provided a glimmer of hope for Armymen who had lost their limbs. There were many such cases in the 1965 India-Pakistan war. I would see them limping across to our unit canteen, trying out their newly acquired legs. One of my most poignant memories is of meeting my drill instructor from my cadet days – Kartar Singh, a JCO from the Jat Regiment. On seeing me, Kartar broke down. “Saabji, I was good only as a drill instructor. Without my leg, my life is finished,” he said. I had no words to console him because in those days Army personnel who lost their limbs were sent home with a disability pension.
But Joshi, who too was fitted with artificial limbs at the ALC, was of different mettle. From day one, he never gave up. He fought every inch to overcome his handicap. He came to the swimming pool riding a bicycle. His friends said he was on the dance floor within a month of getting the artificial legs. Fortunately for him, the Army changed its medical categorization rules in 1978. Physical capability rather than physical condition became the determining factor for retention of physically handicapped personnel. Joshi’s grit and willpower enabled him to achieve what was seemingly impossible when a special medical board examined him.
His physical capability was found to be on a par with any officer’s. Years later, when I attended the Senior Command course, I saw Joshi as an instructor at the War College, Mhow. Nobody spoke of his handicap as we saw him climbing high ground with us. I heard a number of stories of his achievements: his participation in the Himalayan Car Rally as part of the Army team and his cycling 40 km in a cycle expedition. There was no stopping him as he went on to command a battalion, brigade and corps. So we were not surprised when he was made Commander of the Central Command with Lt General rank.
Joshi’s life is reminiscent of Britain’s World War II hero – Group Captain Douglas Robert Steuart Bader of the Royal Air Force. He was commissioned in 1931. A flamboyant personality, he lost both legs in an air crash while attempting a low-level slow roll in response to a dare. He was retired on medical grounds in 1933, but relentlessly overcame his limitations and showed the RAF he could still fly a fighter aircraft. When World War II broke out, the RAF took him back. He flew many fighter missions and took part in the operations in Dunkirk and the Battle of Britain. He made 22 “kills” of German aircraft. Bader was taken prisoner when he baled out after his aircraft was shot down during a mission over occupied France in 1941. He escaped in August 1942 only to be recaptured and sent to Colditz Castle, a prisoner of war camp for those who made repeated attempts to escape. He impressed even the German ace pilot, Adolf Galland, who became his friend. When the war ended, the RAF refused his request for continued service and he retired in early 1946.
The legend of Bader still lives in British memory. He remains a visible manifestation of the nation’s proud “never say die” attitude. Like Bader, Gen Joshi was an ideal role model for young people. Unfortunately, he was born in a nation that lauds only filmstars or cricket players as role models. The others who hog media headlines are politicians who kindle the worst divisive instincts among the public. Little wonder that Joshi’s passing away went unnoticed by the mainstream media.
YET the armed forces will continue to produce more Joshis. Recently, there came heart warming news of the Army deciding to promote Brigadier SK Razdan, a paratrooper paralysed from the waist down, to Major General. Fifteen years ago, Razdan suffered a spinal injury in a fire fight in Kashmir where he saved the lives of 14 women. He has been confined to a wheelchair since. He won the Kirti Chakra, the second highest award for peacetime gallantry.
The media report of Razdan’s promotion said, “Razdan would often tell his friends about how he had cheated death, but sometimes he regretted not being a martyr.” There must be many more Razdans in other walks of life who are not as lucky. They push on but their grit and leadership qualities go unrecognized. The nation is the loser as the flock has no role models worth the name.
Courtesy:GFiles Magazine, May 2010
URL:http://gfilesindia.com/title.aspx?title_id=117
Tuesday, May 4, 2010
Bangladesh on a Strategic Tightrope
Sandwiched between two huge powers – India and China – Bangladesh has little option but to do a strategic tightrope walk in its external relations. While India is trying to flex its economic and political power beyond the confines of South Asia, China is bent upon becoming a global economic and military power. As they expand their influence, overlap of their strategic spaces becomes inevitable. This is already evident from the increasing Chinese foot print in South Asia prompting India and the U.S. to seek greater strategic convergence between the two countries. This makes the tight rope walk of Bangladesh a little more precarious, as it is located in the sensitive underbelly of India’s troubled northeast region.
Bangladesh with high population density and steady economic growth offers an expanding market for both countries. While India’s geographic contiguity, shared histories and systemic similarities with Bangladesh confer certain advantages, China’s bigger economic clout, larger variety of products and increasing global influence have their own attraction for Bangladesh. China has also the indirect advantage of being preferred by the strong anti-India element embedded within the body politics of Bangladesh that germinated when it was a part of Pakistan.
For long, Bangladesh has considered itself strategically vulnerable to India because the giant neighbour occupies most of the land border. In a way this uneasiness is reciprocal because Indian strategists always talk of Bangladesh’s physical domination of ‘chicken’s neck’- India’s narrow and tenuous land corridor linking its troubled North-eastern region. Thus in India’s strategic horizon, Bangladesh on its own merit, occupies an important place. Strategic importance of Bangladesh increased further after India embarked upon ‘Look east policy’ to expand its economic and strategic linkages with the ASEAN region and beyond.
Bangladesh has a host of problems with India. This is rooted in mutual suspicion between the two countries for historical reasons and India’s geographically unequal size as an economic and military power. This had stymied the relations between the two nations from evolving a win-win equation. They could not be resolved due to latent fear of Indian domination in Bangladesh’s policy making abetted by India’s patronising attitude and partisan support to Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and his Awami League party in early years of independence.
Bangladesh relations with India took a nosedive after Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was assassinated and a military regime led by Major General Zia ur Rahman took over power in 1975. Zia had his own grouse against India; he accused India of harbouring pro-Mujib extremists’ anti-government activities on its soil as a retaliatory exercise for elimination of Mujib. Elements of Left wing extremists hiding in Indian side of the border were also suspected to carry out hit and run strikes in Bangladesh.
Prior to Bangladesh independence, Pakistan had used its eastern limb to needle India by offering sanctuaries to Naga and Mizo insurgents for their operations against Indian state. Bangladesh gained some notoriety for continuing the Pakistani practice of harbouring insurgent groups from India’s northeast to carry out their nefarious activities with the tacit support of the anti Indian lobby in government.
Till recently the United Liberation Force of Assam (ULFA) and Manipuri insurgent groups found refuge in Bangladesh under the patronage of national intelligence agencies. This became a major cause of concern for India after the notorious terrorist group Harkat ul Jihad I Islami/Bangladesh (HUJI-B) that had connections with Pakistani Jihadi groups, found foothold to launch its forays in India. The West shared Indian concerns as HUJI-B’s presence had its connotations on the U.S. initiated “global war on terror” after 9/11 terror strike.
The polity in Bangladesh is broadly divided in their attitude to India as a regional power and close neighbour. The Awami League that rallied the people during the freedom struggle is perceived as a pro-Indian party. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) founded by General Zia is the other major contender for power. It has on its side the support of anti-Indian elements including obscurantist Islamic parties like Jamaat e Islami. The BNP in collusion with right wing Islamic parties has used the anti-Indian sentiment to rally support at hustings. With political power changing hands between coalitions, India-Bangladesh relations failed to make any headway. Military regimes that came to power in between also had no inclination to improve relations with India.
So the victory of Sheikh Hasina Wajed, leader of the Awami League with a huge majority in the election held in 2008 signals greater cooperation between India and Bangladesh . Considered close to India, Sheikh Hasina has taken a number of initiatives to remove a few long standing irritants in the relationship between the two countries. These are curbing the right wing Jihadi extremist activity, arrest/eviction of Indian insurgent group elements operating from Bangladesh. But this is only a small beginning. There are many more issues to be covered.
Significantly she visited India in January 2010before visiting China in March 2010.
In New Delhi, she signed three agreements with India relating to curbing of trans-border terrorist and criminal activity. Similar initiatives have been taken to institutionalise resolution of boundary disputes and the long standing maritime boundary issue between the two countries. A few other initiatives regarding trade imbalance, connectivity, communication, transit of Indian goods through inland river waters of Bangladesh and development of Mongla and Chittagong ports have been taken up. India has extended $ one billion line of credit to a range of projects mainly relating improving railway infrastructure.
Bangladesh Prime Minister’s visit to China after visiting New Delhi is typical of the country’s desire to balance the relationship with the two giant neighbours. China-Bangladesh relations started off on the wrong foot as China was firmly aligned with Pakistan during the Bangladesh war of independence in 1971. In fact, even after Bangladesh became independent, China opposed the admission of Bangladesh in the UN.
However, China mended its relations in 1975 and post-Mujib regimes had been actively cultivating China for strategic reasons as well as for trade and economic assistance. Heads of successive Bangladesh governments have been visiting China since 1977. With India’s role remaining an incendiary element in Bangladesh politics, China has found it easier to build a cosy relation with Bangladesh Chinese assistance is primarily in the sectors of infrastructure development, telecommunications, and energy. In fact, China had emerged as the largest provider of military hardware to the Bangladesh armed forces. China has assisted in the construction of six major bridges in Bangladesh and China has agreed to assist in construction of a seventh bridge also. Prospects of building the eighth bridge was also agreed during the recent visit of Bangladesh Prime Minister.
Apart from agreements extending economic assistance and facilitating free trade and assistance for infrastructure projects, there were Sheikh Hasina had made two proposals during her visit to Kunming in Yunnan. These could make Indian strategic planners sit up. Chinese are said to have agreed to consider her plea for assistance to build a road link from Chittagong to Kunming in Yunnan via Gumdum in Myanmar. (She is said to have discussed with the Mayor of Kunming, the possibility of building a rail link to Chittagong also.)
This had been a long standing Bangladesh proposal; in fact Prime Minister Begum Khaleda Zia during her visit to Myanmar had signed an agreement for a road from Chittagong to Gumdum on July 27, 2004 after two year long wait. It was to facilitate Bangladesh's access to the Asian Highway on to East Asia. At that time Bangladesh had indicate its interest in developing the road-link system connecting Chittagong port with Kunming.
Apparently Myanmar was lukewarm to the proposal and no worthwhile progress has been made. Bangladesh-Myanmar relations last year took a downslide after a stand off over Myanmar’s offshore prospecting for natural gas in the disputed maritime region claimed by both countries. In view of this, implementation of the project may not come through immediately.
Notwithstanding this, it is an important indicator. China has increased its stakes in Myanmar to gain direct access to Indian Ocean by passing South China Sea and Malacca Strait. The proposed Bangladesh road link also would by pass Malacca Strait and provide a direct access to South Asia from Yunnan enhancing China’s strategic options in Indian Ocean Region.
Similarly, Begum Hasina is said to have sought China’s help to further develop the Chittagong port and develop a deep sea port at Sonadia Island. Even if China’s objective is commercial its involvement in developing Chittagong port could be useful in gaining a foothold. China has already developed ports in Gawadar in Pakistan, and Hambantota in Sri Lanka; if Chittagong is taken up, it could provide yet another maritime infrastructure that could come in handy for China to fulfil its Blue Water ambitions in Indian Ocean Region. Thus Bangladesh has the potential become an important strategic staging post for China in South Asia.
Sheikh Hasina is also reported to have requested the Chinese government to provide two frigates with three helicopters under long-term loan assistance. This perfectly balances increasing cooperation between the Indian and Bangladesh armed forces. Most of the other issues and agreements were follow-up of those taken up during the earlier visits of Bangladesh heads of state.
There should be no illusion that regardless of their political affiliation, governments in Bangladesh would always balance their relationship with India using China as the counterpoise. Apart from strategic compulsions, political parties there have to contend with historical baggage on both sides of the border that colour their perceptions as well as the political influence of anti-India elements in electoral politics. At the same time, caught between the two big economic powers it is but natural for Bangladesh to try and gain the maximum from both of them. This is what Sheikh Hasina is doing – walking a tightrope while trying to ease Bangladesh relations with India.
Courtesy:http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers38%5Cpaper3796.html
Bangladesh with high population density and steady economic growth offers an expanding market for both countries. While India’s geographic contiguity, shared histories and systemic similarities with Bangladesh confer certain advantages, China’s bigger economic clout, larger variety of products and increasing global influence have their own attraction for Bangladesh. China has also the indirect advantage of being preferred by the strong anti-India element embedded within the body politics of Bangladesh that germinated when it was a part of Pakistan.
For long, Bangladesh has considered itself strategically vulnerable to India because the giant neighbour occupies most of the land border. In a way this uneasiness is reciprocal because Indian strategists always talk of Bangladesh’s physical domination of ‘chicken’s neck’- India’s narrow and tenuous land corridor linking its troubled North-eastern region. Thus in India’s strategic horizon, Bangladesh on its own merit, occupies an important place. Strategic importance of Bangladesh increased further after India embarked upon ‘Look east policy’ to expand its economic and strategic linkages with the ASEAN region and beyond.
Bangladesh has a host of problems with India. This is rooted in mutual suspicion between the two countries for historical reasons and India’s geographically unequal size as an economic and military power. This had stymied the relations between the two nations from evolving a win-win equation. They could not be resolved due to latent fear of Indian domination in Bangladesh’s policy making abetted by India’s patronising attitude and partisan support to Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and his Awami League party in early years of independence.
Bangladesh relations with India took a nosedive after Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was assassinated and a military regime led by Major General Zia ur Rahman took over power in 1975. Zia had his own grouse against India; he accused India of harbouring pro-Mujib extremists’ anti-government activities on its soil as a retaliatory exercise for elimination of Mujib. Elements of Left wing extremists hiding in Indian side of the border were also suspected to carry out hit and run strikes in Bangladesh.
Prior to Bangladesh independence, Pakistan had used its eastern limb to needle India by offering sanctuaries to Naga and Mizo insurgents for their operations against Indian state. Bangladesh gained some notoriety for continuing the Pakistani practice of harbouring insurgent groups from India’s northeast to carry out their nefarious activities with the tacit support of the anti Indian lobby in government.
Till recently the United Liberation Force of Assam (ULFA) and Manipuri insurgent groups found refuge in Bangladesh under the patronage of national intelligence agencies. This became a major cause of concern for India after the notorious terrorist group Harkat ul Jihad I Islami/Bangladesh (HUJI-B) that had connections with Pakistani Jihadi groups, found foothold to launch its forays in India. The West shared Indian concerns as HUJI-B’s presence had its connotations on the U.S. initiated “global war on terror” after 9/11 terror strike.
The polity in Bangladesh is broadly divided in their attitude to India as a regional power and close neighbour. The Awami League that rallied the people during the freedom struggle is perceived as a pro-Indian party. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) founded by General Zia is the other major contender for power. It has on its side the support of anti-Indian elements including obscurantist Islamic parties like Jamaat e Islami. The BNP in collusion with right wing Islamic parties has used the anti-Indian sentiment to rally support at hustings. With political power changing hands between coalitions, India-Bangladesh relations failed to make any headway. Military regimes that came to power in between also had no inclination to improve relations with India.
So the victory of Sheikh Hasina Wajed, leader of the Awami League with a huge majority in the election held in 2008 signals greater cooperation between India and Bangladesh . Considered close to India, Sheikh Hasina has taken a number of initiatives to remove a few long standing irritants in the relationship between the two countries. These are curbing the right wing Jihadi extremist activity, arrest/eviction of Indian insurgent group elements operating from Bangladesh. But this is only a small beginning. There are many more issues to be covered.
Significantly she visited India in January 2010before visiting China in March 2010.
In New Delhi, she signed three agreements with India relating to curbing of trans-border terrorist and criminal activity. Similar initiatives have been taken to institutionalise resolution of boundary disputes and the long standing maritime boundary issue between the two countries. A few other initiatives regarding trade imbalance, connectivity, communication, transit of Indian goods through inland river waters of Bangladesh and development of Mongla and Chittagong ports have been taken up. India has extended $ one billion line of credit to a range of projects mainly relating improving railway infrastructure.
Bangladesh Prime Minister’s visit to China after visiting New Delhi is typical of the country’s desire to balance the relationship with the two giant neighbours. China-Bangladesh relations started off on the wrong foot as China was firmly aligned with Pakistan during the Bangladesh war of independence in 1971. In fact, even after Bangladesh became independent, China opposed the admission of Bangladesh in the UN.
However, China mended its relations in 1975 and post-Mujib regimes had been actively cultivating China for strategic reasons as well as for trade and economic assistance. Heads of successive Bangladesh governments have been visiting China since 1977. With India’s role remaining an incendiary element in Bangladesh politics, China has found it easier to build a cosy relation with Bangladesh Chinese assistance is primarily in the sectors of infrastructure development, telecommunications, and energy. In fact, China had emerged as the largest provider of military hardware to the Bangladesh armed forces. China has assisted in the construction of six major bridges in Bangladesh and China has agreed to assist in construction of a seventh bridge also. Prospects of building the eighth bridge was also agreed during the recent visit of Bangladesh Prime Minister.
Apart from agreements extending economic assistance and facilitating free trade and assistance for infrastructure projects, there were Sheikh Hasina had made two proposals during her visit to Kunming in Yunnan. These could make Indian strategic planners sit up. Chinese are said to have agreed to consider her plea for assistance to build a road link from Chittagong to Kunming in Yunnan via Gumdum in Myanmar. (She is said to have discussed with the Mayor of Kunming, the possibility of building a rail link to Chittagong also.)
This had been a long standing Bangladesh proposal; in fact Prime Minister Begum Khaleda Zia during her visit to Myanmar had signed an agreement for a road from Chittagong to Gumdum on July 27, 2004 after two year long wait. It was to facilitate Bangladesh's access to the Asian Highway on to East Asia. At that time Bangladesh had indicate its interest in developing the road-link system connecting Chittagong port with Kunming.
Apparently Myanmar was lukewarm to the proposal and no worthwhile progress has been made. Bangladesh-Myanmar relations last year took a downslide after a stand off over Myanmar’s offshore prospecting for natural gas in the disputed maritime region claimed by both countries. In view of this, implementation of the project may not come through immediately.
Notwithstanding this, it is an important indicator. China has increased its stakes in Myanmar to gain direct access to Indian Ocean by passing South China Sea and Malacca Strait. The proposed Bangladesh road link also would by pass Malacca Strait and provide a direct access to South Asia from Yunnan enhancing China’s strategic options in Indian Ocean Region.
Similarly, Begum Hasina is said to have sought China’s help to further develop the Chittagong port and develop a deep sea port at Sonadia Island. Even if China’s objective is commercial its involvement in developing Chittagong port could be useful in gaining a foothold. China has already developed ports in Gawadar in Pakistan, and Hambantota in Sri Lanka; if Chittagong is taken up, it could provide yet another maritime infrastructure that could come in handy for China to fulfil its Blue Water ambitions in Indian Ocean Region. Thus Bangladesh has the potential become an important strategic staging post for China in South Asia.
Sheikh Hasina is also reported to have requested the Chinese government to provide two frigates with three helicopters under long-term loan assistance. This perfectly balances increasing cooperation between the Indian and Bangladesh armed forces. Most of the other issues and agreements were follow-up of those taken up during the earlier visits of Bangladesh heads of state.
There should be no illusion that regardless of their political affiliation, governments in Bangladesh would always balance their relationship with India using China as the counterpoise. Apart from strategic compulsions, political parties there have to contend with historical baggage on both sides of the border that colour their perceptions as well as the political influence of anti-India elements in electoral politics. At the same time, caught between the two big economic powers it is but natural for Bangladesh to try and gain the maximum from both of them. This is what Sheikh Hasina is doing – walking a tightrope while trying to ease Bangladesh relations with India.
Courtesy:http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers38%5Cpaper3796.html
Madhuri Gupta - the Pak Mole in IHC Islamabad
Recently the media had been going to town with the news story about Madhuri Gupta, an Urdu translator employed in Indian High Commission in Islamabad. Most of the news reports were ill informed and half baked. On the TV shrill voices substituted analytical reporting. And neither the Ministry of External Affairs nor intelligence agencies covered themselves with glory in handling the matter. I am reproducing here the article by Mr B Raman courtesy www.southasiaanalysis.org. The article lays bare the way we as a nation handle serious security breaches in our typical ham handed way.
The She-Mole's Case: Making an Ass of Ourselves
By B. Raman
1991: Liviu Radu, a Romanian diplomat posted in New Delhi, was kidnapped by some Khalistani terrorists. He was got released as a result of an operation mounted by the Intelligence Bureau (IB) and the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW). A Western intelligence agency co-operated in the operation. A senior officer of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) told the media about the identity of the Western agency. It was prominently carried by some sections of the media. The Western country concerned through its Embassy in New Delhi strongly protested against the failure of the MEA officer to protect the identity of its agency.
1993: After the serial blasts in Mumbai in March 1993, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) of the US secretly sent a team of its explosive experts to Mumbai to help the investigators of the Mumbai Police. They were put up in a Mumbai hotel under a non-official cover. The leader of the team was surprised to receive a phone call from a journalist of the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) then posted in New Delhi, who was aware of their FBI identity. Enquiries revealed that a senior officer of the Mumbai Police had told the journalist about their FBI identity and revealed to him the name of the hotel where they were staying. There was a strong protest from the FBI over the indiscretion of the Mumbai Police officer.
2010: Madhuri Gupta, a Second Secretary working in the Press and Information wing of the Indian High Commission in Islamabad, was arrested on a charge of working for the Pakistani intelligence. While reporting on her arrest and interrogation, sections of the media named another officer of the High Commission and claimed that he was from the Indian intelligence. According to a report carried by a national daily, this was mentioned to the journalists by an officer of the MEA.
It is important to protect the identity of serving intelligence officers posted abroad for three reasons. Firstly, the exposure of his identity will make it impossible for him to perform his intelligence tasks in future. Secondly, it could pose a serious threat to his life from terrorists. And, thirdly, it could create operational problems.
In the 1970s, the revelation of the identity of a serving officer of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) posted in Europe led to his assassination by some terrorists. The Congress passed a law making it a criminal offence for anyone to reveal the identity of a serving intelligence officer. Since then, American officials and media take care not to reveal the identity of a serving intelligence officer even if they come to know of it. Dick Cheney, the Vice-President under George Bush, came under severe criticism for asking one of his aides to brief a journalist about the identity of a serving woman officer of the CIA. Cheney's aide had to face an enquiry for carrying out the request of Cheney, which amounted to a crime.
In other countries too, officials as well as the media take great care to protect the identity of serving intelligence officers posted in foreign countries. In Israel, as in the US, it is a crime to reveal the identity of a serving intelligence officer. In India, we have neither laws nor traditions to protect the identities of serving intelligence officers posted abroad. During the last five years, Indian media has exposed the identities of at least a dozen serving external intelligence officers posted abroad, thereby damaging their utility as intelligence officers and exposing them to likely physical threats from terrorists.
This is highly unwise on the part of the journalists, but how can we blame them when they are tipped off by other officers of the Government, who do not realise the importance of protecting the cover and security of intelligence officers serving abroad. There could be strong opposition from the Indian media to the Government enacting a law similar to the US law to protect the identity of intelligence officers serving abroad, but it should at least ensure that such leakages and disclosures do not take place from the officials of the Government.
The case of Madhuri Gupta has been handled in an unprofessional manner, with almost a leak an hour. If some of these leaks are to be believed, she must be the greatest intelligence agent ever produced in the history of espionage from a diplomatic mission comparable to the legendary Cicero, a Nazi agent in the British Embassy in Ankara. (Please see https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol1no4/html/v01i4a06p_0001.html)
If our news channels are to be believed, what all she has done: Exposed the identities of Indian agents in Pakistan; exposed the identities of Indian agents in other countries; gave to the Pakistani intelligence copies of classified documents including what is described as the classified minutes of the Prime Minister's office on India's relations with Pakistan etc etc. If he was alive, Cicero's handling officer would have envied her handling officer in the Pakistani intelligence. There are at least a dozen journalists claiming exclusive access to the results of the interrogation and yet reporting the same unbelievable stories in almost the same language. These dozen journalists are also claiming exclusive access to the interrogation reports. Some of them have even been giving what they claim are quotes from the interrogation reports. I known how interrogation reports are recorded. They are not recorded the way they are shown on some of our TV channels.
Who is Madhuri Gupta? What is her background? She is an Urdu translator posted in Islamabad to monitor the Urdu media. The Press and Information wing in which she was working deals only with open information and handles the Pakistani media. It is not a wing of the mission having access to classified documents. It is the cut and paste from the media wing. And yet our media has been reporting that classified reports passed through her hands. She was not even the head of the wing. She was one of its staff.
I did not know whether to laugh or cry when I saw an anchor criticising Pakistan for not co-operating with India in the investigation of the case. What does he expect Pakistan to do? Admit that she was their agent and tell us the details of what she did for the Pakistani intelligence? The world will be laughing at the kind of reporting that has been going on on our TV channels. Normally, the print media used to be more responsible in reporting. Senior sub-editors used to exercise some check over the exuberance of the reporters and carefully vet their stories before accepting them. Now, even print media journalists are competing with their TV colleagues in being more and more sensational. What is important is not whether one is correct and believable, but whether one's story is sufficiently sensational. The more sensational, the better.
Truth, reliability, balance and restraint in reporting have been the victims of the "breaking news" culture in our TV media. Madhuri Gupta's case is a serious breach of our national security. Even if she had not revealed any classified information to the Pakistani intelligence, the very fact that the Pakistani intelligence succeeded in recruiting her speaks poorly of our counter-intelligence controls. The case deserves to be investigated and analysed in a serious manner on the basis of established facts. Instead, it has been converted into a slapstick serial which will go on until another equally attention-catching serial replaces it.
The Government and our officers who have been talking to the media do not realise the importance of keeping the Pakistani intelligence guessing as to what she has been telling her interrogators. Intelligence agencies worth their salt keep their adversary guessing when they identify and arrest one of its agents. When the KGB, the Soviet intelligence agency, shot down and arrested Francis Gary Powers, the U-2 pilot of the CIA, for quite some time they did not reveal that they had caught him alive. They made an ass of the CIA and then President Dwight Eisenhower by keeping them guessing as to what happened to Powers.
Instead of making an ass of the Pakistani intelligence by keeping it guessing as to what happened to Madhuri Gupta, our intelligence agencies, the MHA and the MEA are making an ass of themselves by vying with one another in leaking out to the media all sorts of stories after revealing prematurely information about her arrest.
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute for Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)
URL: http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers38%5Cpaper3785.html
The She-Mole's Case: Making an Ass of Ourselves
By B. Raman
1991: Liviu Radu, a Romanian diplomat posted in New Delhi, was kidnapped by some Khalistani terrorists. He was got released as a result of an operation mounted by the Intelligence Bureau (IB) and the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW). A Western intelligence agency co-operated in the operation. A senior officer of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) told the media about the identity of the Western agency. It was prominently carried by some sections of the media. The Western country concerned through its Embassy in New Delhi strongly protested against the failure of the MEA officer to protect the identity of its agency.
1993: After the serial blasts in Mumbai in March 1993, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) of the US secretly sent a team of its explosive experts to Mumbai to help the investigators of the Mumbai Police. They were put up in a Mumbai hotel under a non-official cover. The leader of the team was surprised to receive a phone call from a journalist of the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) then posted in New Delhi, who was aware of their FBI identity. Enquiries revealed that a senior officer of the Mumbai Police had told the journalist about their FBI identity and revealed to him the name of the hotel where they were staying. There was a strong protest from the FBI over the indiscretion of the Mumbai Police officer.
2010: Madhuri Gupta, a Second Secretary working in the Press and Information wing of the Indian High Commission in Islamabad, was arrested on a charge of working for the Pakistani intelligence. While reporting on her arrest and interrogation, sections of the media named another officer of the High Commission and claimed that he was from the Indian intelligence. According to a report carried by a national daily, this was mentioned to the journalists by an officer of the MEA.
It is important to protect the identity of serving intelligence officers posted abroad for three reasons. Firstly, the exposure of his identity will make it impossible for him to perform his intelligence tasks in future. Secondly, it could pose a serious threat to his life from terrorists. And, thirdly, it could create operational problems.
In the 1970s, the revelation of the identity of a serving officer of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) posted in Europe led to his assassination by some terrorists. The Congress passed a law making it a criminal offence for anyone to reveal the identity of a serving intelligence officer. Since then, American officials and media take care not to reveal the identity of a serving intelligence officer even if they come to know of it. Dick Cheney, the Vice-President under George Bush, came under severe criticism for asking one of his aides to brief a journalist about the identity of a serving woman officer of the CIA. Cheney's aide had to face an enquiry for carrying out the request of Cheney, which amounted to a crime.
In other countries too, officials as well as the media take great care to protect the identity of serving intelligence officers posted in foreign countries. In Israel, as in the US, it is a crime to reveal the identity of a serving intelligence officer. In India, we have neither laws nor traditions to protect the identities of serving intelligence officers posted abroad. During the last five years, Indian media has exposed the identities of at least a dozen serving external intelligence officers posted abroad, thereby damaging their utility as intelligence officers and exposing them to likely physical threats from terrorists.
This is highly unwise on the part of the journalists, but how can we blame them when they are tipped off by other officers of the Government, who do not realise the importance of protecting the cover and security of intelligence officers serving abroad. There could be strong opposition from the Indian media to the Government enacting a law similar to the US law to protect the identity of intelligence officers serving abroad, but it should at least ensure that such leakages and disclosures do not take place from the officials of the Government.
The case of Madhuri Gupta has been handled in an unprofessional manner, with almost a leak an hour. If some of these leaks are to be believed, she must be the greatest intelligence agent ever produced in the history of espionage from a diplomatic mission comparable to the legendary Cicero, a Nazi agent in the British Embassy in Ankara. (Please see https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol1no4/html/v01i4a06p_0001.html)
If our news channels are to be believed, what all she has done: Exposed the identities of Indian agents in Pakistan; exposed the identities of Indian agents in other countries; gave to the Pakistani intelligence copies of classified documents including what is described as the classified minutes of the Prime Minister's office on India's relations with Pakistan etc etc. If he was alive, Cicero's handling officer would have envied her handling officer in the Pakistani intelligence. There are at least a dozen journalists claiming exclusive access to the results of the interrogation and yet reporting the same unbelievable stories in almost the same language. These dozen journalists are also claiming exclusive access to the interrogation reports. Some of them have even been giving what they claim are quotes from the interrogation reports. I known how interrogation reports are recorded. They are not recorded the way they are shown on some of our TV channels.
Who is Madhuri Gupta? What is her background? She is an Urdu translator posted in Islamabad to monitor the Urdu media. The Press and Information wing in which she was working deals only with open information and handles the Pakistani media. It is not a wing of the mission having access to classified documents. It is the cut and paste from the media wing. And yet our media has been reporting that classified reports passed through her hands. She was not even the head of the wing. She was one of its staff.
I did not know whether to laugh or cry when I saw an anchor criticising Pakistan for not co-operating with India in the investigation of the case. What does he expect Pakistan to do? Admit that she was their agent and tell us the details of what she did for the Pakistani intelligence? The world will be laughing at the kind of reporting that has been going on on our TV channels. Normally, the print media used to be more responsible in reporting. Senior sub-editors used to exercise some check over the exuberance of the reporters and carefully vet their stories before accepting them. Now, even print media journalists are competing with their TV colleagues in being more and more sensational. What is important is not whether one is correct and believable, but whether one's story is sufficiently sensational. The more sensational, the better.
Truth, reliability, balance and restraint in reporting have been the victims of the "breaking news" culture in our TV media. Madhuri Gupta's case is a serious breach of our national security. Even if she had not revealed any classified information to the Pakistani intelligence, the very fact that the Pakistani intelligence succeeded in recruiting her speaks poorly of our counter-intelligence controls. The case deserves to be investigated and analysed in a serious manner on the basis of established facts. Instead, it has been converted into a slapstick serial which will go on until another equally attention-catching serial replaces it.
The Government and our officers who have been talking to the media do not realise the importance of keeping the Pakistani intelligence guessing as to what she has been telling her interrogators. Intelligence agencies worth their salt keep their adversary guessing when they identify and arrest one of its agents. When the KGB, the Soviet intelligence agency, shot down and arrested Francis Gary Powers, the U-2 pilot of the CIA, for quite some time they did not reveal that they had caught him alive. They made an ass of the CIA and then President Dwight Eisenhower by keeping them guessing as to what happened to Powers.
Instead of making an ass of the Pakistani intelligence by keeping it guessing as to what happened to Madhuri Gupta, our intelligence agencies, the MHA and the MEA are making an ass of themselves by vying with one another in leaking out to the media all sorts of stories after revealing prematurely information about her arrest.
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute for Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)
URL: http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers38%5Cpaper3785.html
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