Indra, the god of war in Hindu mythology whose chariot thunders across the rain clouds, must be smiling as the torrential northeast monsoon rains brought the Eelam War in Sri Lanka to a near halt last week. The northeast monsoon, the main source of rainfall in Tamil Nadu and northern Sri Lanka, intensifies during the months of October and November and peters out in December. The average monthly rainfall in the peak period is about 300 mm.
The entire domain of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in the north will be affected by monsoon rains at least for the next five to six weeks. And rains in rough terrain with poor communication are the night mare of troops on the offensive. They make the axes of advance a mess of slush and mire. Equally they could ring death knell to troops manning the defences as well, as rains often flood the bunkers and weapon pits. Thus the tempo of war is likely to be subdued with intermittent spurts of fierce activity during sunny spells. Needless to say, the plight of the population displaced by the ravages of war and caught in the open or under makeshift arrangement would be terrible. Even political protests against the war could be dampened due to heavy rains as it happened in Tamil Nadu.
The defence spokesman in Colombo blamed the wet weather for the security forces' failure to carry out the much awaited capture of Kilinochchi. The heavy rains had made troop movements slow and difficult, he said. However, the Army Commander Lt Gen Sarath Fonseka appear to have factored in the weather in his plans; as his troops claimed to have eaten into some more of the LTTE defences in three fronts when the rains gave way to some clear weather now and then. The security forces reported making some progress beyond Nachikuda in the Task Force I sector; 57 Division also succeeded in capturing parts of LTTE defences around Akkarayankulam on way to Kilinochchi. In the Mullaitivu east, 59 Division also made progress ahead of Janakapura capturing Gajabapura. The LTTE also appeared to be ready to overcome adverse weather and fight the advancing troops.
How far does weather really affect operation when it is in the crucial 'breakthrough' phase? Generally in monsoon rains slows down offensive operations of both warring sides, reduces fire power, hampers close air support, and eats up more time in carrying out every task. And the ruthless justice of weather equally applies to both sides. Thus in the active monsoon period both sides would probably spend more energy to retain their tactical advantages in mire and slush and than fight a high intensity war. In other words the war will be a slow crawl through the mud with fights moving from bunker to bunker.
During monsoon rains three factors – the weather, terrain and troops morale – together affect the soldier. Even when it is not raining and the skies are overcast visibility becomes poor. This makes combat management difficult. Heavy weapon and artillery fire at long ranges become less reliable. Artillery observers will also find it a little more taxing to bring down accurate fire. Mortar bombs are less effective in mud and slush. Air reconnaissance and air transportation are also affected. Close air support for land operations become more difficult.
Though modern fighter aircraft fly above rain clouds, sorties could become fewer as met conditions are favourable for shorter periods only. This applies to support from gun ships as well. More over, ground support operations for aircraft and artillery maintenance, and loading, replenishment of ammunition etc. become more cumbersome. These limitations will apply more to the security forces as they have greater fire power. For the LTTE, spotting and shooting down of aircraft from ground becomes more difficult unless missiles are used. In order to compensate lesser fire support the security forces will be required to use more troops on the offensive. That could translate into more casualties.
Similarly monsoon weather also affects naval operations along the coast and inshore areas as war ships prefer to be out in the high seas than face the turbulence on the coast line. Visibility in monsoon seas is poor. This could affect naval operations in support of troops operating along Mullaitivu coast. The lighter Sea Tiger craft are probably better placed to sneak in closer to naval ships taking advantage of monsoon conditions Landing of troops by sea also becomes tricky and time consuming. This could reduce options available to the security forces in offensive against Pooneryn.
The second aspect is the terrain in bad weather which invariably decides the winner and the vanquished. When the down pour comes, roads are inundated and tracks get flooded; muddy paddy fields could become deathtraps of tanks and trucks. Seasonal streams turn into rapids. Though modern armies have their own engineer units to construct bridges and roads, the havoc caused by rains could outstrip their capability. As vehicles get bogged down, labour units will have to be mustered to carry vital battlefield requirements. Overall the terrain conditions make both launching of attacks and counter attacks equally time and resource consuming.
The third and more important factor is the cumulative effect of bad weather and terrain on morale of fighters. Prolonged operations with long marches through slush and mud in wet weather sap the strength, efficiency and demoralize the troops. Thus even a small setback could have high impact on the psyche of troops. Troops become more vulnerable to mines which get shifted due to the flow of rain water. Fording of even small streams could become tricky when they turn into deep currents. With the weather playing truant, battle field evacuation of casualties becomes difficult both by land and air. During the offensive troops caught in the open will find it more difficult to dig down. Overall the security forces are probably at a slight disadvantage over the LTTE which is fighting probably from well drained bunkers.
However the LTTE would also find the weather restrictive in fighting a classical defensive battle. Pulling back to fall back positions before reinforcing the next line of defence can become a costly exercise. The LTTE would also find the same problem as the security forces in preparing new defensive positions. Its plans to counter attack could also flounder in the face of adverse weather conditions with problems of mobility, support fire and casualty evacuation. It would also face problems of logistic support in meeting battle field needs. Its combat engineering resources are marginal and mostly improvised. That will have its own positive and negative fall out.
Both sides will find it more difficult to carry out deep penetration and commando operations. For the security forces, problems of mobility by air, sea and land could reduce the range of Special Forces operations. Special boat operations would also become more risky. This has relevance if Special Forces are to be used for operations in Pooneryn with naval support.
Assessing military operations in Vanni when the weather is fickle is a difficult proposition. However, considering the overall setting of the battle zones, any northern offensive of 53 and 55 divisions will perforce be restricted to a narrow frontage along Muhamalai-Elephant Pass axis as the lagoons and marshy land on both sides of would be water logged. Particularly the approach along Nagarkovil salient would become unsuited for operations. The Task Force I offensive towards Pooneryn could make better progress than the offensive of 57 Division towards Kilinochchi. Task Force II operations towards A9 highway between Mankulam and Puliyankulam would also probably make some more progress though it will be across the grain of the terrain. 59 Division dominating the area between Gajabapura and Nayaru lagoon in Mullaitivu east would probably make slow progress only. In this difficult terrain the operations will be time consuming with a lot of jungle bashing by foot soldiers.
Given these conditions, whichever side can maintain better morale and ensure effective leadership at platoon level is likely to succeed. The security forces have more troops, larger options, better technology, more victories and lesser casualties to help their morale. On the other hand, the rains and the LTTE have managed to stall their advance to Kilinochchi. The LTTE on the other hand is fighting a battle of survival with a highly motivated band of cadres. Perhaps it will be more realistic to assess the impact of poor weather on the morale of troops on both sides after they are exposed to say three more weeks of intense fighting in wet weather.
The looming possibility of Indian 'intervention' and its political aftermath in Tamil Nadu and India would have had its impact on both the warring sides. Prabhakaran in his interview to Nakkeeran a Tamil weekly has expressed his happiness at the protests in Tamil Nadu. He has said these sentiments added to the LTTE strength. On the other hand the clear statement of Indian Foreign Minister Pranabh Mukherjee on India distancing itself from the Eelam War would have warmed the hearts of the security forces. Thus the confrontation is now literally eyeball to eyeball. And it will depend upon who blinks first. The weatherman is perhaps unwittingly better suited now to assess the course of operations more accurately in the near future as it is interwoven with good weather.
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cnotes5%5Cnote477.html
Monday, October 27, 2008
Monday, October 20, 2008
Sri Lanka: Tactical aspects of the Eelam War
There is a lot of excitement as the Sri Lanka security forces are inching towards Kilinochchi from the southwest on multiple axes. The political tensions in Tamil Nadu over the plight of Tamil civilians in the war zone have added a bit of nervous expectation in Sri Lanka to the war scene. Broadly the security forces have enlarged the forward line roughly by eight km on the west of Kilinochi, isolating the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) stronghold of Nachikuda on the western coast. Task Force 1 which had bypassed Nachikuda, captured Manniyankulam and Vannrikulamon its advance along the A32 route to Pooneryn. Thus the LTTE access to sea routes to Tamil Nadu from the northern Mannar coast will probably come to an end shortly with these developments.
The57 Division, earlier locked in battle at the key road junction of Akkarayankulam (which leads to Kilinochchi in the north and the A9 highway in the east), has "pierced" its defences. According to the security forces this was the last of the LTTE strong points defending Kilinochchi. It has not been a cakewalk to the security forces as the LTTE had put up some resistance at selected places. The breakthrough in Akkarayankulam, in particular, has come after a lot of blood shedding. The defence spokesman has admitted losing '33 soldiers during the clashes in the weekending Sunday Oct 19th; 48 were injured and three were missing. This was perhaps one of the biggest losses suffered by the security forces. On the other hand the LTTE appear to have lost 12 cadres.
However, overall the LTTE had not been able to inflict such losses more often as the security forces advanced. While this could be for reasons of tactical withdrawal, it is clear that the LTTE efforts so far have lacked strength and firepower required to blunt the offensive. Though the fall of Kilinochchi looks imminent, in tactical terms its capture might not be essential. In any case, it would probably come within the security forces' heavy machine gun range in the coming week, making it untenable for the LTTE to hold. Capture of Kilinochchi, the LTTE's administrative capital till recently would certainly be a big loss of face to it. For President Rajapaksa it would add yet another feather in the cap after the 'victory' in the east. And that could make him politically stronger than ever before.
As the Task Force-1 advances to Pooneryn, it would be possible for the security forces to create an anvil extending from the western coast to Kilinochchi so that the hammer of 53 and 55 divisions operating along northern frontlines could be brought down upon the LTTE strong points in the crucial Elephant Pass/Nagarkovil bottleneck. The skirmishes reported in Muhamalai on Oct 16th were probably a probing attempt of the security forces for such an offensive. This option would also provide relief to 57 Division troops which had been on the offensive for three months now. A northern offensive could make the LTTE fight within a narrow strip with only one exit route open on the east to LTTE's Puthukkudiyiruppu defence complex.
If and when that happens, the LTTE domination of the A9 highway would probably end. It would also render both Nachikuda and Pooneryn defences meaningless unless the LTTE can quickly launch a counter stroke. But the moot point is does the LTTE want to launch such an offensive west of A9 highway at all? Their defensive pattern so far would indicate such an intention might not be there at all.
This is only one of the many ways in which this operation can be progressed. With the imminent fall of Kilinochchi, the Army Commander Lt Gen Sarath Fonseka has more options now than ever before. The monsoon is on and close air support could become tricky and mobility and visibility would also be affected. But weather gods are neutral and affect both sides. As the war in Wanni would involve jungle bashing, at best monsoon would slow down the operation on both sides and not stop it.
Understanding the LTTE strategy
So far in the areas west of A9 highway, the LTTE's conventional defence strategy appears to be based upon a series of strong points with bunds and ditches stretching for miles between them. The bunds along the expected axes of advance have been constructed to slow down the advancing troops and attack them at selected points when they try to break through the obstacle.
This is a strategy of the First World War vintage that became obsolete with the advent of increased battlefield mobility, greater depth and density of fire power, and enhanced battlefield reconnaissance capabilities. Unless the bund is protected by fire power and layers of obstacles, modern armies can reduce their effectiveness with no great difficulty.
In modern conventional warfare the technique has morphed into mobile defence based upon strong points that dominate the gaps between them with hard hitting armour based mobile teams. This technique is useful when a large area is to be defended by smaller number of troops as in the case of the LTTE. This strategy if successfully applied would lead to a lot of bloodletting and discourage advancing forces from launching the main offensive.
The LTTE had perhaps adopted defences based on strong points for this very reason. It was fighting against an opponent who outnumbered it by at least ten to one. On hindsight, last year the LTTE probably allowed a comparatively free run to the security forces to occupy areas south of road Vavuniya-Mannar along the Mannar coast so that the troops would be drawn into fighting the strong points further north. After that starting with Adampan in May 20008 there had been a series of LTTE strong points - big and small - forming layers of defences –Adampan-Nedunkandal-Andankulam, Madhu-Palamipiddi-Periyamadu, and so on.
But the LTTE had neither the required mobility nor fire power to dominate the gaps between the strong points to stop the security forces that had superior mobility, fire power and numbers. So probably it took recourse to constructing miles of bunds between strong points. And the security forces have been breaking the inadequately defended bunds regularly. Moreover, the LTTE strategy had seeds of failure as the axes of advance from south to north fanned out over increasingly larger gaps between strong points as the war progressed without a matching increase in troop strength. This is borne out by the LTTE inflicting heavier casualties on the security forces only when their axes converged on Kilinochchi.
The LTTE's performance so far has demonstrated the limitations of insurgency forces in carrying out conventional operations. Being light outfits with limited artillery support they were better suited to tackle company level tactical operations. In order to maximise the impact of conventional operations of insurgents, guerrillas have to be employed in tandem to hit rear areas and gun positions to destabilise the conventional opponent. The LTTE had not been able to carry out such commando strikes effectively so far in Eelam War-4.
During the war in Elephant Pass in 2000 the LTTE was able to overcome its weakness in conventional capability through superior battlefield leadership, high morale, and psychological advantage against the opponent who lacked them. The security forces then lacked the single mindedness of purpose they are showing now. In the Eelam War- 4, clear convergence of political and military focus on military objectives untroubled by other issues has resulted in the relentless pursuit of the LTTE.
The overconfident LTTE leadership is probably paying the price now for ignoring the two important developments in the security environment since the last Eelam War. These were the impact of Karuna's defection and the subsequent loss of east, and the qualitative and quantitative improvements in the Sri Lanka armed forces. This overconfidence of the LTTE gave the security forces a head start when they launched the offensive. The self defeating technique of suicide bombings has also deprived the LTTE of potential junior leaders, though they brought short lived glory.
Future portends
The tactical conjectures discussed so far might be of interest only to military minds. The question in everyone's mind is probably 'when' – in what time frame –Kilinochchi would fall and the A9 highway would open. It is not easy to answer this question. And there are always the imponderables of battlefield that affect the best laid plans.
The security forces had entered Kilinochchi district on July 31, 2008. They appear to be in no hurry to rush forward to overcome the LTTE strong points as they advance. Instead they have focused on inflicting maximum casualty on the LTTE. They have neutralised only those LTTE strong points that mattered on the way and by passed others. This perhaps tied down the LTTE to hold on to all its defences in anticipation.
But now as fall of Kilinochchi looks imminent, political and humanitarian crises are building up in the horizon. These could take the time plan for conduct of war out of the hands of the military. So far President Mahinda Rajapaksa appears to have given full freedom to Gen Fonseka to progress the operation in his own fashion. President Rajapaksa is coming under increasing pressure from India, where Prime Minister Manmohan Singh is facing flak from his Tamil Nadu coalition partners. So both the President and Gen Fonseka might decide to speed up the operations to get the A9 highway opened up and bottle up the LTTE within the Mullaitivu district. This could result in the security forces suffering more casualties than they had bargained for. On the other hand it would give a semblance of normalcy and relieve some of the pressures on the President. Of course it would reduce the plight of displaced civilians caught between the warring sides in the area.
The other question is how will the LTTE respond now as its domain is shrinking? In the past the LTTE had leveraged the criticalities of India-Sri Lanka relations to its advantage to survive and rise up once again to carry the battle another day. Can the LTTE, with its hands tainted with the blood of Rajiv Gandhi, go back to the same ploy? It is true there is loud public outcry in Tamil Nadu against the sufferings of Tamils in the war zones. But at the same time it is equally true that the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister M Karunanidhi has made it clear that this sympathy should not be equated with sympathy for the LTTE.
Of course the easiest option for the LTTE is to inflict maximum possible casualties, cut loose, and pull back its assets deep into the Wanni jungles. Then lie low for a while, shed the conventional uniform and go back to the guerrilla mode. That would mean further suffering and agony for everyone with more suicide bombings, blasts and mayhem everywhere including areas outside the war zone. A more logical thing to achieve a win-win situation would be to sit with Tamil politicians, evolve a face saving political formula to find a democratic solution. But can Prabhakaran, whose strong point had never been logical reasoning, pull such a surprise? I doubt it. And I like millions of others would be happy if he proves me wrong.
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cnotes5%5Cnote476.html
The57 Division, earlier locked in battle at the key road junction of Akkarayankulam (which leads to Kilinochchi in the north and the A9 highway in the east), has "pierced" its defences. According to the security forces this was the last of the LTTE strong points defending Kilinochchi. It has not been a cakewalk to the security forces as the LTTE had put up some resistance at selected places. The breakthrough in Akkarayankulam, in particular, has come after a lot of blood shedding. The defence spokesman has admitted losing '33 soldiers during the clashes in the weekending Sunday Oct 19th; 48 were injured and three were missing. This was perhaps one of the biggest losses suffered by the security forces. On the other hand the LTTE appear to have lost 12 cadres.
However, overall the LTTE had not been able to inflict such losses more often as the security forces advanced. While this could be for reasons of tactical withdrawal, it is clear that the LTTE efforts so far have lacked strength and firepower required to blunt the offensive. Though the fall of Kilinochchi looks imminent, in tactical terms its capture might not be essential. In any case, it would probably come within the security forces' heavy machine gun range in the coming week, making it untenable for the LTTE to hold. Capture of Kilinochchi, the LTTE's administrative capital till recently would certainly be a big loss of face to it. For President Rajapaksa it would add yet another feather in the cap after the 'victory' in the east. And that could make him politically stronger than ever before.
As the Task Force-1 advances to Pooneryn, it would be possible for the security forces to create an anvil extending from the western coast to Kilinochchi so that the hammer of 53 and 55 divisions operating along northern frontlines could be brought down upon the LTTE strong points in the crucial Elephant Pass/Nagarkovil bottleneck. The skirmishes reported in Muhamalai on Oct 16th were probably a probing attempt of the security forces for such an offensive. This option would also provide relief to 57 Division troops which had been on the offensive for three months now. A northern offensive could make the LTTE fight within a narrow strip with only one exit route open on the east to LTTE's Puthukkudiyiruppu defence complex.
If and when that happens, the LTTE domination of the A9 highway would probably end. It would also render both Nachikuda and Pooneryn defences meaningless unless the LTTE can quickly launch a counter stroke. But the moot point is does the LTTE want to launch such an offensive west of A9 highway at all? Their defensive pattern so far would indicate such an intention might not be there at all.
This is only one of the many ways in which this operation can be progressed. With the imminent fall of Kilinochchi, the Army Commander Lt Gen Sarath Fonseka has more options now than ever before. The monsoon is on and close air support could become tricky and mobility and visibility would also be affected. But weather gods are neutral and affect both sides. As the war in Wanni would involve jungle bashing, at best monsoon would slow down the operation on both sides and not stop it.
Understanding the LTTE strategy
So far in the areas west of A9 highway, the LTTE's conventional defence strategy appears to be based upon a series of strong points with bunds and ditches stretching for miles between them. The bunds along the expected axes of advance have been constructed to slow down the advancing troops and attack them at selected points when they try to break through the obstacle.
This is a strategy of the First World War vintage that became obsolete with the advent of increased battlefield mobility, greater depth and density of fire power, and enhanced battlefield reconnaissance capabilities. Unless the bund is protected by fire power and layers of obstacles, modern armies can reduce their effectiveness with no great difficulty.
In modern conventional warfare the technique has morphed into mobile defence based upon strong points that dominate the gaps between them with hard hitting armour based mobile teams. This technique is useful when a large area is to be defended by smaller number of troops as in the case of the LTTE. This strategy if successfully applied would lead to a lot of bloodletting and discourage advancing forces from launching the main offensive.
The LTTE had perhaps adopted defences based on strong points for this very reason. It was fighting against an opponent who outnumbered it by at least ten to one. On hindsight, last year the LTTE probably allowed a comparatively free run to the security forces to occupy areas south of road Vavuniya-Mannar along the Mannar coast so that the troops would be drawn into fighting the strong points further north. After that starting with Adampan in May 20008 there had been a series of LTTE strong points - big and small - forming layers of defences –Adampan-Nedunkandal-Andankulam, Madhu-Palamipiddi-Periyamadu, and so on.
But the LTTE had neither the required mobility nor fire power to dominate the gaps between the strong points to stop the security forces that had superior mobility, fire power and numbers. So probably it took recourse to constructing miles of bunds between strong points. And the security forces have been breaking the inadequately defended bunds regularly. Moreover, the LTTE strategy had seeds of failure as the axes of advance from south to north fanned out over increasingly larger gaps between strong points as the war progressed without a matching increase in troop strength. This is borne out by the LTTE inflicting heavier casualties on the security forces only when their axes converged on Kilinochchi.
The LTTE's performance so far has demonstrated the limitations of insurgency forces in carrying out conventional operations. Being light outfits with limited artillery support they were better suited to tackle company level tactical operations. In order to maximise the impact of conventional operations of insurgents, guerrillas have to be employed in tandem to hit rear areas and gun positions to destabilise the conventional opponent. The LTTE had not been able to carry out such commando strikes effectively so far in Eelam War-4.
During the war in Elephant Pass in 2000 the LTTE was able to overcome its weakness in conventional capability through superior battlefield leadership, high morale, and psychological advantage against the opponent who lacked them. The security forces then lacked the single mindedness of purpose they are showing now. In the Eelam War- 4, clear convergence of political and military focus on military objectives untroubled by other issues has resulted in the relentless pursuit of the LTTE.
The overconfident LTTE leadership is probably paying the price now for ignoring the two important developments in the security environment since the last Eelam War. These were the impact of Karuna's defection and the subsequent loss of east, and the qualitative and quantitative improvements in the Sri Lanka armed forces. This overconfidence of the LTTE gave the security forces a head start when they launched the offensive. The self defeating technique of suicide bombings has also deprived the LTTE of potential junior leaders, though they brought short lived glory.
Future portends
The tactical conjectures discussed so far might be of interest only to military minds. The question in everyone's mind is probably 'when' – in what time frame –Kilinochchi would fall and the A9 highway would open. It is not easy to answer this question. And there are always the imponderables of battlefield that affect the best laid plans.
The security forces had entered Kilinochchi district on July 31, 2008. They appear to be in no hurry to rush forward to overcome the LTTE strong points as they advance. Instead they have focused on inflicting maximum casualty on the LTTE. They have neutralised only those LTTE strong points that mattered on the way and by passed others. This perhaps tied down the LTTE to hold on to all its defences in anticipation.
But now as fall of Kilinochchi looks imminent, political and humanitarian crises are building up in the horizon. These could take the time plan for conduct of war out of the hands of the military. So far President Mahinda Rajapaksa appears to have given full freedom to Gen Fonseka to progress the operation in his own fashion. President Rajapaksa is coming under increasing pressure from India, where Prime Minister Manmohan Singh is facing flak from his Tamil Nadu coalition partners. So both the President and Gen Fonseka might decide to speed up the operations to get the A9 highway opened up and bottle up the LTTE within the Mullaitivu district. This could result in the security forces suffering more casualties than they had bargained for. On the other hand it would give a semblance of normalcy and relieve some of the pressures on the President. Of course it would reduce the plight of displaced civilians caught between the warring sides in the area.
The other question is how will the LTTE respond now as its domain is shrinking? In the past the LTTE had leveraged the criticalities of India-Sri Lanka relations to its advantage to survive and rise up once again to carry the battle another day. Can the LTTE, with its hands tainted with the blood of Rajiv Gandhi, go back to the same ploy? It is true there is loud public outcry in Tamil Nadu against the sufferings of Tamils in the war zones. But at the same time it is equally true that the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister M Karunanidhi has made it clear that this sympathy should not be equated with sympathy for the LTTE.
Of course the easiest option for the LTTE is to inflict maximum possible casualties, cut loose, and pull back its assets deep into the Wanni jungles. Then lie low for a while, shed the conventional uniform and go back to the guerrilla mode. That would mean further suffering and agony for everyone with more suicide bombings, blasts and mayhem everywhere including areas outside the war zone. A more logical thing to achieve a win-win situation would be to sit with Tamil politicians, evolve a face saving political formula to find a democratic solution. But can Prabhakaran, whose strong point had never been logical reasoning, pull such a surprise? I doubt it. And I like millions of others would be happy if he proves me wrong.
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cnotes5%5Cnote476.html
Thursday, October 16, 2008
Is the Eelam dream over?
Sheela Bhatt in New Delhi, Oct 16, 2008
The Lankan government believes that the quarter-century old militant movement of the Liberation Tigers of the Tamil Eelam is in its last phase. The Sri Lanka [Images]n army is merely 1.2 miles away from Kilinochchi, the LTTE's headquarters in northern Sri Lanka.
According to Colonel R Hariharan, a retired military intelligence specialist who served as the head of intelligence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka from 1987-90, "Six divisions of the Sri Lankan army have gheraoed Kilinochchi.The rains and the dense tall vegetation make airstrikes very difficult. The situation is critical for both sides."
The Sri Lankan defence ministry claims that the army has killed 7,553 rebels since Sri Lanka pulled out of a Norwegian-backed truce in January, while 748 soldiers have died in the clashes.
By all accounts the situation is a turning point in Sri Lanka's blood-soaked ethnic history. President Mahinda Rajapakase has waged a decisive battle against the LTTE and seems to be winning it so far.
His critics allege that he is looking for a military solution and not for a political dialogue. The Pesident's supporters claim that he had offered an olive branch to Prabhakaran, when he came to power. Rajapkse had offered to have a structured dialogue but the LTTE did not respond, so he was left with no option but to go for an armed offensive.
As the LTTE is pushed to the wall, allegations of the sufferings and misery of the Lankan Tamils have been reported, particularly due to heavy air strikes. Even some Europe-based experts on Sri Lanka have started saying that government's "attitude and actions are that of an invading country in an enemy's territory."
The use of air power against its own people is severely objected to by critics of Sri Lankan government. B Raman, rediff.com columnist and a Chennai-based expert on security matters said, " The continuing use of indiscriminate air strikes by the Rajapakse government against the Tamil civilian population in order to intimidate it into stop supporting the LTTE has come in for strong criticism."
Sri Lanka is more confident than ever that it will get rid of the LTTE menace because it has been able to get all manner of help from China, Pakistan, Iran and the United States.
In geo-strategic terms the Lankans are better consolidated than ever, with China building a port south of Colombo, India and Pakistan training the Sri Lankan army on a regular basis and the US and Iran supporting government in terms of resources and materials.
The Sri Lankan economy is also stable and sturdy. Some weeks ago, a senior officer of Sri Lanka had said "We are seeing light at the end of the tunnel after 25 long years of struggle. We have had significant success in the operation against the LTTE. It is on run, they are running with full pockets."
While showing maps of 2006 and 2008, the officer said that 75 percent of thearea has been recaptured and the fighting capacity of the LTTE had been seriously eroded. The Sri Lankan government had been able to hold elections in the estern province too, he said.
The Lankan government's assessment is that LTTE chief Prabhakaran has been pushed into his hide-out with 3,000-4,000 cadres at most.
As the battle become decisive in the Kilinochchi, pressure is building up within Tamil Nadu, where politicians are guessing that the LTTE is cornered. The question on everyones lips seems to be what effect the fall of LTTE chief Prabhakaran will have on the region.
The Tamil politicians are completely divided and the nuance is lost, the divide complete. Those who are speaking for the plight of the Sri Lankans Tamils because they are also being killed with LTTE militants are being silenced by the critics of LTTE.
While those who speak for the LTTE have a weak case due to India's current sufferings due to terrorism and also because the politics over the Sri Lankan issue is more complex with Prabhakaran and his deputy Pottu Amman, being prime accused in the Rajiv Gandhi murder case.
India wants them tried in Indian courts. It is not possible for India to unconditionally start or participate in any dialogue with these two Tamil-militant leaders.
Hawkish Tamil leaders like Vaiko want to break diplomatic ties with Sri Lanka while Chief Minister M Karunanidhi has told PM Manmohan Singh to implore Rajapakse to find a political solution and not resort to brute force.
Under Karunanidhi's leadership a resolution has been passed to create pressure on government to get Sri Lanka to declare a ceasefire. Jayalalitha has targeted Karunanidhi, "If India interferes with the internal affairs of Sri Lanka there is a possibility that our neighbouring countries could begin interfering with our internal affairs. It will create trouble for India's sovereignty. The countries in the world will not accept India interfering with the affairs of another country."
Jayalalitha further says, "The important thing was to prevent the Indian Army from providing training to the Sri Lankan Army and to stop the military offensive against the Sri Lankan Tamils. But Karunanidhi is not making any efforts in this regard."
The editorial column written by Malini Parthasarathy in The Hindu titled The dangers of Tamil chauvinism strongly argued that, " The latest campaign in Tamil Nadu masterminded by a desperate LTTE must not be allowed to undermine the sound policy decision upheld by successive Indian governments since 1991 to stay out of Sri Lanka's internal affairs."
Hariharan points out that recently The New Indian Express carried a survey that reflected the complexities of the matter. Hariharan said, "51 percent of respondents have said that India should lift the ban on the LTTE. But, only 30 percent have said that they are freedom fighters. 31 percent have said that India should send troops if Prabhakaran is cornered. While 40 percent of people have said they would like to donate for the cause of a Tamil Eelam. Do not equate public sympathy for Tamil rights with support for the LTTE."
Many critics of LTTE think "the game plan of the LTTE and its supporters is to rally the Tamil chauvinist sentiment" so that the siege around Kilinochchi can be relaxed.
Raman disagrees that Tamil politicians are trying to bail-out Prabhakaran. "The LTTE is not using Tamil politicians. The case of Vaiko is different but one can't say same thing about parties like the Dravida Munnetra Kaghazham and the Congress. The people are genuinely concerned about the hawkish statements made by Sri Lankan army chief Lt.Gen.Sarath Fonseka and Gothbaya, brother of President Mahinda Rajapaksa is also causing tension. There will be repercussions if Prabhakaran is killed. Tamil politicians would like to prevent the tension spreading in the state," Raman said.
In his interview to the Canadian daily National Post, General Fonseka said "I strongly believe that this country belongs to the Sinhalese but there are minority communities and we treat them like our people�being the majority of the country we will never give in and we have the right to protect our country�We are also a strong nation � They(minorities) can live in this country with us, but they must not try to, under the pretext of being a minority, demand undue things."
An All India Dravida Munnetra Kazhgham leader speaking off the record told rediff.com, "We dislike the LTTE and do not support it but no way it should stop us from raising the voice against butchering of Tamils in Sri Lanka." Raman points out that it's not only issue of Sri Lankan Tamils rights alone that is hurting psyche of people. He says, "There has been a perceptible disenchantment in Tamil Nadu over what is seen as the lack of interest shown by Manmohan Singh in the problems of the Sri Lankan Tamils. He is being compared unfavourably with Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi, who took a keen interest in the problems of the Tamils and did not hesitate to take up the matter strongly with the governments in power in Colombo."
Raman says that this disenchantment has turned into shock following reports of two Indian radar technicians being injured when two planes of the LTTE's air wing bombed a Sri Lankan military base in Vavuniya in September." Hariharan says, "I don't see what Indian government can do beyond a point. The two warring sides don't want Indian help. They may be asking for Indian help but, at least they have not quantified it, so far."
Interestingly, no Tamil party has spelled out , in practical terms how much India can influence the Sri Lankan government who are fighting most important battle on their land.
Hariharan puts forward a few conditions before India can increase its involvement in the issue. He says, "India can interfere only if there is a chance of peace. We cannot get into a '1987 type' situation. We must take into account the trade between two countries at $4 billion. Any miscalculation can directly impact it. We are facing a strategic challenge in Sri Lanka because Iran, Pakistan and China are helping Rajpakasa. It's the leverage he has. The Sri Lankan parliament has 42 Tamil-speaking MPs who should also put pressure on the government."
Interestingly, a vocal supporter of the LTTE in Chennai told rediff.com, "The siege of Kilinochchi will prove to be the siege of Leningrad. Hitler's [Images] army besieged the city for 872 days but still could not oust the Russians, who put up a heroic struggle. The LTTE will also win the battle of Kilinochchi using the same tactics as the Russians. You can expect a surprise."
Even if the Sri Lankan government wins the battle, will their win bring peace to the island nation is the moot question. They will have to start a reconciliation process, says Rajapakse supporters. Raman says, "Very few in Tamil Nadu take seriously the assurances of Rajapaksa that after neutralising the LTTE as a terrorist organisation, his government will initiate political measures for meeting the legitimate aspirations of the Tamil people."
Courtesy:www.rediff.com
The Lankan government believes that the quarter-century old militant movement of the Liberation Tigers of the Tamil Eelam is in its last phase. The Sri Lanka [Images]n army is merely 1.2 miles away from Kilinochchi, the LTTE's headquarters in northern Sri Lanka.
According to Colonel R Hariharan, a retired military intelligence specialist who served as the head of intelligence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka from 1987-90, "Six divisions of the Sri Lankan army have gheraoed Kilinochchi.The rains and the dense tall vegetation make airstrikes very difficult. The situation is critical for both sides."
The Sri Lankan defence ministry claims that the army has killed 7,553 rebels since Sri Lanka pulled out of a Norwegian-backed truce in January, while 748 soldiers have died in the clashes.
By all accounts the situation is a turning point in Sri Lanka's blood-soaked ethnic history. President Mahinda Rajapakase has waged a decisive battle against the LTTE and seems to be winning it so far.
His critics allege that he is looking for a military solution and not for a political dialogue. The Pesident's supporters claim that he had offered an olive branch to Prabhakaran, when he came to power. Rajapkse had offered to have a structured dialogue but the LTTE did not respond, so he was left with no option but to go for an armed offensive.
As the LTTE is pushed to the wall, allegations of the sufferings and misery of the Lankan Tamils have been reported, particularly due to heavy air strikes. Even some Europe-based experts on Sri Lanka have started saying that government's "attitude and actions are that of an invading country in an enemy's territory."
The use of air power against its own people is severely objected to by critics of Sri Lankan government. B Raman, rediff.com columnist and a Chennai-based expert on security matters said, " The continuing use of indiscriminate air strikes by the Rajapakse government against the Tamil civilian population in order to intimidate it into stop supporting the LTTE has come in for strong criticism."
Sri Lanka is more confident than ever that it will get rid of the LTTE menace because it has been able to get all manner of help from China, Pakistan, Iran and the United States.
In geo-strategic terms the Lankans are better consolidated than ever, with China building a port south of Colombo, India and Pakistan training the Sri Lankan army on a regular basis and the US and Iran supporting government in terms of resources and materials.
The Sri Lankan economy is also stable and sturdy. Some weeks ago, a senior officer of Sri Lanka had said "We are seeing light at the end of the tunnel after 25 long years of struggle. We have had significant success in the operation against the LTTE. It is on run, they are running with full pockets."
While showing maps of 2006 and 2008, the officer said that 75 percent of thearea has been recaptured and the fighting capacity of the LTTE had been seriously eroded. The Sri Lankan government had been able to hold elections in the estern province too, he said.
The Lankan government's assessment is that LTTE chief Prabhakaran has been pushed into his hide-out with 3,000-4,000 cadres at most.
As the battle become decisive in the Kilinochchi, pressure is building up within Tamil Nadu, where politicians are guessing that the LTTE is cornered. The question on everyones lips seems to be what effect the fall of LTTE chief Prabhakaran will have on the region.
The Tamil politicians are completely divided and the nuance is lost, the divide complete. Those who are speaking for the plight of the Sri Lankans Tamils because they are also being killed with LTTE militants are being silenced by the critics of LTTE.
While those who speak for the LTTE have a weak case due to India's current sufferings due to terrorism and also because the politics over the Sri Lankan issue is more complex with Prabhakaran and his deputy Pottu Amman, being prime accused in the Rajiv Gandhi murder case.
India wants them tried in Indian courts. It is not possible for India to unconditionally start or participate in any dialogue with these two Tamil-militant leaders.
Hawkish Tamil leaders like Vaiko want to break diplomatic ties with Sri Lanka while Chief Minister M Karunanidhi has told PM Manmohan Singh to implore Rajapakse to find a political solution and not resort to brute force.
Under Karunanidhi's leadership a resolution has been passed to create pressure on government to get Sri Lanka to declare a ceasefire. Jayalalitha has targeted Karunanidhi, "If India interferes with the internal affairs of Sri Lanka there is a possibility that our neighbouring countries could begin interfering with our internal affairs. It will create trouble for India's sovereignty. The countries in the world will not accept India interfering with the affairs of another country."
Jayalalitha further says, "The important thing was to prevent the Indian Army from providing training to the Sri Lankan Army and to stop the military offensive against the Sri Lankan Tamils. But Karunanidhi is not making any efforts in this regard."
The editorial column written by Malini Parthasarathy in The Hindu titled The dangers of Tamil chauvinism strongly argued that, " The latest campaign in Tamil Nadu masterminded by a desperate LTTE must not be allowed to undermine the sound policy decision upheld by successive Indian governments since 1991 to stay out of Sri Lanka's internal affairs."
Hariharan points out that recently The New Indian Express carried a survey that reflected the complexities of the matter. Hariharan said, "51 percent of respondents have said that India should lift the ban on the LTTE. But, only 30 percent have said that they are freedom fighters. 31 percent have said that India should send troops if Prabhakaran is cornered. While 40 percent of people have said they would like to donate for the cause of a Tamil Eelam. Do not equate public sympathy for Tamil rights with support for the LTTE."
Many critics of LTTE think "the game plan of the LTTE and its supporters is to rally the Tamil chauvinist sentiment" so that the siege around Kilinochchi can be relaxed.
Raman disagrees that Tamil politicians are trying to bail-out Prabhakaran. "The LTTE is not using Tamil politicians. The case of Vaiko is different but one can't say same thing about parties like the Dravida Munnetra Kaghazham and the Congress. The people are genuinely concerned about the hawkish statements made by Sri Lankan army chief Lt.Gen.Sarath Fonseka and Gothbaya, brother of President Mahinda Rajapaksa is also causing tension. There will be repercussions if Prabhakaran is killed. Tamil politicians would like to prevent the tension spreading in the state," Raman said.
In his interview to the Canadian daily National Post, General Fonseka said "I strongly believe that this country belongs to the Sinhalese but there are minority communities and we treat them like our people�being the majority of the country we will never give in and we have the right to protect our country�We are also a strong nation � They(minorities) can live in this country with us, but they must not try to, under the pretext of being a minority, demand undue things."
An All India Dravida Munnetra Kazhgham leader speaking off the record told rediff.com, "We dislike the LTTE and do not support it but no way it should stop us from raising the voice against butchering of Tamils in Sri Lanka." Raman points out that it's not only issue of Sri Lankan Tamils rights alone that is hurting psyche of people. He says, "There has been a perceptible disenchantment in Tamil Nadu over what is seen as the lack of interest shown by Manmohan Singh in the problems of the Sri Lankan Tamils. He is being compared unfavourably with Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi, who took a keen interest in the problems of the Tamils and did not hesitate to take up the matter strongly with the governments in power in Colombo."
Raman says that this disenchantment has turned into shock following reports of two Indian radar technicians being injured when two planes of the LTTE's air wing bombed a Sri Lankan military base in Vavuniya in September." Hariharan says, "I don't see what Indian government can do beyond a point. The two warring sides don't want Indian help. They may be asking for Indian help but, at least they have not quantified it, so far."
Interestingly, no Tamil party has spelled out , in practical terms how much India can influence the Sri Lankan government who are fighting most important battle on their land.
Hariharan puts forward a few conditions before India can increase its involvement in the issue. He says, "India can interfere only if there is a chance of peace. We cannot get into a '1987 type' situation. We must take into account the trade between two countries at $4 billion. Any miscalculation can directly impact it. We are facing a strategic challenge in Sri Lanka because Iran, Pakistan and China are helping Rajpakasa. It's the leverage he has. The Sri Lankan parliament has 42 Tamil-speaking MPs who should also put pressure on the government."
Interestingly, a vocal supporter of the LTTE in Chennai told rediff.com, "The siege of Kilinochchi will prove to be the siege of Leningrad. Hitler's [Images] army besieged the city for 872 days but still could not oust the Russians, who put up a heroic struggle. The LTTE will also win the battle of Kilinochchi using the same tactics as the Russians. You can expect a surprise."
Even if the Sri Lankan government wins the battle, will their win bring peace to the island nation is the moot question. They will have to start a reconciliation process, says Rajapakse supporters. Raman says, "Very few in Tamil Nadu take seriously the assurances of Rajapaksa that after neutralising the LTTE as a terrorist organisation, his government will initiate political measures for meeting the legitimate aspirations of the Tamil people."
Courtesy:www.rediff.com
Wednesday, October 15, 2008
Intelligence in India's Sri Lanka War
Introduction
A review of India's military intervention in Sri Lanka (1987-90) now after two decades has the benefit of hindsight. During those two decades a number of global developments have enlarged the concept of strategic security. As a result, Military Intelligence (MI) has undergone changes in form, content and expectations.
When Indian forces operated in Sri Lanka, the Cold War confrontation between the Soviet Union and the U.S. was at its peak after the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. The US-Pakistan relations were perhaps at the closest, making India's Pakistan-centric security focus more acute. Only two months before signing of the India-Sri Lanka Agreement (ISLA) in July 1987, Operation Brass Tacks, in which the two countries almost went to war, had concluded. Indian army suffered from this Pakistan-centric preoccupation and Indian army had to pay a price for it in Sri Lanka.
Viewed in the overall context of India-Sri Lanka relations, India's war in Sri Lanka might be termed as Indian state's reactive military response to a largely internal political situation in Sri Lanka that affected India's interests also. Unfortunately, at that time the nation did not have a structural frame work to plan, conduct and monitor such overseas response. There was no integrated body with accountability to take informed decisions on national security issues. Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs (CCPA) was the only forum to carry out this task. During the Sri Lanka operations, a Core Group was formed to look after the day to day issues. This empowered group functioned under the Chairmanship of the Minister of State, External Affairs.
Sri Lanka operation was India's first -ever overseas force projection. Before that Indian troops had operated overseas only as part of United Nations forces. For the first time all the three services were involved in an overseas joint operation. Perhaps it was also the first time Indian army was drawn into a counter insurgency operation for which it had either planned or prepared in advance. To cap it all, the counter insurgency conflict involved operating in urban as well as jungle settings.
Communication technology was just making its early breakthroughs. The battlefield competencies of armed forces were yet to benefit from them. The MI did not enjoy the advantages imparted by information technology and its applications. It was essentially a HUMINT and COMBATINT operation.
MI had limited organic HUMINT capability and what little was there was focused on Pakistan. By modern standards, the then available ELINT and SIGINT resources would be considered primitive. However, over the years the MI had gained certain amount of expertise in HUMINT operations and interrogation in counter insurgency setting. The divisional intelligence units deployed in insurgency affected regions were the main sources of this expertise.
When the Sri Lanka army's crackdown on Tamil militants reached a critical stage in Jaffna Peninsula around April 1987, Directorate General of Military Intelligence (DGMI) moved a small MI team to Chennai to cover Sri Lanka. It had very limited capability. Thus till Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) was inducted into Sri Lanka, this MI team was DGMI's sole organic source of intelligence. Of course, it had access to some of the inputs of the external intelligence agency Research & Analysis Wing (RAW) and the counter intelligence service Intelligence Bureau (IB). The IB had been keeping a watchful eye on the activities of thousands of Sri Lanka Tamil refugees present in Tamil Nadu. It also had very good knowledge of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)'s activities in Tamil Nadu. However, the DGMI had no access to the Tamil Nadu State Police (Q Branch) which was yet another rich source of intelligence on Sri Lanka Tamil militancy.
Intelligence before the outbreak of war
Southern Command based in Pune established the Operational Force Commander's Headquarters (OFC HQ) at Chennai to for the task of overseeing the operation when India decided to send troops to Sri Lanka to help implementation of the ISLA. As soon as the ISLA was signed on July 29, 1987, opposition to the Agreement snowballed in Sri Lanka threatening the stability of the regime of President JR Jayawardane. 54 Infantry Division (less most of the support arms) was hastily despatched to Sri Lanka in the first week of August 1987 as a show of support to the President and the Tamils. The Southern Army Commander as the OFC had an ambiguous mandate on Sri Lanka. As a corollary 54 Infantry Division also was not given a clear role at that stage.
The DGMI attached a dozen Tamil speaking Intelligence Corps officers and NCOs to the OFC HQ at Chennai to assist the OFC. The attachment of the MI team was fire fighting measure as it had neither exposure to Sri Lanka nor had a briefing on its task. The team moved to Jaffna (Palali) in the first week of August, a few days after 54 Infantry Division arrived there. The OFC HQ assigned no specific task to the MI team except to 'keep an eye' on the happenings there. The team was provided no functional resources
The MI team tasked itself to study and understand the environment in north-eastern Sri Lanka. It familiarized itself with the terrain, and important personalities and decision makers among militant groups notably the LTTE. The team forwarded its reports directly to DGMI under whose command it operated. There was very little intelligence input from either DGMI or from civil intelligence agencies to either OFC HQ and as a result 54 Infantry Division had only marginal information.
From September 1987 onwards the LTTE showed marked reluctance in implementing the ISLA refusing to surrender of the arms it held. As the IPKF task looked a long haul, DGMI moved 57 Mtn Div Int & FS Company to Palali to augment MI resources in the island. Tamil speaking officers and NCOs were posted to man the unit.
The Divisional Headquarters in Palali perhaps due to the confusing command and control structure of the MI team did not use it. In fact the Divisional Headquarters kept the MI team out of all its interactions and political parleys with the LTTE. The Division Headquarters also did not project specific intelligence requirements of any kind to the MI team. For reasons not very clear, the services of the MI team were never used during the Division's operational planning process prior to the Jaffna operations. (According to the RAW, the Army Headquarters also did not take the RAW into confidence or sought its advice prior to the Jaffna operations). Thus the Division launched the Jaffna operation on its own steam.
Intelligence during the operations
Only after the Jaffna operation commenced and troops were rapidly inducted from mainland, the Division asked the Officer Commanding, 57 Div Int & FS Coy to brief the troops prior to their induction into the war zone! Similarly, as the operation progressed, the intelligence unit was tasked to interrogate suspected civilians and prisoners.
There was no advance planning at either the OFC HQ, or the Divisional HQ for screening of civilian population or holding prisoners. This was in direct contrast to 1971 operational experience in eastern theatre when we had meticulously planned in advance the handling and interrogation of prisoners. Short duration training was also imparted to NCOs from infantry units on combat interrogation. This resulted in the failure to gain tactical information through interrogation in the early stages of operation.
However, by the time Jaffna operations ended, the force level of IPKF was increased with the induction of two more divisions. The command and control structure of the Advance Headquarters of the OFC at Chennai was also streamlined. In addition to the 57 Int and FS Coy, another intelligence unit was specifically raised for the IPKF operations and inducted. The unit had both intelligence acquisition and interrogation capabilities. The unit had its headquarters in Chennai; one team and an interrogation centre each from this unit were deployed in Vavuniya, Trincomalee and Batticaloa. 57 Int and FS Coy provided the intelligence cover for 54 Div sector including Kilinochchi. Both the units served under the command of Col GS (Int) of the Advance HQ OFC.
Communication intelligence was provided by the SIGINT detachments and EWCP. Though they were under Army Headquarters, they worked closely with forward troops and provided accurate real time information.
The RAW after its initial false start, improved its linkages with the Advance HQ OFC, after the Jafffna operations commenced. From then onwards, the Chennai RAW unit maintained close touch with the Advance HQ OFC, and provided valuable inputs particularly on political developments in Sri Lanka. Though RAW provided up to date information on overall developments, it could not provide specific information on the LTTE's military capabilities or cogent assessments on their likely course of action.
Despite the MI officers enjoying excellent rapport at the senior level, both the Q Branch of the Tamil Nadu State Police and the IB at Chennai provided no information to the IPKF throughout the period of operation. Their information resources on the LTTE activities in Tamil Nadu could have helped the IPKF in planning and conduct of its operations. Thanks to the vehement opposition of the ruling Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) party to the IPKF operations, the Tamil Nadu government issued no formal orders to the Q Branch on sharing of information relevant to the IPKF. The IB fared no better. It usually fobbed off our requests saying that they had no military information, though political information had a lot of relevance to IPKF operations.
MI performance: Army Headquarters level
There was practically no intelligence sharing between the three services intelligence wings at the functional level in Sri Lanka. Perhaps the confusion in the overall command and control equation among the three services was the reason for this aberration. The DGMI also probably did not identify and articulate its needs to the other two services.
The DGMI had built no intelligence assets on Sri Lanka before the ISLA. It is surprising that this requirement was not visualised, despite India's close political involvements there since 1983. This was only symptomatic of the lack of mission clarity that had marked Indian army's foray into Sri Lanka. Thus DGMI could not provide timely information to the forces in Sri Lanka either during the political parleys with the LTTE or before Jaffna operations. However, once the role of the IPKF was crystallised, the DGMI rose to the occasion. It made available maximum possible intelligence resources within the first few months. It also assisted in recruiting Sinhala knowing Tamils migrants from Sri Lanka to help MI and SIGINT units.
But the biggest failure of the Army HQ and the DGMI was in their inability to change the Tamil Nadu government's negative attitude not only on information sharing but also in taking follow up actions requested by the IPKF on specific LTTE activity in the state. During the entire period of operations, the LTTE had an unprecedented freedom to operate with impunity in Tamil Nadu despite being at war with Indian state. This not only exposed the troops traversing the state to potential LTTE threat but reflected the callousness with which the whole operation was treated. This created a great feeling of insecurity among Tamil sources, who felt the MI did not have enough "influence" to ensure their security even at home. This lack of confidence affected MI's performance.
The DGMI's also showed its inability to provide down assessments to the IPKF, even though it received regular inputs from RAW, IB and other agencies at the Army HQ. Similarly the HQ Southern Command GS (Int) also failed to provide useful assessments or inputs, presumably because it had no operational responsibility. The absence of such top down assessments handicapped the MI planning and collection process at the Advance HQ OFC. The DGMI could have helped the IPKF to assess the situation better with appropriate and timely inputs on developments at home that had impacted MI's intelligence operations in Sri Lanka.
MI performance: OFC MI
At the field level, OFC MI had set itself the task of keeping abreast of three strategic developments that could destabilise the IPKF operations. These were: the acquisition of MANPADS by the LTTE, contacts between the LTTE and the Marxist Sinhala militant group Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) operating in other parts of Sri Lanka, and collaboration between the LTTE and elements of the Government of Sri Lanka. In all the three aspects, the OFC MI all along kept abreast of the developments. Despite the initial glitches of command and control and limited resources, the MI units in Sri Lanka made some positive contributions. Their assessments were generally more accurate than any other national intelligence agency.
OFC MI had used the period of troubled peace from August to October 1987, to create useful assets both within the LTTE and among influential pro-LTTE elements in Jaffna and Trincomalee. These assets came in handy when the operations started. They provided valuable inputs on political and strategic moves of the LTTE as well as Sri Lanka government. During the IPKF's consolidation phase, after Jaffna was cleared, the OFC MI's was able to provide useful information on movement of LTTE pistol groups within Jaffna and in eastern Sri Lanka. It also provided clinching evidence of collusion between elements of the Sri Lankan government and army, and the LTTE. These helped us to understand the changing operational environment and assess the depth of the emerging equation between the Sri Lanka President and the LTTE.
Generally frontline troops had high expectation of tactical intelligence from OFC MI units. To certain extent these were met wherever close coordination existed between the MI elements and troops, notably in Jaffna, Trincomalee, and Batticaloa sectors. Unfortunately this could not be achieved fully in Vavuniya and Mullaitivu districts where the jungle terrain made HUMINT operations difficult. Troops in those areas had to depend upon their own combat intelligence. However, the front line infantry units lacked adequate intelligence awareness to successfully carry out combat intelligence tasks. On the other hand, Para Commando units showed excellent response and added some 'muscle' to MI operations conducted with their help. And naturally their operational performance was far superior to regular infantry units.
The OFC MI established useful links with Sri Lanka's National Intelligence Bureau (NIB). Though some of the NIB information was misleading, it helped in understanding the official line of Sri Lanka. The OFC MI had to maintain constant vigilance against NIB efforts to thwart its operations, particularly in the year 1988-89.
Communication and electronic intelligence produced valuable inputs. However, such information was not validated adequately due to paucity of intelligence staff. In future operations of force projection such inputs are likely to increase enormously. In order to get the overall picture, intelligence staff at the formation level would require better training to evolve realistic assessments combining HUMINT, ELINT and SIGINT inputs.
There was practically no input from Air and Naval Intelligence sources. Presumably MI failed to seek specific information from them. Navy could have been useful particularly in gaining information on the LTTE's supplies from Tamil Nadu across the Palk Strait. MI did not fully tap the Tamil media both in Tamil Nadu and Sri Lanka that were rich open sources of information.
Coordination with civil intelligence agencies
Coordination between the MI as the user and the RAW as the provider had always been one sided. The RAW usually did not meet DGMI's military intelligence requirements in a usable form. Presumably RAW's own priorities were different from those of the armed forces. Ideally when the IPKF was inducted, the RAW had the capability to produce a comprehensive handbook on Sri Lanka containing all the information forces required. Probably the DGMI did not project such a requirement nor did the RAW anticipate it. This speaks for the limited coordination that had existed between the Army and the RAW. However, after initial hiccups on this count in Sri Lanka, the RAW – Army cooperation improved once the Advance HQ OFC was created.
Though over a period of time, some form of top level agency coordination emerged in New Delhi it never percolated down to formation level in Sri Lanka. At present interaction between the Army and RAW counterparts is based only on personal equation established between the two in the absence of standard operating procedures for information sharing. Thus officers on both sides grow up in a culture of denial rather than sharing. Perhaps we can take a leaf out of the Japanese industrial management practice of forming Small Group Activity for the user and producer to understand the user's problems to evolve workable solutions.
As far as the IB was concerned, internal political intelligence appeared to be their focus. Functionally in critical internal situations in India the IB representatives had been forthcoming in sharing information of military interest. However, this does not apply to IB's political intelligence sharing with the army even in counter insurgency situation in India. However, in the case of counter insurgency operations in Sri Lanka, the fine line dividing political and operational intelligence got blurred. Perhaps the IB was not able to appreciate this need for forces operating in alien environment. That would explain its reluctance to share information of any kind relating to Sri Lanka with the IPKF.
The failure of the State police machinery to share intelligence relevant to the IPKF represented the dissonance in our national security perceptions. The failure of the Tamil Nadu Home Department to act in the interest of national security for political reasons had kept up the morale of LTTE fighting with our forces in Sri Lanka. This has been well documented in the Jain Commission report. The precedent set by Tamil Nadu Government during the IPKF operations on this count taking roots now in the political culture cannot be ruled out. To avoid a similar contingency arising in our future overseas operations, it would be prudent for the armed forces to handle with more alacrity by demanding clear mandates in advance with clear guidelines and responsibilities.
Intelligence in overseas operations of the future
The IPKF operations in the early stages were hastily conceived, inadequately planned and executed because there was a lack of role clarity. This was mainly due to the absence of an empowered national decision making body on national security at the government level. Similarly there was an inadequate framework for conducting combined operations overseas at the joint services level. Remedial action has been taken since then to address these limitations, though they might not be wholly satisfactory as the Kargil war had demonstrated. However, it is likely to improve as the nation gradually gains more experience in handling strategic security issues on a global perspective.
Intelligence on a real time basis will be the catalyst of success of armed forces in future overseas operations. MI will be required to meticulously plan and be ready to meet the intelligence requirements in overseas operations before and after the induction of troops. As sources of information have enlarged in scope and width, MI should be in a position to provide reasonable assessments in real time to forces operating in battle fields dominated by larger force levels, great mobility and high fire power. This would require a greater degree of intelligence integration of MI with its counterparts in other services as well as civil intelligence agencies. Thus there is an urgent need to integrate this need in perspective planning of operations for such contingencies.
To achieve such readiness, MI will require clear policy formulations applicable to the three services as well as civil intelligence agencies, better integration and coordination of inputs and assessments through a structured mechanism. It will also require coordinated advance planning by all the intelligence stakeholders at various levels.
Over the long term, MI will also have to build its own expertise in areas of potential operational interest. Ideally, a defence university will be the appropriate forum to create such knowledge banks. In the absence of such an institution, repositories of knowledge can be created in selected academies of excellence like university departments of defence studies so that there is continuity of effort. Intelligence Corps officers should be encouraged to specialise in regions or countries of national interest. Unless MI plans and evolves such an integrated intelligence matrix, success in future overseas operations will come only at great cost of men and material.
Military intelligence is a specialised job that requires the application of military knowledge to understand the information needs of the battle field and provide useful assessments to the fighting forces. In future operational environments, MI staff will be required to make real time assessments to assist operational decision making. No doubt the quantum jump in communication and information technology provides useful tools for the MI to meet this requirement. However, much of its success would depend upon the training imparted to intelligence staff to be technologically savvy in keeping with the dynamics of the emerging battle field needs.
With the nation poised to emerge as a regional power in the near future, MI has to transform itself into a technology driven organisation to meld TECHINT, ELINT, SIGINT and HUMINT inputs to meet the requirements of force projection overseas. Focus on intelligence management rather than mere information management has become the order of the day. That will remove the aberrations of intelligence acquisition and coordination at all levels and contribute meaningfully to operational planning and execution.
[This article is based on a presentation made at the seminar "Indian Experience in Force Projection" organised by the Centre for Joint Warfare Studies (CENJOWS) at New Delhi on September 15 and 16, 2008.]
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers29%5Cpaper2882.html
A review of India's military intervention in Sri Lanka (1987-90) now after two decades has the benefit of hindsight. During those two decades a number of global developments have enlarged the concept of strategic security. As a result, Military Intelligence (MI) has undergone changes in form, content and expectations.
When Indian forces operated in Sri Lanka, the Cold War confrontation between the Soviet Union and the U.S. was at its peak after the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. The US-Pakistan relations were perhaps at the closest, making India's Pakistan-centric security focus more acute. Only two months before signing of the India-Sri Lanka Agreement (ISLA) in July 1987, Operation Brass Tacks, in which the two countries almost went to war, had concluded. Indian army suffered from this Pakistan-centric preoccupation and Indian army had to pay a price for it in Sri Lanka.
Viewed in the overall context of India-Sri Lanka relations, India's war in Sri Lanka might be termed as Indian state's reactive military response to a largely internal political situation in Sri Lanka that affected India's interests also. Unfortunately, at that time the nation did not have a structural frame work to plan, conduct and monitor such overseas response. There was no integrated body with accountability to take informed decisions on national security issues. Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs (CCPA) was the only forum to carry out this task. During the Sri Lanka operations, a Core Group was formed to look after the day to day issues. This empowered group functioned under the Chairmanship of the Minister of State, External Affairs.
Sri Lanka operation was India's first -ever overseas force projection. Before that Indian troops had operated overseas only as part of United Nations forces. For the first time all the three services were involved in an overseas joint operation. Perhaps it was also the first time Indian army was drawn into a counter insurgency operation for which it had either planned or prepared in advance. To cap it all, the counter insurgency conflict involved operating in urban as well as jungle settings.
Communication technology was just making its early breakthroughs. The battlefield competencies of armed forces were yet to benefit from them. The MI did not enjoy the advantages imparted by information technology and its applications. It was essentially a HUMINT and COMBATINT operation.
MI had limited organic HUMINT capability and what little was there was focused on Pakistan. By modern standards, the then available ELINT and SIGINT resources would be considered primitive. However, over the years the MI had gained certain amount of expertise in HUMINT operations and interrogation in counter insurgency setting. The divisional intelligence units deployed in insurgency affected regions were the main sources of this expertise.
When the Sri Lanka army's crackdown on Tamil militants reached a critical stage in Jaffna Peninsula around April 1987, Directorate General of Military Intelligence (DGMI) moved a small MI team to Chennai to cover Sri Lanka. It had very limited capability. Thus till Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) was inducted into Sri Lanka, this MI team was DGMI's sole organic source of intelligence. Of course, it had access to some of the inputs of the external intelligence agency Research & Analysis Wing (RAW) and the counter intelligence service Intelligence Bureau (IB). The IB had been keeping a watchful eye on the activities of thousands of Sri Lanka Tamil refugees present in Tamil Nadu. It also had very good knowledge of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)'s activities in Tamil Nadu. However, the DGMI had no access to the Tamil Nadu State Police (Q Branch) which was yet another rich source of intelligence on Sri Lanka Tamil militancy.
Intelligence before the outbreak of war
Southern Command based in Pune established the Operational Force Commander's Headquarters (OFC HQ) at Chennai to for the task of overseeing the operation when India decided to send troops to Sri Lanka to help implementation of the ISLA. As soon as the ISLA was signed on July 29, 1987, opposition to the Agreement snowballed in Sri Lanka threatening the stability of the regime of President JR Jayawardane. 54 Infantry Division (less most of the support arms) was hastily despatched to Sri Lanka in the first week of August 1987 as a show of support to the President and the Tamils. The Southern Army Commander as the OFC had an ambiguous mandate on Sri Lanka. As a corollary 54 Infantry Division also was not given a clear role at that stage.
The DGMI attached a dozen Tamil speaking Intelligence Corps officers and NCOs to the OFC HQ at Chennai to assist the OFC. The attachment of the MI team was fire fighting measure as it had neither exposure to Sri Lanka nor had a briefing on its task. The team moved to Jaffna (Palali) in the first week of August, a few days after 54 Infantry Division arrived there. The OFC HQ assigned no specific task to the MI team except to 'keep an eye' on the happenings there. The team was provided no functional resources
The MI team tasked itself to study and understand the environment in north-eastern Sri Lanka. It familiarized itself with the terrain, and important personalities and decision makers among militant groups notably the LTTE. The team forwarded its reports directly to DGMI under whose command it operated. There was very little intelligence input from either DGMI or from civil intelligence agencies to either OFC HQ and as a result 54 Infantry Division had only marginal information.
From September 1987 onwards the LTTE showed marked reluctance in implementing the ISLA refusing to surrender of the arms it held. As the IPKF task looked a long haul, DGMI moved 57 Mtn Div Int & FS Company to Palali to augment MI resources in the island. Tamil speaking officers and NCOs were posted to man the unit.
The Divisional Headquarters in Palali perhaps due to the confusing command and control structure of the MI team did not use it. In fact the Divisional Headquarters kept the MI team out of all its interactions and political parleys with the LTTE. The Division Headquarters also did not project specific intelligence requirements of any kind to the MI team. For reasons not very clear, the services of the MI team were never used during the Division's operational planning process prior to the Jaffna operations. (According to the RAW, the Army Headquarters also did not take the RAW into confidence or sought its advice prior to the Jaffna operations). Thus the Division launched the Jaffna operation on its own steam.
Intelligence during the operations
Only after the Jaffna operation commenced and troops were rapidly inducted from mainland, the Division asked the Officer Commanding, 57 Div Int & FS Coy to brief the troops prior to their induction into the war zone! Similarly, as the operation progressed, the intelligence unit was tasked to interrogate suspected civilians and prisoners.
There was no advance planning at either the OFC HQ, or the Divisional HQ for screening of civilian population or holding prisoners. This was in direct contrast to 1971 operational experience in eastern theatre when we had meticulously planned in advance the handling and interrogation of prisoners. Short duration training was also imparted to NCOs from infantry units on combat interrogation. This resulted in the failure to gain tactical information through interrogation in the early stages of operation.
However, by the time Jaffna operations ended, the force level of IPKF was increased with the induction of two more divisions. The command and control structure of the Advance Headquarters of the OFC at Chennai was also streamlined. In addition to the 57 Int and FS Coy, another intelligence unit was specifically raised for the IPKF operations and inducted. The unit had both intelligence acquisition and interrogation capabilities. The unit had its headquarters in Chennai; one team and an interrogation centre each from this unit were deployed in Vavuniya, Trincomalee and Batticaloa. 57 Int and FS Coy provided the intelligence cover for 54 Div sector including Kilinochchi. Both the units served under the command of Col GS (Int) of the Advance HQ OFC.
Communication intelligence was provided by the SIGINT detachments and EWCP. Though they were under Army Headquarters, they worked closely with forward troops and provided accurate real time information.
The RAW after its initial false start, improved its linkages with the Advance HQ OFC, after the Jafffna operations commenced. From then onwards, the Chennai RAW unit maintained close touch with the Advance HQ OFC, and provided valuable inputs particularly on political developments in Sri Lanka. Though RAW provided up to date information on overall developments, it could not provide specific information on the LTTE's military capabilities or cogent assessments on their likely course of action.
Despite the MI officers enjoying excellent rapport at the senior level, both the Q Branch of the Tamil Nadu State Police and the IB at Chennai provided no information to the IPKF throughout the period of operation. Their information resources on the LTTE activities in Tamil Nadu could have helped the IPKF in planning and conduct of its operations. Thanks to the vehement opposition of the ruling Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) party to the IPKF operations, the Tamil Nadu government issued no formal orders to the Q Branch on sharing of information relevant to the IPKF. The IB fared no better. It usually fobbed off our requests saying that they had no military information, though political information had a lot of relevance to IPKF operations.
MI performance: Army Headquarters level
There was practically no intelligence sharing between the three services intelligence wings at the functional level in Sri Lanka. Perhaps the confusion in the overall command and control equation among the three services was the reason for this aberration. The DGMI also probably did not identify and articulate its needs to the other two services.
The DGMI had built no intelligence assets on Sri Lanka before the ISLA. It is surprising that this requirement was not visualised, despite India's close political involvements there since 1983. This was only symptomatic of the lack of mission clarity that had marked Indian army's foray into Sri Lanka. Thus DGMI could not provide timely information to the forces in Sri Lanka either during the political parleys with the LTTE or before Jaffna operations. However, once the role of the IPKF was crystallised, the DGMI rose to the occasion. It made available maximum possible intelligence resources within the first few months. It also assisted in recruiting Sinhala knowing Tamils migrants from Sri Lanka to help MI and SIGINT units.
But the biggest failure of the Army HQ and the DGMI was in their inability to change the Tamil Nadu government's negative attitude not only on information sharing but also in taking follow up actions requested by the IPKF on specific LTTE activity in the state. During the entire period of operations, the LTTE had an unprecedented freedom to operate with impunity in Tamil Nadu despite being at war with Indian state. This not only exposed the troops traversing the state to potential LTTE threat but reflected the callousness with which the whole operation was treated. This created a great feeling of insecurity among Tamil sources, who felt the MI did not have enough "influence" to ensure their security even at home. This lack of confidence affected MI's performance.
The DGMI's also showed its inability to provide down assessments to the IPKF, even though it received regular inputs from RAW, IB and other agencies at the Army HQ. Similarly the HQ Southern Command GS (Int) also failed to provide useful assessments or inputs, presumably because it had no operational responsibility. The absence of such top down assessments handicapped the MI planning and collection process at the Advance HQ OFC. The DGMI could have helped the IPKF to assess the situation better with appropriate and timely inputs on developments at home that had impacted MI's intelligence operations in Sri Lanka.
MI performance: OFC MI
At the field level, OFC MI had set itself the task of keeping abreast of three strategic developments that could destabilise the IPKF operations. These were: the acquisition of MANPADS by the LTTE, contacts between the LTTE and the Marxist Sinhala militant group Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) operating in other parts of Sri Lanka, and collaboration between the LTTE and elements of the Government of Sri Lanka. In all the three aspects, the OFC MI all along kept abreast of the developments. Despite the initial glitches of command and control and limited resources, the MI units in Sri Lanka made some positive contributions. Their assessments were generally more accurate than any other national intelligence agency.
OFC MI had used the period of troubled peace from August to October 1987, to create useful assets both within the LTTE and among influential pro-LTTE elements in Jaffna and Trincomalee. These assets came in handy when the operations started. They provided valuable inputs on political and strategic moves of the LTTE as well as Sri Lanka government. During the IPKF's consolidation phase, after Jaffna was cleared, the OFC MI's was able to provide useful information on movement of LTTE pistol groups within Jaffna and in eastern Sri Lanka. It also provided clinching evidence of collusion between elements of the Sri Lankan government and army, and the LTTE. These helped us to understand the changing operational environment and assess the depth of the emerging equation between the Sri Lanka President and the LTTE.
Generally frontline troops had high expectation of tactical intelligence from OFC MI units. To certain extent these were met wherever close coordination existed between the MI elements and troops, notably in Jaffna, Trincomalee, and Batticaloa sectors. Unfortunately this could not be achieved fully in Vavuniya and Mullaitivu districts where the jungle terrain made HUMINT operations difficult. Troops in those areas had to depend upon their own combat intelligence. However, the front line infantry units lacked adequate intelligence awareness to successfully carry out combat intelligence tasks. On the other hand, Para Commando units showed excellent response and added some 'muscle' to MI operations conducted with their help. And naturally their operational performance was far superior to regular infantry units.
The OFC MI established useful links with Sri Lanka's National Intelligence Bureau (NIB). Though some of the NIB information was misleading, it helped in understanding the official line of Sri Lanka. The OFC MI had to maintain constant vigilance against NIB efforts to thwart its operations, particularly in the year 1988-89.
Communication and electronic intelligence produced valuable inputs. However, such information was not validated adequately due to paucity of intelligence staff. In future operations of force projection such inputs are likely to increase enormously. In order to get the overall picture, intelligence staff at the formation level would require better training to evolve realistic assessments combining HUMINT, ELINT and SIGINT inputs.
There was practically no input from Air and Naval Intelligence sources. Presumably MI failed to seek specific information from them. Navy could have been useful particularly in gaining information on the LTTE's supplies from Tamil Nadu across the Palk Strait. MI did not fully tap the Tamil media both in Tamil Nadu and Sri Lanka that were rich open sources of information.
Coordination with civil intelligence agencies
Coordination between the MI as the user and the RAW as the provider had always been one sided. The RAW usually did not meet DGMI's military intelligence requirements in a usable form. Presumably RAW's own priorities were different from those of the armed forces. Ideally when the IPKF was inducted, the RAW had the capability to produce a comprehensive handbook on Sri Lanka containing all the information forces required. Probably the DGMI did not project such a requirement nor did the RAW anticipate it. This speaks for the limited coordination that had existed between the Army and the RAW. However, after initial hiccups on this count in Sri Lanka, the RAW – Army cooperation improved once the Advance HQ OFC was created.
Though over a period of time, some form of top level agency coordination emerged in New Delhi it never percolated down to formation level in Sri Lanka. At present interaction between the Army and RAW counterparts is based only on personal equation established between the two in the absence of standard operating procedures for information sharing. Thus officers on both sides grow up in a culture of denial rather than sharing. Perhaps we can take a leaf out of the Japanese industrial management practice of forming Small Group Activity for the user and producer to understand the user's problems to evolve workable solutions.
As far as the IB was concerned, internal political intelligence appeared to be their focus. Functionally in critical internal situations in India the IB representatives had been forthcoming in sharing information of military interest. However, this does not apply to IB's political intelligence sharing with the army even in counter insurgency situation in India. However, in the case of counter insurgency operations in Sri Lanka, the fine line dividing political and operational intelligence got blurred. Perhaps the IB was not able to appreciate this need for forces operating in alien environment. That would explain its reluctance to share information of any kind relating to Sri Lanka with the IPKF.
The failure of the State police machinery to share intelligence relevant to the IPKF represented the dissonance in our national security perceptions. The failure of the Tamil Nadu Home Department to act in the interest of national security for political reasons had kept up the morale of LTTE fighting with our forces in Sri Lanka. This has been well documented in the Jain Commission report. The precedent set by Tamil Nadu Government during the IPKF operations on this count taking roots now in the political culture cannot be ruled out. To avoid a similar contingency arising in our future overseas operations, it would be prudent for the armed forces to handle with more alacrity by demanding clear mandates in advance with clear guidelines and responsibilities.
Intelligence in overseas operations of the future
The IPKF operations in the early stages were hastily conceived, inadequately planned and executed because there was a lack of role clarity. This was mainly due to the absence of an empowered national decision making body on national security at the government level. Similarly there was an inadequate framework for conducting combined operations overseas at the joint services level. Remedial action has been taken since then to address these limitations, though they might not be wholly satisfactory as the Kargil war had demonstrated. However, it is likely to improve as the nation gradually gains more experience in handling strategic security issues on a global perspective.
Intelligence on a real time basis will be the catalyst of success of armed forces in future overseas operations. MI will be required to meticulously plan and be ready to meet the intelligence requirements in overseas operations before and after the induction of troops. As sources of information have enlarged in scope and width, MI should be in a position to provide reasonable assessments in real time to forces operating in battle fields dominated by larger force levels, great mobility and high fire power. This would require a greater degree of intelligence integration of MI with its counterparts in other services as well as civil intelligence agencies. Thus there is an urgent need to integrate this need in perspective planning of operations for such contingencies.
To achieve such readiness, MI will require clear policy formulations applicable to the three services as well as civil intelligence agencies, better integration and coordination of inputs and assessments through a structured mechanism. It will also require coordinated advance planning by all the intelligence stakeholders at various levels.
Over the long term, MI will also have to build its own expertise in areas of potential operational interest. Ideally, a defence university will be the appropriate forum to create such knowledge banks. In the absence of such an institution, repositories of knowledge can be created in selected academies of excellence like university departments of defence studies so that there is continuity of effort. Intelligence Corps officers should be encouraged to specialise in regions or countries of national interest. Unless MI plans and evolves such an integrated intelligence matrix, success in future overseas operations will come only at great cost of men and material.
Military intelligence is a specialised job that requires the application of military knowledge to understand the information needs of the battle field and provide useful assessments to the fighting forces. In future operational environments, MI staff will be required to make real time assessments to assist operational decision making. No doubt the quantum jump in communication and information technology provides useful tools for the MI to meet this requirement. However, much of its success would depend upon the training imparted to intelligence staff to be technologically savvy in keeping with the dynamics of the emerging battle field needs.
With the nation poised to emerge as a regional power in the near future, MI has to transform itself into a technology driven organisation to meld TECHINT, ELINT, SIGINT and HUMINT inputs to meet the requirements of force projection overseas. Focus on intelligence management rather than mere information management has become the order of the day. That will remove the aberrations of intelligence acquisition and coordination at all levels and contribute meaningfully to operational planning and execution.
[This article is based on a presentation made at the seminar "Indian Experience in Force Projection" organised by the Centre for Joint Warfare Studies (CENJOWS) at New Delhi on September 15 and 16, 2008.]
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers29%5Cpaper2882.html
Sunday, October 12, 2008
Sri Lanka: Understanding Each Other's "Concerns"
The tragedy of the Fourth Eelam War is that it is going along well trodden path of wars of earlier vintage. So as the Sri Lanka security forces knocked on the doors of Kilinochchi, the undeclared capital of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the rhetoric of Tamil Nadu Chief Minister M Karunanidhi reached a new high. He spoke to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on August 6, 2008 to highlight his concern at the growing plight of Tamils in Sri Lanka due to the ongoing war and requested New Delhi for action.
The prime minister assured him of support and action. MK Narayanan, National Security Advisor, summoned Sri Lanka Deputy High Commissioner to convey India's concern and unhappiness at the growing casualties of unarmed Tamil civilians as a result of military action. Later the Indian High Commissioner to Colombo met President Rajapaksa to apprise him of India's concerns.
At a public meeting later, Karunanidhi gave an ominous warning to the coalition government in Delhi He said "…If the war in Lanka continues, Tamils here will not remain silent. In such a situation the Indian government should co-operate with us. If Sri Lanka transgresses the warning we would have to consider if this government (in Tamil Nadu) should continue." The chief minister did not explain how "sacrificing" his office would help increase the pressure on Sri Lanka to end the war. However, as he has very limited option to bring pressure on New Delhi, his veiled threat to quit office was perhaps his way to do it. His support continues to be important as the coalition government in New Delhi is delicately poised. The Left withdrew support after the nuclear deal and the Samajwadi Party, which had voted for the government on the same issue, is sending conflicting signals of its support.
But as the war is closing on Kilinochchi and civilians are at peril, Karunanidhi's utterances are more than mere politics. Almost all political parties in Tamil Nadu have rallied to the cause of Tamils trapped in the war zone in the north. Though Karunanidhi and leaders of other political parties differed in their perspectives, unmistakably they were expressing the sentiments of Tamils everywhere over the safety and well being of civilians in the north.
This should not be trivialised as a political gimmick because the Sri Lanka is not a mainstream "vote catcher" issue at present. But if the situation worsens and the refugee inflow increases in Tamil Nadu, the sentiments could harden, though they might not be in the same scale as 1983. This widespread sympathy in Tamil Nadu is for Tamil population and does not translate itself in support to the armed actions of the LTTE, though its make-believe world might think so.
It is not only Tamil Nadu or India that is concerned at the worsening plight in Vanni. Britain has expressed its concern over the developing humanitarian crisis. British Minister for the Department for International Development (DFID) Shahid Malik has offered to fund the movement of humanitarian aid to the people affected by war in the north.
Sri Lanka's leadership has shown a clear understanding of the delicate situation in which Indian government is placed in handling the Tamil issue particularly when the Tamil population is at the receiving end. On the one hand the Indian government has to respect the genuine humanitarian concerns of a section of its population; on the other hand it understands the compulsions of the Sri Lanka government in going to war against the LTTE just as India had done in 1987. President Rajapaksa had stated in the past that he understood India's political compulsions in shaping India-Sri Lanka relations.
But understanding the Indian position does not answer the India's concerns. After India's expression of concern, the President spoke of his political efforts at making peace and called upon the LTTE to lay down arms at a meeting of the All Parry Conference. It is doubtful whether the APC, which has woken up from hibernation, carries any credibility among the people as a vehicle for evolving a durable solution for peace. The APC's failure in its task and the increasing emphasis on militarism in Sri Lanka does not augur well for the country. Even as the much heralded "final victory" against the LTTE is in the horizon, proposal to increase armed forces strength to 200,000 is reported to be under consideration. This continued over emphasis on armed forces can only foster a culture of militarism. And a large Sinhala dominated army will be of growing concern to all minorities and peace lobbies who are debating the question "what after Kilinochchi."
The increasing public expression of Sinhala nationalism by people in power further adds fuel to the fire of suspicion about the ulterior motives of the government in furthering a military agenda. Is it to re-impose a status quo of Sinhala domination or is it to usher in an equitable democracy after the war for everyone? A case in point is the recent interview given by Lt Gen Sarath Fonseka, the architect of Sri Lanka armed forces victorious march against the LTTE so far. For sometime now, the Army Commander had been strident in asserting the Sinhala majority sentiments that originally planted the seeds of insurgency in Tamil minds.
In his interview to the Canadian daily National Post, Gen Fonseka said "I strongly believe that this country belongs to the Sinhalese but there are minority communities and we treat them like our people…We being the majority of the country, 75%, we will never give in and we have the right to protect this country…We are also a strong nation … They can live in this country with us. But they must not try to, under the pretext of being a minority, demand undue things." If this is the essence of the present war against LTTE, it can only be interpreted as a war against not only the LTTE but also Tamils and even Muslims as well. Surely, the Army Commander does not want such an interpretation. Does he? But in an insurgency situation, when we talk of "winning hearts and minds of the people" the General's statement is not the way to go about it. It is no wonder that almost all political parties have condemned the Army Commander's statement as untenable.
It is not only the Sri Lankan government that has to share the blame for the loss of lives of Sri Lankan civilians – Tamils, Sinhalas and Muslims. The LTTE is equally responsible for continuing the war and generating hatred, death and mayhem. Even as MK Naryanan was conveying Indian concerns about Tamil civilian deaths to the Sri Lankan envoy, the LTTE dirty tricks department was at work. A suicide bomber blasted the former Army chief of staff Maj Gen Janaka Perera, his wife, and 26 others to death on the spot at Anuradhapura, the temple city. Over four scores of others were injured. The retired general, widely respected for his victories against the LTTE in an earlier edition of the war, had been a leading light of the United National Party (UNP). It was a truly tragic moment for Sri Lanka.
Not content with the killing of the retired General, a LTTE suicide bomber made an abortive attempt three days later in the outskirts of Colombo to kill Maithripala Sirisena, Minister of Agricultural Development and Agrarian Services Development, and also the General Secretary of the ruling Sri Lanka Freedom Party. However, the minister managed to escape with minor injuries while four others were also injured. The suicide bomber was killed in the blast.
Such targeted killings by the LTTE are no sign of it being ready for any more talks of peace than the Sri Lankans. They require to be condemned equally if not more vehemently as they are targeted against individual civilians unlike Sri Lankan air strikes which are area weapons. (Of course, to the dead it makes no difference what weapon was used or what was the intention.)
Curiously the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister's statement on Tamil civilians' plight was made after the LTTE's killing of Gen Perera and 27 other civilians – including Sinhalas, Tamils and Muslims. Sadly, the Chief Minister's statement made no reference to the meaningless and wanton killing of civilians, let alone condemning the LTTE. Thus the Chief Minister's statement lost a bit of legitimacy with this omission.
To the ordinary Sri Lankans, India's expression of concern at the growing casualties of unarmed Tamil civilians due to military action, when the LTTE had just killed a war hero and 27 civilians, probably looked ill timed and facile. Sri Lanka's share of India baiters believe India has an ulterior motive in its bid to help Sri Lanka build a plural democracy. For them India's silence on the LTTE's mindless killings, speak more loudly and clearly to reinforce their beliefs.
Perhaps it is time for India to do more than issuing demarches and statements of its concern, while it is business as usual for both the Sri Lanka government and the LTTE. That does not mean the heavy handed 'Big Brother talk' with Sri Lanka, either. Sri Lanka is a friendly power with a lot of goodwill for India. But at the same time, Sri Lanka should not take good relations with India for granted as the basis for forcing a military solution. Both sides have to mutually reinforce a move towards bringing peace in the island nation. And equitable justice for Tamils is germane to it.
India unfortunately does not give the impression of doing enough to alter the course of events. India has to bring the LTTE on track, much as it might abhor. Because it is not enough if Sri Lanka is ready for peace; is the LTTE ready? The LTTE has to prove that it genuinely wants peace, and not as a ploy to buy time for the next war as in the past.
The failure of Indian intervention in Sri Lanka in 1987 came as a result of building too much expectation among the Sri Lankan Tamils. It ended up promising too much and delivering too little. Both India and Sri Lanka had a share in its failure to take it to the logical end of lasting peace. Both nations do not appear to be learning from their past. Understanding each other's concerns is not enough. It is high time Sri Lanka and India started meaningfully interacting with each other to bring peace, than merely count bodies to decide for whom they should shed tears.
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cnotes5%5Cnote475.html
The prime minister assured him of support and action. MK Narayanan, National Security Advisor, summoned Sri Lanka Deputy High Commissioner to convey India's concern and unhappiness at the growing casualties of unarmed Tamil civilians as a result of military action. Later the Indian High Commissioner to Colombo met President Rajapaksa to apprise him of India's concerns.
At a public meeting later, Karunanidhi gave an ominous warning to the coalition government in Delhi He said "…If the war in Lanka continues, Tamils here will not remain silent. In such a situation the Indian government should co-operate with us. If Sri Lanka transgresses the warning we would have to consider if this government (in Tamil Nadu) should continue." The chief minister did not explain how "sacrificing" his office would help increase the pressure on Sri Lanka to end the war. However, as he has very limited option to bring pressure on New Delhi, his veiled threat to quit office was perhaps his way to do it. His support continues to be important as the coalition government in New Delhi is delicately poised. The Left withdrew support after the nuclear deal and the Samajwadi Party, which had voted for the government on the same issue, is sending conflicting signals of its support.
But as the war is closing on Kilinochchi and civilians are at peril, Karunanidhi's utterances are more than mere politics. Almost all political parties in Tamil Nadu have rallied to the cause of Tamils trapped in the war zone in the north. Though Karunanidhi and leaders of other political parties differed in their perspectives, unmistakably they were expressing the sentiments of Tamils everywhere over the safety and well being of civilians in the north.
This should not be trivialised as a political gimmick because the Sri Lanka is not a mainstream "vote catcher" issue at present. But if the situation worsens and the refugee inflow increases in Tamil Nadu, the sentiments could harden, though they might not be in the same scale as 1983. This widespread sympathy in Tamil Nadu is for Tamil population and does not translate itself in support to the armed actions of the LTTE, though its make-believe world might think so.
It is not only Tamil Nadu or India that is concerned at the worsening plight in Vanni. Britain has expressed its concern over the developing humanitarian crisis. British Minister for the Department for International Development (DFID) Shahid Malik has offered to fund the movement of humanitarian aid to the people affected by war in the north.
Sri Lanka's leadership has shown a clear understanding of the delicate situation in which Indian government is placed in handling the Tamil issue particularly when the Tamil population is at the receiving end. On the one hand the Indian government has to respect the genuine humanitarian concerns of a section of its population; on the other hand it understands the compulsions of the Sri Lanka government in going to war against the LTTE just as India had done in 1987. President Rajapaksa had stated in the past that he understood India's political compulsions in shaping India-Sri Lanka relations.
But understanding the Indian position does not answer the India's concerns. After India's expression of concern, the President spoke of his political efforts at making peace and called upon the LTTE to lay down arms at a meeting of the All Parry Conference. It is doubtful whether the APC, which has woken up from hibernation, carries any credibility among the people as a vehicle for evolving a durable solution for peace. The APC's failure in its task and the increasing emphasis on militarism in Sri Lanka does not augur well for the country. Even as the much heralded "final victory" against the LTTE is in the horizon, proposal to increase armed forces strength to 200,000 is reported to be under consideration. This continued over emphasis on armed forces can only foster a culture of militarism. And a large Sinhala dominated army will be of growing concern to all minorities and peace lobbies who are debating the question "what after Kilinochchi."
The increasing public expression of Sinhala nationalism by people in power further adds fuel to the fire of suspicion about the ulterior motives of the government in furthering a military agenda. Is it to re-impose a status quo of Sinhala domination or is it to usher in an equitable democracy after the war for everyone? A case in point is the recent interview given by Lt Gen Sarath Fonseka, the architect of Sri Lanka armed forces victorious march against the LTTE so far. For sometime now, the Army Commander had been strident in asserting the Sinhala majority sentiments that originally planted the seeds of insurgency in Tamil minds.
In his interview to the Canadian daily National Post, Gen Fonseka said "I strongly believe that this country belongs to the Sinhalese but there are minority communities and we treat them like our people…We being the majority of the country, 75%, we will never give in and we have the right to protect this country…We are also a strong nation … They can live in this country with us. But they must not try to, under the pretext of being a minority, demand undue things." If this is the essence of the present war against LTTE, it can only be interpreted as a war against not only the LTTE but also Tamils and even Muslims as well. Surely, the Army Commander does not want such an interpretation. Does he? But in an insurgency situation, when we talk of "winning hearts and minds of the people" the General's statement is not the way to go about it. It is no wonder that almost all political parties have condemned the Army Commander's statement as untenable.
It is not only the Sri Lankan government that has to share the blame for the loss of lives of Sri Lankan civilians – Tamils, Sinhalas and Muslims. The LTTE is equally responsible for continuing the war and generating hatred, death and mayhem. Even as MK Naryanan was conveying Indian concerns about Tamil civilian deaths to the Sri Lankan envoy, the LTTE dirty tricks department was at work. A suicide bomber blasted the former Army chief of staff Maj Gen Janaka Perera, his wife, and 26 others to death on the spot at Anuradhapura, the temple city. Over four scores of others were injured. The retired general, widely respected for his victories against the LTTE in an earlier edition of the war, had been a leading light of the United National Party (UNP). It was a truly tragic moment for Sri Lanka.
Not content with the killing of the retired General, a LTTE suicide bomber made an abortive attempt three days later in the outskirts of Colombo to kill Maithripala Sirisena, Minister of Agricultural Development and Agrarian Services Development, and also the General Secretary of the ruling Sri Lanka Freedom Party. However, the minister managed to escape with minor injuries while four others were also injured. The suicide bomber was killed in the blast.
Such targeted killings by the LTTE are no sign of it being ready for any more talks of peace than the Sri Lankans. They require to be condemned equally if not more vehemently as they are targeted against individual civilians unlike Sri Lankan air strikes which are area weapons. (Of course, to the dead it makes no difference what weapon was used or what was the intention.)
Curiously the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister's statement on Tamil civilians' plight was made after the LTTE's killing of Gen Perera and 27 other civilians – including Sinhalas, Tamils and Muslims. Sadly, the Chief Minister's statement made no reference to the meaningless and wanton killing of civilians, let alone condemning the LTTE. Thus the Chief Minister's statement lost a bit of legitimacy with this omission.
To the ordinary Sri Lankans, India's expression of concern at the growing casualties of unarmed Tamil civilians due to military action, when the LTTE had just killed a war hero and 27 civilians, probably looked ill timed and facile. Sri Lanka's share of India baiters believe India has an ulterior motive in its bid to help Sri Lanka build a plural democracy. For them India's silence on the LTTE's mindless killings, speak more loudly and clearly to reinforce their beliefs.
Perhaps it is time for India to do more than issuing demarches and statements of its concern, while it is business as usual for both the Sri Lanka government and the LTTE. That does not mean the heavy handed 'Big Brother talk' with Sri Lanka, either. Sri Lanka is a friendly power with a lot of goodwill for India. But at the same time, Sri Lanka should not take good relations with India for granted as the basis for forcing a military solution. Both sides have to mutually reinforce a move towards bringing peace in the island nation. And equitable justice for Tamils is germane to it.
India unfortunately does not give the impression of doing enough to alter the course of events. India has to bring the LTTE on track, much as it might abhor. Because it is not enough if Sri Lanka is ready for peace; is the LTTE ready? The LTTE has to prove that it genuinely wants peace, and not as a ploy to buy time for the next war as in the past.
The failure of Indian intervention in Sri Lanka in 1987 came as a result of building too much expectation among the Sri Lankan Tamils. It ended up promising too much and delivering too little. Both India and Sri Lanka had a share in its failure to take it to the logical end of lasting peace. Both nations do not appear to be learning from their past. Understanding each other's concerns is not enough. It is high time Sri Lanka and India started meaningfully interacting with each other to bring peace, than merely count bodies to decide for whom they should shed tears.
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cnotes5%5Cnote475.html
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