The government of Sri Lanka under President Mahinda Rajapaksa said it was going to war against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) with the battle cry of freedom. It spoke of a vision of a Sri Lanka where peoples lives would not be determined by the language they spoke. However, after the war is over, with a great deal of sacrifice of men and material resources, the emerging socio-political environment does not indicate the vision coming true; it may well remain what it was – just a vision.
By now it is clear that the word ‘devolution’ has joined the rank of words to be wished away - like ‘federalism’ - into political obsolescence. And the word ‘minority’ also might join the list soon. That seems to be the new emerging order that is seen across the board not only with the ruling coalition but also among the major political parties. This was best illustrated by the United National Party (UNP) presided over by Ranil Wickremesinghe. As Prime Minister he agreed to federalism as fundamental to the peace process in 2002 but now he and his party had no hesitation in jettisoning it at the altar of political expediency. And the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) is no better.
This comes as no surprise to Sri Lanka watchers as political parties, like many of their leaders, have done similar acts of political somersault more than once.(I should confess our own Indian political parties and leaders are no better. The latest in this genre was the Tamil Nadu political leader Ms Jayalalithaa’s sudden volte face on the question of Tamil Eelam on the eve of recent parliamentary poll. ) Apparently, it has become part of the political culture although it is extremely doubtful whether the common man is taken by such double whammy on the eve of elections. But in Sri Lanka in the past, the political double speak was the main reason why Tamil people lost faith in the political process. Ultimately Tamil youth took up arms to fight for their beliefs, right or wrong, because they saw only failed political process.
President Mahinda Rajapaksa appears to be in no hurry to implement the 13th amendment of the constitution in full, despite repeated promises to do so after the eastern province election. There might be sound internal political reasons for this; the President appears to be getting ready to advance the date of Presidential election to early next year as indicated in his recent interview to cash in on his popularity to get elected as president for a second term. And probably he would like to retain his Southern Sri Lanka votes in tact.
But does the President require a popular mandate to implement what is authorised in the constitution? In case a peoples’ mandate was necessary for the President’s course of action, parliamentary poll would be the true barometer. That would help his party gain a majority in parliament without the President sacrificing part of his present term. Of course, a strong presidential mandate first would ensure the SLFP sweeping the parliamentary polls. Thus it would enable the President to do away with the dependence upon other smaller parties. It might also reduce the influence detractors of his policy who have migrated from various political parties to the SLFP bandwagon as well as the opposition - the leftist Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) and the right wing Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU).
With nearly twenty percent of Tamil population living as displaced persons behind barbed wire in welfare camps, elections would be democratic if they are free. Would they be free before the presidential poll? That is a question the government has to answer because there are contradictory signals coming from different limbs of government. And there is also the traditional gap between intent and action of the government.
The President has with equal alacrity turned the all party committee for devolution, which he constituted on assuming office in 2006 with a lot of fanfare, into one more committee of irrelevance if not non-action, as recently confessed by its chairman Tissa Vitarana. His report submitted is said to cover a wide range of subjects that ail Sri Lanka from the executive presidency to revision of constitution to the rights and powers of people living away from Colombo. This well meaning effort is in the danger of consigned to the archives of history to company with President Chandrika Kumaratunga’s attempts at constitutional amendment that had almost everyone’s consensus.
Curiously, India which had initially been speaking of devolution later to downgraded its desire to implementation of the 13th amendment. And when even that is in doubt India has become strangely muted, except that it came up as a point in the sidelines of the conference of non-aligned nations attended by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President Rajapaksa.
But all these are exercises in politics and not of the promised pathway to ethnic reconciliation. It is not good intentions that is lacking in Sri Lanka but their implementation. President Rajapaksa has sought to wish away the term minority as applied to non Sinhalese citizens of the country. This is an admirable sentiment but it does not appear realistic in the absence of political, structural, constitutional and social actions needed to make it a reality. Unless the vision of a minority free Sri Lanka is fleshed out with appropriate missions to turn into a reality, it would remain a distant vision only. And sadly, this is what it is turning out to be, it appears.
The ethnic divide has established deep roots of distrust between the two communities that are yet to bee uprooted. So when the state once again sidelines the basic issue of Tamil quest for equitable treatment there cannot be but a feeling of déjã vu among the people on this issue. These are partly reinforced by the continued presence of nearly 300,000 Tamil IDPs still in ‘welfare camps’ with no hope of returning back to their war ravaged villages “within six months” as promised earlier.
Their doubts on the new dispensation increase further when Dayan Jayatilake, who turned in a stellar performance at the UN to save the face of Sri Lanka, was sacked overnight. Of course, he was ‘guilty’ of trying to sell the state’s own merchandise – the implementation of 13th amendment (plus?). Such actions only turn the feeling of discomfort of those who question government policy decisions into to insecurity. A nation needs conscience keepers to question and introspect. And a free media is the vehicle of conscience keepers; and they are ill served if the Damocles sword of Press Council keeps the media in tenterhooks.
After decades of agonising conflict Sri Lanka needs an ambience free of fear and suspicion, where all people will have a fair share of power in decision making. And that unfortunately is not happening.
The process of polarisation of Sinhala and Tamil communities had been going on for over half a century. It had been clouding the emergence of a united Sri Lankan identity after it became bread and butter of Sinhala and Tamil politics in Sri Lanka. It has resulted in Sri Lanka going through a full circle from politics to extremism to militancy to insurgency to terrorism to war to politics now. Should Sri Lanka go through this agonising cycle all over once again? This is a question the people and rulers of Sri Lanka cannot afford to ignore.
www.southasiaanalysis.org
Thursday, July 30, 2009
Sunday, July 19, 2009
Sri Lanka: President Rajapaksa’s Military Manoeuvres
As the dust settled down after the victory celebrations ended, Sri Lanka President Mahinda Rajapaksa announced a series of senior appointments connected with armed forces. To call it a shake up would be journalese but that is what it appears to be. All the three chiefs of armed forces were changed, a chief of defence staff (CDS) and a national security advisor were appointed.
The Chief of Defence Staff
General Sarath Fonseka, the military architect of the successful Eelam War IV, was made chief of defence staff. This was not unexpected particularly after the Chief of Defence Staff Act was passed in parliament last month, formalising and defining a loose arrangement that existed earlier. However, the speed with which Gen Fonseka was asked to assume office on July 15, with barely three days notice, was a little surprising.
General Fonseka’s professional skill and leadership provided to the army in the war has increased his national popularity. And probably he has more admirers cutting across party lines than any other political leader at present. He is a man who does not hesitate to say what he feels, mincing no words, whether it is calling Tamil Nadu politicians as jokers (that appears to be his view of politicians as a whole) or declaring that Sri Lanka was for majority population. He is also a man of strong likes and dislikes and has not hesitated to vocalise it. His differences with Admiral Karannagoda, the Naval Chief, are well known. Added to all this, Gen Fonseka’s political ambitions still remain a question mark.
So it is possible that the General’s style and growing public profile were making politicians in power a little uncomfortable. As CDS, General Fonseka would not be in direct control of troops as he would be involved more in providing strategic direction to them. And that should ease the politicians’ discomfort.
In Sri Lanka, Ministry of Defence, Public Security and Law and Order is a powerful one as it controls not only the armed forces, but paramilitary forces, the intelligence apparatus, and the police. (This is somewhat like combining the defence ministry and certain departments of home ministry into one ministry in the Indian government set up: a mind boggling exercise in chaos in Indian conditions!) The newly created Coast Guard adds further muscle to the Ministry. The post of CDS now will be a powerful one as has now been formalised, and made more accountable with clear cut responsibilities through an act of parliament. It provides General Fonseka a strong toehold in the Ministry of Defence and gives him the ability to influence decision making process on defence related issues including policy, procurement, expansion and probably even operational deployment.
According to the CDS Bill published on June 1, the President shall pick the CDS from among the serving chiefs of three services and appoint him for a two-year term; and he can be reappointed for any number of terms. The CDS will function “under the direction, supervision and control of the Secretary to the Ministry of Defence.” Thus the chain of command and control of not only the CDS but also the armed forces have now been clearly spelled out.
The CDS’ duties include a whole gamut of tasks connected with providing strategic direction to the armed forces, development of doctrine for joint employment of the armed forces and facilitating the preparation of strategic plans for the armed forces. He also has responsibilities relating to the co-ordination of intelligence within the three services of armed forces. The CDS will also undertake operational assessments to facilitate planning, coordination, and implementation of joint plans in the three services.
The CDS Bill also provides for the establishment of a Committee of the Chief of Defence Staff under the chairmanship of the CDS with the three service chiefs as members. Presumably this committee has been constituted to facilitate the co-ordination of activities between the armed forces and the Ministry of Defence. But tucked in the bill is a significant sentence that says the President has “powers to appoint the Chief of Defence Staff as the Chairman of this Committee.” Does it mean the CDS need not always be chairman of the Committee of the CDS? Only the bureaucracy can explain this.
Army Commander
A comparatively junior officer Maj Gen Jagath Jayasuriya, an armoured corps officer, was appointed Army Commander in the rank of Lt General to succeed General Fonseka. Maj Gen Jayasuriya had served as commander, Security Forces, Wanni with distinction during the Eelam War from 2007 onwards. But what is important is that he superseded eight other seniors to become the new Army Commander. Lt Gen Jayasuriya had a few things going for him to become the chief: apparently he came on top of the Merit Scheme General Fonseka had introduced for promotions (under this scheme which caused some heartburn, promotions are based on battlefield performance and not on mere seniority).
Secondly, Lt Gen Jayasuriya can serve a full term as army chief as he is due to retire only in 2014. The seniors he superseded were either retiring this year or in 2010. With him as the army commander, Gen Fonseka would be able to implement in full his strategic plans for the army under one army chief. It would also indicate that the new army commander enjoys Gen Fonseka’s complete confidence.
With Lt Gen Jayasuriya’s appointment the merit scheme appears to have been accepted as the norm. It has set a clear precedence of performance over riding seniority for selection of senior appointments. While this will undoubtedly improve professionalism, it is going to make officer management within the army more difficult for commanders, particularly in peacetime. Traditionally seniority is an accepted as an essential criterion for promotion in armed forces. And when operational experience does not exist (as it is likely in the coming years in Sri Lanka), the merit scheme could be trivialised to include considerations other than professional excellence.
National Security Advisor
President Rajapaksa pulled yet another surprise with the appointment of the outgoing naval chief Admiral Karannagoda as National Security Advisor (NSA) to the President. Admiral Karannagoda had performed as the naval chief with great professional skill in crippling the LTTE’s logistic fleet which was a key element in winning the war. As he was senior to Gen Fonseka, he would have been the logical choice for the newly created post of CDS. On the other hand as commander of the army, the largest of the three services, Gen Fonseka’s appointment would have been a more logical step.
The admiral’s appointment as NSA has baled out the President from a potentially tricky and embarrassing situation when Gen Fonseka was chosen as the CDS.
As the NSA would be functioning under the President, the scope of his advisory might be broader and cover more areas. However, the NSA’s functions and responsibilities have not yet been formalised. Only when that process comes in place we would know the extent of NSA’s role as a senior member of the national decision making architecture as in India and the U.S.
Significance of the changes
The Sri Lanka government appears to be taking a total re-look at its national security setup. The recent appointments and structural changes in the national security set up would indicate that this process has already started. With the plans of modernization of navy and expansion of the army to a 300,000 strong force afoot, the creation of the post of CDS and appointment of Gen Fonseka as the first CDS are of significance to strategic security of the region. This is likely to be taken note of Sri Lanka’s neighbours and allies as Sri Lanka occupies a ringside seat in Indian Ocean security. A strong Sri Lanka army is of special significance for India’s national security as both the countries have very close relations on many issues including defence.
Sri Lanka armed forces are going through a transitory phase. The army was hastily expanded for the purpose of counter insurgency operations against a formidable insurgent force that had limited conventional warfare capability. Gen Fonseka as the new CDS is in a position to translate his ideas of building what was essentially a counter insurgency force into a regular professional army ready to face other armed forces on equal footing.
According to media reports the the new CDS will have a staff of 300 including seven major generals, one rear admiral, and an air vice marshal. The staff include Chief of Staff, a Director General Joint Planning & Defence Development, Director Joint Intelligence, War Assistant to the CDS, War Secretary to CDS, and Director Research & Development. The names of the new appointees have also been mentioned. The strength of the staff and scope of work indicate that the CDS will be fully functional in his new office. It will soon become clear what will be his priorities, particularly relating to intelligence, joint operations and planning.
The appointment of a NSA, if it is more than an expedience or stop gap arrangement, has the potential to become a powerful post when it is formalized. However, only when that happens, we will be able to assess how the NSA would impact the decision making process of the executive presidency in Sri Lanka, particularly on strategic security issues.
Talking of military appointments, the appointment of Major General GA Chandrasiri, who was Chief of Staff of the Army, as governor of Northern province, has the advantage of rewarding his service without making him army commander. It might be administratively smooth to have a military man as a governor in the province which has a very large number of troops operating. However, from the point of view of normalisation and increasing the security and trust of civilians in the government it is a retrograde step.
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cnotes6%5Cnote527.html
The Chief of Defence Staff
General Sarath Fonseka, the military architect of the successful Eelam War IV, was made chief of defence staff. This was not unexpected particularly after the Chief of Defence Staff Act was passed in parliament last month, formalising and defining a loose arrangement that existed earlier. However, the speed with which Gen Fonseka was asked to assume office on July 15, with barely three days notice, was a little surprising.
General Fonseka’s professional skill and leadership provided to the army in the war has increased his national popularity. And probably he has more admirers cutting across party lines than any other political leader at present. He is a man who does not hesitate to say what he feels, mincing no words, whether it is calling Tamil Nadu politicians as jokers (that appears to be his view of politicians as a whole) or declaring that Sri Lanka was for majority population. He is also a man of strong likes and dislikes and has not hesitated to vocalise it. His differences with Admiral Karannagoda, the Naval Chief, are well known. Added to all this, Gen Fonseka’s political ambitions still remain a question mark.
So it is possible that the General’s style and growing public profile were making politicians in power a little uncomfortable. As CDS, General Fonseka would not be in direct control of troops as he would be involved more in providing strategic direction to them. And that should ease the politicians’ discomfort.
In Sri Lanka, Ministry of Defence, Public Security and Law and Order is a powerful one as it controls not only the armed forces, but paramilitary forces, the intelligence apparatus, and the police. (This is somewhat like combining the defence ministry and certain departments of home ministry into one ministry in the Indian government set up: a mind boggling exercise in chaos in Indian conditions!) The newly created Coast Guard adds further muscle to the Ministry. The post of CDS now will be a powerful one as has now been formalised, and made more accountable with clear cut responsibilities through an act of parliament. It provides General Fonseka a strong toehold in the Ministry of Defence and gives him the ability to influence decision making process on defence related issues including policy, procurement, expansion and probably even operational deployment.
According to the CDS Bill published on June 1, the President shall pick the CDS from among the serving chiefs of three services and appoint him for a two-year term; and he can be reappointed for any number of terms. The CDS will function “under the direction, supervision and control of the Secretary to the Ministry of Defence.” Thus the chain of command and control of not only the CDS but also the armed forces have now been clearly spelled out.
The CDS’ duties include a whole gamut of tasks connected with providing strategic direction to the armed forces, development of doctrine for joint employment of the armed forces and facilitating the preparation of strategic plans for the armed forces. He also has responsibilities relating to the co-ordination of intelligence within the three services of armed forces. The CDS will also undertake operational assessments to facilitate planning, coordination, and implementation of joint plans in the three services.
The CDS Bill also provides for the establishment of a Committee of the Chief of Defence Staff under the chairmanship of the CDS with the three service chiefs as members. Presumably this committee has been constituted to facilitate the co-ordination of activities between the armed forces and the Ministry of Defence. But tucked in the bill is a significant sentence that says the President has “powers to appoint the Chief of Defence Staff as the Chairman of this Committee.” Does it mean the CDS need not always be chairman of the Committee of the CDS? Only the bureaucracy can explain this.
Army Commander
A comparatively junior officer Maj Gen Jagath Jayasuriya, an armoured corps officer, was appointed Army Commander in the rank of Lt General to succeed General Fonseka. Maj Gen Jayasuriya had served as commander, Security Forces, Wanni with distinction during the Eelam War from 2007 onwards. But what is important is that he superseded eight other seniors to become the new Army Commander. Lt Gen Jayasuriya had a few things going for him to become the chief: apparently he came on top of the Merit Scheme General Fonseka had introduced for promotions (under this scheme which caused some heartburn, promotions are based on battlefield performance and not on mere seniority).
Secondly, Lt Gen Jayasuriya can serve a full term as army chief as he is due to retire only in 2014. The seniors he superseded were either retiring this year or in 2010. With him as the army commander, Gen Fonseka would be able to implement in full his strategic plans for the army under one army chief. It would also indicate that the new army commander enjoys Gen Fonseka’s complete confidence.
With Lt Gen Jayasuriya’s appointment the merit scheme appears to have been accepted as the norm. It has set a clear precedence of performance over riding seniority for selection of senior appointments. While this will undoubtedly improve professionalism, it is going to make officer management within the army more difficult for commanders, particularly in peacetime. Traditionally seniority is an accepted as an essential criterion for promotion in armed forces. And when operational experience does not exist (as it is likely in the coming years in Sri Lanka), the merit scheme could be trivialised to include considerations other than professional excellence.
National Security Advisor
President Rajapaksa pulled yet another surprise with the appointment of the outgoing naval chief Admiral Karannagoda as National Security Advisor (NSA) to the President. Admiral Karannagoda had performed as the naval chief with great professional skill in crippling the LTTE’s logistic fleet which was a key element in winning the war. As he was senior to Gen Fonseka, he would have been the logical choice for the newly created post of CDS. On the other hand as commander of the army, the largest of the three services, Gen Fonseka’s appointment would have been a more logical step.
The admiral’s appointment as NSA has baled out the President from a potentially tricky and embarrassing situation when Gen Fonseka was chosen as the CDS.
As the NSA would be functioning under the President, the scope of his advisory might be broader and cover more areas. However, the NSA’s functions and responsibilities have not yet been formalised. Only when that process comes in place we would know the extent of NSA’s role as a senior member of the national decision making architecture as in India and the U.S.
Significance of the changes
The Sri Lanka government appears to be taking a total re-look at its national security setup. The recent appointments and structural changes in the national security set up would indicate that this process has already started. With the plans of modernization of navy and expansion of the army to a 300,000 strong force afoot, the creation of the post of CDS and appointment of Gen Fonseka as the first CDS are of significance to strategic security of the region. This is likely to be taken note of Sri Lanka’s neighbours and allies as Sri Lanka occupies a ringside seat in Indian Ocean security. A strong Sri Lanka army is of special significance for India’s national security as both the countries have very close relations on many issues including defence.
Sri Lanka armed forces are going through a transitory phase. The army was hastily expanded for the purpose of counter insurgency operations against a formidable insurgent force that had limited conventional warfare capability. Gen Fonseka as the new CDS is in a position to translate his ideas of building what was essentially a counter insurgency force into a regular professional army ready to face other armed forces on equal footing.
According to media reports the the new CDS will have a staff of 300 including seven major generals, one rear admiral, and an air vice marshal. The staff include Chief of Staff, a Director General Joint Planning & Defence Development, Director Joint Intelligence, War Assistant to the CDS, War Secretary to CDS, and Director Research & Development. The names of the new appointees have also been mentioned. The strength of the staff and scope of work indicate that the CDS will be fully functional in his new office. It will soon become clear what will be his priorities, particularly relating to intelligence, joint operations and planning.
The appointment of a NSA, if it is more than an expedience or stop gap arrangement, has the potential to become a powerful post when it is formalized. However, only when that happens, we will be able to assess how the NSA would impact the decision making process of the executive presidency in Sri Lanka, particularly on strategic security issues.
Talking of military appointments, the appointment of Major General GA Chandrasiri, who was Chief of Staff of the Army, as governor of Northern province, has the advantage of rewarding his service without making him army commander. It might be administratively smooth to have a military man as a governor in the province which has a very large number of troops operating. However, from the point of view of normalisation and increasing the security and trust of civilians in the government it is a retrograde step.
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cnotes6%5Cnote527.html
Wednesday, July 15, 2009
An Army of Occupation: A Bureaucratic View of the Military
[I had published an article by Admiral Arun Prakash, retired Naval Chief "WHILE WE SLEPT:POLITICIZATION OF INDIA’S ARMED FORCES" on June 21, 2009 highlighting the growing disenchantment of armed forces on the way they are being handled. Here is a no holds barred piece from Lt Gen Harwant Singh, a widely respected soldier, giving yet another disturbing perspective from soldier's point of view about which not many care to know, it seems.]
An Army of Occupation: A Bureaucratic View of the Military
Lt Gen Harwant Singh (Retd)
Many defence analysts are of the view that had the Kashmir war not started in 1947, in less than a decade the Indian army would have been reduced to a constabulary. When the subject of modernization of the army was raised with Nehru, it is believed that he responded by saying that, if need be, the army should be prepared to fight with 'lathies.'
Kashmir operations not withstanding, the plan to systematically and persistently downgrade the military was put into operation and by 1962 much had been achieved. The political class had come to believe that they had ascended an era of peace, free of international power politics, strategic power play and the role of military power to protect national interests had become minimal. It was a utopian world where reason and dialogue were believed to be the ultimate tools for the resolution of clash of interests and conflict situations. Though the Chinese did give a severe jolt and tried to shake our leadership out of their world of make belief, it succeeded only partially, because when 1965 came we found ourselves, militarily inferior to Pakistan in many key areas.
There was a pathological dislike of the Indian military by the congress party which came to power at the centre on attaining independence. Herein rests the answer to the military's down-gradation in so systematic and persistent a manner soon after independence! The Bureaucracy exploited this bias of the congress to the hilt and added to it the fear and the possibility of a military take over as had occurred in some of the neighbhouring countries. It also managed to restructure the higher defence set-up to the nation's overall strategic disadvantage.
Gen O P Malhotra as Chief of Defence Staff, in a note to the RM in 1981 raised the issue of down grading of service officers in the warrant of precedence (which bears on pay etc as well ) and that these down-gradations coincided with the termination of every war ( 1948,62,65, and 71. ) and this had seriously effected the morale of armed forces. A committee of three secretaries periodically revise the warrant of precedence, which is rubber stamped by the supreme commander of the armed forces, who is not known to have even once raised a query on this regular assault on the officers of his forces.
In response to Gen OP Malhotra's objection, the committee of secretaries recorded, "military officers were placed unduly high in the old warrant of precedence,presumably as it was considered essential for officers of army of occupation to be given special status and authority." While it appeared to be an independent perception of a few babus, the political class, either had a similar view or were indifferent to bureaucratic machinations. Of all the people of this world, we Indians, who have been under the heels of armies of occupation for more than two thousand years, should know what such armies are like. To call Indian army of the 20th century (1900 to 1947) an army of occupation was blasphemous.
Congress resolution of 1942 stated "The present Indian Army is an off-shoot of the British Army and has been maintained to mainly hold India in subjugation. It has been completely segregated from the general population." These were the very years in which the British used police and not the army to ruthlessly crush the 'Quit India movement' and that Lala Lajpat Rai fell to police 'lathies' and not an army bullet. Yet the Congress heaped this ignominy on the military.
From end 1939, the Indian army was out of India and nearer home involved in a desperate fight to keep the Japanese at bay. The congress leadership in 1942 had no experience of state craft or state power and could only accuse, agitate and was scared to name the police and found army a distant and easy target.
Segregation of military from the local population was nothing new. It was an essential requirement for maintaining discipline and professionalism. Even within Indian forts, the soldiers quarters were segregated from the rest. The concept of 'Chawanies' (cantonments) in India was first introduced by Maharaja Ranjit Singh. Residences and offices of senior civil servants too were located in British cantonments established well away from civil population.
Gen Malhotra pointed out that on the other hand, this committee of babus while expounding the theory of 'army of occupation' failed to realize that a high place was accorded to the civil servants in the colonial bureaucracy, because they were the trusted paladins of the imperial power. It was the British P.M, Lloyd George, who referred to the ICS as the steel frame of the British to control India. It was the civil services and the police who were the instruments of oppression and were the willing and enthusiastic tools employed to crush the nationalist upsurge, fervour and the freedom movement. Recall that incident in Lahore where the police arrested a 'Tongawala' whose only crime was that he urged his lazy horse to move faster: at Hitler's speed. (chal Hitler di chaley). Police and civil services were more loyal than the king.
The Indian Army held NW frontier for a hundred years and prevented those wild tribes from across the Hindu Kush Mountains from making periodic forays into the Indo-Gangetic Plain. Later it fought a savage war in the jungles of Burma and finally stemmed, at Imphal and Kohima, the Japanese assault on India. The Japanese army was barbaric in the extreme and our people in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and POWs, had a taste of its brutality.
It is the mutinies in the Army and Navy which threw a clear signal to the British that it was time to leave. So it is highly malicious for anyone to term Indian Army as army of occupation. Consider this. The Indian government, in the first 50 years of independence, has deployed the Indian army to quell riots, maintain order etc 10 times more than the British did in their last 50 years of their rule in India. So much for the poor governance we have had all these years. A soldier is under oath and fealty to the constitution/ government of the day. There can be no grounds for him to break his oath. That is why the INA troops, and those of the Navy and Army who mutinied, could not be taken back into service after independence.
However, the suspicion injected deep into the political mind of a military take over lingers. Moreover the political class continues to be in the grip of the bureaucracy or as Nirad C Chaudhury puts it so succinctly, "the political leadership is helplessly flapping its wings against the bars of the cage in which the bureaucracy has placed it."
This down gradation of the military officers was even taken into armed forces headquarters, where a civilian officer in the appointment of Director equated with a Lt-Col /Col, was suddenly equated with a brigadier. This completely distorted the working equations at armed forces headquarters and had adverse impact on the working at Service Headquarters. Gen Rodriques, as Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee, lodged a strong protest with the RM, against this chicanery of the bureaucracy, but the protests fell on deaf ears and political class appeared helpless against continued assault on the military.
Since the down gradation of the military is continuing to this day: 6th CPC being the latest manifestation of this six decade old policy, presumably the Indian military is still being perceived as an army of occupation. Military service has become so unattractive that few want to join it and those inside want to quit. 15 of the brightest colonels of the army have declined to sign up for the Higher Command Course, which is an essential stepping stone for promotions to higher ranks. In the last two years over 2000 officers have sought release from service, which includes brigs and generals. Is there similar leakage of talent in the civil services?
Indian army has been in, 'no war no peace,' state since independence. Wars apart, army has lost 569 officers and over 9000 JCOs and other ranks in counter insurgency operation during the last ten years. While there is little value for human life in India, the value of soldier's life count for nothing in this country. Therefore, one wonders whose army it is anyway and who will soldier for India!
We have the ambition to be a world economic power, but the vision and will of a third world country when it comes to creating strategic capabilities. Given the geo-strategic environments of the region and India's unwillingness to rise to meet the emerging challenges, the picture is getting fairly grim by the day. To complete that picture one may add the factor of demotivation of country's armed forces.
An Army of Occupation: A Bureaucratic View of the Military
Lt Gen Harwant Singh (Retd)
Many defence analysts are of the view that had the Kashmir war not started in 1947, in less than a decade the Indian army would have been reduced to a constabulary. When the subject of modernization of the army was raised with Nehru, it is believed that he responded by saying that, if need be, the army should be prepared to fight with 'lathies.'
Kashmir operations not withstanding, the plan to systematically and persistently downgrade the military was put into operation and by 1962 much had been achieved. The political class had come to believe that they had ascended an era of peace, free of international power politics, strategic power play and the role of military power to protect national interests had become minimal. It was a utopian world where reason and dialogue were believed to be the ultimate tools for the resolution of clash of interests and conflict situations. Though the Chinese did give a severe jolt and tried to shake our leadership out of their world of make belief, it succeeded only partially, because when 1965 came we found ourselves, militarily inferior to Pakistan in many key areas.
There was a pathological dislike of the Indian military by the congress party which came to power at the centre on attaining independence. Herein rests the answer to the military's down-gradation in so systematic and persistent a manner soon after independence! The Bureaucracy exploited this bias of the congress to the hilt and added to it the fear and the possibility of a military take over as had occurred in some of the neighbhouring countries. It also managed to restructure the higher defence set-up to the nation's overall strategic disadvantage.
Gen O P Malhotra as Chief of Defence Staff, in a note to the RM in 1981 raised the issue of down grading of service officers in the warrant of precedence (which bears on pay etc as well ) and that these down-gradations coincided with the termination of every war ( 1948,62,65, and 71. ) and this had seriously effected the morale of armed forces. A committee of three secretaries periodically revise the warrant of precedence, which is rubber stamped by the supreme commander of the armed forces, who is not known to have even once raised a query on this regular assault on the officers of his forces.
In response to Gen OP Malhotra's objection, the committee of secretaries recorded, "military officers were placed unduly high in the old warrant of precedence,presumably as it was considered essential for officers of army of occupation to be given special status and authority." While it appeared to be an independent perception of a few babus, the political class, either had a similar view or were indifferent to bureaucratic machinations. Of all the people of this world, we Indians, who have been under the heels of armies of occupation for more than two thousand years, should know what such armies are like. To call Indian army of the 20th century (1900 to 1947) an army of occupation was blasphemous.
Congress resolution of 1942 stated "The present Indian Army is an off-shoot of the British Army and has been maintained to mainly hold India in subjugation. It has been completely segregated from the general population." These were the very years in which the British used police and not the army to ruthlessly crush the 'Quit India movement' and that Lala Lajpat Rai fell to police 'lathies' and not an army bullet. Yet the Congress heaped this ignominy on the military.
From end 1939, the Indian army was out of India and nearer home involved in a desperate fight to keep the Japanese at bay. The congress leadership in 1942 had no experience of state craft or state power and could only accuse, agitate and was scared to name the police and found army a distant and easy target.
Segregation of military from the local population was nothing new. It was an essential requirement for maintaining discipline and professionalism. Even within Indian forts, the soldiers quarters were segregated from the rest. The concept of 'Chawanies' (cantonments) in India was first introduced by Maharaja Ranjit Singh. Residences and offices of senior civil servants too were located in British cantonments established well away from civil population.
Gen Malhotra pointed out that on the other hand, this committee of babus while expounding the theory of 'army of occupation' failed to realize that a high place was accorded to the civil servants in the colonial bureaucracy, because they were the trusted paladins of the imperial power. It was the British P.M, Lloyd George, who referred to the ICS as the steel frame of the British to control India. It was the civil services and the police who were the instruments of oppression and were the willing and enthusiastic tools employed to crush the nationalist upsurge, fervour and the freedom movement. Recall that incident in Lahore where the police arrested a 'Tongawala' whose only crime was that he urged his lazy horse to move faster: at Hitler's speed. (chal Hitler di chaley). Police and civil services were more loyal than the king.
The Indian Army held NW frontier for a hundred years and prevented those wild tribes from across the Hindu Kush Mountains from making periodic forays into the Indo-Gangetic Plain. Later it fought a savage war in the jungles of Burma and finally stemmed, at Imphal and Kohima, the Japanese assault on India. The Japanese army was barbaric in the extreme and our people in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and POWs, had a taste of its brutality.
It is the mutinies in the Army and Navy which threw a clear signal to the British that it was time to leave. So it is highly malicious for anyone to term Indian Army as army of occupation. Consider this. The Indian government, in the first 50 years of independence, has deployed the Indian army to quell riots, maintain order etc 10 times more than the British did in their last 50 years of their rule in India. So much for the poor governance we have had all these years. A soldier is under oath and fealty to the constitution/ government of the day. There can be no grounds for him to break his oath. That is why the INA troops, and those of the Navy and Army who mutinied, could not be taken back into service after independence.
However, the suspicion injected deep into the political mind of a military take over lingers. Moreover the political class continues to be in the grip of the bureaucracy or as Nirad C Chaudhury puts it so succinctly, "the political leadership is helplessly flapping its wings against the bars of the cage in which the bureaucracy has placed it."
This down gradation of the military officers was even taken into armed forces headquarters, where a civilian officer in the appointment of Director equated with a Lt-Col /Col, was suddenly equated with a brigadier. This completely distorted the working equations at armed forces headquarters and had adverse impact on the working at Service Headquarters. Gen Rodriques, as Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee, lodged a strong protest with the RM, against this chicanery of the bureaucracy, but the protests fell on deaf ears and political class appeared helpless against continued assault on the military.
Since the down gradation of the military is continuing to this day: 6th CPC being the latest manifestation of this six decade old policy, presumably the Indian military is still being perceived as an army of occupation. Military service has become so unattractive that few want to join it and those inside want to quit. 15 of the brightest colonels of the army have declined to sign up for the Higher Command Course, which is an essential stepping stone for promotions to higher ranks. In the last two years over 2000 officers have sought release from service, which includes brigs and generals. Is there similar leakage of talent in the civil services?
Indian army has been in, 'no war no peace,' state since independence. Wars apart, army has lost 569 officers and over 9000 JCOs and other ranks in counter insurgency operation during the last ten years. While there is little value for human life in India, the value of soldier's life count for nothing in this country. Therefore, one wonders whose army it is anyway and who will soldier for India!
We have the ambition to be a world economic power, but the vision and will of a third world country when it comes to creating strategic capabilities. Given the geo-strategic environments of the region and India's unwillingness to rise to meet the emerging challenges, the picture is getting fairly grim by the day. To complete that picture one may add the factor of demotivation of country's armed forces.
Sri Lanka Perspectives – June 2009
[The Sri Lanka Perspectives for June 2009, an assessment on developments in Sri Lanka during the month of June 2009, was written on June 30, 2009 and published in the SOUTH ASIA SECURITY TRENDS, Vol 3 No 6 July 2009 issue. It is published courtesy www.security-risks.com]
The IDP issue
After the “final victory” over the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) culminating in the death of its leader Prabhakaran in May, during the month of June the focus of Sri Lanka shifted to prevent the resurgence of Tamil insurgents, rather than restoring normalcy in the north. Nearly 300,000 people of Vanni area displaced by the war continue to be held in camps run by the army, ostensibly to complete the process of screening them for LTTE elements as well as clearance of landmines in the region.
Described by some UN representatives as “internment camps,” the five holding camps have continued to draw adverse criticism from international community and INGOs on various counts of living conditions, health, denial of freedom of movement etc. The government of Sri Lanka has not been taken kindly to the cricism. It has tightened the visa regime for visits by overseas politicians and representatives of NGOs. There appears to be some confusion within Sri Lanka government between the defence ministry and the foreign ministry in the handling of overseas criticism. This was highlighted when Canadian opposition leader Bob Rae, and a vocal critic of the way Sri Lanka had been handling humanitarian and human rights issues, was refused entryon landing in Colombo by military intelligence although the Sri Lanka embassy in Ottawa had issued him a visa. Government sources said Bob Rae was considered a security risk because of his pro-LTTE sentiments. Canadian government and press have strongly criticised Sri Lanka’s seemingly ham handed action in this affair.
France, U.S. and U.K. have come out with strong statements on the need for restoration of normal life in the war affected areas. The U.S. has also emphasised the need for implementing the 13th amendment of the Sri Lanka constitution giving limited autonomy to the provincial councils. The U.S. State Department has also issued a travel advisory cautioning U.S. travellers to Sri Lanka with veiled criticism of the conditions in Sri Lanka. It stated: “American citizens of Sri Lankan origin may be subject to additional scrutiny upon arrival and while in the country. In some cases, foreigners of Sri Lankan origin may be detained without their embassy being notified. The activities of journalists, researchers, aid workers, and volunteers receive particular attention.”
The continued failure of Sri Lanka government to address the issue of Vanni Tamils has also had its repercussions in India, particularly in Tamil Nadu. Sri Lanka Government sent a high power delegation led by Senior Presidential Advisor and MP Basil Rajapaksa, Defence Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa and Presidential Secretary Lalith Weerathunga to India to specially discuss with Indian foreign minister SM Krishna issues related to the resettlement of the displaced civilians in the North. They said, after discussion, that Indiahad agreed to provide eight de-mining teams process to clear the affected areas so that resettlement could be done within a six month period.However, it is doubtful whether the resettlement would be completed in this short period.
An aid ship “Captain Ali”, carrying a load of relief materials meant for displaced civilians, which was not allowed to enter Sri Lankan territorial waters by the Government authorities had anchored off Chennai seeking Indian intervention. During their meeting in New Delhi, the Sri Lankans were reported to have agreed to India’s suggestion to allow the ship “Captain Ali” to off-load the relief material. It now transpires that these items will be routed to Sri Lanka by the Red Cross in both the countries.
However, it is clear that India had not been happy with Sri Lanka’s actions on relief and resettlement of Tamils in Vanni. Union Home Minister P Chidambaram expressed dissatisfaction over the issue. Specifically, he said that though India had allocated Rs 500 crores for their rehabilitation, Sri Lanka had not come up with the rehabilitation plan. He also asked Sri Lanka to allow INGOs like the Red Cross to carry out the relief work and to permit the media to enter IDP camps.
The issue of Vanni civilians languishing in camps has also provided the much needed rallying point for the LTTE supporters among Tamil expatriates to muster public support. Even otherwise all most all Tamil expatriates are feeling aggrieved at the lack of international collective action against Sri Lanka on this count. And their continued agitation particularly in the UK has kept the issue of Tamil Eelam in the limelight. UK has drawn a lot of flak in Colombo for allowing such demonstrations.
It has whipped up anti-western sentiments in Sri Lanka among the Sinhala nationalist and chauvinist political parties resulting in the hardening of Sri Lanka government attitude also towards nations “meddling” in its affairs. The Obama administration’s nomination of Ms. Patricia Butenis, senior U.S. Foreign Service Officer and currently the deputy chief of mission in Iraq, to be its next ambassador to Sri Lanka has also come under close public scrutiny. This has also resulted in paranoia about activities of critical media, NGO activists, foreign media representatives, and even workers of UN agencies.
A direct consequence of these developments was the delay in release of International Monetary Fund’s loan of $ 1.9 billion to Colombo due to political pressure from the U.S., U.K. and other Western nations unhappy with Sri Lanka’s handling of the final stages of the war in which thousands of civilians were killed. Sri Lanka’s trade minister G.L. Peiris has accused IMF of getting embroiled in “controversial political issues as part of the criteria governing their judgment in respect of particular transactions.”
Sri Lanka government is taking a few measures to restore normalcy in the north. It has opened the A9 highway to Jaffna for commercial goods traffic. The proposed local body elections for the Jaffna and Vavuniya municipal councils are to be held on August 8, 2009. The ruling United Peoples Freedom Alliance (UPFA) campaign in Jaffna is managed by Social Services and Social Welfare Minister Douglas Devananda. 174 candidates from six political parties and two independent groups are in the fray for 29 seats in the Jaffna Municipal Council. For the 15 seats in the Vavuniya Urban Council 135 candidates from six political parties and three independent groups are contesting. The elections will be a testing ground for the nascent Tamil political leadership.
Changes in military command and control
The passing of the Chief of Defence Staff Act in Sri Lanka parliament has formalised the appointment of CDS which had been in existence before. The post of CDS was created (though not formalized) in 1999 in the place of the civilian post of chief of the Joint Operations Bureau.
With this, the CDS as the co-ordinating head of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Police, emerges as a powerful figure in the hierarchy. With General Sarath Fonseka tipped to take over as the new CDS with clearly defined powers working under the defence secretary, plans for strengthening the military would be implemented faster.
The creation of the CDS would also probably facilitate in getting through the controversial future role of the expanded 300,000 strong army in the north where normal life is not restored yet. It will also help the implementation of army’s expansion plans better and faster. Plans are already underway for expansion of the navy, which is expected to play a major role in protecting Sri Lanka’s extended exclusive economic zone in the Indian Ocean.
Revival of the LTTE
The Tamil expatriates who still believe in the creation of a Tamil Eelam state, smarting under the defeat of the LTTE, have got together and announced a slew of measures to form the Provisional Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam (PTGTE) for progressing the cause. Though it appears to be broad based in its concept, its birth after the LTTE has ceased to be a power centre makes it clear that it would claim to be a successor to the LTTE. However, the decision to form PTGE taken without consulting the pro-LTTE Tamil National Alliance (TNA) which is rooted in Sri Lanka politics has raised doubts about the future viability of PTGE. It has also placed TNA in a dilemma.
However, it provides a rallying point for pro-LTTE elements to muster their strength and strengthens the hands of Kumaran Pathmanathan (KP), the overseas representative of the LTTE who had been trying to take over the leadership of the organization. The new name would also overcome the legal hurdle of publicly espousing the LTTE in 32 nations including India, Canada, USA and the EU where the organisation is banned as a terrorist group. However, PTGE has to prove itself as a viable entity; till that happens it will have little credibility both within and outside Sri Lanka. And its effort to establish itself is not going to be a smooth process with competing interests trying to take over the leadership mantle of the LTTE.
June 30, 2009
The IDP issue
After the “final victory” over the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) culminating in the death of its leader Prabhakaran in May, during the month of June the focus of Sri Lanka shifted to prevent the resurgence of Tamil insurgents, rather than restoring normalcy in the north. Nearly 300,000 people of Vanni area displaced by the war continue to be held in camps run by the army, ostensibly to complete the process of screening them for LTTE elements as well as clearance of landmines in the region.
Described by some UN representatives as “internment camps,” the five holding camps have continued to draw adverse criticism from international community and INGOs on various counts of living conditions, health, denial of freedom of movement etc. The government of Sri Lanka has not been taken kindly to the cricism. It has tightened the visa regime for visits by overseas politicians and representatives of NGOs. There appears to be some confusion within Sri Lanka government between the defence ministry and the foreign ministry in the handling of overseas criticism. This was highlighted when Canadian opposition leader Bob Rae, and a vocal critic of the way Sri Lanka had been handling humanitarian and human rights issues, was refused entryon landing in Colombo by military intelligence although the Sri Lanka embassy in Ottawa had issued him a visa. Government sources said Bob Rae was considered a security risk because of his pro-LTTE sentiments. Canadian government and press have strongly criticised Sri Lanka’s seemingly ham handed action in this affair.
France, U.S. and U.K. have come out with strong statements on the need for restoration of normal life in the war affected areas. The U.S. has also emphasised the need for implementing the 13th amendment of the Sri Lanka constitution giving limited autonomy to the provincial councils. The U.S. State Department has also issued a travel advisory cautioning U.S. travellers to Sri Lanka with veiled criticism of the conditions in Sri Lanka. It stated: “American citizens of Sri Lankan origin may be subject to additional scrutiny upon arrival and while in the country. In some cases, foreigners of Sri Lankan origin may be detained without their embassy being notified. The activities of journalists, researchers, aid workers, and volunteers receive particular attention.”
The continued failure of Sri Lanka government to address the issue of Vanni Tamils has also had its repercussions in India, particularly in Tamil Nadu. Sri Lanka Government sent a high power delegation led by Senior Presidential Advisor and MP Basil Rajapaksa, Defence Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa and Presidential Secretary Lalith Weerathunga to India to specially discuss with Indian foreign minister SM Krishna issues related to the resettlement of the displaced civilians in the North. They said, after discussion, that Indiahad agreed to provide eight de-mining teams process to clear the affected areas so that resettlement could be done within a six month period.However, it is doubtful whether the resettlement would be completed in this short period.
An aid ship “Captain Ali”, carrying a load of relief materials meant for displaced civilians, which was not allowed to enter Sri Lankan territorial waters by the Government authorities had anchored off Chennai seeking Indian intervention. During their meeting in New Delhi, the Sri Lankans were reported to have agreed to India’s suggestion to allow the ship “Captain Ali” to off-load the relief material. It now transpires that these items will be routed to Sri Lanka by the Red Cross in both the countries.
However, it is clear that India had not been happy with Sri Lanka’s actions on relief and resettlement of Tamils in Vanni. Union Home Minister P Chidambaram expressed dissatisfaction over the issue. Specifically, he said that though India had allocated Rs 500 crores for their rehabilitation, Sri Lanka had not come up with the rehabilitation plan. He also asked Sri Lanka to allow INGOs like the Red Cross to carry out the relief work and to permit the media to enter IDP camps.
The issue of Vanni civilians languishing in camps has also provided the much needed rallying point for the LTTE supporters among Tamil expatriates to muster public support. Even otherwise all most all Tamil expatriates are feeling aggrieved at the lack of international collective action against Sri Lanka on this count. And their continued agitation particularly in the UK has kept the issue of Tamil Eelam in the limelight. UK has drawn a lot of flak in Colombo for allowing such demonstrations.
It has whipped up anti-western sentiments in Sri Lanka among the Sinhala nationalist and chauvinist political parties resulting in the hardening of Sri Lanka government attitude also towards nations “meddling” in its affairs. The Obama administration’s nomination of Ms. Patricia Butenis, senior U.S. Foreign Service Officer and currently the deputy chief of mission in Iraq, to be its next ambassador to Sri Lanka has also come under close public scrutiny. This has also resulted in paranoia about activities of critical media, NGO activists, foreign media representatives, and even workers of UN agencies.
A direct consequence of these developments was the delay in release of International Monetary Fund’s loan of $ 1.9 billion to Colombo due to political pressure from the U.S., U.K. and other Western nations unhappy with Sri Lanka’s handling of the final stages of the war in which thousands of civilians were killed. Sri Lanka’s trade minister G.L. Peiris has accused IMF of getting embroiled in “controversial political issues as part of the criteria governing their judgment in respect of particular transactions.”
Sri Lanka government is taking a few measures to restore normalcy in the north. It has opened the A9 highway to Jaffna for commercial goods traffic. The proposed local body elections for the Jaffna and Vavuniya municipal councils are to be held on August 8, 2009. The ruling United Peoples Freedom Alliance (UPFA) campaign in Jaffna is managed by Social Services and Social Welfare Minister Douglas Devananda. 174 candidates from six political parties and two independent groups are in the fray for 29 seats in the Jaffna Municipal Council. For the 15 seats in the Vavuniya Urban Council 135 candidates from six political parties and three independent groups are contesting. The elections will be a testing ground for the nascent Tamil political leadership.
Changes in military command and control
The passing of the Chief of Defence Staff Act in Sri Lanka parliament has formalised the appointment of CDS which had been in existence before. The post of CDS was created (though not formalized) in 1999 in the place of the civilian post of chief of the Joint Operations Bureau.
With this, the CDS as the co-ordinating head of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Police, emerges as a powerful figure in the hierarchy. With General Sarath Fonseka tipped to take over as the new CDS with clearly defined powers working under the defence secretary, plans for strengthening the military would be implemented faster.
The creation of the CDS would also probably facilitate in getting through the controversial future role of the expanded 300,000 strong army in the north where normal life is not restored yet. It will also help the implementation of army’s expansion plans better and faster. Plans are already underway for expansion of the navy, which is expected to play a major role in protecting Sri Lanka’s extended exclusive economic zone in the Indian Ocean.
Revival of the LTTE
The Tamil expatriates who still believe in the creation of a Tamil Eelam state, smarting under the defeat of the LTTE, have got together and announced a slew of measures to form the Provisional Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam (PTGTE) for progressing the cause. Though it appears to be broad based in its concept, its birth after the LTTE has ceased to be a power centre makes it clear that it would claim to be a successor to the LTTE. However, the decision to form PTGE taken without consulting the pro-LTTE Tamil National Alliance (TNA) which is rooted in Sri Lanka politics has raised doubts about the future viability of PTGE. It has also placed TNA in a dilemma.
However, it provides a rallying point for pro-LTTE elements to muster their strength and strengthens the hands of Kumaran Pathmanathan (KP), the overseas representative of the LTTE who had been trying to take over the leadership of the organization. The new name would also overcome the legal hurdle of publicly espousing the LTTE in 32 nations including India, Canada, USA and the EU where the organisation is banned as a terrorist group. However, PTGE has to prove itself as a viable entity; till that happens it will have little credibility both within and outside Sri Lanka. And its effort to establish itself is not going to be a smooth process with competing interests trying to take over the leadership mantle of the LTTE.
June 30, 2009
Tuesday, July 7, 2009
Friendly Neighbourhood Terrorism
The Lalgarh operation against Maoist extremism in West Bengal exposed the weaknesses of our fight against non state actors. The ruling CPM coalition in West Bengal did not want to 'ban' the ultra Left Maoists, but expected the Union government to send paramilitary forces to fight them. But more disturbing is the growing nexus of corrupt politicians-bureaucrats and criminal gangs in diluting state action against trans-border crimes including gun running and human trafficking. This is abetting extremists gaining access to weapons. In addition to this, for a number of years Indian insurgents have been operating from hideouts and bases in India's neighbourhood - notoriously Pakistan, Bangladesh and Myanmar - often with the connivance of the government of the country. Here is my article 'Spreding Out of Control' on the subject for your reading. It was published in GFiles magazine, July 2009 issue. Copyright: GFiles magazine
SPREADING OUT OF CONTROL
Local militancy going global in our neighbourhood has a deadly impact on national security
by COL R HARIHARAN GFiles, Vol 3 Issue 4 July 2009
TWO former chiefs of Bangladesh’s espionage agency – the National Security Intelligence (NSI) – Major General Rezakul Haider Chowdhury and Brigadier General Abdur Rahim, were recently arrested in Dhaka in the infamous arms smuggling case of Chittagong on April 2, 2004. They are being prosecuted for landing a shipload of Chinese arms in Chittagong destined for the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), which is based in Bangladesh and waging an insurgency war in Assam.
It was not a small smuggling operation. According to the Bangladeshi media, police recovered from the 10- truckload consignment a wide range of sophisticated firearms, including 27,020 grenades, 840 rocket launchers, 300 accessories of rocket launchers, 2000 grenade-launching tubes, 6392 magazines and 1,140,520 bullets. The Aga Rahman Yousuf Group, a Dubaibased business conglomerate, had sent the arms and ammunitions from China to Bangladesh for ULFA’s use.
This is one of many instances of local militancy and insurgencies going global in India’s neighbourhood with a deadly impact on India’s national security. Their symbiotic growth with a host of other criminal activities ranging from trafficking in weapons, drugs, and women and children to smuggling, forgery, and money laundering. They have also corrupted the law enforcing agencies and helped the growth of the political- criminal nexus. South Asia is geographically located between two of the biggest sources of the illegal drug trade in opium and heroin – Afghanistan in the west and Myanmar in the east. Drug trafficking generates a number of other criminal activities, including money laundering, illegal arms trade, and human trafficking. The drug trade is a huge money spinner and it is not accidental that a number of insurgency movements have close links with the drug trade in Afghanistan, Myanmar, and Pakistan.
Traditionally, the growth of militancy and other forms of extremist insurgency is attributed to socio-economic reasons, lack of proper governance and rule of law, religious fundamentalism, or aberrations of caste, creed, and linguistic differences. While these factors do provide a fertile ground for growth of militancy, the easy availability of illegal arms encourages escalation of political conflicts into extremism.
So South Asia has also become the heartland of the illegal trade in light weapons. Thanks to technological advances, they are no more light in their performance. The generally accepted 1977 UN definition of light weapons includes: MANPADS (man-portable air defence systems), ATGWs (anti-tank guided weapons), heavy machine guns (including anti-aircraft guns), antimaterial rifles, recoilless rifles and guns, grenade launchers, unguided anti-tank rocket launchers, and mortars. The disturbing aspect is that all these weapons of modern armies have been in use among terrorist and militant groups operating in South Asia.
Formidable network of terror
EVEN without taking into account Afghanistan, which has been the focus of the US-led global war on terror since 2001, three South Asian countries – India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka – have so far given birth to 249 anti-state entities that took up arms to achieve their goals, according to South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) data. Fortunately, only 91 of them, including 15 transnational ones, are functional today.
India has the largest number of terrorist and extremist organizations – 69 (including four transnational ones) still operating in its midst. Pakistan, the unrecognized homeland of Jihadi terrorism, has 22 extremist organizations (11 domestic and 11 transnational ones). It is in a gridlock with terrorists, fighting for its survival as a democratic nation.
Sri Lanka produced 37 insurgent bodies of various hues when the Tamil minority’s political quest for equal rights failed to produce results. However, recently the Sri Lanka military succeeded in crushing the only surviving Tamil insurgent group – the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The only Sinhala insurgent group, the Janatha Vimukti Peramuna (JVP) turned into a Left-leaning political party two decades ago, after much bloodshed. And the country now hopes to have some respite from active insurgency.
Though Bangladesh has only five extremist organizations of the extreme leftist and Islamic fundamentalist varieties, they have continued to be a powerful destabilizing factor in the country’s politics. Nepal had been more fortunate. Its only insurgent body – the Nepal Communist Party (Maoist) – managed to convert itself into a political party after the end of monarchy. It has not given up arms yet and that can spell potential trouble for Nepal’s nascent democracy.
Bhutan and the Maldives, having no major extremist entity in their midst, are the most fortunate.
The growth of terrorism in India has been encouraged by the availability of sanctuaries for terrorists and insurgents in Pakistan, Bangladesh and Myanmar. (India had also offered sanctuary to Sri Lanka Tamil extremists for nearly a decade in the 1990s). Unfortunately, both Pakistan and Bangladesh have been using Indian insurgent groups in their midst to indirectly assert their power against India. In the case of Myanmar, the military regime had not been able to curb Indian insurgents operating from its soil due to their links with local insurgency groups.
Unless these countries deny sanctuary to Indian insurgent groups, India’s counterinsurgency operations will be only partially successful.
Given this setting, under the garb of protection, flaunting of weapons has become a status symbol in many of our states. As a corollary, indiscriminate issue of weapon licences has armed entire communities in many parts of India. The increasing social tolerance of the gun culture is symbolized by the replacement of the traditional soft image of Bollywood heroes with guntoting honchos sporting six packs.
It is not surprising that small arms are increasingly used to gain coercive power in public life. Poor governance and weaknesses in the criminal justice system have increased the clout of power brokers supported by armed gangs. Unfortunately, with criminals gaining more political influence, the gun culture has become a part of political life not only in India but other South Asian states as well. This has vitiated the effectiveness of existing gun control laws.
Between 1994 and 2008, about 60,000 people lost their lives in armed violence in India. Small arms were used to cause most of these deaths. These shocking figures give an idea of the price the nation is paying due to uncontrolled spread of illegal arms and the ever-increasing fire power of militancy.
So any grand strategy to curb insurgency and terrorism should address the larger social issues relating to the gun culture and easy access to illegal weapons. Existing laws on gun control need updating and enforcement needs to be tightened even for licensed guns. The growing nexus between politician bureaucrat- criminal gangs is the hothouse for insurgents to gain access to weapons. Unless this is broken through effective governance, lasting success in curbing terrorism and insurgency cannot be achieved.
Courtesy:http://gfilesindia.com/title.aspx?title_id=13
SPREADING OUT OF CONTROL
Local militancy going global in our neighbourhood has a deadly impact on national security
by COL R HARIHARAN GFiles, Vol 3 Issue 4 July 2009
TWO former chiefs of Bangladesh’s espionage agency – the National Security Intelligence (NSI) – Major General Rezakul Haider Chowdhury and Brigadier General Abdur Rahim, were recently arrested in Dhaka in the infamous arms smuggling case of Chittagong on April 2, 2004. They are being prosecuted for landing a shipload of Chinese arms in Chittagong destined for the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), which is based in Bangladesh and waging an insurgency war in Assam.
It was not a small smuggling operation. According to the Bangladeshi media, police recovered from the 10- truckload consignment a wide range of sophisticated firearms, including 27,020 grenades, 840 rocket launchers, 300 accessories of rocket launchers, 2000 grenade-launching tubes, 6392 magazines and 1,140,520 bullets. The Aga Rahman Yousuf Group, a Dubaibased business conglomerate, had sent the arms and ammunitions from China to Bangladesh for ULFA’s use.
This is one of many instances of local militancy and insurgencies going global in India’s neighbourhood with a deadly impact on India’s national security. Their symbiotic growth with a host of other criminal activities ranging from trafficking in weapons, drugs, and women and children to smuggling, forgery, and money laundering. They have also corrupted the law enforcing agencies and helped the growth of the political- criminal nexus. South Asia is geographically located between two of the biggest sources of the illegal drug trade in opium and heroin – Afghanistan in the west and Myanmar in the east. Drug trafficking generates a number of other criminal activities, including money laundering, illegal arms trade, and human trafficking. The drug trade is a huge money spinner and it is not accidental that a number of insurgency movements have close links with the drug trade in Afghanistan, Myanmar, and Pakistan.
Traditionally, the growth of militancy and other forms of extremist insurgency is attributed to socio-economic reasons, lack of proper governance and rule of law, religious fundamentalism, or aberrations of caste, creed, and linguistic differences. While these factors do provide a fertile ground for growth of militancy, the easy availability of illegal arms encourages escalation of political conflicts into extremism.
So South Asia has also become the heartland of the illegal trade in light weapons. Thanks to technological advances, they are no more light in their performance. The generally accepted 1977 UN definition of light weapons includes: MANPADS (man-portable air defence systems), ATGWs (anti-tank guided weapons), heavy machine guns (including anti-aircraft guns), antimaterial rifles, recoilless rifles and guns, grenade launchers, unguided anti-tank rocket launchers, and mortars. The disturbing aspect is that all these weapons of modern armies have been in use among terrorist and militant groups operating in South Asia.
Formidable network of terror
EVEN without taking into account Afghanistan, which has been the focus of the US-led global war on terror since 2001, three South Asian countries – India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka – have so far given birth to 249 anti-state entities that took up arms to achieve their goals, according to South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) data. Fortunately, only 91 of them, including 15 transnational ones, are functional today.
India has the largest number of terrorist and extremist organizations – 69 (including four transnational ones) still operating in its midst. Pakistan, the unrecognized homeland of Jihadi terrorism, has 22 extremist organizations (11 domestic and 11 transnational ones). It is in a gridlock with terrorists, fighting for its survival as a democratic nation.
Sri Lanka produced 37 insurgent bodies of various hues when the Tamil minority’s political quest for equal rights failed to produce results. However, recently the Sri Lanka military succeeded in crushing the only surviving Tamil insurgent group – the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The only Sinhala insurgent group, the Janatha Vimukti Peramuna (JVP) turned into a Left-leaning political party two decades ago, after much bloodshed. And the country now hopes to have some respite from active insurgency.
Though Bangladesh has only five extremist organizations of the extreme leftist and Islamic fundamentalist varieties, they have continued to be a powerful destabilizing factor in the country’s politics. Nepal had been more fortunate. Its only insurgent body – the Nepal Communist Party (Maoist) – managed to convert itself into a political party after the end of monarchy. It has not given up arms yet and that can spell potential trouble for Nepal’s nascent democracy.
Bhutan and the Maldives, having no major extremist entity in their midst, are the most fortunate.
The growth of terrorism in India has been encouraged by the availability of sanctuaries for terrorists and insurgents in Pakistan, Bangladesh and Myanmar. (India had also offered sanctuary to Sri Lanka Tamil extremists for nearly a decade in the 1990s). Unfortunately, both Pakistan and Bangladesh have been using Indian insurgent groups in their midst to indirectly assert their power against India. In the case of Myanmar, the military regime had not been able to curb Indian insurgents operating from its soil due to their links with local insurgency groups.
Unless these countries deny sanctuary to Indian insurgent groups, India’s counterinsurgency operations will be only partially successful.
Given this setting, under the garb of protection, flaunting of weapons has become a status symbol in many of our states. As a corollary, indiscriminate issue of weapon licences has armed entire communities in many parts of India. The increasing social tolerance of the gun culture is symbolized by the replacement of the traditional soft image of Bollywood heroes with guntoting honchos sporting six packs.
It is not surprising that small arms are increasingly used to gain coercive power in public life. Poor governance and weaknesses in the criminal justice system have increased the clout of power brokers supported by armed gangs. Unfortunately, with criminals gaining more political influence, the gun culture has become a part of political life not only in India but other South Asian states as well. This has vitiated the effectiveness of existing gun control laws.
Between 1994 and 2008, about 60,000 people lost their lives in armed violence in India. Small arms were used to cause most of these deaths. These shocking figures give an idea of the price the nation is paying due to uncontrolled spread of illegal arms and the ever-increasing fire power of militancy.
So any grand strategy to curb insurgency and terrorism should address the larger social issues relating to the gun culture and easy access to illegal weapons. Existing laws on gun control need updating and enforcement needs to be tightened even for licensed guns. The growing nexus between politician bureaucrat- criminal gangs is the hothouse for insurgents to gain access to weapons. Unless this is broken through effective governance, lasting success in curbing terrorism and insurgency cannot be achieved.
Courtesy:http://gfilesindia.com/title.aspx?title_id=13
Thursday, July 2, 2009
Investigating Kargil - Indian Style
Vice Admiral Taj M Khattak(retired), former Vice Chief of Staff, Pakistan Navy has written an interesting and insightful article "Investigating Kargil" on General Musharraff's misadventure in Kargil that caused almost a nuclear confrontation between Pakistan and India ten years ago. In that piece published in the www.thenews.com.pk on July 2, he has stressed the need for investigating the Kargil fiasco when the actors who directed and organised it are alive. So true.
In June 2004 I wrote an article "Learning from Kargil" (reproduced below) on the lack of follow up action on the K Subrahmanyam Committee report that investigated Kargil war. I had raised a few issues in the article which would impact on the nation's strategic security. In particular there are three issues K Subrahmanyam Committee had raised on which I still have strong doubts about any progress at all. Now that we have a government that has set about with a little more determination than the earlier one, will it enlighten the public on the progress? Will the under-worked parliament get to tackle such gut issues rather than waste time on frivolous 'walk-outs'? The three issues are:
1. Inadequate coordination at the ground level among Army intelligence and other agencies.
2. The nuclear posture adopted by successive Prime Ministers thus put the Indian Army at a disadvantage vis-à-vis its Pakistani counterpart. While the former was in the dark about India's nuclear capability, the latter as the custodian of Pakistani nuclear weaponry was fully aware of its own capability.
3. It is necessary to evolve a long-term strategy to reduce the involvement of the Army in counterinsurgency and devise more cost-effective means of dealing with the problem.
LEARNING FROM KARGIL: A Soldier's View
By Col R. Hariharan(retd.) June 12, 2004
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers11%5Cpaper1025.html
Never learn to do anything: if you don’t learn, you will always find someone else to do it for you. – Mark Twain
A new Lok Sabha was in session; but its old cacophony had not changed. Members have shouted their slogans, showed their loyalties to their icons by jumping and thumping, collected their entitlements and that’s it. Parliament’s inaugural session has ended. Has it achieved anything? The American English word “zilch” sums it up. But among the few foils that came in handy in the sad and sordid drama of Indian politics was Kargil and who goofed it up. The newspapers say the Kargil issue was brought up as a counter to the opposition’s vociferous objection to a few criminals accused of mundane crimes like rape, kidnapping and plotting to murder and elected as M.P.s becoming ministers. It is sad to see a possible security lapse in Kargil being equated with the issue of some smart, but criminally inclined fellows getting elected and ending up as ministers with full police protection!
Everyone, including the cynical but docile public, knows from past experience how this charade will be gone through. There will be a lot of finger pointing and talks of our jawans and Army being second to none; but nothing will come out of it. After all it is five years since K Subrahmanyam Committee on Kargil presented its reports. Now, we find the Defence Minister is keen to follow up and ensure its findings are implemented. Five years is a long time for the troops serving in these troubled areas. They and their families (including me) would like to know how this issue did not figure all these years in the scheme of things of parties currently ruling the country (many of them were members of the outgoing government also!)
Its five years since hundreds like young Lt Saurabh Kalia died in the Kargil War. Many more are still dying in these frontiers unsung, unheard with only their families to mourn. As an old soldier who fought the wars in 1965, 1971 and lastly in Sri Lanka as part of the IPKF, I wonder now whether the few thousands of my comrades who died for this country (and continue to do so, on and off) for notions of patriotism, loyalty and Izzat had done so in vain. The sheer callousness of our people in power shocks me.
Take for instance the case of 22 Border Security Force jawans and their families including women and children killed by militants in a mine blast in J and K. The State Chief Minister had no time to send even a condolence message. Was it because his party was busy probing for human rights violations in the fight against armed insurgents who are waging war on lawful government? Every time a jawan salutes him will he remember him for all the good he is going to do?
There is a tendency by bureaucrats, including those of the Armed Forces, to use the Official Secrets Act as a convenient cloak to cover all inefficiency, incompetence and deficiencies in the planning and handling of vital issues of national security and defence. I think the best memorial for those who died in Kargil would be not to allow another Kargil to happen. Even if it happens, the soldiers should go to war there confidently that they would not go like their predecessors did – taken by surprise, handled by ineptness, and lastly killed by sheer lack of timely decision making. It is time the Parliament debated the issues of defence seriously on matters more urgent than the number of orderlies Army officers use.. A whole list of issues is there in K Subrahmanyam Committee’s Report that needs to be followed up (and not to score political brownie points). These points need to be accounted for to the public at large as part of good governance. Here are some (findings of the Report given in italics):
* Inadequate border surveillance: Has the surveillance been beefed up in J and K, as the Committee found the intruders avoided detection because our Winter Air Surveillance Operations (WASO) by helicopters was of negligible effect? Israel was supposed to supply special surveillance helicopters for use in this sector. As in the new dispensation Israel appears to have become a bad word in South Block, has an alternate source been found? Or are still the files are being “processed”?
* The report states that there was inadequate coordination at the ground level among Army intelligence and other agencies. Has it improved now? If so, how.
* Holding of special (glacial) clothing for extreme cold climates was inadequate. Can we now say this problem has been overcome?
* Though the new light rifle (5.56 mm INSA) has been inducted into service, most troops are yet to be equipped with light rifles. Adequate attention has not been paid to lightening the load on infantry soldiers deployed at high altitudes. In broader terms, increasing the firepower and combat efficiency of infantrymen has also suffered, as has the modernisation process as a whole. This needs to be speedily rectified. (This light rifle was introduced when I left the Army 13 years back. It’s a big joke that combat troops in high altitudes are still saddled with old rifles! I am not too optimistic things will change on this count). Can we hope for improvement?
* Nuclear weapons programme: For reasons of security, none of these Prime Ministers took anyone other than Chairmen of the Atomic Energy Commission (not all), and the Scientific Adviser to the Defence Minister into confidence. The Chiefs of Staff, senior Cabinet Ministers and senior civil servants were kept out of the loop. The nuclear posture adopted by successive Prime Ministers thus put the Indian Army at a disadvantage vis-à-vis its Pakistani counterpart. While the former was in the dark about India's nuclear capability, the latter as the custodian of Pakistani nuclear weaponry was fully aware of its own capability. Three former Indian Chiefs of Army Staff expressed unhappiness about this asymmetric situation. Are the Service Chiefs still in the dark about their own nuclear capabilities? (I remember Johnson’s “Ignorance is bliss when it is folly to be wise” in this context). Is this major issue going to be brushed aside as “directly not pertaining to Kargil War”?
* Comprehensive manpower policy: Pakistan has ruthlessly employed terrorism in Punjab, J& K and the Northeast to involve the Indian Army in Counterinsurgency operations and neutralise its conventional superiority. Having partially achieved this objective, it has also persuaded itself that nuclear blackmail against India has succeeded on three occasions. A coherent counterstrategy to deal with Pakistan's terrorist-nuclear blackmail and the conventional threat has to be thought through. The Committee believes that a comprehensive manpower policy is required to deal with this problem. In the present international security environment, proxy war…. it is necessary to evolve a long-term strategy to reduce the involvement of the Army in counterinsurgency and devise more cost-effective means of dealing with the problem. Has any thought been given to sort out the role of Army and evolution of a long-tem strategy for counter-insurgency? Or is it going to be deferred to the next government?
I saw a report saying that each parliament member costs the exchequer Rs 22 lacs. If they deliver the goods I don’t mind that expenditure at all. After all India is shining, (though the shine has been successfully tarnished a bit now) and why shouldn’t the parliament? But if the money is to become an investment, we would like them to be really people’s representatives. We want them to sit debate and improve the situation, lest the ghosts of those dead heroes of Kargil haunt us forever.
This is my learning from Kargil.
In June 2004 I wrote an article "Learning from Kargil" (reproduced below) on the lack of follow up action on the K Subrahmanyam Committee report that investigated Kargil war. I had raised a few issues in the article which would impact on the nation's strategic security. In particular there are three issues K Subrahmanyam Committee had raised on which I still have strong doubts about any progress at all. Now that we have a government that has set about with a little more determination than the earlier one, will it enlighten the public on the progress? Will the under-worked parliament get to tackle such gut issues rather than waste time on frivolous 'walk-outs'? The three issues are:
1. Inadequate coordination at the ground level among Army intelligence and other agencies.
2. The nuclear posture adopted by successive Prime Ministers thus put the Indian Army at a disadvantage vis-à-vis its Pakistani counterpart. While the former was in the dark about India's nuclear capability, the latter as the custodian of Pakistani nuclear weaponry was fully aware of its own capability.
3. It is necessary to evolve a long-term strategy to reduce the involvement of the Army in counterinsurgency and devise more cost-effective means of dealing with the problem.
LEARNING FROM KARGIL: A Soldier's View
By Col R. Hariharan(retd.) June 12, 2004
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers11%5Cpaper1025.html
Never learn to do anything: if you don’t learn, you will always find someone else to do it for you. – Mark Twain
A new Lok Sabha was in session; but its old cacophony had not changed. Members have shouted their slogans, showed their loyalties to their icons by jumping and thumping, collected their entitlements and that’s it. Parliament’s inaugural session has ended. Has it achieved anything? The American English word “zilch” sums it up. But among the few foils that came in handy in the sad and sordid drama of Indian politics was Kargil and who goofed it up. The newspapers say the Kargil issue was brought up as a counter to the opposition’s vociferous objection to a few criminals accused of mundane crimes like rape, kidnapping and plotting to murder and elected as M.P.s becoming ministers. It is sad to see a possible security lapse in Kargil being equated with the issue of some smart, but criminally inclined fellows getting elected and ending up as ministers with full police protection!
Everyone, including the cynical but docile public, knows from past experience how this charade will be gone through. There will be a lot of finger pointing and talks of our jawans and Army being second to none; but nothing will come out of it. After all it is five years since K Subrahmanyam Committee on Kargil presented its reports. Now, we find the Defence Minister is keen to follow up and ensure its findings are implemented. Five years is a long time for the troops serving in these troubled areas. They and their families (including me) would like to know how this issue did not figure all these years in the scheme of things of parties currently ruling the country (many of them were members of the outgoing government also!)
Its five years since hundreds like young Lt Saurabh Kalia died in the Kargil War. Many more are still dying in these frontiers unsung, unheard with only their families to mourn. As an old soldier who fought the wars in 1965, 1971 and lastly in Sri Lanka as part of the IPKF, I wonder now whether the few thousands of my comrades who died for this country (and continue to do so, on and off) for notions of patriotism, loyalty and Izzat had done so in vain. The sheer callousness of our people in power shocks me.
Take for instance the case of 22 Border Security Force jawans and their families including women and children killed by militants in a mine blast in J and K. The State Chief Minister had no time to send even a condolence message. Was it because his party was busy probing for human rights violations in the fight against armed insurgents who are waging war on lawful government? Every time a jawan salutes him will he remember him for all the good he is going to do?
There is a tendency by bureaucrats, including those of the Armed Forces, to use the Official Secrets Act as a convenient cloak to cover all inefficiency, incompetence and deficiencies in the planning and handling of vital issues of national security and defence. I think the best memorial for those who died in Kargil would be not to allow another Kargil to happen. Even if it happens, the soldiers should go to war there confidently that they would not go like their predecessors did – taken by surprise, handled by ineptness, and lastly killed by sheer lack of timely decision making. It is time the Parliament debated the issues of defence seriously on matters more urgent than the number of orderlies Army officers use.. A whole list of issues is there in K Subrahmanyam Committee’s Report that needs to be followed up (and not to score political brownie points). These points need to be accounted for to the public at large as part of good governance. Here are some (findings of the Report given in italics):
* Inadequate border surveillance: Has the surveillance been beefed up in J and K, as the Committee found the intruders avoided detection because our Winter Air Surveillance Operations (WASO) by helicopters was of negligible effect? Israel was supposed to supply special surveillance helicopters for use in this sector. As in the new dispensation Israel appears to have become a bad word in South Block, has an alternate source been found? Or are still the files are being “processed”?
* The report states that there was inadequate coordination at the ground level among Army intelligence and other agencies. Has it improved now? If so, how.
* Holding of special (glacial) clothing for extreme cold climates was inadequate. Can we now say this problem has been overcome?
* Though the new light rifle (5.56 mm INSA) has been inducted into service, most troops are yet to be equipped with light rifles. Adequate attention has not been paid to lightening the load on infantry soldiers deployed at high altitudes. In broader terms, increasing the firepower and combat efficiency of infantrymen has also suffered, as has the modernisation process as a whole. This needs to be speedily rectified. (This light rifle was introduced when I left the Army 13 years back. It’s a big joke that combat troops in high altitudes are still saddled with old rifles! I am not too optimistic things will change on this count). Can we hope for improvement?
* Nuclear weapons programme: For reasons of security, none of these Prime Ministers took anyone other than Chairmen of the Atomic Energy Commission (not all), and the Scientific Adviser to the Defence Minister into confidence. The Chiefs of Staff, senior Cabinet Ministers and senior civil servants were kept out of the loop. The nuclear posture adopted by successive Prime Ministers thus put the Indian Army at a disadvantage vis-à-vis its Pakistani counterpart. While the former was in the dark about India's nuclear capability, the latter as the custodian of Pakistani nuclear weaponry was fully aware of its own capability. Three former Indian Chiefs of Army Staff expressed unhappiness about this asymmetric situation. Are the Service Chiefs still in the dark about their own nuclear capabilities? (I remember Johnson’s “Ignorance is bliss when it is folly to be wise” in this context). Is this major issue going to be brushed aside as “directly not pertaining to Kargil War”?
* Comprehensive manpower policy: Pakistan has ruthlessly employed terrorism in Punjab, J& K and the Northeast to involve the Indian Army in Counterinsurgency operations and neutralise its conventional superiority. Having partially achieved this objective, it has also persuaded itself that nuclear blackmail against India has succeeded on three occasions. A coherent counterstrategy to deal with Pakistan's terrorist-nuclear blackmail and the conventional threat has to be thought through. The Committee believes that a comprehensive manpower policy is required to deal with this problem. In the present international security environment, proxy war…. it is necessary to evolve a long-term strategy to reduce the involvement of the Army in counterinsurgency and devise more cost-effective means of dealing with the problem. Has any thought been given to sort out the role of Army and evolution of a long-tem strategy for counter-insurgency? Or is it going to be deferred to the next government?
I saw a report saying that each parliament member costs the exchequer Rs 22 lacs. If they deliver the goods I don’t mind that expenditure at all. After all India is shining, (though the shine has been successfully tarnished a bit now) and why shouldn’t the parliament? But if the money is to become an investment, we would like them to be really people’s representatives. We want them to sit debate and improve the situation, lest the ghosts of those dead heroes of Kargil haunt us forever.
This is my learning from Kargil.
Wednesday, July 1, 2009
Kargil War and Murphy's Combat Laws
It will be ten years since Kargil War took place. It was a war that should have never happened and raised a lot of questions on our approach to war as a nation. Have things improved? It is difficult to say unless another Kargil tests the nation and all of us. In this context Murphy's Combat Laws comes to mind because Kargil validated it. I am reproducing this collection from unknown authors here for your reading; its reproduced not only for humour but underlying truth. Ask any guy who had participated in a war not only in India, but Pakistan, Aghanistan, Iraq or anywhere he will agree with me.
Murphy's Combat Laws
Friendly fire - isn't.
Recoilless rifles - aren't.
Suppressive fires - won't.
A sucking chest wound is Nature's way of telling you to slow down.
If it's stupid but it works, it isn't stupid.
Try to look unimportant; the enemy may be low on ammo and not want to waste a bullet on you.
If at first you don't succeed, call in an air strike.
If you are forward of your position, your artillery will fall short.
Never share a foxhole with anyone braver than yourself.
Never go to bed with anyone crazier than yourself.
Never forget that your weapon was made by the lowest bidder.
If your attack is going really well, it's an ambush.
The enemy diversion you're ignoring is their main attack.
The enemy invariably attacks on two occasions: when they're ready. & when you're not.
No Op Plan ever survives initial contact.
There is no such thing as a perfect plan.
Five second fuses always burn three seconds.
There is no such thing as an atheist in a foxhole.
A retreating enemy is probably just falling back and regrouping.
The important things are always simple; the simple are always hard.
The easy way is always mined.
Teamwork is essential; it gives the enemy other people to shoot at.
Don't look conspicuous; it draws fire. For this reason, it is not at all uncommon for aircraft carriers to be known as bomb magnets.
Never draw fire; it irritates everyone around you.
If you are short of everything but the enemy, you are in the combat zone.
When you have secured the area, make sure the enemy knows it too.
Incoming fire has the right of way.
No combat ready unit has ever passed inspection.
No inspection ready unit has ever passed combat.
If the enemy is within range, so are you.
The only thing more accurate than incoming enemy fire is incoming friendly fire.
Things which must be shipped together as a set, aren't.
Things that must work together; can't be carried to the field that way.
Radios will fail as soon as you need fire support.
Radar tends to fail at night and in bad weather, and especially during both.
Anything you do can get you killed, including nothing.
Make it too tough for the enemy to get in, and you won't be able to get out.
Tracers work both ways.
If you take more than your fair share of objectives, you will get more than your fair share of objectives to take.
When both sides are convinced they're about to lose, they're both right.
Professional soldiers are predictable; the world is full of dangerous amateurs.
Military Intelligence is a contradiction.
Fortify your front; you'll get your rear shot up.
Weather isn’t neutral.
If you can't remember, the Claymore is pointed towards you.
Air defence motto: shoot them down; sort them out on the ground.
Flies high, it dies; low and slow, it'll go.
Mines are equal opportunity weapons
Sniper's motto: reach out and touch someone.
The one item you need is always in short supply.
Interchangeable parts aren't.
It's not the one with your name on it; it's the one addressed "to whom it may concern" you've got to think about.
When in doubt, empty your magazine.
The side with the simplest uniforms wins.
Combat will occur on the ground between two adjoining maps.
If you can keep your head while those around you are losing theirs, you may have misjudged the situation.
If two things are required to make something work, they will never be shipped together.
Anything you do can get you shot, including nothing.
Whenever you lose contact with the enemy, look behind you.
The most dangerous thing in the combat zone is an officer with a map.
The quartermaster has only two sizes, too large and too small.
If you really need an officer in a hurry, take a nap.
There is nothing more satisfying than having someone take a shot at you, and miss.
If your sergeant can see you, so can the enemy.
You'll only remember your hand grenades when the sound is too close to use them.
Close only counts in horseshoes and hand grenades.
Well .. It could be worse: It could be raining .. and we could be out in it.
So he said, "Cheer up: it could be worse!" So we cheered up. And it got worse.
The side with the simplest uniform wins...
The spare batteries for the PRC-whatever your troops have been carrying are either nearly dead or for the wrong radio.
How come you are on one frequency when everyone else is on another?
Murphy's Combat Laws
Friendly fire - isn't.
Recoilless rifles - aren't.
Suppressive fires - won't.
A sucking chest wound is Nature's way of telling you to slow down.
If it's stupid but it works, it isn't stupid.
Try to look unimportant; the enemy may be low on ammo and not want to waste a bullet on you.
If at first you don't succeed, call in an air strike.
If you are forward of your position, your artillery will fall short.
Never share a foxhole with anyone braver than yourself.
Never go to bed with anyone crazier than yourself.
Never forget that your weapon was made by the lowest bidder.
If your attack is going really well, it's an ambush.
The enemy diversion you're ignoring is their main attack.
The enemy invariably attacks on two occasions: when they're ready. & when you're not.
No Op Plan ever survives initial contact.
There is no such thing as a perfect plan.
Five second fuses always burn three seconds.
There is no such thing as an atheist in a foxhole.
A retreating enemy is probably just falling back and regrouping.
The important things are always simple; the simple are always hard.
The easy way is always mined.
Teamwork is essential; it gives the enemy other people to shoot at.
Don't look conspicuous; it draws fire. For this reason, it is not at all uncommon for aircraft carriers to be known as bomb magnets.
Never draw fire; it irritates everyone around you.
If you are short of everything but the enemy, you are in the combat zone.
When you have secured the area, make sure the enemy knows it too.
Incoming fire has the right of way.
No combat ready unit has ever passed inspection.
No inspection ready unit has ever passed combat.
If the enemy is within range, so are you.
The only thing more accurate than incoming enemy fire is incoming friendly fire.
Things which must be shipped together as a set, aren't.
Things that must work together; can't be carried to the field that way.
Radios will fail as soon as you need fire support.
Radar tends to fail at night and in bad weather, and especially during both.
Anything you do can get you killed, including nothing.
Make it too tough for the enemy to get in, and you won't be able to get out.
Tracers work both ways.
If you take more than your fair share of objectives, you will get more than your fair share of objectives to take.
When both sides are convinced they're about to lose, they're both right.
Professional soldiers are predictable; the world is full of dangerous amateurs.
Military Intelligence is a contradiction.
Fortify your front; you'll get your rear shot up.
Weather isn’t neutral.
If you can't remember, the Claymore is pointed towards you.
Air defence motto: shoot them down; sort them out on the ground.
Flies high, it dies; low and slow, it'll go.
Mines are equal opportunity weapons
Sniper's motto: reach out and touch someone.
The one item you need is always in short supply.
Interchangeable parts aren't.
It's not the one with your name on it; it's the one addressed "to whom it may concern" you've got to think about.
When in doubt, empty your magazine.
The side with the simplest uniforms wins.
Combat will occur on the ground between two adjoining maps.
If you can keep your head while those around you are losing theirs, you may have misjudged the situation.
If two things are required to make something work, they will never be shipped together.
Anything you do can get you shot, including nothing.
Whenever you lose contact with the enemy, look behind you.
The most dangerous thing in the combat zone is an officer with a map.
The quartermaster has only two sizes, too large and too small.
If you really need an officer in a hurry, take a nap.
There is nothing more satisfying than having someone take a shot at you, and miss.
If your sergeant can see you, so can the enemy.
You'll only remember your hand grenades when the sound is too close to use them.
Close only counts in horseshoes and hand grenades.
Well .. It could be worse: It could be raining .. and we could be out in it.
So he said, "Cheer up: it could be worse!" So we cheered up. And it got worse.
The side with the simplest uniform wins...
The spare batteries for the PRC-whatever your troops have been carrying are either nearly dead or for the wrong radio.
How come you are on one frequency when everyone else is on another?
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