[This is the second part of earlier article "Sri Lanka: War after the fall of Vidattalthivu-Part 1 dated July 21, 2008.]
During the last one week, Sri Lanka army has kept up its momentum of advance. According to defence sources, the troops of 57 Division are on the periphery of line Tunukkai-Mallavi, west of A9 highway. We can expect them to secure the line from Vellankulam on the coast to Mallavi during the course of the week The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)'s failed attempt to dislodge the security forces in area South of Vavunikulam tank by last Wednesday is significant. Vavunikulam is astride the Vellankulam-Mallavi-Mankulam road axis and provides a take off point to build up the threat to Mankulam on A9. Even if the LTTE had succeeded, at best it would have bought a few more days of respite. However, the fact is that the LTTE was beaten back at Vavunikulam with a body count of 29 LTTE dead.
The LTTE counter attack probably did not have either the force levels required to stall the advancing troops or the fire power to unnerve them. The overwhelming size of the security forces offensive has cast the odds heavily against the LTTE. By present reckoning the LTTE at present can respond only fight defensive battles to save its shrinking territorial assets rather than mount a forceful offensive.
The LTTE has to halt the troops in their tracks in a series of delaying actions, or build a major offensive to cut the advancing military's long line of communication at a place of its choosing. So can the LTTE do it? And if so, where will it do? These are questions which Sri Lankan operational planners must be looking at. It seems from the Sri Lanka Army Commander Lt Gen Sarath Fonseka's statement that he expects the LTTE leaders to be huddled in their Vanni bunkers in a bid to save themselves when the LTTE Heroes Day comes in November 2008. He probably implied that the security forces would secure the territory west of A9 road by then. The build up of a three-division offensive on a broad front extending the whole of Mullaitivu district from Vellankulam on the west to Welioya on the east could aim at making a sweep from west to east to make the line Pooneryn-Kilinochchi untenable for the LTTE to hold in the coming month. However this military conjecture is only one of wide options open to the security forces now.
The LTTE appears to be responding in the way it knows best. Strategically, make a play internationally with an eye on drawing the overseas Tamil support, kindle Tamil Nadu's latent sympathetic embers, and step up killings and mayhem around Colombo and the heartlands of Sri Lanka. On the tactical front its actions are hazy and uncertain.
The LTTE's damatic announcement on July 21 to "observe a unilateral ceasefire that is devoid of military actions during the period of the SAARC [South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation] conference from 26th July to 4th August and give our cooperation for the success of the conference" is undoubtedly part of this strategy to buy time and aspire for a sympathetic audience when international attention focuses on the 15th SAARC summit conference is held in Colombo.
Apparently the LTTE gesture was laudable and would be welcomed by the people of Vanni who have been suffering immensely in the conflict. Tactically it would be unacceptable to the security forces when their offensive had made substantial progress and pose a real threat to the LTTE stronghold at Pooneryn/ Kilinochchi in the near future. A ceasefire even for 10 days would break the momentum of Sri Lankan advance. That would provide a vital breathing space for the LTTE forces now under tremendous pressure to recuperate their losses, tighten up defences and be prepared to respond to the security forces better. So it came as no surprise that the Sri Lanka government rejected the LTTE's unilateral ceasefire announcement.
In any case past experience of the LTTE misusing such ceasefire periods does not endear anyone fighting it to accept such offers. (Even Indian army experience of such 'LTTE ceasefire' was similar). When the LTTE was fighting the earlier episode of the Eelam War, it declared one such unilateral ceasefire on December 24, 2000 that continued up to April 2001. Even then the Sri Lanka government was cautious in its response, despite international efforts to initiate mediation. Barely three months later, in July 2001 came the daring LTTE Black Tiger raid on Katunayake airport crippling the civilian airlines and destroying substantial air force assets shocking the whole nation. Armies the world over go by lessons of war learned with their own blood and sweat. And Sri Lanka is no exception.
As far as the international audience is concerned, the number of ears sympathetic to the LTTE is dwindling. The global attitude to terrorism has changed. For all intents and purposes many nations consider the LTTE a terrorist organisation regardless of semantic arguments. Its international credibility is perhaps at the lowest now thanks to the nerve wracking experience of nations in handling terrorists of various kinds. Even those nations that do not call or consider the LTTE a terrorist body are cautious about coming out in support of the LTTE as they used to do in the 90s. So in reality the LTTE probably had no great expectations of any positive international response to its announcement.
The LTTE's strategic campaign among expatriates works best on an audience prone to be sympathetic to its cause. To augment its support base the LTTE will have to win over those who respond to the cause of Tamil autonomy but find the LTTE style of working abhorrent. This is what the LTTE is attempting among the Tamil expatriates at the large Pongu Thamizh public gatherings marshalled in key European capitals with strategically positioned LTTE flags and Prabhakaran portraits to catch the visual media. To make this strategy work the LTTE will have to do more than use its muscle power it had exercised among the expatriates all these years.
The LTTE's autocratic style has limited political appeal for expatriates who are enjoying the fruits freedom in democratic societies where they live. However, all these years they were impressed with its innovative conventional and unconventional operational skill. However, that fundamental military credibility on which the LTTE's reputation is built has now been shaken in the Eelam War-4. So the LTTE has to prove its military muscle in the war; and so far this is being weakened further with every success of the security
forces.
The best option for the LTTE is to look for an external power to bale it out of the war mess. In the past India, which has been sympathetic to the cause of Sri Lanka Tamil autonomy, did intervene in their favour till the LTTE shot itself in the foot when its assassin exploded the suicide bomb to kill Rajiv Gandhi. There were reports of India planning to induct substantial strength of Indian forces for the security of its Prime Minister during the SAARC conference. Immediately, the anti Indian lobby in Sri Lanka became vocal in their objection. Though the LTTE did not do so, it must have been really worried because Indian military intrevention for whatever apparent reason was the last thing it would like. So the LTTE's unilateral ceasefire announcement was also probably prompted by this desire ease India's apprehensions.
The ceasefire was also timed to coincide with the increasing incidents of Indian fishermen coming under the attack of Sri Lanka navy reported in Tamil Nadu. Such reports are stirring up the sentiments of Tamil population in India. When public sentiments are roused the technicalities of Tamil Nadu fishermen poaching in Sri Lanka waters or smuggling essential goods for the LTTE in the war zone are not considered germane to the larger interests of Tamils. So the LTTE stands to gain as long as this issue is on the boil. And as the battle progresses, we can expect the LTTE to offer more incentives for Tamil Nadu fishermen to lure them to smuggle supplies vital to survive and fight. With the security forces dominating the Mannar coast more and more such efforts could spark more flashpoints of attack on fishermen. How the Tamil Nadu government responds to such incidents is going to become crucial in the coming weeks.
The Tamil Nadu chief minister M Karunanidhi extended the whole hearted support of the Dravida Munnetra Kazagham (DMK) to the ruling coalition in Delhi when the recent vote of confidence for the Manmohan Singh government came up in Indian parliament. Having proved his credentials as a dependable ally, with the parliamentary polls coming up after four months the DMK leader can be expected to retain his strong links with the Congress party to fight his bệte noire Miss J Jayalalitha of the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazagham (AIADMK). As the elections get closer, he will have to reiterate his credentials as a leader of the Tamils sympathetic to Sri Lanka Tamil cause. So the LTTE will have a difficult task to do the extra mile to enrol even his covert support unless it looks like the winning side in the war.
So the LTTE's war is looking loaded against it both strategically, and tactically. Can Prabhakaran pull the rabbit out of his hat to turn the war? And it is a tough take for anyone because that is a 64 dollar question.
www.southasiaanalysis.org
Monday, July 28, 2008
Monday, July 21, 2008
Sri Lanka: War after the fall of Vidattalthivu-Part 1
Keeping up the momentum of their offensive, Sri Lanka army's 58 Division and Commando troops advanced another 10 km to the north to capture Illuppakkadavai on Sunday July 20, 2008 close on the heels of their success in capturing the Sea Tiger base of Vidattalthivu on the Mannar coast on July 16, 2008. According to Defence sources, the Commandos pursued and attacked the cadres of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) fleeing Iluppakkadavai, three km to the north on the A32 Mannar- Pooneryn road.
The rapid progress of the Mannar offensive and its quick successes send clear signals of the intention of Sri Lanka President Mahinda Rajapaksa to fight the LTTE unto finish despite his recent statement in India about his readiness to talk to the LTTE. At best the statement was a palliative to mollify ruffled sentiments in India where the LTTE enjoys a love-hate relationship in Tamil Nadu. (And the scale still appears to be weighted against 'love'.)
The military victories should enable the President, who had been beleaguered by issues of high inflation, food shortages and financial tight squeeze due to war expenditure, to more confidently host the forthcoming summit of South Asian nations at the 15th SAARC meet in Colombo. The demonstrated military strength of a leader always sends a stronger message than words. In his case it would show his determination to pursue military objective first, regardless of the subterranean rumblings about it among the international community.
The capture of Vidattalthivu and Iluppakadavai are hard earned victories that have come about not a day soon. Though Adampan was captured on May 8 after prolonged efforts to penetrate its satellite defences, obviously it was the breakthrough at Periyamadhu on the
eastern side that had enabled the security forces to speed up their offensive. The fact the offensive troops have kept up their momentum to secure Iluppakadavain, a well established LTTE location, in four days shows that the army is overcoming its past weakness of slowing down after every success.
Apparently the operational plans now had been reworked and better orchestrated than the half-hearted efforts that got bogged down for quite sometime around the Giant's Tank on the flank of Adampan last year.
Though 200 cadres of the LTTE managed to pull out of the Vidattalthivu base before the security forces took it over, the operation was a difficult one as it involved reducing well fortified defences built around the base with a network of defensive positions on three sides providing depth to it. This was the reason why its capture took so long as it involved reducing the satellite defensive positions on the south and east. No doubt the injection of additional troops of the newly raised 61 Division and the linking up of 57 and 58 Divisions had boosted the chances of success in the Vidattalthivu-Iluppakadavai offensive.
With these successes, not only the LTTE's clandestine logistic umbilical chord from Tamil Nadu coast is cut, but the manoeuvring space of the LTTE to switch troops from east to west and ability to coordinate operations on more than one front are also reduced. As against this, the security forces have now gained a decisive advantage with the linking up of forces operating on a wide front from the key road junction at Iluppakadavi to areas west of Mankulam on the A9 highway.
After the fall of Iluppakkadavai, the Nachchikuda LTTE base located 17 km further to the north becomes an important objective in the security forces offensive towards Pooneryn. Sea Tiger operations from Nachchikuda in tandem with Vidattalthivu had been a thorn in the flesh of Sri Lanka navy. The shallow waters of Vidattalthivu and the hundreds of Indian fishing boats in the vicinity had enabled the Sea Tiger boats to carry out sneak operations with little interference.
As the Sea Tigers would be handicapped after the fall of Vidattalthivu, the navy should be able to control if not totally curtail sea movement across Palk Bay and Nachikuda either towards island territories off Jaffna or to the Tamil Nadu coast. It would also help the navy in providing better support to its outposts and detachments operating along the coast from the Mannar salient to Delft island.
The land offensive building up against Nachchikuda might well turn out to be a combined army-navy operation. The offensive patrolling operations of coastal patrol vessels of the navy reported in the seas around Vidattalthivu and Nachchikuda on July 20 indicate the likelihood of greater naval involvement in operations against Nachchikuda and more importantly in Pooneryn later.
However, before Nachchikuda is taken the security forces will have to secure and consolidate their hold on line Vellankulam-Tunukkai-Malavi on the road branching off from A32 to Mankulam. (This would probably involve further advance on a broad front for about 4km.) In the present operational situation, the Mankulam-Vellankulam axis to the east of A32 provides perhaps the best opportunity for the LTTE to launch a counterattack to dislodge the security forces as they are stretched now with the rapid advance. So we can expect the 57 Division sector to the west of A9 road become active in the coming week.
The A32 provides an alternate route to Jaffna from Pooneryn across the Jaffna Bay. Pooneryn's location on the western flank of A9 road can bring the war closer to Kilinochchi. Even if Pooneryn is not captured, the successes of the security forces on A32 road have increased their options to further progress their offensive because they will be operating on a wide front with a choice of multiple thrust lines with the advantage of secure flanks.
In spite of the quick successes, Lt Gen Sarath Fonseka, the Army Commander is understandably cautious about the course of operations in the future. This is evident from the interview he had given to the Sunday Observer on July 20. His guarded approach had enabled him to carefully plan and conduct his operations probably at a time of his choosing. So he usually avoids coming up with rash promises on operations unlike some politicians. Perhaps he remembers that nearly a decade ago when the LTTE was not having so of much fire power, it had upstaged the Sri Lanka security forces in the same sector though they had scored initial successes. It is interesting to see despite the official claims of killing 9000 LTTE cadres in Eelam War-4 he still credits the LTTE with a strength of 5000, which appears to be a realistic assessment. This strength includes hardened elements as well as raw inexperienced and ill trained hands. How they fare against the armed forces will be seen in the coming weeks.
www.southasiaanalysis.org
The rapid progress of the Mannar offensive and its quick successes send clear signals of the intention of Sri Lanka President Mahinda Rajapaksa to fight the LTTE unto finish despite his recent statement in India about his readiness to talk to the LTTE. At best the statement was a palliative to mollify ruffled sentiments in India where the LTTE enjoys a love-hate relationship in Tamil Nadu. (And the scale still appears to be weighted against 'love'.)
The military victories should enable the President, who had been beleaguered by issues of high inflation, food shortages and financial tight squeeze due to war expenditure, to more confidently host the forthcoming summit of South Asian nations at the 15th SAARC meet in Colombo. The demonstrated military strength of a leader always sends a stronger message than words. In his case it would show his determination to pursue military objective first, regardless of the subterranean rumblings about it among the international community.
The capture of Vidattalthivu and Iluppakadavai are hard earned victories that have come about not a day soon. Though Adampan was captured on May 8 after prolonged efforts to penetrate its satellite defences, obviously it was the breakthrough at Periyamadhu on the
eastern side that had enabled the security forces to speed up their offensive. The fact the offensive troops have kept up their momentum to secure Iluppakadavain, a well established LTTE location, in four days shows that the army is overcoming its past weakness of slowing down after every success.
Apparently the operational plans now had been reworked and better orchestrated than the half-hearted efforts that got bogged down for quite sometime around the Giant's Tank on the flank of Adampan last year.
Though 200 cadres of the LTTE managed to pull out of the Vidattalthivu base before the security forces took it over, the operation was a difficult one as it involved reducing well fortified defences built around the base with a network of defensive positions on three sides providing depth to it. This was the reason why its capture took so long as it involved reducing the satellite defensive positions on the south and east. No doubt the injection of additional troops of the newly raised 61 Division and the linking up of 57 and 58 Divisions had boosted the chances of success in the Vidattalthivu-Iluppakadavai offensive.
With these successes, not only the LTTE's clandestine logistic umbilical chord from Tamil Nadu coast is cut, but the manoeuvring space of the LTTE to switch troops from east to west and ability to coordinate operations on more than one front are also reduced. As against this, the security forces have now gained a decisive advantage with the linking up of forces operating on a wide front from the key road junction at Iluppakadavi to areas west of Mankulam on the A9 highway.
After the fall of Iluppakkadavai, the Nachchikuda LTTE base located 17 km further to the north becomes an important objective in the security forces offensive towards Pooneryn. Sea Tiger operations from Nachchikuda in tandem with Vidattalthivu had been a thorn in the flesh of Sri Lanka navy. The shallow waters of Vidattalthivu and the hundreds of Indian fishing boats in the vicinity had enabled the Sea Tiger boats to carry out sneak operations with little interference.
As the Sea Tigers would be handicapped after the fall of Vidattalthivu, the navy should be able to control if not totally curtail sea movement across Palk Bay and Nachikuda either towards island territories off Jaffna or to the Tamil Nadu coast. It would also help the navy in providing better support to its outposts and detachments operating along the coast from the Mannar salient to Delft island.
The land offensive building up against Nachchikuda might well turn out to be a combined army-navy operation. The offensive patrolling operations of coastal patrol vessels of the navy reported in the seas around Vidattalthivu and Nachchikuda on July 20 indicate the likelihood of greater naval involvement in operations against Nachchikuda and more importantly in Pooneryn later.
However, before Nachchikuda is taken the security forces will have to secure and consolidate their hold on line Vellankulam-Tunukkai-Malavi on the road branching off from A32 to Mankulam. (This would probably involve further advance on a broad front for about 4km.) In the present operational situation, the Mankulam-Vellankulam axis to the east of A32 provides perhaps the best opportunity for the LTTE to launch a counterattack to dislodge the security forces as they are stretched now with the rapid advance. So we can expect the 57 Division sector to the west of A9 road become active in the coming week.
The A32 provides an alternate route to Jaffna from Pooneryn across the Jaffna Bay. Pooneryn's location on the western flank of A9 road can bring the war closer to Kilinochchi. Even if Pooneryn is not captured, the successes of the security forces on A32 road have increased their options to further progress their offensive because they will be operating on a wide front with a choice of multiple thrust lines with the advantage of secure flanks.
In spite of the quick successes, Lt Gen Sarath Fonseka, the Army Commander is understandably cautious about the course of operations in the future. This is evident from the interview he had given to the Sunday Observer on July 20. His guarded approach had enabled him to carefully plan and conduct his operations probably at a time of his choosing. So he usually avoids coming up with rash promises on operations unlike some politicians. Perhaps he remembers that nearly a decade ago when the LTTE was not having so of much fire power, it had upstaged the Sri Lanka security forces in the same sector though they had scored initial successes. It is interesting to see despite the official claims of killing 9000 LTTE cadres in Eelam War-4 he still credits the LTTE with a strength of 5000, which appears to be a realistic assessment. This strength includes hardened elements as well as raw inexperienced and ill trained hands. How they fare against the armed forces will be seen in the coming weeks.
www.southasiaanalysis.org
Sunday, July 13, 2008
Conventional and unconventional wars: The end of one and beginning of the other
by Rajan Philips
Sri Lanka’s supposedly most successful Army Commander has spoken. According to General Sarath Fonseka, the Tigers are finished as a conventional army, if not already, certainly by next year. He has also added the caveat that the LTTE will not be totally eliminated and that as an insurgent force it could go on forever, fuelled by Tamil nationalism and bankrolled by Tamil expatriates. As military declarations go, this one was rather cautious and guarded, quite unlike the “Mission Accomplished” bravado that President Bush mouthed off on the Iraq war and has been egg-faced ever since.
Even so, the cautious optimism of Sarath Fonseka is being questioned by objective observers – from the London Economist to Jane’s Defense Weekly (written by Iqbal Athas who appears to have been forced into mute mode in Colombo) among others. The difference between conventional and unconventional modes of war, according to Colonel Hariharan of Chennai, is that firepower is concentrated in the former while in the latter it is unleashed in “penny packets”. It should be obvious to any observer and all sufferers of Eelam wars over the last thirty years that the penny packets of violence have inflicted far greater havoc on our civilian populations and physical resources than the unleashing of concentrated firepower in territorial battlegrounds.
So there are question to be asked of those who make decisions to wage war and who support the war. What has been the net gain to the country in allegedly attenuating the LTTE as a conventional force while admitting that it will continue as unconventional insurgency forever? Are we marking the end of one mode of war while acknowledging the new beginning of an older mode? Are we resigned to being stuck in this vicious circle of wars, or are we mature enough as a people and a country to look for and find a political breakthrough?
Colonel Hariharan, a retired Indian officer who served in the IPKF and now writes highly credible military and political analysis of Sri Lankan affairs, has traced the sources of the LTTE’s conventional and unconventional warfare capabilities. The conventional capability is, says Hariharan, “an acquired skill egged on and abetted by skewed Sri Lankan political priorities and decisions.” The roots and sustenance of the unconventional warfare, on the other hand, are Tamil political grievances.
One dimensional presidency
It is fair to say that the LTTE’s conventional capability came about in spite of India and not because of India, the result of the most skewed of all Sri Lankan political decisions that got rid of the IPKF and frustrated the 13th Amendment. Although Hariharan avoids saying it, India certainly did have more than a hand in the development of the unconventional capability of not just the LTTE but every Tamil militant group that spawned during the 1980s. Arguably, India’s hand in that development was a botched forerunner to the currently controversial R2P paradigm.
Arguably as well, the LTTE’s conventional capability has been overplayed for opposite reasons both by LTTE supporters and their southern detractors. The former, the more loquacious of them, have apparently proclaimed that the matter of Eelam will be decided on the battlefield by the conventional armies of the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government. This assertion is now being used to justify the war efforts of Sri Lanka’s “militarily most successful President.” There could not be a more inadvertent indictment of President Rajapakse by one of his more glamorous beneficiaries – as a one dimensional President! The Economist has no need to be circumspect and has dubbed Rajapakse – ‘the war President.’
The notion of conventional force and possession of territory was used by the LTTE to pretend that it had arrived at the makings of a separate Tamil state and to insist on military parity with the Sri Lankan state. The army’s claim that the LTTE’s conventional capability has been destroyed will be used by the government to pretend that the unitary state has been protected and to insist that there will be no military parity with LTTE as a basis for future negotiations.
General Fonseka’s has gone a lot further and suggested that the LTTE’s conventional capability had to be defeated because the goal of the LTTE is not just to create Tamil Eelam in a part of Sri Lanka but to capture all of Sri Lanka. He apparently vowed: “we will not allow that at any cost, we will fight them.” The truth of the matter is that the LTTE has not been able to make sustainable gains through conventional battles to support anything more than a pretension of a separate sate. Even the occasionally dramatic LTTE battlefield victories have not been cumulatively consequential towards creating Tamil Eelam, let alone capturing the whole of Sri Lanka.
The General and the President appear to have a specific southern political reason to showcase their conventional warfare success. And that is to vindicate everything that they have done in the last three years to negate all the positive efforts of the last twenty (post-13th Amendment) years to address the Tamil and Muslim nationalist grievances. Just as President Premadasa tried to show that he had stood up to India unlike his more socially privileged predecessor (President Jayewardene), President Rajapakse appears to be showing that he is boldly calling the LTTE’s bluff while his Colombo-centric detractors (Kumaratunga and Wickremasinghe) were directly or indirectly appeasing the LTTE.
The upshots of the Premadasa / Rajapakse detours are also equally damning. President Premadasa’s actions contributed to LTTE graduating from an insurgent force to adopting the trappings of a conventional army. The war efforts of President Rajapakse may or may not have put the conventional genie of the LTTE in the bottle, but its unconventional genie, by General Fonseka’s own admission, will haunt Sri Lanka forever.
The only way out of this vicious circle is to stop pretending that Eelam is a serious option and that the unitary constitution is the only basis for a political solution. Equally, it is necessary to start realizing that the matter of Eelam will not be decided in the conventional battlefield or on the basis of military parity, but by enshrining political parity in a new constitutional arrangement and thereby rendering Eelam a redundant demand except for purposes of Tamil nationalist symbolism. This is the crux of our national problem.
And it can be resolved, as Martin McGuinness, the former IRA man turned Northern Ireland politician, said recently, “only at the negotiating table”. He went on to say: "Both the government and the Tamil Tigers believe that they can have more victories over each other possibly in advance of peace negotiations. I have to say, I think both the government and the Tamil Tigers are foolish if they believe that."
Sri Lanka’s supposedly most successful Army Commander has spoken. According to General Sarath Fonseka, the Tigers are finished as a conventional army, if not already, certainly by next year. He has also added the caveat that the LTTE will not be totally eliminated and that as an insurgent force it could go on forever, fuelled by Tamil nationalism and bankrolled by Tamil expatriates. As military declarations go, this one was rather cautious and guarded, quite unlike the “Mission Accomplished” bravado that President Bush mouthed off on the Iraq war and has been egg-faced ever since.
Even so, the cautious optimism of Sarath Fonseka is being questioned by objective observers – from the London Economist to Jane’s Defense Weekly (written by Iqbal Athas who appears to have been forced into mute mode in Colombo) among others. The difference between conventional and unconventional modes of war, according to Colonel Hariharan of Chennai, is that firepower is concentrated in the former while in the latter it is unleashed in “penny packets”. It should be obvious to any observer and all sufferers of Eelam wars over the last thirty years that the penny packets of violence have inflicted far greater havoc on our civilian populations and physical resources than the unleashing of concentrated firepower in territorial battlegrounds.
So there are question to be asked of those who make decisions to wage war and who support the war. What has been the net gain to the country in allegedly attenuating the LTTE as a conventional force while admitting that it will continue as unconventional insurgency forever? Are we marking the end of one mode of war while acknowledging the new beginning of an older mode? Are we resigned to being stuck in this vicious circle of wars, or are we mature enough as a people and a country to look for and find a political breakthrough?
Colonel Hariharan, a retired Indian officer who served in the IPKF and now writes highly credible military and political analysis of Sri Lankan affairs, has traced the sources of the LTTE’s conventional and unconventional warfare capabilities. The conventional capability is, says Hariharan, “an acquired skill egged on and abetted by skewed Sri Lankan political priorities and decisions.” The roots and sustenance of the unconventional warfare, on the other hand, are Tamil political grievances.
One dimensional presidency
It is fair to say that the LTTE’s conventional capability came about in spite of India and not because of India, the result of the most skewed of all Sri Lankan political decisions that got rid of the IPKF and frustrated the 13th Amendment. Although Hariharan avoids saying it, India certainly did have more than a hand in the development of the unconventional capability of not just the LTTE but every Tamil militant group that spawned during the 1980s. Arguably, India’s hand in that development was a botched forerunner to the currently controversial R2P paradigm.
Arguably as well, the LTTE’s conventional capability has been overplayed for opposite reasons both by LTTE supporters and their southern detractors. The former, the more loquacious of them, have apparently proclaimed that the matter of Eelam will be decided on the battlefield by the conventional armies of the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government. This assertion is now being used to justify the war efforts of Sri Lanka’s “militarily most successful President.” There could not be a more inadvertent indictment of President Rajapakse by one of his more glamorous beneficiaries – as a one dimensional President! The Economist has no need to be circumspect and has dubbed Rajapakse – ‘the war President.’
The notion of conventional force and possession of territory was used by the LTTE to pretend that it had arrived at the makings of a separate Tamil state and to insist on military parity with the Sri Lankan state. The army’s claim that the LTTE’s conventional capability has been destroyed will be used by the government to pretend that the unitary state has been protected and to insist that there will be no military parity with LTTE as a basis for future negotiations.
General Fonseka’s has gone a lot further and suggested that the LTTE’s conventional capability had to be defeated because the goal of the LTTE is not just to create Tamil Eelam in a part of Sri Lanka but to capture all of Sri Lanka. He apparently vowed: “we will not allow that at any cost, we will fight them.” The truth of the matter is that the LTTE has not been able to make sustainable gains through conventional battles to support anything more than a pretension of a separate sate. Even the occasionally dramatic LTTE battlefield victories have not been cumulatively consequential towards creating Tamil Eelam, let alone capturing the whole of Sri Lanka.
The General and the President appear to have a specific southern political reason to showcase their conventional warfare success. And that is to vindicate everything that they have done in the last three years to negate all the positive efforts of the last twenty (post-13th Amendment) years to address the Tamil and Muslim nationalist grievances. Just as President Premadasa tried to show that he had stood up to India unlike his more socially privileged predecessor (President Jayewardene), President Rajapakse appears to be showing that he is boldly calling the LTTE’s bluff while his Colombo-centric detractors (Kumaratunga and Wickremasinghe) were directly or indirectly appeasing the LTTE.
The upshots of the Premadasa / Rajapakse detours are also equally damning. President Premadasa’s actions contributed to LTTE graduating from an insurgent force to adopting the trappings of a conventional army. The war efforts of President Rajapakse may or may not have put the conventional genie of the LTTE in the bottle, but its unconventional genie, by General Fonseka’s own admission, will haunt Sri Lanka forever.
The only way out of this vicious circle is to stop pretending that Eelam is a serious option and that the unitary constitution is the only basis for a political solution. Equally, it is necessary to start realizing that the matter of Eelam will not be decided in the conventional battlefield or on the basis of military parity, but by enshrining political parity in a new constitutional arrangement and thereby rendering Eelam a redundant demand except for purposes of Tamil nationalist symbolism. This is the crux of our national problem.
And it can be resolved, as Martin McGuinness, the former IRA man turned Northern Ireland politician, said recently, “only at the negotiating table”. He went on to say: "Both the government and the Tamil Tigers believe that they can have more victories over each other possibly in advance of peace negotiations. I have to say, I think both the government and the Tamil Tigers are foolish if they believe that."
Friday, July 11, 2008
Sri Lanka: LTTE Fishing in Tamil Nadu Waters
The political chief of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) B Nadesan has been vocal in talking to the media ever since the election in the eastern province concluded. In these "medialogues" the LTTE's concern on the political and military developments taking place in Sri Lanka was evident. The successful implementation of the 13th amendment in the eastern province would pave way for restoration of peace and security there. And that would be political loss of face for the LTTE. (Fortunately for the LTTE, this does not appear to be happening with the required alacrity.)
In the two successive interviews in Indian media (to the populist Chennai Tamil weekly Kumudam and the other to the Times Now TV) Nadesan has touched upon developments in the India-Sri Lanka relations and in Tamil Nadu 'Eelam' politics. The reasons for this sudden LTTE interest in India and Tamil Nadu are not hard to understand.
The low profile visit of a high level Indian delegation that included the National Security Advisor M. K. Narayanan to Colombo last June gave rise to a lot of speculative stories. The visit ostensibly to discuss security and other issues connected with the forthcoming SAARC conference spawned stories of induction Indian troops and gun ships to Colombo for 'security cover.' The unconfirmed report ruffled the dovecotes (or is it hawk perch?) of anti-India lobby in Colombo, with the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) joining in to raise the decibel of protest against any such move.
To the LTTE, now beleaguered in the ever decreasing constricted domain in the north, the entry of Indian troops into Sri Lanka under any excuse would be bad news. The 'follow up visit' of Sri Lanka President Mahinda Rajapaksa to Delhi taking place now must have further added to LTTE's worry about India.
With a regime not friendly to the LTTE in power in Delhi, the LTTE had not been keen on India's intervention. That stand still appears to remain unchanged. In a Daily Mirror interview on June 12, 2008 Nadesan parried a pointed question on LTTE's stand on India playing a role as peace facilitator and spoke about India giving consistent support to the Norwegian facilitated peace process. He was only reiterating what other leaders of the LTTE had said in the past on the subject.
On the other hand, the LTTE appears to be evolving a strategy to kindle the interest of the people of Tamil Nadu in the Eelam war which had been lukewarm at best. With the parliamentary polls around the corner in India, in LTTE assessment probably this was the right time to revive the subject in Tamil. LTTE's idea was to enrolling the support of the people of Tamil Nadu to bring about a change in Indian policy on Tamil struggle (read LTTE). The LTTE ideologue V Balakumaran was the first to speak on this subject in recent times. In an Australian Tamil radio interview last month, Balakumaran while hoping India would change "its current policy towards us one day," said "we believe firmly, our strong cultural ties to our brothers and sisters in India will help their policy makers to select a just and fair path towards our people."
That inevitably brings the question of attitude of Tamil Nadu leaders towards the LTTE. The political fate of Tamil Nadu is decided by veteran leader of Dravida Munnetra Kazagham (DMK) M Karunanidhi now in power and J Jayalalitha, the supreme leader of the rival All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazagham (AIDMK) sitting in opposition. Karunanidhi had been distancing himself from the LTTE after it was involved in killing Rajiv Gandhi, the former Indian Prime Minister, near Chennai in 1991. It was probably his way of absolving his past espousal of the LTTE cause even as Indian troops were fighting them. But Rajiv killing ended in DMK electoral rout and the LTTE became an
untouchable.
The LTTE appears to be making a studied appeal to M Karunandhi to come to the help Eelam Tamils (read LTTE) now suffering in the Sri Lanka war. In the Kumudam interview, Nadesan was all praise for Karunanidhi. Describing him as a person "with love for Tamil language and a man with full of Tamil sentiments," he said he had a deep interest in the Eelam Tamil affairs. "As blood is thicker than water, seeing the despicable situation of Tamils in Eelam, he remains emotively firm [on this issue]. We fervently hope that the Kalaignar's personal emotions of would turn into the emotions of the great organization DMK and along with the other political parties in Tamil Nadu."
Nadesan further added that it was a mistake to say that Karunandihi was running an administration very strict on the LTTE because of the Central Government pressure. It seems the LTTE was prepared to grin and bear the past as far as Karunandihi was concerned. Nadesan made this clear when he said "Whatever said and done, it is not a wrong idea for us to expect that the Kalaingnar should consider beyond the borders of India's national as well as regional political confines, but it is important that he should come forward to help the liberation of the Eelam Tamils."
The LTTE probably does not want any other adverse issue related to the LTTE be raked up at this stage in Tamil Nadu. The most adverse issue is LTTE's assassination of Rajiv Gandhi. It is an indelible black mark on LTTE however much the LTTE acolytes may speak of hidden hands and plots. The issue suddenly came to the limelight a few months back when Mrs Priyanka Vadra, the daughter of Rajiv Gandhi had a low profile meeting with Nalini Murugan, who is completing a life term of imprisonment in Vellore prison for her role in the Rajiv Gandhi's murder. Her death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment at the intervention of Mrs Sonia Gandhi, the ruling Congress party president. Nalini has appealed for release from prison as she has completed 14
years of imprisonment.
Priyanka-Nalini meeting brought out the feeling of contrition in Nalini for her role in the black deed. According to media reports at that time, Nalini felt as if "all my sins have been washed off by Priyanka's visit... I feel she has pardoned me by calling on me at the prison... I am indebted to her all my life." This is hardly the image of an avenging killer fighting for the cause of Eelam. So when the TV interviewer raised the issue of Nalini's release, Nadesan said the release would 'recognise' the legitimate aspirations of Tamil people. "We firmly believe holistic changes will take place and Indian government will recognize the legitimate aspirations of Tamil people and their freedom struggle," he added.
The legitimate aspirations of Tamils are well recognised both in India and Tamil Nadu. It does not require the release of a person convicted of complicity in murdering an Indian leader who had great sympathy for the Tamil cause. And his memories still occupy a special place in Tamil Nadu. Nalini's release would only churn up more dirt on LTTE's deeds in Tamil Nadu which are already causing concern to law enforcing machinery.
In any case the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister has his cup full even without taking up the Eelam cause at the behest of the LTTE. The survival of the present ruling coalition in Delhi, where he wields a lot of influence, is at stake. There are reports of back end proxy skirmishes between his two sons to seek a place in the sun in the pecking order of succession. The rising prices of essentials are hitting the roof top after the petrol prices were hiked. And he will have to work out a fresh strategy for the parliamentary election to hold on to his coalition flock, after the Patali Makkal Katchi (PMK) a minor coalition partner broke away.
The AIADMK under Jayalalitha is flexing its biceps to take on the DMK in the parliamentary poll. If the Eelam issue is taken up by the DMK leader, the AIADMK chief well known for her anti-LTTE stance will strike back.
Past elections had shown that the time for the Eelam cause as a "vote catcher" in Tamil Nadu was over. The LTTE would do well to rethink its Tamil Nadu strategy. It should study and understand Balakumaran's advice in his radio interview. He said, "while support of the international community is necessary for achieving the goal of liberation, Tamil people should clearly understand that policies of the International community towards different nationalist struggles are often inconsistent and motivated by self-interest." So probably the LTTE has to plough its own furrow now, because support from India and Tamil Nadu will require a total change of its act.
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org
In the two successive interviews in Indian media (to the populist Chennai Tamil weekly Kumudam and the other to the Times Now TV) Nadesan has touched upon developments in the India-Sri Lanka relations and in Tamil Nadu 'Eelam' politics. The reasons for this sudden LTTE interest in India and Tamil Nadu are not hard to understand.
The low profile visit of a high level Indian delegation that included the National Security Advisor M. K. Narayanan to Colombo last June gave rise to a lot of speculative stories. The visit ostensibly to discuss security and other issues connected with the forthcoming SAARC conference spawned stories of induction Indian troops and gun ships to Colombo for 'security cover.' The unconfirmed report ruffled the dovecotes (or is it hawk perch?) of anti-India lobby in Colombo, with the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) joining in to raise the decibel of protest against any such move.
To the LTTE, now beleaguered in the ever decreasing constricted domain in the north, the entry of Indian troops into Sri Lanka under any excuse would be bad news. The 'follow up visit' of Sri Lanka President Mahinda Rajapaksa to Delhi taking place now must have further added to LTTE's worry about India.
With a regime not friendly to the LTTE in power in Delhi, the LTTE had not been keen on India's intervention. That stand still appears to remain unchanged. In a Daily Mirror interview on June 12, 2008 Nadesan parried a pointed question on LTTE's stand on India playing a role as peace facilitator and spoke about India giving consistent support to the Norwegian facilitated peace process. He was only reiterating what other leaders of the LTTE had said in the past on the subject.
On the other hand, the LTTE appears to be evolving a strategy to kindle the interest of the people of Tamil Nadu in the Eelam war which had been lukewarm at best. With the parliamentary polls around the corner in India, in LTTE assessment probably this was the right time to revive the subject in Tamil. LTTE's idea was to enrolling the support of the people of Tamil Nadu to bring about a change in Indian policy on Tamil struggle (read LTTE). The LTTE ideologue V Balakumaran was the first to speak on this subject in recent times. In an Australian Tamil radio interview last month, Balakumaran while hoping India would change "its current policy towards us one day," said "we believe firmly, our strong cultural ties to our brothers and sisters in India will help their policy makers to select a just and fair path towards our people."
That inevitably brings the question of attitude of Tamil Nadu leaders towards the LTTE. The political fate of Tamil Nadu is decided by veteran leader of Dravida Munnetra Kazagham (DMK) M Karunanidhi now in power and J Jayalalitha, the supreme leader of the rival All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazagham (AIDMK) sitting in opposition. Karunanidhi had been distancing himself from the LTTE after it was involved in killing Rajiv Gandhi, the former Indian Prime Minister, near Chennai in 1991. It was probably his way of absolving his past espousal of the LTTE cause even as Indian troops were fighting them. But Rajiv killing ended in DMK electoral rout and the LTTE became an
untouchable.
The LTTE appears to be making a studied appeal to M Karunandhi to come to the help Eelam Tamils (read LTTE) now suffering in the Sri Lanka war. In the Kumudam interview, Nadesan was all praise for Karunanidhi. Describing him as a person "with love for Tamil language and a man with full of Tamil sentiments," he said he had a deep interest in the Eelam Tamil affairs. "As blood is thicker than water, seeing the despicable situation of Tamils in Eelam, he remains emotively firm [on this issue]. We fervently hope that the Kalaignar's personal emotions of would turn into the emotions of the great organization DMK and along with the other political parties in Tamil Nadu."
Nadesan further added that it was a mistake to say that Karunandihi was running an administration very strict on the LTTE because of the Central Government pressure. It seems the LTTE was prepared to grin and bear the past as far as Karunandihi was concerned. Nadesan made this clear when he said "Whatever said and done, it is not a wrong idea for us to expect that the Kalaingnar should consider beyond the borders of India's national as well as regional political confines, but it is important that he should come forward to help the liberation of the Eelam Tamils."
The LTTE probably does not want any other adverse issue related to the LTTE be raked up at this stage in Tamil Nadu. The most adverse issue is LTTE's assassination of Rajiv Gandhi. It is an indelible black mark on LTTE however much the LTTE acolytes may speak of hidden hands and plots. The issue suddenly came to the limelight a few months back when Mrs Priyanka Vadra, the daughter of Rajiv Gandhi had a low profile meeting with Nalini Murugan, who is completing a life term of imprisonment in Vellore prison for her role in the Rajiv Gandhi's murder. Her death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment at the intervention of Mrs Sonia Gandhi, the ruling Congress party president. Nalini has appealed for release from prison as she has completed 14
years of imprisonment.
Priyanka-Nalini meeting brought out the feeling of contrition in Nalini for her role in the black deed. According to media reports at that time, Nalini felt as if "all my sins have been washed off by Priyanka's visit... I feel she has pardoned me by calling on me at the prison... I am indebted to her all my life." This is hardly the image of an avenging killer fighting for the cause of Eelam. So when the TV interviewer raised the issue of Nalini's release, Nadesan said the release would 'recognise' the legitimate aspirations of Tamil people. "We firmly believe holistic changes will take place and Indian government will recognize the legitimate aspirations of Tamil people and their freedom struggle," he added.
The legitimate aspirations of Tamils are well recognised both in India and Tamil Nadu. It does not require the release of a person convicted of complicity in murdering an Indian leader who had great sympathy for the Tamil cause. And his memories still occupy a special place in Tamil Nadu. Nalini's release would only churn up more dirt on LTTE's deeds in Tamil Nadu which are already causing concern to law enforcing machinery.
In any case the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister has his cup full even without taking up the Eelam cause at the behest of the LTTE. The survival of the present ruling coalition in Delhi, where he wields a lot of influence, is at stake. There are reports of back end proxy skirmishes between his two sons to seek a place in the sun in the pecking order of succession. The rising prices of essentials are hitting the roof top after the petrol prices were hiked. And he will have to work out a fresh strategy for the parliamentary election to hold on to his coalition flock, after the Patali Makkal Katchi (PMK) a minor coalition partner broke away.
The AIADMK under Jayalalitha is flexing its biceps to take on the DMK in the parliamentary poll. If the Eelam issue is taken up by the DMK leader, the AIADMK chief well known for her anti-LTTE stance will strike back.
Past elections had shown that the time for the Eelam cause as a "vote catcher" in Tamil Nadu was over. The LTTE would do well to rethink its Tamil Nadu strategy. It should study and understand Balakumaran's advice in his radio interview. He said, "while support of the international community is necessary for achieving the goal of liberation, Tamil people should clearly understand that policies of the International community towards different nationalist struggles are often inconsistent and motivated by self-interest." So probably the LTTE has to plough its own furrow now, because support from India and Tamil Nadu will require a total change of its act.
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org
Sri Lanka: Future of Karuna, The Reluctant Rebel
Vinayagamoorthi Muralitharan, better known as Karuna Amman, the dreaded leader of Batticaloa during his days in the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), must be a chastened man as he was flown into Colombo escorted by British security men on July 3, 2008. His return to Sri Lanka brings to a close the episode of his ill fated trip to the UK under a false identity that saw him sentenced to imprisonment by a London court in January 2008.
But Karuna appears to have embarked upon another uneasy episode – his future prospects in what is purported to be the 'liberated' eastern province, where his former aide S. Chandrakanthan is ruling the roost as the chief minister of the Eastern Provincial Council.
Life had never been smooth for Karuna ever since he broke away from the LTTE in March 2004. Firstly, he had to marshal the LTTE cadres who had followed him to safety and organise them into a political body. At the same time they had to retain their weapons to survive the wrath of LTTE. He formed the Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP) as a political party of sorts, though he appeared unclear to take it further ahead. At the same time he had to go underground to survive the LTTE supari(contract) on his head. In the course of the survival struggle, the LTTE killed many of close followers including his
brother Reggie.
He had to wage another struggle for survival when both the major parties - the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and the United National Party (UNP) – wanted to disown him when the LTTE accused them of duplicity for engineering Karuna's defection. Only the security forces stood by Karuna and he had no choice but to survive at the pleasure of Military Intelligence and the army. Politically, there was a lot of suspicion about his role. Initially he gained some credit by sending back a large number of young cadres recruited by him during the LTTE days from the east to their homes.
Later Karuna and his followers were accused of being involved in kidnappings and killings, and the clamour for disarming his troops became louder. Luckily for him, in 2005 the TMVP became valuable allies when the army launched its operations in the east. At the same time, there was a deliberate attempt to ensure that Karuna does not
become too big for his boots. As the security forces progressively captured more and more territory in the east, the contribution of the TMVP cadres to the military successes was either played down or ignored.
International NGOs had orchestrated a campaign to take Karuna and his cadres to task on charges of kidnappings, recruitment of children and other human rights violations. They accused of the collusion of the government with the TMVP in such acts and this became a major source of embarrassment to the government. When the issue was repeatedly taken up by the EU members, and at the UN, the government probably thought it was time to jettison Karuna to ward off complaints of inaction on humanitarian violations. The decision to promote the TMVP minus Karuna as a political entity and ally of the ruling coalition was probably taken at that point of time.
Karuna's reluctance to play a major political role probably came in handy to pick up his protégé S. Chandrakanthan (Pillaiyan) to stage a palace coup of sorts to take over the TMVP. Apparently Karuna was packed off to the UK under a cover identity on a diplomatic passport to keep the government association with him off the limelight. Though this effort appears to have only succeeded in buying time, it did take the heat off both the government and the TMVP. It enabled the TMVP to gain recognition as a political entity to contest the eastern provincial council elections. The success of the ruling alliance with the TMVP as a major partner in the EPC elections that followed is
history.
In this entire tale of intrigues, killings, violence, backroom deals and politicking, a few things stand out:
• Reluctance of Karuna to play a major role in Tamil politics unlike Chandrakanthan (who has less experience both as a militant and as a leader of the same calibre as Karuna). Karuna's reluctance might be rooted in his pessimism about the future of both the current Colombo dispensation and the LTTE's survival as a strong entity. So he might wait and watch for the outcome of the war to make up his mind on his future role.
• His desire to be with his family in London appears to have made his heart overrule the head when he decided to go to the UK incognito. The unhappy experience of his visit probably has burnt the boats for his future visits to the UK (though stranger things have happened in international diplomacy). So this latent desire to be with his family might dictate his future course of action to seek a safe third country refuge.
• Karuna's utility for the TMVP and its UPFA ally remains only if he keeps a low profile. To this end Karuna's benign presence as a figurehead of the TMVP could be a possible way out for the time being. Chandrakanthan in his comments after Karuna's return has indicated that he would not be averse to defer to Karuna's "continued leadership." Probably this arrangement would suit Karuna also at present.
• Though sections of Sinhala and Muslim polity (and laughably, even the Tamil National Alliance) would like to get at Karuna for his past involvement in the LTTE massacres of the innocent in the east, it is doubtful whether the state would take any action. Such precipitate action now could send wrong signals to other former LTTE cadres, including Pillaiyan, who are now cooperating with the ruling coalition. So we may expect the government to take no follow up action on the calls from the Amnesty International and the Human Rights Watch on this count. Such action could also trigger calls for similar action against the security forces personnel involved in humanitarian violations. That could be too embarrassing for the government as it would like to avoid any move to upset the upbeat mood of the armed forces right now.
Way back on November 11, 2004 in an article titled "Karuna in a no win situation" (available at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers12%5Cpaper1165.html ), this
author while examining the problems of Karuna's emergence as a political leader, had said: "It is not easy for militant leaders like Prabhakaran and Karuna to transform themselves into political leaders; this is a major reason why peace is eluding in Sri Lanka. Running a political party needs a political vision just as conducting a military operation requires military strategy and a physical goal. Political leadership needs situational leadership skills such as flexibility in approach, ability to mould themselves to people and places, accepting diversity, and excellent communication skills that appeal to both the common man and the intellectual. So it is not always true that military leaders make good political leaders. Prabhakaran has the frontline support of political leaders like Anton Balasingham and Tamilselvan who can interface with not only other national leaders but also with international personalities.
Karuna has to establish his credibility in this regard if he has to make headway and find acceptance as a political leader, not only with the Tamil people of the East but also with other political leaders of Sri Lanka, particularly in the UNP and SLFP alliance and its partners. As of now he appears to be lacking in this ability."
Karuna's subdued political role so far appears to justify the above assessment. Can he break out of this mould? The answer to the question probably lies with Karuna, because he only can decide what he wants to be. At present he does not appear to have made up his mind. A few external change agents could nudge him in this process. These include drastic reduction in the LTTE's overall military capability (or on the flip side, scaling up of the LTTE activity in the east of which there are some stray indications), and the continued usefulness of the Chandrakanthan-led TMVP to President Rajapaksa's political scheme of things. Such developments would increase Karuna's value as a leader in the east. Needless to say, for all this Karuna has to survive the machinations of LTTE's elephantine memory.
July 7, 2008
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org
But Karuna appears to have embarked upon another uneasy episode – his future prospects in what is purported to be the 'liberated' eastern province, where his former aide S. Chandrakanthan is ruling the roost as the chief minister of the Eastern Provincial Council.
Life had never been smooth for Karuna ever since he broke away from the LTTE in March 2004. Firstly, he had to marshal the LTTE cadres who had followed him to safety and organise them into a political body. At the same time they had to retain their weapons to survive the wrath of LTTE. He formed the Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP) as a political party of sorts, though he appeared unclear to take it further ahead. At the same time he had to go underground to survive the LTTE supari(contract) on his head. In the course of the survival struggle, the LTTE killed many of close followers including his
brother Reggie.
He had to wage another struggle for survival when both the major parties - the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and the United National Party (UNP) – wanted to disown him when the LTTE accused them of duplicity for engineering Karuna's defection. Only the security forces stood by Karuna and he had no choice but to survive at the pleasure of Military Intelligence and the army. Politically, there was a lot of suspicion about his role. Initially he gained some credit by sending back a large number of young cadres recruited by him during the LTTE days from the east to their homes.
Later Karuna and his followers were accused of being involved in kidnappings and killings, and the clamour for disarming his troops became louder. Luckily for him, in 2005 the TMVP became valuable allies when the army launched its operations in the east. At the same time, there was a deliberate attempt to ensure that Karuna does not
become too big for his boots. As the security forces progressively captured more and more territory in the east, the contribution of the TMVP cadres to the military successes was either played down or ignored.
International NGOs had orchestrated a campaign to take Karuna and his cadres to task on charges of kidnappings, recruitment of children and other human rights violations. They accused of the collusion of the government with the TMVP in such acts and this became a major source of embarrassment to the government. When the issue was repeatedly taken up by the EU members, and at the UN, the government probably thought it was time to jettison Karuna to ward off complaints of inaction on humanitarian violations. The decision to promote the TMVP minus Karuna as a political entity and ally of the ruling coalition was probably taken at that point of time.
Karuna's reluctance to play a major political role probably came in handy to pick up his protégé S. Chandrakanthan (Pillaiyan) to stage a palace coup of sorts to take over the TMVP. Apparently Karuna was packed off to the UK under a cover identity on a diplomatic passport to keep the government association with him off the limelight. Though this effort appears to have only succeeded in buying time, it did take the heat off both the government and the TMVP. It enabled the TMVP to gain recognition as a political entity to contest the eastern provincial council elections. The success of the ruling alliance with the TMVP as a major partner in the EPC elections that followed is
history.
In this entire tale of intrigues, killings, violence, backroom deals and politicking, a few things stand out:
• Reluctance of Karuna to play a major role in Tamil politics unlike Chandrakanthan (who has less experience both as a militant and as a leader of the same calibre as Karuna). Karuna's reluctance might be rooted in his pessimism about the future of both the current Colombo dispensation and the LTTE's survival as a strong entity. So he might wait and watch for the outcome of the war to make up his mind on his future role.
• His desire to be with his family in London appears to have made his heart overrule the head when he decided to go to the UK incognito. The unhappy experience of his visit probably has burnt the boats for his future visits to the UK (though stranger things have happened in international diplomacy). So this latent desire to be with his family might dictate his future course of action to seek a safe third country refuge.
• Karuna's utility for the TMVP and its UPFA ally remains only if he keeps a low profile. To this end Karuna's benign presence as a figurehead of the TMVP could be a possible way out for the time being. Chandrakanthan in his comments after Karuna's return has indicated that he would not be averse to defer to Karuna's "continued leadership." Probably this arrangement would suit Karuna also at present.
• Though sections of Sinhala and Muslim polity (and laughably, even the Tamil National Alliance) would like to get at Karuna for his past involvement in the LTTE massacres of the innocent in the east, it is doubtful whether the state would take any action. Such precipitate action now could send wrong signals to other former LTTE cadres, including Pillaiyan, who are now cooperating with the ruling coalition. So we may expect the government to take no follow up action on the calls from the Amnesty International and the Human Rights Watch on this count. Such action could also trigger calls for similar action against the security forces personnel involved in humanitarian violations. That could be too embarrassing for the government as it would like to avoid any move to upset the upbeat mood of the armed forces right now.
Way back on November 11, 2004 in an article titled "Karuna in a no win situation" (available at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers12%5Cpaper1165.html ), this
author while examining the problems of Karuna's emergence as a political leader, had said: "It is not easy for militant leaders like Prabhakaran and Karuna to transform themselves into political leaders; this is a major reason why peace is eluding in Sri Lanka. Running a political party needs a political vision just as conducting a military operation requires military strategy and a physical goal. Political leadership needs situational leadership skills such as flexibility in approach, ability to mould themselves to people and places, accepting diversity, and excellent communication skills that appeal to both the common man and the intellectual. So it is not always true that military leaders make good political leaders. Prabhakaran has the frontline support of political leaders like Anton Balasingham and Tamilselvan who can interface with not only other national leaders but also with international personalities.
Karuna has to establish his credibility in this regard if he has to make headway and find acceptance as a political leader, not only with the Tamil people of the East but also with other political leaders of Sri Lanka, particularly in the UNP and SLFP alliance and its partners. As of now he appears to be lacking in this ability."
Karuna's subdued political role so far appears to justify the above assessment. Can he break out of this mould? The answer to the question probably lies with Karuna, because he only can decide what he wants to be. At present he does not appear to have made up his mind. A few external change agents could nudge him in this process. These include drastic reduction in the LTTE's overall military capability (or on the flip side, scaling up of the LTTE activity in the east of which there are some stray indications), and the continued usefulness of the Chandrakanthan-led TMVP to President Rajapaksa's political scheme of things. Such developments would increase Karuna's value as a leader in the east. Needless to say, for all this Karuna has to survive the machinations of LTTE's elephantine memory.
July 7, 2008
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org
Wednesday, July 2, 2008
Analysis of Sri Lanka Military Situation
Years back when I was a young officer in the Regiment of Artillery, our regiment moved from New Mal in Eastern India to Deolali in Western India. On the day of our departure we trooped into the railway station with our trucks, baggage, stores and all the men at 6 am in the morning. Our special train was scheduled to leave at 11 am. We sweated in the heat in the roofless station but the train earmarked for us was nowhere in sight. The hapless station master could do nothing. Around one pm we were informed the train would be placed by 5 pm. It came at 7 pm and we were kept busy loading it for next three hours because we were told the train would leave by 10 pm. But it did not even stir when the clock struck twelve.
I was the train duty officer and ran around trying to find the railway staff that had vanished. Around 12 am I collared the station master in his house. “The train is ready for a long time to leave, sir,” he said. I was furious; “then why doesn’t it leave,” I thundered brimming with military efficiency. He walked over to the station and told me, “sir, train is there, but power has not come.” My uni-polar military brain could not understand the term ‘power’. “What ‘power’ do you mean?” I asked. He said “sir, you call it the engine, we call it power - the one that pulls the coaches, that has not arrived.” By the time ‘power’ came, a new dawn was on the horizon and we reached our destination two days late.
That small real life experience comes to mind when we look at the current military situation in the Eelam War-4. The military developments are in some order, just as political developments are in disorder.
Sri Lanka security forces made the strategic link up in the north between 57 and 58 divisions, capturing a large chunk of the territory between A32 Mannar-Pooneryn highway fromt and the A9 Kandy-Jaffna highway. It is no mean achievement for any army, considering that this was achieved in three weeks time, after a few bloody battles and loss of quite a few human lives. For the Sri Lankan army it is a creditable achievement showing how a learning army can overcome its own past shortcomings and reach new levels of operational efficiency. The strategic link up, if held, could block the free transportation of LTTE supplies smuggled from India arriving at the Mannar coast either eastwards or northwards movement along the A32 highway. It also provides launching pads for Sri Lankan offensives to wrest Vidathaltivu and later Pooneryn.
And the army should be able to hold on to the gains, considering that two divisions plus the newly raised 61 Division are there to defend. It is doubtful whether the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) still retain the capability to launch a sizeable conventional strike to dislodge the army form their gains. The arithmetic of force levels is against the LTTE and probably it would rather reinforce its Wanni defences and safeguard the line Pooneryn-Elephant Pass-Kilinochchi- Puthukudiyiruppu than deplete its forces in launching a counterattack.
Sri Lanka Army Commander Lt Gen Sarath Fonseka vocalised the recent achievements of the security forces while speaking to foreign correspondents recently. “The LTTE has lost the capability of fighting as a conventional army. Although they are (still) fighting us, they (are) not in the same manner as was in the past. That type of resistance is not there anymore.”
Does that mean the ‘final military victory’ over the LTTE is around the corner? The Army Commander was more realistic. He said that though the LTTE's fighting capabilities was badly weakened, it would take another one year or so “to completely defeat them militarily.” He summed up the assessment saying, “I am sure the LTTE will totally lose even their present capability in less than one year. Then they will resort to a totally different type of tactic” So what the LTTE has lost is its proactive conventional operational capability. And that is undoubtedly a plus point for the security forces because they have the military initiative in the war from now onwards.
To the man fighting the insurgents, the only difference between the two kinds of warfare is that firepower is concentrated in conventional war, while it comes in penny packets in unconventional war. But bullets remain equally deadly in both kinds of warfare. This was dramatically illustrated yesterday when some extremist element shot at the Bell 412 helicopter while it was returning after flying in the President in Amparai. The LTTE in that area was driven away more than a year ago. Fortunately, the helicopter managed to land safely though its fuel tank was punctured by bullet fire.
But what the General said in the course of the interview on the on the ‘overall plan’ of his forces was a little disturbing. “We do not just go for terrains, but we go for the kill. This is the difference between the military operations in the past and the present,” he said. The laudable military achievements need to be put in the overall perspective. Was the LTTE’s military capability the only issue that had dragged the nation into war with its own population for the last three decades?
Far from it; as long as there is Tamil population outside the fold of good governance in Kilinochchi, Mullaitivu and parts of Vavuniya and Jaffna districts, even if the LTTE loses its conventional capability, every year it should be able to muster 1000 to 2000 recruits by coercion or otherwise. The LTTE’s conventional capability is an acquired skill egged on and abetted by skewed Sri Lankan political priorities and decisions. Unlike that the LTTE’s unconventional war capability is rooted in the grievance of the Tamil population. It does not matter whether others feel these grievances exist or not. And definitely it is not due to international conspiracy as dubbed by some Sri Lankans.
How does the LTTE sustain the ability to wage unconventional war? It is because the government has not given the Tamil population a feeling of security and trust in the present dispensation. The slogan ‘Freeing the Tamils from the LTTE yoke’ (as the government media proclaims) alone will not gain their trust if the they feel that they are being saddled with another yoke! This lack of trust and feeling of insecurity among them cannot vanish as long as white van operations continue, media is muzzled, inquiries into illegal killings become political soap operas, and indefinite incarcerations without trials go on as before. These actions are not done by international NGOs or friendly foreign powers as it is made out for political convenience. Most of such actions are taken such loose cannons operating within the system to score political brownie points rather than solve problems.
Many Tamils feel that every action to empower them with all the good intentions is undone by backroom operations. Two glaring examples of lack of political sincerity are the half hearted implementation of the 13th amendment and the ‘non working’ of the APRC – the all party committee - constituted for evolving an acceptable formulation of devolution. The 13th amendment has a lot of lacunae for the elected provincial government to exercise its powers; the government agents do not come under it, it has little powers to collect any form of revenue, and it has policing as a subject but has no control over the police force (the DIG Northeast works under Colombo). It cannot even organize and control water supply for the people. Added to this is a general reluctance to implement even its limited articulation of power. So merely installing a Tamil chief minister in the east is not going to make the problem vanish. It requires hard decisions to empower the population. And there is no sign of anyone in authority seriously considering this.
As regards the APRC, there is nothing much to show. After a lengthy and very eloquent dialogue process, with all the inputs of wise men, its only practical achievement is its recommendation for the implementation of the existing 13th amendment of the constitution. And beyond that, there appears to be nothing on its cards except the travel bills accumulated on tours of the committee members to study how the devolution process has been achieved in other countries. Is this status going to change? Sadly, there is no sign of any other initiative.
Mahatma Gandhi’s description of Sir Stafford Cripp’s Mission in 1942 as the 'post-dated cheque on a failing bank,' appears apt for the current situation in Sri Lanka. The government in Sri Lanka regardless of its composition or ideology has to create a sense of security and trust among the minorities. And this is not going to come on its own by military victory over the LTTE alone. The security forces can only do so much. The government has to act to make use of the opportunities provided by military victories. The Tamils have to feel the ‘power’ to take them to new places, like my own military experience taught me when we moved our regiment by train.
www.southasiaanalysis.org
I was the train duty officer and ran around trying to find the railway staff that had vanished. Around 12 am I collared the station master in his house. “The train is ready for a long time to leave, sir,” he said. I was furious; “then why doesn’t it leave,” I thundered brimming with military efficiency. He walked over to the station and told me, “sir, train is there, but power has not come.” My uni-polar military brain could not understand the term ‘power’. “What ‘power’ do you mean?” I asked. He said “sir, you call it the engine, we call it power - the one that pulls the coaches, that has not arrived.” By the time ‘power’ came, a new dawn was on the horizon and we reached our destination two days late.
That small real life experience comes to mind when we look at the current military situation in the Eelam War-4. The military developments are in some order, just as political developments are in disorder.
Sri Lanka security forces made the strategic link up in the north between 57 and 58 divisions, capturing a large chunk of the territory between A32 Mannar-Pooneryn highway fromt and the A9 Kandy-Jaffna highway. It is no mean achievement for any army, considering that this was achieved in three weeks time, after a few bloody battles and loss of quite a few human lives. For the Sri Lankan army it is a creditable achievement showing how a learning army can overcome its own past shortcomings and reach new levels of operational efficiency. The strategic link up, if held, could block the free transportation of LTTE supplies smuggled from India arriving at the Mannar coast either eastwards or northwards movement along the A32 highway. It also provides launching pads for Sri Lankan offensives to wrest Vidathaltivu and later Pooneryn.
And the army should be able to hold on to the gains, considering that two divisions plus the newly raised 61 Division are there to defend. It is doubtful whether the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) still retain the capability to launch a sizeable conventional strike to dislodge the army form their gains. The arithmetic of force levels is against the LTTE and probably it would rather reinforce its Wanni defences and safeguard the line Pooneryn-Elephant Pass-Kilinochchi- Puthukudiyiruppu than deplete its forces in launching a counterattack.
Sri Lanka Army Commander Lt Gen Sarath Fonseka vocalised the recent achievements of the security forces while speaking to foreign correspondents recently. “The LTTE has lost the capability of fighting as a conventional army. Although they are (still) fighting us, they (are) not in the same manner as was in the past. That type of resistance is not there anymore.”
Does that mean the ‘final military victory’ over the LTTE is around the corner? The Army Commander was more realistic. He said that though the LTTE's fighting capabilities was badly weakened, it would take another one year or so “to completely defeat them militarily.” He summed up the assessment saying, “I am sure the LTTE will totally lose even their present capability in less than one year. Then they will resort to a totally different type of tactic” So what the LTTE has lost is its proactive conventional operational capability. And that is undoubtedly a plus point for the security forces because they have the military initiative in the war from now onwards.
To the man fighting the insurgents, the only difference between the two kinds of warfare is that firepower is concentrated in conventional war, while it comes in penny packets in unconventional war. But bullets remain equally deadly in both kinds of warfare. This was dramatically illustrated yesterday when some extremist element shot at the Bell 412 helicopter while it was returning after flying in the President in Amparai. The LTTE in that area was driven away more than a year ago. Fortunately, the helicopter managed to land safely though its fuel tank was punctured by bullet fire.
But what the General said in the course of the interview on the on the ‘overall plan’ of his forces was a little disturbing. “We do not just go for terrains, but we go for the kill. This is the difference between the military operations in the past and the present,” he said. The laudable military achievements need to be put in the overall perspective. Was the LTTE’s military capability the only issue that had dragged the nation into war with its own population for the last three decades?
Far from it; as long as there is Tamil population outside the fold of good governance in Kilinochchi, Mullaitivu and parts of Vavuniya and Jaffna districts, even if the LTTE loses its conventional capability, every year it should be able to muster 1000 to 2000 recruits by coercion or otherwise. The LTTE’s conventional capability is an acquired skill egged on and abetted by skewed Sri Lankan political priorities and decisions. Unlike that the LTTE’s unconventional war capability is rooted in the grievance of the Tamil population. It does not matter whether others feel these grievances exist or not. And definitely it is not due to international conspiracy as dubbed by some Sri Lankans.
How does the LTTE sustain the ability to wage unconventional war? It is because the government has not given the Tamil population a feeling of security and trust in the present dispensation. The slogan ‘Freeing the Tamils from the LTTE yoke’ (as the government media proclaims) alone will not gain their trust if the they feel that they are being saddled with another yoke! This lack of trust and feeling of insecurity among them cannot vanish as long as white van operations continue, media is muzzled, inquiries into illegal killings become political soap operas, and indefinite incarcerations without trials go on as before. These actions are not done by international NGOs or friendly foreign powers as it is made out for political convenience. Most of such actions are taken such loose cannons operating within the system to score political brownie points rather than solve problems.
Many Tamils feel that every action to empower them with all the good intentions is undone by backroom operations. Two glaring examples of lack of political sincerity are the half hearted implementation of the 13th amendment and the ‘non working’ of the APRC – the all party committee - constituted for evolving an acceptable formulation of devolution. The 13th amendment has a lot of lacunae for the elected provincial government to exercise its powers; the government agents do not come under it, it has little powers to collect any form of revenue, and it has policing as a subject but has no control over the police force (the DIG Northeast works under Colombo). It cannot even organize and control water supply for the people. Added to this is a general reluctance to implement even its limited articulation of power. So merely installing a Tamil chief minister in the east is not going to make the problem vanish. It requires hard decisions to empower the population. And there is no sign of anyone in authority seriously considering this.
As regards the APRC, there is nothing much to show. After a lengthy and very eloquent dialogue process, with all the inputs of wise men, its only practical achievement is its recommendation for the implementation of the existing 13th amendment of the constitution. And beyond that, there appears to be nothing on its cards except the travel bills accumulated on tours of the committee members to study how the devolution process has been achieved in other countries. Is this status going to change? Sadly, there is no sign of any other initiative.
Mahatma Gandhi’s description of Sir Stafford Cripp’s Mission in 1942 as the 'post-dated cheque on a failing bank,' appears apt for the current situation in Sri Lanka. The government in Sri Lanka regardless of its composition or ideology has to create a sense of security and trust among the minorities. And this is not going to come on its own by military victory over the LTTE alone. The security forces can only do so much. The government has to act to make use of the opportunities provided by military victories. The Tamils have to feel the ‘power’ to take them to new places, like my own military experience taught me when we moved our regiment by train.
www.southasiaanalysis.org
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