[This was written by the Chairman of an industrial house - Thapar Group - for internal circulation.]
The average age of the army man is 23 years.
He is a short haired, tight-muscled kid who, under normal circumstances is considered by society as half man, half boy. Not yet dry behind the ears, not old enough to buy a beer in the capital of his country, but old enough to die for his country.
He's a recent school or college graduate; he was probably an average student from one of the Kendriya Vidyalayas, pursued some form of sport activities, drives a rickety bicycle, and had a girlfriend that either broke up with him when he left, or swears to be waiting when he returns from half a world away. He listens to rock and roll or hip -hop or bhangra or gazals and a 155mm howitzer.
He is 5 or 7 kilos lighter now than when he was at home because he is working or fighting the insurgents or standing guard on the icy Himalayas from before dawn to well after dusk or he is at Mumbai engaging the terrorists. He has trouble spelling, thus letter writing is a pain for him, but he can field strip a rifle in 30 seconds and reassemble it in less time in the dark. He can recite to you the nomenclature of a machine gun or grenade launcher and use either one effectively if he must.
He digs foxholes and latrines and can apply first aid like a professional.
He can march until he is told to stop, or stop until he is told to march.
He obeys orders instantly and without hesitation, but he is not without spirit or individual dignity. His pride and self-respect, he does not lack.
He is self-sufficient.
He has two sets of combat dress: he washes one and wears the other.
He keeps his water bottle full and his feet dry.
He sometimes forgets to brush his teeth, but never to clean his rifle. He can cook his own meals, mend his own clothes, and fix his own wounds.
If you're thirsty, he'll share his water with you; if you are hungry, his food. He'll even split his ammunition with you in the midst of battle when you run low.
He has learned to use his hands like weapons and weapons like they were his hands.
He can save your life - or take it, because he's been trained for both.
He will often do twice the work of a civilian, draw half the pay, and still find ironic humor in it all.
He has seen more suffering and death than he should have in his short lifetime.
He has wept in public and in private, for friends who have fallen in combat and is unashamed to do so.
He feels every note of the Jana Gana Mana vibrate through his body while at rigid attention, while tempering the burning desire to 'square-away' those around him who haven't bothered to stand, remove their hands from their pockets, or even stop talking. In an odd twist, day in and day out, far from home, he defends their right to be disrespectful. Just as did his Father, Grandfather, and Great-grandfather, he is paying the price for our freedom.
Beardless or not, he is not a boy.
He is your nation's Fighting Man that has kept this country free and defended your right to Freedom. He has experienced deprivation and adversity, and has seen his buddies falling to bullets and maimed and blown.
And he smiles at the irony of the IAS babu and politician reducing his status year after year and the unkindest cut of all, even reducing his salary and asking why he should get 24 eggs a week free! And when he silently whispers in protest, the same politician and babu aghast, suggest he's mutinying!
Wake up citizens of India! Let's begin discriminating between the saviours of India and the traitors.
Friday, December 26, 2008
Monday, December 22, 2008
The Clear and Present Danger From 6th Pay Commission
by Adm. Arun Prakash (Retd)
The "blame-game" which has inevitably reared its ugly head in the aftermath of the 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks instantly reminded me of the fervent appeals of three successive Chiefs of R&AW to Naval HQ, in recent years, to loan them naval officers for analysis of maritime intelligence. They were seriously concerned that they did not have the necessary in-house expertise available to draw the right conclusions and inferences from the mass of information the agency collected from open, human and technical sources. And very correctly they approached the Navy.
Lack of maritime intelligence has also been the Navy's bane for years, so we understood the handicap R&AW worked under, fully shared their concern, and felt that it was the navy's duty to help. I recall (as the Chief of Personnel) having personally selected some officers for deputation to R&AW, but to my consternation, I learnt within a few months that most wanted to return to the navy. Before I go any further, let me just say that this piece is not about intelligence failure. It is about a failure on a larger scale which represents an equal degree of danger to the nation.
The naval officers deputed to R&AW did not wish to continue with their deputation and I learnt that this was not a new phenomenon) because when they were assigned their desks in the Cabinet Secretariat they found to their dismay that they had been placed under officers who were many years their junior in terms of service. Having taken this stoically, they then found that they were deprived of things like telephones, stenographers and transport because the "status" assigned to them did not entitle them to these utilities.
The R&AW authorities were most sympathetic but pleaded that the they were not in a position to alter the equivalences, apparently "laid down" by a Kafkaesque Department of Personnel. Neither pay-scales nor years of service nor any logic seem to guide this fixation of relativities of Armed Forces officers with civilian counterparts. It was not that we had not experienced such discrimination earlier - the Service HQ have always been chary of sending their officers on deputation - but one felt that intelligence was an issue of national importance and certainly worth undergoing some inconvenience. But we found that naval officers would accept such assignments only with the utmost reluctance.
I have used this example, only because it is symptomatic of a larger malaise: the lack of coordination between organs of the Government of India (GoI) which has contributed to the recent Mumbai fiasco. This should not come as a surprise because the GoI seems so laissez faire in its approach that it will not intervene to eliminate inter-agency inequity even when it clearly results in crippling disfunctionality, as mentioned above. On the contrary, by its acts of omission as well as commission the GoI has been contributing to steady erosion of the locus standi of the Armed Forces in the national security matrix.
In a seemingly illogical and self-destructive continuum, the GoI has progressively and with great deliberation proceeded to marginalize, downgrade and degrade its own Armed Forces, thus undermining the security of the Indian State as surely as the nation's worst enemy. This is a process that has been underway since independence, and at the risk of sounding hyperbolic, I would venture to state that the proverbial last straw may have been added by the 6th Central Pay Commission (CPC).
Today, there is a distinct impression that the CPC has erred grievously on many issues relating to the Armed Forces because they were not represented in the commission, and its recommendations have spread confusion and consternation. One of the most serious consequences (whether intended or not) is the sudden and arbitrary alteration of relativities between the Armed Forces and their civilian counterparts, to the detriment of the former. The resulting change in relationships between the Armed Forces and para-militaries has grave operational implications which do not seem to have been understood at all at the political level.
The ex-Servicemen (ESM) are completely stunned to see the number of anomalies thrown up by the CPC. This confusion has been further compounded by different interpretations being put out in successive letters by the Controller of Defence Accounts. To take just one example: no one understands by what logic a Lieutenant-General, Major-General and Brigadier are going to be paid exactly the same pension, and a Colonel (with half the service) will receive just one hundred rupees less.
The GoI has yet again rejected the "one rank on pension" demand, but not even a feeble attempt has been made to bridge the yawning gap between today's and yesterday's pensioners of the same rank. There is also a distinct impression that the CPC recommendations have been fiddled with, and even changed by the bureaucracy, without due authorization at the political level. Such is the level of discontent and strength of feelings that one hears of planned hunger strikes by ESM; something that would have earlier been unthinkable in the Armed Forces ethos.
The most logical way to avoid this confusion and the resultant sense of grievance in the armed forces and the ESM would have been to place a Service representative, if not in the CPC, then in the Review Committee. Either the committee would have convinced this representative of the appropriateness of the issues or the other way round; thus avoiding controversy, speculation and unhappiness. A few retired Service Chiefs (including this writer) had written to the PM to accord this concession but the appeal remained unanswered.
What people have either not understood, or are imprudently ignoring, is the fact that the CPC recommendations (and subsequent developments) are causing deep resentment, because they strike, not at the monetary status of the Services and the ESM, but at their standing relative to the other services. The Armed Forces just cannot understand (nor has anyone explained to them) why it was necessary to cut them down, yet again, a few notches relative to the police or the civil services at this particular junction. This severe blow to their "izzat" appears illogical and incomprehensible.
If there is indeed a sound rationale for the down-gradation of the Armed Forces, the Government must share it with them, and with the nation. Most importantly, the impression that this is the result of machinations of the bureaucracy, must be dispelled, if untrue; and it must be made amply clear that this decision emanates from the GoI.
Spreading unhappiness and confusion amongst the nation's Armed Forces or demoralizing them, and the 2-3 million strong ESM community does not serve anyone's interest. Should someone in authority not sit up and take notice?
The "blame-game" which has inevitably reared its ugly head in the aftermath of the 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks instantly reminded me of the fervent appeals of three successive Chiefs of R&AW to Naval HQ, in recent years, to loan them naval officers for analysis of maritime intelligence. They were seriously concerned that they did not have the necessary in-house expertise available to draw the right conclusions and inferences from the mass of information the agency collected from open, human and technical sources. And very correctly they approached the Navy.
Lack of maritime intelligence has also been the Navy's bane for years, so we understood the handicap R&AW worked under, fully shared their concern, and felt that it was the navy's duty to help. I recall (as the Chief of Personnel) having personally selected some officers for deputation to R&AW, but to my consternation, I learnt within a few months that most wanted to return to the navy. Before I go any further, let me just say that this piece is not about intelligence failure. It is about a failure on a larger scale which represents an equal degree of danger to the nation.
The naval officers deputed to R&AW did not wish to continue with their deputation and I learnt that this was not a new phenomenon) because when they were assigned their desks in the Cabinet Secretariat they found to their dismay that they had been placed under officers who were many years their junior in terms of service. Having taken this stoically, they then found that they were deprived of things like telephones, stenographers and transport because the "status" assigned to them did not entitle them to these utilities.
The R&AW authorities were most sympathetic but pleaded that the they were not in a position to alter the equivalences, apparently "laid down" by a Kafkaesque Department of Personnel. Neither pay-scales nor years of service nor any logic seem to guide this fixation of relativities of Armed Forces officers with civilian counterparts. It was not that we had not experienced such discrimination earlier - the Service HQ have always been chary of sending their officers on deputation - but one felt that intelligence was an issue of national importance and certainly worth undergoing some inconvenience. But we found that naval officers would accept such assignments only with the utmost reluctance.
I have used this example, only because it is symptomatic of a larger malaise: the lack of coordination between organs of the Government of India (GoI) which has contributed to the recent Mumbai fiasco. This should not come as a surprise because the GoI seems so laissez faire in its approach that it will not intervene to eliminate inter-agency inequity even when it clearly results in crippling disfunctionality, as mentioned above. On the contrary, by its acts of omission as well as commission the GoI has been contributing to steady erosion of the locus standi of the Armed Forces in the national security matrix.
In a seemingly illogical and self-destructive continuum, the GoI has progressively and with great deliberation proceeded to marginalize, downgrade and degrade its own Armed Forces, thus undermining the security of the Indian State as surely as the nation's worst enemy. This is a process that has been underway since independence, and at the risk of sounding hyperbolic, I would venture to state that the proverbial last straw may have been added by the 6th Central Pay Commission (CPC).
Today, there is a distinct impression that the CPC has erred grievously on many issues relating to the Armed Forces because they were not represented in the commission, and its recommendations have spread confusion and consternation. One of the most serious consequences (whether intended or not) is the sudden and arbitrary alteration of relativities between the Armed Forces and their civilian counterparts, to the detriment of the former. The resulting change in relationships between the Armed Forces and para-militaries has grave operational implications which do not seem to have been understood at all at the political level.
The ex-Servicemen (ESM) are completely stunned to see the number of anomalies thrown up by the CPC. This confusion has been further compounded by different interpretations being put out in successive letters by the Controller of Defence Accounts. To take just one example: no one understands by what logic a Lieutenant-General, Major-General and Brigadier are going to be paid exactly the same pension, and a Colonel (with half the service) will receive just one hundred rupees less.
The GoI has yet again rejected the "one rank on pension" demand, but not even a feeble attempt has been made to bridge the yawning gap between today's and yesterday's pensioners of the same rank. There is also a distinct impression that the CPC recommendations have been fiddled with, and even changed by the bureaucracy, without due authorization at the political level. Such is the level of discontent and strength of feelings that one hears of planned hunger strikes by ESM; something that would have earlier been unthinkable in the Armed Forces ethos.
The most logical way to avoid this confusion and the resultant sense of grievance in the armed forces and the ESM would have been to place a Service representative, if not in the CPC, then in the Review Committee. Either the committee would have convinced this representative of the appropriateness of the issues or the other way round; thus avoiding controversy, speculation and unhappiness. A few retired Service Chiefs (including this writer) had written to the PM to accord this concession but the appeal remained unanswered.
What people have either not understood, or are imprudently ignoring, is the fact that the CPC recommendations (and subsequent developments) are causing deep resentment, because they strike, not at the monetary status of the Services and the ESM, but at their standing relative to the other services. The Armed Forces just cannot understand (nor has anyone explained to them) why it was necessary to cut them down, yet again, a few notches relative to the police or the civil services at this particular junction. This severe blow to their "izzat" appears illogical and incomprehensible.
If there is indeed a sound rationale for the down-gradation of the Armed Forces, the Government must share it with them, and with the nation. Most importantly, the impression that this is the result of machinations of the bureaucracy, must be dispelled, if untrue; and it must be made amply clear that this decision emanates from the GoI.
Spreading unhappiness and confusion amongst the nation's Armed Forces or demoralizing them, and the 2-3 million strong ESM community does not serve anyone's interest. Should someone in authority not sit up and take notice?
Saturday, December 20, 2008
A 15-year old writes on Mumbai terror strike
This piece on Mumbai terror strike was written by Payoshi Roy, a 15-year old school girl from Bangalore. It gives an idea how the 26/11 terror attack has struck a chord in everyone in India.
STOP, THINK, CRY, LOVE
The siege on Mumbai left even the most experienced of us, stunned. Even those who have become immune to grief and tragedy stopped for a second. The 48-hour encounter with these extremely sophisticated and trained terrorists of Pakistani origin left India burning in every sense of the word. The versions and accounts are endless. Trying to quantify people's grief would not only be futile but indeed low down. People who went for their daily evening session of beer and gossip at the Leopold café, that special once a month dinner at the Taj or for the bitter sweet occasion of farewell at CST Station never returned. This isn't the first time we're hearing about something like this. These stories have been talked about through out this year and to be honest through out our lives. We have experienced five separate series of bomb blasts across the country in this year alone. The dreadful cries of the Gujarat riots are yet to recede from recent memories. The 2006 and 1993 Bombay blasts and riots haunt their victims even now.
However, we are not here to talk about the grief that these victims suffer. Nor do I wish to discuss the various and repeated intelligence failures and lackadaisical attempts of the government and its security agencies. We are here to figure out what exactly is wrong with us, because it is evident that there is something horribly amiss in this country and it's people.
People are not born terrorists. Teenagers do not get up one fine day with the conviction that violence is the path of their lives. The terrorist that battled with NSG in the Taj hotel for over 24 hours was not more that 25 years old. Can any of you imagine the kind of courage and determination that this young boy exemplified in accomplishing such a feat. He is a terrorist, a terrorist who is responsible for the death of over 150 people. He is also a mere boy. A boy whom we have forced into becoming the man he died as. The Indian mujahidin consists of young boys from the JMI College in Delhi. Sadhvi Pragya is in her early twenties. These people are our age. They are people who we see in movie halls and at street corners. They are not aliens of another race. Terrorism was not brought in from Mars. It breeds within us. The worst part is, that we created it.
Every kind of terrorism stems from extremism; and extremism is the most obvious ramification of discrimination. Discrimination is sadly practiced in every nook and corner of our country. We think it's insignificant, we think that it's just the way people are. But it is discrimination and if only we were brave enough to face it.
It is discrimination when the age-old story of Hindu parents refusing to marry their daughter into a Muslim family repeats itself. It is discrimination when parents of Muslim children refuse to sing Hindu bhajans. It is discrimination when Christians refuse to participate in Hindu and Muslim festivals. All of this is discrimination. And every form of terrorism and extremism finds it's roots in this kind of discrimination, which is practiced in each and every one of our homes. That is why we need to look at our homes and our thinking before we cry out in rage and protest against the government and security forces.
Last night you had emotional and angry Mumbai mobs screaming out anti Pakistani slogans.. That is the beginning of terrorism. Have we all gone mad? What does the normal Pakistani family who is probably in their own way praying for the Mumbai victims have anything to do with this? This is the quintessential problem that we are facing. When will we realize that by blaming each other the problem will only intensify.
The Hindus destroyed the Babri masjid. The Muslims blew up a Hindu coach. The Hindus killed a city full of Muslims. Wave after wave of madness. Stop! How long can we go on like this? An eye for an eye has never been the answer and it should not take us a thousand years to accept the truth of this statement.
You had Raj Thakare chasing out the north Indians and Biharis from Maharashtra. Over three hundred North Indians of the NSG saved his beloved Marathi manoos. Where was Bal Thakare then? Forget about this one man, where were the rest of our cosmopolitan Mumbaikers who let this man get away with what he did.. Where were the progressive and peaceful Hindu leaders when churches burnt in Orissa and Karnataka? We should all hang our heads in shame.
In another 60 years we'll have Bihari terrorists attacking Maharashtra and Maharashtrian terrorist retaliating. Next we'll have border security squadrons for our state borders. Don't smile skeptically. The India-Pakistan feud had also started off in 1947 with Muslims being chased out of Delhi and Hindus being chased out of Lahore. Look where it stands now.
Today you have every news channel proudly acclaiming the army, NSG and Marine commandos as heroes.People in Mumbai are running out on the streets to congratulate them. These heroes weren't born today. They have been here all this while. Where were these people of India, the Media, when the IAS used their Machiavellian minds to reduce the salaries of all the Defense Forces. Where were these people when the corporate world squabbled over a few hundred rupees rise in the salaries of these men who always risk their lives to keep us safe? I could not see the bureaucracy putting their life on the line to save hostages in the Trident. I did not see the corporate world dying at the border during the Kargil war. And I did not see Indian citizens who today call these soldiers heroes defending them when they needed us the most.
You want to know what the problem with India is? We're cowards. We don't think as a single nation and we can't stand up for what's right.
I'll give you a small and perfect example of what is wrong with us. We all complain about this country's dirty roads. We love holidaying in London's spick and span streets. The most educated of us are yet to hesitate while throwing a sweet wrapper or lays packet on the street. Or we'll throw it in an already existing dump on the street. We can't even wait till we come across a dustbin. This is what is wrong with us.
We have enough and more to say about Manmohan Singh and Advani and every other useless politician and rightly so. But the fact is that in all honesty we couldn't care less. The best of us don't vote, don't contest in elections and don't even help out N.G.O.s When we can't do anything for our country how dare we, I repeat, how dare we expect anyone else to do anything.
We can go on talking about stepping up security, straightening out our coast guards and eradicating terrorism. But the problem lies not in our security system but in us. It lies in our madrassas, in our temples, in our schools in our homes and in our minds. And until we realize our role, until we open our eyes to this truth, not a thing will change.
Everyone talks about this new India, a shining progressive and young India. Well it's time for Young, New and Shining India to prove herself. Stand up and prove your worth. This so- called liberal and progressive thinking generation needs to root out those weeds that grow in the oldest corners our gardens. We need to start thinking and start talking. Talking to ourselves and to others. We need to start doing. This has to be a national youth movement. We have to make it the beginning of a revolution. Every historic movement starts like this. Vague, uncertain and hesitant but moving towards a common calling motivated by the same inspiration and dream. This is our chance.
Don't tell me that we won't be able to reach out to the people who need to hear what we have to say. These people live among us. There is no limit to what people can achieve when they set out to do something. You are talking about a country whose founding father won a war without raising a weapon. Who have lived on stories of Subhash Chandra Bose calling out for blood and promising freedom. Well we've bled. Now it's time to get our freedom. Freedom from our own mindsets. Freedom from shackles we've placed on ourselves.
These last two days have been the worst attack that India has ever dealt with. If this alarm wasn't loud enough, no alarm will ever wake us up.
How many more people have to die before we respond to India's desperate plea for help?
Payoshi Roy
Class XI
Bishop Cottons Girls School
Bangalore
STOP, THINK, CRY, LOVE
The siege on Mumbai left even the most experienced of us, stunned. Even those who have become immune to grief and tragedy stopped for a second. The 48-hour encounter with these extremely sophisticated and trained terrorists of Pakistani origin left India burning in every sense of the word. The versions and accounts are endless. Trying to quantify people's grief would not only be futile but indeed low down. People who went for their daily evening session of beer and gossip at the Leopold café, that special once a month dinner at the Taj or for the bitter sweet occasion of farewell at CST Station never returned. This isn't the first time we're hearing about something like this. These stories have been talked about through out this year and to be honest through out our lives. We have experienced five separate series of bomb blasts across the country in this year alone. The dreadful cries of the Gujarat riots are yet to recede from recent memories. The 2006 and 1993 Bombay blasts and riots haunt their victims even now.
However, we are not here to talk about the grief that these victims suffer. Nor do I wish to discuss the various and repeated intelligence failures and lackadaisical attempts of the government and its security agencies. We are here to figure out what exactly is wrong with us, because it is evident that there is something horribly amiss in this country and it's people.
People are not born terrorists. Teenagers do not get up one fine day with the conviction that violence is the path of their lives. The terrorist that battled with NSG in the Taj hotel for over 24 hours was not more that 25 years old. Can any of you imagine the kind of courage and determination that this young boy exemplified in accomplishing such a feat. He is a terrorist, a terrorist who is responsible for the death of over 150 people. He is also a mere boy. A boy whom we have forced into becoming the man he died as. The Indian mujahidin consists of young boys from the JMI College in Delhi. Sadhvi Pragya is in her early twenties. These people are our age. They are people who we see in movie halls and at street corners. They are not aliens of another race. Terrorism was not brought in from Mars. It breeds within us. The worst part is, that we created it.
Every kind of terrorism stems from extremism; and extremism is the most obvious ramification of discrimination. Discrimination is sadly practiced in every nook and corner of our country. We think it's insignificant, we think that it's just the way people are. But it is discrimination and if only we were brave enough to face it.
It is discrimination when the age-old story of Hindu parents refusing to marry their daughter into a Muslim family repeats itself. It is discrimination when parents of Muslim children refuse to sing Hindu bhajans. It is discrimination when Christians refuse to participate in Hindu and Muslim festivals. All of this is discrimination. And every form of terrorism and extremism finds it's roots in this kind of discrimination, which is practiced in each and every one of our homes. That is why we need to look at our homes and our thinking before we cry out in rage and protest against the government and security forces.
Last night you had emotional and angry Mumbai mobs screaming out anti Pakistani slogans.. That is the beginning of terrorism. Have we all gone mad? What does the normal Pakistani family who is probably in their own way praying for the Mumbai victims have anything to do with this? This is the quintessential problem that we are facing. When will we realize that by blaming each other the problem will only intensify.
The Hindus destroyed the Babri masjid. The Muslims blew up a Hindu coach. The Hindus killed a city full of Muslims. Wave after wave of madness. Stop! How long can we go on like this? An eye for an eye has never been the answer and it should not take us a thousand years to accept the truth of this statement.
You had Raj Thakare chasing out the north Indians and Biharis from Maharashtra. Over three hundred North Indians of the NSG saved his beloved Marathi manoos. Where was Bal Thakare then? Forget about this one man, where were the rest of our cosmopolitan Mumbaikers who let this man get away with what he did.. Where were the progressive and peaceful Hindu leaders when churches burnt in Orissa and Karnataka? We should all hang our heads in shame.
In another 60 years we'll have Bihari terrorists attacking Maharashtra and Maharashtrian terrorist retaliating. Next we'll have border security squadrons for our state borders. Don't smile skeptically. The India-Pakistan feud had also started off in 1947 with Muslims being chased out of Delhi and Hindus being chased out of Lahore. Look where it stands now.
Today you have every news channel proudly acclaiming the army, NSG and Marine commandos as heroes.People in Mumbai are running out on the streets to congratulate them. These heroes weren't born today. They have been here all this while. Where were these people of India, the Media, when the IAS used their Machiavellian minds to reduce the salaries of all the Defense Forces. Where were these people when the corporate world squabbled over a few hundred rupees rise in the salaries of these men who always risk their lives to keep us safe? I could not see the bureaucracy putting their life on the line to save hostages in the Trident. I did not see the corporate world dying at the border during the Kargil war. And I did not see Indian citizens who today call these soldiers heroes defending them when they needed us the most.
You want to know what the problem with India is? We're cowards. We don't think as a single nation and we can't stand up for what's right.
I'll give you a small and perfect example of what is wrong with us. We all complain about this country's dirty roads. We love holidaying in London's spick and span streets. The most educated of us are yet to hesitate while throwing a sweet wrapper or lays packet on the street. Or we'll throw it in an already existing dump on the street. We can't even wait till we come across a dustbin. This is what is wrong with us.
We have enough and more to say about Manmohan Singh and Advani and every other useless politician and rightly so. But the fact is that in all honesty we couldn't care less. The best of us don't vote, don't contest in elections and don't even help out N.G.O.s When we can't do anything for our country how dare we, I repeat, how dare we expect anyone else to do anything.
We can go on talking about stepping up security, straightening out our coast guards and eradicating terrorism. But the problem lies not in our security system but in us. It lies in our madrassas, in our temples, in our schools in our homes and in our minds. And until we realize our role, until we open our eyes to this truth, not a thing will change.
Everyone talks about this new India, a shining progressive and young India. Well it's time for Young, New and Shining India to prove herself. Stand up and prove your worth. This so- called liberal and progressive thinking generation needs to root out those weeds that grow in the oldest corners our gardens. We need to start thinking and start talking. Talking to ourselves and to others. We need to start doing. This has to be a national youth movement. We have to make it the beginning of a revolution. Every historic movement starts like this. Vague, uncertain and hesitant but moving towards a common calling motivated by the same inspiration and dream. This is our chance.
Don't tell me that we won't be able to reach out to the people who need to hear what we have to say. These people live among us. There is no limit to what people can achieve when they set out to do something. You are talking about a country whose founding father won a war without raising a weapon. Who have lived on stories of Subhash Chandra Bose calling out for blood and promising freedom. Well we've bled. Now it's time to get our freedom. Freedom from our own mindsets. Freedom from shackles we've placed on ourselves.
These last two days have been the worst attack that India has ever dealt with. If this alarm wasn't loud enough, no alarm will ever wake us up.
How many more people have to die before we respond to India's desperate plea for help?
Payoshi Roy
Class XI
Bishop Cottons Girls School
Bangalore
Institutional Mechanism for Handling Terrorism and Insurgency
R Hariharan
[I wrote this article in September 2008 - before Mumbai terror strike - as a background paper for a presentation at a seminar for NGOs titled “Violence and Insurgencies in India” organised by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation and the Vishwa Yuvak Kendra at Manali from September 7 to 10, 2008.]
Nature of insurgency and terrorism
There is a lot of confusion in understanding terrorism. It is often confused with acts of violence. The dynamics of global political and economic changes during the last two decades have churned up social order and traditional value systems in the country. The resulting social and economic contradictions have given rise to a number of political and social conflicts. At the same time, increasing empowerment of deprived sections of society has made their demand for their rights more strident.
Over the years, these sections have increased their influence in shaping state policies. Inevitably the mobility of marginalized sections often results in acts of political violence. The recent Gurjar agitation in Rajasthan is a good example of social discontent degenerating into mindless violence against the state. Such violence can be successfully defused through people friendly political and administrative mechanisms of the state. Though these conflicts are inevitable, they can be isolated if the state is sensitive and responsive to public grievances. Such acts of violence should not be confused with insurgency or terrorism.
Insurgency is aimed at capture of state power. Since independence India has been facing militancy and insurgency by sections of population fighting for a variety of causes. The causes generally relate to preservation of ethnic, linguistic, religious or territorial identity. They adopt militancy and insurgency as unconventional modes to fight for their goals against the well entrenched state machinery. Insensitive or repressive administration and cold war polemics provided the incentive for such struggles to spread. Ethnic insurgencies of the northeast come under this category.
However, the globalization of trade and the realignment of global power equation after the collapse of the Soviet Union towards the end of the millennium have nudged insurgency struggles to the sidelines. In this environment, many insurgent movements indulge in acts of terror as a coercive tool to achieve their ends. This has made the dividing line between insurgents and terrorists very thin.
Despite such use of terror as a tool by insurgents, terrorism has its own distinct sphere in the world of violence. Terrorism is aimed destabilizing social order through violent acts of terror, killings and intimidating the population rather than capturing state power. Early in this millennium, Islamic obscurantism emerged as a major practitioner of terrorism. It has found terrorism a cost effective way to wage a war against nations considered as “threats” to their concept of Islamic way of life. The Al Qaeda’s 9/11 strikes in the US and the series of Jihadi attacks in Pakistan and India are manifestations of this phenomenon.
Controlling terrorism
The emergence of terrorism as a global threat to order and peace has become a major cause of international concern particularly after 9/11 Al Qaeda attacks in the US. International community has come together to coordinate their activities to root out terrorism. International protocols are coming into force to control maritime traffic, illegal arms purchases and traffic, and money laundering to eradicate the internationalisation of terrorism through front organisations and propaganda tools to spread their influence. The European Union and the US have introduced strong enactments to curb terrorism.
However, such international actions can be fully effective only if frontline countries of South Asia take equally strong action to control terrorism. Unfortunately, lack of national consensus in acting against terrorists due to overriding political considerations based upon playing up religious divide in countries like India has prevented collective action against terrorism.
Elements of success of terrorists and insurgents
Insurgents always try to make their struggle relevant to the common man as popular support is the lifeblood of insurgency. Invariably they espouse popular causes and provide rallying points for the social, economic and political grievances of aggrieved population. They use violent methods to destroy the existing state mechanisms and establish their control over society to achieve their ends. Insurgents thrive in areas where the administration is insensitive to the peoples’ actual or felt grievances.
Often, the majority-dominated democratic systems that deny adequate space for articulation for the sentiments of minority population breed such movements. In democratic societies, political parties tend to exploit the existing political, social and cultural divide among the people for their own advantage. Thus the explosive environment built up by poor governance, corruption, political opportunism and unbridled use of state machinery to curb fundamental rights make the job easier for the insurgent to win popular support. Absence of a conflict resolution mechanism in such a set up further alienates the population from the population. External powers exploit such situations to finance and arm insurgent groups to further their agenda.
Hence it is important the state introduces systemic improvements in all arms of administration, including the initiation of a dialogue process with the aggrieved population. Experience in our country has shown that systemic improvements alone cannot wean away the public support to insurgency movements if the state cannot ensure the physical security of the common man. To regain the trust of the alienated population the state has to show it is a reliable functional entity that can ensure security of the people. To do this the state has to physically curb the insurgents from interfering with the normal life of people even as the state introduces systemic improvements. Then only insurgency movements will lose their relevance to the people. This will lead to their neutralization. In the Indian context Mizoram is a good example of such success.
In our country the non-state actors have exploited the existing or potential conflict areas in society to further their influence. For instance, in the backward tribal regions of Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, and Orissa the Maoist insurgents have expanded their hold using the long standing and unattended grievances of tribal population and landless poor. They have emerged as the alternate to democratic and administrative instruments denied to the affected people. In these parts social security mechanism are absent and the Maoists have tried to exploit such gaps to increase their influence.
In these regions the exploitative social class like money lenders, exploitative land owners, in collusion with corrupt politicians and bureaucrats have alienated the poor from having a say in the grass root democratic bodies. Over the years such exploitative sections have been exercising their coercive power over the people. And the state machinery, particularly the law enforcing agencies, has gained the reputation as organs of exploitation rather than governance. With acts of terrorism the insurgents have managed to gain power and resources to spread their areas of control. The government does not have cohesive political and social strategies to regain the trust of people in the affected and give them a sense of security.
Unlike the insurgent, the terrorist tries to gain control over the population through acts of terror aimed at instilling fear among them. Creation of a supportive social ambience required for the growth of insurgency is not a perquisite for the success of terrorist movements. Terrorist acts are perpetrated by small number of highly motivated and indoctrinated people who feel totally alienated from the mainstream. Terrorism grows by its acts of daring and audacity giving it a larger than life image among the people. It creates a sense of awe and exposes the state as ineffective machinery to safeguard the security of the citizen.
Terrorist organizations like the Al Qaeda or Lashkar-e-Taiba operate in extreme secrecy. Special intelligence effort must be made to unearth their network of supporters, sources of finance and arms, training methods, front organizations, and sleeper agents within other political and social organizations. Terrorists are increasingly using modern electronic and web-based communication and media systems to increase the impact their violent acts on the public.
Institutional mechanism to fight terrorism and insurgency
In order to fight them effectively, creation of a national authority to evolve dynamic counter insurgency and terrorism policies and execute them with vigour. Its overall aim should be to discourage, deter, detect, and defeat the use of violence and terror as a tool by non state actors against the state. It has to work in close coordination with national and state level intelligence and police agencies. Broadly it has to be composed of three elements - advisory, strategic planning assessment, and tactical operations. It should be able to have at its disposal forces specially trained for carrying out special operations with adequate mobility, technology and fire power support to respond to the needs of states affected by non state actors.
To be effective in a plural society the institutional mechanism should have autonomy of decision making to insulate it from political manipulation. This in practice would increase its accountability at the national and state levels. It would also make it responsive to real time dynamics of terrorism.
As each region has its own social issues affecting the fight against terrorism, the execution should be local police and administrative machinery along with the central institutions. This would result in evolving local conflict resolution mechanism so that the relevance of insurgent groups to the socially exploited people diminishes over a period. Participatory development, responsive administration, and removal of grievances would ultimately reinforce the success generated by physically eliminating the insurgents through the use of force.
Quick response to acts of terrorism can be effective if only the administration ensures unbiased follow up action and deterrent administration of justice, ensuring the rule of law. At the same time socio-political strategies to wean away the people should also be in place in tandem. Respect to human rights should be adhered to by the law enforcers so that they provide a more attractive security alternative to the people. Then only the state can improve the credibility of the administration among the people and discourage the appeal held by non state actors.
The state and local administration should be encouraged to adopt preventive strategies sufficiently early without undue emphasis on the exclusive use of force. However in areas where non state actors are active the aim should be to free the population from their influence through the use of security forces in tandem with measures to revamp a people-friendly administration measures to restore normal life and resume development activities in such areas.
Ideally the mechanism should respond from below upwards and take action above downwards, link laterally with diverse government departments to implement cohesive strategies. It should not be intrusive and allow full freedom for local communities to solve their communal, caste and tribal issues and intervene only when extremism enters the scene. This would imply the involvement of the people in having a say on the issues of governance and development.
To be meaningful local democratic institutions should be strengthened to freely operate and act as the mechanism for ventilating and redressing people’s grievances. This would reduce the relevance of insurgents to the people and sections of society. Panchayat raj institutions should be strengthened and be empowered to assume this responsibility as the areas are freed from the influence of non state actors.
Role of NGOs
NGOs are the conscience keepers of society. They form an important part of the civil society which acts as a non-formal bridge between the population and the administration. Thus NGOs have a role in both the active and passive phase of counter insurgency. In the conflict management phase, NGOs can provide succour to the affected population and provide an interface between them and the administration wherever needed. They can act as a forum for the public to ventilate their grievances and pass them on to the administration. In order to be able to function in insurgency and terrorism affected areas, the NGOs run the risk of antagonising both the administrative machinery and the extremists. So they will have to operate without bias and be seen as neutral agents in the conflict. This requires close monitoring and guidance of field workers activities in affected areas. Then NGOs can increase their usefulness to the people.
In the conflict resolution phase, NGOs can act as facilitators for evolving the modalities for putting in place a conflict resolution mechanism. The credibility of NGOs can only be improved if they act without fear or favour. Then only they will be able to operate in such areas and be useful in bringing succour to the people.
September 4, 2008
[I wrote this article in September 2008 - before Mumbai terror strike - as a background paper for a presentation at a seminar for NGOs titled “Violence and Insurgencies in India” organised by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation and the Vishwa Yuvak Kendra at Manali from September 7 to 10, 2008.]
Nature of insurgency and terrorism
There is a lot of confusion in understanding terrorism. It is often confused with acts of violence. The dynamics of global political and economic changes during the last two decades have churned up social order and traditional value systems in the country. The resulting social and economic contradictions have given rise to a number of political and social conflicts. At the same time, increasing empowerment of deprived sections of society has made their demand for their rights more strident.
Over the years, these sections have increased their influence in shaping state policies. Inevitably the mobility of marginalized sections often results in acts of political violence. The recent Gurjar agitation in Rajasthan is a good example of social discontent degenerating into mindless violence against the state. Such violence can be successfully defused through people friendly political and administrative mechanisms of the state. Though these conflicts are inevitable, they can be isolated if the state is sensitive and responsive to public grievances. Such acts of violence should not be confused with insurgency or terrorism.
Insurgency is aimed at capture of state power. Since independence India has been facing militancy and insurgency by sections of population fighting for a variety of causes. The causes generally relate to preservation of ethnic, linguistic, religious or territorial identity. They adopt militancy and insurgency as unconventional modes to fight for their goals against the well entrenched state machinery. Insensitive or repressive administration and cold war polemics provided the incentive for such struggles to spread. Ethnic insurgencies of the northeast come under this category.
However, the globalization of trade and the realignment of global power equation after the collapse of the Soviet Union towards the end of the millennium have nudged insurgency struggles to the sidelines. In this environment, many insurgent movements indulge in acts of terror as a coercive tool to achieve their ends. This has made the dividing line between insurgents and terrorists very thin.
Despite such use of terror as a tool by insurgents, terrorism has its own distinct sphere in the world of violence. Terrorism is aimed destabilizing social order through violent acts of terror, killings and intimidating the population rather than capturing state power. Early in this millennium, Islamic obscurantism emerged as a major practitioner of terrorism. It has found terrorism a cost effective way to wage a war against nations considered as “threats” to their concept of Islamic way of life. The Al Qaeda’s 9/11 strikes in the US and the series of Jihadi attacks in Pakistan and India are manifestations of this phenomenon.
Controlling terrorism
The emergence of terrorism as a global threat to order and peace has become a major cause of international concern particularly after 9/11 Al Qaeda attacks in the US. International community has come together to coordinate their activities to root out terrorism. International protocols are coming into force to control maritime traffic, illegal arms purchases and traffic, and money laundering to eradicate the internationalisation of terrorism through front organisations and propaganda tools to spread their influence. The European Union and the US have introduced strong enactments to curb terrorism.
However, such international actions can be fully effective only if frontline countries of South Asia take equally strong action to control terrorism. Unfortunately, lack of national consensus in acting against terrorists due to overriding political considerations based upon playing up religious divide in countries like India has prevented collective action against terrorism.
Elements of success of terrorists and insurgents
Insurgents always try to make their struggle relevant to the common man as popular support is the lifeblood of insurgency. Invariably they espouse popular causes and provide rallying points for the social, economic and political grievances of aggrieved population. They use violent methods to destroy the existing state mechanisms and establish their control over society to achieve their ends. Insurgents thrive in areas where the administration is insensitive to the peoples’ actual or felt grievances.
Often, the majority-dominated democratic systems that deny adequate space for articulation for the sentiments of minority population breed such movements. In democratic societies, political parties tend to exploit the existing political, social and cultural divide among the people for their own advantage. Thus the explosive environment built up by poor governance, corruption, political opportunism and unbridled use of state machinery to curb fundamental rights make the job easier for the insurgent to win popular support. Absence of a conflict resolution mechanism in such a set up further alienates the population from the population. External powers exploit such situations to finance and arm insurgent groups to further their agenda.
Hence it is important the state introduces systemic improvements in all arms of administration, including the initiation of a dialogue process with the aggrieved population. Experience in our country has shown that systemic improvements alone cannot wean away the public support to insurgency movements if the state cannot ensure the physical security of the common man. To regain the trust of the alienated population the state has to show it is a reliable functional entity that can ensure security of the people. To do this the state has to physically curb the insurgents from interfering with the normal life of people even as the state introduces systemic improvements. Then only insurgency movements will lose their relevance to the people. This will lead to their neutralization. In the Indian context Mizoram is a good example of such success.
In our country the non-state actors have exploited the existing or potential conflict areas in society to further their influence. For instance, in the backward tribal regions of Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, and Orissa the Maoist insurgents have expanded their hold using the long standing and unattended grievances of tribal population and landless poor. They have emerged as the alternate to democratic and administrative instruments denied to the affected people. In these parts social security mechanism are absent and the Maoists have tried to exploit such gaps to increase their influence.
In these regions the exploitative social class like money lenders, exploitative land owners, in collusion with corrupt politicians and bureaucrats have alienated the poor from having a say in the grass root democratic bodies. Over the years such exploitative sections have been exercising their coercive power over the people. And the state machinery, particularly the law enforcing agencies, has gained the reputation as organs of exploitation rather than governance. With acts of terrorism the insurgents have managed to gain power and resources to spread their areas of control. The government does not have cohesive political and social strategies to regain the trust of people in the affected and give them a sense of security.
Unlike the insurgent, the terrorist tries to gain control over the population through acts of terror aimed at instilling fear among them. Creation of a supportive social ambience required for the growth of insurgency is not a perquisite for the success of terrorist movements. Terrorist acts are perpetrated by small number of highly motivated and indoctrinated people who feel totally alienated from the mainstream. Terrorism grows by its acts of daring and audacity giving it a larger than life image among the people. It creates a sense of awe and exposes the state as ineffective machinery to safeguard the security of the citizen.
Terrorist organizations like the Al Qaeda or Lashkar-e-Taiba operate in extreme secrecy. Special intelligence effort must be made to unearth their network of supporters, sources of finance and arms, training methods, front organizations, and sleeper agents within other political and social organizations. Terrorists are increasingly using modern electronic and web-based communication and media systems to increase the impact their violent acts on the public.
Institutional mechanism to fight terrorism and insurgency
In order to fight them effectively, creation of a national authority to evolve dynamic counter insurgency and terrorism policies and execute them with vigour. Its overall aim should be to discourage, deter, detect, and defeat the use of violence and terror as a tool by non state actors against the state. It has to work in close coordination with national and state level intelligence and police agencies. Broadly it has to be composed of three elements - advisory, strategic planning assessment, and tactical operations. It should be able to have at its disposal forces specially trained for carrying out special operations with adequate mobility, technology and fire power support to respond to the needs of states affected by non state actors.
To be effective in a plural society the institutional mechanism should have autonomy of decision making to insulate it from political manipulation. This in practice would increase its accountability at the national and state levels. It would also make it responsive to real time dynamics of terrorism.
As each region has its own social issues affecting the fight against terrorism, the execution should be local police and administrative machinery along with the central institutions. This would result in evolving local conflict resolution mechanism so that the relevance of insurgent groups to the socially exploited people diminishes over a period. Participatory development, responsive administration, and removal of grievances would ultimately reinforce the success generated by physically eliminating the insurgents through the use of force.
Quick response to acts of terrorism can be effective if only the administration ensures unbiased follow up action and deterrent administration of justice, ensuring the rule of law. At the same time socio-political strategies to wean away the people should also be in place in tandem. Respect to human rights should be adhered to by the law enforcers so that they provide a more attractive security alternative to the people. Then only the state can improve the credibility of the administration among the people and discourage the appeal held by non state actors.
The state and local administration should be encouraged to adopt preventive strategies sufficiently early without undue emphasis on the exclusive use of force. However in areas where non state actors are active the aim should be to free the population from their influence through the use of security forces in tandem with measures to revamp a people-friendly administration measures to restore normal life and resume development activities in such areas.
Ideally the mechanism should respond from below upwards and take action above downwards, link laterally with diverse government departments to implement cohesive strategies. It should not be intrusive and allow full freedom for local communities to solve their communal, caste and tribal issues and intervene only when extremism enters the scene. This would imply the involvement of the people in having a say on the issues of governance and development.
To be meaningful local democratic institutions should be strengthened to freely operate and act as the mechanism for ventilating and redressing people’s grievances. This would reduce the relevance of insurgents to the people and sections of society. Panchayat raj institutions should be strengthened and be empowered to assume this responsibility as the areas are freed from the influence of non state actors.
Role of NGOs
NGOs are the conscience keepers of society. They form an important part of the civil society which acts as a non-formal bridge between the population and the administration. Thus NGOs have a role in both the active and passive phase of counter insurgency. In the conflict management phase, NGOs can provide succour to the affected population and provide an interface between them and the administration wherever needed. They can act as a forum for the public to ventilate their grievances and pass them on to the administration. In order to be able to function in insurgency and terrorism affected areas, the NGOs run the risk of antagonising both the administrative machinery and the extremists. So they will have to operate without bias and be seen as neutral agents in the conflict. This requires close monitoring and guidance of field workers activities in affected areas. Then NGOs can increase their usefulness to the people.
In the conflict resolution phase, NGOs can act as facilitators for evolving the modalities for putting in place a conflict resolution mechanism. The credibility of NGOs can only be improved if they act without fear or favour. Then only they will be able to operate in such areas and be useful in bringing succour to the people.
September 4, 2008
Friday, December 12, 2008
Unless you sacrifice, you can't fight terror
Colonel R Hariharan is a specialist on South Asia military intelligence. He served as the head of intelligence for the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka between 1987 and 1990. He is associated with the South Asia Analysis Group and the Chennai Centre for China Studies.
Colonel Hariharan spoke to rediff.com's Shobha Warrier about what needs to be done to avoid terror attacks like the one in Mumbai terror attacks.
Media reports say that the Indian intelligence agencies had prior information about the Mumbai terror attacks. After every terror attack, we hear reports that intelligence agencies had prior information about it. Where is it going wrong then? Do you call this an intelligence failure?
I have no hesitation in saying that it was intelligence failure that led to the attacks. Today's terrorists are more tech savvy than the establishment. Intelligence failure is not only the failure of intelligence agencies. They have to process the information and make an assessment.
There are more than 12 agencies like the Customs, the Enforcement Directorate etc which collect intelligence information, and this excludes the state police.
Firstly, the quality of intelligence collected has to be validated. No agency shares the information with everybody because they want to score brownie points.
What we need is a central control room where intelligence information is shared and immediate action is taken. We don't have a culture of centralised control rooms. I know the Intelligence Bureau has enough intelligent officers, but they don't process intelligence information properly because they are in a hurry to push it so that the responsibility does not fall on them.
How important is processing the information?
It is the most important part of intelligence gathering. You may say, a terror strike is coming from the coast. But from where? Which coast? From whom? When? These questions are never answered. In military intelligence, we don't accept this kind of nonsense.
The Americans failed in processing the information before the 9/11 attacks. We told them a year earlier that Islamic militant guys are being trained in flying. We had told Australia that they are being trained in Australian flying schools. They passed it on to the Americans but nobody took action because they had too much information.
We have to have management in our information systems. Technology is rudimentary in India. We are a lazy nation as far as the governing system is concerned. So, why blame the intelligence agencies alone? You should blame the government, the various departments and ourselves.
Do you think the current attacks will ring alarm bells and something concrete will happen?
I am not an optimist. I expect some more strikes to come. Will just changing the Union home minister solve the problem?
I am not seeing any action now. There will be more strikes. Something like what is happening in Bangkok has to happen in India too. Everything has to be stopped to make the government act. People have to take to the streets. Only that works.
The ordinary people of India feel that after the 9/11 attacks, the US could stop any further attack while in India, every month, there is a terror strike...
Are we prepared to sacrifice some of our fundamental rights? That is the bottom line. The US has sacrificed part of their fundamental rights. US laws are very stringent. We didn't want POTA which guarantees witness protection.
Where should the overhaul start?
It has to be there everywhere; from the grass-roots to the middle level to the structural level.
Three things are important. At the state level, they must read and process the information themselves. The central agencies and state agencies should share information all the time. Today, they don't do that. The culture of sharing of information should come. In Assam, I have seen only army guys in the meetings; the state guys won't even turn up. Some sort of commitment has to come within the states.
Two, the country must learn to sacrifice some rights to fight terror. While fighting terror, you cannot have the same freedom. Unless you sacrifice, you can't fight terror.
Three, our laws will not hold today's times. You catch two out of 15 terrorists, but you cannot prosecute them. Human rights fellows will make a noise; courts will give them bail even if they are murderers. That is why so many Maoists are not being prosecuted. So, you require a special law.
The coast of India is controlled by many departments, and do you feel it is high time the coast comes under one agency, say the Coast Guard?
There are 12 agencies involved in the coastal security of India. In this country, nobody will give up power. Port security is under the ministry of shipping! What does it know of security?
In the US, when a ship comes to the sea, it comes under the Coast Guard. It is responsible for the coast. Here, it is not. The land is under police, the coastal police have become a big joke. The policemen do not know how to swim. They don't have a sea orientation. Why should you have the same policemen doing the coastal job? You require marine police who should look after coastal and port security.
The Coast Guard has got huge deficiencies like the armed forces. They must make up the deficiency right now. Marine security must come under central authority and the Coast Guard is the best arm. It comes under the navy both in the US and here.
Create internal security separately as a ministry. The time has come.
There is a kind of fear and insecurity in the mind of the people of India.
It can happen in Chennai too. Are you sure it will not happen in the other coasts? In Maharashtra, it will change now just like it changed in Gujarat. Gujarat has a dynamic chief minister and he knows his job. He wanted a law which is similar to what Mumbai is having, but he is not being allowed based on party politics. The Centre also won't bring the law and he also won't be allowed to have a law, and he is asked to control terrorism. What are we afraid of?
When you were gathering intelligence as a military intelligence officer, what were the difficulties you faced?
The major problem is of access to other intelligence agencies. There is no sharing of information. That is the biggest hurdle.
In Sri Lanka, that was what happened. The Research and Analysis Wing was involved in training the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) but it is so compartmentalised that when we went in, the guy from R&AW who was helping us did not have the figures because it was under some other department. So, we must take some hard decisions on sharing information.
Every month there is a terror strike. Will Indians have to learn to live with terror attacks?
Do you know such attacks are happening regularly in the north-east? This is the 8th terror attack this year. I am sure it will continue.
• Unless we must have a transparent policy that will guide the structural framework.
• Unless the media acts conscientiously. You give more prominence to Arundhati Roy for defending a guy who attacked our Parliament.
• Unless the structural mechanism involves states and becomes federal in character.
• Unless decision making is done by experts and not politicians.
• Unless you make up the deficiencies of all the counter-terror mechanisms with modern technology.
• Unless policy making, intelligence and execution work in tandem.
There are politicians in the US and the UK too, but they could manage to stop terror attacks.
Because they are Americans, and we are Indians, I am sorry to say. We have no commitment. Did people react the same way when the Mumbai local trains were attacked? They did not because the rich and VIPs were not involved. Because five star hotels were not involved. Only poor guys, who travelled by train suffered. Did you see the same candles then?
December 12, 2008 | 11:46 IST
Courtesy:
http://www.rediff.com///news/2008/dec/12mumterror-unless-you-sacrifice-you-cant-fight-terror.htm
Colonel Hariharan spoke to rediff.com's Shobha Warrier about what needs to be done to avoid terror attacks like the one in Mumbai terror attacks.
Media reports say that the Indian intelligence agencies had prior information about the Mumbai terror attacks. After every terror attack, we hear reports that intelligence agencies had prior information about it. Where is it going wrong then? Do you call this an intelligence failure?
I have no hesitation in saying that it was intelligence failure that led to the attacks. Today's terrorists are more tech savvy than the establishment. Intelligence failure is not only the failure of intelligence agencies. They have to process the information and make an assessment.
There are more than 12 agencies like the Customs, the Enforcement Directorate etc which collect intelligence information, and this excludes the state police.
Firstly, the quality of intelligence collected has to be validated. No agency shares the information with everybody because they want to score brownie points.
What we need is a central control room where intelligence information is shared and immediate action is taken. We don't have a culture of centralised control rooms. I know the Intelligence Bureau has enough intelligent officers, but they don't process intelligence information properly because they are in a hurry to push it so that the responsibility does not fall on them.
How important is processing the information?
It is the most important part of intelligence gathering. You may say, a terror strike is coming from the coast. But from where? Which coast? From whom? When? These questions are never answered. In military intelligence, we don't accept this kind of nonsense.
The Americans failed in processing the information before the 9/11 attacks. We told them a year earlier that Islamic militant guys are being trained in flying. We had told Australia that they are being trained in Australian flying schools. They passed it on to the Americans but nobody took action because they had too much information.
We have to have management in our information systems. Technology is rudimentary in India. We are a lazy nation as far as the governing system is concerned. So, why blame the intelligence agencies alone? You should blame the government, the various departments and ourselves.
Do you think the current attacks will ring alarm bells and something concrete will happen?
I am not an optimist. I expect some more strikes to come. Will just changing the Union home minister solve the problem?
I am not seeing any action now. There will be more strikes. Something like what is happening in Bangkok has to happen in India too. Everything has to be stopped to make the government act. People have to take to the streets. Only that works.
The ordinary people of India feel that after the 9/11 attacks, the US could stop any further attack while in India, every month, there is a terror strike...
Are we prepared to sacrifice some of our fundamental rights? That is the bottom line. The US has sacrificed part of their fundamental rights. US laws are very stringent. We didn't want POTA which guarantees witness protection.
Where should the overhaul start?
It has to be there everywhere; from the grass-roots to the middle level to the structural level.
Three things are important. At the state level, they must read and process the information themselves. The central agencies and state agencies should share information all the time. Today, they don't do that. The culture of sharing of information should come. In Assam, I have seen only army guys in the meetings; the state guys won't even turn up. Some sort of commitment has to come within the states.
Two, the country must learn to sacrifice some rights to fight terror. While fighting terror, you cannot have the same freedom. Unless you sacrifice, you can't fight terror.
Three, our laws will not hold today's times. You catch two out of 15 terrorists, but you cannot prosecute them. Human rights fellows will make a noise; courts will give them bail even if they are murderers. That is why so many Maoists are not being prosecuted. So, you require a special law.
The coast of India is controlled by many departments, and do you feel it is high time the coast comes under one agency, say the Coast Guard?
There are 12 agencies involved in the coastal security of India. In this country, nobody will give up power. Port security is under the ministry of shipping! What does it know of security?
In the US, when a ship comes to the sea, it comes under the Coast Guard. It is responsible for the coast. Here, it is not. The land is under police, the coastal police have become a big joke. The policemen do not know how to swim. They don't have a sea orientation. Why should you have the same policemen doing the coastal job? You require marine police who should look after coastal and port security.
The Coast Guard has got huge deficiencies like the armed forces. They must make up the deficiency right now. Marine security must come under central authority and the Coast Guard is the best arm. It comes under the navy both in the US and here.
Create internal security separately as a ministry. The time has come.
There is a kind of fear and insecurity in the mind of the people of India.
It can happen in Chennai too. Are you sure it will not happen in the other coasts? In Maharashtra, it will change now just like it changed in Gujarat. Gujarat has a dynamic chief minister and he knows his job. He wanted a law which is similar to what Mumbai is having, but he is not being allowed based on party politics. The Centre also won't bring the law and he also won't be allowed to have a law, and he is asked to control terrorism. What are we afraid of?
When you were gathering intelligence as a military intelligence officer, what were the difficulties you faced?
The major problem is of access to other intelligence agencies. There is no sharing of information. That is the biggest hurdle.
In Sri Lanka, that was what happened. The Research and Analysis Wing was involved in training the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) but it is so compartmentalised that when we went in, the guy from R&AW who was helping us did not have the figures because it was under some other department. So, we must take some hard decisions on sharing information.
Every month there is a terror strike. Will Indians have to learn to live with terror attacks?
Do you know such attacks are happening regularly in the north-east? This is the 8th terror attack this year. I am sure it will continue.
• Unless we must have a transparent policy that will guide the structural framework.
• Unless the media acts conscientiously. You give more prominence to Arundhati Roy for defending a guy who attacked our Parliament.
• Unless the structural mechanism involves states and becomes federal in character.
• Unless decision making is done by experts and not politicians.
• Unless you make up the deficiencies of all the counter-terror mechanisms with modern technology.
• Unless policy making, intelligence and execution work in tandem.
There are politicians in the US and the UK too, but they could manage to stop terror attacks.
Because they are Americans, and we are Indians, I am sorry to say. We have no commitment. Did people react the same way when the Mumbai local trains were attacked? They did not because the rich and VIPs were not involved. Because five star hotels were not involved. Only poor guys, who travelled by train suffered. Did you see the same candles then?
December 12, 2008 | 11:46 IST
Courtesy:
http://www.rediff.com///news/2008/dec/12mumterror-unless-you-sacrifice-you-cant-fight-terror.htm
Wednesday, December 10, 2008
Understanding the mindset of troops fighting insurgents
R Hariharan
Armies face a thankless task if they are called upon to fight insurgents - a section of their own people. The media is often more sympathetic to the plight of the population affected by the operations than the problems faced by the soldier. Troops feel both the public and media are unfair to soldiers doing their duty. Their grouse is understandable because the guerrilla operates among the people and only a thin line divides him and his sympathisers among the population.
Invariably troops employed in counterinsurgency tasks face charges of human rights abuses. It is no consolation that this is a universal phenomenon. It is frequently reported in Afghanistan and Iraq. Nearer home, Sri Lanka is a prime example of this phenomenon. We can also see such cases in India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh.
Troops fighting insurgents at home run into twin problems - professional and cultural and this takes a toll on their performance. The soldier is trained for conventional warfare. He is taught to shoot to kill first, use overwhelming firepower, and destroy enemy defences to retain the initiative at all times. Military training has a high degree of regimentation. Everything is reduced to a drill. So a soldier’s response under fire is reflexive than deliberate. In short, armies are trained to become killing machines of a conventional war. The soldier’s training gives him an abounding faith in his weapon and in his skill to kill his foe. And the macho culture of armed forces encourages this phenomenon.
I remember an instance in 1989, while serving with the Indian Peace Keeping Force. I was attending a party in Colombo in the lawns of the Indian High Commission to celebrate the Republic Day. The Pakistani Naval advisor chatted up me when he learnt I was a senior staff officer of the IPKF. “Colonel, I believe you’re having problem with employment of Madras Regiment units in Sri Lanka operations,” he said. Clearly he was needling me because I was a Tamilian.
In 1965 Pakistan had made a clumsy propaganda effort to play up the so-called South-North divide among some of the South Indian prisoners of war. It not only failed miserably but boomeranged when the Pakistanis were shooed out by the jawans. In reality, the Madras Regiment fought with thorough professionalism during the Jaffna operations. So to reply him was easy; “Commander, I don’t know about your army, but I know our army. If I ask a squad of soldiers to open fire on the passing traffic on Mount Road (in Madras) they will just do that. They would not show any hesitation.” This is the level of conditioning our soldiers have.
The soldier in counterinsurgency operations is supposed to take on the militant hiding among ordinary people without hurting others who are in the location. This is a Herculean task for the soldier because he has to overcome his professional training routine for conventional warfare. So the soldier has to be retrained in counterinsurgency warfare techniques before fighting insurgents. But retraining is not always possible when situations overtake planning as it happened in Sri Lanka.
In counterinsurgency troops rarely confront the enemy face to face. The attacks are indirect attacks and the methods are unconventional. Troops exposed to such nerve wracking experience over a long period develop a strong animal feeling of insecurity. During a confrontation, self preservation becomes their sole priority, overtaking all other considerations. Their nerves are an edge and the use of force is instantaneous at the slightest suspicious move. In other words, they get brutalised in the process of fighting the insurgent in the midst of the population over a period of time. Often those who order the use of army in a knee jerk response in areas where insurgents thrive do not bother to understand this occupational hazard of the soldier.
The infamous case of My Lai massacre in the Tet offensive in the Vietnam War in 1968 is classic example of brutalisation of forces. In this incident that shocked the world for its sheer brutality, the U.S. army soldiers massacred over 500 civilians including women and children. In the trials that followed the massacre, the conscience of the world was touched. In his testimony of private Dennis Bunning said "I would say that most people in our company didn't consider the Vietnamese human... A guy would just grab one of the girls there and in one or two incidents they shot the girls when they got done." This statement explains the brutalised mindset that sets in among soldiers who feel insecure even in the midst of civilians in such circumstances. And the world of armies in action has only marginally improved.
Rotation of troops can partly reduce brutalisation. In Jammu and Kashmir the Army has raised Rashtriya Rifles battalions especially for fighting insurgency. Soldiers are not permanently posted to such units and. serve by rotation. But rotation of troops can only partly reduce the problem of brutalisation.
The typical Indian soldier comes from the rural area into the strange world of armed forces. He also comes with a baggage of prejudices and perceptions of the rural society. He hardly understands human rights because he has not experienced them first hand in his conservative society. He sees the world in tones of black and white, right or wrong. The army takes charge of his life 24x7 – it tells him not only how to shoot to kill, but also how to obey orders without question, dress and eat properly. In short, the army is his Mai-Bhap (father and mother). And unlike urban cynics, he still believes in long forgotten old world values like loyalty to the hand that feeds you.
At times a promotion gives him a status never known earlier because of his low caste, poor education, poverty, or lack of urban smartness. The officers are no exception to this, though they might speak English, and come from an urban middle class background (this variety is dwindling). They may grumble and whine but do what their superiors tell them with little consideration for other things.
The security forces living in this schizophrenic existence counter insurgency theatres fail some time and succeed at some. Either way military operations make good copy because war makes news. If they fail, everybody bays for the blood of the soldier. The soldier has a difficult time understanding this kind of behaviour. The public expectations of the armed forces are very high because they are supposed to uphold the rule of law, justice, order and discipline. If we want the army to live up to such expectations, other limbs of government and society have to show at least incremental improvement. Otherwise the task may well be too big for the army.
Nov 10, 2008 Copyright: GFiles
Armies face a thankless task if they are called upon to fight insurgents - a section of their own people. The media is often more sympathetic to the plight of the population affected by the operations than the problems faced by the soldier. Troops feel both the public and media are unfair to soldiers doing their duty. Their grouse is understandable because the guerrilla operates among the people and only a thin line divides him and his sympathisers among the population.
Invariably troops employed in counterinsurgency tasks face charges of human rights abuses. It is no consolation that this is a universal phenomenon. It is frequently reported in Afghanistan and Iraq. Nearer home, Sri Lanka is a prime example of this phenomenon. We can also see such cases in India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh.
Troops fighting insurgents at home run into twin problems - professional and cultural and this takes a toll on their performance. The soldier is trained for conventional warfare. He is taught to shoot to kill first, use overwhelming firepower, and destroy enemy defences to retain the initiative at all times. Military training has a high degree of regimentation. Everything is reduced to a drill. So a soldier’s response under fire is reflexive than deliberate. In short, armies are trained to become killing machines of a conventional war. The soldier’s training gives him an abounding faith in his weapon and in his skill to kill his foe. And the macho culture of armed forces encourages this phenomenon.
I remember an instance in 1989, while serving with the Indian Peace Keeping Force. I was attending a party in Colombo in the lawns of the Indian High Commission to celebrate the Republic Day. The Pakistani Naval advisor chatted up me when he learnt I was a senior staff officer of the IPKF. “Colonel, I believe you’re having problem with employment of Madras Regiment units in Sri Lanka operations,” he said. Clearly he was needling me because I was a Tamilian.
In 1965 Pakistan had made a clumsy propaganda effort to play up the so-called South-North divide among some of the South Indian prisoners of war. It not only failed miserably but boomeranged when the Pakistanis were shooed out by the jawans. In reality, the Madras Regiment fought with thorough professionalism during the Jaffna operations. So to reply him was easy; “Commander, I don’t know about your army, but I know our army. If I ask a squad of soldiers to open fire on the passing traffic on Mount Road (in Madras) they will just do that. They would not show any hesitation.” This is the level of conditioning our soldiers have.
The soldier in counterinsurgency operations is supposed to take on the militant hiding among ordinary people without hurting others who are in the location. This is a Herculean task for the soldier because he has to overcome his professional training routine for conventional warfare. So the soldier has to be retrained in counterinsurgency warfare techniques before fighting insurgents. But retraining is not always possible when situations overtake planning as it happened in Sri Lanka.
In counterinsurgency troops rarely confront the enemy face to face. The attacks are indirect attacks and the methods are unconventional. Troops exposed to such nerve wracking experience over a long period develop a strong animal feeling of insecurity. During a confrontation, self preservation becomes their sole priority, overtaking all other considerations. Their nerves are an edge and the use of force is instantaneous at the slightest suspicious move. In other words, they get brutalised in the process of fighting the insurgent in the midst of the population over a period of time. Often those who order the use of army in a knee jerk response in areas where insurgents thrive do not bother to understand this occupational hazard of the soldier.
The infamous case of My Lai massacre in the Tet offensive in the Vietnam War in 1968 is classic example of brutalisation of forces. In this incident that shocked the world for its sheer brutality, the U.S. army soldiers massacred over 500 civilians including women and children. In the trials that followed the massacre, the conscience of the world was touched. In his testimony of private Dennis Bunning said "I would say that most people in our company didn't consider the Vietnamese human... A guy would just grab one of the girls there and in one or two incidents they shot the girls when they got done." This statement explains the brutalised mindset that sets in among soldiers who feel insecure even in the midst of civilians in such circumstances. And the world of armies in action has only marginally improved.
Rotation of troops can partly reduce brutalisation. In Jammu and Kashmir the Army has raised Rashtriya Rifles battalions especially for fighting insurgency. Soldiers are not permanently posted to such units and. serve by rotation. But rotation of troops can only partly reduce the problem of brutalisation.
The typical Indian soldier comes from the rural area into the strange world of armed forces. He also comes with a baggage of prejudices and perceptions of the rural society. He hardly understands human rights because he has not experienced them first hand in his conservative society. He sees the world in tones of black and white, right or wrong. The army takes charge of his life 24x7 – it tells him not only how to shoot to kill, but also how to obey orders without question, dress and eat properly. In short, the army is his Mai-Bhap (father and mother). And unlike urban cynics, he still believes in long forgotten old world values like loyalty to the hand that feeds you.
At times a promotion gives him a status never known earlier because of his low caste, poor education, poverty, or lack of urban smartness. The officers are no exception to this, though they might speak English, and come from an urban middle class background (this variety is dwindling). They may grumble and whine but do what their superiors tell them with little consideration for other things.
The security forces living in this schizophrenic existence counter insurgency theatres fail some time and succeed at some. Either way military operations make good copy because war makes news. If they fail, everybody bays for the blood of the soldier. The soldier has a difficult time understanding this kind of behaviour. The public expectations of the armed forces are very high because they are supposed to uphold the rule of law, justice, order and discipline. If we want the army to live up to such expectations, other limbs of government and society have to show at least incremental improvement. Otherwise the task may well be too big for the army.
Nov 10, 2008 Copyright: GFiles
Sri Lanka:The Slow Crawl to Kilinochchi
R Hariharan
On Sunday December 7, the security forces were within “kissing distance” of the outer defence lines Kilinochchi, announced the defence spokesman. On Monday, December 8, it became “Troops in Kilinochchi are targeting the town and they are in the vicinity of the town.” However, by December 9 it seems the security forces’ strategic focus had shifted from Kilinochchi to Mullaitivu according to the defence ministry. This contradicts what the army commander Lt Gen Sarath Fonseka said in his Sunday Observer interview on the same day; he said “after capturing Kilinochchi the security forces will definitely capture Mullaithivu...”
In military parlance, this kind of shift in 24 hours takes place only in tactical rather than strategic focus. Somebody is not getting the terminology right or the army is facing major problems in turning the “kiss” into reality in Kilinochchi. Its two pronged offensive on Kilinochchi by Task Force-I from the west and by 57 Division from the southwest was reported facing very heavy LTTE resistance. Could this have compelled them a change in the security forces’ strategy? The defence spokesman had acknowledged this at least on the Task Force-I front. In the Muhamalai sector also there appear to be no substantial progress in spite of 53 Division’s claims of having captured 800 m long and 8 km wide line of defences there. All these bits put together would indicate stalling of offensive.
A second possibility is that 59 Division was making better progress having captured Alampil on December 8. With Task Force-III making good progress on A34 Mankulam-Mullaitivu road branching off eastwards from A9 road 59 Division’s offensive to Mullaitivu would be benefited. So a tactical shift of immediate focus from Kilinochchi to Mullaitivu is understandable.
But such a shift in axis would still be a tactical shift. Ultimately the security forces have to either capture Kilinochchi or force the LTTE to vacate it after they pay a heavy price. Then only the A9 Kandy-Jaffna road can be opened to restore some form of normal life for most of the population of Northern Province. Regaining A9 road from the LTTE control by evicting them from Kilinochchi –Elephant Pass would always remain the strategic objective of the entire operation.
But these are all military semantics; in the absence of independent sources to verify operational information, semantics of both the defence spokesman and the LTTE become important; they indicate the issues hidden behind the words.
After the capture of Pooneryn on November 15, crossing Akkarayankulam bund on October 31, and capture of Mankulam on November 17, it is a month. Evidently since then, momentum of advance has been stalled due to adverse weather on a few days, and stiff LTTE resistance that had been progressively increasing. This would contradict repeated Sri Lankan assertion that the LTTE was on the run. If this is not so, what is holding up the troops?
Loss of momentum in an offensive means more time for the opponent to recoup, rest, repair and readjust defences, reinforce positions, launch counter offensives and inflict more casualties. And cost of war in terms of men, material and money goes up as the clock ticks in days and days become months. The more it is prolonged the better it is for the forces on the defence.
Fortunately, the army commander has cleverly put himself in an advantageous position with multiple options of axes to pick and choose. He also has adequate troops for achieving the strategic objective. Even granting the monsoon rains that affected both sides comes in fits and starts the progress is becoming slow and taking too long. This raises a few operational questions:
• Why the offensive to Kilinochchi is ending up as a slow crawl?
• Has the LTTE built up its strength beyond the ken of four divisions?
• Is the army commander facing a major operational dilemma or political rider interfering with his operations for reasons not known to the public?
In this context, Lt Gen Sarath Fonseka’s comments on India’s role in Sri Lanka in an interview to the Sunday Observer is interesting for more reasons than his derogatory description of Nedumaran and Vaiko,(Tamil Nadu politicians who head the pro-LTTE political lobby in Tamil Nadu) as jokers who receive money from the LTTE. Regarding the operations he sounded quite confident of capturing both Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu. He was not unduly worried about the slow progress or any casualties. There was apparently no operational stress. Does it mean operations are going on smoothly at an accepted pace? In the absence of access to information our questions still linger, unanswered.
The interview had a political content not usually found in interviews of army chiefs. His sarcastic comment was clearly provocative. As anticipated it drew widespread condemnation from political parties in Tamil Nadu and Government of India protested to Sri Lanka on the issue. There was quick apology from the Defence Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapakse the General’s remarks. And in the corrective action that followed, Colombo axed the editor of Sunday Observer while the errant General went scot-free. One cannot imagine the army commander casually tackling a political issue involving a sensitive neighbour without some tacit official acceptance of his perceptions. The freedom of operation given by the President to Lt Gen Fonseka appears to go well beyond the military kind.
And this is not the first time Gen Fonseka has made a politically controversial remark His interview inn October 2008 to the National Post, a Canadian daily, created enough concerns among Tamils when he said: “I strongly believe that this country belongs to the Sinhalese but there are minority communities and we treat them like our people…We being the majority of the country, 75%, we will never give in and we have the right to protect this country…We are also a strong nation … They can live in this country with us. But they must not try to, under the pretext of being a minority, demand undue things.”
While that remark did not endear him to Tamils and caused more concerns in the ethnically polarised nation, Sinhala right wing lobbies applauded him.
Why is Lt Gen Fonseka making such controversial remarks repeatedly? Does he nurture political ambitions after he completes his extended tenure next year? His latest remark on Tamilnadu politicians in the Sunday Observer interview definitely raises this question.
But whatever be the reason, such provocative remarks of the army commander only strengthen the Tamil suspicions of the ulterior objective of Sri Lanka government’s war against the LTTE.
On Sunday December 7, the security forces were within “kissing distance” of the outer defence lines Kilinochchi, announced the defence spokesman. On Monday, December 8, it became “Troops in Kilinochchi are targeting the town and they are in the vicinity of the town.” However, by December 9 it seems the security forces’ strategic focus had shifted from Kilinochchi to Mullaitivu according to the defence ministry. This contradicts what the army commander Lt Gen Sarath Fonseka said in his Sunday Observer interview on the same day; he said “after capturing Kilinochchi the security forces will definitely capture Mullaithivu...”
In military parlance, this kind of shift in 24 hours takes place only in tactical rather than strategic focus. Somebody is not getting the terminology right or the army is facing major problems in turning the “kiss” into reality in Kilinochchi. Its two pronged offensive on Kilinochchi by Task Force-I from the west and by 57 Division from the southwest was reported facing very heavy LTTE resistance. Could this have compelled them a change in the security forces’ strategy? The defence spokesman had acknowledged this at least on the Task Force-I front. In the Muhamalai sector also there appear to be no substantial progress in spite of 53 Division’s claims of having captured 800 m long and 8 km wide line of defences there. All these bits put together would indicate stalling of offensive.
A second possibility is that 59 Division was making better progress having captured Alampil on December 8. With Task Force-III making good progress on A34 Mankulam-Mullaitivu road branching off eastwards from A9 road 59 Division’s offensive to Mullaitivu would be benefited. So a tactical shift of immediate focus from Kilinochchi to Mullaitivu is understandable.
But such a shift in axis would still be a tactical shift. Ultimately the security forces have to either capture Kilinochchi or force the LTTE to vacate it after they pay a heavy price. Then only the A9 Kandy-Jaffna road can be opened to restore some form of normal life for most of the population of Northern Province. Regaining A9 road from the LTTE control by evicting them from Kilinochchi –Elephant Pass would always remain the strategic objective of the entire operation.
But these are all military semantics; in the absence of independent sources to verify operational information, semantics of both the defence spokesman and the LTTE become important; they indicate the issues hidden behind the words.
After the capture of Pooneryn on November 15, crossing Akkarayankulam bund on October 31, and capture of Mankulam on November 17, it is a month. Evidently since then, momentum of advance has been stalled due to adverse weather on a few days, and stiff LTTE resistance that had been progressively increasing. This would contradict repeated Sri Lankan assertion that the LTTE was on the run. If this is not so, what is holding up the troops?
Loss of momentum in an offensive means more time for the opponent to recoup, rest, repair and readjust defences, reinforce positions, launch counter offensives and inflict more casualties. And cost of war in terms of men, material and money goes up as the clock ticks in days and days become months. The more it is prolonged the better it is for the forces on the defence.
Fortunately, the army commander has cleverly put himself in an advantageous position with multiple options of axes to pick and choose. He also has adequate troops for achieving the strategic objective. Even granting the monsoon rains that affected both sides comes in fits and starts the progress is becoming slow and taking too long. This raises a few operational questions:
• Why the offensive to Kilinochchi is ending up as a slow crawl?
• Has the LTTE built up its strength beyond the ken of four divisions?
• Is the army commander facing a major operational dilemma or political rider interfering with his operations for reasons not known to the public?
In this context, Lt Gen Sarath Fonseka’s comments on India’s role in Sri Lanka in an interview to the Sunday Observer is interesting for more reasons than his derogatory description of Nedumaran and Vaiko,(Tamil Nadu politicians who head the pro-LTTE political lobby in Tamil Nadu) as jokers who receive money from the LTTE. Regarding the operations he sounded quite confident of capturing both Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu. He was not unduly worried about the slow progress or any casualties. There was apparently no operational stress. Does it mean operations are going on smoothly at an accepted pace? In the absence of access to information our questions still linger, unanswered.
The interview had a political content not usually found in interviews of army chiefs. His sarcastic comment was clearly provocative. As anticipated it drew widespread condemnation from political parties in Tamil Nadu and Government of India protested to Sri Lanka on the issue. There was quick apology from the Defence Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapakse the General’s remarks. And in the corrective action that followed, Colombo axed the editor of Sunday Observer while the errant General went scot-free. One cannot imagine the army commander casually tackling a political issue involving a sensitive neighbour without some tacit official acceptance of his perceptions. The freedom of operation given by the President to Lt Gen Fonseka appears to go well beyond the military kind.
And this is not the first time Gen Fonseka has made a politically controversial remark His interview inn October 2008 to the National Post, a Canadian daily, created enough concerns among Tamils when he said: “I strongly believe that this country belongs to the Sinhalese but there are minority communities and we treat them like our people…We being the majority of the country, 75%, we will never give in and we have the right to protect this country…We are also a strong nation … They can live in this country with us. But they must not try to, under the pretext of being a minority, demand undue things.”
While that remark did not endear him to Tamils and caused more concerns in the ethnically polarised nation, Sinhala right wing lobbies applauded him.
Why is Lt Gen Fonseka making such controversial remarks repeatedly? Does he nurture political ambitions after he completes his extended tenure next year? His latest remark on Tamilnadu politicians in the Sunday Observer interview definitely raises this question.
But whatever be the reason, such provocative remarks of the army commander only strengthen the Tamil suspicions of the ulterior objective of Sri Lanka government’s war against the LTTE.
Friday, December 5, 2008
Sri Lanka: Allegations Over the Use of Cluster Bombs in the war
By R Hariharan
The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have accused the Sri Lankan air force of dropping cluster bombs on an internally displaced persons (IDP) camp in Vanni area on November 29, 2008. According to the TamilNet report three refugees were killed and 29 shelters of displaced persons were destroyed in the air strike. Recordings of oral accounts of those affected are also available on the Internet. The North East Secretariat on Human Rights (NESoHR) and the Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation (TRO), two NGOs who work in the area and are known for their pro-LTTE sympathies, have also published detailed reports of the incident.
Regardless of the source of these reports, the allegation needs to be thoroughly investigated by a neutral body because the use of cluster bombs on civilian settlements is most inhuman and should not be condoned under any circumstances. More so when the civilians were fleeing from the war and are housed in temporary shelters as in the case in point. If the reports are true, those responsible for it should be taken to task and the affected people should be adequately compensated.
The NESoHR has reported that the SLAF had dropped 16 cluster bombs on the IDP camp in Uzhavanoor in the early hours of the day. Identifying the camp location as four km down the Sundikulam junction on the Paranthan-Mullaitivu road, NESoHR report said that apart from the three deaths 26 people were also injured in the air strike on the camp. The TRO said in another report on the air strike that the camp, constructed and maintained by it and another local NGO, was set up in an area declared as "safe zone" in November by the Sri Lanka government. The photographs of bombs published with the reports showed markings in Russian.
Cluster bombs, like 'jumping' mines and claymore mines, are one of the cruel inventions of war from the World War II days. Each cluster bomb delivers about 2000 small bomblets known as sub-munitions over a wide area. Over the last six decades its deadliness has been refined to offer a bouquet of death to humans and materials through fragmentation, anti-armour, and anti-material varieties. A combination of these can be put together in one payload. Both artillery and aircraft can be used to deliver the deadly payload.
What makes cluster bomb use deadly to civilians is its residual effect. It releases many small unexploded bomblets over a wide area that are capable of killing and maiming civilians long after they are dropped. Israel gained a lot of notoriety when its left over bomblets of cluster bombing of Beirut in 2006 caused avoidable death and destruction to civilians returning to their bombed out city after they pulled out of Lebanon.
Considering the seriousness of the allegations, the casual treatment meted out to these reports by Sri Lanka is surprising. One reason could be that the reports were possibly an international propaganda ploy of the LTTE. The allegations of the LTTE and pro-LTTE NGOs have come at a time when the issue of use of cluster bombs is in international limelight. An international conclave of nations, international NGOs and UN bodies had just met at Oslo to sign the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM). Ninety two countries including Britain, Australia, Canada, France, and Germany signed the CCM at Oslo on November 3. Significant absentees at the Oslo convention included Russia, China, Israel, United States and India.
Though Sri Lanka is not a signatory to the CCM, it will be in Sri Lanka's interest to clear the allegations for three reasons – the weapon is inhuman, its use on unarmed non-combatants is despicable, and Sri Lanka probably possesses some cluster bombs like most of the countries in the sub-continent. And if it is LTTE's international propaganda effort, Sri Lanka has all the more reason to call the bluff.
05-Dec-2008 http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cnotes5%5Cnote486.html
The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have accused the Sri Lankan air force of dropping cluster bombs on an internally displaced persons (IDP) camp in Vanni area on November 29, 2008. According to the TamilNet report three refugees were killed and 29 shelters of displaced persons were destroyed in the air strike. Recordings of oral accounts of those affected are also available on the Internet. The North East Secretariat on Human Rights (NESoHR) and the Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation (TRO), two NGOs who work in the area and are known for their pro-LTTE sympathies, have also published detailed reports of the incident.
Regardless of the source of these reports, the allegation needs to be thoroughly investigated by a neutral body because the use of cluster bombs on civilian settlements is most inhuman and should not be condoned under any circumstances. More so when the civilians were fleeing from the war and are housed in temporary shelters as in the case in point. If the reports are true, those responsible for it should be taken to task and the affected people should be adequately compensated.
The NESoHR has reported that the SLAF had dropped 16 cluster bombs on the IDP camp in Uzhavanoor in the early hours of the day. Identifying the camp location as four km down the Sundikulam junction on the Paranthan-Mullaitivu road, NESoHR report said that apart from the three deaths 26 people were also injured in the air strike on the camp. The TRO said in another report on the air strike that the camp, constructed and maintained by it and another local NGO, was set up in an area declared as "safe zone" in November by the Sri Lanka government. The photographs of bombs published with the reports showed markings in Russian.
Cluster bombs, like 'jumping' mines and claymore mines, are one of the cruel inventions of war from the World War II days. Each cluster bomb delivers about 2000 small bomblets known as sub-munitions over a wide area. Over the last six decades its deadliness has been refined to offer a bouquet of death to humans and materials through fragmentation, anti-armour, and anti-material varieties. A combination of these can be put together in one payload. Both artillery and aircraft can be used to deliver the deadly payload.
What makes cluster bomb use deadly to civilians is its residual effect. It releases many small unexploded bomblets over a wide area that are capable of killing and maiming civilians long after they are dropped. Israel gained a lot of notoriety when its left over bomblets of cluster bombing of Beirut in 2006 caused avoidable death and destruction to civilians returning to their bombed out city after they pulled out of Lebanon.
Considering the seriousness of the allegations, the casual treatment meted out to these reports by Sri Lanka is surprising. One reason could be that the reports were possibly an international propaganda ploy of the LTTE. The allegations of the LTTE and pro-LTTE NGOs have come at a time when the issue of use of cluster bombs is in international limelight. An international conclave of nations, international NGOs and UN bodies had just met at Oslo to sign the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM). Ninety two countries including Britain, Australia, Canada, France, and Germany signed the CCM at Oslo on November 3. Significant absentees at the Oslo convention included Russia, China, Israel, United States and India.
Though Sri Lanka is not a signatory to the CCM, it will be in Sri Lanka's interest to clear the allegations for three reasons – the weapon is inhuman, its use on unarmed non-combatants is despicable, and Sri Lanka probably possesses some cluster bombs like most of the countries in the sub-continent. And if it is LTTE's international propaganda effort, Sri Lanka has all the more reason to call the bluff.
05-Dec-2008 http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cnotes5%5Cnote486.html
Accountability of Intelligence Agencies
By B. Raman
The Intelligence Bureau (IB) and the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW) have mounted a damage-control exercise by sharing with senior journalists details of technical intelligence (TECHINT) collected by them, which clearly indicated that the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), the Pakistani terrorist organisation, which is a member of Osama bin Laden's International Islamic Front (IIF) For Jihad Against the Crusaders and the Jewish People, was planning to carry out sea-borne terrorist strikes against hotels on Mumbai's coast, one of the hotels being the Taj Mahal hotel, which was actually attacked and occupied by some terrorists on the night of November 26, 2008. This intelligence was disseminated by them to those responsible for physical security. It seems to be the contention of the IB and the R&AW that what happened in Mumbai was a serious instance of physical security failure and failure to act on available intelligence and not an instance of intelligence failure.
2. Other independent reports indicate that the reports were acted upon by the Mumbai Police and the security authorities of the Taj Mahal Hotel. It was not as if they ignored them. The Mumbai Police alerted the hotels mentioned in the R&AW report and advised them on the need to strengthen security. The Mumbai Police also set up a security barrier at a point near the sea where , in their assessment, clandestine landings might take place.
3. The two specific reports of the R&AW based on intercepts were disseminated in September. There was no follow-up report for nearly five weeks, either from the IB or the R&AW. As a result, the Mumbai Police and hotels downgraded the security alert. The Taj Mahal Hotel removed a security barrier, which they had erected, and the Mumbai Police removed the security barrier which they had set up to prevent clandestine landings. The terrorists from Pakistan seem to have landed at this very point, where the Mumbai Police had erected the security barrier on the receipt of the alert from the R&AW.
4. The R&AW and the IB have their offices in Mumbai headed by senior officers to interact closely with the local police and the Armed Forces units. All of them are members of special co-ordination committees. How come the IB and the R&AW officers did not come to know that the security alert had been downgraded following the non-receipt of any follow-up reports from the R&AW? Did the R&AW immediately advise the Mumbai Police, the Navy and the hotel authorities that the alert should be continued till they receive information that the LET has abandoned its plans?
5. While the intercepts of September speak well of the interception capability of the R&AW, it does not necessarily speak well of its capability for analysis, assessment and follow-up action. Many questions are relevant in this regard: In what form did it report the intelligence? Did it tone it down while reporting the intercepts in a paraphrased form? Did it tell the persons to whom it sent the two reports of September that the intelligence was based on intercepts of telephone conversations of an LET operative based in Pakistan? If it did not do so on grounds of operational security, how come it is now sharing them with journalists? This only strengthens the suspicion that the IB and the R&AW show a greater readiness to share sensitive intelligence with journalists to protect themselves than with each other to protect the nation and its people. To which Ministries and departments were the reports sent and at what level?
6. Unless one looks into all these questions, one cannot say where the failures occurred, which made the terrorist strikes possible. In 1987, the R&AW received a human intelligence report about a Khalistani plot to kill Rajiv Gandhi, then Prime Minister, during his visit to Rajghat on Mahatma Gandhi's birthday. The R&AW officer----of the rank of Director, one rank below a Joint Secretary--- conveyed the information in a written note to a Joint Secretary in the Home Ministry and the Delhi Police. He did not alert other senior officers.
7. The report proved to be accurate. Rajiv Gandhi narrowly escaped the assassination attempt. T. N. Seshan, who was then co-ordinating the security arrangements for Rajiv Gandhi, was asked to enquire into this. He held both the Delhi Police and the R&AW responsible for omissions, which could have led to a national tragedy. He blamed the Delhi Police for inaction on the R&AW report and the R&AW for not realising the gravity of the information when it was received and for disseminating it at a lower level without alerting the senior officers responsible for Rajiv's security.
8. A report in the "Hindustan Times" of December 2, 2008, quotes an unnamed officer of the R&AW as saying that its job in the Mumbai case was over with sending the report to the concerned quarters in the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS) and that it had no other responsibility since it does not operate in Indian territory.
9. This is a highly irresponsible mindset, which needs to be checked. B. N. Mallick and R. N. Kao, the founding fathers of the Indian intelligence, used to stress on their officers that the responsibility of an intelligence officer does not stop with his sending a memo or a note about intelligence of a serious nature collected. It is equally their responsibility to ensure that the intelligence receives the attention it deserves in the ministries and departments concerned and that the necessary follow-up action is taken. In respect of terrorism, the role and responsibility of an intelligence officer starts from the moment he collects a piece of intelligence and continues till it is acted upon and the act of terrorism thwarted.
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Government of India, New Delhi, and presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)
December 3, 2008
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers30%5Cpaper2958.html
The Intelligence Bureau (IB) and the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW) have mounted a damage-control exercise by sharing with senior journalists details of technical intelligence (TECHINT) collected by them, which clearly indicated that the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), the Pakistani terrorist organisation, which is a member of Osama bin Laden's International Islamic Front (IIF) For Jihad Against the Crusaders and the Jewish People, was planning to carry out sea-borne terrorist strikes against hotels on Mumbai's coast, one of the hotels being the Taj Mahal hotel, which was actually attacked and occupied by some terrorists on the night of November 26, 2008. This intelligence was disseminated by them to those responsible for physical security. It seems to be the contention of the IB and the R&AW that what happened in Mumbai was a serious instance of physical security failure and failure to act on available intelligence and not an instance of intelligence failure.
2. Other independent reports indicate that the reports were acted upon by the Mumbai Police and the security authorities of the Taj Mahal Hotel. It was not as if they ignored them. The Mumbai Police alerted the hotels mentioned in the R&AW report and advised them on the need to strengthen security. The Mumbai Police also set up a security barrier at a point near the sea where , in their assessment, clandestine landings might take place.
3. The two specific reports of the R&AW based on intercepts were disseminated in September. There was no follow-up report for nearly five weeks, either from the IB or the R&AW. As a result, the Mumbai Police and hotels downgraded the security alert. The Taj Mahal Hotel removed a security barrier, which they had erected, and the Mumbai Police removed the security barrier which they had set up to prevent clandestine landings. The terrorists from Pakistan seem to have landed at this very point, where the Mumbai Police had erected the security barrier on the receipt of the alert from the R&AW.
4. The R&AW and the IB have their offices in Mumbai headed by senior officers to interact closely with the local police and the Armed Forces units. All of them are members of special co-ordination committees. How come the IB and the R&AW officers did not come to know that the security alert had been downgraded following the non-receipt of any follow-up reports from the R&AW? Did the R&AW immediately advise the Mumbai Police, the Navy and the hotel authorities that the alert should be continued till they receive information that the LET has abandoned its plans?
5. While the intercepts of September speak well of the interception capability of the R&AW, it does not necessarily speak well of its capability for analysis, assessment and follow-up action. Many questions are relevant in this regard: In what form did it report the intelligence? Did it tone it down while reporting the intercepts in a paraphrased form? Did it tell the persons to whom it sent the two reports of September that the intelligence was based on intercepts of telephone conversations of an LET operative based in Pakistan? If it did not do so on grounds of operational security, how come it is now sharing them with journalists? This only strengthens the suspicion that the IB and the R&AW show a greater readiness to share sensitive intelligence with journalists to protect themselves than with each other to protect the nation and its people. To which Ministries and departments were the reports sent and at what level?
6. Unless one looks into all these questions, one cannot say where the failures occurred, which made the terrorist strikes possible. In 1987, the R&AW received a human intelligence report about a Khalistani plot to kill Rajiv Gandhi, then Prime Minister, during his visit to Rajghat on Mahatma Gandhi's birthday. The R&AW officer----of the rank of Director, one rank below a Joint Secretary--- conveyed the information in a written note to a Joint Secretary in the Home Ministry and the Delhi Police. He did not alert other senior officers.
7. The report proved to be accurate. Rajiv Gandhi narrowly escaped the assassination attempt. T. N. Seshan, who was then co-ordinating the security arrangements for Rajiv Gandhi, was asked to enquire into this. He held both the Delhi Police and the R&AW responsible for omissions, which could have led to a national tragedy. He blamed the Delhi Police for inaction on the R&AW report and the R&AW for not realising the gravity of the information when it was received and for disseminating it at a lower level without alerting the senior officers responsible for Rajiv's security.
8. A report in the "Hindustan Times" of December 2, 2008, quotes an unnamed officer of the R&AW as saying that its job in the Mumbai case was over with sending the report to the concerned quarters in the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS) and that it had no other responsibility since it does not operate in Indian territory.
9. This is a highly irresponsible mindset, which needs to be checked. B. N. Mallick and R. N. Kao, the founding fathers of the Indian intelligence, used to stress on their officers that the responsibility of an intelligence officer does not stop with his sending a memo or a note about intelligence of a serious nature collected. It is equally their responsibility to ensure that the intelligence receives the attention it deserves in the ministries and departments concerned and that the necessary follow-up action is taken. In respect of terrorism, the role and responsibility of an intelligence officer starts from the moment he collects a piece of intelligence and continues till it is acted upon and the act of terrorism thwarted.
(The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Government of India, New Delhi, and presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)
December 3, 2008
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers30%5Cpaper2958.html
Tuesday, December 2, 2008
Sri Lanka Perspectives Series - October 2008
I have been writing a monthly assessment of the Sri Lanka situation for 'Security Trends' a strategic security journal published from New Delhi. They reflect my ability to assess the future course of events in Sri Lanka. These are written at the end of each month and contain an assessment on future trends. They are published here with the permission of the publishers. For copyright reasons the articles in this series may be reproduced with the permission of the publishers available at www.security-risks.com
Overview
As the existence of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in the north became precarious, the continuing war affecting over 200,000 Tamils living in LTTE controlled touched off an upsurge of protest in Tamil Nadu with almost all political parties lending a hand. The LTTE happy at these developments tried to project its demand for immediate ceasefire through local politicians in the state. And M Karunanidhi, the chief minister, always sympathetic to the cause of Eelam Tamils, gave an ultimatum to the Centre threatening to pull out his Dravida Munnetra Kazagham (DMK) party members from the parliament by end October 2008 if the war was not stopped. Resignation of DMK members could have affected the survival of Dr Manmohan Singh’s ruling coalition in Delhi. So there was a flurry of diplomatic and political activity in Delhi, Chennai and Colombo.
However, the Centre managed to assuage the feelings of Tamil Nadu with some adroit diplomacy with Sri Lanka. After discussions with the Sri Lanka Presidential advisor Basil Rajapaksa at Delhi, the two countries issued a joint statement. Sri Lanka agreed to take all measures to ensure the safety and well being of Tamils affected in the war zone and speed up the devolution process for equitable rights to Tamils. India decided to despatch 80 tons of relief material to the affected people. Significantly the question of ceasefire did not figure in the statement. The LTTE has continued to kindle the embers of sympathy in Tamil Nadu; even political parties distancing themselves from the LTTE have continued to keep the issue alive in their activities. However, in Sri Lanka the President has probably politically gained more mileage out of this as he had shown his ability to keep India politically at bay despite Tamil Nadu politicians pin pricks.
The rapid progress of the Sri Lanka security forces in the Northern Province ran into twin troubles to slow them down on their tracks during October 2008. The northeast monsoon rains came down heavily affecting the cross country mobility of the security forces operating west of A9 Kandy –Jaffna highway. The monsoon rains in spurts are likely to continue the whole of November which could slow down the operations of the security forces. The security forces encountered heavy resistance on a defence line approximately 13 km from Kilinochchi and suffered heavy casualties.
Military Operations
Despite establishing contact by mid September 2008, advancing troops were held up for nearly six weeks due to stiff resistance in the outer defences of the LTTE in area Akkarayankulam Lake, roughly 15 km from Kilinochchi, the administrative capital. The rains further added to their woes. After suffering heavy casualties the security forces managed to capture the heights of bunds around the lake only by end October. This should ease their forward movement whenever there is a break in the rainfall.
The advancing security forces in this sector encountered LTTE defences based on bunds across both the approaches west of Kilinochchi. One bund of about 17 km long extended from Nachchikuda on the north-western coast to Akkarayankulam.
Task Force I advancing towards Pooneryn trying to by pass the heavily fortified Nachikuda base had to neutralise defences based on the obstacle at Kambivelliyavillu, Pandiveddiaru, Maninyankulam, Vannerikulam, and Jeyapuram with stiff opposition. Surrounded on three sides, the LTTE vacated the Nachikuda base on October 29. With the loss of this base the LTTE control on the northwest coast from Silvattuai to the Pooneryn salient is practically finished. This would result in denial of the coast to smuggle LTTE supplies as well as an alternate route to infiltrate Jaffna. The access to the road would also facilitate faster build up of offensive against Pooneryn located14 km from Nachikuda.
On the Welioya sector, 59 Division managed to further consolidate their area expanding it progressively. With the capture of Gajabapura, the division is established in secure area up to Nayaru lagoon. As the lagoon ridden Mullaitivu coast line would be affected by monsoon and as they troop strength is inadequate, the division is unlikely to launch major offensives at least till December.
A single light aircraft of the LTTE air wing on October 30 made a sneak raid and dropped two bombs damaging two turbines of the Kelanitissa power plant. This has resulted in interruption of electricity power supply for nearly six months. The same sortie also managed to bomb Thalladi military base in Mannar Sector. Despite detection by Sri Lankan radars and being airborne for more than one hour, the LTTE aircraft evaded the F7 interceptor. It failed to shoot down the raider as its missile could not lock on the taarget. This would indicate serious flaws in the security forces air defence system and poor training of pilots of air force. This air raid though not a major success would undoubtedly boost the morale of the LTTE.
However, the naval machine gunners on board two merchant vessels gave a better account in repelling a suicide raid by three Sea Tiger boats off Myliddy near Kankesanturai port in Jaffna peninsula on October 22. They sank one and drove off two other boats which tried to raid the ships carrying food supplies for Jaffna.
LTTE
The LTTE appears to have cleverly used the ground and the monsoon rains to its advantage. It managed to inflict heavy casualties particularly in 57 Divisions battles based around the Akkarayankulam lake area. Only in the third week of October the Division could breakthrough the defences and push the LTTE from the defences. In a single operation in this area on Oct 19, the security forces lost '33 soldiers as against the LTTE’s loss of 12 cadres. In addition 48 soldiers were injured and three were missing, which would mean loss of one company of troops. However, given the force level constraints and sheer numerical superiority of the security forces, it is doubtful whether the LTTE can afford to mount such costly encounters in future in this sector.
In this front, the LTTE appears to have used CS gas against the assaulting troops. CS is not a prohibited item in the international protocol on chemical warfare. Basically an irritant, a type of tear gas, it is used by police in some countries for crowd control. It is not clear how useful it is as without gas masks for the defenders.
After the successful suicide attack killing retired Lt Gen Janaka Perera and 27 other civilians on September 26 in Anuradhapura, the LTTE carried out another attack on Maithripala Sirisena, Minister of Agricultural Development Maithripala Sirisena, Minister of Agricultural Development & Agrarian Services Development and General Secretary of the ruling Sri Lanka Freedom Party in the outskirts of Colombo on October 9. However, except for the suicide bomber no one else was killed though five others were injured. The anti terrorism police have also recovered a cleverly improvised ‘book bomb’ from a Jaffna school teacher working in Bandarawela. This would indicate that despite the stepped up security the LTTE would continue its efforts at sabotage and suicide attacks.
Future portends
The obstacle based defence extending from Nachikuda to Akkarayankulam and further up across the road communication up to A9 highway near Iranamadu indicate the LTTE had selected this line for halting the advancing Sri Lanka forces. Though the LTTE caused heavy casualties probably in the proportion of at least two Sri Lankan soldiers for every cadre killed, the laid back defensive position has given away too much territory at too low a price for the security forces. In the bargain the LTTE failed to defend the vital north-western coastal supply route from Silvatturai to Nachikuda vital for retaining their conventional capability. This would indicate perhaps the LTTE would cause maximum casualty in the operations in the coming weeks till the monsoon runs out of rains in December and then pull back to the jungles of Mullaitivu.
The slow and cautious progress of the security forces in earlier months for keeping the casualties low has resulted in their main battle for Kilinochchi to be fought in adverse weather conditions. As a result they have lesser air and artillery support and reduced mobility. As the A32 axis along the coast is wide open now after the fall of Nachikuda, we can expect the LTTE to take on the security forces in area Pooneryn. Loss of Pooneryn would mean the loss of LTTE ability to carryout artillery strikes against the Palali air base. This could also result in losing the ability to engage the administrative echelons of 53 and 54 divisions deployed against the Muhamalai-Elephant Pass/Nagarkovil front in the north.
The ability of the LTTE air wing to carry out sneak attack despite use of air defence measures should be a cause for concern for the Sri Lankans. We can expect the LTTE to carry out a dramatic attack against some of the valuable targets including VIPs, ports and defence headquarters in Colombo.
With the erosion of their ability in the Gulf of Mannar LTTE Sea Tigers appear to be trying to stage a comeback in northern coast line of Jaffna. Though risky, Jaffna coast provides alternate access to Vedaranyam in Tamil Nadu coast, east of the controversial Rama Sethu. We can expect this coast line to become active with more encounters between the Sri Lanka Navy and the Sea Tigers, as the LTTE’s logistic pressure increases. We can expect the LTTE to try to indirectly overcome this by whipping up agitation in Tamil Nadu by pro-LTTE elements. However, despite political polemics both the state and central governments appear to be firm in strictly curbing the resurgence of LTTE activity in Tamil Nadu.
According to the data of UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, as on Oct 24 in all 144,560 persons belonging to Kilinochchi district alone have been displaced due to war. This figure is likely to swell to over two lakhs in the coming moths and a major humanitarian tragedy may be in the offing. That could stir up political protests further in Tamil Nadu.
Oct 31, 2008 Copyright:www.security-risks.com
Overview
As the existence of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in the north became precarious, the continuing war affecting over 200,000 Tamils living in LTTE controlled touched off an upsurge of protest in Tamil Nadu with almost all political parties lending a hand. The LTTE happy at these developments tried to project its demand for immediate ceasefire through local politicians in the state. And M Karunanidhi, the chief minister, always sympathetic to the cause of Eelam Tamils, gave an ultimatum to the Centre threatening to pull out his Dravida Munnetra Kazagham (DMK) party members from the parliament by end October 2008 if the war was not stopped. Resignation of DMK members could have affected the survival of Dr Manmohan Singh’s ruling coalition in Delhi. So there was a flurry of diplomatic and political activity in Delhi, Chennai and Colombo.
However, the Centre managed to assuage the feelings of Tamil Nadu with some adroit diplomacy with Sri Lanka. After discussions with the Sri Lanka Presidential advisor Basil Rajapaksa at Delhi, the two countries issued a joint statement. Sri Lanka agreed to take all measures to ensure the safety and well being of Tamils affected in the war zone and speed up the devolution process for equitable rights to Tamils. India decided to despatch 80 tons of relief material to the affected people. Significantly the question of ceasefire did not figure in the statement. The LTTE has continued to kindle the embers of sympathy in Tamil Nadu; even political parties distancing themselves from the LTTE have continued to keep the issue alive in their activities. However, in Sri Lanka the President has probably politically gained more mileage out of this as he had shown his ability to keep India politically at bay despite Tamil Nadu politicians pin pricks.
The rapid progress of the Sri Lanka security forces in the Northern Province ran into twin troubles to slow them down on their tracks during October 2008. The northeast monsoon rains came down heavily affecting the cross country mobility of the security forces operating west of A9 Kandy –Jaffna highway. The monsoon rains in spurts are likely to continue the whole of November which could slow down the operations of the security forces. The security forces encountered heavy resistance on a defence line approximately 13 km from Kilinochchi and suffered heavy casualties.
Military Operations
Despite establishing contact by mid September 2008, advancing troops were held up for nearly six weeks due to stiff resistance in the outer defences of the LTTE in area Akkarayankulam Lake, roughly 15 km from Kilinochchi, the administrative capital. The rains further added to their woes. After suffering heavy casualties the security forces managed to capture the heights of bunds around the lake only by end October. This should ease their forward movement whenever there is a break in the rainfall.
The advancing security forces in this sector encountered LTTE defences based on bunds across both the approaches west of Kilinochchi. One bund of about 17 km long extended from Nachchikuda on the north-western coast to Akkarayankulam.
Task Force I advancing towards Pooneryn trying to by pass the heavily fortified Nachikuda base had to neutralise defences based on the obstacle at Kambivelliyavillu, Pandiveddiaru, Maninyankulam, Vannerikulam, and Jeyapuram with stiff opposition. Surrounded on three sides, the LTTE vacated the Nachikuda base on October 29. With the loss of this base the LTTE control on the northwest coast from Silvattuai to the Pooneryn salient is practically finished. This would result in denial of the coast to smuggle LTTE supplies as well as an alternate route to infiltrate Jaffna. The access to the road would also facilitate faster build up of offensive against Pooneryn located14 km from Nachikuda.
On the Welioya sector, 59 Division managed to further consolidate their area expanding it progressively. With the capture of Gajabapura, the division is established in secure area up to Nayaru lagoon. As the lagoon ridden Mullaitivu coast line would be affected by monsoon and as they troop strength is inadequate, the division is unlikely to launch major offensives at least till December.
A single light aircraft of the LTTE air wing on October 30 made a sneak raid and dropped two bombs damaging two turbines of the Kelanitissa power plant. This has resulted in interruption of electricity power supply for nearly six months. The same sortie also managed to bomb Thalladi military base in Mannar Sector. Despite detection by Sri Lankan radars and being airborne for more than one hour, the LTTE aircraft evaded the F7 interceptor. It failed to shoot down the raider as its missile could not lock on the taarget. This would indicate serious flaws in the security forces air defence system and poor training of pilots of air force. This air raid though not a major success would undoubtedly boost the morale of the LTTE.
However, the naval machine gunners on board two merchant vessels gave a better account in repelling a suicide raid by three Sea Tiger boats off Myliddy near Kankesanturai port in Jaffna peninsula on October 22. They sank one and drove off two other boats which tried to raid the ships carrying food supplies for Jaffna.
LTTE
The LTTE appears to have cleverly used the ground and the monsoon rains to its advantage. It managed to inflict heavy casualties particularly in 57 Divisions battles based around the Akkarayankulam lake area. Only in the third week of October the Division could breakthrough the defences and push the LTTE from the defences. In a single operation in this area on Oct 19, the security forces lost '33 soldiers as against the LTTE’s loss of 12 cadres. In addition 48 soldiers were injured and three were missing, which would mean loss of one company of troops. However, given the force level constraints and sheer numerical superiority of the security forces, it is doubtful whether the LTTE can afford to mount such costly encounters in future in this sector.
In this front, the LTTE appears to have used CS gas against the assaulting troops. CS is not a prohibited item in the international protocol on chemical warfare. Basically an irritant, a type of tear gas, it is used by police in some countries for crowd control. It is not clear how useful it is as without gas masks for the defenders.
After the successful suicide attack killing retired Lt Gen Janaka Perera and 27 other civilians on September 26 in Anuradhapura, the LTTE carried out another attack on Maithripala Sirisena, Minister of Agricultural Development Maithripala Sirisena, Minister of Agricultural Development & Agrarian Services Development and General Secretary of the ruling Sri Lanka Freedom Party in the outskirts of Colombo on October 9. However, except for the suicide bomber no one else was killed though five others were injured. The anti terrorism police have also recovered a cleverly improvised ‘book bomb’ from a Jaffna school teacher working in Bandarawela. This would indicate that despite the stepped up security the LTTE would continue its efforts at sabotage and suicide attacks.
Future portends
The obstacle based defence extending from Nachikuda to Akkarayankulam and further up across the road communication up to A9 highway near Iranamadu indicate the LTTE had selected this line for halting the advancing Sri Lanka forces. Though the LTTE caused heavy casualties probably in the proportion of at least two Sri Lankan soldiers for every cadre killed, the laid back defensive position has given away too much territory at too low a price for the security forces. In the bargain the LTTE failed to defend the vital north-western coastal supply route from Silvatturai to Nachikuda vital for retaining their conventional capability. This would indicate perhaps the LTTE would cause maximum casualty in the operations in the coming weeks till the monsoon runs out of rains in December and then pull back to the jungles of Mullaitivu.
The slow and cautious progress of the security forces in earlier months for keeping the casualties low has resulted in their main battle for Kilinochchi to be fought in adverse weather conditions. As a result they have lesser air and artillery support and reduced mobility. As the A32 axis along the coast is wide open now after the fall of Nachikuda, we can expect the LTTE to take on the security forces in area Pooneryn. Loss of Pooneryn would mean the loss of LTTE ability to carryout artillery strikes against the Palali air base. This could also result in losing the ability to engage the administrative echelons of 53 and 54 divisions deployed against the Muhamalai-Elephant Pass/Nagarkovil front in the north.
The ability of the LTTE air wing to carry out sneak attack despite use of air defence measures should be a cause for concern for the Sri Lankans. We can expect the LTTE to carry out a dramatic attack against some of the valuable targets including VIPs, ports and defence headquarters in Colombo.
With the erosion of their ability in the Gulf of Mannar LTTE Sea Tigers appear to be trying to stage a comeback in northern coast line of Jaffna. Though risky, Jaffna coast provides alternate access to Vedaranyam in Tamil Nadu coast, east of the controversial Rama Sethu. We can expect this coast line to become active with more encounters between the Sri Lanka Navy and the Sea Tigers, as the LTTE’s logistic pressure increases. We can expect the LTTE to try to indirectly overcome this by whipping up agitation in Tamil Nadu by pro-LTTE elements. However, despite political polemics both the state and central governments appear to be firm in strictly curbing the resurgence of LTTE activity in Tamil Nadu.
According to the data of UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, as on Oct 24 in all 144,560 persons belonging to Kilinochchi district alone have been displaced due to war. This figure is likely to swell to over two lakhs in the coming moths and a major humanitarian tragedy may be in the offing. That could stir up political protests further in Tamil Nadu.
Oct 31, 2008 Copyright:www.security-risks.com
Monday, December 1, 2008
Mumbai terror strike and Prabhakaran's expectations of India's support
The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) chief Prabhakaran's usually much hyped Great Hero's Day 2008 speech on November 27 became a casualty of the daring terror strike on the same day in Mumbai. Holding the city to ransom for three days the terror story hogged headlines and only few of the Indian print media carried Prabhakaran's speech on the sidelines, while the visual media ignored it.
And this time he needed the ears of New Delhi, more than Tamil Nadu, to act upon his strong plea for India's support for his armed struggle and lifting the Indian ban on the LTTE. Actually this was the central theme of his, otherwise recycled, annual speech.
The Manmohan Singh coalition is fighting a battle to survive the ground swell of criticism for its abysmally poor performance in handling the Mumbai terror strike. In a knee jerk reaction so typical of New Delhi, long standing proposals to strengthen the counter terror apparatus at the Centre and the states are hurriedly being resurrected. With the general elections in another three months, no Indian political party can afford any more to soft pedal terrorism of any hue – religious, ideological or ethnic. The national impact of the Mumbai terror raid is so strong that policy makers from now onwards can only take a hard line on activities of terrorist organisations. And in India that includes the LTTE, whose conduct had qualified it to be banned as a terrorist organisation. Only recently the Delhi High Court has upheld the ban on the LTTE.
The first counter measures against terror are already in the pipeline and relate to coastal and marine terrorism. Stricter control of illegal entrants, tightening of security at airports and harbours, tightening of shipping and fisheries control, and tougher vetting of visitors from neighbouring countries would probably follow. The proposed federal agency for integrating the national response to terror attacks and expansion of the reach of the counter terror force - the Natinal Security Guard (NSG) to the metros might take a little more time to come through. But surely come they will, for the government had been dithering on these issues for years now.
And all this is bad news for Prabhakaran's mission to win friends and influence people in India.
Happy at the resurgence of political support in Tamil Nadu for the LTTE, Prabhakaran called it a "great changes taking place in India." Prabhakaran is probably expecting greater acceptance of the LTTE in Tamil Nadu encouraged by the revival of pro-LTTE elements in Tamil Nadu as the "dormant voices in support of our struggle" re-emerging aloud again, as he termed them.
Perhaps in a bid to save the face of Tamil Nadu leaders who are demanding immediate ceasefire, he explained his readiness to talk peace, after listing out the record of failed peace efforts in the past. He stressed that Tamil genocide was taking place as a result of the war, to strike a chord among Tamils everywhere.
It is significant that Prabhkaran wants India's help on his own terms as there is not a word of regret or remorse in the speech for his own betrayal of India when it had actively intervened in support of the Tamil cause in the past. He has not even provided a fig leaf of apology for the role of LTTE in the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, former Indian prime minister on the soil of Tamil Nadu.
It is out of question for any politician in India to ask people to wish away (as Prabhakaran had done) not only the Rajiv assassination but also the LTTE's black record of killings of his own kind let alone his opponents, Tamil or otherwise. This attitudinal problem of Prabhakaran will make it difficult for any worthwhile Tamil politician to openly express support for the LTTE, even if the ban on the LTTE is lifted. Many Sri Lankan Tamils apparently consider these issues as not germane to their struggle which has been militarily taken over by the LTTE.
But across the Palk Straits it is still considered as the LTTE's unacceptable conduct, particularly when it had depended upon India's goodwill for its survival, not once, but many times in the past. Prabhakaran's refusal to recognize this is manifest in his description of the earlier Indian interventions as "injurious to the people of Tamil Eelam, as well as to their struggle." Obviously this was to justify his collusion with President Premadasa, of the same "racist Sinhala state, "to throw out the Indian forces which went to Sri Lanka to help Tamils. Not only that, his love-hate thoughts on India were evident when he blamed "the racist Sinhala state, with its intrigues, conspired to bring enmity between our freedom movement and the earlier Indian administration." So his platitudes of India "the super power" sound hollow.
Prabhakaran has castigated "some countries which identified themselves as so-called Peace Sponsors, rushed into activities which impaired negotiations." Obviously this was a reference to the U.S. and the EU who have banned the LTTE as a terrorist organisation. They have also busted LTTE clandestine arms procurement rings and clamped down its front organisations including some NGOs. He probably felt no more confident of influencing them to mend their ways in favour of the LTTE.
As a corollary, his need for India to bale him out is more than ever before as the security forces are closing in on the LTTE bastion at Kilinochchi.
So it was not surprising to read that he had "great expectations that the Indian super power will take a positive stand on our national question." Probably, he expects further political pressure from Tamil Nadu to influence India. He felt Tamil Nadu "has taken heart to rise on behalf of our people at this hour of need. This timely intervention has gratified the people of Tamil Eelam and our freedom movement and given us a sense of relief." Of course Sri Lankan Tamils plight is dear to the heart of Tamils but not the self-inflicted plight of the LTTE.
Though India has unequivocally stated that it was against the creation of an independent Tamil Eelam, the LTTE leader had "cordially" requested them "to raise their voice firmly in favour of our struggle for a Tamil Eelam state, and to take appropriate and positive measures to remove the ban which remains an impediment to an amicable relationship between India and our movement." Does he really believe in his call? Or a stray event like the celebration of his birthday by a group of lawyers in the Madras High Court has kindled his high expectations? Prabhakaran is too shrewd for that. All this hype built over Indian support is probably to boost up his constituency among expatriate Tamils and the LTTE cadres battling it out in Wanni under adverse conditions.
The Great Heroes Day statement only shows that despite his strategic blunders Prabhakaran is yet to introspect and come to term with the dynamics of sub-continental reality. If he wants Indian support he has to change his script drastically. And it has to be on India's terms, not his. That might well be an academic question in the case of Prabhkaran.
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cnotes5%5Cnote484.html
And this time he needed the ears of New Delhi, more than Tamil Nadu, to act upon his strong plea for India's support for his armed struggle and lifting the Indian ban on the LTTE. Actually this was the central theme of his, otherwise recycled, annual speech.
The Manmohan Singh coalition is fighting a battle to survive the ground swell of criticism for its abysmally poor performance in handling the Mumbai terror strike. In a knee jerk reaction so typical of New Delhi, long standing proposals to strengthen the counter terror apparatus at the Centre and the states are hurriedly being resurrected. With the general elections in another three months, no Indian political party can afford any more to soft pedal terrorism of any hue – religious, ideological or ethnic. The national impact of the Mumbai terror raid is so strong that policy makers from now onwards can only take a hard line on activities of terrorist organisations. And in India that includes the LTTE, whose conduct had qualified it to be banned as a terrorist organisation. Only recently the Delhi High Court has upheld the ban on the LTTE.
The first counter measures against terror are already in the pipeline and relate to coastal and marine terrorism. Stricter control of illegal entrants, tightening of security at airports and harbours, tightening of shipping and fisheries control, and tougher vetting of visitors from neighbouring countries would probably follow. The proposed federal agency for integrating the national response to terror attacks and expansion of the reach of the counter terror force - the Natinal Security Guard (NSG) to the metros might take a little more time to come through. But surely come they will, for the government had been dithering on these issues for years now.
And all this is bad news for Prabhakaran's mission to win friends and influence people in India.
Happy at the resurgence of political support in Tamil Nadu for the LTTE, Prabhakaran called it a "great changes taking place in India." Prabhakaran is probably expecting greater acceptance of the LTTE in Tamil Nadu encouraged by the revival of pro-LTTE elements in Tamil Nadu as the "dormant voices in support of our struggle" re-emerging aloud again, as he termed them.
Perhaps in a bid to save the face of Tamil Nadu leaders who are demanding immediate ceasefire, he explained his readiness to talk peace, after listing out the record of failed peace efforts in the past. He stressed that Tamil genocide was taking place as a result of the war, to strike a chord among Tamils everywhere.
It is significant that Prabhkaran wants India's help on his own terms as there is not a word of regret or remorse in the speech for his own betrayal of India when it had actively intervened in support of the Tamil cause in the past. He has not even provided a fig leaf of apology for the role of LTTE in the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, former Indian prime minister on the soil of Tamil Nadu.
It is out of question for any politician in India to ask people to wish away (as Prabhakaran had done) not only the Rajiv assassination but also the LTTE's black record of killings of his own kind let alone his opponents, Tamil or otherwise. This attitudinal problem of Prabhakaran will make it difficult for any worthwhile Tamil politician to openly express support for the LTTE, even if the ban on the LTTE is lifted. Many Sri Lankan Tamils apparently consider these issues as not germane to their struggle which has been militarily taken over by the LTTE.
But across the Palk Straits it is still considered as the LTTE's unacceptable conduct, particularly when it had depended upon India's goodwill for its survival, not once, but many times in the past. Prabhakaran's refusal to recognize this is manifest in his description of the earlier Indian interventions as "injurious to the people of Tamil Eelam, as well as to their struggle." Obviously this was to justify his collusion with President Premadasa, of the same "racist Sinhala state, "to throw out the Indian forces which went to Sri Lanka to help Tamils. Not only that, his love-hate thoughts on India were evident when he blamed "the racist Sinhala state, with its intrigues, conspired to bring enmity between our freedom movement and the earlier Indian administration." So his platitudes of India "the super power" sound hollow.
Prabhakaran has castigated "some countries which identified themselves as so-called Peace Sponsors, rushed into activities which impaired negotiations." Obviously this was a reference to the U.S. and the EU who have banned the LTTE as a terrorist organisation. They have also busted LTTE clandestine arms procurement rings and clamped down its front organisations including some NGOs. He probably felt no more confident of influencing them to mend their ways in favour of the LTTE.
As a corollary, his need for India to bale him out is more than ever before as the security forces are closing in on the LTTE bastion at Kilinochchi.
So it was not surprising to read that he had "great expectations that the Indian super power will take a positive stand on our national question." Probably, he expects further political pressure from Tamil Nadu to influence India. He felt Tamil Nadu "has taken heart to rise on behalf of our people at this hour of need. This timely intervention has gratified the people of Tamil Eelam and our freedom movement and given us a sense of relief." Of course Sri Lankan Tamils plight is dear to the heart of Tamils but not the self-inflicted plight of the LTTE.
Though India has unequivocally stated that it was against the creation of an independent Tamil Eelam, the LTTE leader had "cordially" requested them "to raise their voice firmly in favour of our struggle for a Tamil Eelam state, and to take appropriate and positive measures to remove the ban which remains an impediment to an amicable relationship between India and our movement." Does he really believe in his call? Or a stray event like the celebration of his birthday by a group of lawyers in the Madras High Court has kindled his high expectations? Prabhakaran is too shrewd for that. All this hype built over Indian support is probably to boost up his constituency among expatriate Tamils and the LTTE cadres battling it out in Wanni under adverse conditions.
The Great Heroes Day statement only shows that despite his strategic blunders Prabhakaran is yet to introspect and come to term with the dynamics of sub-continental reality. If he wants Indian support he has to change his script drastically. And it has to be on India's terms, not his. That might well be an academic question in the case of Prabhkaran.
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cnotes5%5Cnote484.html
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