My responses as a military analyst to questions from the media on some of the current developments in Sri Lanka are given below:
1. Do you think that the LTTE leader V Prabhakaran will be captured by the Sri Lankan army which says they are within the last six square kilometres of LTTE held territory?
Capturing Prabhakaran would not be an easy task. I do not believe he would stay at the front and fight till the last bullet and die. If he is still there - it is a big if – he would fight to make a get away. In my assessment, he might have got away from the no fire zone sometime last week, after the two-day pause in operations ended when the sudden increase in civilian exodus flooded the area. LTTE could have allowed thousands of civilians to get out the area in one go as it would impede the launching of a major offensive against the LTTE.
2. Why Sri Lanka is ‘defiant’ in not responding to the call for ceasefire from many nations of the world, including the U.S., U.K., and even India?
There could be both internal and external reasons for this. Internally, President Rajapaksa has been elected with a promise to eliminate the LTTE and he has almost completely succeeded in physically executing this task. At this stage it would be politically suicidal for him and the SLFP to accept a ceasefire because of external pressure. If he proposes to go for the parliamentary elections when the tragic episode in Vanni is ended a ceasefire decision would affect his chances at the polls.
The international community had been helping Sri Lanka, wittingly or unwittingly, to abandon the peace process 2002 and continue the war from 2006 onwards. Thirty two countries have banned the LTTE as a terrorist organisation, they share intelligence with Sri Lanka and they have been equipping and training Sri Lanka armed forces. By their support they have been sending a clear message that the LTTE in its present terrorist format is unacceptable to the international community, though by and large they sympathise with the Tamil community in their struggle for equitable rights. That is why their calls for ceasefire have been tempered with a call upon the LTTE to surrender.
Moreover, within the UN Security Council the plight of the trapped civilians rather than the war by itself had figured as a point of discussion. Sri Lanka is not even listed in its agenda as a subject. So there are limitations what they can do to really enforce a ceasefire short of sending a peace keeping force, an idea that will find few takers. Even imposing an international economic sanction on Sri Lanka would not be easy as the idea might not find adequate support. The fact that IMF is negotiating loan for $ 1.9 billion dollar loan to Sri Lanka is a pointer to this. Moreover, Sri Lanka has cushioned itself to a limited extend with financial largesse from China and Iran who have their own agenda in this region. And even Libya had announced a credit line of $ one billion!
3. Your comment on the LTTE announcement of a unilateral ceasefire.
It has come very late in the day, when the LTTE lost its military capability to stop the tide of security forces trying to engulf. Probably it was done to satisfy international community and Tamil supporters of the LTTE to show that it had real concern for the trapped civilians. But it is meaningless now as the military initiative is totally with Sri Lankans. That is why it has not evoked any enthusiasm even among its supporters.
4. What is your comment on the Sri Lanka government announcement that combat operations have “reached their conclusion and the security forces have been instructed to end the use of heavy calibre guns, combat aircraft and aerial weapons that would cause civilian casualties”? Has the war ended?
I think this is the Sri Lanka response to the growing calls for a halt to the war to save the civilians still trapped in the no fire zone. One of the main accusations against Sri Lanka, as stated by the UN agencies and international NGOs is that during the war it had been using heavy weapons and air strikes causing huge casualties to civilians in the no fire zone. In fact, the UN has put the figure of such civilian deaths at over 6000.
Sri Lanka had been denying this. It has been saying that it was only returning the LTTE fire. However, the issue has become a major cause of humanitarian concern for not only for Tamils all over the world, but most of the nations. It is a source of international embarrassment for Sri Lanka. For all of us in India it had been heartbreaking, tragic news. The US has come out with a strong statement. Three European foreign ministers are visiting Sri Lanka because of this issue. The latest Sri Lankan announcement could be to satisfy, at least partly some of these concerns.
Apart from the above non-military reasons, the operation has reached almost the goalpost. The security forces are within 6 km of the last LTTE position. There is really no requirement for air strikes. The LTTE positions are probably within range of infantry battalion weapons like machine guns, mortars, grenade launchers, and recoilless rifles. And probably the LTTE also lost all its artillery assets by now and artillery retaliatory fire might not be required. Of course, if the security forces do not use artillery during the final assault, they would suffer more casualties because they would inflict fewer casualties on the LTTE.
However, the moot point is that all the infantry weapons are capable of killing any civilians within their range because the operational area is so restricted. So while the casualties might be less, the threat to civilians there very much exists.
Lastly, the war has not ended with the latest Sri Lanka announcement. The operative words in the statement indicating future course of action is: "Our security forces will confine their attempts to rescuing civilians who are held hostage and give foremost priority to saving civilians." In Sri Lanka’s official parlance that means the war would continue because it has always claimed that the objective of the war is to liberate the people held as hostage by the LTTE. So the war would continue probably in a slower pace, perhaps less dramatically, provided the LTTE can still sustain.
Monday, April 27, 2009
Saturday, April 25, 2009
Some Insights on Sri Lanka's Success in the Eelam War -IV
[This article was published in ‘Agni’ Studies in International Strategic Issues, Volume XII Number 1, January – March 2009. It may quoted or reproduced only with the prior permission of the publishers and copy right holders - Forum for Strategic & Security Studies, New Delhi-110 003.]
INTRODUCTION
Sri Lanka appears to be the only success story in the dismal scene everywhere in the war against terror. It has been extremely successful in the Eelam War IV, going on since 2006 against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) insurgents. Collectively known as the Eelam Wars, these wars have been going on from 1983. Sri Lanka security forces (SLSF) were not able to achieve decisive results in their three earlier outings. The Tamil insurgent group fighting for an independent Tamil Eelam state to be created for minority Tamils has been rated by According to the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), “the Tamil Tigers are among the most dangerous and deadly extremists in the world.” The FBI said the LTTE’s “ruthless tactics have inspired terrorist networks worldwide, including Al Qaeda in Iraq.”
The LTTE has also the dubious credit of refining the use of suicide terrorism as a force multiplier in its terrorist operations. The LTTE is perhaps the only insurgent and terrorist group in the world with proven capability to wage both conventional as well as non conventional war on land, in air, and on sea. It has used suicide terrorism to change the course of events irreversibly both in India and Sri Lanka.
During the last three of years of the current war, the SLSF have wrested control of nine districts over which the LTTE had exercised control for over a decade in the Tamil-predominant northern and eastern provinces. According to Sri Lanka Defence Ministry by end February 2009, the SLSF had regained about 15,000 sq km of territory from the insurgent group. The LTTE ‘territory’ is now reduced to a miniscule 70 square kilometres area only. The LTTE, is still surviving there because it is using about 200,000 Tamil civilians in the area as human shield to delay the SLSF’s final offensive.
Both sides have suffered heavy casualties in the Eelam War IV. However independently verified figures of casualties of both sides are not available. But the LTTE appears to have suffered the most casualties. The estimated LTTE strength now stands reduced to only 3000 to 4000 from the 2006 estimate of 15,000- 18,000 cadres. According to the data released by the LTTE in November 2008, it had lost a total of 22,390 cadres (17, 496 men and 4894 women) in all the Eelam Wars from November 27, 1982 to Nov 20, 2008. Interpolated with similar data of earlier years, in the current war the LTTE appears to have lost 5,500 cadres - one quarter of its overall total. More importantly, in this war the insurgent group has lost most of its experienced frontline middle-level leadership - veterans of previous wars.
However, these figures do not include the LTTE auxiliaries and members of the hastily raised militia ‘Makkal Padai’ who have taken part in operations. If they are taken into reckoning, the LTTE’s total losses in this war would probably come to 11,000 as claimed by the Army Commander Lt Gen Fonseka. As against this the SLSF losses are probably around 5000 as they had lost 3000 troops in the offensive on Kilinochchi between October 2008 and January 2009.
The LTTE has also probably lost most of its artillery including scores of 81 mm mortars, 155 mm and 130 mm guns and infantry support weapons. Its ship building, arms-manufacturing, and air-operation infrastructures, communication and broadcasting facilities have been captured. In 2006-07, Sri Lanka navy successfully destroyed the LTTE’s tramp fleet of at least eight ships along with weapons and military equipment they carried. The navy has also successfully immobilised the Sea Tigers activity after the Sea Tiger bases on eastern and western coastlines were captured by the army. With the LTTE’s freedom to operate overseas curtailed now as it is banned in 32 countries, rebuilding the organisation even with the help of the expatriate Tamils is going to be an uphill task.
Thus, the SLSF appear to have dealt a grievous blow to the LTTE in this war. Even if the LTTE survives the current war, its ability will be limited to carrying out only sporadic bomb blasts, suicide attacks and assassinations only. It may take a couple of years in favourable environment to regain its past s glory. Thus the President appears to have almost achieved his aim of cutting down the LTTE to size and reducing its self assumed status of a state within the nation to that of an extremist group with limited activity. Sri Lanka’s success in the war against the LTTE holds some useful strategic learning for other countries in reworking their own counter insurgency/terrorism strategies.
LEADERSHIP STRATEGY
There is no doubt that President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s unwavering focus on the objective of totally eliminating the LTTE, fulfilling his electoral promise, was the key to the nation’s success in the war. The clarity he imparted to the national leadership gave a well-defined direction to the government’s actions in tandem with SLSF operations. Neither such clarity of objective nor commitment to goal was evident in the earlier wars against the Tamil insurgent group.
After the first three years of the peace process 2002, Sri Lanka was facing a political crisis due to its inability to shore up the stalled peace process. It could neither handle the LTTE’s large-scale violations nor come up with a nationally agreed political response to the LTTE’s interim self governing authority (ISGA) proposal. The morale of the armed forces was low as the ceasefire agreement prevented them from responding to repeated LTTE attacks against SLSF officers and intelligence operatives.
It was in this environment Mr Mahinda Rajapaksa was elected Sri Lanka President in November 2005 with a wafer thin majority of votes from Southern Sinhalas with a promise to tame the LTTE. He also vowed to end the peace process 2002. In a way his election was aided by the LTTE enforced boycott of the elections in areas under its control. This deprived Tamils votes that would have got the rival candidate Mr Ranil Wickremasinghe of the United National Party elected.
Mr Rajapaksa’s predecessors had considered the LTTE’s challenge to the State’s authority as an offshoot of the Tamil ethnic struggle for autonomy. So their approach wavered between military operations and peace talks aimed at addressing the broader issue of devolution of equitable powers to the Tamil minority. At the operational level, this created confusion both in the SLSF and the government machinery and cramped the military operations from reaching their logical conclusion.
In the past the government felt more comfortable in politically handling the LTTE than embarking upon yet another round of war. On the other hand, the LTTE always had more faith in its armed might than in its vague socialist political ideology reminiscent of Fascism, with allegiance of all ranks to the supreme leader Prabhakaran. So at all times in peace and war, the LTTE was comfortable only when it retained the military initiative.
The LTTE had always used the peace pauses between wars to build its strength and firepower for the next round of war. This enabled the LTTE to emerge stronger and cockier than before after the collapse of the peace effort. For instance, it used the four years of peace that prevailed during the peace process 2002 to develop its air capability for the first time. It imported at least three to four light planes, developed as many as eight airstrips, two of them with ground infrastructure, trained the pilots, and imported at least 15 ship loads of military equipment. This strategy had helped the LTTE to go on the war mode and spring military surprises whenever it chose to do so.
However, Mr Rajapaksa appears to have been determined not to allow LTTE the luxury of taking the military initiative to go to war while paying obeisance to the peace process. By the time he assumed office in November 2005 the peace progress reached a dead end.
All along the period of ceasefire, the LTTE had shown a studied disregard in observing the ceasefire, committing over 3200 violations even while the peace process was in force. This had strengthened President Rajapaksa’s move to disown the peace process as unworkable. So to start with, President Rajapaksa apparently decided to ignore the ceasefire agreement and bided his time to hit back at the LTTE. The four sponsors of the peace process - European Union, Japan, Norway and the U.S - collectively known as the co-chairs were muted in their protests against the Sri Lankan action.
Governments in Sri Lanka in the past had dithered on evolving a national consensus
on handling the Tamil issue due to internal political differences and lack of political will. After he came to power, President Rajapaksa formed an all-party committee to evolve a solution to the Tamil problem acceptable to all sections of society. Though this was in keeping with his election manifesto, many considered this an exercise to buy time for the President to militarily cut down the LTTE to size. The President’s marked preference for vigorously pursuing the military option first only proved this surmise correct.
The President has consistently been strengthening his political base in tandem with his military effort. He has accommodated a motley collection of small political parties of all hues in his jumbo cabinet of 104 ministers to ensure adequate budgetary support in parliament for the war effort. The lure of power has badly split almost all the opposition parties. The success of the President’s United Peoples Freedom Alliance coalition in the successive provincial council elections has shown that politically he is stronger than ever before. The mutually reinforcing success of his military operations and political strategy appear to be the main reason for this.
The LTTE provided the President an opportunity to seize the military imitative when a LTTE woman suicide bomber made a bid to kill the Sri Lanka Army Commander Lt Gen Sarath Fonseka on April 25, 2006. Immediately, air force planes struck the LTTE’s headquarters in an assertion of retaliatory power. However, Mr Rajapaksa’s war got more legitimacy and punch in July 2006 when the LTTE closed the sluice gates of a weir at Mavil Aru in eastern province to cut off the water supply to Sinhala farmers downstream. The SLSF launched Operation Watershed to rid of the LTTE from Mavil Aru. After that there was no respite for the LTTE from the SLSF offensive.
The SLSF probably chose the eastern province for a military showdown with the LTTE because the insurgents had a smaller force there and the population was a mix of Tamils, Muslims and Sinhalas. By then in the east the LTTE was facing internal problems after Karuna, a senior LTTE leader and commander of Batticaloa, and his followers broke away from the organisation in 2004, depleting the insurgent strength. Karuna’s help became a useful add on to the SLSF operations.
By June 2007, the SLSF broke through the strong LTTE resistance and captured all the areas under its control in the east. However, the LTTE probably managed to extricate bulk of its strength in the east. The armed forces were buoyed by their success and became confident of taking on the LTTE in its home ground in the north.
The success in the east probably helped the President to sell the idea of a full scale war against the LTTE in the north to the people, who were not too confident of the SLSF capability till then. The government started terming the war as a “war for liberation of Tamils”; and the President promised restoration of full powers promised under the 13th amendment of the constitution to the newly “liberated” eastern province.
After the success in the east the President probably firmed up his plan for launching operations in the north where the LTTE was stronger. The plan had three tangibles in its core: no resumption of peace talks till the LTTE’s military power is crushed, keep the international community (particularly India) at bay and in good humour, and not to allow any local or external pressure to affect the war plans.
The President’s plans are put into action by his executive team consisting of his brothers Mr Basil Rajapakse and Mr Gotabaya Rajapakse, who were inducted as the Presidential Advisor and the Defence Secretary respectively, and Lt Gen Fonseka, the Army Commander. While Mr Basil Rajapakse provided the political interface for military operations, Mr Gotabaya Rajapakse provided the government interface for the military operations. Thus the military operations are well coordinated with other initiatives of the government. In Sri Lanka the defence ministry also controls law and order and public security. Thus the actions of paramilitary forces, civil defence forces and the police are seamlessly coordinated with SLSF operational requirements. This arrangement appears to be continuing, though Mr Basil Rajapakse has become a parliament member now.
The President has given a free hand for the Army Commander in planning and conduct of operations; there is good rapport between the Army Commander and the Defence Secretary who had served with Lt Gen Fonseka during his army service. On the flip side, concentration of power in a few persons is liable to misuse and this has caused concern among NGOs working on human rights issues.
CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS
The SLSF was a small entity with army strength of a little over 16,000 even as late as 1985. However, it was the growth of Tamil militancy in the nineties that made the SLSF re-think of its force levels and structure. However, this perspective was further modified when the LTTE recovered from the mauling it received at the hands of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (1987-90) and staged a powerful comeback from 1991 onwards. At that stage, the LTTE was weak in conventional operations as it could never regain Jaffna which it lost to the Indian Peace Keeping Force in 1987 and the SLSF in the Eelam War II in 1990-91. For example the LTTE bid to capture Elephant Pass in 1991 was beaten back with the loss of 1,100 cadres. Perhaps this made the SLSF a little complacent in understanding the development of the LTTE into a major force with land, and sea capability.
The operational experience in these wars taught the LTTE some ivaluable lessons in reorganising itself for modern warfare. It restructured itself into military formations, adding fire power with mortars and anti tank weapons. It raised women’s battalions to shore up its strength. Its gained the expertise to use suicide bombing with devastating effect to destabilise the other side. The middle level leadership showed strong motivation and a lot of battlefield innovation. The LTTE Sea Tigers, its nascent naval wing, showed a lot of innovation and developed techniques suited to use suicide boats to attack Sri Lanka naval boats. The LTTE was constantly using modern technology innovations to improve its battlefield capability. It started the manufacture of grenades, Claymore mines and innovatively designed its improvised explosive devices. The LTTE’s overseas support network organised among expatriates living in Canada, Europe and the U.S provided the support and sustenance for the LTTE’s growth.
In the Eelam War III (1995-2002) the SLSF’s performance was not satisfactory. By then the LTTE had earned the dubious distinction of being the only organisation to have assassinated two heads of government and to have developed a daring guerrilla navy capable of taking on conventional navy. The army suffered heavy casualties in defending Mullaitivu losing 1600 troops while the navy lost two naval ships due to Sea Tiger sabotage operations. In the Elephant Pass the military suffered a very big setback losing 204 soldiers. In that operation the LTTE acquired its modern artillery by capturing: three 152 mm guns, two 122 mm guns, 12 x120 mm heavy mortars, and several .50 machine guns, and thousands of automatic rifles. The LTTE also captured several armoured vehicles, tanks, military trucks, bulldozers and high-tech communication systems.
The country was shocked when the LTTE Black Tiger suicide commandos carried out a daring raid on Katunayake air base in July 2001 in which a total of 26 civil and military aircraft were destroyed.
However, the SLSF appear to have made significant efforts to learn from past mistakes when they went into Eelam War IV. In October 2006, apparently with the euphoria of victories in the east, the army made an abortive foray in Jaffna peninsula that drew a LTTE counter offensive in which 129 soldiers were killed and 515 wounded. Similarly in another army offensive on April 23, 2008 offensive against the LTTE defence line in Muhamalai failed to make headway and as many as 165 soldiers were killed. Apparently stung by such failures and based upon his past campaign experience, the Army Commander addressed three key issues that had been the bane of Sri Lanka armed forces for a long time. These include providing adequate force levels, coordination of operations on multiple axes, and flexible battlefield strategy to overcome bottlenecks. He seem to have understood and exploited the weakness of the LTTE in defending offensives along multiple axes and its paucity of artillery and anti aircraft weapons. His operational strategy for the full scale northern offensive appeared to be broadly as under:
• Pin down the LTTE at the forward defended localities astride the Kandy – Jaffna A9 road in the north at Kilali-Muhamalai-Nagarkovil and in the south along line Palamoddai-Omanthai. This would prevent the LTTE from thinning out troops to reinforce defences along other axes.
• Launch offensives along two broad axes: the Mannar-Pooneryn/Jaffna A32 road along the coast to close the LTTE access to Tamil Nadu through Mannar Sea on west, and along the east coast on axis Welioya- Alampil-Mullaitivu-Puthukkudiyiruppu. Operations on these axes would cut off external flow of supply of military equipment and essential goods to the LTTE by sea.
• Naval and air operations to be coordinated to maximise support to ground operations. Air operations to destroy the LTTE support infrastructure and prevent free movement of cadres. Helicopter gun ships to assist both land and sea operations wherever necessary. Navy to progressively curtail the freedom of movement of Sea Tiger boats and prevent LTTE shipments from reaching Sri Lanka coast.
• Special Forces units to be employed in helping ground operations to overcome resistance, conduct deep penetration operations and long range reconnaissance patrols. Special Boat Squadrons to patrol lagoons, carry out special missions, and take on opportunity targets in coastal areas.
In order to provide adequate force levels the army went into a recruiting spree. In the year 2008 alone 40,000 troops were added to raise 47 infantry battalions, 13 brigades, 4 task force contingents, and two divisions. The army now has 13 divisions, three task forces, and one armoured brigade out of which 12 divisions are operationally deployed under the security forces headquarters for Jaffna (four divisions and an armoured brigade), Wanni (five divisions and three task forces), and East (three divisions).
The LTTE had occupied well defended strong points at communication centres in layers of defences to block all the major axes of advance. Perhaps wiser from the army’s failure to breakthrough Muhamalai, the army focused on reducing the defences and claimed the destruction of as many as 250 bunkers particularly along Kilali-Muhamalai-Nagarkovil in the north. However, the army offensive did not go in full swing till the second quarter of 2008 to provide for adequate force build up. Initially the offensive along Adampan and Madhu axes west of A9 road was taken up and by July 2008, two divisions managed to capture a major part of Mannar district up to Vidattalthivu Sea Tiger base of the LTTE on the A32 coastal road. After the fall of Nachikuda an important port of the LTTE in October 2008, Pooneryn across Jaffna lagoon was captured by November 2008. This enabled the army to build a fresh threat to Kilinochchi, the administrative capital of the LTTE.
To its east, one division had advanced up to Akkarayankulam, 24 km from Kilinochchi by September 2008 after fighting a series of battles. However, its offensive was stalled as Charles Anthony Brigade, a crack formation of the LTTE inflicted heavy casualty during October –December when the troops were caught badly in the monsoon rains along the well fortified bund. However the task force advancing along lateral axis Pooneryn-Paranthan astride A9 road captured Paranthan to drive a wedge between Kilinochchi and Elephant Pass. This facilitated the subsequent capture of Kilinochchi and vacation of Elephant Pass in the first week of January 2009.
On the east, one division after initial success in capturing advance LTTE bases was stalled by the monsoon rains and dengue attack. However, when the LTTE started losing on other sectors, this axis was also broken though with the reduction of a series of strong points to result in the capture of Nedunkerni, Alampil and finally Mullaittivu by January 25, 2009. Meanwhile other task forces operating along areas between A-9 road and the Welioya axis managed to link up by the time the offensive on Mullaittivu was attacked. Right now four divisions and three task forces have surrounded the last bit of LTTE territory built around Puthukkudiyiruppu. They are in the process of nibbling into the LTTE areas as over 200,000 civilians are used as human shield by the LTTE. The situation is causing a major humanitarian concern the world over.
AIR FORCE
The Sri Lanka Air Force (SLAF) carried out 1,345 missions in the Eelam War IV from June 2006 onwards till January 2009. Three jet squadrons namely Kfirs (No 10), MIGs (No 12) and F7s (No 5) undertook 1,116 missions while helicopter gunships took part in 229 operations. A total of 2582 sorties were flown by jets and helicopter gun ships indicating the extensive use of air support for land and sea operations.
Undoubtedly, air support was a key factor in preventing offensive action by the LTTE which had no worthwhile anti-aircraft weapon or missile. Usually, the fighters softened up the targets before an offensive; in addition to this they also took on targets to hit at the leadership of the LTTE. Among its major successes was the killing of the LTTE political wing leader SP Thamilchelvan in an air raid.
However, the successful suicide attack by 21Black Tiger commandos on Anuradhapura air base on October 27, 2007 in which 10 troops were killed while 19 aircraft were put out of action, exposed the weakness of the SLAF in guarding its ground assets. The air force also failed to effectively counter the eight sneak raids carried out by the Air Tiger light aircraft. Though these low flying ZLIN aircraft adroitly managed to raid even the Katunayake air base near Colombo, the SLAF was never able to take them on either in the air or on ground despite flying a number of sorties. Though the Air Tigers did not cause any major damage it created a psychological impact on the public and for a time reinforced the image of invincibility the LTTE had created. However, the newly created Air Defence Command to coordinate air defence was successfully blooded when thwarted the two Air Tiger planes that tried to carry out a suicide attack on Katunayake air base and the Air Headquarters in Colombo on February 20, 2009.
The LTTE in the year 2007 and first half of 2008 managed to successfully carryout a series of bomb blasts and unconventional operations mainly in the vicinity of Colombo and Anuradhapura. In the first six months of 2008, the LTTE carried out as many as nine blasts in which 76 civilians were killed while 454 were injured.. Following this security measures were tightened and police surveillance increased drastically reducing the number of such attacks. Despite a number of improvisations at least a dozen blasts were averted either due to alertness of civilians or security checks. This indicated the limitations of such unconventional methods as a force multiplier.
NAVY
.Black Sea Tiger suicide boats are the offensive weapons of the LTTE. They operate in two types of modes. A small number of them mingle with large numbers of fishing craft and carryout a suicide attack when they approach a naval boat. They also operate in a ‘wolf pack’ of suicide boats with or without other Sea Tiger craft.
They have been most effective when they use a flotilla of mixed craft – fast attack craft (FAC) and suicide boats. The two seater Idayan fibre glass boat has a stealth-like design, with special paint to reduce radar detection, is usually used as suicide boat. They have detonation cones at the front. The LTTE’s large command ships are fast moving craft equipped with surface search radar.
Though during 2006-07 the SLN suffered considerable loss, it improved its tactics to take on the suicide vessels and command vessels before the attack materialised. Moreover the suicide attacks deprive experienced sailors in the Sea Tigers and over a period has become a self defeating strategy after the SLN started successfully breaking up their attack. One of the main reason is the qualitative improvements carried out in the Navy’s FAC.
The FAC is the mainstay of the SLN in countering the Sea Tiger suicide attacks. With a speed of 45 knots these FACs operate in pairs to counter Sea Tiger ‘wolf packs.’ In keeping with operational requirement, their armaments have been increased to 30mm stabilized cannon as the primary armament with long range electro optic systems to locate Sea Tiger boats well in advance. They also have surface search radars. They carry additional weapons like automatic grenade launchers and 12.7 mm machine guns. The Navy’s success against the Sea Tiger had been mainly due to their superior tactics and the progressive loss of ground support for the Sea Tigers.
CONCLUSION
The SLSF success in the Eelam War IV is mainly due to the clear objectives spelt out by the national political leadership. This enabled the Army Commander a realistic strategy that aimed at exploiting the LTTE’s strategic weaknesses to his advantage. However, he might have reduced his casualties had the final offensive on Kilinochchi been launched before the onset of monsoon. Adoption of multiple thrust lines, excellent coordination of the three services with formations operating on different axes and providing adequate force levels appear to be the key to the SLSF success.
The SLSF also showed strong motivation to carry on with the task despite casualties. This demonstrated the strength of its junior leadership. However, the use of air force and artillery in counter insurgency/terrorism war against the country’s own citizens is questionable on humanitarian grounds.
Though Sri Lanka has scored a remarkable success in the conventional war against the LTTE it will be meaningful only if the fundamental grievances of the Tamil population are addressed to bring in permanent peace.
© Forum for Strategic & Security Studies, New Delhi-110 003
INTRODUCTION
Sri Lanka appears to be the only success story in the dismal scene everywhere in the war against terror. It has been extremely successful in the Eelam War IV, going on since 2006 against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) insurgents. Collectively known as the Eelam Wars, these wars have been going on from 1983. Sri Lanka security forces (SLSF) were not able to achieve decisive results in their three earlier outings. The Tamil insurgent group fighting for an independent Tamil Eelam state to be created for minority Tamils has been rated by According to the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), “the Tamil Tigers are among the most dangerous and deadly extremists in the world.” The FBI said the LTTE’s “ruthless tactics have inspired terrorist networks worldwide, including Al Qaeda in Iraq.”
The LTTE has also the dubious credit of refining the use of suicide terrorism as a force multiplier in its terrorist operations. The LTTE is perhaps the only insurgent and terrorist group in the world with proven capability to wage both conventional as well as non conventional war on land, in air, and on sea. It has used suicide terrorism to change the course of events irreversibly both in India and Sri Lanka.
During the last three of years of the current war, the SLSF have wrested control of nine districts over which the LTTE had exercised control for over a decade in the Tamil-predominant northern and eastern provinces. According to Sri Lanka Defence Ministry by end February 2009, the SLSF had regained about 15,000 sq km of territory from the insurgent group. The LTTE ‘territory’ is now reduced to a miniscule 70 square kilometres area only. The LTTE, is still surviving there because it is using about 200,000 Tamil civilians in the area as human shield to delay the SLSF’s final offensive.
Both sides have suffered heavy casualties in the Eelam War IV. However independently verified figures of casualties of both sides are not available. But the LTTE appears to have suffered the most casualties. The estimated LTTE strength now stands reduced to only 3000 to 4000 from the 2006 estimate of 15,000- 18,000 cadres. According to the data released by the LTTE in November 2008, it had lost a total of 22,390 cadres (17, 496 men and 4894 women) in all the Eelam Wars from November 27, 1982 to Nov 20, 2008. Interpolated with similar data of earlier years, in the current war the LTTE appears to have lost 5,500 cadres - one quarter of its overall total. More importantly, in this war the insurgent group has lost most of its experienced frontline middle-level leadership - veterans of previous wars.
However, these figures do not include the LTTE auxiliaries and members of the hastily raised militia ‘Makkal Padai’ who have taken part in operations. If they are taken into reckoning, the LTTE’s total losses in this war would probably come to 11,000 as claimed by the Army Commander Lt Gen Fonseka. As against this the SLSF losses are probably around 5000 as they had lost 3000 troops in the offensive on Kilinochchi between October 2008 and January 2009.
The LTTE has also probably lost most of its artillery including scores of 81 mm mortars, 155 mm and 130 mm guns and infantry support weapons. Its ship building, arms-manufacturing, and air-operation infrastructures, communication and broadcasting facilities have been captured. In 2006-07, Sri Lanka navy successfully destroyed the LTTE’s tramp fleet of at least eight ships along with weapons and military equipment they carried. The navy has also successfully immobilised the Sea Tigers activity after the Sea Tiger bases on eastern and western coastlines were captured by the army. With the LTTE’s freedom to operate overseas curtailed now as it is banned in 32 countries, rebuilding the organisation even with the help of the expatriate Tamils is going to be an uphill task.
Thus, the SLSF appear to have dealt a grievous blow to the LTTE in this war. Even if the LTTE survives the current war, its ability will be limited to carrying out only sporadic bomb blasts, suicide attacks and assassinations only. It may take a couple of years in favourable environment to regain its past s glory. Thus the President appears to have almost achieved his aim of cutting down the LTTE to size and reducing its self assumed status of a state within the nation to that of an extremist group with limited activity. Sri Lanka’s success in the war against the LTTE holds some useful strategic learning for other countries in reworking their own counter insurgency/terrorism strategies.
LEADERSHIP STRATEGY
There is no doubt that President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s unwavering focus on the objective of totally eliminating the LTTE, fulfilling his electoral promise, was the key to the nation’s success in the war. The clarity he imparted to the national leadership gave a well-defined direction to the government’s actions in tandem with SLSF operations. Neither such clarity of objective nor commitment to goal was evident in the earlier wars against the Tamil insurgent group.
After the first three years of the peace process 2002, Sri Lanka was facing a political crisis due to its inability to shore up the stalled peace process. It could neither handle the LTTE’s large-scale violations nor come up with a nationally agreed political response to the LTTE’s interim self governing authority (ISGA) proposal. The morale of the armed forces was low as the ceasefire agreement prevented them from responding to repeated LTTE attacks against SLSF officers and intelligence operatives.
It was in this environment Mr Mahinda Rajapaksa was elected Sri Lanka President in November 2005 with a wafer thin majority of votes from Southern Sinhalas with a promise to tame the LTTE. He also vowed to end the peace process 2002. In a way his election was aided by the LTTE enforced boycott of the elections in areas under its control. This deprived Tamils votes that would have got the rival candidate Mr Ranil Wickremasinghe of the United National Party elected.
Mr Rajapaksa’s predecessors had considered the LTTE’s challenge to the State’s authority as an offshoot of the Tamil ethnic struggle for autonomy. So their approach wavered between military operations and peace talks aimed at addressing the broader issue of devolution of equitable powers to the Tamil minority. At the operational level, this created confusion both in the SLSF and the government machinery and cramped the military operations from reaching their logical conclusion.
In the past the government felt more comfortable in politically handling the LTTE than embarking upon yet another round of war. On the other hand, the LTTE always had more faith in its armed might than in its vague socialist political ideology reminiscent of Fascism, with allegiance of all ranks to the supreme leader Prabhakaran. So at all times in peace and war, the LTTE was comfortable only when it retained the military initiative.
The LTTE had always used the peace pauses between wars to build its strength and firepower for the next round of war. This enabled the LTTE to emerge stronger and cockier than before after the collapse of the peace effort. For instance, it used the four years of peace that prevailed during the peace process 2002 to develop its air capability for the first time. It imported at least three to four light planes, developed as many as eight airstrips, two of them with ground infrastructure, trained the pilots, and imported at least 15 ship loads of military equipment. This strategy had helped the LTTE to go on the war mode and spring military surprises whenever it chose to do so.
However, Mr Rajapaksa appears to have been determined not to allow LTTE the luxury of taking the military initiative to go to war while paying obeisance to the peace process. By the time he assumed office in November 2005 the peace progress reached a dead end.
All along the period of ceasefire, the LTTE had shown a studied disregard in observing the ceasefire, committing over 3200 violations even while the peace process was in force. This had strengthened President Rajapaksa’s move to disown the peace process as unworkable. So to start with, President Rajapaksa apparently decided to ignore the ceasefire agreement and bided his time to hit back at the LTTE. The four sponsors of the peace process - European Union, Japan, Norway and the U.S - collectively known as the co-chairs were muted in their protests against the Sri Lankan action.
Governments in Sri Lanka in the past had dithered on evolving a national consensus
on handling the Tamil issue due to internal political differences and lack of political will. After he came to power, President Rajapaksa formed an all-party committee to evolve a solution to the Tamil problem acceptable to all sections of society. Though this was in keeping with his election manifesto, many considered this an exercise to buy time for the President to militarily cut down the LTTE to size. The President’s marked preference for vigorously pursuing the military option first only proved this surmise correct.
The President has consistently been strengthening his political base in tandem with his military effort. He has accommodated a motley collection of small political parties of all hues in his jumbo cabinet of 104 ministers to ensure adequate budgetary support in parliament for the war effort. The lure of power has badly split almost all the opposition parties. The success of the President’s United Peoples Freedom Alliance coalition in the successive provincial council elections has shown that politically he is stronger than ever before. The mutually reinforcing success of his military operations and political strategy appear to be the main reason for this.
The LTTE provided the President an opportunity to seize the military imitative when a LTTE woman suicide bomber made a bid to kill the Sri Lanka Army Commander Lt Gen Sarath Fonseka on April 25, 2006. Immediately, air force planes struck the LTTE’s headquarters in an assertion of retaliatory power. However, Mr Rajapaksa’s war got more legitimacy and punch in July 2006 when the LTTE closed the sluice gates of a weir at Mavil Aru in eastern province to cut off the water supply to Sinhala farmers downstream. The SLSF launched Operation Watershed to rid of the LTTE from Mavil Aru. After that there was no respite for the LTTE from the SLSF offensive.
The SLSF probably chose the eastern province for a military showdown with the LTTE because the insurgents had a smaller force there and the population was a mix of Tamils, Muslims and Sinhalas. By then in the east the LTTE was facing internal problems after Karuna, a senior LTTE leader and commander of Batticaloa, and his followers broke away from the organisation in 2004, depleting the insurgent strength. Karuna’s help became a useful add on to the SLSF operations.
By June 2007, the SLSF broke through the strong LTTE resistance and captured all the areas under its control in the east. However, the LTTE probably managed to extricate bulk of its strength in the east. The armed forces were buoyed by their success and became confident of taking on the LTTE in its home ground in the north.
The success in the east probably helped the President to sell the idea of a full scale war against the LTTE in the north to the people, who were not too confident of the SLSF capability till then. The government started terming the war as a “war for liberation of Tamils”; and the President promised restoration of full powers promised under the 13th amendment of the constitution to the newly “liberated” eastern province.
After the success in the east the President probably firmed up his plan for launching operations in the north where the LTTE was stronger. The plan had three tangibles in its core: no resumption of peace talks till the LTTE’s military power is crushed, keep the international community (particularly India) at bay and in good humour, and not to allow any local or external pressure to affect the war plans.
The President’s plans are put into action by his executive team consisting of his brothers Mr Basil Rajapakse and Mr Gotabaya Rajapakse, who were inducted as the Presidential Advisor and the Defence Secretary respectively, and Lt Gen Fonseka, the Army Commander. While Mr Basil Rajapakse provided the political interface for military operations, Mr Gotabaya Rajapakse provided the government interface for the military operations. Thus the military operations are well coordinated with other initiatives of the government. In Sri Lanka the defence ministry also controls law and order and public security. Thus the actions of paramilitary forces, civil defence forces and the police are seamlessly coordinated with SLSF operational requirements. This arrangement appears to be continuing, though Mr Basil Rajapakse has become a parliament member now.
The President has given a free hand for the Army Commander in planning and conduct of operations; there is good rapport between the Army Commander and the Defence Secretary who had served with Lt Gen Fonseka during his army service. On the flip side, concentration of power in a few persons is liable to misuse and this has caused concern among NGOs working on human rights issues.
CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS
The SLSF was a small entity with army strength of a little over 16,000 even as late as 1985. However, it was the growth of Tamil militancy in the nineties that made the SLSF re-think of its force levels and structure. However, this perspective was further modified when the LTTE recovered from the mauling it received at the hands of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (1987-90) and staged a powerful comeback from 1991 onwards. At that stage, the LTTE was weak in conventional operations as it could never regain Jaffna which it lost to the Indian Peace Keeping Force in 1987 and the SLSF in the Eelam War II in 1990-91. For example the LTTE bid to capture Elephant Pass in 1991 was beaten back with the loss of 1,100 cadres. Perhaps this made the SLSF a little complacent in understanding the development of the LTTE into a major force with land, and sea capability.
The operational experience in these wars taught the LTTE some ivaluable lessons in reorganising itself for modern warfare. It restructured itself into military formations, adding fire power with mortars and anti tank weapons. It raised women’s battalions to shore up its strength. Its gained the expertise to use suicide bombing with devastating effect to destabilise the other side. The middle level leadership showed strong motivation and a lot of battlefield innovation. The LTTE Sea Tigers, its nascent naval wing, showed a lot of innovation and developed techniques suited to use suicide boats to attack Sri Lanka naval boats. The LTTE was constantly using modern technology innovations to improve its battlefield capability. It started the manufacture of grenades, Claymore mines and innovatively designed its improvised explosive devices. The LTTE’s overseas support network organised among expatriates living in Canada, Europe and the U.S provided the support and sustenance for the LTTE’s growth.
In the Eelam War III (1995-2002) the SLSF’s performance was not satisfactory. By then the LTTE had earned the dubious distinction of being the only organisation to have assassinated two heads of government and to have developed a daring guerrilla navy capable of taking on conventional navy. The army suffered heavy casualties in defending Mullaitivu losing 1600 troops while the navy lost two naval ships due to Sea Tiger sabotage operations. In the Elephant Pass the military suffered a very big setback losing 204 soldiers. In that operation the LTTE acquired its modern artillery by capturing: three 152 mm guns, two 122 mm guns, 12 x120 mm heavy mortars, and several .50 machine guns, and thousands of automatic rifles. The LTTE also captured several armoured vehicles, tanks, military trucks, bulldozers and high-tech communication systems.
The country was shocked when the LTTE Black Tiger suicide commandos carried out a daring raid on Katunayake air base in July 2001 in which a total of 26 civil and military aircraft were destroyed.
However, the SLSF appear to have made significant efforts to learn from past mistakes when they went into Eelam War IV. In October 2006, apparently with the euphoria of victories in the east, the army made an abortive foray in Jaffna peninsula that drew a LTTE counter offensive in which 129 soldiers were killed and 515 wounded. Similarly in another army offensive on April 23, 2008 offensive against the LTTE defence line in Muhamalai failed to make headway and as many as 165 soldiers were killed. Apparently stung by such failures and based upon his past campaign experience, the Army Commander addressed three key issues that had been the bane of Sri Lanka armed forces for a long time. These include providing adequate force levels, coordination of operations on multiple axes, and flexible battlefield strategy to overcome bottlenecks. He seem to have understood and exploited the weakness of the LTTE in defending offensives along multiple axes and its paucity of artillery and anti aircraft weapons. His operational strategy for the full scale northern offensive appeared to be broadly as under:
• Pin down the LTTE at the forward defended localities astride the Kandy – Jaffna A9 road in the north at Kilali-Muhamalai-Nagarkovil and in the south along line Palamoddai-Omanthai. This would prevent the LTTE from thinning out troops to reinforce defences along other axes.
• Launch offensives along two broad axes: the Mannar-Pooneryn/Jaffna A32 road along the coast to close the LTTE access to Tamil Nadu through Mannar Sea on west, and along the east coast on axis Welioya- Alampil-Mullaitivu-Puthukkudiyiruppu. Operations on these axes would cut off external flow of supply of military equipment and essential goods to the LTTE by sea.
• Naval and air operations to be coordinated to maximise support to ground operations. Air operations to destroy the LTTE support infrastructure and prevent free movement of cadres. Helicopter gun ships to assist both land and sea operations wherever necessary. Navy to progressively curtail the freedom of movement of Sea Tiger boats and prevent LTTE shipments from reaching Sri Lanka coast.
• Special Forces units to be employed in helping ground operations to overcome resistance, conduct deep penetration operations and long range reconnaissance patrols. Special Boat Squadrons to patrol lagoons, carry out special missions, and take on opportunity targets in coastal areas.
In order to provide adequate force levels the army went into a recruiting spree. In the year 2008 alone 40,000 troops were added to raise 47 infantry battalions, 13 brigades, 4 task force contingents, and two divisions. The army now has 13 divisions, three task forces, and one armoured brigade out of which 12 divisions are operationally deployed under the security forces headquarters for Jaffna (four divisions and an armoured brigade), Wanni (five divisions and three task forces), and East (three divisions).
The LTTE had occupied well defended strong points at communication centres in layers of defences to block all the major axes of advance. Perhaps wiser from the army’s failure to breakthrough Muhamalai, the army focused on reducing the defences and claimed the destruction of as many as 250 bunkers particularly along Kilali-Muhamalai-Nagarkovil in the north. However, the army offensive did not go in full swing till the second quarter of 2008 to provide for adequate force build up. Initially the offensive along Adampan and Madhu axes west of A9 road was taken up and by July 2008, two divisions managed to capture a major part of Mannar district up to Vidattalthivu Sea Tiger base of the LTTE on the A32 coastal road. After the fall of Nachikuda an important port of the LTTE in October 2008, Pooneryn across Jaffna lagoon was captured by November 2008. This enabled the army to build a fresh threat to Kilinochchi, the administrative capital of the LTTE.
To its east, one division had advanced up to Akkarayankulam, 24 km from Kilinochchi by September 2008 after fighting a series of battles. However, its offensive was stalled as Charles Anthony Brigade, a crack formation of the LTTE inflicted heavy casualty during October –December when the troops were caught badly in the monsoon rains along the well fortified bund. However the task force advancing along lateral axis Pooneryn-Paranthan astride A9 road captured Paranthan to drive a wedge between Kilinochchi and Elephant Pass. This facilitated the subsequent capture of Kilinochchi and vacation of Elephant Pass in the first week of January 2009.
On the east, one division after initial success in capturing advance LTTE bases was stalled by the monsoon rains and dengue attack. However, when the LTTE started losing on other sectors, this axis was also broken though with the reduction of a series of strong points to result in the capture of Nedunkerni, Alampil and finally Mullaittivu by January 25, 2009. Meanwhile other task forces operating along areas between A-9 road and the Welioya axis managed to link up by the time the offensive on Mullaittivu was attacked. Right now four divisions and three task forces have surrounded the last bit of LTTE territory built around Puthukkudiyiruppu. They are in the process of nibbling into the LTTE areas as over 200,000 civilians are used as human shield by the LTTE. The situation is causing a major humanitarian concern the world over.
AIR FORCE
The Sri Lanka Air Force (SLAF) carried out 1,345 missions in the Eelam War IV from June 2006 onwards till January 2009. Three jet squadrons namely Kfirs (No 10), MIGs (No 12) and F7s (No 5) undertook 1,116 missions while helicopter gunships took part in 229 operations. A total of 2582 sorties were flown by jets and helicopter gun ships indicating the extensive use of air support for land and sea operations.
Undoubtedly, air support was a key factor in preventing offensive action by the LTTE which had no worthwhile anti-aircraft weapon or missile. Usually, the fighters softened up the targets before an offensive; in addition to this they also took on targets to hit at the leadership of the LTTE. Among its major successes was the killing of the LTTE political wing leader SP Thamilchelvan in an air raid.
However, the successful suicide attack by 21Black Tiger commandos on Anuradhapura air base on October 27, 2007 in which 10 troops were killed while 19 aircraft were put out of action, exposed the weakness of the SLAF in guarding its ground assets. The air force also failed to effectively counter the eight sneak raids carried out by the Air Tiger light aircraft. Though these low flying ZLIN aircraft adroitly managed to raid even the Katunayake air base near Colombo, the SLAF was never able to take them on either in the air or on ground despite flying a number of sorties. Though the Air Tigers did not cause any major damage it created a psychological impact on the public and for a time reinforced the image of invincibility the LTTE had created. However, the newly created Air Defence Command to coordinate air defence was successfully blooded when thwarted the two Air Tiger planes that tried to carry out a suicide attack on Katunayake air base and the Air Headquarters in Colombo on February 20, 2009.
The LTTE in the year 2007 and first half of 2008 managed to successfully carryout a series of bomb blasts and unconventional operations mainly in the vicinity of Colombo and Anuradhapura. In the first six months of 2008, the LTTE carried out as many as nine blasts in which 76 civilians were killed while 454 were injured.. Following this security measures were tightened and police surveillance increased drastically reducing the number of such attacks. Despite a number of improvisations at least a dozen blasts were averted either due to alertness of civilians or security checks. This indicated the limitations of such unconventional methods as a force multiplier.
NAVY
.Black Sea Tiger suicide boats are the offensive weapons of the LTTE. They operate in two types of modes. A small number of them mingle with large numbers of fishing craft and carryout a suicide attack when they approach a naval boat. They also operate in a ‘wolf pack’ of suicide boats with or without other Sea Tiger craft.
They have been most effective when they use a flotilla of mixed craft – fast attack craft (FAC) and suicide boats. The two seater Idayan fibre glass boat has a stealth-like design, with special paint to reduce radar detection, is usually used as suicide boat. They have detonation cones at the front. The LTTE’s large command ships are fast moving craft equipped with surface search radar.
Though during 2006-07 the SLN suffered considerable loss, it improved its tactics to take on the suicide vessels and command vessels before the attack materialised. Moreover the suicide attacks deprive experienced sailors in the Sea Tigers and over a period has become a self defeating strategy after the SLN started successfully breaking up their attack. One of the main reason is the qualitative improvements carried out in the Navy’s FAC.
The FAC is the mainstay of the SLN in countering the Sea Tiger suicide attacks. With a speed of 45 knots these FACs operate in pairs to counter Sea Tiger ‘wolf packs.’ In keeping with operational requirement, their armaments have been increased to 30mm stabilized cannon as the primary armament with long range electro optic systems to locate Sea Tiger boats well in advance. They also have surface search radars. They carry additional weapons like automatic grenade launchers and 12.7 mm machine guns. The Navy’s success against the Sea Tiger had been mainly due to their superior tactics and the progressive loss of ground support for the Sea Tigers.
CONCLUSION
The SLSF success in the Eelam War IV is mainly due to the clear objectives spelt out by the national political leadership. This enabled the Army Commander a realistic strategy that aimed at exploiting the LTTE’s strategic weaknesses to his advantage. However, he might have reduced his casualties had the final offensive on Kilinochchi been launched before the onset of monsoon. Adoption of multiple thrust lines, excellent coordination of the three services with formations operating on different axes and providing adequate force levels appear to be the key to the SLSF success.
The SLSF also showed strong motivation to carry on with the task despite casualties. This demonstrated the strength of its junior leadership. However, the use of air force and artillery in counter insurgency/terrorism war against the country’s own citizens is questionable on humanitarian grounds.
Though Sri Lanka has scored a remarkable success in the conventional war against the LTTE it will be meaningful only if the fundamental grievances of the Tamil population are addressed to bring in permanent peace.
© Forum for Strategic & Security Studies, New Delhi-110 003
Saturday, April 18, 2009
Forgotten Signalmen of Jabalpur
Recently Raghu, one my readers, had drawn my attention to an article (“Radioactive Rebels” in Outlook magazine, April 20, 2009) of an unrecognized revolt by some Signalmen in the Signals Training Centre, Jabalpur February 26, 1946, against the British Raj.
According to the article 120 men of the 'J' company of the Signals Training Centre (STC), Jabalpur, defied their British superiors a broke free from their barracks. Part of a radio signalling unit, they were angry at the abuse heaped on them by their British counterparts. They were also upset at the incarceration of two Indian National Army (INA) officers at Red Fort in Delhi. The ranks of the mutineers swelled to 1,700 men, armed with nothing more than Congress and Muslim League flags. The protest was peaceful till they were bayonet charged by the Somerset Light Infantry to break up the revolt. Eighty men were court-martialled and dismissed without pay and pension and 41 others were sent to prison.
According to the article, the British hushed up the whole incident and destroyed most of the records. However, Forty-one others were sent to prison. But the incident was quickly hushed up. The British officers stationed in Jabalpur were replaced by Indian officers and most of the records destroyed. This part of unwritten role of armed forces in Indian freedom would have remained so till Maj Gen VK Singh (retd.) chanced upon the information while collating material for the third volume of the official history of the Corps of Signals.
He has included the details of the Jabalpur mutiny his recent book “The Contribution of the Indian Armed Forces to the Freedom Movement.”
He chanced upon the few remaining records of the Jabalpur mutiny while working on the official history of the Corps of Signals. He has already published the second volume of the corps's history and is busy collating material for the third and final volume. According to Maj Gen VK Singh, the Jabalpur mutiny so soon after the Naval mutiny became a matter of grave concern to the British colonial rulers. .
Of course, the men who took part in the revolt for the cause of Indian freedom were forgotten after independence.
This was not the only mutiny during the last days of the Raj. Writing in the Mainstream, (Vol XLVI No 41 October 1, 2008), the author Ajeet Jawed says “between March 1942 and the beginning of 1946 there were 19 uprisings in the Royal Indian Navy alone.” The most important and tragic was the Royal Indian Naval revolt that started with a strike in Bombay by naval ratings of HMIS Talwar February 18, 1946, just a week earlier than the army mutiny at Jabalpur. Like the naval army men the naval ratings were also protesting against the racist behaviour of Royal Navy personnel towards Indian sailors and against the prosecution of two INA officers in Delhi. The mutiny evoked widespread public support and Bombay observed a general strike in sympathy on February 19. It was suppressed with British troops with casualties on both sides.
According to Ajeet Jawed, the naval ratings strike spread within 48 hours to “almost all the ships at anchor and on the sea and establishments ashore in India and abroad. Even the units at far-flung Aden and Bahrain did not remain unaffected. In all 74 ships, four flotillas and 20 shore establishments (including three major naval bases) joined the strike. The ratings pulled down the Union Jack and raised the tricolour (Congress), crescent (Muslim League) and hammer-sickle (Communist Party) flags on the mastheads of the rebel ships.”
The revolt in Bombay also triggered sympathetic vibrations in distant Karachi, Morvi and Manora as well. He says, about 1200 airmen of the Royal Indian Air Force also went on a procession in support of their strike on Februray 20. Indian officers of the RIAF refused to fly out troops, and the transport units refused to carry British troops to fight the naval ratings and the Indian officers refused to pilot planes to bomb the ships.
The mutiny was called off following after senior Congress leader Vallabh Bhai Patel met the strike committee leaders and requested them to end it. The Muslim League chief Mohammed Ali Jinnah also made similar call. Of course, politicians did not help the mutineers from being court-martialled and dismissed from service. And after independence in India and Pakistan they were never reinstated. They were either incarcerated or rendered jobless.
Their struggle was not recognized for a long time after independence. The Congress government of the time probably wanted to ignore this important chapter in India’s freedom struggle because there were many Communist sympathisers among the naval mutineers. However, they were later accorded the status of freedom fighters.
But all the army men who revolted in Jabalpur have not been accorded this recognition so far. According to the Outlook article Lance Naik Neelakantan Nair, one of the survivors of the mutiny appealed to the Kerala High Court seeking redress. Though the court directed the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Kerala government to look into the matter nothing came of it. The MHA in a letter dated February 14, 2003 (No 8/2/2003-FF-P), stated that the issue of granting freedom fighter status to the mutineers had been "considered and it has been decided at the level of the home minister that they cannot be treated as freedom fighters."
What is more important in the current political context when BJP has come out in strong support of the armed forces demands its election manifesto, is the then Home minister and BJP’s present prime ministerial aspirant L.K. Advani did not find “the mutiny and its impact adequate enough to club it with the freedom struggle.” However, thanks to the efforts of the Corps of Signals the signals corps 41, out of over 1,700 mutineers, were granted the freedom fighters meagre pension. The others were ignored since official records showed that they had been "discharged on administrative grounds," although the discharge certificates showed they were discharged for taking part in the "Jubalpore STC mutiny".
This simple incident of forgotten history of a few hundred soldiers point to two home truths: veterans must be cautious in putting too much faith in BJP politicians’ electoral promises becoming a reality. Firstly, politicians suffer from a peculiar ailment: post-election amnesia. Secondly, even if they want to do something, the roadblocks of Babudom have to be overcome.
I have first hand experience of the mysterious ways of “Babudom blocks.” this. After independence, my father was recognized as a freedom fighter because he was imprisoned for a year during the individual satyagraha. For nearly 30 years he enjoyed the nation’s recognition as a freedom fighter more than the small pension that went with the official stamp of approval. When he passed away, my mother as the spouse of the freedom fighter was eligible for a smaller pension. However, her application was rejected as the officials of MHA wanted a copy of my father’s original prison discharge certificate after 80 years - half a century of imprisonment and 30 years of receiving the pension! My efforts when I was posted in Army Headquarters on this count were in vain. I gave up the struggle in disgust as the watchdogs of government would not relent. My mother died without ever getting the pension that was her due.
The moral of the story: it is Babus who rule India. During the British rule it was British Babudom that held the sway. The only change after independence is the change in the colour of its skin. So veterans should be prepared for a long haul for OROP to come through even if the political heads nod in agreement, unless the mandarins of Babudom will it.
According to the article 120 men of the 'J' company of the Signals Training Centre (STC), Jabalpur, defied their British superiors a broke free from their barracks. Part of a radio signalling unit, they were angry at the abuse heaped on them by their British counterparts. They were also upset at the incarceration of two Indian National Army (INA) officers at Red Fort in Delhi. The ranks of the mutineers swelled to 1,700 men, armed with nothing more than Congress and Muslim League flags. The protest was peaceful till they were bayonet charged by the Somerset Light Infantry to break up the revolt. Eighty men were court-martialled and dismissed without pay and pension and 41 others were sent to prison.
According to the article, the British hushed up the whole incident and destroyed most of the records. However, Forty-one others were sent to prison. But the incident was quickly hushed up. The British officers stationed in Jabalpur were replaced by Indian officers and most of the records destroyed. This part of unwritten role of armed forces in Indian freedom would have remained so till Maj Gen VK Singh (retd.) chanced upon the information while collating material for the third volume of the official history of the Corps of Signals.
He has included the details of the Jabalpur mutiny his recent book “The Contribution of the Indian Armed Forces to the Freedom Movement.”
He chanced upon the few remaining records of the Jabalpur mutiny while working on the official history of the Corps of Signals. He has already published the second volume of the corps's history and is busy collating material for the third and final volume. According to Maj Gen VK Singh, the Jabalpur mutiny so soon after the Naval mutiny became a matter of grave concern to the British colonial rulers. .
Of course, the men who took part in the revolt for the cause of Indian freedom were forgotten after independence.
This was not the only mutiny during the last days of the Raj. Writing in the Mainstream, (Vol XLVI No 41 October 1, 2008), the author Ajeet Jawed says “between March 1942 and the beginning of 1946 there were 19 uprisings in the Royal Indian Navy alone.” The most important and tragic was the Royal Indian Naval revolt that started with a strike in Bombay by naval ratings of HMIS Talwar February 18, 1946, just a week earlier than the army mutiny at Jabalpur. Like the naval army men the naval ratings were also protesting against the racist behaviour of Royal Navy personnel towards Indian sailors and against the prosecution of two INA officers in Delhi. The mutiny evoked widespread public support and Bombay observed a general strike in sympathy on February 19. It was suppressed with British troops with casualties on both sides.
According to Ajeet Jawed, the naval ratings strike spread within 48 hours to “almost all the ships at anchor and on the sea and establishments ashore in India and abroad. Even the units at far-flung Aden and Bahrain did not remain unaffected. In all 74 ships, four flotillas and 20 shore establishments (including three major naval bases) joined the strike. The ratings pulled down the Union Jack and raised the tricolour (Congress), crescent (Muslim League) and hammer-sickle (Communist Party) flags on the mastheads of the rebel ships.”
The revolt in Bombay also triggered sympathetic vibrations in distant Karachi, Morvi and Manora as well. He says, about 1200 airmen of the Royal Indian Air Force also went on a procession in support of their strike on Februray 20. Indian officers of the RIAF refused to fly out troops, and the transport units refused to carry British troops to fight the naval ratings and the Indian officers refused to pilot planes to bomb the ships.
The mutiny was called off following after senior Congress leader Vallabh Bhai Patel met the strike committee leaders and requested them to end it. The Muslim League chief Mohammed Ali Jinnah also made similar call. Of course, politicians did not help the mutineers from being court-martialled and dismissed from service. And after independence in India and Pakistan they were never reinstated. They were either incarcerated or rendered jobless.
Their struggle was not recognized for a long time after independence. The Congress government of the time probably wanted to ignore this important chapter in India’s freedom struggle because there were many Communist sympathisers among the naval mutineers. However, they were later accorded the status of freedom fighters.
But all the army men who revolted in Jabalpur have not been accorded this recognition so far. According to the Outlook article Lance Naik Neelakantan Nair, one of the survivors of the mutiny appealed to the Kerala High Court seeking redress. Though the court directed the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Kerala government to look into the matter nothing came of it. The MHA in a letter dated February 14, 2003 (No 8/2/2003-FF-P), stated that the issue of granting freedom fighter status to the mutineers had been "considered and it has been decided at the level of the home minister that they cannot be treated as freedom fighters."
What is more important in the current political context when BJP has come out in strong support of the armed forces demands its election manifesto, is the then Home minister and BJP’s present prime ministerial aspirant L.K. Advani did not find “the mutiny and its impact adequate enough to club it with the freedom struggle.” However, thanks to the efforts of the Corps of Signals the signals corps 41, out of over 1,700 mutineers, were granted the freedom fighters meagre pension. The others were ignored since official records showed that they had been "discharged on administrative grounds," although the discharge certificates showed they were discharged for taking part in the "Jubalpore STC mutiny".
This simple incident of forgotten history of a few hundred soldiers point to two home truths: veterans must be cautious in putting too much faith in BJP politicians’ electoral promises becoming a reality. Firstly, politicians suffer from a peculiar ailment: post-election amnesia. Secondly, even if they want to do something, the roadblocks of Babudom have to be overcome.
I have first hand experience of the mysterious ways of “Babudom blocks.” this. After independence, my father was recognized as a freedom fighter because he was imprisoned for a year during the individual satyagraha. For nearly 30 years he enjoyed the nation’s recognition as a freedom fighter more than the small pension that went with the official stamp of approval. When he passed away, my mother as the spouse of the freedom fighter was eligible for a smaller pension. However, her application was rejected as the officials of MHA wanted a copy of my father’s original prison discharge certificate after 80 years - half a century of imprisonment and 30 years of receiving the pension! My efforts when I was posted in Army Headquarters on this count were in vain. I gave up the struggle in disgust as the watchdogs of government would not relent. My mother died without ever getting the pension that was her due.
The moral of the story: it is Babus who rule India. During the British rule it was British Babudom that held the sway. The only change after independence is the change in the colour of its skin. So veterans should be prepared for a long haul for OROP to come through even if the political heads nod in agreement, unless the mandarins of Babudom will it.
Thursday, April 16, 2009
Issues Hobbling the Armed Forces
On April 16, 2009 I read a perceptive article "Defending India: No Compromise, No Concession" written by Lt Gen NS Malik, former Deputy Chief of Army Staff, on the internet. The General has highlighted the problems dogging the defence forces in the context of overall national security. Even detractors of some of the points he has raised like income tax exemption for service personnel will agree that there are major issues hobbling the armed forces to optimise their performance. In the interest of our national security, the concerns he has highlighted deserve immediate attention. Here is the article for your reading:
"Defending India: No Compromise, No Concession"
N S Malik
“If ever things come to a sordid pass when, on a given day, the Mauryan soldier has to LOOK BACK over his shoulder (simhawalokana) prompted by even a single worry about his and his family's material, physical and social well being, it should cause you and your Council the greatest concern and distress. I beseech you to take instant note and act with uncommon dispatch to address the soldier's anxiety. It is my bounden duty to assure you, My Lord, that the day when the Mauryan soldier has to demand his dues or, worse, plead for them ,will neither have arrived overnight nor in vain. It will also bode ill for Magadha. For then, on that day, you, My Lord, will have lost all moral sanction to be King! It will also be the beginning of the end of the Mauryan Empire!!" - Kautilya to Chandragupta on the Mauryan Soldier
Taking note of the deteriorating security scenario, at least one political party has issued a comprehensive manifesto covering all aspects of national activities for creating a modern, powerful, prosperous, progressive and secure India through the three main instruments of ‘Good Governance, Development & Security.’
National Security covers both areas of external and internal security. Today with state-sponsored terrorism through non-State actors and religious fundamentalists, internal security has assumed menacing shape and cannot be left to police and CPO forces alone. Armed forces and Para Military Forces (PMF) of the nation, therefore, face a much bigger challenge on both fronts simultaneously. Political parties must understand this and devise a Defence Policy based on the above threat perception. In simple words understanding the common citizen’s basic need of security, the mantra is “Fear shall no longer stalk this land.”
Armed Forces are the ultimate weapon with which the state is to fight the external aggressor and the internal insurgent. Thus the need to strengthen the armed forces to be ever ready to crush any attack on the sovereignty and integrity of India. Tragically, the armed forces have been ignored by the government and its failure to address legitimate military concerns has bred undesirable discontent among the serving soldiery and forced the veterans to come out in protest by returning their most precious possession, the war medals, to the President of India.
Thus the promise to ‘address all pending issues immediately’ is welcome, and must include:
1. The long-pending acquisition of military hardware must be expedited through absolutely transparent means in a time-bound manner.
2. Budget allocations for defense forces must be spent without being allowed to lapse. The criminal negligence of the defense forces so far has resulted in nearly Rs. 24,000 crores of budgetary allocations being allowed to lapse over five years. This endangers the lives of our soldiers and also the security of the nation.
3. Our forces are performing a service to the nation and deserve better pay and privileges. This includes:
a] Pending issues of pay and privileges must be revisited and resolved to the satisfaction of the defense forces. The modalities for setting up a separate Pay Commission for the forces must be expedited;
b] All personnel of the Army, Air Force and Navy, as also paramilitary forces, should be exempt from paying income tax on salaries and perquisites;
c] Honorarium for winners of gallantry awards like Pram Vir Chakra, which is abysmally low at Rs 500 to Rs 3,000, may be enhanced to Rs 5,000 to Rs 30,000, and made tax free.
d] The principle of one rank, one pension be implemented;
e] Incentive-based steps be taken to make joining the defence services an exciting proposition for young men and women to overcome shortage of officers; and,
f] Incentives be offered to State Governments for ensuring honourable settlement of retired personnel of the defence services.
4. Present shortage of defence personnel at all levels be met by making the Services an attractive career option through competitive pay and privileges and pension benefits.
5. Enhance capacities of Defence Research and Development Organisation; explore the PPP route for conventional defence production bearing in mind the nation’s needs and make India a competitive player in the global market by 2020.
The above has concentrated on four major issues directly effecting national security:
a] Defence Budget and its correct use;
b] pay and perks for the soldier and the veteran;
c] shortage of officers in the services and
d] independent strategic nuclear programme.
There are basically two burning issues for the forces: Income tax exemption for Armed Forces and PMF personnel, and implementation of ‘One rank One Pension.’ Here a few points stand out and need to be correctly understood.
The point that the armed forces are unique and need to be dealt with on a special footing in matters of pay, perks and privileges is accepted by all. Income tax exemption mooted by a political party has been taken by some as a form of ‘bribe;’ they have opined that it was not really necessary as it could lead to other government and non-government employees demanding the same.
This argument is very unfortunate, as incentives given to the soldier in the form of Gallantry Awards, or to players in the form of awards and monetary benefits, besides a host of other bonuses in the corporate sector, can all be brought under the same argument. Besides, government schemes for relief or upliftment of some sections of society, such as loan waivers to farmers, could come under the same accusation.
Reiterating that armed forces are unique, in that they are asked to sign a blank cheque to the nation with no limits up to and including the supreme sacrifice, why begrudge them a minor concession? More than monetary, it is psychological, to make the armed forces feel they are special.
Regarding the one-rank-one-pension demand, there is misunderstanding regarding its financial burden and a fear that civil servants will demand the same, making it unbearable for the government. First, only a small sum of Rs. 1500 crores annually is likely to go out initially and will taper off; secondly, conditions of service and retirement are quite different between the civil and the military and cannot be equated. A soldier is compulsorily retired after 17 years of service in the age group of 35-38 years, and gets a very meagre pension based on last pay drawn; other Personnel Below Officer Rank (PBOR) are also retired at various stages before they reach the age of 50 years. Similarly, the bulk of officers retire at the age of 54-56, only a miniscule number going to 58 and 60 (a mere 0.02%). In contrast, all civil servants retire at 60 years, having drawn maximum pay of grade and pension at the highest scale of grade.
Then, service conditions often take the soldier away from his family and children; there are problems of education, among other problems.
Another important issue bearing on the OROP principle is that a soldier retiring at the age of 35-38 faces many Pay Commissions in his retired life, but benefits from only the initial one; rest of the time being left out as his pension is kept at the bottom of his grade at the next Pay Commission. The civil servant having retired at 60 faces only one or at best two Pay Commissions before we all succumb to the laws of nature.
To conclude:
“The Armed Forces are not like a limited liability Company to be reconstructed from time to time as the money fluctuates. It is not an inanimate thing like a house to be pulled down or enlarged or structurally altered at the caprice of the tenant or owner. It is a living thing; if it is bullied, it sulks; if it is unhappy, it pines; if it is harried, it gets feverish; if it is sufficiently disturbed, it will wither and dwindle and almost die, and when it comes to this last serious condition, it is only revived through a lot of effort and lots of money” - Winston Churchill
http://www.vijayvaani.com/FrmPublicDisplayArticle.aspx?id=512
"Defending India: No Compromise, No Concession"
N S Malik
“If ever things come to a sordid pass when, on a given day, the Mauryan soldier has to LOOK BACK over his shoulder (simhawalokana) prompted by even a single worry about his and his family's material, physical and social well being, it should cause you and your Council the greatest concern and distress. I beseech you to take instant note and act with uncommon dispatch to address the soldier's anxiety. It is my bounden duty to assure you, My Lord, that the day when the Mauryan soldier has to demand his dues or, worse, plead for them ,will neither have arrived overnight nor in vain. It will also bode ill for Magadha. For then, on that day, you, My Lord, will have lost all moral sanction to be King! It will also be the beginning of the end of the Mauryan Empire!!" - Kautilya to Chandragupta on the Mauryan Soldier
Taking note of the deteriorating security scenario, at least one political party has issued a comprehensive manifesto covering all aspects of national activities for creating a modern, powerful, prosperous, progressive and secure India through the three main instruments of ‘Good Governance, Development & Security.’
National Security covers both areas of external and internal security. Today with state-sponsored terrorism through non-State actors and religious fundamentalists, internal security has assumed menacing shape and cannot be left to police and CPO forces alone. Armed forces and Para Military Forces (PMF) of the nation, therefore, face a much bigger challenge on both fronts simultaneously. Political parties must understand this and devise a Defence Policy based on the above threat perception. In simple words understanding the common citizen’s basic need of security, the mantra is “Fear shall no longer stalk this land.”
Armed Forces are the ultimate weapon with which the state is to fight the external aggressor and the internal insurgent. Thus the need to strengthen the armed forces to be ever ready to crush any attack on the sovereignty and integrity of India. Tragically, the armed forces have been ignored by the government and its failure to address legitimate military concerns has bred undesirable discontent among the serving soldiery and forced the veterans to come out in protest by returning their most precious possession, the war medals, to the President of India.
Thus the promise to ‘address all pending issues immediately’ is welcome, and must include:
1. The long-pending acquisition of military hardware must be expedited through absolutely transparent means in a time-bound manner.
2. Budget allocations for defense forces must be spent without being allowed to lapse. The criminal negligence of the defense forces so far has resulted in nearly Rs. 24,000 crores of budgetary allocations being allowed to lapse over five years. This endangers the lives of our soldiers and also the security of the nation.
3. Our forces are performing a service to the nation and deserve better pay and privileges. This includes:
a] Pending issues of pay and privileges must be revisited and resolved to the satisfaction of the defense forces. The modalities for setting up a separate Pay Commission for the forces must be expedited;
b] All personnel of the Army, Air Force and Navy, as also paramilitary forces, should be exempt from paying income tax on salaries and perquisites;
c] Honorarium for winners of gallantry awards like Pram Vir Chakra, which is abysmally low at Rs 500 to Rs 3,000, may be enhanced to Rs 5,000 to Rs 30,000, and made tax free.
d] The principle of one rank, one pension be implemented;
e] Incentive-based steps be taken to make joining the defence services an exciting proposition for young men and women to overcome shortage of officers; and,
f] Incentives be offered to State Governments for ensuring honourable settlement of retired personnel of the defence services.
4. Present shortage of defence personnel at all levels be met by making the Services an attractive career option through competitive pay and privileges and pension benefits.
5. Enhance capacities of Defence Research and Development Organisation; explore the PPP route for conventional defence production bearing in mind the nation’s needs and make India a competitive player in the global market by 2020.
The above has concentrated on four major issues directly effecting national security:
a] Defence Budget and its correct use;
b] pay and perks for the soldier and the veteran;
c] shortage of officers in the services and
d] independent strategic nuclear programme.
There are basically two burning issues for the forces: Income tax exemption for Armed Forces and PMF personnel, and implementation of ‘One rank One Pension.’ Here a few points stand out and need to be correctly understood.
The point that the armed forces are unique and need to be dealt with on a special footing in matters of pay, perks and privileges is accepted by all. Income tax exemption mooted by a political party has been taken by some as a form of ‘bribe;’ they have opined that it was not really necessary as it could lead to other government and non-government employees demanding the same.
This argument is very unfortunate, as incentives given to the soldier in the form of Gallantry Awards, or to players in the form of awards and monetary benefits, besides a host of other bonuses in the corporate sector, can all be brought under the same argument. Besides, government schemes for relief or upliftment of some sections of society, such as loan waivers to farmers, could come under the same accusation.
Reiterating that armed forces are unique, in that they are asked to sign a blank cheque to the nation with no limits up to and including the supreme sacrifice, why begrudge them a minor concession? More than monetary, it is psychological, to make the armed forces feel they are special.
Regarding the one-rank-one-pension demand, there is misunderstanding regarding its financial burden and a fear that civil servants will demand the same, making it unbearable for the government. First, only a small sum of Rs. 1500 crores annually is likely to go out initially and will taper off; secondly, conditions of service and retirement are quite different between the civil and the military and cannot be equated. A soldier is compulsorily retired after 17 years of service in the age group of 35-38 years, and gets a very meagre pension based on last pay drawn; other Personnel Below Officer Rank (PBOR) are also retired at various stages before they reach the age of 50 years. Similarly, the bulk of officers retire at the age of 54-56, only a miniscule number going to 58 and 60 (a mere 0.02%). In contrast, all civil servants retire at 60 years, having drawn maximum pay of grade and pension at the highest scale of grade.
Then, service conditions often take the soldier away from his family and children; there are problems of education, among other problems.
Another important issue bearing on the OROP principle is that a soldier retiring at the age of 35-38 faces many Pay Commissions in his retired life, but benefits from only the initial one; rest of the time being left out as his pension is kept at the bottom of his grade at the next Pay Commission. The civil servant having retired at 60 faces only one or at best two Pay Commissions before we all succumb to the laws of nature.
To conclude:
“The Armed Forces are not like a limited liability Company to be reconstructed from time to time as the money fluctuates. It is not an inanimate thing like a house to be pulled down or enlarged or structurally altered at the caprice of the tenant or owner. It is a living thing; if it is bullied, it sulks; if it is unhappy, it pines; if it is harried, it gets feverish; if it is sufficiently disturbed, it will wither and dwindle and almost die, and when it comes to this last serious condition, it is only revived through a lot of effort and lots of money” - Winston Churchill
http://www.vijayvaani.com/FrmPublicDisplayArticle.aspx?id=512
Sunday, April 12, 2009
SRI LANKA: Inconvenient questions answered
In the last few weeks I have received a number of questions from readers for which there are no simple answers. I have tried to answer some of these inconvenient questions, although my answers may not satisfy all.
1. You have been writing only about the war situation, in utter disregard to the humanitarian crisis. And your analysis is also based upon Sri Lanka defence sources reports. Don’t you think it would mislead the readers?
There are three issues involved in my writing:
• I am basically a military analyst. I am commenting upon the military performance of the two sides. And war is not a cricket match. It is basically an inhuman exercise. It is a fight by the two sides to eliminate each other and survive. And I have commented upon the inhuman nature of war and its humanitarian implications in many of my articles. But as I am not a human rights analyst – many experts in that field are doing excellent work – my comments on humanitarian issues are included in my analysis as relevant in forecasting the developing military trends. But I also believe war can be still prosecuted more humanely; so I am against small arms proliferation brought about by insurgency and war as well the use of inhumane and dangerous weapons. I had devoted an entire article on the subject of small arms proliferation and insurgency. Similarly I had also condemned the reported use of cluster ammunition.
• Sri Lanka security forces have been providing detailed and regular battlefield reports and most of the analysts have been using them with caution, particularly regarding the number of casualties. On the other hand the LTTE had been giving reports in bits and pieces with no logical coherence – perhaps due to problems of communication after the destruction of its infrastructure including TV broadcasting facility were destroyed during the war. And the LTTE has not regularly reported on the fall of its defences creating doubts about its selective reporting. In war, possession is three fourths of law and the security forces achievements are there for all, including the LTTE, to see. There is no point in not recognizing the reality that the security forces have performed better than LTTE. So the question of misleading the readers does not arise.
• Lastly, as far as possible I am avoiding what other commentators are writing in their own expertise on political, sociological and economic issues related to war. So I have been confining largely to my area of specialisation – intelligence analysis and assessment. So there will be limitations in content on issues not directly related to the overall assessment. As this war is being commented upon with inadequate independent sources of battlefield information, commenting upon every incident is not possible.
2. From your writing you appear to be against a ceasefire that would provide relief to the trapped civilians. Even the UK and Canada have called for it. Please explain.
Ceasefire in war is not a purely military issue. It is a political issue also; in the case of Sri Lanka there is a strong international element also. So, although ceasefire is not wholly in my domain let me attempt to answer the question from the point of view of a military man.
I am not against a ceasefire. But to expect a ceasefire to come into force when one side is routed and the other side is winning in a hot war is not realistic. This applies to any war. I believe in writing on what is possible. And my writing on Sri Lanka is no exception.
Even if theoretically, the Sri Lanka government agrees to a ceasefire it will not be able to survive the political upheaval that is likely to follow. Moreover, if a ceasefire comes into force, the LTTE would be the gainer, not the Sri Lanka government. LTTE would survive to carry on the fight as before another day. So for Sri Lanka to seriously consider ceasefire as an option instead of war, there has to be an incentive - say a LTTE promise to denounce armed conflict to gain Tamil Eelam. (I am not too sure the LTTE would agree to it). Protagonists of ceasefire call should take their own call seriously and work on how to achieve a ceasefire; mere sloganeering would not do. And they should work on both the warring sides to get results and not focus on Sri Lanka government only.
Yes, the well-meaning souls in power in the UK and Canada have called for an immediate ceasefire. Although I don’t doubt their humanitarian intentions, it sounds a little hollow as there is suspicion their eyes might be on the Tamil expatriate votes while making the call. So if they are to be taken seriously they can come with some concrete suggestions on how Sri Lanka can go about doing it without a loss of face. One suggestion is that they can offer a sanctuary to all the LTT militants on their soil to start with.
And for a lasting ceasefire, the question “what after the ceasefire?” also needs to be examined in advance. That was one of the reasons for the failure of the ceasefire of 2002 to hold. Ceasefire has to be linked to a political process. I don’t see any such move in the horizon in Sri Lanka or elsewhere.
3. “Prabhakaran is a clever military strategist. So even if the LTTE is defeated now, he would rise up once again and vanquish the Sinhala Army.” Your comments please.
There is no doubt that Prabhakaran has a natural talent for military strategy. But progressing a war is a dynamic process and one cannot be victorious at all times. In the present Eelam War IV, he has been outwitted, outgunned, and out-strategised. And that has hurt the LTTE grievously. It will take a long time for the LTTE to recoup from the war wounds. That process requires safe havens, funds, arms, and a lot of loyal supporters who would forgive LTTE’s failure and be ready to sacrifice the lives of the next generation of Tamils. So even though he might still be capable, Prabhakaran has to run the gauntlet of issues I have raised to rebuild the LTTE literally from the ashes. At the age of 52 it will be an ordeal of fire for Prabhakaran to do so. But now his immediate priority is to survive the war that has not ended yet.
In this context I am reminded of the life of Mustafa Barzani (1903-1979), the legendary political and military leader of Kurdish revolution. He fought both the Iraqi and Iranian governments to carve out an independent Kurdish nation all his adult life. Although a short-lived Kurdish Republic of Mahabad was created in Iran in 1945, it lasted only a year. He went into exile in Soviet Union after the Iranians overran the Republic. He did not give up; he revived the Kurdish struggle and negotiated peace with Iraq but ultimately all failed because Iran and Iraq bartered away Kurdish autonomy to suit their mutual rapprochement efforts. He died in exile in Washington. And an independent Kurdistan never came into being; it exists as a province in Iraq with a measure of autonomy thanks to the support of the US.
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cnotes6%5Cnote506.html
1. You have been writing only about the war situation, in utter disregard to the humanitarian crisis. And your analysis is also based upon Sri Lanka defence sources reports. Don’t you think it would mislead the readers?
There are three issues involved in my writing:
• I am basically a military analyst. I am commenting upon the military performance of the two sides. And war is not a cricket match. It is basically an inhuman exercise. It is a fight by the two sides to eliminate each other and survive. And I have commented upon the inhuman nature of war and its humanitarian implications in many of my articles. But as I am not a human rights analyst – many experts in that field are doing excellent work – my comments on humanitarian issues are included in my analysis as relevant in forecasting the developing military trends. But I also believe war can be still prosecuted more humanely; so I am against small arms proliferation brought about by insurgency and war as well the use of inhumane and dangerous weapons. I had devoted an entire article on the subject of small arms proliferation and insurgency. Similarly I had also condemned the reported use of cluster ammunition.
• Sri Lanka security forces have been providing detailed and regular battlefield reports and most of the analysts have been using them with caution, particularly regarding the number of casualties. On the other hand the LTTE had been giving reports in bits and pieces with no logical coherence – perhaps due to problems of communication after the destruction of its infrastructure including TV broadcasting facility were destroyed during the war. And the LTTE has not regularly reported on the fall of its defences creating doubts about its selective reporting. In war, possession is three fourths of law and the security forces achievements are there for all, including the LTTE, to see. There is no point in not recognizing the reality that the security forces have performed better than LTTE. So the question of misleading the readers does not arise.
• Lastly, as far as possible I am avoiding what other commentators are writing in their own expertise on political, sociological and economic issues related to war. So I have been confining largely to my area of specialisation – intelligence analysis and assessment. So there will be limitations in content on issues not directly related to the overall assessment. As this war is being commented upon with inadequate independent sources of battlefield information, commenting upon every incident is not possible.
2. From your writing you appear to be against a ceasefire that would provide relief to the trapped civilians. Even the UK and Canada have called for it. Please explain.
Ceasefire in war is not a purely military issue. It is a political issue also; in the case of Sri Lanka there is a strong international element also. So, although ceasefire is not wholly in my domain let me attempt to answer the question from the point of view of a military man.
I am not against a ceasefire. But to expect a ceasefire to come into force when one side is routed and the other side is winning in a hot war is not realistic. This applies to any war. I believe in writing on what is possible. And my writing on Sri Lanka is no exception.
Even if theoretically, the Sri Lanka government agrees to a ceasefire it will not be able to survive the political upheaval that is likely to follow. Moreover, if a ceasefire comes into force, the LTTE would be the gainer, not the Sri Lanka government. LTTE would survive to carry on the fight as before another day. So for Sri Lanka to seriously consider ceasefire as an option instead of war, there has to be an incentive - say a LTTE promise to denounce armed conflict to gain Tamil Eelam. (I am not too sure the LTTE would agree to it). Protagonists of ceasefire call should take their own call seriously and work on how to achieve a ceasefire; mere sloganeering would not do. And they should work on both the warring sides to get results and not focus on Sri Lanka government only.
Yes, the well-meaning souls in power in the UK and Canada have called for an immediate ceasefire. Although I don’t doubt their humanitarian intentions, it sounds a little hollow as there is suspicion their eyes might be on the Tamil expatriate votes while making the call. So if they are to be taken seriously they can come with some concrete suggestions on how Sri Lanka can go about doing it without a loss of face. One suggestion is that they can offer a sanctuary to all the LTT militants on their soil to start with.
And for a lasting ceasefire, the question “what after the ceasefire?” also needs to be examined in advance. That was one of the reasons for the failure of the ceasefire of 2002 to hold. Ceasefire has to be linked to a political process. I don’t see any such move in the horizon in Sri Lanka or elsewhere.
3. “Prabhakaran is a clever military strategist. So even if the LTTE is defeated now, he would rise up once again and vanquish the Sinhala Army.” Your comments please.
There is no doubt that Prabhakaran has a natural talent for military strategy. But progressing a war is a dynamic process and one cannot be victorious at all times. In the present Eelam War IV, he has been outwitted, outgunned, and out-strategised. And that has hurt the LTTE grievously. It will take a long time for the LTTE to recoup from the war wounds. That process requires safe havens, funds, arms, and a lot of loyal supporters who would forgive LTTE’s failure and be ready to sacrifice the lives of the next generation of Tamils. So even though he might still be capable, Prabhakaran has to run the gauntlet of issues I have raised to rebuild the LTTE literally from the ashes. At the age of 52 it will be an ordeal of fire for Prabhakaran to do so. But now his immediate priority is to survive the war that has not ended yet.
In this context I am reminded of the life of Mustafa Barzani (1903-1979), the legendary political and military leader of Kurdish revolution. He fought both the Iraqi and Iranian governments to carve out an independent Kurdish nation all his adult life. Although a short-lived Kurdish Republic of Mahabad was created in Iran in 1945, it lasted only a year. He went into exile in Soviet Union after the Iranians overran the Republic. He did not give up; he revived the Kurdish struggle and negotiated peace with Iraq but ultimately all failed because Iran and Iraq bartered away Kurdish autonomy to suit their mutual rapprochement efforts. He died in exile in Washington. And an independent Kurdistan never came into being; it exists as a province in Iraq with a measure of autonomy thanks to the support of the US.
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cnotes6%5Cnote506.html
Time to Rewrite the Sri Lanka Agenda Part II
Long-term agenda
Sri Lanka’s long-term agenda has seen enough words; it urgently needs action. Last week, the Chief Justice of Sri Lanka Sarath N. Silva speaking at Anuradhapura spelled out the fundamentals of a new long term agenda for Sri Lanka: peace must be maintained in the North by enforcing the rule of law. “We must look into the causes of law breakdowns and the terrorism and find ways and means to rectify the situation,” the Chief Justice said. If justice had been meted out to all in the past, a faction of people would not have become terrorists, he added.
President Rajapaksa promised of equity to the Tamil population after the eliminating the LTTE in the eastern province However the eastern province has not been a real model of democracy in action. Its problems are not merely of devolution of powers but the basic issue of good governance. In playing politics there, a good opportunity to show Tamils everywhere that the government means what it says has been frittered away. Already the remnants of LTTE are showing their hand their hand and they could find increasing relevance if rule of law is not established and basic problems of security is not addressed there.
To make an impact in the long term, the overall aim of all actions relating to north and east should be at reduce the relevance of separatism to the Tamil people.
Promises of action are not enough. Large sections of Tamils had seen such political promises made in the past vanishing into thin air. With such a historical background, there is no doubt that the President has the tough task of disproving their ingrained suspicion of Sinhala politicians by his actions as the country is riding the crest of military victory.
So merely holding local body and provincial elections are not going to resolve the problems of the troubled provinces. Development and devolution are not a zero sum game. They are mutually reinforcing factors to be meaningful they have to be carried on together.
A starting point of the long-term agenda would be to transform the military operational mould of the environment in north and east to a normal civilian one. The government should not allow a military mindset to influence every action it takes in restoring normal life in the areas freed of the LTTE control. The sooner it is done, the better it would be. And militarily this should not be difficult as the security forces have proved their prowess in the battlefield and the population is tired of war. The security forces have grown large and powerful and undoubtedly their concurrence would be an important factor in any action relating to the military.
During the period of war, Jaffna was a town set amidst a military garrison. The military check posts should be progressively reduced and if required, handed over to the police. Of course, there might be a need for continued military patrolling. And at times the army might be required to carry out search operations. However, there is a requirement to reduce the military profile of such operations. Policemen have to be Tamil speaking to reduce the feeling of alienation.
Life in Jaffna peninsula had been severely affected due to the war. There had been shortages of fuel, medicines and food supplies. The A9 road linking Jaffna to the mainland should be opened for free public traffic. The railway has resumed the Yaal devi express which now runs up to only Vavuniya. The President has said the reconstruction of the railway line linking Jaffna destroyed during the insurgency would be rebuilt. This project should be undertaken on a priority basis. Presumably help of India, which has a record of successfully undertaking railway construction projects, could be sought for the expensive endeavour.
It is good to remember that one of the main reasons for the failure of the peace process 2002 was the failure to resolve the vexing issue of High Security Zones in populated areas. A participatory mechanism has to be created to resolve the issue not only in the north and east but elsewhere in Sri Lanka in the long term.
Public utilities and housing have suffered heavy damages in most of the towns and villages in Vanni area in the north. For the people living there life can be meaningful only if they enjoy at least the basic essential facilities. Easy credit to rebuild homes and restore business should be extended to the affected people and international financial resources could be made available if the international community feels confident of the outcome of such schemes.
International community can also help the government agencies in such work and enable rehabilitation of the affected people. However, that would require the easing of current restrictions on the operation of NGOs in northern province. There is no use flaying them at every opportunity.
Tamil agenda
By now it should be clear to Tamils that they also should take a relook at their priorities. Expounding the worn out rhetoric is not the way forward. They should take the leadership once again in order to ensure interests of Tamils are not paid adequate political attention in the aftermath of war. First thing is to restore normal life of the people, battered by three decades of extremism, insurgency, revenge and retribution. The politicians' agenda must focus on progressing both development and devolution in tandem. For this their own petty bickering should be deferred to evolve a common minimum programme of action. Use of collective political power rather than recounting historical blunders is the way to achieve results. That would constructively pressurize the government into action.
The Tamil National Alliance knows that the LTTE failed to deliver the goods for Tamils when it had the political opportunity and they had a role in this failure. However, it should forget about saving its face for its role in the past and get into some positive action. Unfortunately, the LTTE enigma appears to have prevented it from using the opportunity to talk about the gut issues of Tamils when the President offered the opportunity. But perhaps as the enigma is diffusing now TNA leaders should muster their courage and assert their position in their own rights. They owe it to the people in whose name they have been claiming their representation in parliament. Unfortunately, so far the TNA has not shown any unified to resolve to visit new pastures which is disappointing. The members are debating to decide on whether they should talk to the Indian Foreign Secretary! So there appears to be more inaction than positive action. I hope they prove me wrong.
International community
International community, despite its pious criticism of Sri Lanka on human rights and humanitarian issues, has helped Sri Lanka in preventing the LTTE’s global support network from coming into play during the war. Much has been written on their ability to set right the human rights records and sagging economy of Sri Lanka. One can only hope at least some of this turned into action.
However, they have a key role in ensuring that the LTTE is not allowed to use their soil to resurrect its war machine. The LTTE global network, despite some serious setbacks in the last three years, still exists. India, Britain, the US and Canada in particular have a major responsibility in this. The EU should ensure a little more coordination among member countries in curbing LTTE activities either directly or through front organisations.
In the changed environment after war, the LTTE would lose two key elements of international recognition accorded to it in the peace process 2002: status of parity with Sri Lanka and exclusive representation of Tamil interests in any dispensation. This would indicate that the peace process 2002 needs not only a change of name but in form and content. The peace process 2002 will have reincarnate as a peace and reconciliation process between communities rather than a peace process between the government and the LTTE.
Norway despite its good intentions has lost its credibility with the Sri Lanka government and sections of the people. So its usefulness in any future international effort in Sri Lanka is likely to be minimal.
The EU, Japan, and the US, the other three co-chairs of the peace process, should rework their strategies to constructively contribute to the twin processes of devolution and development.
India as a dominant neighbour can make immense contribution to restoration of lasting peace in Sri Lanka. Its role in Sri Lanka is different from other countries in form and content. However, India’s role can be analysed meaningfully only after the general elections set to be completed in May 2009. Even if the same ruling coalition returns to power the Sri Lanka dispensation may be different in form and content.
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cnotes6%5Cnote508.html
Sri Lanka’s long-term agenda has seen enough words; it urgently needs action. Last week, the Chief Justice of Sri Lanka Sarath N. Silva speaking at Anuradhapura spelled out the fundamentals of a new long term agenda for Sri Lanka: peace must be maintained in the North by enforcing the rule of law. “We must look into the causes of law breakdowns and the terrorism and find ways and means to rectify the situation,” the Chief Justice said. If justice had been meted out to all in the past, a faction of people would not have become terrorists, he added.
President Rajapaksa promised of equity to the Tamil population after the eliminating the LTTE in the eastern province However the eastern province has not been a real model of democracy in action. Its problems are not merely of devolution of powers but the basic issue of good governance. In playing politics there, a good opportunity to show Tamils everywhere that the government means what it says has been frittered away. Already the remnants of LTTE are showing their hand their hand and they could find increasing relevance if rule of law is not established and basic problems of security is not addressed there.
To make an impact in the long term, the overall aim of all actions relating to north and east should be at reduce the relevance of separatism to the Tamil people.
Promises of action are not enough. Large sections of Tamils had seen such political promises made in the past vanishing into thin air. With such a historical background, there is no doubt that the President has the tough task of disproving their ingrained suspicion of Sinhala politicians by his actions as the country is riding the crest of military victory.
So merely holding local body and provincial elections are not going to resolve the problems of the troubled provinces. Development and devolution are not a zero sum game. They are mutually reinforcing factors to be meaningful they have to be carried on together.
A starting point of the long-term agenda would be to transform the military operational mould of the environment in north and east to a normal civilian one. The government should not allow a military mindset to influence every action it takes in restoring normal life in the areas freed of the LTTE control. The sooner it is done, the better it would be. And militarily this should not be difficult as the security forces have proved their prowess in the battlefield and the population is tired of war. The security forces have grown large and powerful and undoubtedly their concurrence would be an important factor in any action relating to the military.
During the period of war, Jaffna was a town set amidst a military garrison. The military check posts should be progressively reduced and if required, handed over to the police. Of course, there might be a need for continued military patrolling. And at times the army might be required to carry out search operations. However, there is a requirement to reduce the military profile of such operations. Policemen have to be Tamil speaking to reduce the feeling of alienation.
Life in Jaffna peninsula had been severely affected due to the war. There had been shortages of fuel, medicines and food supplies. The A9 road linking Jaffna to the mainland should be opened for free public traffic. The railway has resumed the Yaal devi express which now runs up to only Vavuniya. The President has said the reconstruction of the railway line linking Jaffna destroyed during the insurgency would be rebuilt. This project should be undertaken on a priority basis. Presumably help of India, which has a record of successfully undertaking railway construction projects, could be sought for the expensive endeavour.
It is good to remember that one of the main reasons for the failure of the peace process 2002 was the failure to resolve the vexing issue of High Security Zones in populated areas. A participatory mechanism has to be created to resolve the issue not only in the north and east but elsewhere in Sri Lanka in the long term.
Public utilities and housing have suffered heavy damages in most of the towns and villages in Vanni area in the north. For the people living there life can be meaningful only if they enjoy at least the basic essential facilities. Easy credit to rebuild homes and restore business should be extended to the affected people and international financial resources could be made available if the international community feels confident of the outcome of such schemes.
International community can also help the government agencies in such work and enable rehabilitation of the affected people. However, that would require the easing of current restrictions on the operation of NGOs in northern province. There is no use flaying them at every opportunity.
Tamil agenda
By now it should be clear to Tamils that they also should take a relook at their priorities. Expounding the worn out rhetoric is not the way forward. They should take the leadership once again in order to ensure interests of Tamils are not paid adequate political attention in the aftermath of war. First thing is to restore normal life of the people, battered by three decades of extremism, insurgency, revenge and retribution. The politicians' agenda must focus on progressing both development and devolution in tandem. For this their own petty bickering should be deferred to evolve a common minimum programme of action. Use of collective political power rather than recounting historical blunders is the way to achieve results. That would constructively pressurize the government into action.
The Tamil National Alliance knows that the LTTE failed to deliver the goods for Tamils when it had the political opportunity and they had a role in this failure. However, it should forget about saving its face for its role in the past and get into some positive action. Unfortunately, the LTTE enigma appears to have prevented it from using the opportunity to talk about the gut issues of Tamils when the President offered the opportunity. But perhaps as the enigma is diffusing now TNA leaders should muster their courage and assert their position in their own rights. They owe it to the people in whose name they have been claiming their representation in parliament. Unfortunately, so far the TNA has not shown any unified to resolve to visit new pastures which is disappointing. The members are debating to decide on whether they should talk to the Indian Foreign Secretary! So there appears to be more inaction than positive action. I hope they prove me wrong.
International community
International community, despite its pious criticism of Sri Lanka on human rights and humanitarian issues, has helped Sri Lanka in preventing the LTTE’s global support network from coming into play during the war. Much has been written on their ability to set right the human rights records and sagging economy of Sri Lanka. One can only hope at least some of this turned into action.
However, they have a key role in ensuring that the LTTE is not allowed to use their soil to resurrect its war machine. The LTTE global network, despite some serious setbacks in the last three years, still exists. India, Britain, the US and Canada in particular have a major responsibility in this. The EU should ensure a little more coordination among member countries in curbing LTTE activities either directly or through front organisations.
In the changed environment after war, the LTTE would lose two key elements of international recognition accorded to it in the peace process 2002: status of parity with Sri Lanka and exclusive representation of Tamil interests in any dispensation. This would indicate that the peace process 2002 needs not only a change of name but in form and content. The peace process 2002 will have reincarnate as a peace and reconciliation process between communities rather than a peace process between the government and the LTTE.
Norway despite its good intentions has lost its credibility with the Sri Lanka government and sections of the people. So its usefulness in any future international effort in Sri Lanka is likely to be minimal.
The EU, Japan, and the US, the other three co-chairs of the peace process, should rework their strategies to constructively contribute to the twin processes of devolution and development.
India as a dominant neighbour can make immense contribution to restoration of lasting peace in Sri Lanka. Its role in Sri Lanka is different from other countries in form and content. However, India’s role can be analysed meaningfully only after the general elections set to be completed in May 2009. Even if the same ruling coalition returns to power the Sri Lanka dispensation may be different in form and content.
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cnotes6%5Cnote508.html
Time to Rewrite the Sri Lanka Agenda Part I
The Sri Lanka security forces appear to be completing out what they set out to do in early 2006 – militarily defeat the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). After three days of fierce battle they captured of the last of the LTTE stronghold in Anandaapuram in Puthukkudiyiruppu area on April 5 the LTTE are left with only the 20 sq km “No fire zone.” Ideally, they would like to get out of the area by both land and sea to safer pastures.
The last major operation was a bloody one where the body counts had been high. The LTTE is have suffered over 500 dead including almost the cream of senior commanders. Confirmed figures of the security forces’ casualty are not known, but likely to be high. Militarily they also appear to have lost their major artillery weapons including 130mm guns and anti aircraft weapons. Thus the security forces have overwhelmed the LTTE not only physically, but also psychologically, as it would take a long time to recover its strength again.
Some pointers
However, it would be useful for Sri Lanka to look beyond the final military victory and draw some pointers for its future course of action.
• The immediate issue is saving over 100,000 of Sri Lankan non combatant people, regardless of their language and beliefs, trapped in the “safe zone” that had not ensured their safety. Over 2500 of them appear to have perished in the area as the two warring sides do not appear to have shown adequate sensitivity to their safety in pursuing their own military goals. Even if Sri Lanka disputes the numbers involved it has the responsibility as an elected government to get them out safely.
• There had been massive demonstration of Tamils all over the world – in almost all metros of the world – for a ceasefire to save the civilians in the safe zone. And the issue has almost found unanimous political support in Tamil Nadu, the home of sixty million Tamils of India. Just because some LTTE acolytes displayed carefully modified LTTE’s red flags at these rallies and raised some slogans in support of Tamil Eelam the sentiment behind the rallies should not be ignored or denounced as LTTE propaganda ploy. There is genuine concern among Tamils all over the world, including this author, regarding their safety. This includes even those who do not subscribe to the LTTE goals or methods. It would be a folly for Sri Lanka to ignore their sentiment.
• The battle at Aanandapuram has shown the strong motivation of the LTTE cadres to carry on the fight even in the face of sure death. That shows that mere territorial victory or high body count or capture of heavy military hardware is unlikely to prevent regeneration of the LTTE particularly as both the LTTE chief V Prabhkaran and his second in command Pottu Amman appear to be still at large. The Sri Lanka government needs the support of the Tamil expatriates the world over to prevent the rise of the LTTE or its clone in some other name. That could happen sooner than later as Prabhakaran is sure to cash in on the wave of public sympathy among Tamils for their kin in trouble.
• Almost all nations, who had supported Sri Lanka’s war either overtly or covertly because they were averse to the LTTE’s goals and methods, have highlighted the need for Sri Lanka to take adequate steps to ensure safety of trapped civilians. And UN agencies and interlocutors have also expressed the same opinion. There is no point in finding fault with their views. It is for Sri Lanka to disprove their opinion is incorrect by taking adequate visible action. It will be good to remember that all of them including the much maligned Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have denounced the LTTE vehemently for its attitude and actions in this regard. And Sri Lanka needs all their support, particularly its friends – India, the EU, UK, USA and Canada – if it has to prevent the resurrection of the LTTE once and for all. This overall goal should not be confused while members of the government make statements at will denouncing them.
Immediate agenda
Sri Lanka President Mahinda Rajapaksa has proved that he could militarily do what he promised. But it is time he revisited his agenda to deliver on the “freedom” he promised the Tamil people while reneging the peace process 2002.
To quote a well-worn statement once again, military victory is not the final act in counter insurgency warfare. The victory comes fully when the government is able to win over the people who had supported the insurgents. This time-consuming battle to win over the minds that have indelible memories of grievous personal losses is yet to start. Shorn of all political and military rhetoric that should be President Rajapaksa’s purpose of the new agenda. It has two parts – immediate and long term.
The immediate agenda should be to extricate the civilians trapped in the “No Fire zone.” With the LTTE in the midst of civilians it is going to be a messy affair when the security forces close in. The aim should be to minimize the civilian casualties with the selective use of heavy firepower and avoid air strikes. No one outside the government is confident that the security forces are addressing this requirement. So it would be useful if greater access were provided to representatives of media and selected NGOs. This is unlikely to compromise the ongoing operations when the LTTE has reeled under grievous losses. At worst, it might prolong the operation but it would help Sri Lanka improve its credibility. And militarily the final results are not going to be affected if Sri Lanka agrees to give a sufficiently long pause of its operations. That would compel the LTTE to come to terms with the reality and send a strong message to the international community.
The trapped civilians are scared of their treatment at the hands of the security forces manned mostly by Sinhalas. More of them would walk out of the area if they are confident of fair treatment. Over 60,000 people, who had fled from the LTTE areas, are now housed in camps run by the army. The army is involved in the time consuming process of screening them to weed out LTTE cadres and active supporters among them. This has given rise to a lot of suspicion among some of the NGOs and sections of public about the purpose of these camps.
To create a climate of confidence, Sri Lanka government should implement the suggestions of the UNHCR regarding these persons. The key elements of the suggestion are: handing over control of these camps to a civilian agency even as the army continues its screening process, providing external access a little more liberally to the inmates, house the 3000 LTTE cadres in their midst separately, and a more humane approach to resolve problems of split families, the sick, infirm and the wounded.
Speedy completion of the screening process should not be too difficult for the military intelligence now that the war is on its last legs. The early return of these people to their villages to resume normal life would be biggest public expression of fair treatment extended to Tamils not only among the Tamil population everywhere but also in the international community.
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cnotes6%5Cnote507.html
The last major operation was a bloody one where the body counts had been high. The LTTE is have suffered over 500 dead including almost the cream of senior commanders. Confirmed figures of the security forces’ casualty are not known, but likely to be high. Militarily they also appear to have lost their major artillery weapons including 130mm guns and anti aircraft weapons. Thus the security forces have overwhelmed the LTTE not only physically, but also psychologically, as it would take a long time to recover its strength again.
Some pointers
However, it would be useful for Sri Lanka to look beyond the final military victory and draw some pointers for its future course of action.
• The immediate issue is saving over 100,000 of Sri Lankan non combatant people, regardless of their language and beliefs, trapped in the “safe zone” that had not ensured their safety. Over 2500 of them appear to have perished in the area as the two warring sides do not appear to have shown adequate sensitivity to their safety in pursuing their own military goals. Even if Sri Lanka disputes the numbers involved it has the responsibility as an elected government to get them out safely.
• There had been massive demonstration of Tamils all over the world – in almost all metros of the world – for a ceasefire to save the civilians in the safe zone. And the issue has almost found unanimous political support in Tamil Nadu, the home of sixty million Tamils of India. Just because some LTTE acolytes displayed carefully modified LTTE’s red flags at these rallies and raised some slogans in support of Tamil Eelam the sentiment behind the rallies should not be ignored or denounced as LTTE propaganda ploy. There is genuine concern among Tamils all over the world, including this author, regarding their safety. This includes even those who do not subscribe to the LTTE goals or methods. It would be a folly for Sri Lanka to ignore their sentiment.
• The battle at Aanandapuram has shown the strong motivation of the LTTE cadres to carry on the fight even in the face of sure death. That shows that mere territorial victory or high body count or capture of heavy military hardware is unlikely to prevent regeneration of the LTTE particularly as both the LTTE chief V Prabhkaran and his second in command Pottu Amman appear to be still at large. The Sri Lanka government needs the support of the Tamil expatriates the world over to prevent the rise of the LTTE or its clone in some other name. That could happen sooner than later as Prabhakaran is sure to cash in on the wave of public sympathy among Tamils for their kin in trouble.
• Almost all nations, who had supported Sri Lanka’s war either overtly or covertly because they were averse to the LTTE’s goals and methods, have highlighted the need for Sri Lanka to take adequate steps to ensure safety of trapped civilians. And UN agencies and interlocutors have also expressed the same opinion. There is no point in finding fault with their views. It is for Sri Lanka to disprove their opinion is incorrect by taking adequate visible action. It will be good to remember that all of them including the much maligned Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have denounced the LTTE vehemently for its attitude and actions in this regard. And Sri Lanka needs all their support, particularly its friends – India, the EU, UK, USA and Canada – if it has to prevent the resurrection of the LTTE once and for all. This overall goal should not be confused while members of the government make statements at will denouncing them.
Immediate agenda
Sri Lanka President Mahinda Rajapaksa has proved that he could militarily do what he promised. But it is time he revisited his agenda to deliver on the “freedom” he promised the Tamil people while reneging the peace process 2002.
To quote a well-worn statement once again, military victory is not the final act in counter insurgency warfare. The victory comes fully when the government is able to win over the people who had supported the insurgents. This time-consuming battle to win over the minds that have indelible memories of grievous personal losses is yet to start. Shorn of all political and military rhetoric that should be President Rajapaksa’s purpose of the new agenda. It has two parts – immediate and long term.
The immediate agenda should be to extricate the civilians trapped in the “No Fire zone.” With the LTTE in the midst of civilians it is going to be a messy affair when the security forces close in. The aim should be to minimize the civilian casualties with the selective use of heavy firepower and avoid air strikes. No one outside the government is confident that the security forces are addressing this requirement. So it would be useful if greater access were provided to representatives of media and selected NGOs. This is unlikely to compromise the ongoing operations when the LTTE has reeled under grievous losses. At worst, it might prolong the operation but it would help Sri Lanka improve its credibility. And militarily the final results are not going to be affected if Sri Lanka agrees to give a sufficiently long pause of its operations. That would compel the LTTE to come to terms with the reality and send a strong message to the international community.
The trapped civilians are scared of their treatment at the hands of the security forces manned mostly by Sinhalas. More of them would walk out of the area if they are confident of fair treatment. Over 60,000 people, who had fled from the LTTE areas, are now housed in camps run by the army. The army is involved in the time consuming process of screening them to weed out LTTE cadres and active supporters among them. This has given rise to a lot of suspicion among some of the NGOs and sections of public about the purpose of these camps.
To create a climate of confidence, Sri Lanka government should implement the suggestions of the UNHCR regarding these persons. The key elements of the suggestion are: handing over control of these camps to a civilian agency even as the army continues its screening process, providing external access a little more liberally to the inmates, house the 3000 LTTE cadres in their midst separately, and a more humane approach to resolve problems of split families, the sick, infirm and the wounded.
Speedy completion of the screening process should not be too difficult for the military intelligence now that the war is on its last legs. The early return of these people to their villages to resume normal life would be biggest public expression of fair treatment extended to Tamils not only among the Tamil population everywhere but also in the international community.
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cnotes6%5Cnote507.html
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