Tuesday, February 26, 2008

Kosovo & LTTE Separatism

(February 25, Colombo – Chennai, Sri Lanka Guardian) Kosovo is no more a part of Serbia and has become a free state. Nation after nation have begun to recognize this new status. This development has become a popular news story throughout the world and questions have begun about how this would influence various liberation movements, and in the case of Sri Lanka, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam.

Nilantha Ilangamuwa set his task to get a cross-section of views from experts in various parts of the world particularly concerned with liberation movements. How did Kosovo achieve this status?

Here we present what Col R. Hariharan shared with the Sri Lanka Guardian.

Questions:
What do you think declared of independence (UDI) by Kosovo from Serbia? How is it an influence to other guerilla movements, who are seeking separate state such as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)?

Answer:
Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence is all together different in nuance and content from the demand for Tamil Eelam by sections of Tamil polity and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).

The evolution of the word balkanisation relating to this volatile region of erstwhile Yugoslavia indicates the instability and shifting tectonic relationship between Serbs, Croats, Bosnians, Slovanians and Kosovan Albanians in the Balkans for centuries. There are religious, racial, linguistic and cultural differences between these communities occupying this region. Chauvinism of different varieties is endemic to this region.Global powers in different centuries have played upon these differences to create constituencies for themselves for their imperial aims. Kosovo independence is only yet another manifestation of this with the US and the NATO powers ranged on one side and the Russians on the other.

The German conquest of this region in the World War II and the fight against it by the nationalists united under Tito gave him a national leader a status. This led to the creation of a united Yugoslavian state once again under him. Marshall Tito, though a Croat, was able to rule the whole country as one united entity by virtue of his personality and ruthless style of Communist leadership. When he fell out with the Soviet Union, he used the cold war rivalries to survive and keep his Communist regime in power. After he died the unity wrought by monolithic control collapsed and Yugoslavia broke up into smaller states. The break up of the Soviet Union and the emergence of new republics in the same region almost coincided with the disintegration of Yugoslav state.

The two major countries among Balkan states Serbia and Croatia have different religions (Orthodox and Catholic respectively) and languages (written in different scripts) with historical affinities with Russia and Germany respectively. Being the two major power blocs in the erstwhile Yugoslavia their assertion of power came to a boil when Serb leader Mlasevic came to power. Mlasevic considered Serbia as the legitimate successor of Yugoslavia, fostered Serbian chauvinism.

It was in this scene, the Albanians majority in Kosovo decided to fight Serbian authority and launched the struggle for independence. Mlasevic’s ruthless use of force to put down the Kosovans fight for their identity and pogroms carried out against them kindled worldwide sympathy for Kosovo. When the UN Security Council did not accept the recommendation for its independence in 1997, the NATO countries and the US used their forces to bombard Serbia relentlessly so that it was forced to accept UN presence to govern Kosovo in an interim arrangement in 1999.

The Kosovo declaration of independence has neither UN mandate nor approval. The UDI is not likely to be accepted by many countries because it is outside the ambit of UN process. Many nations which have internal separatist insurgencies fear their recognition of Kosovo would set precedence for similar demands in their countries. Such nations also include some members of the EU like Spain. However as Kosovo has the presence of EU troops under UN umbrella it could succeed in surviving thanks to the support of the US and some of the important members of the EU. Within the Security Council it is doubtful whether it would ever be approved. So its anomalous existence is likely to continue.

It is difficult to predict how the UDI of Kosovo would affect the fate of other insurgency movements because they have diverse agenda, background, and operational environments in societies different from the Europe. Some like the Kurdish insurgency has trans-national character involving more than one nation. Some others like the Baloch in Pakistan have regional and tribal grievances. In Kashmir most of the insurgent groups do not have independence as the goal.

This applies to the LTTE struggle also. The Tamils have a long history of living alongside Sinhala population. Till 1973 there had never been any Tamil insurgency to form a united Tamil nation. Otherwise, with Tamil Nadu across the sea, historically the Tamils would have carved out a united Tamil nation involving parts of Sri Lanka and India long ago. Secondly, the Kosovo independence came about not because of Albanian struggle alone. It found support from the west and the US. That type of international support for Tamil Eelam does not exist. And the LTTE’s ruthless style of operation against Tamils and Sinhalas – troops and civilians alike - has alienated global sympathy that was there in plenty in 1983. Of course much would depend upon how the Sri Lanka government comes out of the present war. If it uses it as an opportunity to subjugate and alienate Tamil population due to feeling of Sinhala superiority instead of genuine nation building, no Kosovo is needed to rekindle international opinion in favour of Tamils.

Thirdly, international laws are selectively applied upon weaker states. It is often used as a tool in the power struggle of nations. Kosovo has proved this. After all the US human rights record is not lily white; still nations enforced their will on Serbia on the very same charges! A major reason is the US has a transparent system of governance that did not exist in Serbia. This is an important reason why Serbia does not find too many friends.

Lastly, legal precedents do not always translate into similar action; but possession does (as the saying possession is three fourths of law goes). This applies to nation states, however they originate. Both sides are right now trying to prove this maxim in Sri Lanka through military means.

http://lankaguardian.blogspot.com/2008/02/kosovo-ltte-separatism.html

International response to Sri Lanka war after the end of CFA

R. Hariharan


The European Union's decision to renew the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) plus scheme provided for Sri Lanka's exports for another three years from January 2009, despite its adverse reaction to the ending of the ceasefire agreement (CFA) by Sri Lanka government. (The GSP plus concession enables Sri Lanka to export its goods and products to the EU at reduced or exempted tax and duty levies.) This decision comes in the face of strong stand taken by Germany on this issue. In an interview published on February 9 Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul, German Minister for Economic Cooperation and Development, had said that if Sri Lanka continued with the military option without seeking credible political solution to the conflict in Sri Lanka she would demand the EU to withdraw the GSP offered to Sri Lanka.

This clearly illustrated the ambivalence between thought and action that underlines the response of international community in responding to contentious issues. This applies not only to the Sri Lanka issue, but many other similar global issues.
There has been widespread international concern at the growing human rights violations and disregard for humanitarian concerns in Sri Lanka ever since the security forces went on the offensive against in December 2005.

Sri Lanka's reluctance to allow international involvement in either monitoring or improving the Human Rights situation has not endeared it to other nations even while the CFA was in force. This concern has been compounded by major escalation in the Eelam war-4 resulting in heavy loss of life since then. Moreover, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) response to the security forces offensive with series of blasts and killings targeting civilians in the south has further compounded international concerns over the Sri Lanka war.

Undoubtedly these developments have disappointed friendly nations who had put their time and resources in giving form and content to the now defunct peace process 2002. With the security forces on the threshold of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) heartland in the north, the battle would only intensify further, choking the hopes of reviving international mediation process for bringing peace, perhaps irrevocably.

Apart from the four co-chairs of Tokyo Donors Conference – the EU, Japan, Norway and the U.S., India, Canada and the UK have consistently shown great interest in helping Sri Lanka resolve the Tamil issue peacefully. Though their reaction to the Sri Lankan walkout from the CFA varied, their response had two common elements: regret at the government decision to withdraw from the CFA and a reminder that Sri Lanka could resolve the issue not merely by military means but with a political package on devolution. Despite such clarity on basic issues, international community's future course of action in respect of Sri Lanka's active pursuit of war will be conditioned by their national self interest.

India as a major regional power has its own equation with other members of the Tokyo Donors Conference and other western powers. India - Sri Lanka relation is unique due to closeness geographical, cultural and trade interests. It has its own coordinates, conditioned by many geo-strategic issues. Among these India's interest in ensuring smooth resolution of the problem of Sri Lanka Tamils so that it does not affect the peace and tranquillity in both countries is an important one. So study of India's response to Sri Lanka war comes under a category different from other countries.

The LTTE's dependence upon its global support network of Sri Lanka Tamil expatriates to progress the war in Sri Lanka has inevitably drawn it within the ambit of the U.S-led global war on terror. At the same time, it also served as incentive for the international community led by power centres from three continents – the U.S., the EU, Japan (and Norway representing the peace lobbies) – take a lead in gilding a Sri Lanka peace package with developmental finance as incentive. As a result the Sri Lanka government and the LTTE agreed upon the CFA and the Norwegian mediated peace process in 2002. India dogged by the ghosts of its bitter experience at peace making in Sri Lanka in the past tacitly agreed to the mediation "intrusion" by external players, in what it had considered as its own domain of power. However, the large scale violation of the ceasefire by the LTTE till December 2005 and by the Sri Lanka government as well thereafter has probably led to the disillusionment of the four co-chairs with both the Sri Lanka government and the LTTE.

The demise of the peace process has also resulted in the dismantling of the international structural assets painfully built to moderate and monitor the peace process. Along with that, much of the Lanka-friendly attitudes of nations actively involved in the peace process are also eroded.

If international understanding of the Sri Lanka government's stand on ending the ceasefire is interpolated on a scale of 1 to 9, India and Japan with a score of 6 show a close understanding. At the same time, they have made clear that military solution alone was unworkable. Both have tended to play down Sri Lanka's performance on human rights issues and do not air their views freely in public. They are unlikely to go along with international of collective action, if any, to coerce Sri Lanka government to improve human rights. However, they are likely to support any persuasive measures for producing the same results. The same applies to resumption of peace negotiations also.

On the other hand, the U.S. (with a score of 5) has shown a keen understanding of the Sri Lankan stand than the rest. The U.S. has stressed the need for the government to come out with a devolution package for Tamils without further delay. The U.S. has also put some riders on future aid and military assistance till Sri Lanka mends its dismal human rights record. At the same time these actions were balanced with other acts or statements to soften the impact. For instance the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) issued a statement terming the LTTE as the most dreaded role model of Al Qaeda almost at the same time as the U.S. issued a statement critical of the Sri Lanka government for abandoning the CFA. We can expect the U.S. to continue this carefully tailored approach in Sri Lanka. While the U.S. has a fairly good understanding of the Tamil quest for equal rights, it neither condones nor supports the LTTE, which has been representing the Tamil interests in the peace process. So it will continue to cooperate with the government in Sri Lanka while supporting the resumption of peace parleys. At best, the U.S. would pitch more forcefully to sponsor the presence of a UN Human Rights watchdog at Colombo.

The UK, with the same score of 5 as the U.S., appears to be slightly better nuanced in its approach than other EU members. However, the large and influential Tamil expatriate lobby in the UK is already bringing considerable political pressures on the ruling party to make the government policy more sensitive and considerate to the Tamil struggle for equity. When the elections get closer this could generate more positive action than issuing palliative statements on Sri Lanka Tamils. This could result in bringing more pressure upon Sri Lanka government.

The EU with 4 points and Norway at 3 points have shown strong resentment of Sri Lanka's disdain for international concerns on ending the CFA and on its deteriorating human rights record. They have been strident in the UN in their demand for structural and qualitative improvement on the Human Rights front in Sri Lanka. They are likely to keep up pressure on this question, diplomatically and in public, both within and outside the UN. However, internally the EU members have their own differing perceptions on the overall situation in Sri Lanka. These will condition their behaviour and prescription on any proposal for collective action.
Canada appears to figure somewhere between the EU and Norway. It is driven both by local political considerations where Tamils have a strong say, and the opposing stands taken by the ruling party and the opposition on the LTTE's war. Unlike its predecessor, the present government in Canada is strongly opposed to terrorism of the LTTE kind and had been fully cooperating with the U.S. in its actions against the LTTE. Without loud statements such actions by Canada are likely to continue. At the same time, Canada has equally strong stand on human rights issues in conformity with that of the EU.

The attitudes of China and Pakistan to Sri Lanka have been largely conditioned by considerations of strategic security, trade and geo-politics. Their interest lies in creating their own special space in Sri Lanka's policy horizon. China would like to establish a strategic foothold in Sri Lanka beyond security orientation relating to India. Probably Chinese interests are focused on the larger canvass of Indian Ocean security. China would continue to maintain and enlarge upon the existing goodwill between the two countries through improved commercial relations and armament sales. While India with its geographical and cultural closeness would always have an advantage in its relations with Sri Lanka, Sri Lanka would like to use the competitive nature of the India-China relations to gain maximum advantage for its own benefit.

In the case of Pakistan, the interest is more oriented to South Asia focusing on India's increasing assertion in the region and Asia. Many Sri Lankans perceive Pakistan as a friend particularly on occasions when India had not been helpful in issues impinging upon the Tamil conflict. While this attitude may not be a great advantage in building better trade relations between Sri Lanka and Pakistan, it is handy for Sri Lanka in its current phase of war to source arms supply from Pakistan. Sri Lanka's increasingly close relationship with India makes it a unique listening post for Pakistan's India operations. And Pakistan will continue to take full advantage of its relations with Sri Lanka to exploit this unique status of Sri Lank.
Thus both China and Pakistan have identified themselves completely with the actions of the Sri Lanka government. By doing this without any "suspicious agenda" from Sri Lanka's point of view, Sri Lanka's relationship with both these countries is likely to flourish. Of course, political and geo-strategic constraints on Sri Lanka over such a growth will always be there.

Attitude towards the LTTE

The LTTE has been finding it hard to reconcile itself to the fall in international esteem ever since it walked out of the peace process. Its continued refusal to read the changing international mood and come to terms with reality was evident from its statement on the CFA even as early as February 22, 2007. It said "It (the CFA) recognised Tamil Eelam's de facto existence, with its unique characteristics; a distinct population; a government comprising a defence force, a police force, a judiciary, a civil administration and other institutions for effective governance of a people, and capability of entering into agreements with other governments, with a line of control reflecting the ground reality of the existence of the Tamil homeland demarcated with recognised borders. The CFA recognised the balance of power between the GOSL (Government of Sri Lanka) and the LTTE, and was premised on this balance of power…" However, its intention to resume the war of secession made in the same statement has not helped nations like Norway and the EU which had tried to revive the peace process.

This attitudinal rigidity coupled with its renewed violent actions against civilian targets well outside its beat after the end of the CFA is probably an important consideration in shaping international lack of interest in the LTTE's style of fighting for Tamil rights. The LTTE's political head B Nadesan's grandiose claim "we are a conventional force. We will launch attacks on military targets but we will not target civilians," even as its bomb squads started hitting civilian targets served only to increase the gap in LTTE's international credibility. So when Nadesan addressed a letter to the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon indicating the readiness of the LTTE to adhere by the CFA scrupulously it made no impact.

The LTTE argument that the only "path open to regain the rights of the Tamil people" was through recognition of the sovereignty of the Tamil nation particularly after being a party to the demise of the CFA and peace process will find few takers internationally. With the continued identification of the LTTE as a part of the global terror regimes, the militant group is likely to find it has less and less freedom to operate outside Sri Lanka in the coming months.

In a nut shell

In concrete terms, the international community is not likely to take any major collective action against Sri Lanka unless they are involved in yet another peace process for which the chances are slim. At the same time, reasons of real politick are likely to discourage collective responsibility of the kind they had shown in 2002-03 that culminated in the peace process, unless both Sri Lanka and the LTTE agree to fully cooperate to ensure success of such an initiative.

Tamil expatriates, who appear to put too much faith in international action in Sri Lanka to force the government to give up the military option and revive the peace process, would do well to remember this. And probably they will have to persuade India to prevail upon Sri Lanka to effect any change because it stands outside the internationally networked stand on this issue. India is in no mood or under compulsion to do this at present for its own reasons. What India can do to make it a win-win situation for all in Sri Lanka requires a more detailed examination because it depends upon what the LTTE, the Tamil expatriates, the people, politicians and the Sri Lanka government should do to help themselves.

So the light at the end of the tunnel is still not visible because the tunnel has not ended. And that is a tragedy for the people of Sri Lanka and all other stakeholders including the international community.

Thursday, February 21, 2008

Myanmar: Wishing away Suu Kyi

For India and China, who were patting themselves on the back for achieving some results through their ‘benevolent’ intervention in Myanmar to make the military regime to reintroduce democracy, the moment of truth appears to have arrived. The Myanmar decision to bar Aung San Suu Kyi from taking part in the elections to be held under the proposed new constitution in 2010 has laid bare the true nature of Than Shwe led military dictatorship’s concept of democracy. A guided democracy with the military junta vetoing participation of the leading light of country’s politics is not what the people aspire for in Myanmar. They want a government of their own, elected by free will.

Even those Myanmar politicians who have some differences with Daw Suu Kyi, will not dispute the iconic role this frail woman, with no history of political leadership, has played in bringing the struggle for democracy to national and global focus. This is what has hurt the military regime. She came as a breath of fresh air to lead the struggle for democracy in a country which had only unpleasant memories of democratic life. Myanmar had three decades of democratic politics soon after independence which did no credit to the concept of democracy. Corrupt politicians and squabbling political opportunists had sullied democratic rule and paved the way for perpetuating a military regime.

Daw Suu Kyi brought three ingredients absent in the ‘guided’ politics of Myanmar. These were: leading a focused political struggle with people’s participation for a regime change, reassertion of inalienable democratic rights of the people to lead a free life, and ability to draw international attention to the struggle and leverage it to the advantage of the people’s movement. That was how the issue gained global sympathy, paving the way for the United Nations to intercede, though in a limited fashion.

No other politician or military leader in Myanmar had been able to lead the whole nation to wage such a single-minded struggle as Daw Suu Kyi after the country became independent in 1948. Of course, she had the advantage of brand image inherited from her father Major General Aung San, the architect of Burma’s freedom struggle against the British and the Japanese colonialists. But more important is how she has used the brand image to the larger good of the people rather than her own benefit or comfort.

A referendum is scheduled to be held in May (of course, under the ‘supervision’ of the same dictatorial regime) to approve a new constitution for the country. The ruling junta approved the draft constitution on February 19.The constitution drafting came as a sequel to the consideration of a “road map for democracy” by a national convention of members handpicked by the military regime. The deliberations of the omnibus national convention of 1000 members dragged on for 14 years with the military regime twisting the elbows of the participating members to toe its line. The major political and ethnic minority parties boycotted the convention denouncing its undemocratic ways of functioning. On the whole, the national convention lacking transparency and representative character was clearly used by the military junta to buy time to delay the process of democratisation mainly to satisfy international community.

The new constitution is supposed to provide for a ‘democratic set up’ for the country’s change over from military control of government to peoples rule. The constitution has been drafted by the Commission for Drafting the State Constitution, and chaired by the Chief Justice U Aung Toe. The 54 members of the commission were picked by the military regime. According to U Aung Toe the new constitution has been drafted in accordance with the six objectives of the National Convention. These included national unity, multi-party democracy, and values such as justice, liberty and equality.

The draft also provides for military participation in political leadership. This has kindled the fears of political parties that the new constitution would be used as an instrument to legitimise the role of military within a ‘guided democracy’ for perpetuity. This fear is legitimate as the 104 basic principles of the constitution are said to provide for reservation of at least 25 percent of the seats in all government bodies for the military. Ethnic minorities who form a sizeable part of the population also feel uneasy with the way the military regime has road rolled the whole process. They have seen how the regime had used dubious means to dissipate the struggle of minorities for space in national power structure.

Naturally the major national political and ethnic minority parties have condemned the move to hold a referendum on the draft constitution which has not been made public. The National League for Democracy (NLD), which was not allowed to rule in spite of winning a thumping majority in the last democratic elections held in 1990, has asked for throwing open the draft constitution for public review. It has also asked the military regime to explain the essence of the constitution to the people before the referendum in May. These are very reasonable demands considering that the NLD did not have a say in the process of constitution making despite enjoying the support of the people as demonstrated in the last democratic election.

The Myanmar Foreign Minister Nyan Win announced the decision not to permit Daw Suu Kyi to contest the 2010 elections because she had married a foreigner, at a meeting of foreign ministers of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in Singapore. At present there is no law that could prevent Daw Suu Kyi from contesting the election. However, it is learnt that the proposed constitution bars a citizen who has a foreign husband and children, who are not Myanmar citizens from contesting the election. It is evident this clause is specially tailored to prevent Daw Suu Kyi from contesting the elections. Daw Suu Kyi had married British Professor Michael Aris and their two children are British citizens.

A group of seven Nobel laureates including Desmond Tutu of South Africa and the Dalai Lama, the exiled spiritual leader of Tibet in a quick reaction to the announcement of elections have called for an arms embargo against Myanmar. Dismissing it as flawed if Daw Suu Kyi was barred, the laureates demanded the inclusion of representatives from the NLD and ethnic nationalities in the constitutional drafting committee. But already a sanctions regime including arms embargo imposed by the United States, Canada, European Union and Australia, among others, is in force.

However, the international sanctions regime has clearly failed to curb the style of the military regime because many nations have only been paying lip service to them for reasons of real politicks and perceived national interest. The November 2007 report of the Human Rights Watch (HRW) has identified 27 companies in 13 countries as having investment interests in Myanmar’s flourishing oil and gas industry. Thirteen of these companies are owned at least partially by foreign countries through state-owned entities. These companies have invested in 20 of the 30 projects underway at present. According to another HRW report of 2006 the ruling military regime received the bulk of its income from off shore gas fields at Yadana and Yetagun. While the Yadana consortium consists of Total of France, Chevron of the United States and the Thai public enterprise PTT Exploration Co Ltd. The Yetagun consortium has Malaysia’s state owned Petronas and Japan’s Nippon Oil apart from the Thai PTT Exploration.

Myanmar earned $ 1 billion in gas revenue in 2006. This is likely to register a phenomenal increase in the coming years as more discoveries of gas are likely to be made. The potential of gas resources in the newly discovered Shwe off shore gas fields alone has been estimated at $ 37 to 52 billion. This would benefit the country with an estimated profit of $ 12 to 17 billion. With the ever-increasing global appetite for energy resources the value income from gas resources would only go up. And in this race for gas resources in Myanmar, China and India are the front runners as their rapid development has boosted up their energy requirements phenomenally.

Apart from the energy potential, for both China and India have strategic interests in Myanmar due to its geographic location on their borders. For China it is a key neighbour with potential to open a direct access to the Indian Ocean by-passing the more crowded and vulnerable route through the South China Sea and Strait of Malacca. China would like to develop a deep sea port in Kyauk Phru in Arakan state for shipping oil from West Asia to landlocked Chinese provinces through a shorter and more secure route. Myanmar also provides China yet another overland access to India and South Asia.

For India to articulate its ‘Look East’ policy aimed at opening up the markets in Southeast Asia, the cooperation and support of Myanmar is an important factor. Moreover, with a reluctant Bangladesh not allowing access across the country for India to its own landlocked states in the northeast, Myanmar can provide vital sea and land access. The absence of such an alternate route has stunted development of this region resulting in social unrest and insurgency. A friendly Myanmar would also providea strategic space for India to its northeastern borders to cushion a potential Chinese threat.

However, without the participation of China, India and ASEAN in the sanction regime, the sanctions have failed to have the desired effect on the military regime. Their reactions to the question of imposing sanctions have varied from strong objection from China to ignoring the issue by India. Of course, ASEAN simply does not believe in such a move against one of its own member countries. So the military regime in Myanmar is sitting pretty sourcing its requirements from these countries and buying time to find a permanent space in any democratic set up that would come in the near future.

Daw Aung San Suu Kyi with her unique national and international appeal represents the single factor that could upset the strategy of the military regime. This is the main reason for the military junta’s single-minded focus in physically controlling access to Daw Suu Kyi. This also the reason why it is preventing her active participation even in the limited political space it is prepared to allow for others. But the writing on the wall is clear. The regime cannot simply wish away Daw Suu Kyi and what she represents.

Most of the western nations have come out strongly against the Myanmar’s constitution making process and the charade of a referendum. They have also condemned the move to bar Daw Suu Kyi from participating in the elections. However, others have been lukewarm at best in their comments. Even the UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon could only call upon Myanmar regime to make the constitution making process “inclusive, participatory, and transparent” the three qualities markedly absent in the military regime’s approach. He again stressed the need for substantive and time-bound dialogue with Daw Suu Kyi and political parties, just as his predecessor had done many times.

China, the main pillar of support of the military junta, will jettison its support when it feels the regime can no longer survive. China is well ensconced in the larger economy of Myanmar. It will continue to have strategic linkages with Myanmar regardless of the nature of the regime. So it cannot be expected to underwrite any change in the regime.

The military regime has outlived its relevance as there is a restive population in the country whose voice can only get stronger and louder. This was seen during the saffron revolution of the monks last year. Given this setting, it is for India and its democratic polity and conscience keepers to re-examine their national priorities. Should they put all their cards on a military regime that is trampling upon the very qualities that Indian Constitution cherishes? Definitely not. Time has come for India to take a re-look at its Myanmar policy to make it more people- relevant.

Friday, February 15, 2008

Crisis over LTTE issue result of a Lankan ploy

By M.C. Rajan in Chennai 7-2-08 http://www.mailtoday.in/epapermain.aspx

Karunanidhi’s daughter Kanimozhi called on Sonia Gandhi on Wednesday to diffuse a political crisis that has been getting worse by the day.
Last Saturday, finance minister P. Chidambaram had criticised the state government, prompting the chief minister the next day to dare the Centre to sack him. On Monday, the Intelligence Bureau director PC Haldar, was rushed in to appease the CM.

The crisis that has now sucked in the country’s top politicians was borne of an Opposition campaign that LTTE has become very active in Tamil Nadu. The campaign picked up momentum with rumours spreading all over south India that Prabhakaran and his wife Mathivathani had reached the Indian shores.
Mathivathani was supposed to have landed at the Mandapam refugee camp, fleeing the Sri Lankan air force’s incessant bombardment of Tamil areas in north Lanka. Believe it or not, the “first lady of Eelam” had even enquired after the well being of her subjects! Her “mission” apparently was to identify a hospital for her wounded husband. Next, it was the turn of the “supreme leader of Eelam” to turn up to convalesce at a TN hospital, either in Coimbatore or coastal Thoothukudi.
After a fortnight of such rumours, the Congress walked out of the TN Assembly. But interestingly, neither the Centre nor any other agency has any confirmation of the alleged heightened LTTE activities in TN.

Experts feel this is primarily the handiwork of Sri Lankan intelligence. “It is almost impossible,” says Col Hariharan, laughing off reports of Prabhakaran crossing over to Tamil Nadu. “It could well be the mischief of Sri Lankan intelligence agencies. They are the ones who will benefit by spreading such rumours,” he argues.
Hariharan is one of the most credible military analysts in the country and was the head of Military Intelligence for the Indian Peace Keeping Mission headquartered in Jaffna. He had three MI units working for him.


He insists that the Tiger chief could not have fled his jungle hideout. “I know the LTTE. I had interacted with the Tiger leadership. I have seen Prabhakaran at close quarters. This just can’t be true,” he insists.

Colombo, Hariharan points out, has much to gain from creating the impression that Prabhakaran is on the run. “Creating confusion in the enemy ranks can always help in weakening the adversary.”

He rules out the involvement of Indian intelligence, though the IB has been issuing warnings of LTTE plots in Chennai. “The rumours are intended to provide a psychological advantage to the battle-fatigued Lankan forces. Further, it is also aimed at creating an element of doubt about the invincibility of the LTTE chief,” he analyses.

Hariharan points out that there is just one exit route for Prabhakaran: the Naachi Kuda area in north Sri Lanka. This is yet to come under the effective control of the Lankan Navy, but it is highly risky and fraught with dangerous consequences.
The Colonel is not ready to buy the theory that Prabhakaran was critically wounded. “It is only wishful thinking at best. According to my sources and information coming from the island, Prabhakaran has not suffered any major injury,” he maintains.

The LTTE has been cornered in the jungles of Vanni and is fighting with their back to the wall. Still, it seems highly unlikely that the guerrilla leader could have crossed over to India. Hariharan feels that even if Prabhakaran is wounded, it is much easier to take a doctor from Tamil Nadu or elsewhere to the Tiger territory for treatment.
Even before the excitement created by these rumours of Prabhakaran’s sighting could die down, the police claimed to have busted a LTTE conspiracy to assassinate V. Perumal, an anti-Tiger Lankan leader. He was scheduled to attend a marriage in the city. But it wasn’t explained why the LTTE should kill an inconsequential politician.
Intelligence officials were aghast at the stories about the movement of the LTTE leader and his wife. The rumours hit the state when Sri Lankan army chief Gen. Fonseka claiming that Prabhakaran was critically wounded in an air strike. With no denial coming up from the Tigers, he continued to maintain his theory that the Tiger leader was either bedridden or had fled.

Police combed the entire coastline. Nothing came out of these operations. But nothing could be left to chance as Karunanidhi remains embattled ever since he wrote an elegy for slain LTTE leader Thamilchelvan.

Sri Lanka: Caught Between Tweedledum and Tweedledee

Col R Hariharan (retd)

Tweedledum and Tweedledee
Agreed to have a battle!
For Tweedledum said Tweedledee
Had spoiled his nice new rattle.

Just then flew down a monstrous crow,
As black as a tar-barrel!
Which frightened both the heroes so,
They quite forgot their quarrel.'

- Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking Glass

Sri Lanka is all set to implement the 13th Amendment of the Constitution in full as recommended by the All Party Representative Committee (APRC) "as a prelude to the APRC proposals." This is what the APRC has recommended to President Rajapaksa in its interim proposal (given in appendix below). And the President wanted it to do so and it has done it. Driving the devolution ghost is as simple as that, it seems.

And the suggestion to implement to fully implement the 13th Amendment, that is celebrating its twentieth birthday, comes after the APRC had 63 sittings over a period of one and a half years! The action of the APRC reminds me of the Tamil proverb "Malayai kalli eliyai pidithan" (dug up the mountain to catch a mouse).

Had this action been taken in 1987-88 by the crafty Sri Lankan President JR Jayawardane who introduced the 13th amendmen, the country would have avoided bloodshed, acrimony and conflict that has dogged it for two decades. This was not done. So the price the nation has paid at the altar of political expedience, ethnic fanaticism, and religious and language frenzy is colossal. It can never be calculated in actual terms. Roughly it involved sacrificing the lives of over 80,000 people from Sri Lanka and India, displacement and dissipation of orderly lives of more than a million people, and destruction of billions of rupees of national wealth and private property or his.And the tragedy continues like serial killing.

But caught between the Tweedledum and Tweedledee of Sri Lanka politics national vision is yet to emerge as seen from the signatories of the APRC interim recommendations. The United National Party (UNP), and the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) - two of the three political parties that matter in resolving any complex national issue are absent among them, just as the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) – the conglomerate of erstwhile Tamil political foes of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) now toeing its line – which was never invited.

At least the JVP had been consistent in its opposition to the whole effort of the APRC. Both the UNP which was instrumental in pushing through the 13th amendment and the SLFP which had opposed it, had occupied the Temple Trees in the last two decades of war, mayhem and peace. But they did not care to implement it in full during their rule. So there are sufficient grounds for Tamils to ask the question "are the mainstream political parties of Sri Lanka genuine when they talk of devolution of powers to minorities?"

It is equally strange that President Rajapaksa now requires the APRC recommendation to take action on what is already in the statute books of the government. One cannot but agree with the views of Western Peoples Front (WPF) one of the smaller parties, on the whole charade of trying to delay devolution of powers using the APRC as an instrument to do the dirty deed. Questioning the need to reintroduce an already active legislative instrument, the press release, the WPF said: "13th amendment is already law. What is pending is the implementation of the same. Failure to implement what is already law is the sole business of the government. The All Party Conference and the APRC were formed to discuss and develop a set of new constitutional proposals addressing what is referred as the ethnic problem or the Tamil problem."

However we cannot find fault with Tissa Vithrana, the chairman of the APRC, for this imbroglio because the good man is trying to shore up some positive action towards devolution as the APRC appears to be having an eternal dialogue rooted in rigid and frozen beliefs on what is good for Sri Lanka rather than what will save the country from further collapse, death and destruction. The sad thing is that the nation had not been able to use the services of a person of Vitharana's calibre to work out a meaningful solution speedily. Pragmatism rather than political expediency or backroom deals is the need of the hour if Sri Lanka wants to have permanent peace. It has no other choice.

Sri Lanka appears to have gone into a time warp since 2005 as the President is setting the clock back on a whole lot of contentious issues that had settled on median of possible resolution. First he denounced the federal format agreed for resolving the conflict with the LTTE. Then he froze the peace process instead of resuscitating it with military offensives, and denounced the Norwegian mediation. He hastily broke up the united north eastern province created following the India-Sri Lanka agreement 1987 to meet one of the key demands of Tamils. And he heralded the New Year with a walk out of the ceasefire agreement to hammer the last nail on the coffin of the peace process 2002. So it is only logical to conclude that the President is buying time to delay the "final" devolution package, hopefully till the end of the year when he expects the security forces to "erase" the LTTE. Then he will be able to negotiate from a position of military and political superiority to make Tamils to accept his solution..

Unfortunately, the political situation in India leaves it no choice but to accept the face saving action o 13th Amendment that is coming 20 years too late. The acceptance of the APRC's recommendations will enable India also to buy time politically before radically taking a re-look at the Sri Lanka policy more positively. By then India's power structure and priorities might alter and India will also perhaps join this game of 'back to the past' rather than look to the future. Let us hope not.

Tamils of all hues must also share the blame for leaving it to a military machine like the LTTE to decide the fate of all Tamils. It has always put its own interests before considering what is good for the largest number of people. Now weakened politically and militarily, it is doubtful whether the LTTE, extant or extinct, can ever deliver devolution of power to the people. It has not been able devolve powers to its own flock all these years.

Instead of breast beating and despairing with cries of 'I told you so', it is the responsibility of Tamil politicians including those of the TNA to ensure that they unite to see the President fully implements the 13th Amendment in letter and spirit. If they can do that the Tamil struggle for democratic rights would be genuine and not by silently watching the bombing buses carrying women and children or condoning suicide attacks. The time for silence is over. They should make the full implementation of the 13th Amendment could be a beginning of national reconciliation and path to full devolution of powers.

Lastly, President Rajapaksa has an excellent opportunity now to implement the 13th Amendment not only to please India or any political lobby, or buy time to find the "final solution" to the LTTE, but to achieve his lofty aim of building a united Sri Lanka, practically from the ashes. But will he do it? Only he can answer.

In this context the lines of Bob Dylan's modern version of 'Tweedledee and Tweedledum' come to my mind. It goes like this:

Tweedle-dee Dee is a lowdown, sorry old man
Tweedle-dee Dum, he'll stab you where you stand
"I've had too much of your company,"
Says, Tweedle-dee Dum to Tweedle-dee Dee.

That would be a human tragedy of immense proportions.

Courtesy: SAAG Paper No 2566 26 Jan 2008

ttp://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers26%5Cpaper2566.html

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Appendix

ACTION TO BE TAKEN BY THE PRESIDENT TO FULLY IMPLEMENT RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION AS A PRELUDE TO THE APRC PROPOSALS

1. Introduction

1.1 The APRC was mandated by the President to prepare a set of proposals that would be the basis for a solution to the national question. After 63 sittings over a period of 1½ years the consensus document is being finalised and it should be possible to hand it over to the President in the very near future. The outcome would be a basis for appropriate constitutional arrangements. Implementation of this would of course require amendment of the present Constitution, and in respect of some Articles, approval by the People at a referendum. This would of course take time, once a favourable climate is established.

1.2 Under the circumstances, the APRC taking into consideration its own proposals has identified a course of action to achieve maximum and effective devolution of powers to the provinces in the short term. The emphasis would be on meeting the aspirations of the Tamil speaking peoples, especially in the North and East. This would be done within the framework of the present Constitution, that is, the 1978 Constitution. The course of action proposed by the APRC would be implementable with immediate effect, and envisages an interim arrangement pending the restoration of democratically elected Provincial Councils in the North and East.

1.3 The 13th Amendment to the 1978 Constitution was enacted following the Indo Sri Lanka Agreement of July 1987. It resulted in the setting up of Provincial Councils throughout Sri Lanka and it devolved power to the Provinces under the unitary Constitution. The powers devolved fall under a Provincial List and a Concurrent List. All other powers were reserved for the Centre through a Reserved List. Further, any subject or function not included in any of the three Lists will also be deemed to be a subject or function in the Reserved List.

1.4 Implementation of subjects and functions devolved on the Provinces through the Concurrent List has not taken place at all due to the fact most of these subjects and functions were retained by the Centre as if they also belonged to the Reserved List.

2. Steps necessary to permit Maximum Devolution of Powers to Provinces under the 13th Amendment

2.1 The Government should endeavour to implement the 13th Amendment to the Constitution in respect of legislative, executive and administrative powers, overcoming existing shortcomings.

2.2 Adequate funds should be provided by the Government to facilitate effective functioning of the Provincial Councils.

2.2.1 The Centre should hereinafter route all finances in respect of special projects undertaken by the Centre in the Provinces, if they are on subjects under the purview of the Provinces, through the respective Provincial Administrations.

3. Special Arrangements necessary to permit Maximum Devolution of Powers to the Northern and Eastern Provinces under the 13th Amendment

3.1 The APRC is of the view that conditions in the Eastern Province are conducive to holding elections to the Provincial Council and that elections should be held immediately.

3.2 Conditions in the Northern Province are far from being peaceful. A free and fair election in the North will not be possible in the near future. Hence an alternative arrangement is required in the Northern Province to enable the people of that Province to enjoy the fruits of devolution.

3.3 As it is not possible to hold elections in the North, the President could make appropriate order to establish an Interim Council for the Northern Province in terms of the Constitution.

3.4 The Interim Council of a Province will aid and advise the Governor in the exercise of his executive powers, and will function until Provincial Council elections are held in that Province.

3.4.1 The Interim Council should reflect the ethnic character of that Province.

3.4.2 It is proposed that the Interim Council for a Province should consist of individuals who have political experience and an abiding interest in the development of the Province and in its people and be acceptable to the people of the Province. A person to qualify for appointment as a member of an Interim Council should have a thorough knowledge of the particular Province.

4. Implementation of the Official Languages Provision of the Constitution

4.1 The Government should take immediate steps to ensure that Parliament enacts laws to provide for the full implementation of Chapter IV of the Constitution on Language.

4.2 There are many contexts in which remedial measures will assume an administrative, rather than a legislative, character.

The following are instances of measures which should be strenuously accelerated and implemented by the Government.

(a) recruitment of Tamil speaking police officers in sufficient numbers to enable Tamil speaking members of the public, not only in the North and East, but in the country as a whole, to transact business in their own language in police stations;

(b) the taking of all steps, including recruitment of staff and procurement of equipment to enable Tamil speaking members of the public to deal with Ministries, Government Departments, statutory corporations and all other public bodies in their own language;

(c) the regular holding of, and streamlining of procedures for, mobile "clinics" where officials fluent in the Tamil language will engage problem solving on the spot;

(d) the provision of interpreters, translators and other relevant facilities in all courts of law, so that the needs of members of provincial minority communities are catered fully with regard to all aspects of the administration of justice;

(e) The Sinhala minorities in the North and East suffer from disadvantages similar to those affecting Tamil speaking peoples as mentioned above. Suitable steps should be taken to address them along the same lines.

The All Party Representative Committee (APRC) comprised:

  1. Sri Lanka Freedom Party
  2. United National Party (D)
  3. Jathika Hela Urumaya
  4. Ceylon Workers Congress
  5. Sri Lanka Muslim Congress
  6. All Ceylon Muslim Congress
  7. Mahajana Eksath Peramuna
  8. National Unity Alliance
  9. Up-country People's Front
  10. Communist Party of Sri Lanka
  11. Eelam People's Democratic Party
  12. National Congress
  13. Western People's Front
  14. Lanka Sama Samaja Party