By Col R Hariharan (Retd.)
INTRODUCTION
Myanmar’s newly elected parliament under the 2008 Constitution had its first session on January 31, 2011. In the political history of Myanmar, it marks a new milestone; however, its impact on Myanmar’s quest for democracy remains an open question. Despite the limitations in transferring political power to peoples’ representatives imposed by the 2008 Constitution, a new element – limited civilian rule - has now been introduced after continuous military dictatorship for 22 years.
The 2008 Constitution has a lot of democratic veneer. There is bicameral Union Assembly (Pyidaungsu Hluttaw) consisting of the 440-member lower house - ‘House of Representatives (Pyithu Hluttaw)’ and the 224-member upper house - ‘House of Nationalities (Amyotha Hluttaw).’ All the 14 regions or states have their own assemblies. Despite this the constitution designed by the ruling junta can hardly be called a democratic one in its present form. Only 330 of the 440-seat lower house are filled by elected civilian members; similarly only 168 out of 224 seats of upper house will be filled by civilians. Military officials would be occupying the rest (25 percent) of the seats.
The State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) – the official name for the ruling Junta – dissolved itself on March 31, 2011 on the same day when civilian president and ministers took office. Despite this cosmetic change the SPDC is likely to continue to ‘back seat drive’ the new government; otherwise it is difficult to explain the allocation of a sizeable chunk of funds for the SPDC in the current year’s budget. The so-called civilian rulers who have assumed office also do not inspire optimism in the country turning over a new leaf to embrace democracy. The civilian President Thein Sein was the same Lieutenant General who served as Prime Minister before the elections. The key ministries of defence, home affairs and border affairs are in the hands of ministers who are army officers. To top it all, the foreign minister is a former army officer.
With civilian government’s feet hobbled by the military, the 2008-Constitution can hardly be called the harbinger of democracy.
CONSTITUTION MAKING IN MYANMAR
An analysis of the circumstances under which the new constitution was conceived will be useful in assessing the future course of events in Myanmar. The country has had so far three constitutions: 1947, 1974, and the 2008. The first ever constitution drafted in 1947 before independence was adopted when the country became independent in 1948. Under the 1947 Constitution, the national government consisted of three branches: judiciary, legislature and executive. The Union Parliament – a bicameral legislature - consisted of the upper house ‘Chamber of Nationalities (125 members)’ and lower house ‘the Chamber of Deputies (Pyithu Hluttaw)’ whose strength depended upon the electorate. This constitution was truly liberal as it recognised the right of states of the Union to secede; this clause was included to create confidence in ethnic minorities who formed over one third of the population.
Unfortunately for Myanmar, the 1948 Constitution could not cope with the lack of political cohesion among the large number of political parties with diverse ideologies and agendas. The national leadership could not sustain the initial confidence ethnic minorities had shown in the government. Successive governments failed to hold their own in the face of usurpers of power. Powerful Communist insurgency supported by China and ethnic insurgencies added to the instability of civilian governments. Absence of rule of law and widespread corruption weakened the government further. This paved the way for the army to step in as the stabilizing force in 1962.
The Burmese Army, unlike its other South Asian counterparts, was not a product of British colonialism. It was formed to spearhead Burma’s independence struggle and commanded widespread popularity in that period. Almost all founding fathers of Burma had served in the army during the freedom struggle. General Ne Win, the chief of the Burmese army in 1962 had impeccable credentials in the fight first against the British colonial regime and later against the Japanese occupation forces. So initially the public welcomed Ne Win when he seized power through a coup d’etat in 1962. He promised to preserve the hard won freedom and ensure stability with army rule.
However, one of the first things he did was to suspend the 1947 Constitution and curtail fundamental freedom of the people. The bicameral legislature was abolished. The Socialist Revolutionary Council under his leadership ruled the country through the Burmese Socialist Programme Party (BSSP) recognised as the only legal entity.
Ne Win introduced ‘Burmese Way of Socialism’ a curious mixture of Marxism, xenophobia and autocratic rule. He nationalised all industries and enterprises and expelled foreigners who had established themselves in Burma. Over 100,000 Indians of Burmese origin were expelled without any compensation for their confiscated property. His xenophobia isolated Myanmar from international mainstream. Ne Win’s brand of socialism took the country to economic ruin. Ne Win decided to revamp the economy and reduce the policy of isolationism.
A new constitution was introduced 1974 after a referendum in 1973. It legitimised the one-party rule. The new constitution became effective on 3 January 1974. It provided for only one legislature – the Pyithu Hluttaw (Peoples Assembly). Army control was firmed-in in all organs of state and institutions of society. In this period Ne Win also managed to crush Communist insurgency and bring down ethnic insurgencies to manageable proportions. However the insurgencies enabled Ne Win to expand and strengthen the army. As Chinese support for insurgency ended in the seventies relationship with China improved. Unfortunately, Ne Win’s ideological creed from 1962 to 88 not only hobbled the national economy, but also discouraged the growth of healthy multi-party politics and civil society institutions. Cronyism and corruption became embedded part of the administration.
Elections under the 2008 Constitution
However there were changes in the world order from early nineties. Global priorities were shifting from Cold War rhetoric to globalisation of trade and commerce. Collapse of the Soviet Union heralded a new power equation with the U.S. emerging as the sole super power. China started growing into a major economic power with global ambitions. There was knowledge revolution integrating global communication and media networks, resulting in real time news coverage. All these changes impacted Burmese youth whose aspiration levels expanded.
In August 1988 when Burmese economy collapsed and inflation rose very high and prices spiralled, students and youth took to the streets in protest. The military junta’s heavy handed response using brute force killed thousands of agitators; hundreds of students including student leaders were arrested and sent to serve long jail terms. These inhuman acts of the Junta sent shock waves all over the country and discontent against the regime swelled. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, daughter of Major General Aung San, the founding father of independent Myanmar, galvanised all democratic forces under the banner of National League for Democracy (NLD) and turned it into a mass movement against military rule.
Suu Kyi’s national agitation for democracy caught the military leadership on the wrong foot. The military was grappling with an internal power struggle of succession after the ailing dictator Gen Ne Win was put to pasture after 26 years of rule. Faced with mounting agitation the military junta agreed to hold the first ever multi-party elections since 1962. In the run up to the elections in 1990, Suu Kyi campaigned for complete democratic rule without any sharing of power with the military.
In the elections people voted overwhelmingly in support of the NLD. The NLD won 392 out of the 489 seats, securing 60 percent of votes. The pro-military National Union was routed. Alarmed at the prospect of losing control over power, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) as the ruling junta was known refused to hand over power to the elected members. Instead it annulled the elections and came down heavily on all political parties including the NLD. It arrested thousands of political leaders and party supporters; they were handed in long prison sentences. Suu Kyi was kept under house arrest since then for most of the decade and a half thereafter.
There was worldwide protest against the military junta’s action, particularly the arrest of Suu Kyi and NLD leaders. The U.S. slapped sanctions against Myanmar while the European Union placed embargo on arms sales, suspension of aid and trade preferences. India after initially criticising the crushing of democratic movement relented and from 1992 onwards. China and Russia had also ignored the sanction regime. Pressure on the military regime to restore democracy increased progressively even though international sanctions regime was not fully effective. Myanmar’s neighbours notably China ensured that the country is not affected by the sanctions regime.
The response of the SLORC led by General Than Shwe to mounting international opinion in support of Suu Kyi’s struggle for democracy was ingenious. The name of the SLORC was changed to a more conciliatory SPDC (State Peace and Development Council). The 1974 Constitution was suspended on 18 September 1988. The Junta stuck upon the stratagem of drafting a new constitution that would provide for the step-by-step restoration of democratic rule. The junta’s internationally more adept representative Khin Nyunt evolved a 7-Step Roadmap to Democracy for drafting and implementing the new constitution in the country’s journey towards civilian rule. A National Convention was to be convened for the task of working out the form and content of the new constitution. At the same time, the regime also struck deals with as many as 14 ethnic insurgency groups to work out ceasefire agreements. Shan, Karen and some of the Kachin insurgent groups refused to toe the line of the Military Junta.
However, the NLD refused to attend the National Convention as the Junta refused to release its leaders languishing in jail. Similarly, there were differences over selection of representatives of ethnic minorities which resulted in the boycott of the process by some of the major ethnic minorities. These hiccups delayed the progress of the constitutional convention beyond 1996. However, the regime revamped the process in 2004 with handpicked members attending the convention to work out a draft constitution as prepared by the army. The slow and stilted process came to an end by 2007 and a draft constitution was ready.
The timing of the release of the draft constitution was uncanny. The military junta had drawn a lot of international criticism when it used brute force to crush a protest started against withdrawal of subsidies on fuel and other essential commodities. By September 2007 the peaceful protests revived the demand for democracy which was termed as the ‘saffron revolution’ when Buddhist monks in large numbers came out in support of the people. This provided fresh impetus for the democracy movement to international to gain international attention. Continued house arrest of Suu Kyi also raised the ire of powerful nations like the U.S.
The regime announced it would hold a referendum to approve the draft constitution. However, the final draft was made public only in April 2008. The public had barely a month to study the draft constitution as the referendum to approve it was scheduled it in May 2008. The referendum was held under the disastrous conditions due to cyclone Nargis in which nearly 200,000 people are estimated to have perished. Though the whole exercise was far from democratic, it deflected national and international attention from the continued house arrest of Suu Kyi and incarceration of political leaders.
The electoral laws for holding elections to the new parliament appeared to be tailored to exclude existing political leaders including Aung San Suu Kyi from participating in the electoral process. Firstly, the members of the electoral commission to be constituted for conducting the elections were nominated by the military junta. Secondly, it banned anyone who was serving a prison sentence belonging to a political party would not be permitted to participate in the election. This effectively barred over 2000 political prisoners from participation. The electoral law also barred leaders of religious and insurgent groups from participation in elections.
On November 7, 2010 the elections were held. NLD decided to boycott the elections as it had basic differences in permitting a role for the military in the government envisaged under 2008 Constitution. However, some of the NLD leaders decided to contest the elections under the banner of National Democratic Force (NDF) so that the military regime would not have a free run of the elections. In all 40 political parties registered themselves for the election. Of these six political parties are said to be pro-military junta.
The conduct of election was far from satisfactory. Media coverage was controlled and opposition campaigners were hounded. All the six opposition parties have filed complaints of fraudulent conduct of elections with the election commissioner. In the run up to the election there were bomb blasts in Yangon. United Nations expressed concern over the fairness of the election.
With the NLD boycotting the election, the results were not unexpected. The pro-government Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) led by former Prime Minister and ex-General Thein Sein won 259 seats and 129 seats respectively in the lower and upper house. Another pro-military party the National Union Party (NUP), formed in the Ne Win days, captured 12 seats in lower house and 5 seats in upper house. The major opposition party - the National Democratic Front (NDF) formed by leaders who broke away from NLD had limited success winning only 12 (lower house) and 5 (upper house) seats. The Shan Nationalities for Democracy (SNLD) representing Shan ethnic community won 18 (lower house) and 3 (upper house) seats.
Future of democracy after 2010 elections
The military junta had always undertaken constitution making exercise so that it would continue to hold on to the reins of power. However, it appears to have realised the need for changing its act as a result of its increasing exposure to international community and participation in ASEAN. The Junta’s desire to build closer relations with China and India as part of its national strategy has also probably induced the Junta to be a little more accommodative for the demand for civilian rule. The 2008 Constitution offering limited political participation in the power structure is a product of this mindset of the Junta. So it can hardly provide the take off point for Myanmar’s growth into full fledged democracy in the coming years.
The convening of the parliament in January 2011 represented the 6th Step in the Junta’s much touted 7-Step Roadmap to Democracy. The 7th and final step of the Roadmap to Democracy is rather pompously titled “Building a modern, developed and democratic nation by the state leaders elected by the Hluttaw; and the government and other central organs formed by the Hluttaw.”
The title of the 7th Step says it all: building a modern, developed and democratic nation. In a democracy this is done by the people but according to the Roadmap the state leaders “elected” by the Hluttaw would be doing it. With the military dominating the parliament, this means the ruling Junta in its new democratic guise would be building “a modern democratic nation.” Of course the building process ‘guided by the military’ will also involve the government and other central organisations formed by the Hluttaw.
Elections in Myanmar have also left home truths in their wake. The 1990 elections showed the power of one leader - Aung San Suu Kyi - to rally the people to keep the struggle for democracy going. Similarly, the 2010 elections have shown the need for democratic forces to revisit their strategies to face the ground reality: an army that would not quit the power structure without a share. The reality is that the 2008 Constitution has succeeded in achieving what had eluded the Military Junta during four decades of military rule - giving the Tatmadaw ( armed forces) – a fig leaf of constitutional legitimacy to hold on to power in a seemingly civilian framework. So providing space for the army in the national power structure has become the harsh reality.
Therefore the question of accepting the rule based on 2008 Constitution has divided all political parties and ethnic entities. This has in fact helped the Military Junta in continuing to influence politics through divide and rule.
These developments must be disheartening to thousands of political leaders and workers languishing in prisons or living in exile for decades. However, there is at least one positive outcome; after 22 years of dictatorship people now have a dose of “democracy,” even though it is minuscule. And as Daw Aung San Suu Kyi said, “It [elections] did make some people understand what elections should not be about, or how elections should not be conducted. I think that is positive, if people can start to get an understanding of what should not be done if elections are supposed to be democratic.”
CRYSTAL GAZING
What does all this mean to different stakeholders of Myanmar in the medium term, say next five years?
Political parties
We can expect opposition strength to be whittled down by retaining coercive legislations. After de-recognition, the coercive marginalisation of NLD’s and Suu Kyi’s influence is likely to continue. Can the veneer of political unity Suu Kyi was able to achieve in the nineties withstand this? I wish I could be optimistic but historically political disunity had been the only common denominator of Myanmar politics. However, as long as Suu Kyi’s voice is there, there is hope for national unity. Historically, youth and student segments had spearheaded change in Myanmar. If Buddhist Sangha can join them and once again rally public opinion, it can inspire democrats to unite. Will Buddhist clergy be allowed to rise up once again? If that happens, we can expect the newly elected “democratic” government’s options getting constricted if the Tatmadaw waiting in the wings feel civilian rule is ineffective.
Ethnic insurgency
The four major insurgent groups of Kachins, Shans, Karens and Arakanese are still outside the “ceasefire net” thrown by the Junta. Wa insurgency is also in dissonance. Already the army is carrying out operations against Shan and Karen insurgents. But with insurgencies getting clubbed with terrorism the world over, their future looks bleak. Thailand has already become a reluctant host to ethnic refugees. Other neighbours of Myanmar are likely to deny external support reaching them. With the U.S. already blinking, its traditional “Christian” support to Karens may not be forthcoming anymore. The Junta had never shown keen interest in expelling Naga, Assamese and Manipuri insurgent groups from their sanctuaries in Myanmar. It is unlikely to change this policy because their presence in Myanmar keeps India on line.
Army
The “civilian government”, led by a former military leader, has introduced a new element in Myanmar’s power structure dominated by the military. Though toothless at present, the civilian government can grow ambitious; as Clemenceau said ‘power corrupts’ and civilian leaders may not prove an exception. They could run into a conflict of interest with the military if the leaders become too ambitious. However, this is still in the realms of conjecture.
Military regimes always face the potential threat of a putsch and Myanmar is no exception. [Presumably, this is the reason why 10 light infantry divisions – one third of the total 30 - are kept directly under the army chief]. The possibility of an internal power struggle within the army increases if the importance of the army gets progressively marginalised in the coming years. To prevent this, the Junta has to continue to exist as invisible overlords to keep the civilian government in tight leash. This is indirectly confirmed by the budget allocation of Kyats 20 billion (about $22 million) made for the State Peace and Development Council office (euphemism for Junta).
Myanmar armed forces are nearly half a million strong (roughly half the size of India’s army) and their modernisation would be a logical next step. Ethnic insurgency had been the life blood of Tatmadaw. However, the importance of ethnic insurgencies in the future is likely to wane as the Junta has successfully de-fanged 17 major insurgent groups during the last decade. In the latest budget defence has been allocated Kyats 1.8 trillion ($2 billion - 23.6%) which could only be for modernisation of weapon systems.
This is where the Asia Times Online report about Myanmar producing Scud-type missiles with North Korean experts’ assistance in one of the two munitions factories located near Minhla, south of Minbu in Magway Division becomes important. If the report is correct Tatmadaw’s battlefield capability would increase. Such strategic up-gradation of military capability is unlikely to happen in Myanmar without tacit approval of China. This could become the focus of interest for Indian China watchers in the future.
International community
Junta’s half way measure on civilian participation in government has split not only political parties (including the NLD) but has also created dilemma of nations in relating to the new environment in Myanmar. The introduction of limited civilian rule has saved the face of neighbouring countries – China, India and ASEAN countries – that had cosied up with the Junta. It has also softened the hard stand of the U.S. and the West who are re-examining their options, including the lifting of sanctions. In the face of the uncertain future, even Suu Kyi is reworking NLD stand on the sanctions regime.
We can expect the voices against Myanmar in the United Nations corridors and podiums to become less strident. To put it in a nutshell, the military has cleverly inveigled itself into legitimate power structure of the government labelled as democracy. Regardless of its label, the election is a charade enacted to appease international opinion, and perpetuate military control over the power structure rather than providing a road map for genuine democratic rule.
International community’s frozen attitudes would slowly change if the democratic ‘experiment’ Myanmar yields dividends. So we are unlikely to see any immediate change in the supportive attitudes of important benefactors of Myanmar like China, India and ASEAN countries. However, we can expect some changes in Western dispensation towards Myanmar provided the latter handles Suu Kyi and the democratic constituency without undue harshness.
ASEAN
Myanmar’s admission to the Association of South East Nations (ASEAN) as a member in 1997 was an important milestone in the country’s unsavoury international relations. Within the ASEAN also there was considerable concern about admitting Myanmar as a member. The ruling junta’s attitude against restoration of civilian rule, refusal to release thousands of political prisoners and denial of fundamental freedoms including the media to its people did not make Myanmar a welcome member of the ASEAN. However, probably ASEAN members did not want to be left out of the scramble for the country’s large natural resources and lucrative markets. They agreed upon ‘constructive cooperation’ with Myanmar as the best way to do it. But some of the ASEAN members like Indonesia and Philippines have continued to insist on some progress towards restoration of democracy. The true test of Myanmar- ASEAN relations in the post 2010 election would be when the issue of electing Myanmar as chairman for ASEAN comes up in the coming months. Till then no major changes in ASEAN attitudes can be expected.
Written on May 12, 2011
Courtesy: World Focus -Monthly discussion journal, May 2011 issue.
www.cnfworldfocus.org
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