The night raid by two light aircraft of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) air wing on the Trincomalee naval base on August 26, 2008 may be termed as moderately successful. The two aircraft were similar to the ZLIN piston-engined ones that had raided Katunayake air base on March 27, 2007 and in the subsequent attacks on Palali air base on April 24, 2007 and the Anuradhapura air field on October 22, 2007. As in all the four air raids earlier they evaded both the ground fire and the chase by Sri Lanka air force fighters to return safely to their home base.
There had been discrepancies in the reports on the raid both in the number of casualties and on how the LTTE raid was conducted out. Broadly the raid went somewhat like this. Around 9 PM the LTTE aircraft flew in undetected and managed to sneak into the air space of the high security zone of the naval complex housing the Eastern Naval Headquarters and the Trincomalee dockyard. After dodging the anti aircraft gunfire when they were detected, one aircraft managed to drop two improvised bombs. Though the Eastern Naval Headquarters was not struck, at least four sailors were killed when one of the bombs struck a sailors’ billet. Ten to 20 persons (depending upon the source of the report) were reported injured.
It seems the intruding aircraft were detected a little late to engage them by fighters. Evading the anti aircraft fire the LTTE aircraft flew off after the strike on the sailors’ barracks. As in the earlier cases, one bomb did not explode. In retaliation the air force fighters took off to hunt the raiders but could not succeed in doing so. After that the air force bombed Iranamadu air strip and its assets.
Though the defence spokesman called it an abortive raid, it was not wholly so. The LTTE raiders succeeded at least partially in fulfilling their mission. And they managed to inflict casualty on the security forces while escaping unscathed. Two inquiries are being held apparently to find out how the LTTE planes managed to infiltrate through the air defence network without detection and carried out the raid.
Though the raid did not create the panic reaction among the public seen last year after the Katunayake raid, it will surely give a psychological lift up to the sagging morale of the LTTE’s support network both at home and abroad. So far they had to console themselves only with the rhetoric of the political commissar Nadesan on the impending LTTE response to the successful Sri Lankan offensive going on now for two years. The raid will also come as a shot in the arm for LTTE’s defenders in frontlines who had been having a tough time for the last few months as the offensive gathered momentum. A far as the Sri Lanka public is concerned they appear to be taking it in the stride as one of the necessary evils of pursuing the military option. Thus the LTTE air raids appear to have lost their public threat potential enhanced by the very audacity of their ability to carry out such a raid well away from the LTTE home grounds in Wanni.
Otherwise, the air raid would be classified as a small scale raid daringly carried out. But in comparison with the scale of the happenings in the battlefronts of the north, the air raid does not have the potential to cause significant impact on the ongoing operations. Except for tasking a special commando force to seek and destroy the LTTE’s secret hangars in Wanni as the operation progresses, no other special action would probably be taken at the battlefront. The LTTE operational planners probably know this limitation. The pressure on them must be mounting as the security forces advance had been causing exodus of civilians in thousands from battle zones. So they probably carried out the air raid for want of any other manageable operational task that could create some impact immediately.
At the same time, operationally the raid gives some interesting insights –
• The ability of the LTTE air wing to penetrate the airspace in high security zones remains undiminished, despite the counter measures taken so far. As discussed in my earlier articles on the subject, light aircraft with small radar signatures, flying below the horizon can escape early radar detection. This is more so if they follow a flight path hugging the coastline contours to escape early detection.
• To overcome this weakness the anti aircraft defence network should include integrated ground observer posts along likely air ingress routes. This is a very time tested civil defence method against air raids in vogue for over seventy years! However, to be successful it needs committed people with well rehearsed procedure for identification and reporting.
• On detection, the anti aircraft guns need to put maximum number of shots in the air in the fastest time to get a hit. In a night raid visual firing is fraught with serious limitations as the city lights in the horizon confuse the vision. This will again require a lot of practice firing.
• In the past also the fighters had never been able to chase and kill the raiding aircraft. This is not surprising. Rarely will the fighters be able to respond in time unless they are positioned in operational readiness platforms (ORP) on the runway at the airfield. The mute point is, do such occasional raids by light aircraft merit tedious ORP status involving expensive hi-tech fighters designed for not only air combat but also ground support operations in counter insurgency? Only the security chiefs can answer this question.
• It is surprising that despite the large number of modern surveillance and early warning devices available to monitor the intruding aircraft from take off to reaching target area, the LTTE pilots had always managed to prevent detection till the last moment when they gain height. Perhaps the security forces would do well to study the successful tactics of these “amateur fighter pilots” a little more seriously to eliminate the air threat.
• There has been high rate of failure of the improvised bombs of the LTTE. This would show the LTTE has not been able to refine both the aerodynamics of the bomb design and the use of appropriate fuses to reduce the strike failure rate.
I would only reiterate that such air raids of limited fire power are more effective only when carried out in tandem with ground operation. This was proved in Anuradhapura air base raid last year. The chances of the LTTE carrying out such a coordinated ground-air raid is more likely now than ever before, given the growing tail of administrative echelons of the advancing forces on long lines of communication from Kandy upwards. Looking at the well planned operations so far, the security forces would have already catered for such a possibility in their contingency plans.
Friday, August 29, 2008
Thursday, August 28, 2008
The Issue in Kahmir is More Than Communalism
The statistics on militancy and terrorism in Kashmir is grim and alarming. I wonder how many Indians, who follow the peccadilloes of Bollywood stars avidly, read it. Here it is for those who want to know;
"A total of 42,147 people, including 20,647 militants and 5,024 security personnel were killed in the State between January 1990 and the middle of February 2007... Violence left 33,885 people, including 12,124 security personnel and 21,659 civilians injured during the same period in the State... 11,221 civilians were killed by militants and another 1,678 lost their lives in grenade and Improvised Explosive Device explosions, while 173 civilians were killed when they were caught in clashes between militants. A total of 3,404 civilians were killed in cross-firing incidents between security forces and militants... The highest number of 1,438 civilians were killed in 1996, the year elections were held after a gap of seven year, while the highest number of 3,602 Army and other paramilitary personnel lost their lives fighting militants in the same year. Jammu and Kashmir Police lost 537 personnel since January 1990.
As many as 438 Special Police Officers engaged by the police in counter-insurgency operations were killed. 127 Village Defence Committee members were killed fighting militants in the State. 613 security personnel were killed in a single year in 2001, which was again the highest."
These are the figures only up to 2007. Already eight months more in 2008 are gone and the statistics can only grow more.
Now mainstream political parties of the valley would rather seek to open the road to Muzaffarabad in Pakistan for trade, rather than open the road to their own country blocked in Jammu. Some of them want Pakistan currency to become legal tender there. Few others are proudly flying Pak flags.
And our TV channels are having whale of a time, showing images of houses burning and police firing teargas shells on mobs, while politicians who were in power and did nothing talk of solutions to problems by people to people contact. And endless committee meetings of groups of ministers, secretaries, and polticians will follow in Delhi or Jammu. And more people are dying.
Are the politicians and bureaucrats being humorous? Far from it. Civil unrest has become big business in politics. And they thrive in it. That is why so many with criminal record want to enter the parliament. Some become ministers too.
Is the Kashmir issue a communal one? Is it due to a few hectares of forest land being leased to a Hindu shrine? Is it due to hundreds of Jihadi terrorists armed and trained in Pakistan infiltrating into Kashmir? Is it due to lack of development opportunities for Kashmiris? Is it due to human rights violations by police and security forces? Is it the activity of VHP and Hindu fundamentalists increasing the communal divide? Is it due to a few hundred thousand Kashmiri Pandits fleeing their homes in the Valley to escape Muslim wrath? Is it due to the failure of the security forces to effectively put down extremism?
These are the causes politicians and apologists for those in power repeatedly give in talk shows on the current situation in Kashmir. One can see a conspicuous omission in the whole list: the failure of the State to assert its right to govern fairly and firmly.
Well, the problem in Kashmir is beyond all these. It is the failure of successive governments in Delhi to assert their right rule over a state though they repeatedly remind the world is a part of India. It is as simple as that. It represents the monumental failure of Indian polity to deliver the goods they promised when they take oath as members of legislatures. They don't want to call a spade a spade and hide behind a play of words for their inaction.
And it is time, they paused for a moment and honestly searched their hearts, corroded by lust for power and corrupted by wealth. Who will do that? To be honest, I have no hopes, for all of us and the poor Kashmiris. It's Kashmir today when will it be our turn?
"A total of 42,147 people, including 20,647 militants and 5,024 security personnel were killed in the State between January 1990 and the middle of February 2007... Violence left 33,885 people, including 12,124 security personnel and 21,659 civilians injured during the same period in the State... 11,221 civilians were killed by militants and another 1,678 lost their lives in grenade and Improvised Explosive Device explosions, while 173 civilians were killed when they were caught in clashes between militants. A total of 3,404 civilians were killed in cross-firing incidents between security forces and militants... The highest number of 1,438 civilians were killed in 1996, the year elections were held after a gap of seven year, while the highest number of 3,602 Army and other paramilitary personnel lost their lives fighting militants in the same year. Jammu and Kashmir Police lost 537 personnel since January 1990.
As many as 438 Special Police Officers engaged by the police in counter-insurgency operations were killed. 127 Village Defence Committee members were killed fighting militants in the State. 613 security personnel were killed in a single year in 2001, which was again the highest."
These are the figures only up to 2007. Already eight months more in 2008 are gone and the statistics can only grow more.
Now mainstream political parties of the valley would rather seek to open the road to Muzaffarabad in Pakistan for trade, rather than open the road to their own country blocked in Jammu. Some of them want Pakistan currency to become legal tender there. Few others are proudly flying Pak flags.
And our TV channels are having whale of a time, showing images of houses burning and police firing teargas shells on mobs, while politicians who were in power and did nothing talk of solutions to problems by people to people contact. And endless committee meetings of groups of ministers, secretaries, and polticians will follow in Delhi or Jammu. And more people are dying.
Are the politicians and bureaucrats being humorous? Far from it. Civil unrest has become big business in politics. And they thrive in it. That is why so many with criminal record want to enter the parliament. Some become ministers too.
Is the Kashmir issue a communal one? Is it due to a few hectares of forest land being leased to a Hindu shrine? Is it due to hundreds of Jihadi terrorists armed and trained in Pakistan infiltrating into Kashmir? Is it due to lack of development opportunities for Kashmiris? Is it due to human rights violations by police and security forces? Is it the activity of VHP and Hindu fundamentalists increasing the communal divide? Is it due to a few hundred thousand Kashmiri Pandits fleeing their homes in the Valley to escape Muslim wrath? Is it due to the failure of the security forces to effectively put down extremism?
These are the causes politicians and apologists for those in power repeatedly give in talk shows on the current situation in Kashmir. One can see a conspicuous omission in the whole list: the failure of the State to assert its right to govern fairly and firmly.
Well, the problem in Kashmir is beyond all these. It is the failure of successive governments in Delhi to assert their right rule over a state though they repeatedly remind the world is a part of India. It is as simple as that. It represents the monumental failure of Indian polity to deliver the goods they promised when they take oath as members of legislatures. They don't want to call a spade a spade and hide behind a play of words for their inaction.
And it is time, they paused for a moment and honestly searched their hearts, corroded by lust for power and corrupted by wealth. Who will do that? To be honest, I have no hopes, for all of us and the poor Kashmiris. It's Kashmir today when will it be our turn?
Wednesday, August 27, 2008
Sri Lanka: Victory in PC Elections, a Vote for War or Yearning for Peace?
As the results of the North Central and Sabaragamuwa Provincial Council elections streamed in, it was clear that Sri Lanka President Mahinda Rajapaksa has turned his continued success in war to pay political dividends. The ruling United Peoples Freedom Alliance (UPFA) scored resounding success capturing 20 of the 33 seats (securing 56.37% of votes) in Sabaragamuwa Province, and 25 of the 44 seats (securing 65.53% votes) in North Central Province.
The immediate reaction to the results would be to call it a vote for war, as Western Province Governor Alavi Mowlana had done. He said the people of the two provinces gave their verdict “for the Government and the Security Forces to continue military operations against the LTTE to liberate the people living in the grip of LTTE tyranny and to usher peace.” Probably this statement marked only his exultation at his party’s victory rather than on its implications. Because it would also imply that over 40% of the people who voted against the UPFA were against the war and for peace. Both the conclusions would be narrow, because contrary to what some leaders of UPFA declared before the election this was no referendum for war.
The voting was not solely based on war and peace issues but also on many other grievances of the common man particularly the shooting cost of fuel, and other essential day to day needs.
President Rajapaksa saw the election victory in a broader perspective as “the new people’s mandate given to the Mahinda Chinthana.” Undoubtedly, the election victory though flawed by violence during the campaign period, was a clear signal of majority support for the President’s way of doing things despite its weaknesses and shortcomings. It equally reflected the inability of the opposition to throw up a leader who could rally the masses to challenge President Rajapaksa.
The Morning Leader, Colombo had some interesting poll analysis. It pointed out that despite its apparently unimpressive performance the opposition United National Party (UNP) has not done badly in comparison with the 2004 PC elections. The comparative performance of the UPFA and the UNP in both the 2004 and current elections were as under:
1. Sabaragamuwa Province. UPFA UNP
Votes gained in 2008 elections: 74000 111000
Seats gained in 2008 elections: (-) 3 (+) 2
2. North Central Province. UPFA UNP
Votes gained in 2008 elections: 22000 62000
Seats gained in 2008 elections: (-) 2 (+) 2
This would indicate that the UNP’s voters are in tact despite its inability to make dramatic improvement in its political performance. At the same time the voters have indicated their wish to continue with the UPFA agenda.
Some of the other useful pointers of the election results are -
• This is a green signal for the President to carry forward the military operations in the present fashion, as the peace constituency is yet to stage a 2002-style comeback.
• Though the election victories indicate a favourable environment for the UPFA to call for a general election, they also indicate there is no urgency for the President to do so. He can do this at a time of his choosing perhaps when he reduces the LTTE strength to make it a marginal player sometime next year.
• The rallying of Sinhala voters behind the President at the cost of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) represents the cutting down to size of the JVP. It had been eating into the traditional Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) pastures during the last few years. The election results also reduce the JVP’s ability to pressurize the ruling coalition to toe its line. (This is remarkably similar to the sidelining of the Indian Leftists’ influence in the Centre ever since they lost their showdown with Manmohan Singh government in the Indian parliament over the India-US nuclear deal).
• Similarly the election results show the declining fortunes of the Ceylon Workers Congress (CWC), and the Upcountry Peoples Front (UPF) among the Plantation Tamils, who have a strong presence in two constituencies of Sabaragamuwa Province. The success of the Western Peoples Front (WPF) contesting in alliance with the UNP could result in further erosion of influence of CWC within the ruling coalition.
Peace rather than war beckons
With a clear mandate in his favour, and freed of the shackles of JVP conditional support, the President has a unique opportunity to not only progress the war to its natural conclusion but also to bring lasting peace. This involves speeding up the process of the devolution of powers to the provincial councils as prescribed in the 13th amendment as a part of larger vision for ushering in peace that has to be beyond capturing Kilinochchi.
The development of the Eastern Province stands as a mute testimony to averments of the President’s in the Mahinda Chintana not yet translated into action. Its promise of equitable treatment of all people regardless of their class, creed or language is still tangled in loops of politicking, vote bank politics and negative influences. The chief minister in the east is yet to gain many of the powers promised in the 13th amendment.
The huge number of civilians fleeing the northern battlefields is now estimated at 175,000. And they are converging on Kilinochchi. They are the visible indicator of the unmapped agenda that is building up for an action plan after the guns go silent. For lasting peace, it has to go well beyond short term measures that would provide only a face lift for the government and not the affected people. Is the government ready with such a plan? Only time will tell.
Already, there are indications that the LTTE is slowly but surely staging a comeback in the east. The ruling Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP) has spoken about increasing LTTE intelligence operations in the Kanjikudichcharu area. Other sources have also confirmed the growing presence of LTTE elements there. It would be no different in the north after the LTTE is driven out from Kilinochchi to the bush at great human cost.
This only underlines that winning the war against the insurgents is well beyond battle field victories and capture of territories. Though these are essential for defeating the LTTE, unless its ability to capture the minds of the population is rooted out, the victories would not be lasting. That could come only through a peace architecture that would make the LTTE’s armed conflict irrelevant. The Army Commander, a veteran of the conflict, knows this home truth as much as the President, the master strategist, does.
Overall, the electoral mandate given to the President is as much to usher in permanent peace as pursue the war. We can only hope they build a peace agenda with the same vigour they did for the war.
The immediate reaction to the results would be to call it a vote for war, as Western Province Governor Alavi Mowlana had done. He said the people of the two provinces gave their verdict “for the Government and the Security Forces to continue military operations against the LTTE to liberate the people living in the grip of LTTE tyranny and to usher peace.” Probably this statement marked only his exultation at his party’s victory rather than on its implications. Because it would also imply that over 40% of the people who voted against the UPFA were against the war and for peace. Both the conclusions would be narrow, because contrary to what some leaders of UPFA declared before the election this was no referendum for war.
The voting was not solely based on war and peace issues but also on many other grievances of the common man particularly the shooting cost of fuel, and other essential day to day needs.
President Rajapaksa saw the election victory in a broader perspective as “the new people’s mandate given to the Mahinda Chinthana.” Undoubtedly, the election victory though flawed by violence during the campaign period, was a clear signal of majority support for the President’s way of doing things despite its weaknesses and shortcomings. It equally reflected the inability of the opposition to throw up a leader who could rally the masses to challenge President Rajapaksa.
The Morning Leader, Colombo had some interesting poll analysis. It pointed out that despite its apparently unimpressive performance the opposition United National Party (UNP) has not done badly in comparison with the 2004 PC elections. The comparative performance of the UPFA and the UNP in both the 2004 and current elections were as under:
1. Sabaragamuwa Province. UPFA UNP
Votes gained in 2008 elections: 74000 111000
Seats gained in 2008 elections: (-) 3 (+) 2
2. North Central Province. UPFA UNP
Votes gained in 2008 elections: 22000 62000
Seats gained in 2008 elections: (-) 2 (+) 2
This would indicate that the UNP’s voters are in tact despite its inability to make dramatic improvement in its political performance. At the same time the voters have indicated their wish to continue with the UPFA agenda.
Some of the other useful pointers of the election results are -
• This is a green signal for the President to carry forward the military operations in the present fashion, as the peace constituency is yet to stage a 2002-style comeback.
• Though the election victories indicate a favourable environment for the UPFA to call for a general election, they also indicate there is no urgency for the President to do so. He can do this at a time of his choosing perhaps when he reduces the LTTE strength to make it a marginal player sometime next year.
• The rallying of Sinhala voters behind the President at the cost of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) represents the cutting down to size of the JVP. It had been eating into the traditional Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) pastures during the last few years. The election results also reduce the JVP’s ability to pressurize the ruling coalition to toe its line. (This is remarkably similar to the sidelining of the Indian Leftists’ influence in the Centre ever since they lost their showdown with Manmohan Singh government in the Indian parliament over the India-US nuclear deal).
• Similarly the election results show the declining fortunes of the Ceylon Workers Congress (CWC), and the Upcountry Peoples Front (UPF) among the Plantation Tamils, who have a strong presence in two constituencies of Sabaragamuwa Province. The success of the Western Peoples Front (WPF) contesting in alliance with the UNP could result in further erosion of influence of CWC within the ruling coalition.
Peace rather than war beckons
With a clear mandate in his favour, and freed of the shackles of JVP conditional support, the President has a unique opportunity to not only progress the war to its natural conclusion but also to bring lasting peace. This involves speeding up the process of the devolution of powers to the provincial councils as prescribed in the 13th amendment as a part of larger vision for ushering in peace that has to be beyond capturing Kilinochchi.
The development of the Eastern Province stands as a mute testimony to averments of the President’s in the Mahinda Chintana not yet translated into action. Its promise of equitable treatment of all people regardless of their class, creed or language is still tangled in loops of politicking, vote bank politics and negative influences. The chief minister in the east is yet to gain many of the powers promised in the 13th amendment.
The huge number of civilians fleeing the northern battlefields is now estimated at 175,000. And they are converging on Kilinochchi. They are the visible indicator of the unmapped agenda that is building up for an action plan after the guns go silent. For lasting peace, it has to go well beyond short term measures that would provide only a face lift for the government and not the affected people. Is the government ready with such a plan? Only time will tell.
Already, there are indications that the LTTE is slowly but surely staging a comeback in the east. The ruling Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP) has spoken about increasing LTTE intelligence operations in the Kanjikudichcharu area. Other sources have also confirmed the growing presence of LTTE elements there. It would be no different in the north after the LTTE is driven out from Kilinochchi to the bush at great human cost.
This only underlines that winning the war against the insurgents is well beyond battle field victories and capture of territories. Though these are essential for defeating the LTTE, unless its ability to capture the minds of the population is rooted out, the victories would not be lasting. That could come only through a peace architecture that would make the LTTE’s armed conflict irrelevant. The Army Commander, a veteran of the conflict, knows this home truth as much as the President, the master strategist, does.
Overall, the electoral mandate given to the President is as much to usher in permanent peace as pursue the war. We can only hope they build a peace agenda with the same vigour they did for the war.
Thursday, August 21, 2008
India: Military Snippets-6
India -Malaysia defence ties
News report, New Delhi18 August 2008: India-Malaysia defence ties got a boost recently when the Indian Air Force ( IAF ) began to train Malaysian pilots to fly Russian-made Sukhoi fighters. IAF chief Air Chief Marshal Fali Homi Major left for Malaysia on August 16 to discuss bilateral defence cooperation. He will be meeting with the Malaysian defence minister and Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF) chief on ways to bolster defence ties. He will also visit the Gong Kedak airbase, where a team of IAF pilots and technicians are now stationed...
Israeli missile system for IAF
Media report New Delhi18 August 2008: The government will be giving the go ahead for long-delayed IAF plans to procure SpyDer low-level quick-reaction air defence missile systems from Israel. News reports quoting sources said the deal costing over Rs 1,800 crore for the 18 SpyDer systems would be inked within a few weeks after being approved by the Defence Acquisitions Council. The deal was stalled so far as Israeli Aerospace Industries and Rafael were named by the CBI in the case of kickbacks in the Rs 1,160 crore Barak-I deal.
IAF short of 400 pilots: Air Chief
News report, New Delhi20 August 2008: The chief of Indian Air Force (IAF) Air Chief Marshal Fali Homi Major has said the IAF was facing a shortage of 400 pilots. According to him it would take five years to make up the shortage. It takes 6-8 years of operational training before an IAF pilot can become fully operational in his role. The Air Chief said "They have to be trained over a period of time and there are not shortcuts. We are short of about 400 pilots but with the measures we are taking, we will make good the shortage in the next five years.”
Progress in India’s defence cooperation with Russia
News report, New Delhi 20 August 2008: At a two-day meeting of the Inter Governmental Commission on military cooperation held here on August 18, India and Russia seem to have resolved the bottleneck over transfer of key technology for the T90 S Main Battle Tank (MBT). The issue had slowed down the production rate of the Russian tank in India. Russia has promised to share the specifications of the gun barrel and will transfer all relevant documents by the end of the year under a new agreement.
Both sides also exchanged views on the progress of other joint projects like missile systems, shipbuilding, and aviation sector projects like the fifth generation fighter aircraft and multi role transport aircraft. They agreed to take steps for their successful implementation.
News report, New Delhi18 August 2008: India-Malaysia defence ties got a boost recently when the Indian Air Force ( IAF ) began to train Malaysian pilots to fly Russian-made Sukhoi fighters. IAF chief Air Chief Marshal Fali Homi Major left for Malaysia on August 16 to discuss bilateral defence cooperation. He will be meeting with the Malaysian defence minister and Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF) chief on ways to bolster defence ties. He will also visit the Gong Kedak airbase, where a team of IAF pilots and technicians are now stationed...
Israeli missile system for IAF
Media report New Delhi18 August 2008: The government will be giving the go ahead for long-delayed IAF plans to procure SpyDer low-level quick-reaction air defence missile systems from Israel. News reports quoting sources said the deal costing over Rs 1,800 crore for the 18 SpyDer systems would be inked within a few weeks after being approved by the Defence Acquisitions Council. The deal was stalled so far as Israeli Aerospace Industries and Rafael were named by the CBI in the case of kickbacks in the Rs 1,160 crore Barak-I deal.
IAF short of 400 pilots: Air Chief
News report, New Delhi20 August 2008: The chief of Indian Air Force (IAF) Air Chief Marshal Fali Homi Major has said the IAF was facing a shortage of 400 pilots. According to him it would take five years to make up the shortage. It takes 6-8 years of operational training before an IAF pilot can become fully operational in his role. The Air Chief said "They have to be trained over a period of time and there are not shortcuts. We are short of about 400 pilots but with the measures we are taking, we will make good the shortage in the next five years.”
Progress in India’s defence cooperation with Russia
News report, New Delhi 20 August 2008: At a two-day meeting of the Inter Governmental Commission on military cooperation held here on August 18, India and Russia seem to have resolved the bottleneck over transfer of key technology for the T90 S Main Battle Tank (MBT). The issue had slowed down the production rate of the Russian tank in India. Russia has promised to share the specifications of the gun barrel and will transfer all relevant documents by the end of the year under a new agreement.
Both sides also exchanged views on the progress of other joint projects like missile systems, shipbuilding, and aviation sector projects like the fifth generation fighter aircraft and multi role transport aircraft. They agreed to take steps for their successful implementation.
Monday, August 18, 2008
Sri Lanka: War, Peace, and Relations Across the Palk Strait
Status of Eelam War-4
The Eelam War is entering the messy phase. During the last two weeks, in Mannar sector the security forces have progressed up to Mulankavil (southeast of Nachikuda on the Mannar coast) on A32 road to Pooneryn. They are leaning on lineTunukkai-Mallavi, West of Mankulam on A9 highway increasing the threat to Pooneryn and Kilinochchi defences of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). This should put the LTTE in a dilemma as the security forces have two options to strike – along A32 to Pooneryn with holding operations along Tunukkai-Uyilankulam/ Mallavi, or progress in the other way round to threaten Kilinochchi. Both are viable as they have another task force guarding their eastern flank of 57 Division operating closer to A9.
On the Welioya sector, though 59 Division has managed to capture Andankulam base its progress into the Tiger heartland north and west of Mullaitivu could get sticky due to the terrain that eats up troops.
These operations have amply demonstrated how the security forces are overcoming their weaknesses on three difficult aspects – higher coordination of war involving multiple formations, effective use of commandos in tandem with conventional operations, and retaining military initiative at all times.
On the negative side, as the security forces progress further into the LTTE areas, the lines of communication become stretched, they would become vulnerable to determined LTTE interdiction or even blocks. Much would depend upon Prabhakaran’s ability to motivate the cadres and the ability of the security forces not be destabilised by such operations. One can expect the security forces to have contingency plan for such a development.
Whether one believes in the huge number of casualties of the put out daily by the Sri Lanka Ministry of Defence or not, the writing on the wall would be clear to the insurgent group. Time is running out for it to hold on to its conventional capability. In war, time is the only resource available equally to both the victor and the vanquished. If at all the LTTE has to do anything to stem the tide of the security force eating into its vitals, it has to do it now. Overall, on both sectors the progress is going to be messy and slower, with the monsoon also making life more difficult for both the forces.
The non-military issue that could upset the security forces advance is the flow of refugees going out of control when they move in to the more inhabited areas closer to Kilinochchi, Mankulam and Pooneryn. The security forces had managed to avoid this so far in the Mannar sector by patiently investing or by passing small towns (as seen in Adampan operations). That might not be possible unless they streamline a policy on handling the large outflow of population expected to spill over on axes of advance when the operations are joined in. There will also be the huge burden of logistics to control and care for the civilians. These are the known fall outs of war that cannot be wished away. (That is what makes war a non-option.)
Relations across the Palk Strait
A few days back when India’s National Security Advisor MK Narayanan told The Straits Times interviewer that the Sri Lankan government should get the Tamil population on their side to succeed there was a mild flutter in Colombo. In the midst of a winning war, brand marketed as the Liberation of the People, Narayanan’s remark "The (Sri Lanka Army) has made a lot of progress in the last few weeks. But even if they win the battle I am not sure they will win the war. I think they haven't got the Tamil population on their side," probably grated the official stand of Colombo on the war.
He did not underestimate Colombo’s reaction to his statement. “I know the Sri Lankan government will be unhappy (at this advice) but we are not interested in preaching to them and that is the best advice they could get. India can give this advice better than the Norwegians or any other country. These are people that we know, we understand. Do they want a situation like many countries have faced?” he added.
On the other hand, Sri Lanka’s Defence Secretary, Gotabaya Rajapaksa had his own view on the subject. Speaking to The Times, London three days later, he said peace in Sri Lanka would return only if Tamil rebels were destroyed completely. "You can't just push them into the jungles and wait. You have to search for them and completely eradicate them. Only then can peace come," he explained further.
The two statements indicate the differing perceptions of India and Sri Lanka on the war going on against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka.
India had been consistent on three issues in its cyclical interest, involvement, and intervention in Sri Lanka Tamil issue. They are – no support to independent Tamil Eelam, support for Sri Lanka’s sovereignty, and the devolution of powers to Sri Lanka Tamils as the key to solve the Tamil issue. MK Narayanan’s statement basically conforms to this pattern, though with a little generosity his wording might be called plain speaking. Even the Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh “stuck to the traditional Indian stand that Sri Lanka should work out a formula which allows for maximum devolution of power to the ethnic Tamils in the north of the island country,” during his recent visit to Colombo to attend the SAARC s summit, as a news report from Colombo stated.
Most of the Sri Lanka watchers (including this author) would agree with the National Security Advisor’s assessment of the Sri Lanka situation: “What the Sri Lankans are not factoring in is the great deal of sullenness in the Tamil man. There are accusations of profiling even in Colombo. Our argument is: unless you give Tamils a feeling they have the right to their own destiny in many matters you will not succeed. LTTE's capacity to carry out terrorist attacks is not diminished. What we are telling them is, get the Tamils on your side by greater devolution of power. For them to be part of Sri Lankan state, they need the huge Tamil minority on their side.”
In essence, Narayanan’s statement does not question the legitimacy of Sri Lanka’s war against the LTTE, but the overall objective of the war. President Rajapaksa’s government has repeatedly given an impression that once the LTTE is vanquished it would be all smooth sailing with the Tamil population automatically joining the democratic mainstream. The Sri Lanka Defence Secretary’s statement quoted earlier reinforces this impression yet again. It appears to identify the LTTE as the problem, rather than as the manifestation of the problem. And that is the difference between the perceptions of India and Sri Lanka.
A second aspect is the popular aspiration for peace. Surveys indicate increasing public support for war in Sri Lanka. But this increased support has two elements: battles are being won, and people are nursing increased expectations of permanent peace at the end of the war. End objective of war makes a lot of difference to people’s expectations. Peoples’ expectations of permanent peace are unlikely to be met unless there is a matching process of devolution of powers to the Tamils. This simple truth appears to have been wished away in Sri Lanka at present. The holding of elections for the eastern provincial council offered a very good opportunity to the government to demonstrate its faith in devolving limited powers envisaged in the 13th amendment. Unfortunately, even that has not been done so far, and the process still remains a promise in print only.
Presence of a small number of highly motivated terrorists can cause havoc to the normal life of the people as amply demonstrated by the Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) activists in India for sometime now. A small number of them managed to carry serial blasts in a number of cities across the country despite the police and security apparatus of over 12 states coming into play. This should hold an abject lesson for Sri Lanka. If the LTTE is routed and driven out of areas under its control (as total ‘elimination’ of any insurgent force might take years), a large segment of it will take to terrorist attacks across the country.
This is a clear if we look at the long history of the Tamil struggle in Sri Lanka. To convert the entire history of Tamil struggle into a simple equation of war against the LTTE might win some votes in Southern Sri Lanka, but it would not eliminate the Tamil political and militancy problems, though they may not continue in the same form or content as at present.
Notwithstanding these differences in perceptions on the Tamil issue, India and Sri Lanka appear to have a clear understanding of the political compulsions behind their conduct. This has helped them to focus on the positives and not to overplay the differences. This is evident from Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s comments given in another interview to an Indian news agency on Narayanan’s statement.
Rather than criticising Narayanan, he lamented about Sri Lanka’s limitations in convincing others about its intentions. “The only area where we have failed is to show our genuineness, to convince the outsiders, about our sincerity in resolving the problem. In action we have proved it. Unfortunately, we are not good at propaganda. If Tamils indeed are not with us, then it is our weakness.” This statement appears to have chosen to ignore the whole point mad by MK Narayanan. It was much more than propaganda, it was about belief. The defence secretary’s statement may be called over simplification of not only a complex issue.
The Sri Lanka government is fully aware that it needs Indian government’s support even to complete its current military mission. India is extending vital support for the war effort by continuing with tough security measures in Tamil Nadu where a number of LTTE supply modules continue to be busted. This should indicate to Colombo that regardless of nuances of rhetoric, India’s policy has been consistent.
The defence secretary also acknowledged this with the words that Narayanan “only put in different words what our President has been saying, that we need to defeat terrorism but the (ethnic) problem needs to be resolved (politically).” The Defence Secretary took consolation in two positive aspects he saw in Narayanan’s statement: he had said the military was winning, and he did not say that Sri Lank should talk to the LTTE.
This convergence and confusion in view points of India and Sri Lanka will continue till the President is dependent upon right wing Sinhala support. This section of Sinhala polity has survived by building up the so called “Dravidastan” bogey of Tamil Nadu together with the LTTE gobbling up parts of Sri Lanka. The thought of Dravidastan has been shunted to historical irrelevance in Tamil Nadu, which has become a vital development engine in the national mainstream. And the faster the President gets rid of this right wing dependency the better it would be for his government, the people of Sri Lanka, and for India-Sri Lanka relations.
The Eelam War is entering the messy phase. During the last two weeks, in Mannar sector the security forces have progressed up to Mulankavil (southeast of Nachikuda on the Mannar coast) on A32 road to Pooneryn. They are leaning on lineTunukkai-Mallavi, West of Mankulam on A9 highway increasing the threat to Pooneryn and Kilinochchi defences of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). This should put the LTTE in a dilemma as the security forces have two options to strike – along A32 to Pooneryn with holding operations along Tunukkai-Uyilankulam/ Mallavi, or progress in the other way round to threaten Kilinochchi. Both are viable as they have another task force guarding their eastern flank of 57 Division operating closer to A9.
On the Welioya sector, though 59 Division has managed to capture Andankulam base its progress into the Tiger heartland north and west of Mullaitivu could get sticky due to the terrain that eats up troops.
These operations have amply demonstrated how the security forces are overcoming their weaknesses on three difficult aspects – higher coordination of war involving multiple formations, effective use of commandos in tandem with conventional operations, and retaining military initiative at all times.
On the negative side, as the security forces progress further into the LTTE areas, the lines of communication become stretched, they would become vulnerable to determined LTTE interdiction or even blocks. Much would depend upon Prabhakaran’s ability to motivate the cadres and the ability of the security forces not be destabilised by such operations. One can expect the security forces to have contingency plan for such a development.
Whether one believes in the huge number of casualties of the put out daily by the Sri Lanka Ministry of Defence or not, the writing on the wall would be clear to the insurgent group. Time is running out for it to hold on to its conventional capability. In war, time is the only resource available equally to both the victor and the vanquished. If at all the LTTE has to do anything to stem the tide of the security force eating into its vitals, it has to do it now. Overall, on both sectors the progress is going to be messy and slower, with the monsoon also making life more difficult for both the forces.
The non-military issue that could upset the security forces advance is the flow of refugees going out of control when they move in to the more inhabited areas closer to Kilinochchi, Mankulam and Pooneryn. The security forces had managed to avoid this so far in the Mannar sector by patiently investing or by passing small towns (as seen in Adampan operations). That might not be possible unless they streamline a policy on handling the large outflow of population expected to spill over on axes of advance when the operations are joined in. There will also be the huge burden of logistics to control and care for the civilians. These are the known fall outs of war that cannot be wished away. (That is what makes war a non-option.)
Relations across the Palk Strait
A few days back when India’s National Security Advisor MK Narayanan told The Straits Times interviewer that the Sri Lankan government should get the Tamil population on their side to succeed there was a mild flutter in Colombo. In the midst of a winning war, brand marketed as the Liberation of the People, Narayanan’s remark "The (Sri Lanka Army) has made a lot of progress in the last few weeks. But even if they win the battle I am not sure they will win the war. I think they haven't got the Tamil population on their side," probably grated the official stand of Colombo on the war.
He did not underestimate Colombo’s reaction to his statement. “I know the Sri Lankan government will be unhappy (at this advice) but we are not interested in preaching to them and that is the best advice they could get. India can give this advice better than the Norwegians or any other country. These are people that we know, we understand. Do they want a situation like many countries have faced?” he added.
On the other hand, Sri Lanka’s Defence Secretary, Gotabaya Rajapaksa had his own view on the subject. Speaking to The Times, London three days later, he said peace in Sri Lanka would return only if Tamil rebels were destroyed completely. "You can't just push them into the jungles and wait. You have to search for them and completely eradicate them. Only then can peace come," he explained further.
The two statements indicate the differing perceptions of India and Sri Lanka on the war going on against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka.
India had been consistent on three issues in its cyclical interest, involvement, and intervention in Sri Lanka Tamil issue. They are – no support to independent Tamil Eelam, support for Sri Lanka’s sovereignty, and the devolution of powers to Sri Lanka Tamils as the key to solve the Tamil issue. MK Narayanan’s statement basically conforms to this pattern, though with a little generosity his wording might be called plain speaking. Even the Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh “stuck to the traditional Indian stand that Sri Lanka should work out a formula which allows for maximum devolution of power to the ethnic Tamils in the north of the island country,” during his recent visit to Colombo to attend the SAARC s summit, as a news report from Colombo stated.
Most of the Sri Lanka watchers (including this author) would agree with the National Security Advisor’s assessment of the Sri Lanka situation: “What the Sri Lankans are not factoring in is the great deal of sullenness in the Tamil man. There are accusations of profiling even in Colombo. Our argument is: unless you give Tamils a feeling they have the right to their own destiny in many matters you will not succeed. LTTE's capacity to carry out terrorist attacks is not diminished. What we are telling them is, get the Tamils on your side by greater devolution of power. For them to be part of Sri Lankan state, they need the huge Tamil minority on their side.”
In essence, Narayanan’s statement does not question the legitimacy of Sri Lanka’s war against the LTTE, but the overall objective of the war. President Rajapaksa’s government has repeatedly given an impression that once the LTTE is vanquished it would be all smooth sailing with the Tamil population automatically joining the democratic mainstream. The Sri Lanka Defence Secretary’s statement quoted earlier reinforces this impression yet again. It appears to identify the LTTE as the problem, rather than as the manifestation of the problem. And that is the difference between the perceptions of India and Sri Lanka.
A second aspect is the popular aspiration for peace. Surveys indicate increasing public support for war in Sri Lanka. But this increased support has two elements: battles are being won, and people are nursing increased expectations of permanent peace at the end of the war. End objective of war makes a lot of difference to people’s expectations. Peoples’ expectations of permanent peace are unlikely to be met unless there is a matching process of devolution of powers to the Tamils. This simple truth appears to have been wished away in Sri Lanka at present. The holding of elections for the eastern provincial council offered a very good opportunity to the government to demonstrate its faith in devolving limited powers envisaged in the 13th amendment. Unfortunately, even that has not been done so far, and the process still remains a promise in print only.
Presence of a small number of highly motivated terrorists can cause havoc to the normal life of the people as amply demonstrated by the Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) activists in India for sometime now. A small number of them managed to carry serial blasts in a number of cities across the country despite the police and security apparatus of over 12 states coming into play. This should hold an abject lesson for Sri Lanka. If the LTTE is routed and driven out of areas under its control (as total ‘elimination’ of any insurgent force might take years), a large segment of it will take to terrorist attacks across the country.
This is a clear if we look at the long history of the Tamil struggle in Sri Lanka. To convert the entire history of Tamil struggle into a simple equation of war against the LTTE might win some votes in Southern Sri Lanka, but it would not eliminate the Tamil political and militancy problems, though they may not continue in the same form or content as at present.
Notwithstanding these differences in perceptions on the Tamil issue, India and Sri Lanka appear to have a clear understanding of the political compulsions behind their conduct. This has helped them to focus on the positives and not to overplay the differences. This is evident from Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s comments given in another interview to an Indian news agency on Narayanan’s statement.
Rather than criticising Narayanan, he lamented about Sri Lanka’s limitations in convincing others about its intentions. “The only area where we have failed is to show our genuineness, to convince the outsiders, about our sincerity in resolving the problem. In action we have proved it. Unfortunately, we are not good at propaganda. If Tamils indeed are not with us, then it is our weakness.” This statement appears to have chosen to ignore the whole point mad by MK Narayanan. It was much more than propaganda, it was about belief. The defence secretary’s statement may be called over simplification of not only a complex issue.
The Sri Lanka government is fully aware that it needs Indian government’s support even to complete its current military mission. India is extending vital support for the war effort by continuing with tough security measures in Tamil Nadu where a number of LTTE supply modules continue to be busted. This should indicate to Colombo that regardless of nuances of rhetoric, India’s policy has been consistent.
The defence secretary also acknowledged this with the words that Narayanan “only put in different words what our President has been saying, that we need to defeat terrorism but the (ethnic) problem needs to be resolved (politically).” The Defence Secretary took consolation in two positive aspects he saw in Narayanan’s statement: he had said the military was winning, and he did not say that Sri Lank should talk to the LTTE.
This convergence and confusion in view points of India and Sri Lanka will continue till the President is dependent upon right wing Sinhala support. This section of Sinhala polity has survived by building up the so called “Dravidastan” bogey of Tamil Nadu together with the LTTE gobbling up parts of Sri Lanka. The thought of Dravidastan has been shunted to historical irrelevance in Tamil Nadu, which has become a vital development engine in the national mainstream. And the faster the President gets rid of this right wing dependency the better it would be for his government, the people of Sri Lanka, and for India-Sri Lanka relations.
Saturday, August 16, 2008
India: Military Snippets-6
IPKF memorial not in Manmohan’s itinerary
Media report from Colombo Aug 17, 2008: The Sri Lanka Navy has constructed a memorial for the Indian Peace Keeping Force personnel who were killed during operations in Sri Lanka from 1987 to 90. The memorial in Colombo is on the Jana Kala Kendraya premises near the parliament complex.
Many expected Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to open the memorial when he visited Colombo during the SAARC summit two weeks ago. However, the Sri Lanka Foreign Ministry claimed the unveiling of the war memorial was not in the Indian’s Prime Minister’s schedule.
In all 1225 Indian soldiers lost their lives in IPKF operations. And no memorial exists for them even in India. Here is Sri Lankan Navy saying ‘thank you to them.’ According to the Sunday Times, Colombo, the Indian High Commission spokesman Dinker Astana declined to comment on the matter. This makes me have second thoughts on why the opening ceremony was not scheduled during the visit. Was the Indian Prime Minister’s Colombo schedule so heavy that he could not spare a little time to open the memorial? Or was it to pander to coalition politicians of Tamil Nadu politicians who made no secret of their sympathies for the LTTE even when their own army was fighting in Sri Lanka? Will somebody who cares about the dead soldiers bother to answer?
Armed forces welcome pay hike decision
New Delhi, August 15, 2008: The armed forces have reacted positively to the revised pay hike announced by the government. In his initial reaction of Chief of the Naval Staff Admiral Sureesh Mehta, who is also the Chairman of the Chiefs of the Staff Committee, said that "even as more details are awaited, prima facie all the concerns of the defence forces appear to have been suitably addressed." The armed forces were dissatisfied with the Pay Commission's earlier recommendations and forced the government to set up a special review panel.
Media report from Colombo Aug 17, 2008: The Sri Lanka Navy has constructed a memorial for the Indian Peace Keeping Force personnel who were killed during operations in Sri Lanka from 1987 to 90. The memorial in Colombo is on the Jana Kala Kendraya premises near the parliament complex.
Many expected Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to open the memorial when he visited Colombo during the SAARC summit two weeks ago. However, the Sri Lanka Foreign Ministry claimed the unveiling of the war memorial was not in the Indian’s Prime Minister’s schedule.
In all 1225 Indian soldiers lost their lives in IPKF operations. And no memorial exists for them even in India. Here is Sri Lankan Navy saying ‘thank you to them.’ According to the Sunday Times, Colombo, the Indian High Commission spokesman Dinker Astana declined to comment on the matter. This makes me have second thoughts on why the opening ceremony was not scheduled during the visit. Was the Indian Prime Minister’s Colombo schedule so heavy that he could not spare a little time to open the memorial? Or was it to pander to coalition politicians of Tamil Nadu politicians who made no secret of their sympathies for the LTTE even when their own army was fighting in Sri Lanka? Will somebody who cares about the dead soldiers bother to answer?
Armed forces welcome pay hike decision
New Delhi, August 15, 2008: The armed forces have reacted positively to the revised pay hike announced by the government. In his initial reaction of Chief of the Naval Staff Admiral Sureesh Mehta, who is also the Chairman of the Chiefs of the Staff Committee, said that "even as more details are awaited, prima facie all the concerns of the defence forces appear to have been suitably addressed." The armed forces were dissatisfied with the Pay Commission's earlier recommendations and forced the government to set up a special review panel.
India: Military Snippets-5
Singapore Army to train at Indian Army firing ranges
Media report New Delhi Aug 13, 2008: India has signed another agreement with Singapore permitting the Singapore Army to use of Babina and Deolali firing ranges for armour and artillery exercises. India’s Defence Secretary Vijay Singh and Singapore’s Permanent Secretary (Defence) Chiang Chie Foo signed the agreement in New Delhi allowing Singapore the use of firing ranges to train its ground forces for the next five years. In the past Singapore Air Force was allowed to use IAF's Kalaikunda airbase and nearby firing ranges to train its pilots.
IAF finalises QR for new trainer aircraft pilot
Media report Bangalore Aug 13, 2008: Indian Air Force has finalised the qualitative requirements for a new trainer aircraft to be manufactured by the Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL). The IAF had been using the HAL manufactured piston HPT-32 aircraft since 1984. Trainees at the Air Force flying academies first fly this aircraft for 65 hours before they are separated into the fighter, helicopter and transport streams. Of the 65 hours, pilot trainees fly 44 hours solo.
Media report New Delhi Aug 13, 2008: India has signed another agreement with Singapore permitting the Singapore Army to use of Babina and Deolali firing ranges for armour and artillery exercises. India’s Defence Secretary Vijay Singh and Singapore’s Permanent Secretary (Defence) Chiang Chie Foo signed the agreement in New Delhi allowing Singapore the use of firing ranges to train its ground forces for the next five years. In the past Singapore Air Force was allowed to use IAF's Kalaikunda airbase and nearby firing ranges to train its pilots.
IAF finalises QR for new trainer aircraft pilot
Media report Bangalore Aug 13, 2008: Indian Air Force has finalised the qualitative requirements for a new trainer aircraft to be manufactured by the Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL). The IAF had been using the HAL manufactured piston HPT-32 aircraft since 1984. Trainees at the Air Force flying academies first fly this aircraft for 65 hours before they are separated into the fighter, helicopter and transport streams. Of the 65 hours, pilot trainees fly 44 hours solo.
Thursday, August 14, 2008
India: Military Snippets-4
Pinaka' tested successfully
Media reports Balasore, August 13, 2008: Army and defence scientists jointly carried out sample trials of ‘Pinaka’ multi-barrel rocket launcher (MBRL) weapon system being developed by India on August 13 at the Proof Experimental Establishment (PXE) Chandipur-on-sea, about 15 km from Balasore in Orissa state. According to a defence official, the objective of the trials was “to assess its stability in flight as well as accuracy and consistency."
'Pinaka' had already undergone several tests since 1995. 'Pinaka' is an area weapon system to supplement the existing artillery fire power at ranges beyond 30 km. Its advantages are quick response time and high rate of fire. The unguided rocket system 40 km, 'Pinaka' can fire salvo of 12 rockets in 44 seconds. One salvo each (12 rockets) from the battery of six launchers can neutralise at a time a target area of 3.9 sq km.
The system's capability to incorporate several types of warheads makes it deadly with ability to destroy solid structures and bunkers.
Muslim soldier's entry into Puri temple creates flutter
Media report, 13 Aug 2008, Puri: The entry of a a Muslim soldier who came with an army brigadier into the Jagannath temple, a 12th century shrine, which is off-limits to non-Hindus caused a flutter in this temple town in Orissa. Some priests there raised an alarm after they saw the soldier's name badge.
Havildar M A Rashid said "I had absolutely no idea about the rule. Nobody stopped me at the temple gate." Rashid is employed at the Army Air Defence College at Golabandha in Gopalpur, accompanied Brig. Prakash. The brigadier defended his bodyguard's unintentional mistake.
The visit of Rashid was certainly unintentional and it is better to ignore it. But at the same time Army should understand and act appropriately respecting local sentiments. Unfortunately we do not understand why men in uniform accompany officers on their private jaunts.
Defence Minister Orders probe into Congo charges
Media reports; 14 Aug 2008, New Delhi: Indian defence minister A K Antony quickly ordered a thorough and time-bound investigation into the UN allegations of sexual exploitation and child abuse by Indian soldiers in Congo. He was responding to UN secretary-general Ban Ki-moon who asked for disciplinary action to the “maximum degree permitted by Indian law” against those found to be involved in the case. A UN statement had said that its internal investigation had found prima facie evidence that Indian soldiers "may" have engaged in sexual exploitation and child abuse while serving in Congo during 2007-2008.
It had alleged that as many as 100 Indian soldiers could be involved in having sex with minor Congolese girls in exchange for food or small sums of money in North Kivu Province in Congo.
This is not the first time allegations of such aberrations have been made about peace-keeping troops deployed in UN mission (MONUC) in Congo. Such allegations have been made against armies of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh of MONUC and Sri Lanka while serving in Haiti. The alleged offences range from gold smuggling to arms trading, and of course exploitation of girls.
The Army’s reaction in July 2008 to this report is interesting. It had brushed aside allegations against Indian soldiers regarding gold smuggling and arms trading as a malicious campaign to "undermine the credibility" of its soldiers deployed in Congo It said all allegations against its soldiers ranging from gold smuggling and arms trading to even sexual exploitation had been found 'false and baseless'.
Only one incident of 'aberrant behaviour' by in the peace-keeping mission in Congo came to light during the probe conducted into the allegations by UN’s Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS).
The army said disciplinary action had been initiated against the three Indian soldiers — a Lt-Colonel, a subedar and a havaldar — after their involvement was contained in the UNOIOS report. This it said was in keeping with its 'zero tolerance' policy against any acts of omission or commission which violates 'the code of professional ethics'. The facts of the case in question are that an Indian soldier was 'lured' into purchasing a small quantity of counterfeit gold dust for around $480 by a local trader in the North Kivu province of Congo.
Investigations have revealed the soldier, on becoming aware of having being cheated, along with his JCO and his immediate superior officer, detained the trader to recover the money. Subsequently, the trader, an anti-social element, returned the money," said media reports quoting an officer…The three soldiers were recalled to India. After detailed investigations, headed by a Lt-General, and disciplinary action initiated against the three under the Army Act.
But Ban Ki Moon’s statement has made all the difference. The OIOS report has alleged that Indian peacekeepers were involved in a child prostitution racket being run near a base camp at Masisi. The Army had ordered an "internal inquiry" by Brigadier Inderjeet Narayan, commander of the North Kivu brigade after its vice-chief Lt-Gen Milan Naidu visited Congo in May.
India has the largest presence in the 16,475-strong MONUC with 4372 soldiers. This is followed by Pakistan with 3,551 soldiers. At present, India has 8,896 soldiers deployed in six UN missions.
Generally Indian soldiers have a very good record as peace keepers of the UN. In a few occasions the UN command set up which had not been the ideal to handle troops coming from different societies with armies in various stages of development. Soldiers from certain western nations have also faced problems the world over with allegations of rape, graft, unnecessary use of force not to mention the abuses like we've seen in Iraqi prisons for example.
Indian Army Act is highly restrictive regarding the individual rights of its citizens serving as its soldiers. So it has to ensure that false allegations are not foisted upon the soldiers who have no recourse to judicial remedies a common citizen enjoys. However, army should be aware that 21st century demands greater public accountability particularly from the armed forces. It has to act fairly and swiftly to ensure it does not tolerate acts of indiscipline from it soldiers, particularly when serving with international set ups.
And not only should it act but it should be known to others that it acts. Moreover, the UN working itself has been under a cloud over allegations of corruption and embezzlement for sometime now. So the UN service has to be handled with kid glove. And the army response need not be defensive but factual, without breast-beating about ‘conspiracies to tarnish its image.’
That can come through only when its credibility in responding to allegations is swift and transparent. We are confident Indian army is conscious of this and do so as it had done in J and K.
Media reports Balasore, August 13, 2008: Army and defence scientists jointly carried out sample trials of ‘Pinaka’ multi-barrel rocket launcher (MBRL) weapon system being developed by India on August 13 at the Proof Experimental Establishment (PXE) Chandipur-on-sea, about 15 km from Balasore in Orissa state. According to a defence official, the objective of the trials was “to assess its stability in flight as well as accuracy and consistency."
'Pinaka' had already undergone several tests since 1995. 'Pinaka' is an area weapon system to supplement the existing artillery fire power at ranges beyond 30 km. Its advantages are quick response time and high rate of fire. The unguided rocket system 40 km, 'Pinaka' can fire salvo of 12 rockets in 44 seconds. One salvo each (12 rockets) from the battery of six launchers can neutralise at a time a target area of 3.9 sq km.
The system's capability to incorporate several types of warheads makes it deadly with ability to destroy solid structures and bunkers.
Muslim soldier's entry into Puri temple creates flutter
Media report, 13 Aug 2008, Puri: The entry of a a Muslim soldier who came with an army brigadier into the Jagannath temple, a 12th century shrine, which is off-limits to non-Hindus caused a flutter in this temple town in Orissa. Some priests there raised an alarm after they saw the soldier's name badge.
Havildar M A Rashid said "I had absolutely no idea about the rule. Nobody stopped me at the temple gate." Rashid is employed at the Army Air Defence College at Golabandha in Gopalpur, accompanied Brig. Prakash. The brigadier defended his bodyguard's unintentional mistake.
The visit of Rashid was certainly unintentional and it is better to ignore it. But at the same time Army should understand and act appropriately respecting local sentiments. Unfortunately we do not understand why men in uniform accompany officers on their private jaunts.
Defence Minister Orders probe into Congo charges
Media reports; 14 Aug 2008, New Delhi: Indian defence minister A K Antony quickly ordered a thorough and time-bound investigation into the UN allegations of sexual exploitation and child abuse by Indian soldiers in Congo. He was responding to UN secretary-general Ban Ki-moon who asked for disciplinary action to the “maximum degree permitted by Indian law” against those found to be involved in the case. A UN statement had said that its internal investigation had found prima facie evidence that Indian soldiers "may" have engaged in sexual exploitation and child abuse while serving in Congo during 2007-2008.
It had alleged that as many as 100 Indian soldiers could be involved in having sex with minor Congolese girls in exchange for food or small sums of money in North Kivu Province in Congo.
This is not the first time allegations of such aberrations have been made about peace-keeping troops deployed in UN mission (MONUC) in Congo. Such allegations have been made against armies of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh of MONUC and Sri Lanka while serving in Haiti. The alleged offences range from gold smuggling to arms trading, and of course exploitation of girls.
The Army’s reaction in July 2008 to this report is interesting. It had brushed aside allegations against Indian soldiers regarding gold smuggling and arms trading as a malicious campaign to "undermine the credibility" of its soldiers deployed in Congo It said all allegations against its soldiers ranging from gold smuggling and arms trading to even sexual exploitation had been found 'false and baseless'.
Only one incident of 'aberrant behaviour' by in the peace-keeping mission in Congo came to light during the probe conducted into the allegations by UN’s Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS).
The army said disciplinary action had been initiated against the three Indian soldiers — a Lt-Colonel, a subedar and a havaldar — after their involvement was contained in the UNOIOS report. This it said was in keeping with its 'zero tolerance' policy against any acts of omission or commission which violates 'the code of professional ethics'. The facts of the case in question are that an Indian soldier was 'lured' into purchasing a small quantity of counterfeit gold dust for around $480 by a local trader in the North Kivu province of Congo.
Investigations have revealed the soldier, on becoming aware of having being cheated, along with his JCO and his immediate superior officer, detained the trader to recover the money. Subsequently, the trader, an anti-social element, returned the money," said media reports quoting an officer…The three soldiers were recalled to India. After detailed investigations, headed by a Lt-General, and disciplinary action initiated against the three under the Army Act.
But Ban Ki Moon’s statement has made all the difference. The OIOS report has alleged that Indian peacekeepers were involved in a child prostitution racket being run near a base camp at Masisi. The Army had ordered an "internal inquiry" by Brigadier Inderjeet Narayan, commander of the North Kivu brigade after its vice-chief Lt-Gen Milan Naidu visited Congo in May.
India has the largest presence in the 16,475-strong MONUC with 4372 soldiers. This is followed by Pakistan with 3,551 soldiers. At present, India has 8,896 soldiers deployed in six UN missions.
Generally Indian soldiers have a very good record as peace keepers of the UN. In a few occasions the UN command set up which had not been the ideal to handle troops coming from different societies with armies in various stages of development. Soldiers from certain western nations have also faced problems the world over with allegations of rape, graft, unnecessary use of force not to mention the abuses like we've seen in Iraqi prisons for example.
Indian Army Act is highly restrictive regarding the individual rights of its citizens serving as its soldiers. So it has to ensure that false allegations are not foisted upon the soldiers who have no recourse to judicial remedies a common citizen enjoys. However, army should be aware that 21st century demands greater public accountability particularly from the armed forces. It has to act fairly and swiftly to ensure it does not tolerate acts of indiscipline from it soldiers, particularly when serving with international set ups.
And not only should it act but it should be known to others that it acts. Moreover, the UN working itself has been under a cloud over allegations of corruption and embezzlement for sometime now. So the UN service has to be handled with kid glove. And the army response need not be defensive but factual, without breast-beating about ‘conspiracies to tarnish its image.’
That can come through only when its credibility in responding to allegations is swift and transparent. We are confident Indian army is conscious of this and do so as it had done in J and K.
Wednesday, August 13, 2008
India: Terrorism Snippets-1
Muslim body says SIMI has links with Pakistan
According to a report in the Free Press Journal datelined New Delhi, the All India Minority Front has said on August 8 that it had evidence that the outlawed Students Islamic of Movement of India (SIMI) had links with terror outfits in Pakistan. It quoted the AMF national President SM Asif as saying, “We have evidence of SIMI's links with Pakistani terror outfits and are ready to provide it to the central government, provided we are promised security. We have spoken to various Muslim people who have proof in this regard but they fear for their lives.”
He further added “We want SIMI should be banned and punished. The minorities in the country are opposed to all sorts of militancy. Even then Muslims suffer whenever there is any terror attack in the country.” Asif attacked the Railway Minister Lalu Prasad and Samajwadi Party leader Mulayam Singh Yadav for demanding that the ban on SIMI be lifted. “The minorities in the country are opposed to all sorts of militancy. Even then Muslims suffer whenever there is any terror attack in the country” he said.
According to a report in the Free Press Journal datelined New Delhi, the All India Minority Front has said on August 8 that it had evidence that the outlawed Students Islamic of Movement of India (SIMI) had links with terror outfits in Pakistan. It quoted the AMF national President SM Asif as saying, “We have evidence of SIMI's links with Pakistani terror outfits and are ready to provide it to the central government, provided we are promised security. We have spoken to various Muslim people who have proof in this regard but they fear for their lives.”
He further added “We want SIMI should be banned and punished. The minorities in the country are opposed to all sorts of militancy. Even then Muslims suffer whenever there is any terror attack in the country.” Asif attacked the Railway Minister Lalu Prasad and Samajwadi Party leader Mulayam Singh Yadav for demanding that the ban on SIMI be lifted. “The minorities in the country are opposed to all sorts of militancy. Even then Muslims suffer whenever there is any terror attack in the country” he said.
India: Military Snippets-3
Armed Forces Tribunal likely to miss deadline
According to a New Delhi news report of August 11, differences among the three Services over the allocation of posts for the principal Bench of the proposed Armed Forces Tribunal (AFT) is likely to delay its creation by August 15, the deadline set by the Defence Minister AK Antony.
The tribunal is the military version of the Central Administrative Tribunal designed to quickly handle militarymen’s grievances ranging from promotion matters, pensions, court martial decisions and appointments. The Defence Minister had in a Gazette notification on June 13 had made it clear that the principal Bench of the AFT be set up in New Delhi by August 15. Here is yet another case begging for inter-service cooperation.
Navy Chief for one body to oversee maritime issues
Media creports August 10, New Delhi: Indian Navy Chief Admiral Sureesh Mehta has proposed the establishment of a single apex body to oversee maritime issues.He said on August 8 "The constitution of an apex body for management of maritime affairs is an important step, which would facilitate quick decision-making and rapid response.”
With terrorists, gun-runners and drug-smugglers increasingly making forays into the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), the Navy feels it's time the government established an apex body to deal with maritime security issues. The single-window federal agency could tackle security challenges faced by all ministries handling sea-based activities such as shipping, fisheries, ports, Navy and Coast Guard.
The Navy had been pleading for the apex body as it is hampering the smooth functioning and rapid decision making process on issues affecting maritime security. At present as many as 12 agencies are involved.Will the authorities wake up?
Delivering a lecture on the Vision of the Indian Navy, Admiral Sureesh Mehta denied presence of Al-Qaida terrorists in the region but said there had been a marked increase in maritime terrorism across national boundaries and maritime terrorism has gained roots in the Indian Ocean region.
According to a New Delhi news report of August 11, differences among the three Services over the allocation of posts for the principal Bench of the proposed Armed Forces Tribunal (AFT) is likely to delay its creation by August 15, the deadline set by the Defence Minister AK Antony.
The tribunal is the military version of the Central Administrative Tribunal designed to quickly handle militarymen’s grievances ranging from promotion matters, pensions, court martial decisions and appointments. The Defence Minister had in a Gazette notification on June 13 had made it clear that the principal Bench of the AFT be set up in New Delhi by August 15. Here is yet another case begging for inter-service cooperation.
Navy Chief for one body to oversee maritime issues
Media creports August 10, New Delhi: Indian Navy Chief Admiral Sureesh Mehta has proposed the establishment of a single apex body to oversee maritime issues.He said on August 8 "The constitution of an apex body for management of maritime affairs is an important step, which would facilitate quick decision-making and rapid response.”
With terrorists, gun-runners and drug-smugglers increasingly making forays into the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), the Navy feels it's time the government established an apex body to deal with maritime security issues. The single-window federal agency could tackle security challenges faced by all ministries handling sea-based activities such as shipping, fisheries, ports, Navy and Coast Guard.
The Navy had been pleading for the apex body as it is hampering the smooth functioning and rapid decision making process on issues affecting maritime security. At present as many as 12 agencies are involved.Will the authorities wake up?
Delivering a lecture on the Vision of the Indian Navy, Admiral Sureesh Mehta denied presence of Al-Qaida terrorists in the region but said there had been a marked increase in maritime terrorism across national boundaries and maritime terrorism has gained roots in the Indian Ocean region.
Monday, August 11, 2008
China’s Influence in India’s Neighbourhood – Part II
[Extracts of the paper, presented by Col. R.Hariharan, at the India-Taiwan interaction, jointly organised by the Chennai Centre for China Studies and the Federation of Chambers of Commerce & Industry-Tamil Nadu Chapter at Chennai on August 1, 2008. This is in continuation of China’s Influence in India’s Neighbourhood- Part I published earlier.]
China’s South Asia strategy
The Chinese have tried to maintain cordial and correct relations with India despite frequent reiteration of their territorial claims. China has also been expanding the areas of cooperation with India on issues affecting the interest of both the countries. A small beginning has been made in conducting joint training exercise between two armies of the two countries. This strategy has enabled China to keep India’ concerns at bay, even as it increased its influence in India’s neighbourhood. Though the shadow of India continues to loom large over its neighbours, China has succeeded in improving bilateral relations with each one of them.
The very size of India and its seemingly all pervading soft power kindle a sense of disquiet if not fear among some of India’s neighbours. This ‘Indian bogey’ is also used as a pet ploy in the political gamesmanship of countries like Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal. Though India had taken remedial measures, for historical reasons the ‘bogey’ is likely to continue to hobble Indian articulation in the region. China appears to have leveraged itself as the answer to ward off the Indian enigma in these countries.
For instance, Pakistan and Bangladesh have inherited a historical sense of insecurity about India after Pakistan was created in 1947. This provided a convenient foothold for China to step in. India’s economic domination of its neighbours has invariably resulted in lopsided trade imbalance tilted in India’s favour. Building better trade relations with China offers a way for them to balance this tilt. There is widespread fear of Indian cultural melange submerging the national and ethnic identity of some of the small neighbours. These fears are compounded by the physical threat posed by India’s large armed forces.. In the case of Nepal and Sri Lanka this fear is latent though they have enjoyed friendly ties with India most of the time.
China appears to have prioritised its relationship with Pakistan and Bangladesh occupying the top slot. These two nations have built symbiotic relations with China over the years resulting in the creation of infrastructural and military assets that would come in handy for China, when required. They are followed by Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, Nepal, and Maldives in the Chinese order of priority.
Development of China-Afghanistan relations is hobbled by two factors: China’s multi-faceted relationship with Pakistan, and Kabul’s close relationship with India. Afghanistan has always enjoyed a cordial relationship with India, except perhaps during the period of Taliban rule. Their relationship is driven by historicity as much as their strategic synergies where they see Pakistan ranged against them. India’s liberal development aid to the Karzai government and the involvement of Indian development task force in executing vital infrastructure projects in Afghanistan underline the strong bonds being built between them. Moreover, Afghanistan’s survival preoccupation while combating Jihadi terrorism and the all pervasive American presence there has left limited space for China to develop better relationship.
But despite this setting, Afghanistan remains a vital part of China’s energy infrastructure linking China with Pakistan, Iran and the oil rich Central Asian nations. So it came as no surprise when China secured in May 2008 the $3.5 billion Aynak copper field project in the remote Logar Province, making it the largest foreign direct investment project in the Afghan history. The Aynak copper field probably contains ore worth up to $88 billion. Significantly, the Chinese bid included the cost of building a 400 MW coal based power plant and a railway line from western China through Tajikistan and Afghanistan to Pakistan. China’s readiness to make such a large investment in a troubled region underscores its strategic significance for her, apart from its value in developing Western China.
Bhutan has always enjoyed cordial relations with India. China has territorial claims in Bhutan which would probably be settled only when India and China resolve their border dispute. This ‘India factor’ and Bhutan’s strong religious and cultural affinity with Tibet appear to be in the way of China’s efforts to enhance its influence. However, in the coming years this could change when Bhutan from royalty ushers in multiparty democracy.
China’s effort to increase its influence has three facets – economic, military, and political. The emphasis and combinations vary from country to country conditioned by situational priorities. Both Pakistan and Bangladesh are visible examples of China building a win-win relationship using political, economic and military leverages.
The economic aspects include extending loans on low interest and commercial terms, aid, project financing, infrastructure financing etc.
Chinese aided projects invariably have visible national impact. Some of these projects include the Gwadar port complex in Pakistan and the proposed port project at Hambantota in Sri Lanka, and the construction of six vital bridges across major rivers in Bangladesh.
Most of these projects have the potential to add to China’s strategic access and mobility in the region. For example the new extension of the Xinjiang railway up to Kashgar about 500 kilometers (via the Karakoram highway) from the China-Pakistan border is complementary to the project to widen the Karakoram highway. It is significant that China is also involved in the construction of a rail line to link Gwadar with Pakistan-Iran railway line. Similarly, the extension of railway line in Tibet from Lhasa to Indian border region has strategic connotations to the Chinese assistance in developing lateral communications in Bangladesh.
China’s military initiatives in the region are quite a few. Briefly, it comes in three forms: weapons sale, military training, and providing access to weapon technology. Of course military relationship between Pakistan and China goes much beyond these limitations and include sharing of nuclear and missile technology. These are well documented. China used Pakistan’s urge to develop nuclear capability to build enormous strategic bonds that have grown over the years.
India’s military intervention was the key factor that enabled Bangladesh gain independence in 1971. When Bangladeshis were fighting for independence China had supported Pakistan. But it had no hesitation in changing its stance when the independent Bangladesh came into being. When a military coup overthrew the Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s regime, China got cosy with the military dictatorship. With the Bangladesh armed forces equipped now mostly with weapons and armament of Chinese origin, China is firmly established in the country’s strategic security initiatives.
As a result India finds it difficult to involve Bangladesh even in projects that are useful to both the countries and the region. Large scale Indian investments in Bangladesh have been discouraged while China has been awarded a project connected with the development of Chittagong port. The key to China’s success in Bangladesh is the fear of Indian domination (‘hegemony’ to use the ideologically correct term).
We see this happening all over in Sri Lanka. China is using the space provided by India’s reluctance to sell weapons to Sri Lanka for political reasons to increase its influence in Sri Lanka’s strategic spectrum. So the possibility of the Hambantota project ending up as a remake of the Gwadar episode in Pakistan is very much there.
China’s strategy in Nepal has probably been reworked to handle the Maoist dominated democratic regime now in power. China had supported King Gyanendra of Nepal when he was fighting the Maoists. When the Maoists overthrew him, China changed sides overnight. It increased the aid to the Maoist regime by 50 percent to 120 million Yuan over the 80 million Yuan given to the Gyanendra regime. The democratic regime’s readiness to suppress the peaceful protest of Tibetan refugees in Kathmandu recently when the Olympic flame was brought in showed its readiness to please the Chinese. If China’s influence expands rapidly in Nepal, it holds serious portends for New Delhi’s strategic security calculations.
Having gained a strong foothold in India’s neighbourhood, China is poised to increase its strategic clout enormously in this region. This is likely to haunt India’s strategic security planners in the coming years.
China’s South Asia strategy
The Chinese have tried to maintain cordial and correct relations with India despite frequent reiteration of their territorial claims. China has also been expanding the areas of cooperation with India on issues affecting the interest of both the countries. A small beginning has been made in conducting joint training exercise between two armies of the two countries. This strategy has enabled China to keep India’ concerns at bay, even as it increased its influence in India’s neighbourhood. Though the shadow of India continues to loom large over its neighbours, China has succeeded in improving bilateral relations with each one of them.
The very size of India and its seemingly all pervading soft power kindle a sense of disquiet if not fear among some of India’s neighbours. This ‘Indian bogey’ is also used as a pet ploy in the political gamesmanship of countries like Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal. Though India had taken remedial measures, for historical reasons the ‘bogey’ is likely to continue to hobble Indian articulation in the region. China appears to have leveraged itself as the answer to ward off the Indian enigma in these countries.
For instance, Pakistan and Bangladesh have inherited a historical sense of insecurity about India after Pakistan was created in 1947. This provided a convenient foothold for China to step in. India’s economic domination of its neighbours has invariably resulted in lopsided trade imbalance tilted in India’s favour. Building better trade relations with China offers a way for them to balance this tilt. There is widespread fear of Indian cultural melange submerging the national and ethnic identity of some of the small neighbours. These fears are compounded by the physical threat posed by India’s large armed forces.. In the case of Nepal and Sri Lanka this fear is latent though they have enjoyed friendly ties with India most of the time.
China appears to have prioritised its relationship with Pakistan and Bangladesh occupying the top slot. These two nations have built symbiotic relations with China over the years resulting in the creation of infrastructural and military assets that would come in handy for China, when required. They are followed by Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, Nepal, and Maldives in the Chinese order of priority.
Development of China-Afghanistan relations is hobbled by two factors: China’s multi-faceted relationship with Pakistan, and Kabul’s close relationship with India. Afghanistan has always enjoyed a cordial relationship with India, except perhaps during the period of Taliban rule. Their relationship is driven by historicity as much as their strategic synergies where they see Pakistan ranged against them. India’s liberal development aid to the Karzai government and the involvement of Indian development task force in executing vital infrastructure projects in Afghanistan underline the strong bonds being built between them. Moreover, Afghanistan’s survival preoccupation while combating Jihadi terrorism and the all pervasive American presence there has left limited space for China to develop better relationship.
But despite this setting, Afghanistan remains a vital part of China’s energy infrastructure linking China with Pakistan, Iran and the oil rich Central Asian nations. So it came as no surprise when China secured in May 2008 the $3.5 billion Aynak copper field project in the remote Logar Province, making it the largest foreign direct investment project in the Afghan history. The Aynak copper field probably contains ore worth up to $88 billion. Significantly, the Chinese bid included the cost of building a 400 MW coal based power plant and a railway line from western China through Tajikistan and Afghanistan to Pakistan. China’s readiness to make such a large investment in a troubled region underscores its strategic significance for her, apart from its value in developing Western China.
Bhutan has always enjoyed cordial relations with India. China has territorial claims in Bhutan which would probably be settled only when India and China resolve their border dispute. This ‘India factor’ and Bhutan’s strong religious and cultural affinity with Tibet appear to be in the way of China’s efforts to enhance its influence. However, in the coming years this could change when Bhutan from royalty ushers in multiparty democracy.
China’s effort to increase its influence has three facets – economic, military, and political. The emphasis and combinations vary from country to country conditioned by situational priorities. Both Pakistan and Bangladesh are visible examples of China building a win-win relationship using political, economic and military leverages.
The economic aspects include extending loans on low interest and commercial terms, aid, project financing, infrastructure financing etc.
Chinese aided projects invariably have visible national impact. Some of these projects include the Gwadar port complex in Pakistan and the proposed port project at Hambantota in Sri Lanka, and the construction of six vital bridges across major rivers in Bangladesh.
Most of these projects have the potential to add to China’s strategic access and mobility in the region. For example the new extension of the Xinjiang railway up to Kashgar about 500 kilometers (via the Karakoram highway) from the China-Pakistan border is complementary to the project to widen the Karakoram highway. It is significant that China is also involved in the construction of a rail line to link Gwadar with Pakistan-Iran railway line. Similarly, the extension of railway line in Tibet from Lhasa to Indian border region has strategic connotations to the Chinese assistance in developing lateral communications in Bangladesh.
China’s military initiatives in the region are quite a few. Briefly, it comes in three forms: weapons sale, military training, and providing access to weapon technology. Of course military relationship between Pakistan and China goes much beyond these limitations and include sharing of nuclear and missile technology. These are well documented. China used Pakistan’s urge to develop nuclear capability to build enormous strategic bonds that have grown over the years.
India’s military intervention was the key factor that enabled Bangladesh gain independence in 1971. When Bangladeshis were fighting for independence China had supported Pakistan. But it had no hesitation in changing its stance when the independent Bangladesh came into being. When a military coup overthrew the Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s regime, China got cosy with the military dictatorship. With the Bangladesh armed forces equipped now mostly with weapons and armament of Chinese origin, China is firmly established in the country’s strategic security initiatives.
As a result India finds it difficult to involve Bangladesh even in projects that are useful to both the countries and the region. Large scale Indian investments in Bangladesh have been discouraged while China has been awarded a project connected with the development of Chittagong port. The key to China’s success in Bangladesh is the fear of Indian domination (‘hegemony’ to use the ideologically correct term).
We see this happening all over in Sri Lanka. China is using the space provided by India’s reluctance to sell weapons to Sri Lanka for political reasons to increase its influence in Sri Lanka’s strategic spectrum. So the possibility of the Hambantota project ending up as a remake of the Gwadar episode in Pakistan is very much there.
China’s strategy in Nepal has probably been reworked to handle the Maoist dominated democratic regime now in power. China had supported King Gyanendra of Nepal when he was fighting the Maoists. When the Maoists overthrew him, China changed sides overnight. It increased the aid to the Maoist regime by 50 percent to 120 million Yuan over the 80 million Yuan given to the Gyanendra regime. The democratic regime’s readiness to suppress the peaceful protest of Tibetan refugees in Kathmandu recently when the Olympic flame was brought in showed its readiness to please the Chinese. If China’s influence expands rapidly in Nepal, it holds serious portends for New Delhi’s strategic security calculations.
Having gained a strong foothold in India’s neighbourhood, China is poised to increase its strategic clout enormously in this region. This is likely to haunt India’s strategic security planners in the coming years.
China’s Influence in India’s Neighbourhood – Part I
[Extracts of the paper presented by the writer, Col.R.Hariharan, at the India-Taiwan interaction, jointly organised by the Chennai Centre for China Studies and the Federation of Chambers of Commerce & Industry-Tamil Nadu Chapter at Chennai on August 1, 2008.]
China is aiming to quadruple its per capita GDP to $ 3200 by 2020 from $ 800 per capita attained in 2000. This would imply an average annual economic growth of 7.2% till 2020. In order to attain this, China will have to keep meeting the enormous appetite of its manufacturing economy for raw material and energy resources. On the other hand, it has to open up new markets for Chinese products while keeping the competitive economies of Asia and Americas at bay. Though this might be viewed as an exercise in international trade, it has to be driven by international relations backed by strategic defence capability.
Conscious of these imperatives, China’s international relations are developing on twin tracks: gaining sources of raw material across the globe, and increasing its strategic power projection. It is on a fast track development of missile capability and submarine fleet. According to some analysts China would be able to match the defence capability to of the U.S. by 2050. This is evident from the progress of the military modernisation programme of China which is making forays into space warfare, enhancing nuclear deterrence, naval expansion and acquiring rapid reaction and deployment capability.
China’s single minded pursuit for accessing resources has increased its visibility in Asia, Africa and South America. This has also made China support some of the most notorious regimes shunned by the rest of the world including Myanmar, Sudan, and Zimbabwe. At the same time it has embarked upon strategic infrastructure development in friendly countries that would improve China’s strategic reach.
This is reflected in China’s growing influence in South Asia where its presence is being firmed up in Pakistan, Bangladesh, Afghanistan and Sri Lanka, and possibly in Nepal at a future date. This has been a cause of security concern not only for India but also for the U.S.
China’s interest in South Asia
South Asia’s geographic location, midway between the oil rich Middle East and the South East Asian regions, lends it strategic importance. South Asia borders most of China’s sensitive southern boundary. This gives China the strategic option of opening direct access through South Asia to the international sea lanes of Indian Ocean. The Indian Ocean region has always been the scene of power play between Russia, the US and the West, and the theocratic Islamic states because 75 % of global merchant shipping passes through it.
In recent times, South Asia has also become a source of inspiration for Jihadi terrorism and separatism in China. Western parts of South Asia bordering China had been the fountainhead of Jihadi terrorism inspiring fellow Muslims across the borders in Xinjiang province. Similarly, the presence of large number of Tibetan refugees in India and Nepal with strong anti-Chinese sentiments had always been a source of potential trouble for China.
On the other hand South Asia holds a number of attractions for China. The region has a growing economy of over 1.5 billion people in different stages of economic and social development. Its huge, young population represent an enormous and untapped market for Chinese goods. Major political, economic and social problems within and between South Asian nations offer fertile ground for increasing China’s influence through political, military and economic means. The region has considerable natural resources including coal, iron ore, natural gas and oil waiting to be fully exploited.
The India factor
In developing its relations with South Asian nations China has to contend with Indian sensitivities. India borders seven of the eight South Asian nations and dwarfs them both geographically and population wise. This makes it easy for India to physically influence, if not intervene, its neighbouring countries. India’s huge population forms the bulk of South Asia’s teeming millions. Historically, strong Indian influence has been permeating the social, cultural and religious life of its neighbours. As a result India wields a strong political clout unmatched by any other county in this region.
India nearly a decade long economic boom ago is pushing it into the realms of becoming a global economic power by 2050. India’s technology training institutions, churning out large number of engineers and professionals, are making India a reservoir of qualified technology professionals. This has also enabled India to become a world leader in software development. India’s traditional entrepreneurial skill, coupled with sizeable natural resources, gives it a strong economic clout in the region. As India’s share of global trade increases, Indian industrial houses are nursing ambitions to become global players. India is also striving to expand its manufacturing base. It is also in the quest for oil and gas resources all over the world, though on a much smaller scale than China.
The Indian growth model, despite operating within the constraints of being the largest functional democracy in the world, offers a strong contrast to the Chinese single-party model of monolithic development. India’s democratic polity has given it political stability unmatched by most of the other South Asian nations. Its large and modern armed forces serve as guardians of democracy. This is in stark contrast to some other countries of the region i.e., Pakistan and Bangladesh where armed forces had usurped power and throttled democracy.
The failure of India and China to amicably resolve rival territorial claims along the largely unmarked boundary following China’s occupation of large chunks of territory in Aksai Chin and other border areas resulted in the two countries going to war in 1962. The 1962 war had kindled strong suspicion in India about China’s strategic intentions in the region. It had also generated anti-Chinese feeling in India that persists to this day. Despite many rounds of talks between the two countries, the border dispute remains unresolved and continues to cramp the free articulation of Sino-Indian relations.
A major irritant for China in India is the presence of the Tibetan spiritual leader Dalai Lama and his followers in exile, who are the visible face of Tibetan freedom. The presence of a large Tibetan refugee population in India clamouring for Tibetan independence is major cause of security concern for China. The Tibetan issue continues to be another rider in the development of smooth relations between India and China.
In recent years China’s has been viewing with growing concern India’s emergence as a dominant regional military power with nuclear weapon and missile capability. Its large armed forces are being modernised and the Indian navy is on way to acquire blue water capability. The progressive growth of India-US security synergies, adding strength to the strategic security reach of both the powers, has further fuelled China’s security concerns.
These strategic factors coupled with the growing economic muscle have made India a potential challenger to the growth of China’s influence on the South Asian turf. In tandem with the U.S., India could also become a formidable contender for power in other parts of the world in the coming years.
At the same time, India also holds some positive attractions for China. Its growing economy and very large middle class provide an attractive consumer market for Chinese goods. For the resource hungry China, India’s large coal, manganese and iron ore reserves are useful. India also finds doing business with China an attractive proposition and India-China two-way trade had been booming despite the frosty relations. It is set to reach $ 25 billion by 2010.
[To be continued]
China is aiming to quadruple its per capita GDP to $ 3200 by 2020 from $ 800 per capita attained in 2000. This would imply an average annual economic growth of 7.2% till 2020. In order to attain this, China will have to keep meeting the enormous appetite of its manufacturing economy for raw material and energy resources. On the other hand, it has to open up new markets for Chinese products while keeping the competitive economies of Asia and Americas at bay. Though this might be viewed as an exercise in international trade, it has to be driven by international relations backed by strategic defence capability.
Conscious of these imperatives, China’s international relations are developing on twin tracks: gaining sources of raw material across the globe, and increasing its strategic power projection. It is on a fast track development of missile capability and submarine fleet. According to some analysts China would be able to match the defence capability to of the U.S. by 2050. This is evident from the progress of the military modernisation programme of China which is making forays into space warfare, enhancing nuclear deterrence, naval expansion and acquiring rapid reaction and deployment capability.
China’s single minded pursuit for accessing resources has increased its visibility in Asia, Africa and South America. This has also made China support some of the most notorious regimes shunned by the rest of the world including Myanmar, Sudan, and Zimbabwe. At the same time it has embarked upon strategic infrastructure development in friendly countries that would improve China’s strategic reach.
This is reflected in China’s growing influence in South Asia where its presence is being firmed up in Pakistan, Bangladesh, Afghanistan and Sri Lanka, and possibly in Nepal at a future date. This has been a cause of security concern not only for India but also for the U.S.
China’s interest in South Asia
South Asia’s geographic location, midway between the oil rich Middle East and the South East Asian regions, lends it strategic importance. South Asia borders most of China’s sensitive southern boundary. This gives China the strategic option of opening direct access through South Asia to the international sea lanes of Indian Ocean. The Indian Ocean region has always been the scene of power play between Russia, the US and the West, and the theocratic Islamic states because 75 % of global merchant shipping passes through it.
In recent times, South Asia has also become a source of inspiration for Jihadi terrorism and separatism in China. Western parts of South Asia bordering China had been the fountainhead of Jihadi terrorism inspiring fellow Muslims across the borders in Xinjiang province. Similarly, the presence of large number of Tibetan refugees in India and Nepal with strong anti-Chinese sentiments had always been a source of potential trouble for China.
On the other hand South Asia holds a number of attractions for China. The region has a growing economy of over 1.5 billion people in different stages of economic and social development. Its huge, young population represent an enormous and untapped market for Chinese goods. Major political, economic and social problems within and between South Asian nations offer fertile ground for increasing China’s influence through political, military and economic means. The region has considerable natural resources including coal, iron ore, natural gas and oil waiting to be fully exploited.
The India factor
In developing its relations with South Asian nations China has to contend with Indian sensitivities. India borders seven of the eight South Asian nations and dwarfs them both geographically and population wise. This makes it easy for India to physically influence, if not intervene, its neighbouring countries. India’s huge population forms the bulk of South Asia’s teeming millions. Historically, strong Indian influence has been permeating the social, cultural and religious life of its neighbours. As a result India wields a strong political clout unmatched by any other county in this region.
India nearly a decade long economic boom ago is pushing it into the realms of becoming a global economic power by 2050. India’s technology training institutions, churning out large number of engineers and professionals, are making India a reservoir of qualified technology professionals. This has also enabled India to become a world leader in software development. India’s traditional entrepreneurial skill, coupled with sizeable natural resources, gives it a strong economic clout in the region. As India’s share of global trade increases, Indian industrial houses are nursing ambitions to become global players. India is also striving to expand its manufacturing base. It is also in the quest for oil and gas resources all over the world, though on a much smaller scale than China.
The Indian growth model, despite operating within the constraints of being the largest functional democracy in the world, offers a strong contrast to the Chinese single-party model of monolithic development. India’s democratic polity has given it political stability unmatched by most of the other South Asian nations. Its large and modern armed forces serve as guardians of democracy. This is in stark contrast to some other countries of the region i.e., Pakistan and Bangladesh where armed forces had usurped power and throttled democracy.
The failure of India and China to amicably resolve rival territorial claims along the largely unmarked boundary following China’s occupation of large chunks of territory in Aksai Chin and other border areas resulted in the two countries going to war in 1962. The 1962 war had kindled strong suspicion in India about China’s strategic intentions in the region. It had also generated anti-Chinese feeling in India that persists to this day. Despite many rounds of talks between the two countries, the border dispute remains unresolved and continues to cramp the free articulation of Sino-Indian relations.
A major irritant for China in India is the presence of the Tibetan spiritual leader Dalai Lama and his followers in exile, who are the visible face of Tibetan freedom. The presence of a large Tibetan refugee population in India clamouring for Tibetan independence is major cause of security concern for China. The Tibetan issue continues to be another rider in the development of smooth relations between India and China.
In recent years China’s has been viewing with growing concern India’s emergence as a dominant regional military power with nuclear weapon and missile capability. Its large armed forces are being modernised and the Indian navy is on way to acquire blue water capability. The progressive growth of India-US security synergies, adding strength to the strategic security reach of both the powers, has further fuelled China’s security concerns.
These strategic factors coupled with the growing economic muscle have made India a potential challenger to the growth of China’s influence on the South Asian turf. In tandem with the U.S., India could also become a formidable contender for power in other parts of the world in the coming years.
At the same time, India also holds some positive attractions for China. Its growing economy and very large middle class provide an attractive consumer market for Chinese goods. For the resource hungry China, India’s large coal, manganese and iron ore reserves are useful. India also finds doing business with China an attractive proposition and India-China two-way trade had been booming despite the frosty relations. It is set to reach $ 25 billion by 2010.
[To be continued]
India: Military Snippets-2
The recent success of the Manmohan Singh government in the vote of confidence in Parliament appear to have triggered a series of activities involving India and the U.S. that would have been swept under the carpet to stave off Left criticism. Here are some succulent bits
Indo-US defence procurement and production group meeting
According to a New Delhi datelined story the Indo-US defence procurement and production group met at the ministry of defence (MoD) headquarters in New Delhi on August 8. This is the first such meeting ever since the Left parties withdrew support to the government in July. The meeting is significant as India is in the final stages of clinching a US $2.1 billion deal for acquiring from Boeing eight maritime surveillance aircraft.
India to upgrade intelligence sharing with the U.S.
Another news report from New Delhi says that after the terrorist attack on its embassy staff in Kabul, New Delhi was actively considering upgrading the intelligence sharing mechanism with Washington. This would allow both sides to alert each other in case of a terrorist attack against either of the countries. It seems the CIA’s intelligence alert on the Indian embassy attack in Kabul was passed through the Afghanistan's National Security Directorate rather than directly to either the Ministry of Defence in New Delhi or the Indian Embassy in Washington. The much touted defence cooperation between India and the U.S. still appears to be limping trying to untangle the bureaucracy.
Indian Air Force pilots to join US Air Force training exercises
A Las Vegas, USA, news item says for the first time the India's air force pilots are likely to participate in US Air Force training exercises above the Nevada desert. This will be a major step forward in building closer India-US strategic defence cooperation.
Sixty five aircraft will be in the skies over a two week period during the exercise according to US Air Force officials. South Korean and French pilots will also be taking part in the combat exercises from Monday, August 11, 2008.
The report quoted a South Asia specialist as saying "This particular Air Force exercise is important because India is included among some very important allies."
The icing on the cake
It seems the U.S. is also learning from the Indian army. Captain Greg Adams and 29 US Special Forces commandos have joined a training programme at the Counter Insurgency Jungle Warfare School (CIJWS) at Vairangte in India's remote northeastern state of Mizoram. The US Green Berets are being trained on sub-conventional guerrilla warfare, especially in dealing with urban terrorism.
The report quoted Captain Adams as saying, "This is the most amazing military education facility anywhere.” He further added, The training we are currently being imparted here would go a long way in tackling terror. We have also shared our experiences with our Indian counterparts... the entire exercise is simply great."
So far, more than 156,000 soldiers have been trained at CIJWS, including about 1,500 foreign soldiers from 26 countries since the school was set up in 1970. The first batch for training from the US came in 2003 when a group of about 100 elite US commandos completed a three-week anti-insurgency combat training.
The school has also trained soldiers from Sri Lanka, Uzbekistan, Nepal, Malaysia, Indonesia and other countries. They are also expecting soldiers from China and other parts of the world soon according to the commandant of the CIJWS. The soldiers receive training in identifying improvised explosive devices (IEDs), jungle survival, counter terrorism, and interrogation techniques.
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Indo-US defence procurement and production group meeting
According to a New Delhi datelined story the Indo-US defence procurement and production group met at the ministry of defence (MoD) headquarters in New Delhi on August 8. This is the first such meeting ever since the Left parties withdrew support to the government in July. The meeting is significant as India is in the final stages of clinching a US $2.1 billion deal for acquiring from Boeing eight maritime surveillance aircraft.
India to upgrade intelligence sharing with the U.S.
Another news report from New Delhi says that after the terrorist attack on its embassy staff in Kabul, New Delhi was actively considering upgrading the intelligence sharing mechanism with Washington. This would allow both sides to alert each other in case of a terrorist attack against either of the countries. It seems the CIA’s intelligence alert on the Indian embassy attack in Kabul was passed through the Afghanistan's National Security Directorate rather than directly to either the Ministry of Defence in New Delhi or the Indian Embassy in Washington. The much touted defence cooperation between India and the U.S. still appears to be limping trying to untangle the bureaucracy.
Indian Air Force pilots to join US Air Force training exercises
A Las Vegas, USA, news item says for the first time the India's air force pilots are likely to participate in US Air Force training exercises above the Nevada desert. This will be a major step forward in building closer India-US strategic defence cooperation.
Sixty five aircraft will be in the skies over a two week period during the exercise according to US Air Force officials. South Korean and French pilots will also be taking part in the combat exercises from Monday, August 11, 2008.
The report quoted a South Asia specialist as saying "This particular Air Force exercise is important because India is included among some very important allies."
The icing on the cake
It seems the U.S. is also learning from the Indian army. Captain Greg Adams and 29 US Special Forces commandos have joined a training programme at the Counter Insurgency Jungle Warfare School (CIJWS) at Vairangte in India's remote northeastern state of Mizoram. The US Green Berets are being trained on sub-conventional guerrilla warfare, especially in dealing with urban terrorism.
The report quoted Captain Adams as saying, "This is the most amazing military education facility anywhere.” He further added, The training we are currently being imparted here would go a long way in tackling terror. We have also shared our experiences with our Indian counterparts... the entire exercise is simply great."
So far, more than 156,000 soldiers have been trained at CIJWS, including about 1,500 foreign soldiers from 26 countries since the school was set up in 1970. The first batch for training from the US came in 2003 when a group of about 100 elite US commandos completed a three-week anti-insurgency combat training.
The school has also trained soldiers from Sri Lanka, Uzbekistan, Nepal, Malaysia, Indonesia and other countries. They are also expecting soldiers from China and other parts of the world soon according to the commandant of the CIJWS. The soldiers receive training in identifying improvised explosive devices (IEDs), jungle survival, counter terrorism, and interrogation techniques.
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Friday, August 8, 2008
India: Military Snippets - 1
1. India successfully test fires third generation anti tank missile
On two successive days on August 6 and 7, Indian missile scientists successfully test fired the third generation hit-to-kill anti-tank missile, Nag, at Pokhran test range in Rajasthan, India. Media reports say on the first day the weapon system damaged the target, a stationary tank four km away. According to the Nag project director S.S. Mishra the missile achieved the maximum range and was on the target. The test-firing was preceded in the last few days by pre-launch transportation trials in the desert terrain "with full combat load"...
On the second day the third generation missile was successfully test fired on a "moving target.".Launched from the dedicated missile carrier, Namica, the fire-and-forget missile hit the specially-designed target, which was moving on rails at an intermediate range of two km.
2. Breaking the glass ceiling in the armed forces
A New Delhi report of August 6 says that the three secrvices of the Armed Forces have given in principle approval for the induction of women as permanent commissioned officers in non-combat streams. The Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) is expected to formally approve the proposal within the next month. According to media reports women granted permanent commission in all three forces are likely to be in position by 2013. So far women officers were given only short service commission. Short service officers cannot aspire for promotion to senior ranks. Grant of permanent commission will be a major shift in the staffing of Indian armed forces which are male dominated, with women holding senior positions only in the Army Medical Corps ann the Military Nursing Service. Perhaps the huge deficiencies in the officer cadre of the army induced the change over in policy on this aspect.
The Indian Air Force chief, Air Chief Marshal Fali Homi Major, is reported to have said on August 7 that there could come a time in future when women could fly the IAF fighter aircraft. He was replying a reporter in New Delhi whether women could ever be fighter pilots in the IAF. The IAF chief quipped, "It may happen in future, why not. The women in IAF are doing a good job.". But the he added that there was no proposal as of now to induct women as fighter pilots. "No proposal is under consideration right now. We will have to give a lot of thought on it"...So the ceiling might be cracking but the lid is on the cookie jars.
3. IAF sets up aerospace control base
The Indian Air Force chief Air Chief Marshal F.H. Major announced on August 8 that the IAF had set up a "dedicated space sub-branch" to coordinate all its activities on aerospace. The air chief said that the IAF had embarked on "a series of progressive steps to integrate assets in space into its operational plans". This was to synergise the capability that space provides along with the traditional systems in the IAF. "Military application (in space) is only beginning to find a foothold in this country," he added
On two successive days on August 6 and 7, Indian missile scientists successfully test fired the third generation hit-to-kill anti-tank missile, Nag, at Pokhran test range in Rajasthan, India. Media reports say on the first day the weapon system damaged the target, a stationary tank four km away. According to the Nag project director S.S. Mishra the missile achieved the maximum range and was on the target. The test-firing was preceded in the last few days by pre-launch transportation trials in the desert terrain "with full combat load"...
On the second day the third generation missile was successfully test fired on a "moving target.".Launched from the dedicated missile carrier, Namica, the fire-and-forget missile hit the specially-designed target, which was moving on rails at an intermediate range of two km.
2. Breaking the glass ceiling in the armed forces
A New Delhi report of August 6 says that the three secrvices of the Armed Forces have given in principle approval for the induction of women as permanent commissioned officers in non-combat streams. The Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) is expected to formally approve the proposal within the next month. According to media reports women granted permanent commission in all three forces are likely to be in position by 2013. So far women officers were given only short service commission. Short service officers cannot aspire for promotion to senior ranks. Grant of permanent commission will be a major shift in the staffing of Indian armed forces which are male dominated, with women holding senior positions only in the Army Medical Corps ann the Military Nursing Service. Perhaps the huge deficiencies in the officer cadre of the army induced the change over in policy on this aspect.
The Indian Air Force chief, Air Chief Marshal Fali Homi Major, is reported to have said on August 7 that there could come a time in future when women could fly the IAF fighter aircraft. He was replying a reporter in New Delhi whether women could ever be fighter pilots in the IAF. The IAF chief quipped, "It may happen in future, why not. The women in IAF are doing a good job.". But the he added that there was no proposal as of now to induct women as fighter pilots. "No proposal is under consideration right now. We will have to give a lot of thought on it"...So the ceiling might be cracking but the lid is on the cookie jars.
3. IAF sets up aerospace control base
The Indian Air Force chief Air Chief Marshal F.H. Major announced on August 8 that the IAF had set up a "dedicated space sub-branch" to coordinate all its activities on aerospace. The air chief said that the IAF had embarked on "a series of progressive steps to integrate assets in space into its operational plans". This was to synergise the capability that space provides along with the traditional systems in the IAF. "Military application (in space) is only beginning to find a foothold in this country," he added
Wednesday, August 6, 2008
Three dimensions of the Fourth Eelam War in Sri Lanka
By Col R Hariharan (Retd)
“It has become incumbent upon us to confront this group to the extent of our ability, deploying all the resources of the State, to protect the people of Sri Lanka and their democratic way of life. I must add that what I am doing is in no way different to what other democracies have done before, and continue to do, in the face of terrorism.” Mahinda Rajapaksa, President of Sri Lanka, at the Oxford University Student Union, May 13, 2008
Mahinda Rajapaksa’s statement given above to justify the decision of Sri Lanka to wage the Eelam War-4 against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) gives an inkling into his thinking. The war has been going on for nearly two and a half years now. Sri Lanka went to war in December 2005 even while the Norwegian-mediated peace process 2002 was in force. In the past Eelam wars Sri Lanka’s security forces had dithered at achieving decisive results despite initial successes. So the two Eelam wars fought by the probably security forces against the LTTE in the past had ended in a stalemate (the Eelam War-2 was fought by Indian troops in Sri Lanka between 1987 and 1990). And the LTTE had fared a little better, in ensuring its survival and in preserving its core leadership while sacrificing thousands of Tamil lives on and off the battle fields.
Considered in this backdrop, the security forces have achieved some notable success in present episode of the Eelam War. They have inflicted at least 40 to 50% casualties on the LTTE and captured over 55% of the territory the LTTE controlled at the beginning of the peace process in 2002. The security forces owe their military success not only to their better performance in battle field, numerical superiority of forces or preponderance of fire power but also to the unflinching support President Rajapaksa has been extending to the war effort, despite facing severe international criticism for resuming the war while the ceasefire agreement was in force. Buoyed by Sri Lanka’s early successes in the east in the current war, President Rajapaksa has expressed his confidence in “crushing” the LTTE by end of 2008.
The overall impact on Sri Lanka despite its successes so far in the Eelam War-4 had been terrible. So far the war has caused over 7000 casualties including about 5000 of the LTTE and 2000 of the army. As three to four divisions of the security forces are poised to launch their offensive on the main defences of the LTTE in Mannar, Muhamalai, Vavuniya and the Welioya sectors, much more casualties can be expected in the coming months. Already, the fall out of the war is affecting the Sri Lankan economy – inflation rate is touching 25%. Traditional tourist traffic has suffered and food and fuel prices have gone up. Sri Lanka had been under fire internationally for its dismal human rights record triggered by the war. Unless it improves, Sri Lanka may lose the duty free concessions for its exports to the EU under the GSP+ scheme due for renewal in 2009.
There are three dimensions – internal, international and Indian - to the current conflict in Sri Lanka. This conflict is likely to leave its impact on all the three dimensions unlike the earlier three episodes of the Eelam wars.
Internal dimension
The President had very strong reasons to take up the military option. Towards the end 2005 when the presidential poll was due, the nation was facing a political crisis with its inability to shore up the peace process, which was making no headway. The LTTE having submitted its interim self governing authority (ISGA) proposal without proper response from Sri Lanka was holding the political initiative. Despite the ceasefire, in the first three years of peace from 2002 the LTTE had an impressive tally of over 3000 violations of ceasefire painfully verified by the Nordic members of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission.
It had continued “recruiting” underage kids in its ranks despite international condemnation. It expanded its fighting capability, adding an air wing and strengthening its burgeoning Sea Tiger force. On the other hand it had put Sri Lanka on the defensive when its killer squads eliminated key anti-LTTE Tamil political and intelligence elements, military intelligence officers and members of the cabinet. Notable victims of the LTTE included Sri Lanka’s foreign minister Lakshman Kadirgamar, a vocal critic of the LTTE for its agenda of terror. These violations of the LTTE caused the EU and Canada to ban the outfit in their regions.
Compared to the LTTE, the Sri Lanka government’s record was barely ten percent of the LTTE count. Many of them related to human rights, curbing media rights, police harassment and highhandedness, and personal security violations.
In his run up to the presidential elections, in his election manifesto Mahinda Chintanaya Rajapaksa had articulated his opposition to the peace process 2002, and its attendant instrument of ceasefire signed by Sri Lanka with the LTTE. Indirectly the LTTE helped him get elected as it imposed a boycott of the polls in areas under its control, thereby depriving the benefit of Tamils votes for his opponent Ranil Wickramasinghe, the architect of the peace process. When Rajapaksa got elected on a thin majority through southern Sinhala votes, he started translating his poll promises into action programmes. Since then he has shown a single mindedness of purpose in implementing his Chintanaya. Going to war with LTTE well before he formally abrogated the ceasefire agreement on 16 January 2008 was part of his agenda.
Of course Sri Lanka had enough provocations from the LTTE to go to war. It had used the ceasefire period to buttress its claims as a de facto state on the threshold of becoming a legal entity. Eight months before the new President came to office, the LTTE unsuccessfully attempted to assassinate the army commander Lt Gen Sarath Fonseka. It also made an abortive attempt to kill the President’s brother and advisor Gotabaya Rajapaksa in the heart of Colombo high security zone. The attempt on the army commander was probably the trigger that unleashed the ire of armed forces held in check earlier while the two major political coalitions quibbled over how to respond to the LTTE. So when the newly elected President Rajapaksa came up with a military agenda, it found the security forces eager to take it up as a challenge to redeem their prestige and honour.
Through some clever political manipulation, President Rajapaksa has managed to tinker a Sinhala consensus of sorts to gather support for his policy to abandon the peace process and wage war. This has been brought about by splitting strong opposition parties like the United National Party (UNP) and the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna Party (JVP), and by selective intimidation of both homegrown and international peace lobbies campaigning against the war and muzzling the media opposed to his policies. His omnibus cabinet of over 100 ministers included many small parties and ensured he had sufficient support in parliament.
Before President Rajapaksa came to power the breakaway group of the LTTE headed by Karuna, the estranged Batticaloa leader was looking for political moorings to enable it to survive in the conflict between the two warring sides. Karuna had formed the Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Puligal (TMVP), a political party born out of the embers of the splinter group, which could not take off as both the major political parties did not want to publicly associate with it due to its unsavoury reputation.
The TMVP cadres continued to retain their arms and there were widespread complaints of extortion, intimidation and forceful recruitment of children against them. However, the President used the TMVP to support his operational effort, particularly in driving out the LTTE from the east. The successful “liberation” of the east enabled the President to gain a lot of prestige, and to pull in influential sections to his side. Before the east was won, they had been aghast at his style of political manipulation and governance.
His other actions including the de-merger of the northeastern province in deference to a Supreme Court decision, in spite of strong objection from peace lobbies and Tamil polity, have endeared him to the Sinhala population. In fact, parties like the JVP which had depended upon playing upon the Sinhala nationalist sentiments found the President had stolen their thunder. It was the success in the war effort so far that had made the President to go ahead with the implementation of the 13th amendment of the Constitution which had been held in abeyance in the east.
This amendment came about as a result of the India-Sri Lanka Agreement 1987. It had visualized the creation of a united northeastern provincial council to administer Tamil inhabited areas with limited autonomy. However, it was never fully implemented. The President has used the implementation of 13th amendment perhaps to satisfy those who accuse him of not providing even limited autonomy for Tamils.
In May 2008, the first ever poll for the newly created eastern provincial council was successfully conducted. With the three major ethnic communities in almost in equal proportion the eastern province is a sensitive barometer of popular sentiment. The President’s United Peoples Freedom Alliance (UPFA) struck an alliance with the TMVP and a splinter group of the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) for this election to come out with flying colours, capturing 20 seats while the UNP secured 15 seats and one seat each went to the JVP and the Tamil Democratic National Alliance.
There had been complaints against the UPFA and its TMVP partner about stuffing of ballot boxes and intimidation of voters. Such complaints are not unknown even during elections in the normal circumstances. Given this background, one could say the President has managed to get through the elections without major violence or large scale misconduct. The success of his coalition has gained the President a foothold in an area that was considered a UNP-SLMC stronghold. This is likely to further strengthen his party and demoralize the opposition further.
However, the larger issue of satisfying the aggrieved Tamil minority population still remains untouched. The President’s successful war effort has diverted popular attention from implementing a devolution package for Tamils to be worked out by an all party committee which has gone into hibernation after the President decided to conduct the eastern provincial council poll. The feeling of insecurity among Tamils, particularly businessmen, due to killings and kidnappings, and lack of enthusiasm in the government machinery to follow up has affected the public image of the government both at home and abroad.
In single-mindedly pursuing the military option President Rajapaksa had shown a remarkable similarity of intent to the LTTE chief V Prabhakaran. This has added a dangerous dimension to the Eelam War-4 making a “fight to the finish” a real possibility. But can that produce a lasting solution? It is most unlikely as wars with ethnic roots leave long-lasting scars in the psyche of people. In the long run, this poses a potential threat to ethnic reconciliation so essential for the country, than the enormous loss of men and material caused due to the prolonged war. And the Eelam War-4 is directly contributing to this danger.
International dimension
The Eelam War-4 has caused a lot of concern to the EU, Japan, Norway, and the US - the four co-chairs of the Tokyo Donors Conference – which had underwritten the now defunct peace process. But Rajapaksa had adroitly used the prevailing scenario of global war on terror to engage the LTTE militarily. His option has been made more acceptable to other nations as the LTTE is showing neither remorse nor an inclination to consider options other than warfare. On the other hand, the LTTE has continued with its terror tactics to carry out suicide bombing of civilians and government officials, the latest being the assassination of President Rajapaksa’s right hand man and minister Fernando Poulle by a suicide bomber last month.
The Eelam War-4 is taking place when the U.S., stung by 9/11 Al Qaeda attack, is assiduously promoting a global war on terror and implementing internationally networked anti-terror measures. These have made clandestine operations of terror groups to carry out money laundering, human trafficking, illegal weapons procurement and transfers, and extortions more difficult than ever before. As a result LTTE’s time-tested global support system is being torn asunder. The FBI sting operations carried out across the globe in 2006-07 to bust the LTTE efforts to procure missiles and other modern weapons and gadgetry are a good example of the results of the global war on terror. Thanks to international exchange of vital intelligence, Sri Lanka Navy in 2007 managed to destroy eight tramp ships of LTTE’s proxy shipping companies in Indian Ocean while gun running for the insurgents. This has practically put out the LTTE’s in-house capability to ship weapons in its own bottoms.
On the flip side, President Rajapaksa has tried to gain legitimacy for his military option by loudly proclaiming the Sri Lanka war on the LTTE as part of the global war on terror. This argument does not find many takers as many countries while sympathizing with Sri Lanka feel basically see it as a direct consequence of the Tamil struggle for autonomy and not as a part of Al Qaeda inspired terrorism. However, the international voices against the war are muted because the LTTE has gained the dubious reputation of the world’s most powerful internationally networked non state actor with a capability to wage irregular warfare in land, sea and air. As a result India, the EU, Canada and the US have banned the LTTE as a terrorist organization.
With the U.S.’s record tarnished by excesses of human rights violations in Afghanistan and Iraq with episodes like the Guantanamo Bay Camp for Al Qaeda suspects, the moral high ground of the West to question Sri Lanka’s human rights violations has become suspect. Western nations had been unhappy with Rajapaksa’s style of governance and warfare conducted much to the detriment of their peace effort. Generally, they had been supportive of the Sri Lanka government actions to cope up with the compulsions fighting the LTTE. Their economic and military support had been an important component of Sri Lanka’s ability to pursue the war option.
However, Western nations have strong anti-war and human rights lobbies apart from influential Tamil expatriate groups who are campaigning for international action against Sri Lanka for its human rights violations and humanitarian aberrations of war. So the West will be compelled to take some action in the coming months to bring Sri Lanka back to acceptable norms of conduct. As this could affect Sri Lankan economy, the President had been assiduously cultivating India, China, Pakistan, and Iran for their support to shore up Sri Lanka. While India will not supply arms it has strong economic links and assistance programme. Iran has promised to apportion up to $4 billion as aid to Sri Lanka while both China and Pakistan have been important sources of supply of arms. However, it is doubtful whether the Sri Lanka-Iran relations have any future in the face of strong U.S. opposition to such a development which has been made clear to Sri Lanka.
The Indian dimension
There had always been an Indian dimension to war and peace in Sri Lanka, though it varied in form and content from time to time. India’s Sri Lanka perceptions have been impacted by two constants. The first is the geo-strategic element relating to Sri Lanka’s location within India’s area of influence, overlooking the vital shipping lanes of Indian Ocean. Thus developments within Sri Lanka always have relevance to India’s national security. However, during the last decade, Indian strategic perspective has enlarged from its focus on military security of the Cold War days to economic and regional security issues in keeping with the global power and economic equations.
With India’s global trade growing at a fast pace, Sri Lanka is emerging as an important economic partner of its growth story. As a result trade and commerce is playing an important role in shaping India-Sri Lanka relations for a decade now. Close business and commercial links are being built ever since the two countries signed the Free Trade Agreement in 2002. Both the countries have worked hard to make it successful. The Indo-Sri Lanka trade is poised to exceed $ 4 billion by 2010. Indian entrepreneurs are investing heavily in Sri Lanka and Indian investment is flowing into many projects in the energy and infrastructure sectors in Sri Lanka. The economic security component is likely to continue as a major factor in the broadening spectrum of India’s strategic security considerations in the future also.
The other dimension relates to the problems of Tamil speaking minority population of Sri Lanka. Tamil is spoken by about 23 percent of Sri Lankan population composed of ethnic Tamils, Tamils of Indian origin who came as plantation labour, and Muslims. In the seventies the denial of Sri Lankan citizenship for Tamils of Indian origin had figured as an important issue in India -Sri Lanka relations. Over a period of time, this issue has been resolved to a large extent. However, since early eighties the struggle of ethnic Tamil minority in Sri Lanka for autonomy and preserving their distinct identity had evoked a lot of sympathy among the 60-million strong Tamil population in India. Traditionally Tamils of Tamil Nadu have been having close cultural, religious and linguistic affinity with Sri Lankan Tamils. Thus this issue became an important factor not only in shaping the course of Tamil Nadu politics but also India’s Sri Lanka policy.
Around 1976 when the Tamil political struggle for autonomy in Sri Lanka failed to make any progress, the demand for the creation of an independent state of Tamil Eelam gathered strength. And Tamil polity, which could not produce results, gave way to militant organisations to fight for a Tamil Eelam. The issue also assumed political dimensions of some consequence in Tamil Nadu. It gathered a lot of emotional momentum in July 1983 when thousands of Sri Lankan Tamil refugees landed in Tamil Nadu in a bid to escape Sinhala pogrom against them in Colombo. Since then the issue of devolution of powers to Tamil minority in Sri Lanka has remained an important factor in shaping India-Sri Lanka relations. Of course, there are a few perennial issues of lesser importance involving Tamil Nadu like the loss of traditional fishing grounds of Tamil Nadu fishermen when India-Sri Lanka territorial waters were demarcated, and fishing in Sri Lanka waters. But probably these have only a marginal impact on policy making
Since 1981 India’s Sri Lanka policy making has aimed at reconciling the twin considerations of developing closer strategic relations with Sri Lanka while ensuring the Tamil ethnic minority get a fair share of power within a united Sri Lanka. As a result, the India/Sri Lanka relationship had seen its ups and downs during the last two decades in keeping with ebb tide of the strategic developments in the region, and the progress of Sri Lanka’s Tamil conflict. The events of the period 1981-90 termed as “troubled years” by Prof Sahadevan have left indelible marks on the perceptions of both India and Sri Lanka about each other. From this point of view it may be considered as the decisive decade of India-Sri Lanka relations.
The Eelam War-4 now in progress for the third year was a logical sequence to the failure of all stakeholders to implement the peace process 2002 in good faith. However, India despite its strategic and ethnic interests in Sri Lanka had been interested bystander at best ever since the peace process started in 2002. India’s posture was probably based upon its own negative experience in the past which underscored that good intentions of the third party alone were not enough to bring peace in Sri Lanka. However, even in these circumstances India has made clear that while it stood for a united Sri Lanka while it supported a process of devolution of powers for Tamils and for this peace effort rather than war was the answer.
Ever since the peace process failed, the four co-chairs would probably like active involvement of India in the bid to revive the peace process. However, India is reluctant to do so because it has three practical problems in donning the role of a mediator once again. This probably reflects the public opinion prevalent in India on the issue. Many feel India’s past efforts to bring peace have not been recognized in Sri Lanka by both the Tamils and Sinhalas. And under such circumstances the present policy was probably the best option.
Firstly, India’s strategic relations with Sri Lanka being closer than ever before, India would not like to be involved in Sri Lanka conflict if it jeopardized its basic strategic and economic considerations in any way. As the present Sri Lanka regime has strong views on the subject, India would probably get involved more actively only when the circumstances are more opportune and have better chances of success of such intervention. Till then it will probably continue to try and influence Sri Lankan through diplomatic and economic means only.
The second aspect relates to the increasing Indian investments and assets in Sri Lanka. The security of these strategic assets requires a stable government in Sri Lanka. The LTTE despite its avowal of Tamil cause does not have a record of reliability and could act as a destabiliser of Sri Lanka. Hence, India probably feels there is sufficient cause for the Sri Lanka government to militarily reduce the LTTE to manageable proportions after which India could take up the revival of peace effort.
The LTTE and its future itself is the third road block in Indian involvement. The LTTE has a love-hate relationship with India. There is a popular belief both in India and Sri Lanka that there is widespread support and sympathy for the LTTE in Tamil Nadu. There is some confusion in understanding the Tamil mindset among non-Tamils (including Indians and Sri Lankans) about their support to the LTTE. This confusion prevails even among some people in Tamil Nadu also.
The people of Tamilnadu, like most of the Tamils all over the world, have always supported the struggle of Sri Lanka Tamils for their democratic rights. They will continue to do so till the Tamil aspirations are satisfied. Tamilnadu extended passionate support when the Tamil struggle turned into militancy in 1982. The support to militants gained legitimacy in after the Black July pogrom in 1983. Different Tamil Nadu political parties patronised different Tamil groups. While Tamil Eelam Organisation (TELO) had Dravida Munnetra Kazagham (DMK) leader Karunanidhi as a patron, his political rival MG Ramachandran of the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazagham (AIDMK) naturally favoured the LTTE, a contender for Tamil leadership against TELO.
However, two developments split this support base for militants in Tamilnadu in 1987: the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord, and the induction of the Indian Peace Keeping Force. The military involvement of the IPKF against the LTTE was not accepted by most of the Tamil people, who had romantic notions about it. But this notion was shattered when the LTTE carried out the killing of Rajiv Gandhi after meticulous planning. And after Vaiko, then a popular leader of the DMK, fell out with Karunanidhi over his overt support to the LTTE (among many other internal issues), there had been a change in Karunanidhi's attitude.
He had studiously distanced himself from the LTTE, ever since the people of the state adversely came out against the LTTE when Rajiv Gandhi was killed. Though the LTTE had been trying to cultivate him for sometime now, he had been careful in talking about them on the subject. Nothing illustrates this point better than a resolution adopted on April 24, 2008 in the Tamil Nadu state assembly. It called upon the Centre to take steps to bring peace in Sri Lanka. Its constructive tone for finding a peaceful resolution of the problem, rather than the polemical Tamil political rhetoric adopted in the past, is significant. Coincidentally, the resolution was passed when the Eelam War-4 hit new high of combat at Muhamalai causing heavy casualties on both sides.
The Sri Lanka Tamil issue is no more in the centre stage of Tamilnadu’s public or political agenda. However, if the refugee inflows increase it will stage among minor Tamil political partners in the coalition at the Centre. In principle the DMK is unlikely to change its stand in such circumstances. However, political compulsions will force it to toe the same line. The real danger is from the LTTE 'sleeper agents' in Tamil Nadu who have become active as a result of the war. Already a number of cases of clandestine shipments of essential stores, explosives, fuses, and other warlike material to the LTTE apprehended along the Tamil Nadu coast have been reported. Under this circumstance, it is unlikely the Indian government would take any action to encourage the LTTE despite the influence of coalition politics at Delhi on policy making.
The impact of the Eelam War-4 on India’s Sri Lanka policy is direct. The war is between the Sri Lanka government, a friendly neighbour, and the LTTE, a proscribed organisation in India. Unless the LTTE makes amends for its conduct India as a nation will not be able to change its attitude towards it. Given Prabhakaran’s ego-centric leadership it is unlikely he would allow the LTTE to deviate from its present course of war. This is rooted in his false belief that Tamils all over the world support him and the LTTE’s war. This is far from the ground reality.
The LTTE probably enjoys the smallest support base now when compared to the widespread support it had when it entered into the peace process in 2002. The pre-1983 generation that inspired Tamil militancy is fading into oblivion. The new generation uprooted from the red soil of Jaffna to other parts of Sri Lanka or overseas does not have the emotional inspiration for the LTTE ways, because the war has been going on for too long.
Conclusion
The aftermath of every war of the Eelam series starting from the first spell in 1979 saw enhanced the scope and content of warfare adding higher force levels, weaponry, and technical sophistication with the sole purpose of causing more casualties to people and national resources. Of course human rights and humanitarian considerations are the first casualties of every war and Sri Lanka’s Eelam wars are no exception. This pattern makes it weakens the chances of resuming a peace process. By these standards the Eelam War-4 has set many benchmarks even before it is finished. Sri Lankan Prime Minister Wickramanayake has recently clarified that there would be no more ceasefire agreements in future with the LTTE as it had exploited such agreements in the past.
While most of the nations including India and the four co-chairs underwriting the peace process have not been happy with the way President Rajapaksa’s style of politics, diplomacy or war, they know he has a hard task at hand in reigning in the LTTE. Their own exposures to the LTTE have made them to make allowances for it in the policy aberrations of Sri Lanka. However, it would be under estimating international opinion if the President takes international opinion for granted on two vital issues - human rights and upsetting the international power equation in this region.
While he could take palliative measures for improving Sri Lanka’s human rights record, developing closer relations with Iran is fraught with danger as it introduces a new power play of unknown proportions. None of the existing friends of Sri Lanka including the US and India are likely to welcome this development.
With the successful conduct of elections in the east, the President has proved a point that not only he can win the war but also usher in normal life and development in war torn areas. However, this would become true if only the efforts towards development in the east are not frittered away in the notorious corruption regimen that is endemic in Sri Lanka.
India will continue to occupy a large space in Sri Lanka’s strategic and economic picture. As the Indian government policy is unlikely to undergo any drastic change in essential basics, this relationship is likely to grow in the coming years not withstanding the fortunes of war.
Courtesy: Dialogue Quarterly, April-June 2008
“It has become incumbent upon us to confront this group to the extent of our ability, deploying all the resources of the State, to protect the people of Sri Lanka and their democratic way of life. I must add that what I am doing is in no way different to what other democracies have done before, and continue to do, in the face of terrorism.” Mahinda Rajapaksa, President of Sri Lanka, at the Oxford University Student Union, May 13, 2008
Mahinda Rajapaksa’s statement given above to justify the decision of Sri Lanka to wage the Eelam War-4 against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) gives an inkling into his thinking. The war has been going on for nearly two and a half years now. Sri Lanka went to war in December 2005 even while the Norwegian-mediated peace process 2002 was in force. In the past Eelam wars Sri Lanka’s security forces had dithered at achieving decisive results despite initial successes. So the two Eelam wars fought by the probably security forces against the LTTE in the past had ended in a stalemate (the Eelam War-2 was fought by Indian troops in Sri Lanka between 1987 and 1990). And the LTTE had fared a little better, in ensuring its survival and in preserving its core leadership while sacrificing thousands of Tamil lives on and off the battle fields.
Considered in this backdrop, the security forces have achieved some notable success in present episode of the Eelam War. They have inflicted at least 40 to 50% casualties on the LTTE and captured over 55% of the territory the LTTE controlled at the beginning of the peace process in 2002. The security forces owe their military success not only to their better performance in battle field, numerical superiority of forces or preponderance of fire power but also to the unflinching support President Rajapaksa has been extending to the war effort, despite facing severe international criticism for resuming the war while the ceasefire agreement was in force. Buoyed by Sri Lanka’s early successes in the east in the current war, President Rajapaksa has expressed his confidence in “crushing” the LTTE by end of 2008.
The overall impact on Sri Lanka despite its successes so far in the Eelam War-4 had been terrible. So far the war has caused over 7000 casualties including about 5000 of the LTTE and 2000 of the army. As three to four divisions of the security forces are poised to launch their offensive on the main defences of the LTTE in Mannar, Muhamalai, Vavuniya and the Welioya sectors, much more casualties can be expected in the coming months. Already, the fall out of the war is affecting the Sri Lankan economy – inflation rate is touching 25%. Traditional tourist traffic has suffered and food and fuel prices have gone up. Sri Lanka had been under fire internationally for its dismal human rights record triggered by the war. Unless it improves, Sri Lanka may lose the duty free concessions for its exports to the EU under the GSP+ scheme due for renewal in 2009.
There are three dimensions – internal, international and Indian - to the current conflict in Sri Lanka. This conflict is likely to leave its impact on all the three dimensions unlike the earlier three episodes of the Eelam wars.
Internal dimension
The President had very strong reasons to take up the military option. Towards the end 2005 when the presidential poll was due, the nation was facing a political crisis with its inability to shore up the peace process, which was making no headway. The LTTE having submitted its interim self governing authority (ISGA) proposal without proper response from Sri Lanka was holding the political initiative. Despite the ceasefire, in the first three years of peace from 2002 the LTTE had an impressive tally of over 3000 violations of ceasefire painfully verified by the Nordic members of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission.
It had continued “recruiting” underage kids in its ranks despite international condemnation. It expanded its fighting capability, adding an air wing and strengthening its burgeoning Sea Tiger force. On the other hand it had put Sri Lanka on the defensive when its killer squads eliminated key anti-LTTE Tamil political and intelligence elements, military intelligence officers and members of the cabinet. Notable victims of the LTTE included Sri Lanka’s foreign minister Lakshman Kadirgamar, a vocal critic of the LTTE for its agenda of terror. These violations of the LTTE caused the EU and Canada to ban the outfit in their regions.
Compared to the LTTE, the Sri Lanka government’s record was barely ten percent of the LTTE count. Many of them related to human rights, curbing media rights, police harassment and highhandedness, and personal security violations.
In his run up to the presidential elections, in his election manifesto Mahinda Chintanaya Rajapaksa had articulated his opposition to the peace process 2002, and its attendant instrument of ceasefire signed by Sri Lanka with the LTTE. Indirectly the LTTE helped him get elected as it imposed a boycott of the polls in areas under its control, thereby depriving the benefit of Tamils votes for his opponent Ranil Wickramasinghe, the architect of the peace process. When Rajapaksa got elected on a thin majority through southern Sinhala votes, he started translating his poll promises into action programmes. Since then he has shown a single mindedness of purpose in implementing his Chintanaya. Going to war with LTTE well before he formally abrogated the ceasefire agreement on 16 January 2008 was part of his agenda.
Of course Sri Lanka had enough provocations from the LTTE to go to war. It had used the ceasefire period to buttress its claims as a de facto state on the threshold of becoming a legal entity. Eight months before the new President came to office, the LTTE unsuccessfully attempted to assassinate the army commander Lt Gen Sarath Fonseka. It also made an abortive attempt to kill the President’s brother and advisor Gotabaya Rajapaksa in the heart of Colombo high security zone. The attempt on the army commander was probably the trigger that unleashed the ire of armed forces held in check earlier while the two major political coalitions quibbled over how to respond to the LTTE. So when the newly elected President Rajapaksa came up with a military agenda, it found the security forces eager to take it up as a challenge to redeem their prestige and honour.
Through some clever political manipulation, President Rajapaksa has managed to tinker a Sinhala consensus of sorts to gather support for his policy to abandon the peace process and wage war. This has been brought about by splitting strong opposition parties like the United National Party (UNP) and the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna Party (JVP), and by selective intimidation of both homegrown and international peace lobbies campaigning against the war and muzzling the media opposed to his policies. His omnibus cabinet of over 100 ministers included many small parties and ensured he had sufficient support in parliament.
Before President Rajapaksa came to power the breakaway group of the LTTE headed by Karuna, the estranged Batticaloa leader was looking for political moorings to enable it to survive in the conflict between the two warring sides. Karuna had formed the Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Puligal (TMVP), a political party born out of the embers of the splinter group, which could not take off as both the major political parties did not want to publicly associate with it due to its unsavoury reputation.
The TMVP cadres continued to retain their arms and there were widespread complaints of extortion, intimidation and forceful recruitment of children against them. However, the President used the TMVP to support his operational effort, particularly in driving out the LTTE from the east. The successful “liberation” of the east enabled the President to gain a lot of prestige, and to pull in influential sections to his side. Before the east was won, they had been aghast at his style of political manipulation and governance.
His other actions including the de-merger of the northeastern province in deference to a Supreme Court decision, in spite of strong objection from peace lobbies and Tamil polity, have endeared him to the Sinhala population. In fact, parties like the JVP which had depended upon playing upon the Sinhala nationalist sentiments found the President had stolen their thunder. It was the success in the war effort so far that had made the President to go ahead with the implementation of the 13th amendment of the Constitution which had been held in abeyance in the east.
This amendment came about as a result of the India-Sri Lanka Agreement 1987. It had visualized the creation of a united northeastern provincial council to administer Tamil inhabited areas with limited autonomy. However, it was never fully implemented. The President has used the implementation of 13th amendment perhaps to satisfy those who accuse him of not providing even limited autonomy for Tamils.
In May 2008, the first ever poll for the newly created eastern provincial council was successfully conducted. With the three major ethnic communities in almost in equal proportion the eastern province is a sensitive barometer of popular sentiment. The President’s United Peoples Freedom Alliance (UPFA) struck an alliance with the TMVP and a splinter group of the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) for this election to come out with flying colours, capturing 20 seats while the UNP secured 15 seats and one seat each went to the JVP and the Tamil Democratic National Alliance.
There had been complaints against the UPFA and its TMVP partner about stuffing of ballot boxes and intimidation of voters. Such complaints are not unknown even during elections in the normal circumstances. Given this background, one could say the President has managed to get through the elections without major violence or large scale misconduct. The success of his coalition has gained the President a foothold in an area that was considered a UNP-SLMC stronghold. This is likely to further strengthen his party and demoralize the opposition further.
However, the larger issue of satisfying the aggrieved Tamil minority population still remains untouched. The President’s successful war effort has diverted popular attention from implementing a devolution package for Tamils to be worked out by an all party committee which has gone into hibernation after the President decided to conduct the eastern provincial council poll. The feeling of insecurity among Tamils, particularly businessmen, due to killings and kidnappings, and lack of enthusiasm in the government machinery to follow up has affected the public image of the government both at home and abroad.
In single-mindedly pursuing the military option President Rajapaksa had shown a remarkable similarity of intent to the LTTE chief V Prabhakaran. This has added a dangerous dimension to the Eelam War-4 making a “fight to the finish” a real possibility. But can that produce a lasting solution? It is most unlikely as wars with ethnic roots leave long-lasting scars in the psyche of people. In the long run, this poses a potential threat to ethnic reconciliation so essential for the country, than the enormous loss of men and material caused due to the prolonged war. And the Eelam War-4 is directly contributing to this danger.
International dimension
The Eelam War-4 has caused a lot of concern to the EU, Japan, Norway, and the US - the four co-chairs of the Tokyo Donors Conference – which had underwritten the now defunct peace process. But Rajapaksa had adroitly used the prevailing scenario of global war on terror to engage the LTTE militarily. His option has been made more acceptable to other nations as the LTTE is showing neither remorse nor an inclination to consider options other than warfare. On the other hand, the LTTE has continued with its terror tactics to carry out suicide bombing of civilians and government officials, the latest being the assassination of President Rajapaksa’s right hand man and minister Fernando Poulle by a suicide bomber last month.
The Eelam War-4 is taking place when the U.S., stung by 9/11 Al Qaeda attack, is assiduously promoting a global war on terror and implementing internationally networked anti-terror measures. These have made clandestine operations of terror groups to carry out money laundering, human trafficking, illegal weapons procurement and transfers, and extortions more difficult than ever before. As a result LTTE’s time-tested global support system is being torn asunder. The FBI sting operations carried out across the globe in 2006-07 to bust the LTTE efforts to procure missiles and other modern weapons and gadgetry are a good example of the results of the global war on terror. Thanks to international exchange of vital intelligence, Sri Lanka Navy in 2007 managed to destroy eight tramp ships of LTTE’s proxy shipping companies in Indian Ocean while gun running for the insurgents. This has practically put out the LTTE’s in-house capability to ship weapons in its own bottoms.
On the flip side, President Rajapaksa has tried to gain legitimacy for his military option by loudly proclaiming the Sri Lanka war on the LTTE as part of the global war on terror. This argument does not find many takers as many countries while sympathizing with Sri Lanka feel basically see it as a direct consequence of the Tamil struggle for autonomy and not as a part of Al Qaeda inspired terrorism. However, the international voices against the war are muted because the LTTE has gained the dubious reputation of the world’s most powerful internationally networked non state actor with a capability to wage irregular warfare in land, sea and air. As a result India, the EU, Canada and the US have banned the LTTE as a terrorist organization.
With the U.S.’s record tarnished by excesses of human rights violations in Afghanistan and Iraq with episodes like the Guantanamo Bay Camp for Al Qaeda suspects, the moral high ground of the West to question Sri Lanka’s human rights violations has become suspect. Western nations had been unhappy with Rajapaksa’s style of governance and warfare conducted much to the detriment of their peace effort. Generally, they had been supportive of the Sri Lanka government actions to cope up with the compulsions fighting the LTTE. Their economic and military support had been an important component of Sri Lanka’s ability to pursue the war option.
However, Western nations have strong anti-war and human rights lobbies apart from influential Tamil expatriate groups who are campaigning for international action against Sri Lanka for its human rights violations and humanitarian aberrations of war. So the West will be compelled to take some action in the coming months to bring Sri Lanka back to acceptable norms of conduct. As this could affect Sri Lankan economy, the President had been assiduously cultivating India, China, Pakistan, and Iran for their support to shore up Sri Lanka. While India will not supply arms it has strong economic links and assistance programme. Iran has promised to apportion up to $4 billion as aid to Sri Lanka while both China and Pakistan have been important sources of supply of arms. However, it is doubtful whether the Sri Lanka-Iran relations have any future in the face of strong U.S. opposition to such a development which has been made clear to Sri Lanka.
The Indian dimension
There had always been an Indian dimension to war and peace in Sri Lanka, though it varied in form and content from time to time. India’s Sri Lanka perceptions have been impacted by two constants. The first is the geo-strategic element relating to Sri Lanka’s location within India’s area of influence, overlooking the vital shipping lanes of Indian Ocean. Thus developments within Sri Lanka always have relevance to India’s national security. However, during the last decade, Indian strategic perspective has enlarged from its focus on military security of the Cold War days to economic and regional security issues in keeping with the global power and economic equations.
With India’s global trade growing at a fast pace, Sri Lanka is emerging as an important economic partner of its growth story. As a result trade and commerce is playing an important role in shaping India-Sri Lanka relations for a decade now. Close business and commercial links are being built ever since the two countries signed the Free Trade Agreement in 2002. Both the countries have worked hard to make it successful. The Indo-Sri Lanka trade is poised to exceed $ 4 billion by 2010. Indian entrepreneurs are investing heavily in Sri Lanka and Indian investment is flowing into many projects in the energy and infrastructure sectors in Sri Lanka. The economic security component is likely to continue as a major factor in the broadening spectrum of India’s strategic security considerations in the future also.
The other dimension relates to the problems of Tamil speaking minority population of Sri Lanka. Tamil is spoken by about 23 percent of Sri Lankan population composed of ethnic Tamils, Tamils of Indian origin who came as plantation labour, and Muslims. In the seventies the denial of Sri Lankan citizenship for Tamils of Indian origin had figured as an important issue in India -Sri Lanka relations. Over a period of time, this issue has been resolved to a large extent. However, since early eighties the struggle of ethnic Tamil minority in Sri Lanka for autonomy and preserving their distinct identity had evoked a lot of sympathy among the 60-million strong Tamil population in India. Traditionally Tamils of Tamil Nadu have been having close cultural, religious and linguistic affinity with Sri Lankan Tamils. Thus this issue became an important factor not only in shaping the course of Tamil Nadu politics but also India’s Sri Lanka policy.
Around 1976 when the Tamil political struggle for autonomy in Sri Lanka failed to make any progress, the demand for the creation of an independent state of Tamil Eelam gathered strength. And Tamil polity, which could not produce results, gave way to militant organisations to fight for a Tamil Eelam. The issue also assumed political dimensions of some consequence in Tamil Nadu. It gathered a lot of emotional momentum in July 1983 when thousands of Sri Lankan Tamil refugees landed in Tamil Nadu in a bid to escape Sinhala pogrom against them in Colombo. Since then the issue of devolution of powers to Tamil minority in Sri Lanka has remained an important factor in shaping India-Sri Lanka relations. Of course, there are a few perennial issues of lesser importance involving Tamil Nadu like the loss of traditional fishing grounds of Tamil Nadu fishermen when India-Sri Lanka territorial waters were demarcated, and fishing in Sri Lanka waters. But probably these have only a marginal impact on policy making
Since 1981 India’s Sri Lanka policy making has aimed at reconciling the twin considerations of developing closer strategic relations with Sri Lanka while ensuring the Tamil ethnic minority get a fair share of power within a united Sri Lanka. As a result, the India/Sri Lanka relationship had seen its ups and downs during the last two decades in keeping with ebb tide of the strategic developments in the region, and the progress of Sri Lanka’s Tamil conflict. The events of the period 1981-90 termed as “troubled years” by Prof Sahadevan have left indelible marks on the perceptions of both India and Sri Lanka about each other. From this point of view it may be considered as the decisive decade of India-Sri Lanka relations.
The Eelam War-4 now in progress for the third year was a logical sequence to the failure of all stakeholders to implement the peace process 2002 in good faith. However, India despite its strategic and ethnic interests in Sri Lanka had been interested bystander at best ever since the peace process started in 2002. India’s posture was probably based upon its own negative experience in the past which underscored that good intentions of the third party alone were not enough to bring peace in Sri Lanka. However, even in these circumstances India has made clear that while it stood for a united Sri Lanka while it supported a process of devolution of powers for Tamils and for this peace effort rather than war was the answer.
Ever since the peace process failed, the four co-chairs would probably like active involvement of India in the bid to revive the peace process. However, India is reluctant to do so because it has three practical problems in donning the role of a mediator once again. This probably reflects the public opinion prevalent in India on the issue. Many feel India’s past efforts to bring peace have not been recognized in Sri Lanka by both the Tamils and Sinhalas. And under such circumstances the present policy was probably the best option.
Firstly, India’s strategic relations with Sri Lanka being closer than ever before, India would not like to be involved in Sri Lanka conflict if it jeopardized its basic strategic and economic considerations in any way. As the present Sri Lanka regime has strong views on the subject, India would probably get involved more actively only when the circumstances are more opportune and have better chances of success of such intervention. Till then it will probably continue to try and influence Sri Lankan through diplomatic and economic means only.
The second aspect relates to the increasing Indian investments and assets in Sri Lanka. The security of these strategic assets requires a stable government in Sri Lanka. The LTTE despite its avowal of Tamil cause does not have a record of reliability and could act as a destabiliser of Sri Lanka. Hence, India probably feels there is sufficient cause for the Sri Lanka government to militarily reduce the LTTE to manageable proportions after which India could take up the revival of peace effort.
The LTTE and its future itself is the third road block in Indian involvement. The LTTE has a love-hate relationship with India. There is a popular belief both in India and Sri Lanka that there is widespread support and sympathy for the LTTE in Tamil Nadu. There is some confusion in understanding the Tamil mindset among non-Tamils (including Indians and Sri Lankans) about their support to the LTTE. This confusion prevails even among some people in Tamil Nadu also.
The people of Tamilnadu, like most of the Tamils all over the world, have always supported the struggle of Sri Lanka Tamils for their democratic rights. They will continue to do so till the Tamil aspirations are satisfied. Tamilnadu extended passionate support when the Tamil struggle turned into militancy in 1982. The support to militants gained legitimacy in after the Black July pogrom in 1983. Different Tamil Nadu political parties patronised different Tamil groups. While Tamil Eelam Organisation (TELO) had Dravida Munnetra Kazagham (DMK) leader Karunanidhi as a patron, his political rival MG Ramachandran of the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazagham (AIDMK) naturally favoured the LTTE, a contender for Tamil leadership against TELO.
However, two developments split this support base for militants in Tamilnadu in 1987: the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord, and the induction of the Indian Peace Keeping Force. The military involvement of the IPKF against the LTTE was not accepted by most of the Tamil people, who had romantic notions about it. But this notion was shattered when the LTTE carried out the killing of Rajiv Gandhi after meticulous planning. And after Vaiko, then a popular leader of the DMK, fell out with Karunanidhi over his overt support to the LTTE (among many other internal issues), there had been a change in Karunanidhi's attitude.
He had studiously distanced himself from the LTTE, ever since the people of the state adversely came out against the LTTE when Rajiv Gandhi was killed. Though the LTTE had been trying to cultivate him for sometime now, he had been careful in talking about them on the subject. Nothing illustrates this point better than a resolution adopted on April 24, 2008 in the Tamil Nadu state assembly. It called upon the Centre to take steps to bring peace in Sri Lanka. Its constructive tone for finding a peaceful resolution of the problem, rather than the polemical Tamil political rhetoric adopted in the past, is significant. Coincidentally, the resolution was passed when the Eelam War-4 hit new high of combat at Muhamalai causing heavy casualties on both sides.
The Sri Lanka Tamil issue is no more in the centre stage of Tamilnadu’s public or political agenda. However, if the refugee inflows increase it will stage among minor Tamil political partners in the coalition at the Centre. In principle the DMK is unlikely to change its stand in such circumstances. However, political compulsions will force it to toe the same line. The real danger is from the LTTE 'sleeper agents' in Tamil Nadu who have become active as a result of the war. Already a number of cases of clandestine shipments of essential stores, explosives, fuses, and other warlike material to the LTTE apprehended along the Tamil Nadu coast have been reported. Under this circumstance, it is unlikely the Indian government would take any action to encourage the LTTE despite the influence of coalition politics at Delhi on policy making.
The impact of the Eelam War-4 on India’s Sri Lanka policy is direct. The war is between the Sri Lanka government, a friendly neighbour, and the LTTE, a proscribed organisation in India. Unless the LTTE makes amends for its conduct India as a nation will not be able to change its attitude towards it. Given Prabhakaran’s ego-centric leadership it is unlikely he would allow the LTTE to deviate from its present course of war. This is rooted in his false belief that Tamils all over the world support him and the LTTE’s war. This is far from the ground reality.
The LTTE probably enjoys the smallest support base now when compared to the widespread support it had when it entered into the peace process in 2002. The pre-1983 generation that inspired Tamil militancy is fading into oblivion. The new generation uprooted from the red soil of Jaffna to other parts of Sri Lanka or overseas does not have the emotional inspiration for the LTTE ways, because the war has been going on for too long.
Conclusion
The aftermath of every war of the Eelam series starting from the first spell in 1979 saw enhanced the scope and content of warfare adding higher force levels, weaponry, and technical sophistication with the sole purpose of causing more casualties to people and national resources. Of course human rights and humanitarian considerations are the first casualties of every war and Sri Lanka’s Eelam wars are no exception. This pattern makes it weakens the chances of resuming a peace process. By these standards the Eelam War-4 has set many benchmarks even before it is finished. Sri Lankan Prime Minister Wickramanayake has recently clarified that there would be no more ceasefire agreements in future with the LTTE as it had exploited such agreements in the past.
While most of the nations including India and the four co-chairs underwriting the peace process have not been happy with the way President Rajapaksa’s style of politics, diplomacy or war, they know he has a hard task at hand in reigning in the LTTE. Their own exposures to the LTTE have made them to make allowances for it in the policy aberrations of Sri Lanka. However, it would be under estimating international opinion if the President takes international opinion for granted on two vital issues - human rights and upsetting the international power equation in this region.
While he could take palliative measures for improving Sri Lanka’s human rights record, developing closer relations with Iran is fraught with danger as it introduces a new power play of unknown proportions. None of the existing friends of Sri Lanka including the US and India are likely to welcome this development.
With the successful conduct of elections in the east, the President has proved a point that not only he can win the war but also usher in normal life and development in war torn areas. However, this would become true if only the efforts towards development in the east are not frittered away in the notorious corruption regimen that is endemic in Sri Lanka.
India will continue to occupy a large space in Sri Lanka’s strategic and economic picture. As the Indian government policy is unlikely to undergo any drastic change in essential basics, this relationship is likely to grow in the coming years not withstanding the fortunes of war.
Courtesy: Dialogue Quarterly, April-June 2008
Sri Lanka: Military and the Mess Up in Media Relations
"The Sirasa TV crew who went to cover the opening of the second flyover in Kelaniya met with hostility from the bodyguards of Minister Mervyn Silva. An eye witness at the scene claimed that the minister had inquired whether a Sirasa TV crew was present and upon identification had ordered his guards to forcibly remove the video tapes from the camera." – News item in a Colombo daily August 5, 2008.
The above news item is the latest episode in the Sri Lanka Government's mess up of media relations during the last two years. Government representatives have generally been defensive if not out rightly hostile in responding to media's quest for information. Most of the media criticism relate to issues of governance – corruption, nepotism, misuse of office, violation of human rights, use of violence and intimidation against dissent etc. Only a few relate to the armed forces and conduct of military operations.
Normally, these issues would be discussed in parliament. But that avenue had not been effective as the government appears to have increasingly adopted "direct action" as the method to handle criticism. Media representatives writing critically of the government in particular have been victims of violent attacks, intimidation, threats and calumny.
The regime's attitude towards media freedom has drawn a lot of unsavoury international criticism. It is no consolation to scribes that similar trends have been noticed now and then in other countries of South Asia as well.
The successful operations of security forces against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have contributed to the continuing popularity of President Mahinda Rajapaksa among the masses. The security forces, particularly the army, unlike any other arm of the government have been paying a high price for their success. Despite this, the security forces had drawn some flack in defence columns of a few newspapers not only on the conduct of operations but also on issues of nepotism, corruption, and misinformation.
This has not gone well with the security forces as seen in Sri Lanka Army Commander Lt Gen Sarath Fonseka's recent interview to a Colombo Sunday newspaper. Here are some excerpts from this candid interview particularly on media and media freedom:
Question: What is the role you expect the media to play during the time of war?
Answer: War or no war, the media should write in the interest of the country and not to please their favourites. The media is supposed to play a neutral role to educate people. They are not supposed to create situations where they groom people and make heroes out of them. I do not think that certain media in this country is doing their duty with a sense of responsibility.
We know that they are being bribed, given 'drinks,' treated in restaurants and they have their own vested interests. And is it ethical them to go for agendas misleading people?
These so called media guys are not responsible to the people and they are not entitled to such media freedom. Media freedom is there for you to do the right thing and to be fair by everybody. Nobody has given freedom for anybody to drive their own agendas. We know very well about those media people who take bribes, write and voice their opinion for some personal gains… … … So, especially the media people should behave well and set an example to others. To me, those who stage protests with unshaven beards, long hairs and wearing costumes like in fancy dress competitions are not scribes who are clamouring for media freedom but a gang of thugs.
The General's outburst is symptomatic of how armies generally react to media criticism. This state of affairs is not only in Sri Lanka, but in most of the other countries in a similar situation. His views will strike a sympathetic chord among many of his counterparts in other countries, though they might not air them in public. This is because governments and armed forces have not yet come to terms with the 21st century phenomenon of citizen's right to information.
Basically, both the military and media represent committed people who believe in their cause – the armies assume they are custodians of national security, while the media feel they are the guardians of freedom of expression. There is an element of truth in both claims. When both of them interact, inherent contradiction in their coexistence comes to the fore. This has to do with their mindsets. I can claim to have some insights into their mindsets because I have worked both as a journalist and a career military officer by choice.
The uniformed forces, particularly the army, have a macho image of themselves. This comes due to their leadership, training, discipline, and organized way of doing things known popularly as regimentation. On the other hand, media lacks uniformity; to them discipline relates only to deadlines or catching live news. If the military prides itself in smart turnout, many members of the media have a studied shabbiness about them. (I think Gen Fonseka was not far off the mark on this. I have always wondered why media persons cannot groom themselves better!).
Unlike military men, media operators belong to the freewheeling, iconoclastic, and often abrasive, collection of many kinds who would rather question than accept what is told to them. If secrecy and security are watchwords of military, scoops and sting operations are the tools of trade of media. Armed forces have a great faith in the use of force to settle issues, just as the media puts its faith in their own words of wisdom and world view. The army men do not hesitate to use fisticuffs, and the media are not averse to use the poison pen.
To top it all, both the military and media are treated as holy cows of society. Both are patronised by politicians and political parties to articulate power in different ways. So they do not have the resilience to weather criticism unlike the thick skinned political class. Wars are power projections of the rulers and so both the armed forces and the media become part of political polemics between the ruling and the opposition parties. Politicians always use the success and failures of the conduct of war as a stick to drum up support or opposition to the regime in power. And the media comes in handy for such campaigns.
If the military is frozen in the 20th century mindset of inherent righteousness of their actions, the media riding the 21st century war of TRP rating and circulation sensationalise any news item including military matters. In this setting, when media critically reports military operations, the military men feel the media is judgemental, disregarding the ordeal of fire undergone by the soldiers. It is true that generally the media's level of military knowledge is low, just as the military's knowledge of media is poor. So when media carries a half baked report, the military suspects the intention behind it.
The accountability of the media is to the public and not to the government. Thus it is qualitatively different from the accountability of the armed forces. So the armed forces cannot expect the media to be more accountable than the ordinary citizen who wants to know what is happening at the war front. This is the harsh truth of modern media.
In counter insurgency wars every soldier or militant killed or wounded affects the lives of scores of others not involved in the war. So whatever is the result of military operation, some section of the population or media will blame the armed forces. The armed forces have to understand this and adapt their style to provide more information.
The armed forces have no choice but to enlist the support of media as a change agent for influencing public opinion in counter insurgency war. Military has to learn to handle media criticism. Generally the security forces' complaints about media fall under three categories – misinformation, lack of accountability, and compromise of security.
These can be overcome by having a media friendly style. Facilitating information gathering, rather than providing canned information bytes, and providing knowledge inputs produces a friendlier media. Building a media friendly attitude among forces during peace times will pay better dividends in times of war.
Greater transparency on issues of military administration not only builds public credibility but also tones up discipline of armed forces and improves their morale. And that should be the ultimate aim of armed forces - to build a better force regardless of what media feels.
The above news item is the latest episode in the Sri Lanka Government's mess up of media relations during the last two years. Government representatives have generally been defensive if not out rightly hostile in responding to media's quest for information. Most of the media criticism relate to issues of governance – corruption, nepotism, misuse of office, violation of human rights, use of violence and intimidation against dissent etc. Only a few relate to the armed forces and conduct of military operations.
Normally, these issues would be discussed in parliament. But that avenue had not been effective as the government appears to have increasingly adopted "direct action" as the method to handle criticism. Media representatives writing critically of the government in particular have been victims of violent attacks, intimidation, threats and calumny.
The regime's attitude towards media freedom has drawn a lot of unsavoury international criticism. It is no consolation to scribes that similar trends have been noticed now and then in other countries of South Asia as well.
The successful operations of security forces against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have contributed to the continuing popularity of President Mahinda Rajapaksa among the masses. The security forces, particularly the army, unlike any other arm of the government have been paying a high price for their success. Despite this, the security forces had drawn some flack in defence columns of a few newspapers not only on the conduct of operations but also on issues of nepotism, corruption, and misinformation.
This has not gone well with the security forces as seen in Sri Lanka Army Commander Lt Gen Sarath Fonseka's recent interview to a Colombo Sunday newspaper. Here are some excerpts from this candid interview particularly on media and media freedom:
Question: What is the role you expect the media to play during the time of war?
Answer: War or no war, the media should write in the interest of the country and not to please their favourites. The media is supposed to play a neutral role to educate people. They are not supposed to create situations where they groom people and make heroes out of them. I do not think that certain media in this country is doing their duty with a sense of responsibility.
We know that they are being bribed, given 'drinks,' treated in restaurants and they have their own vested interests. And is it ethical them to go for agendas misleading people?
These so called media guys are not responsible to the people and they are not entitled to such media freedom. Media freedom is there for you to do the right thing and to be fair by everybody. Nobody has given freedom for anybody to drive their own agendas. We know very well about those media people who take bribes, write and voice their opinion for some personal gains… … … So, especially the media people should behave well and set an example to others. To me, those who stage protests with unshaven beards, long hairs and wearing costumes like in fancy dress competitions are not scribes who are clamouring for media freedom but a gang of thugs.
The General's outburst is symptomatic of how armies generally react to media criticism. This state of affairs is not only in Sri Lanka, but in most of the other countries in a similar situation. His views will strike a sympathetic chord among many of his counterparts in other countries, though they might not air them in public. This is because governments and armed forces have not yet come to terms with the 21st century phenomenon of citizen's right to information.
Basically, both the military and media represent committed people who believe in their cause – the armies assume they are custodians of national security, while the media feel they are the guardians of freedom of expression. There is an element of truth in both claims. When both of them interact, inherent contradiction in their coexistence comes to the fore. This has to do with their mindsets. I can claim to have some insights into their mindsets because I have worked both as a journalist and a career military officer by choice.
The uniformed forces, particularly the army, have a macho image of themselves. This comes due to their leadership, training, discipline, and organized way of doing things known popularly as regimentation. On the other hand, media lacks uniformity; to them discipline relates only to deadlines or catching live news. If the military prides itself in smart turnout, many members of the media have a studied shabbiness about them. (I think Gen Fonseka was not far off the mark on this. I have always wondered why media persons cannot groom themselves better!).
Unlike military men, media operators belong to the freewheeling, iconoclastic, and often abrasive, collection of many kinds who would rather question than accept what is told to them. If secrecy and security are watchwords of military, scoops and sting operations are the tools of trade of media. Armed forces have a great faith in the use of force to settle issues, just as the media puts its faith in their own words of wisdom and world view. The army men do not hesitate to use fisticuffs, and the media are not averse to use the poison pen.
To top it all, both the military and media are treated as holy cows of society. Both are patronised by politicians and political parties to articulate power in different ways. So they do not have the resilience to weather criticism unlike the thick skinned political class. Wars are power projections of the rulers and so both the armed forces and the media become part of political polemics between the ruling and the opposition parties. Politicians always use the success and failures of the conduct of war as a stick to drum up support or opposition to the regime in power. And the media comes in handy for such campaigns.
If the military is frozen in the 20th century mindset of inherent righteousness of their actions, the media riding the 21st century war of TRP rating and circulation sensationalise any news item including military matters. In this setting, when media critically reports military operations, the military men feel the media is judgemental, disregarding the ordeal of fire undergone by the soldiers. It is true that generally the media's level of military knowledge is low, just as the military's knowledge of media is poor. So when media carries a half baked report, the military suspects the intention behind it.
The accountability of the media is to the public and not to the government. Thus it is qualitatively different from the accountability of the armed forces. So the armed forces cannot expect the media to be more accountable than the ordinary citizen who wants to know what is happening at the war front. This is the harsh truth of modern media.
In counter insurgency wars every soldier or militant killed or wounded affects the lives of scores of others not involved in the war. So whatever is the result of military operation, some section of the population or media will blame the armed forces. The armed forces have to understand this and adapt their style to provide more information.
The armed forces have no choice but to enlist the support of media as a change agent for influencing public opinion in counter insurgency war. Military has to learn to handle media criticism. Generally the security forces' complaints about media fall under three categories – misinformation, lack of accountability, and compromise of security.
These can be overcome by having a media friendly style. Facilitating information gathering, rather than providing canned information bytes, and providing knowledge inputs produces a friendlier media. Building a media friendly attitude among forces during peace times will pay better dividends in times of war.
Greater transparency on issues of military administration not only builds public credibility but also tones up discipline of armed forces and improves their morale. And that should be the ultimate aim of armed forces - to build a better force regardless of what media feels.
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