My article on the emerging strategic scene in Sri Lanka published in the [COVERT] magazine Volume 2 Issue 3 for 18 June - 30 June 2009 is reproduced here for your reading kind courtesy COVERT.
LEST WE LOSE THE GREAT GAME IN LANKA
Chennai: Sri Lanka’s security forces inflicted a crushing defeat on the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, eliminating its leader and guiding spirit Velupillai Prabhakaran and almost the entire leadership. Their success comes after a failure to achieve decisive results in three earlier episodes of war, spread over more than two decades.
Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s result-oriented national leadership was the single major factor that helped Sri Lanka eliminate the LTTE as a power centre threatening national integrity. His Government’s shortcomings on human rights and rule of law appear to have been forgotten in the afterglow of victory. Riding the crest of unprecedented popularity, Rajapaksa is emerging as an unchallenged monolithic power centre in his country.
War and its aftermath have changed the strategic environment in Sri Lanka. The military has emerged as a modern, professionally competent, battle-tested fighting force. The army is poised to grow into a force of 300,000, roughly one fourth the size of the Indian Army and bigger than the armies of Europe — Germany, Italy and France. Oversized armed forces in small countries usually become an additional power centre, and Sri Lanka might prove to be no exception.
A significant feature of the war was the minimal Indian influence exerted on Sri Lanka, in sharp contrast to India’s high profile involvement in Sri Lanka’s Sinhala-Tamil confrontation from the time of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. She had woven the Tamil problem into the overall matrix of India’s strategic security construct on Sri Lanka in the 1980s at the height of the Cold War. But in keeping with its new equations with Sri Lanka, India not only did not interfere in the operations against the LTTE, but also did not contribute much to the peace process that preceded it.
India’s vanilla influence on Sri Lanka started waning after Rajiv Gandhi failed in his well-intentioned, but ill-conceived, military intervention to enforce the India-Sri Lanka Agreement in 1987. India was particularly bitter after it had to ignominiously recall its troops when the LTTE and Sri Lanka colluded to throw the Indians out. LTTE’s assassination of Rajiv Gandhi later dissipated the goodwill and sympathy for Sri Lankan Tamils that existed in 1987.
DURING THE LAST TWO DECADES, India’s strategic priorities have changed in the Indian Ocean Region, in keeping with the strategic changes taking place after the collapse of the Soviet Union. India and the United States are building a strategic relationship in the region. China is increasing its presence in all countries in India’s neighbourhood. Terrorism has become a universal problem.
India’s agenda for Sri Lanka has mainly focused on strategic security cooperation and building of trade linkages. In spite of this, New Delhi was reluctant to participate in the Norwegian mediated peace process in 2002. In fact, India declined to accept President Rajapaksa’s invitation to join the peace process earlier. China stepped in to supply the bulk of armaments Sri Lanka required for its operations against the LTTE. It also made financial aid available. Sri Lanka found the Chinese weapons to be attractively priced and readily available, particularly as India could not help because of stiff opposition from political parties in Tamil Nadu. This enabled China to strengthen its strategic linkages with Sri Lanka. Pakistan also contributed with a supply of weapons, though on a more modest scale than China. As a result, China has gained considerable strategic space and credibility in Sri Lanka, filling the vacuum created by India’s reluctance to participate actively in Sri Lanka’s war effort. The Chinese are also constructing a commercial port complex in Hambantota in the south, and when completed this will make China’s presence in Sri Lanka more assertive.
The US too has been playing an active role in Sri Lanka, participating in the peace process of 2002 and later supporting its war effort. At the same time, the US has been in close touch with India on issues relating to Sri Lanka. This tacit cooperation had continued all through the operations against the LTTE, even on key issues where the two countries had differing views. This consultative relationship is likely to continue because India has a unique geographic and strategic advantage in Sri Lanka unmatched by any other power.
However, US presence is probably also linked to its larger global security concerns over the increasing Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean. So it would be strategically prudent for the US to keep a toehold in Sri Lanka, where China is enlarging its influence. The US is also probably wary of Iran’s moves to cultivate Sri Lanka with the extension of a billion dollars in aid.
The recent US actions in Af-Pak region have not increased India’s confidence in the US. There are indications of the Indo-US civilian nuclear agreement losing its momentum. Thus, when US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visits New Delhi these two issues are likely to dominate the agenda. Sri Lanka might figure only as appreciation of India’s positive influence on the island.
Sri Lanka is slowly being drawn into a global power play and India will feel its impact. India has to evolve a new strategic paradigm to handle it. A peaceful, stable and prosperous Sri Lanka is a strategic asset for India. So fundamentally, India will have to help Sri Lanka get out of the 30-year-old ravages of war to become peaceful and stable.
THE GOVERNMENT will have to focus on its critical strengths conferred by Sri Lanka’s geographic proximity, cultural similarity, religious identity and economic linkages to make India more relevant to the island nation than other distant nations. Already, India-Sri Lanka trade is burgeoning thanks to the Free Trade Agreement in place. But to add to bilateral strategic strength there has to be greater India-Sri Lanka convergence in defence and security perceptions. Both countries have a long history of military cooperation. Sri Lanka, like other smaller neighbours, has a latent fear of India’s overwhelming influence. This has to be addressed to create greater confidence, which will lead to better strategic understanding. India should formalise the defence treaty, which is held in suspended animation.
India will have to help Sri Lanka’s healing process. Sri Lankans should be enabled to travel to India freely. Indian investments can create job opportunities in the troubled north and wean away the youth from possible militancy. Technical-education institutions are a plenty in the South and should be thrown open to Sri Lankan students. War-torn Sri Lanka needs a massive reconstruction and rehabilitation effort. India can help on this front immediately. Contentious issues that had been dogging relations between the two countries will take longer to resolve. All that is required is political will and tenacity of purpose.
Courtesy: http://www.covertmagazine.com/essay.htm
Monday, June 22, 2009
Sunday, June 21, 2009
Politicization of Indian armed forces
I am reproducing a provocative article by former Indian Naval Chief Admiral Arun Prakash on the issue of growing disenchantment of servicemen in India with the way issues relating to the Services are dealt with. I hope the defence minister takes note of this trend, and takes it up with the Prime Minister for corrective action. It will be a sad day the SERVICES, the only totally integrated arm of the nation turns into a cynical body with leaders making deals with backroom boys. Your comments are welcome.
WHILE WE SLEPT: POLITICIZATION OF INDIA’S ARMED FORCES
Adm. Arun Prakash (Retd)
The recent displays of blatant praetorianism across our eastern and western borders have served to confirm that the Indian Armed Forces are truly the sole sub-continental inheritors of the priceless apolitical tradition bequeathed by their British progenitors. Armies are sent into battle only when statesmen and diplomats have been unsuccessful in ensuring peace. Our Armed Forces have not only fought gallantly on the battlefield but consistently and impartially upheld India’s integrity and secular democratic tradition, when all others have failed the nation.
Their darkest hour occurred in the wake of Operation Blue Star; an unseen internal crisis which threatened to rend the taut fabric of discipline and loyalty which binds together our magnificent Army. The manner in which it contained and defused this calamity will remain another (untold) saga of outstanding military leadership.
This monastic devotion to discipline is the reason that Subhash Bose’s Indian National Army and the Free Indian Legion are, till today, spoken of in hushed tones in the Service environment. The exact details of the 1942 Royal Indian Navy mutiny (even though it imparted a decisive impetus to the freedom movement) will forever remain confined to confidential volumes kept under lock and key on board every warship. Similarly, public expressions of defiance like hunger-strikes, dharnas, marches and demonstrations by civilians cause acute discomfort to the soldier, sailor and airman because they run contrary to the essence of all that he has been ever taught: unquestioning respect and obedience of lawful authority.
Once he doffs his uniform, an ex-Serviceman (ESM) is technically liberated from the restraints of military discipline, and is free to adopt the demeanor and behaviour of any civilian on the street. But deep inside, his soul cringes at the very thought of conducting himself in a manner which would have brought disrepute to his uniform, unit or Service.
Why then did our ESM start resorting to demonstrations in April 2008, in the heart of the national capital as well as in many states? Why did they thereafter graduate to relay fasts at Jantar Mantar? And why are they now surrendering their precious medals to low level functionaries in Rashtrapati Bhavan?.
Although they have conducted themselves in a most dignified and orderly manner, the very fact that veterans ranging from Generals to Jawans have been marching on the streets and squatting on footpaths has sent shock waves throughout the Services community; even if the media and our fellow citizens have largely ignored this disturbing development.
I am not about to argue the case of the ESM, but a brief summary of events would help to orient the reader. In early-2006 when the 6th Central Pay Commission (CPC) loomed into sight, the Service Chiefs, individually and collectively, through the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC), appealed to the Raksha Mantri, on the basis of bitter past experience, that a Service member be included in the CPC. This request having been declined, when the CPC Report was released in 2008, the Services found to their dismay that the recommendations expectedly contained many glaring anomalies impacting adversely on serving personnel as well as ESM.
At the persistent urgings of the Service Chiefs, a Review Committee was constituted; ironically yet again bereft of a Service representative. The Review Committee aggravated the anomalous situation by arbitrarily making some further unwarranted modifications. A series of instructions were issued by the Defence Accounts and pension disbursing authorities which were self-contradictory and compounded the prevailing confusion as well as unhappiness. While the Chairman COSC took up the issues relating to serving personnel with the Government, the ESM became convinced that since no one was listening to them, they had no choice but to adopt agitational methods. They have, therefore, taken to the streets since April 2008.
Military veterans, world-wide are objects of spontaneous respect, affection and admiration because they are national symbols of courage, patriotism and sacrifice; a segment deserving of special consideration by the Government. The grievances of our ESM, should, therefore, have been handled with far more sensitivity and responsiveness, than they actually were.
The current ESM movement has been able to mobilize opinion country-wide and gather self-sustaining momentum, mainly due to connectivity provided by the Internet and cellular phone networks. While the MoD seems to have adopted a disdainful and detached stance towards their grievances, the ESM roll-on agenda now encompasses canvassing political support for their cause, and even the formation of an ESM political party which will put up candidates for the forthcoming General Elections.
Thus it is now obvious that, while the nation slept, the process of “politicization” of our Armed Forces is well under way, if not complete. The 6th CPC has also inflicted serious collateral damage by deepening the existing civil-military chasm and thereby further slowing down the languid functioning of the MoD.
As a former Army Chief has pointed out, the ESM retain “an umbilical connection” with the serving personnel; they hail from the same regions or neighbouring villages and often belong to the same extended family, whom they meet when on leave. In any case, the Services and ESM constitute one big family. No one should have any doubts that the essence of whatever happens at Jantar Mantar or India Gate will slowly but surely filter back by a process of “reverse osmosis” to the men in uniform.
Even if the politicians and bureaucrats do not care, the nation’s intelligentsia (where are they?) need to introspect. Does the nation want proud, independent and self-respecting Armed Forces who live by the professional soldiers’ honour code and die unquestioningly for their country; or do we want their soldiers tainted with the stain of “politics”. Were this to happen – even by default – it would constitute the most grievous injury to be needlessly inflicted on itself by the Indian state.
India’s democracy requires that the Armed Forces must be restored to their original pristine state at the earliest; detached from politics, and focused on the profession of arms. The first step is to remove the ESM from the streets, and the best means would be to constitute a multi-party Parliamentary Commission (what is termed a Blue Ribbon Commission in the UK), and NOT another committee of bureaucrats, to examine and address the full gamut of issues.
WHILE WE SLEPT: POLITICIZATION OF INDIA’S ARMED FORCES
Adm. Arun Prakash (Retd)
The recent displays of blatant praetorianism across our eastern and western borders have served to confirm that the Indian Armed Forces are truly the sole sub-continental inheritors of the priceless apolitical tradition bequeathed by their British progenitors. Armies are sent into battle only when statesmen and diplomats have been unsuccessful in ensuring peace. Our Armed Forces have not only fought gallantly on the battlefield but consistently and impartially upheld India’s integrity and secular democratic tradition, when all others have failed the nation.
Their darkest hour occurred in the wake of Operation Blue Star; an unseen internal crisis which threatened to rend the taut fabric of discipline and loyalty which binds together our magnificent Army. The manner in which it contained and defused this calamity will remain another (untold) saga of outstanding military leadership.
This monastic devotion to discipline is the reason that Subhash Bose’s Indian National Army and the Free Indian Legion are, till today, spoken of in hushed tones in the Service environment. The exact details of the 1942 Royal Indian Navy mutiny (even though it imparted a decisive impetus to the freedom movement) will forever remain confined to confidential volumes kept under lock and key on board every warship. Similarly, public expressions of defiance like hunger-strikes, dharnas, marches and demonstrations by civilians cause acute discomfort to the soldier, sailor and airman because they run contrary to the essence of all that he has been ever taught: unquestioning respect and obedience of lawful authority.
Once he doffs his uniform, an ex-Serviceman (ESM) is technically liberated from the restraints of military discipline, and is free to adopt the demeanor and behaviour of any civilian on the street. But deep inside, his soul cringes at the very thought of conducting himself in a manner which would have brought disrepute to his uniform, unit or Service.
Why then did our ESM start resorting to demonstrations in April 2008, in the heart of the national capital as well as in many states? Why did they thereafter graduate to relay fasts at Jantar Mantar? And why are they now surrendering their precious medals to low level functionaries in Rashtrapati Bhavan?.
Although they have conducted themselves in a most dignified and orderly manner, the very fact that veterans ranging from Generals to Jawans have been marching on the streets and squatting on footpaths has sent shock waves throughout the Services community; even if the media and our fellow citizens have largely ignored this disturbing development.
I am not about to argue the case of the ESM, but a brief summary of events would help to orient the reader. In early-2006 when the 6th Central Pay Commission (CPC) loomed into sight, the Service Chiefs, individually and collectively, through the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC), appealed to the Raksha Mantri, on the basis of bitter past experience, that a Service member be included in the CPC. This request having been declined, when the CPC Report was released in 2008, the Services found to their dismay that the recommendations expectedly contained many glaring anomalies impacting adversely on serving personnel as well as ESM.
At the persistent urgings of the Service Chiefs, a Review Committee was constituted; ironically yet again bereft of a Service representative. The Review Committee aggravated the anomalous situation by arbitrarily making some further unwarranted modifications. A series of instructions were issued by the Defence Accounts and pension disbursing authorities which were self-contradictory and compounded the prevailing confusion as well as unhappiness. While the Chairman COSC took up the issues relating to serving personnel with the Government, the ESM became convinced that since no one was listening to them, they had no choice but to adopt agitational methods. They have, therefore, taken to the streets since April 2008.
Military veterans, world-wide are objects of spontaneous respect, affection and admiration because they are national symbols of courage, patriotism and sacrifice; a segment deserving of special consideration by the Government. The grievances of our ESM, should, therefore, have been handled with far more sensitivity and responsiveness, than they actually were.
The current ESM movement has been able to mobilize opinion country-wide and gather self-sustaining momentum, mainly due to connectivity provided by the Internet and cellular phone networks. While the MoD seems to have adopted a disdainful and detached stance towards their grievances, the ESM roll-on agenda now encompasses canvassing political support for their cause, and even the formation of an ESM political party which will put up candidates for the forthcoming General Elections.
Thus it is now obvious that, while the nation slept, the process of “politicization” of our Armed Forces is well under way, if not complete. The 6th CPC has also inflicted serious collateral damage by deepening the existing civil-military chasm and thereby further slowing down the languid functioning of the MoD.
As a former Army Chief has pointed out, the ESM retain “an umbilical connection” with the serving personnel; they hail from the same regions or neighbouring villages and often belong to the same extended family, whom they meet when on leave. In any case, the Services and ESM constitute one big family. No one should have any doubts that the essence of whatever happens at Jantar Mantar or India Gate will slowly but surely filter back by a process of “reverse osmosis” to the men in uniform.
Even if the politicians and bureaucrats do not care, the nation’s intelligentsia (where are they?) need to introspect. Does the nation want proud, independent and self-respecting Armed Forces who live by the professional soldiers’ honour code and die unquestioningly for their country; or do we want their soldiers tainted with the stain of “politics”. Were this to happen – even by default – it would constitute the most grievous injury to be needlessly inflicted on itself by the Indian state.
India’s democracy requires that the Armed Forces must be restored to their original pristine state at the earliest; detached from politics, and focused on the profession of arms. The first step is to remove the ESM from the streets, and the best means would be to constitute a multi-party Parliamentary Commission (what is termed a Blue Ribbon Commission in the UK), and NOT another committee of bureaucrats, to examine and address the full gamut of issues.
Friday, June 19, 2009
Armed Forces Tribunal to start functioning from July
According to media reports the much-awaited Armed Forces Tribunal(AFT)is expected to
start functioning from July 2009. The report said the appointment of 15 retired senior officers of armed forces as administrative members is over. And the appointment of judicial members, to be selected from retired high court judges, is underway.
The enactment for the creation of the AFT was passed in parliament on December 7, 2007. Former Supreme Court judge, Justice AK Mathur, will be heading the tribunal.The AFT's principal Bench would be based at New Delhi
The AFT will deal with about 12,000 cases related to armed forces pending in various courts now relating to courts martial proceedings, and matters such as promotions, postings, pay and allowances, etc.,after they are transferred to it. This measure it is hoped will ensure speedier disposal of cases.
In addition will be eight regional Benches, Chandigarh, Chennai,Guwahati, Jaipur, Kochi, Kolkata, Lucknow and Mumbai. Each Bench will have judicial and well as administrative members.
The media reported the names of the administrative members the Chandigarh Bench as:Lt Gen HS Panag, former GOC-in-C, Northern Command, Lt Gen AS Bahia, former Quarter Master General and Lt Gen NS Brar, former GOC 10 Corps. This bench will deal with cases from the states of Punjab, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh and Jammu and Kashmir.
Lt Gen S Pattabhiraman, Lt Gen ML Naidu, both former Vice-Chief of the Anny Staff, Lt Gen Thomas Mathew, former Adjutant General, Lt Gen RK Chhabra, former Chief of Staff, Southern Command and Rear Admiral R Contractor are some of the other names of administrative memebrs.
All administrative members will have the status of a judge of the high court with corresponding salary and service conditions.
start functioning from July 2009. The report said the appointment of 15 retired senior officers of armed forces as administrative members is over. And the appointment of judicial members, to be selected from retired high court judges, is underway.
The enactment for the creation of the AFT was passed in parliament on December 7, 2007. Former Supreme Court judge, Justice AK Mathur, will be heading the tribunal.The AFT's principal Bench would be based at New Delhi
The AFT will deal with about 12,000 cases related to armed forces pending in various courts now relating to courts martial proceedings, and matters such as promotions, postings, pay and allowances, etc.,after they are transferred to it. This measure it is hoped will ensure speedier disposal of cases.
In addition will be eight regional Benches, Chandigarh, Chennai,Guwahati, Jaipur, Kochi, Kolkata, Lucknow and Mumbai. Each Bench will have judicial and well as administrative members.
The media reported the names of the administrative members the Chandigarh Bench as:Lt Gen HS Panag, former GOC-in-C, Northern Command, Lt Gen AS Bahia, former Quarter Master General and Lt Gen NS Brar, former GOC 10 Corps. This bench will deal with cases from the states of Punjab, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh and Jammu and Kashmir.
Lt Gen S Pattabhiraman, Lt Gen ML Naidu, both former Vice-Chief of the Anny Staff, Lt Gen Thomas Mathew, former Adjutant General, Lt Gen RK Chhabra, former Chief of Staff, Southern Command and Rear Admiral R Contractor are some of the other names of administrative memebrs.
All administrative members will have the status of a judge of the high court with corresponding salary and service conditions.
Soft underbelly of India’s internal security
There are a series of disturbing bits of news flowing in just one week’s media reports that expose the soft underbelly of India’s internal security (own comments are given in italics):
• Saleem Abbasi, an Algerian wanted for his involvement in the blast at Houari Boumediene airport in Algiers on August 26, 1992 was arrested by airport security after Chennai airport immigration authorities spotted him on his arrival from Kualalumpur on June 17th night at Chennai airport. The immigration authorities had no prior knowledge that he was a wanted criminal but a Interpol Red Corner alert in his name resulted in the arrest. The Algerian, travelling on a Qatari passport, was on his way to catch a flight to Bangalore to attend a meeting with the Karnataka Planning Board Deputy Chairman DH Shankaramurthy to discuss Rs 130-crore investment in a solar energy project in Karnataka. Newspapers inform that Abbasi was a globe trotter who has not been caught all these years. So much for global war on terror! It will be interesting to know how many times Abbasi had visited India and where all he has invested and who are his contacts here. But if our past experience is any guide, Abbasi would be set free because India has no extradition treaty with Algeria and he had not committed any offence in India (at least not in public knowledge).
• According to media reports the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) in a raid seized nine firearms (some of them unlicensed) and VHF radio communication sets from the house of Dr Padamsinh Patil, MP and a leader of the Nationalist Congress Party, in Mumbai on June 18th. Dr Patil is accused of plotting the murder of his cousin and political rival Pavanraja Nimbalkar in 2006. His son however claimed that only four weapons, including a pistol, a revolver, a 12 bore gun and a rifle, were seized and all of them were licensed. The radio sets were authorised to be installed in the NCP leader’s residence when he was a cabinet minister for irrigation. However, when he relinquished office they were not returned to the government but shifted to his new home, which was illegal. (He relinquished office when social crusader Anna Hazare levelled corruption charges against him.) According to Dr Patil’s lawyer, the radio sets were shifted “inadvertently”; he claimed that some of the radiosets were in a packed condition and not used at all.
• Interrogators of Mohammed Madani, a suspected Lashkar-e-Tayyabba (LeT) terrorist, arrested in Delhi on June 4th , told a Delhi court that Madni had revealed to the police interrogators that the LeT was acting in coordination with CPI(Maoists) in Jharkand.
• For a second day battle was “raging” on June 19th in Lalgarh in West Bengal between the Maoists and the paramilitary forces of the state and Centre. The West Bengal government is at last trying to re-establish government control after Maoist rampage in Lalgarh in which the local leader of the ruling CPM party was killed and the police station was attacked. Union Home MinisterP Chidambaram questioned why the West Bengal government had not banned the CPI(Maoists) when other states had already outlawed it. He also said the Naxals were entrenched in the adjoining districts of Bankura and Purulia also and it was difficult to say how many were there. Earlier, in an interview in a forest adjoining Lalgarh, Maoist leader Mullajhola Koteshwar Rao alias Kishanji “calmly admitted both the murder of Badal Ahir, a member of the Pingboni local committee and the plot to assassinate West Bengal chief minister Buddhadeb Bhattacharjee. We wanted to kill the chief minstier because the people wanted him to die,” Kishanjee claimed. “We failed. But in future if people give out the same verdict, we will re-plot his assassination” he threatened according to the news report. The media reported that Kishanji might have escaped the police dragnet in Lalgarh area. Naturally he would flee because instead of taking concerted action, the state government and Centre are finger pointing at each othe,r playing the blame game for their inaction against the Naxalites takeover of parts of West Bengal.
Is there a connection between all the above reports (actually I have given only a few of them)? Yes; there is. The bottom line we have a uncoordinated, poorly planned and highly politicised internal security system that is being executed by de-motivated paramilitary and police forces. That is why nobody takes the rule of law seriously, because one has to search for it.
It is no mystery why government in Delhi or elsewhere is not taking seriously the Naxalite threat which is there in nearly 160 districts of the country. Because, they are reluctant. Only Chhattisgarh had taken concerted action against them and it had been facing the flak from Left intellectuals and even the Centre!
So what are we waiting? For another 26/11 to happen I suppose. Then we can have yet another episode of media circus and political mudslinging, appoint a commission to inquire into the new born 26/11 and proceed to suppress the inquiry report from public dissemination. The Maharashtra government has just done it.
• Saleem Abbasi, an Algerian wanted for his involvement in the blast at Houari Boumediene airport in Algiers on August 26, 1992 was arrested by airport security after Chennai airport immigration authorities spotted him on his arrival from Kualalumpur on June 17th night at Chennai airport. The immigration authorities had no prior knowledge that he was a wanted criminal but a Interpol Red Corner alert in his name resulted in the arrest. The Algerian, travelling on a Qatari passport, was on his way to catch a flight to Bangalore to attend a meeting with the Karnataka Planning Board Deputy Chairman DH Shankaramurthy to discuss Rs 130-crore investment in a solar energy project in Karnataka. Newspapers inform that Abbasi was a globe trotter who has not been caught all these years. So much for global war on terror! It will be interesting to know how many times Abbasi had visited India and where all he has invested and who are his contacts here. But if our past experience is any guide, Abbasi would be set free because India has no extradition treaty with Algeria and he had not committed any offence in India (at least not in public knowledge).
• According to media reports the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) in a raid seized nine firearms (some of them unlicensed) and VHF radio communication sets from the house of Dr Padamsinh Patil, MP and a leader of the Nationalist Congress Party, in Mumbai on June 18th. Dr Patil is accused of plotting the murder of his cousin and political rival Pavanraja Nimbalkar in 2006. His son however claimed that only four weapons, including a pistol, a revolver, a 12 bore gun and a rifle, were seized and all of them were licensed. The radio sets were authorised to be installed in the NCP leader’s residence when he was a cabinet minister for irrigation. However, when he relinquished office they were not returned to the government but shifted to his new home, which was illegal. (He relinquished office when social crusader Anna Hazare levelled corruption charges against him.) According to Dr Patil’s lawyer, the radio sets were shifted “inadvertently”; he claimed that some of the radiosets were in a packed condition and not used at all.
• Interrogators of Mohammed Madani, a suspected Lashkar-e-Tayyabba (LeT) terrorist, arrested in Delhi on June 4th , told a Delhi court that Madni had revealed to the police interrogators that the LeT was acting in coordination with CPI(Maoists) in Jharkand.
• For a second day battle was “raging” on June 19th in Lalgarh in West Bengal between the Maoists and the paramilitary forces of the state and Centre. The West Bengal government is at last trying to re-establish government control after Maoist rampage in Lalgarh in which the local leader of the ruling CPM party was killed and the police station was attacked. Union Home MinisterP Chidambaram questioned why the West Bengal government had not banned the CPI(Maoists) when other states had already outlawed it. He also said the Naxals were entrenched in the adjoining districts of Bankura and Purulia also and it was difficult to say how many were there. Earlier, in an interview in a forest adjoining Lalgarh, Maoist leader Mullajhola Koteshwar Rao alias Kishanji “calmly admitted both the murder of Badal Ahir, a member of the Pingboni local committee and the plot to assassinate West Bengal chief minister Buddhadeb Bhattacharjee. We wanted to kill the chief minstier because the people wanted him to die,” Kishanjee claimed. “We failed. But in future if people give out the same verdict, we will re-plot his assassination” he threatened according to the news report. The media reported that Kishanji might have escaped the police dragnet in Lalgarh area. Naturally he would flee because instead of taking concerted action, the state government and Centre are finger pointing at each othe,r playing the blame game for their inaction against the Naxalites takeover of parts of West Bengal.
Is there a connection between all the above reports (actually I have given only a few of them)? Yes; there is. The bottom line we have a uncoordinated, poorly planned and highly politicised internal security system that is being executed by de-motivated paramilitary and police forces. That is why nobody takes the rule of law seriously, because one has to search for it.
It is no mystery why government in Delhi or elsewhere is not taking seriously the Naxalite threat which is there in nearly 160 districts of the country. Because, they are reluctant. Only Chhattisgarh had taken concerted action against them and it had been facing the flak from Left intellectuals and even the Centre!
So what are we waiting? For another 26/11 to happen I suppose. Then we can have yet another episode of media circus and political mudslinging, appoint a commission to inquire into the new born 26/11 and proceed to suppress the inquiry report from public dissemination. The Maharashtra government has just done it.
Tuesday, June 16, 2009
What is China up to in Hambantota?
What is China up to in Hambantota? This is the question many of the readers had been asking me from time to time. Definietly, the increasing Chinese influence in India's neighbourhood is matter of concern for India. Apart from the strong Pakistan-China strategic ties, recent developments in the US-China relations, political developments in Nepal,and the growth of China-Myanmar relations show a definite uptrend in Chinese influence in South Asia. And China had fully used the war situation in Sri Lanka to its advantage. The Hambantota project in Sri Lanka, though a non-military commercial port development project, definitely increases China's strategic options in the region.
But we need to contextualize Hambantota in the overall relationship between India and Sri Lanka on the one hand and India-China relations on the other. It is not that Sri Lanka is completely going under Chinese influence as many LTTE acolytes had started saying as the Tamil Tigers started losing the Eelam War IV. At the same time growing Chinese influence in Sri Lanka should not be ignored.
I found Mr B Raman's article "Hambantota & Gwadar - An Update" published on June 12, 2009 in www.southasiaanalysis.org, the website of South Asia Analysis Group, useful in understanding the Hambantota project. He has made it more interesting by comparing it with the Gwadar port project in Pakistan. I am reproducing Mr Raman's article here, courtesy South Asia Analysis Group.
Hambantota & Gwadar -- An Update
By B. Raman
The foundation for the construction of a modern port with Chinese assistance at Hambantota in southern Sri Lanka was formally laid in October, 2007. The construction actually started in January, 2008.
2. It is a 15-year project to be completed in stages. The entire project is estimated to cost US $ one billion. The present Chinese commitment is for the construction of the first stage only, which is estimated to cost US $ 360 million. China has agreed to give 85 per cent of this amount at concessional interest. The balance is being contributed by the Government of Sri Lanka.
3. The first stage of the 15-year (2008-2023) project is expected to be completed by the end of 2010. This stage envisages the construction of a 1000-metre jetty, which will enable the harbour to function as an industrial port for the import and export of industrial chemicals, fuel and heavy machinery. By 2023, Hambantota is projected to have a liquefied natural gas refinery, aviation fuel storage facilities, three separate docks giving the port a trans shipment capacity and dry docks for ship repair and construction. The project also envisages that when completed the port will serve as a base for bunkering and refueling.
4. The draught (depth) of the new harbour will be 16 metres against 15 metres in Colombo. A 230 metre passage-entrance channel will be created at the breakwater which is 988 metres long on the west end and 311 metres long on the east end.
5. The Government hopes that as a refueling location Hambantota will have many advantages over the Colombo port or ports in South India. The construction has been undertaken by a consortium of Chinese companies headed by the China Harbour Engineering Company and the Sino Hydro Corporation.
6. The project doesn’t have a separate consultant. The Sri Lanka Port Authority (SLPA) is functioning as the client-cum-consultant while the China Harbour Engineering Co Ltd is the contractor. In September, 2008, there were 328 Sri Lankans and 235 Chinese working at the site-----engineers, administrative personnel and others. The present number is not known.
7. The first stage due to be ready by end 2010 will allow three ships to berth. The final stage, for which there is no offer of funding yet from China, is planned to accommodate more than 30 ships, which is the present capacity at Colombo.
8. Reliable reports say that while the Sri Lankan authorities want Hambantota to emerge as a modern port with better facilities and efficiency than any of the ports in South India, they do not want the present importance of the Colombo port to be reduced. Colombo presently has the reputation of being the most modern and most efficient port in South Asia. They want this reputation to be maintained. There is no proposal at present to set up container yards and cater to container ships at Hambantota.
9. The present Chinese interest is in the use of the docking and refueling facilities that would come up in Hambantota for their commercial and naval ships. There is no proposal at present for a Chinese naval base at Hambantota.
10. The Chinese have helped Pakistan in the construction of a similar port at Gwadar on the Mekran coast in Balochistan. The first phase of the construction has already been completed and the port was commissioned when Pervez Musharraf was the President. The contract for the running of the port has been given to a Singapore company.
11. From the beginning, Gwadar was planned as a naval-cum- commercial port. Both Pakistan and China were interested in its naval potential. Pakistan wanted the naval facilities in Gwadar to give a strategic depth to its navy and reduce its dependence on the Karachi port, which is vulnerable to attack by the Indian Navy in times of war. The Chinese were interested in the use of the refueling and docking facilities of Gwadar for their naval ships visiting the Gulf area.
12. The Pakistanis had and continue to have ambitious plans for the development of Gwadar as a port to cater to the external trade of the Central Asian Republics (CARs) and the Xinjiang and the Sichuan provinces and the Tibetan region of China. They also offered to the Chinese the use of Gwadar as a transshipment point for oil and gas, which could be brought to Gwadar and from there moved by pipelines to Xinjiang. They also proposed the construction of a rail and road network between Gwadar and Xinjiang. They are also interested in the construction of a huge oil refining capability in Gwadar. Beyond agreeing to feasibility studies in respect of these proposals emanating from Pakistan, the Chinese have not made any firm commitments regarding their participation in any other project in addition to the port construction.
13. Even though it is about two years since the Gwadar port was commissioned, it has not been attracting many ocean-going ships. Most shipping companies prefer the continued use of the Karachi port despite its inefficiency. This is mainly due to the poor security situation in the Makran coast and the failure of the Pakistani authorities to develop the road and other infrastructure, which could sustain an increased level of activity at Gwadar. Even the Chinese preferred using the facilities at Karachi for the ships of their anti-piracy patrols than the facilities at Gwadar. Unless and until there is peace and stability in Afghanistan, the prospects of Gwadar emerging as the gateway for the external trade of the CARs will remain weak.
14. In contrast to Pakistan, Sri Lanka's interest in developing Hambantota has remained purely commercial. It has very limited external trade. The Colombo port is able to meet satisfactorily its external trade needs. It does not need another port for this purpose. Its interest in Hambantota is as a source of additional foreign exchange earned by offering world class facilities and efficiency to international shipping companies. It is hoping that the present Colombo port and the new port coming up at Hambantota will give it an advantage over India, whose ports are not known for their modern facilities and efficiency.
15. The Sri Lankan Navy has a long history of cordial relations and co-operation with the Indian Navy. It fears no threat from the Indian Navy. As a result, the interest of the Sri Lankan Navy in Hambantota is minimal. But the Chinese interest is more strategic than purely commercial. It is very unlikely that Sri Lanka would allow the Chinese Navy to use Hambantota against India. But a Chinese naval presence in Hambantota would add to the concerns of the Indian Navy by increasing the vulnerability of the South to pressures from the Chinese Navy.
16. Reliable reports say that the Chinese have not so far raised the question of developing Hambantota as a naval base which they can also use to ensure the security of their oil and gas supplies. But they do not rule out the possibility of the Chinese raising it if and when negotiations are held for additional Chinese financial commitments for the subsequent stages of the project.
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers33%5Cpaper3248.html
But we need to contextualize Hambantota in the overall relationship between India and Sri Lanka on the one hand and India-China relations on the other. It is not that Sri Lanka is completely going under Chinese influence as many LTTE acolytes had started saying as the Tamil Tigers started losing the Eelam War IV. At the same time growing Chinese influence in Sri Lanka should not be ignored.
I found Mr B Raman's article "Hambantota & Gwadar - An Update" published on June 12, 2009 in www.southasiaanalysis.org, the website of South Asia Analysis Group, useful in understanding the Hambantota project. He has made it more interesting by comparing it with the Gwadar port project in Pakistan. I am reproducing Mr Raman's article here, courtesy South Asia Analysis Group.
Hambantota & Gwadar -- An Update
By B. Raman
The foundation for the construction of a modern port with Chinese assistance at Hambantota in southern Sri Lanka was formally laid in October, 2007. The construction actually started in January, 2008.
2. It is a 15-year project to be completed in stages. The entire project is estimated to cost US $ one billion. The present Chinese commitment is for the construction of the first stage only, which is estimated to cost US $ 360 million. China has agreed to give 85 per cent of this amount at concessional interest. The balance is being contributed by the Government of Sri Lanka.
3. The first stage of the 15-year (2008-2023) project is expected to be completed by the end of 2010. This stage envisages the construction of a 1000-metre jetty, which will enable the harbour to function as an industrial port for the import and export of industrial chemicals, fuel and heavy machinery. By 2023, Hambantota is projected to have a liquefied natural gas refinery, aviation fuel storage facilities, three separate docks giving the port a trans shipment capacity and dry docks for ship repair and construction. The project also envisages that when completed the port will serve as a base for bunkering and refueling.
4. The draught (depth) of the new harbour will be 16 metres against 15 metres in Colombo. A 230 metre passage-entrance channel will be created at the breakwater which is 988 metres long on the west end and 311 metres long on the east end.
5. The Government hopes that as a refueling location Hambantota will have many advantages over the Colombo port or ports in South India. The construction has been undertaken by a consortium of Chinese companies headed by the China Harbour Engineering Company and the Sino Hydro Corporation.
6. The project doesn’t have a separate consultant. The Sri Lanka Port Authority (SLPA) is functioning as the client-cum-consultant while the China Harbour Engineering Co Ltd is the contractor. In September, 2008, there were 328 Sri Lankans and 235 Chinese working at the site-----engineers, administrative personnel and others. The present number is not known.
7. The first stage due to be ready by end 2010 will allow three ships to berth. The final stage, for which there is no offer of funding yet from China, is planned to accommodate more than 30 ships, which is the present capacity at Colombo.
8. Reliable reports say that while the Sri Lankan authorities want Hambantota to emerge as a modern port with better facilities and efficiency than any of the ports in South India, they do not want the present importance of the Colombo port to be reduced. Colombo presently has the reputation of being the most modern and most efficient port in South Asia. They want this reputation to be maintained. There is no proposal at present to set up container yards and cater to container ships at Hambantota.
9. The present Chinese interest is in the use of the docking and refueling facilities that would come up in Hambantota for their commercial and naval ships. There is no proposal at present for a Chinese naval base at Hambantota.
10. The Chinese have helped Pakistan in the construction of a similar port at Gwadar on the Mekran coast in Balochistan. The first phase of the construction has already been completed and the port was commissioned when Pervez Musharraf was the President. The contract for the running of the port has been given to a Singapore company.
11. From the beginning, Gwadar was planned as a naval-cum- commercial port. Both Pakistan and China were interested in its naval potential. Pakistan wanted the naval facilities in Gwadar to give a strategic depth to its navy and reduce its dependence on the Karachi port, which is vulnerable to attack by the Indian Navy in times of war. The Chinese were interested in the use of the refueling and docking facilities of Gwadar for their naval ships visiting the Gulf area.
12. The Pakistanis had and continue to have ambitious plans for the development of Gwadar as a port to cater to the external trade of the Central Asian Republics (CARs) and the Xinjiang and the Sichuan provinces and the Tibetan region of China. They also offered to the Chinese the use of Gwadar as a transshipment point for oil and gas, which could be brought to Gwadar and from there moved by pipelines to Xinjiang. They also proposed the construction of a rail and road network between Gwadar and Xinjiang. They are also interested in the construction of a huge oil refining capability in Gwadar. Beyond agreeing to feasibility studies in respect of these proposals emanating from Pakistan, the Chinese have not made any firm commitments regarding their participation in any other project in addition to the port construction.
13. Even though it is about two years since the Gwadar port was commissioned, it has not been attracting many ocean-going ships. Most shipping companies prefer the continued use of the Karachi port despite its inefficiency. This is mainly due to the poor security situation in the Makran coast and the failure of the Pakistani authorities to develop the road and other infrastructure, which could sustain an increased level of activity at Gwadar. Even the Chinese preferred using the facilities at Karachi for the ships of their anti-piracy patrols than the facilities at Gwadar. Unless and until there is peace and stability in Afghanistan, the prospects of Gwadar emerging as the gateway for the external trade of the CARs will remain weak.
14. In contrast to Pakistan, Sri Lanka's interest in developing Hambantota has remained purely commercial. It has very limited external trade. The Colombo port is able to meet satisfactorily its external trade needs. It does not need another port for this purpose. Its interest in Hambantota is as a source of additional foreign exchange earned by offering world class facilities and efficiency to international shipping companies. It is hoping that the present Colombo port and the new port coming up at Hambantota will give it an advantage over India, whose ports are not known for their modern facilities and efficiency.
15. The Sri Lankan Navy has a long history of cordial relations and co-operation with the Indian Navy. It fears no threat from the Indian Navy. As a result, the interest of the Sri Lankan Navy in Hambantota is minimal. But the Chinese interest is more strategic than purely commercial. It is very unlikely that Sri Lanka would allow the Chinese Navy to use Hambantota against India. But a Chinese naval presence in Hambantota would add to the concerns of the Indian Navy by increasing the vulnerability of the South to pressures from the Chinese Navy.
16. Reliable reports say that the Chinese have not so far raised the question of developing Hambantota as a naval base which they can also use to ensure the security of their oil and gas supplies. But they do not rule out the possibility of the Chinese raising it if and when negotiations are held for additional Chinese financial commitments for the subsequent stages of the project.
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers33%5Cpaper3248.html
Monday, June 15, 2009
Coming of age of Indian military justice
Indian army follows the military justice system evolved by the British during the colonial times, with some cosmetic changes. Its serious shortcoming were its subjectivity and limitations of the appeal procedure. At last the government appears to be poised to modernise the outdated military jurisprudence system with the appointment of Armed Forces Tribunal.
I am reproducing here Major Navdeep Singh's informative article on the subject:
Armed Forces Tribunal (AFT) appointments underway : Military Jurisprudence - coming of age?
Navdeep Singh
“Draconian”, maybe not, “archaic”, perhaps.
Many pejorative adjectives have been used to describe the present system of military justice in India, but does it deserve such criticism ? More than the statutes themselves, the problem perhaps is with the executors, the method of understanding the spirit behind, and the final implementation of the statutory provisions of the Army Act, 1950, Air Force Act, 1952 and Navy Act, 1957. The provisions of these Acts, though oppressive in parts, were never meant to be draconian and do have a number of inbuilt checks and balances, but of course the method of using the best of these is open to debate. So what was wrong with the system that forced the govt to bring in the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007 ? The one line answer echoed in legal corridors would be - ‘lack of an effective appeal’. The same sentiment was reflected by the Supreme Court in the case of Lt Col Prithi Pal Singh Bedi Vs Union of India (1982) where the Court observed that the absence of even one appeal and power to review evidence was distressing and a glaring lacuna.
Where in the world would you find a judicial system without an appeal, here in India of course. The three Acts did not contain a single provision that could be deemed akin to a judicial appeal. There was a provision of pre and post confirmation petitions but these were rarely used in a fashion more than a mere formality. No judicial authority had the jurisdiction to look into or examine the evidence on the basis of which court martial sentences were rendered or the merits of the issues involved. The High Courts and the Apex Court under the writ jurisdiction could of course intervene but only in cases where there was a flouting of statutory provisions or when the sentences rendered were particularly harsh and not commensurate with the offence. The Supreme Court further observed in Ranjit Thakur Vs Union of India (1987) that conscience shaking sentences which are irrationally disproportionate would not be immune from judicial review. The Supreme Court opined that irrationality and perversity were definite grounds wherein Courts could intervene.
These shortcomings notwithstanding, it would not exactly be appropriate to say that the three military Acts are without enough checks to avoid miscarriage of justice, there are ample provisions parallel to those available under the criminal system of jurisprudence but the problem remains that unlike the criminal courts, courts martial are presided over not by judicial officers but by officers of the regular army who neither have the acumen nor the bent towards legal and judicial modalities. Moreover, all procedures finally leading to conviction by a court martial (such as Courts of Inquiry, Summary of Evidence etc) are handled by military personnel who may just follow provisions of military Acts and Rules in formal letter but not in spirit - and this makes all the difference. And this also brings us to the answer why a body of professionals such as the AFT is so very urgently required to sit in judgement and appeal over justice rendered to men and women in uniform by another set of men and women in uniform.
The military Acts of India were derivatives of similar Acts of the British and that was the basis why these Acts seemed oppressive. These were moulded as such so as to maintain a grip on discipline over the native Army. The existing Army Act of India, for example, can trace its origin to East India Company’s Mutiny Act, 1754 and the Articles of War of the late 1800s, followed by the Indian Army Act of 1911. Of course this could not be justification enough to retain provisions such as Summary Court Martial after independence or to use terms as ‘customs of war’ in these Acts leading to ambiguity of action by those who want to repress. There is no place for ‘customs’ and ambiguity in criminal jurisprudence and all provisions certainly need to be codified and brought out in black and white. Yes, there may be a difference in the quantum of punishment prescribed for offences in operational and non-operational areas and there may be operation-specific offences but all need to be put in words without leaving any scope of indistinctness in action.
Other countries following contemporary systems of justice such as the UK and the USA have since long recognised the need of reducing ‘customs’ to the barest minimum and having an elaborate system of appeal, but India, despite observations by various High Courts, committees and even the Supreme Court, failed to come out of a crude grundnorm which forms the basis of the Army, Navy and Air Force Acts till date.
So how would the AFT help? Firstly, the AFT would be a forum of professionals with judicial and military background, a perfect mix to handle legal issues of the military. While the Chairperson can either be a retired Judge of the Supreme Court or a retired Chief Justice of a High Court, Judicial Members shall be former Judges of High Courts. The Administrative Members would be retired Major Generals or above of any of the three defence services. Each bench of the Tribunal shall consist of a Judicial and an Administrative Member. The Tribunal shall have the power to deal with all findings, orders and decisions of Courts Martial and related matters. As a welcome measure, the AFT has also been granted the power to release persons under military custody on bail. The AFT has also been conferred with powers of Contempt. Unlike the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT), an appeal from the AFT shall lie directly with the Supreme Court.
Besides courts martial, the subject matter of the AFT shall also include service matters such as remuneration, pension, retirment benefits, tenure, appointment, seniority, promotion, superannuation and the like. However Summary trials where dismissal is awarded or Summary Court Martial awards except where dismissal or imprisonment over three months is awarded, would not be under the ambit of the Tribunal. Transfers, postings and leave related matters shall also not be under the purview of the AFT. In case of service matters, even dependants, successors and heirs would be able to approach the Tribunal for justice.
The setting up of the AFT which is bound to bring the much needed relief to military litigants, shall also ensure handling of critical issues by former members of judiciary who would be from outside the ‘chain of command’ and therefore dealing cases with a clean slate with no biases or prejudices. They shall of course be assisted by former military officers - the administrative members, who would, with consensus, be providing important inputs resulting in what hopefully would be well-rounded judicial pronouncements meeting the aspirations of all affected. The AFT would also be in conjunction with the observations by the Supreme Court about providing a proper appellate body for courts martial.
But the AFT, without in-house introspection (below) would not be an answer to the shortcomings of the system. What needs to be eliminated is the subjectivity at all levels, starting from initial stages of Inquiry ending with the Trial. The letter of law at all stages needs to be followed in spirit and not as a sheer formality; an effective system of defence for the accused needs to be put into place and senior officers in the chain of command need to be sensitised so as not to interfere in the deliverance of justice in the military. Presiding officers and officers of the JAG Branch have to be absolutely inert from slanted influences and pre-decisions at all levels.
Objectivity, change in judicial perception coupled with the inception of the AFT, hopefully this would put to rest those strong adjectives for military system of jurisprudence.
Courtesy: http://www.indianmilitary.info
I am reproducing here Major Navdeep Singh's informative article on the subject:
Armed Forces Tribunal (AFT) appointments underway : Military Jurisprudence - coming of age?
Navdeep Singh
“Draconian”, maybe not, “archaic”, perhaps.
Many pejorative adjectives have been used to describe the present system of military justice in India, but does it deserve such criticism ? More than the statutes themselves, the problem perhaps is with the executors, the method of understanding the spirit behind, and the final implementation of the statutory provisions of the Army Act, 1950, Air Force Act, 1952 and Navy Act, 1957. The provisions of these Acts, though oppressive in parts, were never meant to be draconian and do have a number of inbuilt checks and balances, but of course the method of using the best of these is open to debate. So what was wrong with the system that forced the govt to bring in the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007 ? The one line answer echoed in legal corridors would be - ‘lack of an effective appeal’. The same sentiment was reflected by the Supreme Court in the case of Lt Col Prithi Pal Singh Bedi Vs Union of India (1982) where the Court observed that the absence of even one appeal and power to review evidence was distressing and a glaring lacuna.
Where in the world would you find a judicial system without an appeal, here in India of course. The three Acts did not contain a single provision that could be deemed akin to a judicial appeal. There was a provision of pre and post confirmation petitions but these were rarely used in a fashion more than a mere formality. No judicial authority had the jurisdiction to look into or examine the evidence on the basis of which court martial sentences were rendered or the merits of the issues involved. The High Courts and the Apex Court under the writ jurisdiction could of course intervene but only in cases where there was a flouting of statutory provisions or when the sentences rendered were particularly harsh and not commensurate with the offence. The Supreme Court further observed in Ranjit Thakur Vs Union of India (1987) that conscience shaking sentences which are irrationally disproportionate would not be immune from judicial review. The Supreme Court opined that irrationality and perversity were definite grounds wherein Courts could intervene.
These shortcomings notwithstanding, it would not exactly be appropriate to say that the three military Acts are without enough checks to avoid miscarriage of justice, there are ample provisions parallel to those available under the criminal system of jurisprudence but the problem remains that unlike the criminal courts, courts martial are presided over not by judicial officers but by officers of the regular army who neither have the acumen nor the bent towards legal and judicial modalities. Moreover, all procedures finally leading to conviction by a court martial (such as Courts of Inquiry, Summary of Evidence etc) are handled by military personnel who may just follow provisions of military Acts and Rules in formal letter but not in spirit - and this makes all the difference. And this also brings us to the answer why a body of professionals such as the AFT is so very urgently required to sit in judgement and appeal over justice rendered to men and women in uniform by another set of men and women in uniform.
The military Acts of India were derivatives of similar Acts of the British and that was the basis why these Acts seemed oppressive. These were moulded as such so as to maintain a grip on discipline over the native Army. The existing Army Act of India, for example, can trace its origin to East India Company’s Mutiny Act, 1754 and the Articles of War of the late 1800s, followed by the Indian Army Act of 1911. Of course this could not be justification enough to retain provisions such as Summary Court Martial after independence or to use terms as ‘customs of war’ in these Acts leading to ambiguity of action by those who want to repress. There is no place for ‘customs’ and ambiguity in criminal jurisprudence and all provisions certainly need to be codified and brought out in black and white. Yes, there may be a difference in the quantum of punishment prescribed for offences in operational and non-operational areas and there may be operation-specific offences but all need to be put in words without leaving any scope of indistinctness in action.
Other countries following contemporary systems of justice such as the UK and the USA have since long recognised the need of reducing ‘customs’ to the barest minimum and having an elaborate system of appeal, but India, despite observations by various High Courts, committees and even the Supreme Court, failed to come out of a crude grundnorm which forms the basis of the Army, Navy and Air Force Acts till date.
So how would the AFT help? Firstly, the AFT would be a forum of professionals with judicial and military background, a perfect mix to handle legal issues of the military. While the Chairperson can either be a retired Judge of the Supreme Court or a retired Chief Justice of a High Court, Judicial Members shall be former Judges of High Courts. The Administrative Members would be retired Major Generals or above of any of the three defence services. Each bench of the Tribunal shall consist of a Judicial and an Administrative Member. The Tribunal shall have the power to deal with all findings, orders and decisions of Courts Martial and related matters. As a welcome measure, the AFT has also been granted the power to release persons under military custody on bail. The AFT has also been conferred with powers of Contempt. Unlike the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT), an appeal from the AFT shall lie directly with the Supreme Court.
Besides courts martial, the subject matter of the AFT shall also include service matters such as remuneration, pension, retirment benefits, tenure, appointment, seniority, promotion, superannuation and the like. However Summary trials where dismissal is awarded or Summary Court Martial awards except where dismissal or imprisonment over three months is awarded, would not be under the ambit of the Tribunal. Transfers, postings and leave related matters shall also not be under the purview of the AFT. In case of service matters, even dependants, successors and heirs would be able to approach the Tribunal for justice.
The setting up of the AFT which is bound to bring the much needed relief to military litigants, shall also ensure handling of critical issues by former members of judiciary who would be from outside the ‘chain of command’ and therefore dealing cases with a clean slate with no biases or prejudices. They shall of course be assisted by former military officers - the administrative members, who would, with consensus, be providing important inputs resulting in what hopefully would be well-rounded judicial pronouncements meeting the aspirations of all affected. The AFT would also be in conjunction with the observations by the Supreme Court about providing a proper appellate body for courts martial.
But the AFT, without in-house introspection (below) would not be an answer to the shortcomings of the system. What needs to be eliminated is the subjectivity at all levels, starting from initial stages of Inquiry ending with the Trial. The letter of law at all stages needs to be followed in spirit and not as a sheer formality; an effective system of defence for the accused needs to be put into place and senior officers in the chain of command need to be sensitised so as not to interfere in the deliverance of justice in the military. Presiding officers and officers of the JAG Branch have to be absolutely inert from slanted influences and pre-decisions at all levels.
Objectivity, change in judicial perception coupled with the inception of the AFT, hopefully this would put to rest those strong adjectives for military system of jurisprudence.
Courtesy: http://www.indianmilitary.info
Sunday, June 14, 2009
Honouring the veteran
A veteran Indian army officer, Colonel P P Vyas had recently circulated an extract (pages 110 & 111) from the book ‘Toward Resurgent India ’ written by Lt. Gen.(Retd.) M. M. Lakhera, one time Lt. Gov. of Pondicherry and also of Andaman & Nicobar, and now the Governor of Mizoram (and my old teacher at the College of Combat for the Senior Command Course). It made me happy to see how Indian old soldiers are recognised in the United Kingdom. It also made me sad at the contrast in India, where the old soldier would have been elbowed out by an indifferent policeman on security duty to make way for the Deputy Prime Minister, who would whiz past with red lights blazing. I doubt whether any member of our cabinet would recognise a Param Vir Chakra, the Indian equivalent one of Victoria Cross, even if they see one.
Here is what Lt Gen Lakhera says: “I had gone to UK in 1995 as Deputy Leader of the Indian Delegation to take part in the 50th Anniversary celebrations of the victory in Europe during the Second World War. I along with four other Army officers, had just stepped out after attending the inaugural session and were waiting on the roadside for the traffic to ease so as to walk across the road to the vehicle park. Among those with me was Honorary Captain Umrao Singh,a Victorian Cross winner (unfortunately, I have received the sad news of his expiry just two days back). All of a sudden a car moving on the road came to a halt in front of us and a well dressed gentleman stepped out. He approached Umrao Singh and said, “Sir, may I have the privilege of shaking hand with the Victoria Cross?” He shook hands with him. Evidently he had spotted Umrao Singh’s medal from his car and had stopped his car to pay his respect to a winner of the highest gallantry medal of his country.
Then he looked at me and said, “General, you are from Indian Army.” When I replied in affirmative, he gave out his name, saying that he was Maichile Hailstine. I was absolutely astounded as the recognition dawned on me that he was the Deputy Prime Minister of UK . I was totally overawed by such courtesy shown by a dignitary of the second highest status in the British Government and humbly thanked him for having invited our delegation for the VE Day function. Again his reply was typical of his sagacity, “General, it is we the British, who should be grateful to your country and your Armed Forces, who had helped us win both the first and the second World wars. How can we be ever so ungrateful to forget your country’s great contribution.” Suddenly I became conscious that all the traffic behind his car had come to stand still. I hurried to thank him and politely requested him to move along to relieve the traffic hold-up. He stated, “Sir, how dare I drive off when Victoria Cross has to cross the road.”
Realizing his genuine feeling I and my colleagues quickly crossed the road. Reaching the other side I looked back and saw that Mr. Hailstine was still standing waiting for the Victoria Cross to be safely across. Ladies & Gentlemen, that is the type of regards they have for their decorated soldiers. I have always aspired that similar respect could be shown at least to a Param Vir Chakra or Ashok Chakra winner by the leaders and prominent figures in our country.”
Here is what Lt Gen Lakhera says: “I had gone to UK in 1995 as Deputy Leader of the Indian Delegation to take part in the 50th Anniversary celebrations of the victory in Europe during the Second World War. I along with four other Army officers, had just stepped out after attending the inaugural session and were waiting on the roadside for the traffic to ease so as to walk across the road to the vehicle park. Among those with me was Honorary Captain Umrao Singh,a Victorian Cross winner (unfortunately, I have received the sad news of his expiry just two days back). All of a sudden a car moving on the road came to a halt in front of us and a well dressed gentleman stepped out. He approached Umrao Singh and said, “Sir, may I have the privilege of shaking hand with the Victoria Cross?” He shook hands with him. Evidently he had spotted Umrao Singh’s medal from his car and had stopped his car to pay his respect to a winner of the highest gallantry medal of his country.
Then he looked at me and said, “General, you are from Indian Army.” When I replied in affirmative, he gave out his name, saying that he was Maichile Hailstine. I was absolutely astounded as the recognition dawned on me that he was the Deputy Prime Minister of UK . I was totally overawed by such courtesy shown by a dignitary of the second highest status in the British Government and humbly thanked him for having invited our delegation for the VE Day function. Again his reply was typical of his sagacity, “General, it is we the British, who should be grateful to your country and your Armed Forces, who had helped us win both the first and the second World wars. How can we be ever so ungrateful to forget your country’s great contribution.” Suddenly I became conscious that all the traffic behind his car had come to stand still. I hurried to thank him and politely requested him to move along to relieve the traffic hold-up. He stated, “Sir, how dare I drive off when Victoria Cross has to cross the road.”
Realizing his genuine feeling I and my colleagues quickly crossed the road. Reaching the other side I looked back and saw that Mr. Hailstine was still standing waiting for the Victoria Cross to be safely across. Ladies & Gentlemen, that is the type of regards they have for their decorated soldiers. I have always aspired that similar respect could be shown at least to a Param Vir Chakra or Ashok Chakra winner by the leaders and prominent figures in our country.”
Thursday, June 11, 2009
Are we ready for the changing global strategic environment?
The U.S.economic meltdown, with its tectonic effects worldwide, is causing some readjustments in the global strategic environment. Chief among them is likely to be the U.S.-China relations. At the same time, Barack Obama, the new occupant of the White House, is trying out an entirely new approach to issues relating to South Asia. So time has come for India to take a hard look at some of them that affect her national security; these include Af-Pak situation, China's increasing profile in South Asia, giving form to the Indo-U.S.strategic relations, and of course a whole lot of nuclear issues. My article "How safe are we? And how safe do we feel?" published in the latest issue of GFiles some of these discussing these aspects is reproduced here, courtesy GFiles, for your reading. It may not be reproduced in any form without the permission of www.gfilesindia.com, who hold the copyright of the article.
GFiles, Vol 3, Issue 3 June 2009
How safe are we? And how safe do we feel?
There is a need to draw up new assessments because the international environment will undergo major changes in the near term
Col R Hariharan
Though the people have voted once again to choose Congress party led coalition to power for a second term in New Delhi, Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh’s government had not covered itself with glory in handling national security issues in its earlier term in office. The record of Atal Bihari Vajapayee-led Bharatiya Janata Party coalition government earlier was equally inept. However, both the prime ministers had responded to security issues when forced to do so. Dr Manmohan Singh stood fast to ensure the safe passage of the Indo-US Nuclear Agreement despite the Leftists threat to pull the rug under the feet of his government. Similarly, Vajapayee’s response to the dangerous Pakistani military adventure in Kargil was equally strong.
The reason for India’s “traditional” knee jerk response is simple - lack of systems thinking in handling of national security issues, abetted by the absence of a national vision. The political and policy dispensations have not been able to evolve a mutually reinforcing approach to security and foreign policy issues. The country has shown a singular lack of will to face issues squarely and dispassionately to ensure a stable security environment in India’s neighbourhood. As a result India has been losing strategic ground even in South Asia, despite its unique geo-strategic advantages.
The national security agenda is generally perceived as limited to ensuring territorial integrity and safeguarding the nation from external and internal threat. Political parties appear to forget that they have a responsibility to foster a feeling of security and trust in the government among the citizens. In other words, the national security has to be people orientated and not merely restricted to military or political diplomacy. This was amply demonstrated in the general feeling of insecurity and lack of trust in the government after the 26/11 terrorist attacks in Mumbai. Some of the informed citizens cynically expressed their doubts of the Indian style of democracy ever responding to calls of national security.
Now that the Congress-led alliance has got a strong mandate from the people, it should redraw the national security agenda. Ideally the agenda should address issues relating to policy, structural and operational aspects.
The first task would be to restore public confidence in the government. That can come only when the government is clear about what it should do. As there are external determinants of national security dynamics, a long term vision is required to be drawn up. The other policy components would be the accountability of advisory, policy making and executive authorities, and working in a time bound manner with clear benchmarks. Then only the operational structure would respond effectively to real time needs.
There is a need to draw up a fresh threat assessment as the global strategic environment is set to undergo some changes in the near term. And these are likely affect the power equation in South Asia, particularly in respect of Pakistan, China, India’s neighbouring countries and the Indian Ocean. The environment is going to be increasingly complex involving economic, fiscal, technology, diplomatic, and political issues. Each one of these issues has the potential to affect internal security threats as well. So, policy making on national security will have to be integrated, inclusive and proactive.
U.S. President Barack Obama, in keeping with his electoral promise, has introduced a few changes in the U.S. approach to the war on terror in Afghanistan and the U.S. involvement in Iraq. A more nuanced approach is likely to come into play in the U.S. handling Iran, North Korea, and even Myanmar - countries dubbed earlier as axis of evil.
The compulsions of the U.S. economic meltdown have adversely impacted the largely export-oriented manufacturing economy of China. This has set both the countries on path of convergence of their economic interests. The close win-win economic relations being built between the U.S. and China could colour, if not distort, the U.S.’s traditional stand on some of the contentious issues between the two countries. Thus we can expect their fall out in India’s neighbourhood also, offering better opportunities for growth of Chinese influence in this region.
As a result of this, some of the China related issues could come increasingly under Indian security scanner in the next few years. These include: increase in Chinese profile in Nepal under the Maoist regime, increasing global acceptance of Myanmar as a domain of China’s strategic interest sidelining India’s security interests, and the increasing strategic presence of China in Sri Lanka and Indian Ocean. Under adverse conditions, the future of Tibetan refugees in India and their struggle for autonomy could also become a contentious issue between India and China.
The much heralded U.S. war on terror in Afghanistan is in disarray with increasing spread of Taliban control over Pakistan territory contiguous to the Afghan border. In fact the democratically elected government of Pakistan is locked in a battle of survival to stop the Taliban forces threatening to take over the country. President Obama’s U.S. prescription for Afghanistan has identified Pakistan as a key player in the war against the Taliban. This has resulted in Pakistan gaining a position of primacy following the extension of the Afghan operational theatre to include Pak territory also.
The U.S. is set to expand its footprint inside Pakistan with the extension of financial and military assistance to strengthen Pakistan armed forces to fight the Taliban. The Pentagon has asked the U.S.Congress to allocate $400 million this year as the first instalment for a new "Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund" to meet specific Pakistani military training and equipment needs as part of a five-year programme. In the past, Pakistan army had always used such U.S. largesse to build its conventional military capability against India, because it views India as its primary threat. Thus whatever is the U.S. intention, Pakistan armed forces are likely to emerge stronger in the coming years; and that would change the dynamics of India’s threat perception relating to Pakistan.
The increasing risk of Taliban forces gaining access to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons has added yet another dangerous dimension to the security scene in Pakistan. The repeated assurances from Pakistan government discounting such a possibility have found few as many suspect the limbs of the government including the armed forces and intelligence are embedded with pro-Taliban elements. It is imperative that Indian policy makers handle this issue with circumspection as the U.S. could use it to get India militarily involved into the strategic mess against the Taliban in the Af-Pak region.
The previous U.S President George W. Bush had laid the foundation for building a strategic alliance with India. Dr Manmohan Singh’s government had claimed the signing of the Indo-US Civil Nuclear Agreement as an important achievement of this new found relationship. However, as the new dispensation in Washington is a strong votary of NPT regime the nuclear agreement runs the risk of being sidelined. The statement of the U.S. assistant secretary of state, Rose Gottemoeller, at the 2010 the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) review conference in New York recently affirming "universal adherence of the NPT itself, including by India, Israel, Pakistan and North Korea, remains a fundamental objective of the United States," has serious connotations for India.
At the same time, there are disturbing reports from Pakistan about the rapid progress in building two large plutonium production reactors that could lead to qualitative and quantitative increase in Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. Americans have apparently chosen to ignore this development in public, probably due to political, diplomatic and military pressures. India needs to be on watch to handle such realpolitik situation when the non-proliferation card comes into play.
On the operational front, our biggest weakness is in timely procurement of defence needs. Unless we invest in strategic military assets well in time, we would lose ground in our own neighbourhood. And stodgy defence procurement had been the biggest road block faced by the security forces in building their strategic capability. There is an urgent need to unclog the channels of procurement that are incapacitating our strategic capability. Otherwise we will be inviting increasing Chinese presence in our neighbourhood. China is rapidly building its naval and missile capabilities. Coupled with its increasing economic clout, Indian Ocean and its peripheral countries are likely to become the scene of China’s heightened power assertion.
By rejecting politicians who traded their caste, communal and criminal proclivities instead of meeting the needs of the people, voters have shown that they were not going to be swayed by rhetoric and politicking. They want results on the ground. So it would be politically prudent for the new government in New Delhi to seriously address long pending national security issues. National interest should be the sole criterion in handling India’s security and foreign policy dispensations. And implementing a new time bound security agenda integrated with foreign policy objectives would be the first step in making it a reality.
Courtesy: GFiles
GFiles, Vol 3, Issue 3 June 2009
How safe are we? And how safe do we feel?
There is a need to draw up new assessments because the international environment will undergo major changes in the near term
Col R Hariharan
Though the people have voted once again to choose Congress party led coalition to power for a second term in New Delhi, Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh’s government had not covered itself with glory in handling national security issues in its earlier term in office. The record of Atal Bihari Vajapayee-led Bharatiya Janata Party coalition government earlier was equally inept. However, both the prime ministers had responded to security issues when forced to do so. Dr Manmohan Singh stood fast to ensure the safe passage of the Indo-US Nuclear Agreement despite the Leftists threat to pull the rug under the feet of his government. Similarly, Vajapayee’s response to the dangerous Pakistani military adventure in Kargil was equally strong.
The reason for India’s “traditional” knee jerk response is simple - lack of systems thinking in handling of national security issues, abetted by the absence of a national vision. The political and policy dispensations have not been able to evolve a mutually reinforcing approach to security and foreign policy issues. The country has shown a singular lack of will to face issues squarely and dispassionately to ensure a stable security environment in India’s neighbourhood. As a result India has been losing strategic ground even in South Asia, despite its unique geo-strategic advantages.
The national security agenda is generally perceived as limited to ensuring territorial integrity and safeguarding the nation from external and internal threat. Political parties appear to forget that they have a responsibility to foster a feeling of security and trust in the government among the citizens. In other words, the national security has to be people orientated and not merely restricted to military or political diplomacy. This was amply demonstrated in the general feeling of insecurity and lack of trust in the government after the 26/11 terrorist attacks in Mumbai. Some of the informed citizens cynically expressed their doubts of the Indian style of democracy ever responding to calls of national security.
Now that the Congress-led alliance has got a strong mandate from the people, it should redraw the national security agenda. Ideally the agenda should address issues relating to policy, structural and operational aspects.
The first task would be to restore public confidence in the government. That can come only when the government is clear about what it should do. As there are external determinants of national security dynamics, a long term vision is required to be drawn up. The other policy components would be the accountability of advisory, policy making and executive authorities, and working in a time bound manner with clear benchmarks. Then only the operational structure would respond effectively to real time needs.
There is a need to draw up a fresh threat assessment as the global strategic environment is set to undergo some changes in the near term. And these are likely affect the power equation in South Asia, particularly in respect of Pakistan, China, India’s neighbouring countries and the Indian Ocean. The environment is going to be increasingly complex involving economic, fiscal, technology, diplomatic, and political issues. Each one of these issues has the potential to affect internal security threats as well. So, policy making on national security will have to be integrated, inclusive and proactive.
U.S. President Barack Obama, in keeping with his electoral promise, has introduced a few changes in the U.S. approach to the war on terror in Afghanistan and the U.S. involvement in Iraq. A more nuanced approach is likely to come into play in the U.S. handling Iran, North Korea, and even Myanmar - countries dubbed earlier as axis of evil.
The compulsions of the U.S. economic meltdown have adversely impacted the largely export-oriented manufacturing economy of China. This has set both the countries on path of convergence of their economic interests. The close win-win economic relations being built between the U.S. and China could colour, if not distort, the U.S.’s traditional stand on some of the contentious issues between the two countries. Thus we can expect their fall out in India’s neighbourhood also, offering better opportunities for growth of Chinese influence in this region.
As a result of this, some of the China related issues could come increasingly under Indian security scanner in the next few years. These include: increase in Chinese profile in Nepal under the Maoist regime, increasing global acceptance of Myanmar as a domain of China’s strategic interest sidelining India’s security interests, and the increasing strategic presence of China in Sri Lanka and Indian Ocean. Under adverse conditions, the future of Tibetan refugees in India and their struggle for autonomy could also become a contentious issue between India and China.
The much heralded U.S. war on terror in Afghanistan is in disarray with increasing spread of Taliban control over Pakistan territory contiguous to the Afghan border. In fact the democratically elected government of Pakistan is locked in a battle of survival to stop the Taliban forces threatening to take over the country. President Obama’s U.S. prescription for Afghanistan has identified Pakistan as a key player in the war against the Taliban. This has resulted in Pakistan gaining a position of primacy following the extension of the Afghan operational theatre to include Pak territory also.
The U.S. is set to expand its footprint inside Pakistan with the extension of financial and military assistance to strengthen Pakistan armed forces to fight the Taliban. The Pentagon has asked the U.S.Congress to allocate $400 million this year as the first instalment for a new "Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund" to meet specific Pakistani military training and equipment needs as part of a five-year programme. In the past, Pakistan army had always used such U.S. largesse to build its conventional military capability against India, because it views India as its primary threat. Thus whatever is the U.S. intention, Pakistan armed forces are likely to emerge stronger in the coming years; and that would change the dynamics of India’s threat perception relating to Pakistan.
The increasing risk of Taliban forces gaining access to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons has added yet another dangerous dimension to the security scene in Pakistan. The repeated assurances from Pakistan government discounting such a possibility have found few as many suspect the limbs of the government including the armed forces and intelligence are embedded with pro-Taliban elements. It is imperative that Indian policy makers handle this issue with circumspection as the U.S. could use it to get India militarily involved into the strategic mess against the Taliban in the Af-Pak region.
The previous U.S President George W. Bush had laid the foundation for building a strategic alliance with India. Dr Manmohan Singh’s government had claimed the signing of the Indo-US Civil Nuclear Agreement as an important achievement of this new found relationship. However, as the new dispensation in Washington is a strong votary of NPT regime the nuclear agreement runs the risk of being sidelined. The statement of the U.S. assistant secretary of state, Rose Gottemoeller, at the 2010 the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) review conference in New York recently affirming "universal adherence of the NPT itself, including by India, Israel, Pakistan and North Korea, remains a fundamental objective of the United States," has serious connotations for India.
At the same time, there are disturbing reports from Pakistan about the rapid progress in building two large plutonium production reactors that could lead to qualitative and quantitative increase in Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. Americans have apparently chosen to ignore this development in public, probably due to political, diplomatic and military pressures. India needs to be on watch to handle such realpolitik situation when the non-proliferation card comes into play.
On the operational front, our biggest weakness is in timely procurement of defence needs. Unless we invest in strategic military assets well in time, we would lose ground in our own neighbourhood. And stodgy defence procurement had been the biggest road block faced by the security forces in building their strategic capability. There is an urgent need to unclog the channels of procurement that are incapacitating our strategic capability. Otherwise we will be inviting increasing Chinese presence in our neighbourhood. China is rapidly building its naval and missile capabilities. Coupled with its increasing economic clout, Indian Ocean and its peripheral countries are likely to become the scene of China’s heightened power assertion.
By rejecting politicians who traded their caste, communal and criminal proclivities instead of meeting the needs of the people, voters have shown that they were not going to be swayed by rhetoric and politicking. They want results on the ground. So it would be politically prudent for the new government in New Delhi to seriously address long pending national security issues. National interest should be the sole criterion in handling India’s security and foreign policy dispensations. And implementing a new time bound security agenda integrated with foreign policy objectives would be the first step in making it a reality.
Courtesy: GFiles
Tuesday, June 9, 2009
Media Bytes on Sri Lanka - June 9, 2009
[Here are my answers to some of the recent questions relating to Sri Lanka from media representatives.]
1. Are you surprised at the decimation of the LTTE? Was it coming for them?
No; it comes as no surprise. In the last three years of operation, the LTTE never regained military initiative. They could not launch a sizeable counter offensive. The army was bent upon causing maximum casualties; and the liquidation and decimation of [LTTE] leadership in the end was the only surprise. It looked so pointless for the leadership to stay to die.
2. What caused the downfall of the LTTE- militarily and politically
This is too big an issue to answer in one or two sentences. Prabhakaran made many strategic blunders; I have summarised them here:
* Handling of Karuna: Karuna’s complaints were handled with disdain. No effort was made to patch up with him. Instead killer squads were sent. This resulted in his breakaway from the LTTE. East was the main source of recruits for the LTTE; this source dried up after Karuna’s departure with detrimental results on LTTE’s military capability during war
* Boycott of Presidential Poll 2005:LTTE imposed the boycott in areas under its control and prevented Tamils from voting. This resulted in the defeat of Ranil Wickremesinghe, who sponsored the peace process 2002 and election of his rival Mahinda Rajapaksa as President with a wafer thin majority, mainly through Southern Sinhala votes. Prabhakaran did not take seriously Rajapaksa’s repeated avowal to eliminate the LTTE, made during the electoral campaign.
* Ignoring International Reaction: Prabhakaran failed to read the changing global attitude to terrorist methods after 9/11 terror attacks and measures taken to control transnational terrorism. His repeated violations of ceasefire terms, particularly the killing of Sri Lanka Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar, in utter disregard to international opinion on such acts, resulted in 32 countries banning the organisation. Similarly the attack on Army Commander damaged LTTE’s international credibility further and provided legitimacy for Sri Lanka to go to war that led to the defeat of LTTE.
* Mending Relations with India: After gaining the status of sole arbiter of the Tamil cause in the peace process, the LTTE failed to mend its relations with India. Thanks to Prabhakaran’s egoistic reasoning the fund of goodwill for the Tamil cause existing in India was never tapped to pressurise Sri Lanka to arrive at a political solution. Instead it was the successive Sri Lanka presidents who cultivated New Delhi to their advantage.
* Failure to Objectively Assess the Security Forces: Riding the crest of success in 2002, Prabhakaran was probably lulled into the self believe that the LTTE was invincible. Perhaps this was the reason that prevented him from objectively assessing the strategic impact of the emerging convergence of Sri Lanka’s political and military goals after President Rajapaksa took over. The international support and cooperation to Sri Lanka, particularly in improving the military’s capability were used as material for LTTE propaganda than assessing their impact on the fighting prowess of the security forces. This led to gross underestimation of the ability of the security forces to relentlessly pursue their offensive against the LTTE.
* Inability to provide a strategic military response: After the loss of its territory in the eastern province, the LTTE had no proactive strategy in the north. It was the security forces that held the military initiative all along. The LTTE failed to pick up the gauntlet and achieve a strategic surprise during the three-year long campaign, as it did in the Eelam War III when it captured the Elephant Pass, despite the overwhelming Sri Lankan superiority in fire power and strength there.
* Trapping civilians in the war zone: The LTTE moved all the civilians from captured areas to areas under its control as the security forces advanced. This was a reactive defence strategy and affected the mobility of cadres, pinning them down to static defences. This questionable strategy neither prevented the security forces from using their heavy weapons and air force nor vindicated the LTTE’s use of civilians as human shields. It generated only adverse publicity.
3. How much role does Prabhakaran has in this downfall?
No LTTE action is possible without Prabhakaran's clearance. So everything that happened to the LTTE was his own making.
4. How did the Sri Lanka government get sudden spurt in their military strength and political resolve as to end the crisis in two years?
It was not sudden spurt; in the presidential poll held in 2005 Rajapaksa had announced that if he was elected he would cancel the peace process and ceasefire agreement and eliminate LTTE. The war started in 2006. In the three years the armed forces were systematically improved and strengthened. The President provided the political leadership and Gen Fonseka did a professional job of leading army to victory. It was deliberate and not left to chance.
5. What role should India have played in this war? How should it now behave in Sri Lanka and handle Tamil problem?
India played a limited role in training naval and army personnel and supplying non-lethal weapons. Your question on India's future Lanka policy is yet to be answered by the new Govt of India itself. It has to decide on its strategic compulsions and act.
6. Can the Kashmir problem be compared with the Tamil issue of Lanka?
No; they are as different as chalk is from cheese.
7. What would be the future of the LTTE and the Tamil cause, in your opinion, post war?
Rajapaksa will dictate the terms of Tamil devolution. As the Tamils have no worthwhile leadership, either politically or militarily, as the LTTE may take years to get back into shape. It is going to be a tough time for Tamils unless Rajapaksa is benevolent and large hearted. This is what Prabhakaran's failed mission has achieved.
1. Are you surprised at the decimation of the LTTE? Was it coming for them?
No; it comes as no surprise. In the last three years of operation, the LTTE never regained military initiative. They could not launch a sizeable counter offensive. The army was bent upon causing maximum casualties; and the liquidation and decimation of [LTTE] leadership in the end was the only surprise. It looked so pointless for the leadership to stay to die.
2. What caused the downfall of the LTTE- militarily and politically
This is too big an issue to answer in one or two sentences. Prabhakaran made many strategic blunders; I have summarised them here:
* Handling of Karuna: Karuna’s complaints were handled with disdain. No effort was made to patch up with him. Instead killer squads were sent. This resulted in his breakaway from the LTTE. East was the main source of recruits for the LTTE; this source dried up after Karuna’s departure with detrimental results on LTTE’s military capability during war
* Boycott of Presidential Poll 2005:LTTE imposed the boycott in areas under its control and prevented Tamils from voting. This resulted in the defeat of Ranil Wickremesinghe, who sponsored the peace process 2002 and election of his rival Mahinda Rajapaksa as President with a wafer thin majority, mainly through Southern Sinhala votes. Prabhakaran did not take seriously Rajapaksa’s repeated avowal to eliminate the LTTE, made during the electoral campaign.
* Ignoring International Reaction: Prabhakaran failed to read the changing global attitude to terrorist methods after 9/11 terror attacks and measures taken to control transnational terrorism. His repeated violations of ceasefire terms, particularly the killing of Sri Lanka Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar, in utter disregard to international opinion on such acts, resulted in 32 countries banning the organisation. Similarly the attack on Army Commander damaged LTTE’s international credibility further and provided legitimacy for Sri Lanka to go to war that led to the defeat of LTTE.
* Mending Relations with India: After gaining the status of sole arbiter of the Tamil cause in the peace process, the LTTE failed to mend its relations with India. Thanks to Prabhakaran’s egoistic reasoning the fund of goodwill for the Tamil cause existing in India was never tapped to pressurise Sri Lanka to arrive at a political solution. Instead it was the successive Sri Lanka presidents who cultivated New Delhi to their advantage.
* Failure to Objectively Assess the Security Forces: Riding the crest of success in 2002, Prabhakaran was probably lulled into the self believe that the LTTE was invincible. Perhaps this was the reason that prevented him from objectively assessing the strategic impact of the emerging convergence of Sri Lanka’s political and military goals after President Rajapaksa took over. The international support and cooperation to Sri Lanka, particularly in improving the military’s capability were used as material for LTTE propaganda than assessing their impact on the fighting prowess of the security forces. This led to gross underestimation of the ability of the security forces to relentlessly pursue their offensive against the LTTE.
* Inability to provide a strategic military response: After the loss of its territory in the eastern province, the LTTE had no proactive strategy in the north. It was the security forces that held the military initiative all along. The LTTE failed to pick up the gauntlet and achieve a strategic surprise during the three-year long campaign, as it did in the Eelam War III when it captured the Elephant Pass, despite the overwhelming Sri Lankan superiority in fire power and strength there.
* Trapping civilians in the war zone: The LTTE moved all the civilians from captured areas to areas under its control as the security forces advanced. This was a reactive defence strategy and affected the mobility of cadres, pinning them down to static defences. This questionable strategy neither prevented the security forces from using their heavy weapons and air force nor vindicated the LTTE’s use of civilians as human shields. It generated only adverse publicity.
3. How much role does Prabhakaran has in this downfall?
No LTTE action is possible without Prabhakaran's clearance. So everything that happened to the LTTE was his own making.
4. How did the Sri Lanka government get sudden spurt in their military strength and political resolve as to end the crisis in two years?
It was not sudden spurt; in the presidential poll held in 2005 Rajapaksa had announced that if he was elected he would cancel the peace process and ceasefire agreement and eliminate LTTE. The war started in 2006. In the three years the armed forces were systematically improved and strengthened. The President provided the political leadership and Gen Fonseka did a professional job of leading army to victory. It was deliberate and not left to chance.
5. What role should India have played in this war? How should it now behave in Sri Lanka and handle Tamil problem?
India played a limited role in training naval and army personnel and supplying non-lethal weapons. Your question on India's future Lanka policy is yet to be answered by the new Govt of India itself. It has to decide on its strategic compulsions and act.
6. Can the Kashmir problem be compared with the Tamil issue of Lanka?
No; they are as different as chalk is from cheese.
7. What would be the future of the LTTE and the Tamil cause, in your opinion, post war?
Rajapaksa will dictate the terms of Tamil devolution. As the Tamils have no worthwhile leadership, either politically or militarily, as the LTTE may take years to get back into shape. It is going to be a tough time for Tamils unless Rajapaksa is benevolent and large hearted. This is what Prabhakaran's failed mission has achieved.
Media bytes on Chinese influence in Sri Lanka
[Here are my answers to some of the questions raised by media representatives on the growing influence of China in Sri Lanka noticed during the recent war in Sri Lanka.]
1.How important was China's support ( arms and diplomacy) for Sri Lanka to defeat the Tigers militarily? Would Sri Lanka have been able to achieve the victory on this timescale without China's help?
On both counts - diplomacy and arms supply - China has rendered invaluable help to Sri Lanka in its war effort against the Tamil Tigers.There are three reasons for this.
a. Chinese arms are readily available at cheaper prices in the global arms market. Sri Lanka had been using Chinese weapons for some time and its troops are familiar in the use of Chinese weaponry. These are important aspects during war situations.[It is good to remember that India was not able to meet Sri Lanka's military requirements due to political reasons. Even otherwise, Chinese weapons are preferred by many countries on the basis of price and ready availability. China is geared for global weapons export market; India is not.]
b. China has no inhibitions about supplying arms, unlike India which has internal political compulsions that affect arms supply to Sri Lanka.
c. Diplomatically, China as a permanent member of the UN Security Council can help Sri Lanka in warding off international criticism. This was evident when the West wanted UN SC to take up the issue of HR violations in Sri Lanka. China has not hesitated to use its veto powers in such cases. And as China has behaved similarly in case of Darfur, and Burma nobody has high moral expectations from it than say a country like India.
2. Why was China so keen to offer that support?
Strategically China perhaps wants to cultivate Sri Lanka as a friendly cockpit for its Indian Ocean defence as China's vital shipping lanes are dominated by Sri Lanka. Moreover, Sri Lanka by its geographic location is the southern vanguard of India's strategic defence. As India is the major competing power in the South Asian region,China would like to strengthen its presence in India's neighbourhood. She has been doing it in Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh and Burma. Even Maldives is now coming under increasing Chinese attention.
3. Is there a connection with the construction of Hambantota?
Of course[there is]; but to be fair to Sri Lanka, I learn they offered it to India first and as India did not sound enthusiastic, Chinese jumped in.
3. China has consistently maintained that Hambantota and Gwadar are commercial enterprises only. How far do you believe this to be the case and, even if they only that are now, what is stop them being used for other purposes later if the political climate changed?
As of now they are commercial enterprises. But there is nothing commercial in their strategic significance in times of war. For instance Gwadar is being linked through a land link/oil pipeline from China to gain direct access to Arabian Sea. And in war time these infrastructure assets will become military/naval assets.Only the concurrence of the host nation for China to use it in times of war will probably be required. If the compulsions are powerful, China may override such concurrence also.
4. To this extent, how much of a worry is it for India that China is investing in these ports?
While India should not 'worry' on each specific Chinese action, it should be concerned about any factor potentially destabilising to its strategic security, introduced in its area of influence. And Hambantota in Sri Lanka is one such case. Unfortunately, our political decision making process on strategic issues is often influenced more by concerns other than national strategic security. India can develop Trincomalee on eastern coast of Sri Lanka as major commercial pub for Indian Ocean traffic. This would balance Chinese influence. But we seem to be lethargic in acting on such issues and we will pay the price when the time comes.
1.How important was China's support ( arms and diplomacy) for Sri Lanka to defeat the Tigers militarily? Would Sri Lanka have been able to achieve the victory on this timescale without China's help?
On both counts - diplomacy and arms supply - China has rendered invaluable help to Sri Lanka in its war effort against the Tamil Tigers.There are three reasons for this.
a. Chinese arms are readily available at cheaper prices in the global arms market. Sri Lanka had been using Chinese weapons for some time and its troops are familiar in the use of Chinese weaponry. These are important aspects during war situations.[It is good to remember that India was not able to meet Sri Lanka's military requirements due to political reasons. Even otherwise, Chinese weapons are preferred by many countries on the basis of price and ready availability. China is geared for global weapons export market; India is not.]
b. China has no inhibitions about supplying arms, unlike India which has internal political compulsions that affect arms supply to Sri Lanka.
c. Diplomatically, China as a permanent member of the UN Security Council can help Sri Lanka in warding off international criticism. This was evident when the West wanted UN SC to take up the issue of HR violations in Sri Lanka. China has not hesitated to use its veto powers in such cases. And as China has behaved similarly in case of Darfur, and Burma nobody has high moral expectations from it than say a country like India.
2. Why was China so keen to offer that support?
Strategically China perhaps wants to cultivate Sri Lanka as a friendly cockpit for its Indian Ocean defence as China's vital shipping lanes are dominated by Sri Lanka. Moreover, Sri Lanka by its geographic location is the southern vanguard of India's strategic defence. As India is the major competing power in the South Asian region,China would like to strengthen its presence in India's neighbourhood. She has been doing it in Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh and Burma. Even Maldives is now coming under increasing Chinese attention.
3. Is there a connection with the construction of Hambantota?
Of course[there is]; but to be fair to Sri Lanka, I learn they offered it to India first and as India did not sound enthusiastic, Chinese jumped in.
3. China has consistently maintained that Hambantota and Gwadar are commercial enterprises only. How far do you believe this to be the case and, even if they only that are now, what is stop them being used for other purposes later if the political climate changed?
As of now they are commercial enterprises. But there is nothing commercial in their strategic significance in times of war. For instance Gwadar is being linked through a land link/oil pipeline from China to gain direct access to Arabian Sea. And in war time these infrastructure assets will become military/naval assets.Only the concurrence of the host nation for China to use it in times of war will probably be required. If the compulsions are powerful, China may override such concurrence also.
4. To this extent, how much of a worry is it for India that China is investing in these ports?
While India should not 'worry' on each specific Chinese action, it should be concerned about any factor potentially destabilising to its strategic security, introduced in its area of influence. And Hambantota in Sri Lanka is one such case. Unfortunately, our political decision making process on strategic issues is often influenced more by concerns other than national strategic security. India can develop Trincomalee on eastern coast of Sri Lanka as major commercial pub for Indian Ocean traffic. This would balance Chinese influence. But we seem to be lethargic in acting on such issues and we will pay the price when the time comes.
Friday, June 5, 2009
Sri Lanka After the War – Part II
[This article is in continuation of the SAAG Paper No 3224 ‘Sri Lanka after the war –Part I’ published on 2 June 2009. Extracts of this article were included in a presentation the author had made at a panel discussion on “Sri Lanka after LTTE reverses” organised by the Centre for Asian Studies, Chennai and the Dept. of Political Science, Madras University, Chennai on May 26, 2009.]
Tamil politics of the North and East
Tamil speaking politicians are there in almost all parties including the two major political parties of Sri Lanka. Though most of the Tamil politicians talk of equitable rights for Tamils, they have never managed to make a united pitch for Tamil rights in recent times. That is how successive governments have continued to drag their feet on the issue of devolution of powers to Tamils. In this context, the emerging north-eastern Tamil political spectrum becomes important in the post war scene. They may be broadly divided into three types:
• Former anti-LTTE militant entities who became political parties (i.e., Eelam Peoples Democratic Party). They had always supported the war against the LTTE as it related to their survival. They also had been reminding now and then about the unfinished devolution agenda of Tamil minorities. They actively participated in Rajapaksa’s war against the LTTE and would strongly oppose its entry into politics. They are pragmatists who understand the limitations of Indian support and have depended more upon the ruling party in Sri Lanka. Their stars will be on the rise in the coming years and President Rajapaksa is likely to increasingly use them to ensure the LTTE does not stage a comeback under the cloak of democracy.
• The Tamil National Alliance, a collection of splintered Tamil parties, who had accepted Prabhakaran’s leadership. They won handsomely in the last parliamentary elections with the LTTE’s benevolent support. They have abundant political talent that was never put to good use for fear of offending Thalaivar Prabhakaran. The government and the people of Sri Lanka generally view them as the political front of LTTE. To some extent this is true; though TNA members were always eloquent on propagating the Tamil cause within the parliament, they neither took any political initiative on their own nor could influence LTTE policies (i.e., boycott of presidential poll) that affected the future of Tamils. Though they criticise India often for not baling out Tamils from their problems, they keep their old links in India alive. After the elimination of LTTE as a power centre their credibility and influence in India is as suspect as it is in Sri Lanka. Their influence on politics will probably be minimal in the coming years and different component party leaders are likely to find ways to survive on their own. Some of their supporters might return to their parent party from which they broke away over the issue of support to the LTTE.
• Then there are former LTTE cadres like the Batticaloa LTTE leader Karuna (Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan, now an MP, minister and vice president of the SLFP) and Pillaiyan (Sivanesathurai Chandrakanthan, chief minister of Eastern Provincial Council) who have stood by President Rajapaksa during the war. Former LTTE cadres, cleared after screening, are likely to gravitate to them in the coming months. They can form a strong political base for Karuna and Pillaiyan, though there might be a scramble between the two on this count. As easterners both the leaders have some limitations in motivating them.
There are two national developments that could affect the future of Tamil politics. All political parties have been split in their support to President Rajapaksa. And the military victory is edging out the opposition from their legitimate political space. Much would depend upon how Tamil leaders these two politically turbulent issues.
Though LTTE would never be allowed to contest as a political party, pro-LTTE sections of the public particularly in the north could be an important factor to swing election results. Similarly, at least some element of Tamil expatriates who had supported the LTTE are also likely to be roped in to support political activity in the coming months. The proposed local body elections in the north would perhaps act as a barometer to indicate the effect of these pulls and pressures.
India-Tamil Nadu-Sri Lanka triangular relations
The strong support for the Congress led coalition in the recent general elections in India is likely to be used to vindicate India’s ambivalent Sri Lanka policy. The success of the Congress - Dravida Munnetra Kazagham (DMK) combine only reinforces the assessment that the Sri Lanka Tamil issue is not a “vote-catching” issue in Tamil Nadu, despite widespread sympathy for their plight. So by and large Indian policy is likely to continue to be reactive rather than proactive.
Given this setting, India-Sri Lanka relations are likely to improve. President Rajapaksa is likely to play the China card effectively to garner maximum advantage. And this might be reflected in favourable trade and investment policies towards Sri Lanka.
However, the Tamil Nadu assembly elections will be due in two years. The DMK, if it goes under new leadership to contest the polls, will have a tough time to regain its mandate. And the failure of India’s Sri Lanka policy could be resurrected once again as an election issue. So the DMK will continue to maintain pressure on Sri Lanka on the twin issues of devolution and rehabilitation of Tamil population in Sri Lanka. So India is likely to press for speedy implementation of the 13th amendment (the only tangible thing at present) and provide large scale support for the rehabilitation kitty.
On the strategic security front, increased Chinese and Pakistani influence will continue to be a matter of concern for India. However, India appears to have taken it in the stride as part of the growing reach of Chinese influence in the Indian Ocean region. Ideally, India should up the development of Trincomalee port as a counterpoise to Hambantota where China is building a port complex. However, India might drag its feet on this issue and probably wait to gauge the impact of possible Sino-US economic convergence on South Asian security.
International perspectives
During the course of the war, Sri Lanka has demonstrated the limitations of international influence in its decision making process. President Rajapaksa has cleverly used the inherent differences among the permanent members of the UN Security Council to deflect criticism of Sri Lanka for its poor human rights and humanitarian record. Sri Lanka’s crude handling of the dissenting media at home, restrictions on NGOs, and delaying of visas for entry of foreign media men and NGOs, have kindled the ire of international community (i.e., EU and the US) by the casual way Sri Lanka treated their objections on human rights and human rights issues. Western nations have strong human rights lobbies and some of them like Britain and Canada have in addition large Sri Lanka Tamil expatriate and immigrant population.
President Rajapaksa managed to ward off a Western effort to condemn Sri Lanka in the UN Human Rights Council for its gross humanitarian violations during the war, when it met in Geneva on April 26. On the contrary, he managed with the help of India, China, Pakistan, Russia, Cuba and other countries, to get the majority votes in the UNHRC to pass Sri Lanka’s resolution congratulating the country for defeating terrorism. Emboldened by this success, Sri Lanka is likely to harden its stand on allowing international watchdogs to probe its human rights record.
It could work against Sri Lanka’s interests as human rights lobbies in the EU and the US are working for strong action, including economic sanctions, against the country. This could affect the renewal of the EU’s duty free GSP plus tariff concessions extended to Sri Lanka (already on one year extension), as well as delay the approval of IMF loan of $1.9 billion dollars.
Despite economic aid from China, India and Iran, SriLanka will need large scale economic assistance to get back on its feet as the war has rendered large populations unproductive and inflation had been galloping. So we can expect the country to come to terms with the West, particularly the US, to find some face saving method on the human rights question. Ultimately President Rajapaksa is likely to implement the 13th amendment to satisfy international community including India to improve Sri Lanka’s international image.
Sri Lanka-UK relations have been strained for sometime for a number of reasons. The UK has a large Tamil expatriate population and politically it would like to soft pedal the Sri Lanka objections over questionable anti Sri Lanka activity of the expatriates. This had been the major source of irritation for Sri Lanka. The kid glove treatment of the massive anti-Sri Lanka demonstrations of expatriate population taken over by LTTE acolytes are case in point. Given its complexity, it is doubtful whether the relations between the two countries would mend in the near future.
Future portends
A few trends are emerging in the aftermath of the war that could affect Sri Lanka’s future. Their impact would depend upon how the President handles these issues to take the country forward.
• Rise of monolithic power: With the opposition weakened as never before, the rise of monolithic power with its attendant weaknesses of lack of accountability, absence of rule of law, increase in bureaucratic power and crushing of dissent are likely to stay for sometime. Coupled with the heady mixture of Sinhala chauvinism it could become an explosive mixture for ethnic amity.
• Military as a power centre: As discussed earlier, rise of militarism and emergence of military as a power centre is a distinct possibility. With a large army continuing to control a major chunk of minority population, minorities will continue to feel insecure. This will be detrimental to restoring normal life in the war affected areas.
• Dissipation of Tamil influence: In the absence of a strong united Tamil lobby to parley with the government, the Tamils might have to be satisfied with what the President offers as devolution package, as and when he chooses to do so. Inevitably, it is likely to be tied to the next parliamentary poll.
• Indian influence: India is likely to play a progressively diminishing role in Sri Lanka politics. However, its economic footprint will probably enlarge.
• Strategic implications for the region: The LTTE might find it difficult to re-emerge as a powerful force in Sri Lanka. This will strengthen Sri Lanka’s ability to handle its internal problems better. At the same time Sri Lanka is likely to be courted by the major powers – China, and the US - for stabilising their strategic influence in the Indian Ocean region. Sri Lanka has a far more important place in India’s overall strategic security map than the two major powers. So development of strategic relations between India and Sri Lanka is going to become a crucial issue.
www.southasiaanalysis.org
Tamil politics of the North and East
Tamil speaking politicians are there in almost all parties including the two major political parties of Sri Lanka. Though most of the Tamil politicians talk of equitable rights for Tamils, they have never managed to make a united pitch for Tamil rights in recent times. That is how successive governments have continued to drag their feet on the issue of devolution of powers to Tamils. In this context, the emerging north-eastern Tamil political spectrum becomes important in the post war scene. They may be broadly divided into three types:
• Former anti-LTTE militant entities who became political parties (i.e., Eelam Peoples Democratic Party). They had always supported the war against the LTTE as it related to their survival. They also had been reminding now and then about the unfinished devolution agenda of Tamil minorities. They actively participated in Rajapaksa’s war against the LTTE and would strongly oppose its entry into politics. They are pragmatists who understand the limitations of Indian support and have depended more upon the ruling party in Sri Lanka. Their stars will be on the rise in the coming years and President Rajapaksa is likely to increasingly use them to ensure the LTTE does not stage a comeback under the cloak of democracy.
• The Tamil National Alliance, a collection of splintered Tamil parties, who had accepted Prabhakaran’s leadership. They won handsomely in the last parliamentary elections with the LTTE’s benevolent support. They have abundant political talent that was never put to good use for fear of offending Thalaivar Prabhakaran. The government and the people of Sri Lanka generally view them as the political front of LTTE. To some extent this is true; though TNA members were always eloquent on propagating the Tamil cause within the parliament, they neither took any political initiative on their own nor could influence LTTE policies (i.e., boycott of presidential poll) that affected the future of Tamils. Though they criticise India often for not baling out Tamils from their problems, they keep their old links in India alive. After the elimination of LTTE as a power centre their credibility and influence in India is as suspect as it is in Sri Lanka. Their influence on politics will probably be minimal in the coming years and different component party leaders are likely to find ways to survive on their own. Some of their supporters might return to their parent party from which they broke away over the issue of support to the LTTE.
• Then there are former LTTE cadres like the Batticaloa LTTE leader Karuna (Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan, now an MP, minister and vice president of the SLFP) and Pillaiyan (Sivanesathurai Chandrakanthan, chief minister of Eastern Provincial Council) who have stood by President Rajapaksa during the war. Former LTTE cadres, cleared after screening, are likely to gravitate to them in the coming months. They can form a strong political base for Karuna and Pillaiyan, though there might be a scramble between the two on this count. As easterners both the leaders have some limitations in motivating them.
There are two national developments that could affect the future of Tamil politics. All political parties have been split in their support to President Rajapaksa. And the military victory is edging out the opposition from their legitimate political space. Much would depend upon how Tamil leaders these two politically turbulent issues.
Though LTTE would never be allowed to contest as a political party, pro-LTTE sections of the public particularly in the north could be an important factor to swing election results. Similarly, at least some element of Tamil expatriates who had supported the LTTE are also likely to be roped in to support political activity in the coming months. The proposed local body elections in the north would perhaps act as a barometer to indicate the effect of these pulls and pressures.
India-Tamil Nadu-Sri Lanka triangular relations
The strong support for the Congress led coalition in the recent general elections in India is likely to be used to vindicate India’s ambivalent Sri Lanka policy. The success of the Congress - Dravida Munnetra Kazagham (DMK) combine only reinforces the assessment that the Sri Lanka Tamil issue is not a “vote-catching” issue in Tamil Nadu, despite widespread sympathy for their plight. So by and large Indian policy is likely to continue to be reactive rather than proactive.
Given this setting, India-Sri Lanka relations are likely to improve. President Rajapaksa is likely to play the China card effectively to garner maximum advantage. And this might be reflected in favourable trade and investment policies towards Sri Lanka.
However, the Tamil Nadu assembly elections will be due in two years. The DMK, if it goes under new leadership to contest the polls, will have a tough time to regain its mandate. And the failure of India’s Sri Lanka policy could be resurrected once again as an election issue. So the DMK will continue to maintain pressure on Sri Lanka on the twin issues of devolution and rehabilitation of Tamil population in Sri Lanka. So India is likely to press for speedy implementation of the 13th amendment (the only tangible thing at present) and provide large scale support for the rehabilitation kitty.
On the strategic security front, increased Chinese and Pakistani influence will continue to be a matter of concern for India. However, India appears to have taken it in the stride as part of the growing reach of Chinese influence in the Indian Ocean region. Ideally, India should up the development of Trincomalee port as a counterpoise to Hambantota where China is building a port complex. However, India might drag its feet on this issue and probably wait to gauge the impact of possible Sino-US economic convergence on South Asian security.
International perspectives
During the course of the war, Sri Lanka has demonstrated the limitations of international influence in its decision making process. President Rajapaksa has cleverly used the inherent differences among the permanent members of the UN Security Council to deflect criticism of Sri Lanka for its poor human rights and humanitarian record. Sri Lanka’s crude handling of the dissenting media at home, restrictions on NGOs, and delaying of visas for entry of foreign media men and NGOs, have kindled the ire of international community (i.e., EU and the US) by the casual way Sri Lanka treated their objections on human rights and human rights issues. Western nations have strong human rights lobbies and some of them like Britain and Canada have in addition large Sri Lanka Tamil expatriate and immigrant population.
President Rajapaksa managed to ward off a Western effort to condemn Sri Lanka in the UN Human Rights Council for its gross humanitarian violations during the war, when it met in Geneva on April 26. On the contrary, he managed with the help of India, China, Pakistan, Russia, Cuba and other countries, to get the majority votes in the UNHRC to pass Sri Lanka’s resolution congratulating the country for defeating terrorism. Emboldened by this success, Sri Lanka is likely to harden its stand on allowing international watchdogs to probe its human rights record.
It could work against Sri Lanka’s interests as human rights lobbies in the EU and the US are working for strong action, including economic sanctions, against the country. This could affect the renewal of the EU’s duty free GSP plus tariff concessions extended to Sri Lanka (already on one year extension), as well as delay the approval of IMF loan of $1.9 billion dollars.
Despite economic aid from China, India and Iran, SriLanka will need large scale economic assistance to get back on its feet as the war has rendered large populations unproductive and inflation had been galloping. So we can expect the country to come to terms with the West, particularly the US, to find some face saving method on the human rights question. Ultimately President Rajapaksa is likely to implement the 13th amendment to satisfy international community including India to improve Sri Lanka’s international image.
Sri Lanka-UK relations have been strained for sometime for a number of reasons. The UK has a large Tamil expatriate population and politically it would like to soft pedal the Sri Lanka objections over questionable anti Sri Lanka activity of the expatriates. This had been the major source of irritation for Sri Lanka. The kid glove treatment of the massive anti-Sri Lanka demonstrations of expatriate population taken over by LTTE acolytes are case in point. Given its complexity, it is doubtful whether the relations between the two countries would mend in the near future.
Future portends
A few trends are emerging in the aftermath of the war that could affect Sri Lanka’s future. Their impact would depend upon how the President handles these issues to take the country forward.
• Rise of monolithic power: With the opposition weakened as never before, the rise of monolithic power with its attendant weaknesses of lack of accountability, absence of rule of law, increase in bureaucratic power and crushing of dissent are likely to stay for sometime. Coupled with the heady mixture of Sinhala chauvinism it could become an explosive mixture for ethnic amity.
• Military as a power centre: As discussed earlier, rise of militarism and emergence of military as a power centre is a distinct possibility. With a large army continuing to control a major chunk of minority population, minorities will continue to feel insecure. This will be detrimental to restoring normal life in the war affected areas.
• Dissipation of Tamil influence: In the absence of a strong united Tamil lobby to parley with the government, the Tamils might have to be satisfied with what the President offers as devolution package, as and when he chooses to do so. Inevitably, it is likely to be tied to the next parliamentary poll.
• Indian influence: India is likely to play a progressively diminishing role in Sri Lanka politics. However, its economic footprint will probably enlarge.
• Strategic implications for the region: The LTTE might find it difficult to re-emerge as a powerful force in Sri Lanka. This will strengthen Sri Lanka’s ability to handle its internal problems better. At the same time Sri Lanka is likely to be courted by the major powers – China, and the US - for stabilising their strategic influence in the Indian Ocean region. Sri Lanka has a far more important place in India’s overall strategic security map than the two major powers. So development of strategic relations between India and Sri Lanka is going to become a crucial issue.
www.southasiaanalysis.org
Sri Lanka Perspectives – May 2009
[This assessment of Sri Lanka for the month of May 2009 written on May 31, 2009, published in the South Asia Security Trends Journal, June 2009 issue, gives an overall assessment of events in Sri Lanka and likely trends in the ensuing month. As the South Asia Security Trends holds the copyright it may not be reproduced in any form without their permission.]
The month of May 2009 will go down as the most momentous in Sri Lanka’s history. Sri Lanka security forces fighting the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) insurgents for nearly three decades wiped out the entire LTTE leadership including its elusive leader Prabhakaran in the Eeelam War IV going on since April 2006. With the elimination of the first and second line leadership of the LTTE by May 19, 2009, the insurgent group is in mortal danger of dying without revival, unless a suitable leader is found quickly.
As it happens when important leaders die under unclear circumstances, there was some initial controversy over the death of Prabhakaran even after finding his deadbody. However, it is now certain that he along with the entire 18-member leadership were killed in operations on night May 17/18. Selvarasa Pathamanathan, LTTE’s international representative, in an interview to the BBC acknowledged the deaths a week later and announced that the body would now carry on the fight for dead leader’s ideals peacefully. However, intelligence wing of the LTTE and the pro-LTTE leaders in Tamil Nadu and among the Diaspora appear continued to be in a state of denial of the deaths. This would indicate a possible succession battle is in the offing within the LTTE to decide on the future course of action of the body as well as its leadership.
The emergence of a single leader who can command the loyalty of supporters overseas as well the scattered LTTE cadres might be difficult process and a collective leadership might be attempted. This is likely to weaken the effectiveness of the insurgent group particularly when Karuna, the breakaway LTTE leader of Batticaloa, now an MP and a minister, appears to be attracting the leaderless flock of LTTE in the island to surrender and join him.
Sri Lanka’s war against Tamil separatists had been going on in the island since 1983. However, in the past in the absence of a strong national leadership determined to achieve its goals and inept or incompetent higher direction of war, the security forces never won a decisive victory against the LTTE. But the unflinching support President Mahinda Rajapaksa had provided to the armed forces enabled it to achieve total military victory. He also geared up all national policies – development, economy, foreign policy, infrastructure - towards achieving this goal. But the security forces’ achievement has been tarnished by the death of nearly 20,000 of the 200,000 civilians trapped in the tiny strip of war zone with the LTTE in their midst in the Mullaitivu coast in the last phase of offensive from April onwards.
President Rajapaksa managed to ward off a Western effort to condemn Sri Lanka in the UN Human Rights Council for its gross humanitarian violations during the war, when it met in Geneva on April 26. On the contrary, he managed with the help of India, China, Pakistan, Russia, Cuba and other countries, to get the majority votes in the UNHRC to pass Sri Lanka’s resolution congratulating the country for defeating terrorism. Emboldened by this success, Sri Lanka is likely to harden its stand on allowing international watchdogs to probe its human rights record.
However, it could work against Sri Lanka’s interests as human rights lobbies in the European Union and the US are strongly lobbying for strong action including economic sanctions against the country. This could affect the renewal of the EU’s duty free GSP plus tariff concessions extended to Sri Lanka (already on one year extension), as well as the approval of IMF loan of $1.9 billion dollars.
As China, Iran, and Libya are extending economic aid to counter the western influence, in order appease the Sinhala chauvinist lobbies, Rajapaksa might delya the consideration of Tissa Vitharana’s all-party committee recommendations on devolution of powers indefinitely. He is likely to use implementation of the 13th Amendment of the Consitution in parts as a carrot to appease India and the western lobby in the meanwhile. With the strong support of the Sinhala public behind the President after his military success, influence of both India and the West is likely to waken further in influencing Sri Lanka policies. They will have to evolve effective political and economic strategies to counter this. India's course of action on this count might depend upon the emergence of clarity in the US-China economic convergence taking place now and its impact on South Asia.
India-Sri Lanka relations
In Tamil Nadu almost all political parties participating in the parliamentary elections had focused on the plight of Sri Lanka Tamils in the war zone to must popular votes for their parties. All the Dravidian parties sacrificing commonsense and political morality overnight became supporters of the demand for an independent Tamil Eelam much to the consternation of Sri Lanka. It boosted the morale of Sri Lankan Tamils agitating worldwide for action to stop the war, particularly in UK, France, Germany, Norway, the US and Canada.
The political pronouncements in Tamil Nadu also gave false hopes of survival to Prabhakaran and the LTTE leadership in their last days. However, the large scale success of the ruling Congress party led coalition in the election showed that the Indian electorate, particularly in Taml Nadu was not prepared to be swayed by either the call of support for Tamil Eelam or the LTTE, despite their sympathy for the civilians in the war zone. The election results are likely to downscale the importance of the Sri Lanka Tamil issue in India’s foreign policy calculus when the new government settles down in the coming months.
Security Forces plans after Prabhakaran’s death
President Rajapaksa has rewarded the three security forces chiefs with higher ranks. Thus army commander will now be a General, while the Air Force and Navy chiefs become Air Chief Marshal and Admiral respectively. There had been widespread public adulation of armed forces for their military success. In some places the celebrations projected this as a victory of Sinhalas over Tamils indicating the strengthening of Sinhala chauvinism.
A major international irritant in Sri Lanka war had been the handling of 289,915 internally displaced people from the north now housed in 42 camps in Jaffna, Mannar, Vavuniya and Tincomalee including 2122 patients undergoing treatment in Trincomalee.
The camps run under the control of the army have been criticized for severe restrictions imposed upon the inmates as well as poor living conditions and shortage of basic essentials including food, water and living space. Already the army claims 9000 LTTE cadres among the inmates have surrendered. They are being segregated and sent to separate rehabilitation camps. There had been widespread international demand for handing over the camps to NGO control and providing free access to the public. Ideally these people should be relocated back in their villages. The government after a great deal of international pressure, have now agreed to do so in six months. But from the concept of development plans being implemented there it appears the government proposes create clusters of villages for them to keep them under the watch of the armed forces.
The Army Commander General Sarath Fonseka revealed in a TV interview that the strength of the army would be increased by 50 per cent to 300,000 to ensure the LTTE does not stage a come back anywhere. He said. "We have won the war, but we have not abandoned our campaign to defeat the Eelam Project." The army is probably planning to establish permanent garrisons in key centres in the north to carry out counterinsurgency operations as well as well ensure control over civilian population. This is likely to further increase the suspicion of Tamils already feeling insecure over the intention of the government and dely hte process of ethnic reconciliation.
The planned large scale expansion of the army is a disturbing aspect as it has now become a power centre that could affect the process of national policy making. India had contributed to strengthening it in the past. However, the increasing influence of China and to a certain extent Pakistan, which supplied arms and equipment during the war, within the armed forces is a possibility and it might come at the cost of India.
Strategically, Sri Lanka is likely to become an important cockpit of global contention between India, China and the US in the coming years. India would do well to keep Sri Lanka in its overall strategic picture particularly in issues relating to ocean defence. Internally, the leaderless LTTE rank and file flowing out of Sri Lanka as refugees is likely to seek safe havens in Indian coastal states. They hold the potential to cause mischief once the LTTE recoups. Vigorous action should be taken by central agencies to screen new arrivals to weed out likely LTTE cadres. It would be best to encourage repatriation of refugees once the elections are held in the northern province and a local government is established there.
Copyright:www.security-risks.com
The month of May 2009 will go down as the most momentous in Sri Lanka’s history. Sri Lanka security forces fighting the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) insurgents for nearly three decades wiped out the entire LTTE leadership including its elusive leader Prabhakaran in the Eeelam War IV going on since April 2006. With the elimination of the first and second line leadership of the LTTE by May 19, 2009, the insurgent group is in mortal danger of dying without revival, unless a suitable leader is found quickly.
As it happens when important leaders die under unclear circumstances, there was some initial controversy over the death of Prabhakaran even after finding his deadbody. However, it is now certain that he along with the entire 18-member leadership were killed in operations on night May 17/18. Selvarasa Pathamanathan, LTTE’s international representative, in an interview to the BBC acknowledged the deaths a week later and announced that the body would now carry on the fight for dead leader’s ideals peacefully. However, intelligence wing of the LTTE and the pro-LTTE leaders in Tamil Nadu and among the Diaspora appear continued to be in a state of denial of the deaths. This would indicate a possible succession battle is in the offing within the LTTE to decide on the future course of action of the body as well as its leadership.
The emergence of a single leader who can command the loyalty of supporters overseas as well the scattered LTTE cadres might be difficult process and a collective leadership might be attempted. This is likely to weaken the effectiveness of the insurgent group particularly when Karuna, the breakaway LTTE leader of Batticaloa, now an MP and a minister, appears to be attracting the leaderless flock of LTTE in the island to surrender and join him.
Sri Lanka’s war against Tamil separatists had been going on in the island since 1983. However, in the past in the absence of a strong national leadership determined to achieve its goals and inept or incompetent higher direction of war, the security forces never won a decisive victory against the LTTE. But the unflinching support President Mahinda Rajapaksa had provided to the armed forces enabled it to achieve total military victory. He also geared up all national policies – development, economy, foreign policy, infrastructure - towards achieving this goal. But the security forces’ achievement has been tarnished by the death of nearly 20,000 of the 200,000 civilians trapped in the tiny strip of war zone with the LTTE in their midst in the Mullaitivu coast in the last phase of offensive from April onwards.
President Rajapaksa managed to ward off a Western effort to condemn Sri Lanka in the UN Human Rights Council for its gross humanitarian violations during the war, when it met in Geneva on April 26. On the contrary, he managed with the help of India, China, Pakistan, Russia, Cuba and other countries, to get the majority votes in the UNHRC to pass Sri Lanka’s resolution congratulating the country for defeating terrorism. Emboldened by this success, Sri Lanka is likely to harden its stand on allowing international watchdogs to probe its human rights record.
However, it could work against Sri Lanka’s interests as human rights lobbies in the European Union and the US are strongly lobbying for strong action including economic sanctions against the country. This could affect the renewal of the EU’s duty free GSP plus tariff concessions extended to Sri Lanka (already on one year extension), as well as the approval of IMF loan of $1.9 billion dollars.
As China, Iran, and Libya are extending economic aid to counter the western influence, in order appease the Sinhala chauvinist lobbies, Rajapaksa might delya the consideration of Tissa Vitharana’s all-party committee recommendations on devolution of powers indefinitely. He is likely to use implementation of the 13th Amendment of the Consitution in parts as a carrot to appease India and the western lobby in the meanwhile. With the strong support of the Sinhala public behind the President after his military success, influence of both India and the West is likely to waken further in influencing Sri Lanka policies. They will have to evolve effective political and economic strategies to counter this. India's course of action on this count might depend upon the emergence of clarity in the US-China economic convergence taking place now and its impact on South Asia.
India-Sri Lanka relations
In Tamil Nadu almost all political parties participating in the parliamentary elections had focused on the plight of Sri Lanka Tamils in the war zone to must popular votes for their parties. All the Dravidian parties sacrificing commonsense and political morality overnight became supporters of the demand for an independent Tamil Eelam much to the consternation of Sri Lanka. It boosted the morale of Sri Lankan Tamils agitating worldwide for action to stop the war, particularly in UK, France, Germany, Norway, the US and Canada.
The political pronouncements in Tamil Nadu also gave false hopes of survival to Prabhakaran and the LTTE leadership in their last days. However, the large scale success of the ruling Congress party led coalition in the election showed that the Indian electorate, particularly in Taml Nadu was not prepared to be swayed by either the call of support for Tamil Eelam or the LTTE, despite their sympathy for the civilians in the war zone. The election results are likely to downscale the importance of the Sri Lanka Tamil issue in India’s foreign policy calculus when the new government settles down in the coming months.
Security Forces plans after Prabhakaran’s death
President Rajapaksa has rewarded the three security forces chiefs with higher ranks. Thus army commander will now be a General, while the Air Force and Navy chiefs become Air Chief Marshal and Admiral respectively. There had been widespread public adulation of armed forces for their military success. In some places the celebrations projected this as a victory of Sinhalas over Tamils indicating the strengthening of Sinhala chauvinism.
A major international irritant in Sri Lanka war had been the handling of 289,915 internally displaced people from the north now housed in 42 camps in Jaffna, Mannar, Vavuniya and Tincomalee including 2122 patients undergoing treatment in Trincomalee.
The camps run under the control of the army have been criticized for severe restrictions imposed upon the inmates as well as poor living conditions and shortage of basic essentials including food, water and living space. Already the army claims 9000 LTTE cadres among the inmates have surrendered. They are being segregated and sent to separate rehabilitation camps. There had been widespread international demand for handing over the camps to NGO control and providing free access to the public. Ideally these people should be relocated back in their villages. The government after a great deal of international pressure, have now agreed to do so in six months. But from the concept of development plans being implemented there it appears the government proposes create clusters of villages for them to keep them under the watch of the armed forces.
The Army Commander General Sarath Fonseka revealed in a TV interview that the strength of the army would be increased by 50 per cent to 300,000 to ensure the LTTE does not stage a come back anywhere. He said. "We have won the war, but we have not abandoned our campaign to defeat the Eelam Project." The army is probably planning to establish permanent garrisons in key centres in the north to carry out counterinsurgency operations as well as well ensure control over civilian population. This is likely to further increase the suspicion of Tamils already feeling insecure over the intention of the government and dely hte process of ethnic reconciliation.
The planned large scale expansion of the army is a disturbing aspect as it has now become a power centre that could affect the process of national policy making. India had contributed to strengthening it in the past. However, the increasing influence of China and to a certain extent Pakistan, which supplied arms and equipment during the war, within the armed forces is a possibility and it might come at the cost of India.
Strategically, Sri Lanka is likely to become an important cockpit of global contention between India, China and the US in the coming years. India would do well to keep Sri Lanka in its overall strategic picture particularly in issues relating to ocean defence. Internally, the leaderless LTTE rank and file flowing out of Sri Lanka as refugees is likely to seek safe havens in Indian coastal states. They hold the potential to cause mischief once the LTTE recoups. Vigorous action should be taken by central agencies to screen new arrivals to weed out likely LTTE cadres. It would be best to encourage repatriation of refugees once the elections are held in the northern province and a local government is established there.
Copyright:www.security-risks.com
Tuesday, June 2, 2009
Sri Lanka after the War – Part I
[Extracts of this article were included in a presentation the author had made at a panel discussion on “Sri Lanka after LTTE reverses” organised by the Centre for Asian Studies, Chennai and the Dept. of Political Science, Madras University, Chennai on May 26, 2009.]
Macro issues
Undoubtedly Sri Lanka, under the leadership of President Mahinda Rajapaksa, has scored an unprecedented military victory in the Eelam War IV with the near total elimination of the entire leadership of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). After that the LTTE’s military struggle has been turned into an existential struggle. It will be a long haul for the LTTE to get back into some shape as the Sri Lanka war machine grinds on relentlessly in the name of taming the Tamil Tigers.
The Sri Lankan victory, tarnished by the death of 20,000 civilians, has thrown afresh the question ‘what happens after the war?’ Many analysts have focused on issues like devolution of powers to Tamils, rehabilitation of displaced population, and development of north and east as some of the instruments to ‘resolve’ the vexing ethnic issue.
The fundamental truth is Sri Lanka society is divided along ethnic lines between Sinhalas and Tamils as never before. The Sinhala-Tamil divide took over 50 years to become a fact of life from the Tamil point of view. In the last three decades or so, Tamil militancy and the state’s response to it had frustrated the chances of healing processes attempted by well meaning souls. The huge show of power in the aftermath of military victory has made minority Tamils confident of their future as their past experience tells them not to expect the rulers to keep their promises.
There are no magic potions that would erase overnight the sense of mistrust and insecurity pervading all sections of Tamil society in Sri Lanka. No amount of speeches in parliament or promises in international podiums is going to convince Tamils unless deeds match the words. As it is a state of mind, it requires much more than the statistical figures of number of Tamil ministers and members in parliament unless they produce worthwhile actions to restore confidence among the minorities. Unfortunately, such actions, beyond political expediency, have not been paid adequate attention by the stakeholders including Sinhala and Tamil intelligentsia.
The situation has become more complex now than ever before because the LTTE is no more there as an extra legal power centre. There is a strong external constituency now as the world is increasingly networked than it was in 1983 when Tamil militancy blossomed.. So old solutions, including military actions, by either side are not going to resolve the issues. Any process to succeed now will have to be inclusive rather than exclusive or ‘home grown’ as President Rajapaksa likes to call it.
To make Sri Lanka’s path to permanent peace a smooth one, the people and rulers of Sri Lanka as well as India and the international community should address a cluster of issues that may be grouped under five heads. These are: the LTTE and its future, rise of Rajapaksa and its impact, Tamil minority politics, the India-Tamil Nadu-Sri Lanka triangular relations, and international response to Sri Lanka.
Future of LTTE
Prabhakaran was the life and soul of the LTTE. Prabhakaran had the ability to control the two vital segments of the organisation – the external resources segment and the internal operational segment. Like many other insurgent groups, LTTE was an autocracy and Prabhakaran’s writ ran the LTTE and decided the life and death of its rank and file. So the leadership hierarchy was in the form of pecking order based on a crony system. The wiping out of the entire leadership has not left a leader of proven ability or remnant of a central leadership that can marshal the cadres scurrying within Sri Lanka to save their lives from the security forces, and motivate them to continue the struggle.
On the other hand, the LTTE’s huge overseas assets, held under cover names of front men and organisations, are under the control of minutemen. Selvarasa Pathmanathan, the LTTE international affairs representative and only senior leader left alive, has sufficient experience in handling the links of LTTE’s external segment. He is a smooth and wily operator who could manage gain control of most of the overseas tentacles. However, the ambitions of some local satraps guarding the LTTE pie with their muscle power might interfere with Pahmanathan’s moves. Moreover, Pathmanathan’s financial integrity in handling party funds was suspect even in Prabhakaran’s time. So even if he controls the external segment, it is doubtful whether he can control and motivate the operational segment inside Sri Lanka. Considering these issues, it might take sometime before a new leadership with control over both the external and internal segments emerges.
President Rajapaksa’s ascendancy
President Rajapaksa has delivered what he promised the voters in the run up to the election – victory over the LTTE. LTTE has been given a body blow from which it would be difficult to regain its former glory. Thus Rajapksa has become the unchallenged leader of the country – a modern day Dutta Gamunu; if all goes well he would be victorious in his quest for presidency for a second term as well. Thus he is likely to be in power till 2028. If he could plan and eliminate LTTE from a position of political and military power in three years, he has the potential to resolve the ethnic divide between the two major communities. But can he and will he do it?
Rajapaksa’s military success has swept lot shortcomings in his style of governance under the carpet. There has been scant respect for rule of law in the high handed conduct of senior officials and ministers; well meaning measures that would improve governance (like the 17th amendment of the Constitution) have been deferred; free media has been hounded by both legal and extra legal methods; NGOs have come under pressure to toe the government line, indirect measures are being adopted to control INGOs, and many Tamils are uncertain of their security as the ‘while van’ syndrome has not vanished.
The devolution of powers to Tamils has been used as a political ploy to keep the Tamil lobbies at bay as the Tissa Vitharana commission’s recommendations have not seen the light of the day. Similarly the much heralded ushering in of 13th amendment of the Constitution to devolve powers to the provincial council still remains a cruel joke than a reality.
The President appears to be ruling the country with the assistance of a triumvirate of his two brothers Basil and Gotabaya along with the Army Commander General Sarath Fonseka. In fact he is more dependent upon them to carry out his agenda than his unwieldy cabinet of ministers. This style of personalised governance focuses on results rather than accountability and suits war situations. However, the style comes with a cost because it inevitably gives rise to many acts of omission and commission. This is what is happening in Sri Lanka.
Though the war is over, the Army Commander General Fonseka has said that armed forces strength would be increased by 50 percent to 300,000 (nearly one fourth the size of Indian armed forces’ strength of 1.13 million). This is ostensibly to eliminate the last vestige of LTTE from the Sri Lanka soil. While the intentions appear logical, the question arises whether such a huge army is required for counter insurgency after armed forces of a much smaller strength had defeated the LTTE and regained territorial control of insurgent-controlled territory.
Oversized armies tend to grow into power centres that influence political decision making either indirectly or directly for decades. Turkey and Indonesia are good examples of this phenomenon. Big armies usually find issues and rationale to justify their existence. Pakistan is a shining example of this home truth. And in counter insurgency operations they tend to cloud political judgement because military option is more easily exercised than protracted peace parleys. Though Sri Lanka armed forces have excelled in warfare, they and the civil society will have to ensure that militarism does not become part of national life.
On the current line of thinking the counter insurgency operations in the coming years in Sri Lanka would probably be based on a network of garrison towns established in major communication centres and towns in north and east. They would probably make endless forays of patrols on search and destroy missions in the interior. There are two problems with this process. Sri Lanka armed forces are manned by the Sinhala community. Unless the armed forces take pains to induct sufficient Tamil speaking recruits and employ them for operations in north and east it will not gain the trust and confidence of demoralised Tamil people. If Sri Lanka attempts to rush through the operation, without undergoing the painful process of turning the armed forces truly national in character and composition, it would only hasten the birth and growth of another Prabhakaran. Secondly, does the Sri Lanka government expect Tamil militancy as a permanent feature of Sri Lanka life?
(To be continued)
www.southasiaanalysis.org
Macro issues
Undoubtedly Sri Lanka, under the leadership of President Mahinda Rajapaksa, has scored an unprecedented military victory in the Eelam War IV with the near total elimination of the entire leadership of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). After that the LTTE’s military struggle has been turned into an existential struggle. It will be a long haul for the LTTE to get back into some shape as the Sri Lanka war machine grinds on relentlessly in the name of taming the Tamil Tigers.
The Sri Lankan victory, tarnished by the death of 20,000 civilians, has thrown afresh the question ‘what happens after the war?’ Many analysts have focused on issues like devolution of powers to Tamils, rehabilitation of displaced population, and development of north and east as some of the instruments to ‘resolve’ the vexing ethnic issue.
The fundamental truth is Sri Lanka society is divided along ethnic lines between Sinhalas and Tamils as never before. The Sinhala-Tamil divide took over 50 years to become a fact of life from the Tamil point of view. In the last three decades or so, Tamil militancy and the state’s response to it had frustrated the chances of healing processes attempted by well meaning souls. The huge show of power in the aftermath of military victory has made minority Tamils confident of their future as their past experience tells them not to expect the rulers to keep their promises.
There are no magic potions that would erase overnight the sense of mistrust and insecurity pervading all sections of Tamil society in Sri Lanka. No amount of speeches in parliament or promises in international podiums is going to convince Tamils unless deeds match the words. As it is a state of mind, it requires much more than the statistical figures of number of Tamil ministers and members in parliament unless they produce worthwhile actions to restore confidence among the minorities. Unfortunately, such actions, beyond political expediency, have not been paid adequate attention by the stakeholders including Sinhala and Tamil intelligentsia.
The situation has become more complex now than ever before because the LTTE is no more there as an extra legal power centre. There is a strong external constituency now as the world is increasingly networked than it was in 1983 when Tamil militancy blossomed.. So old solutions, including military actions, by either side are not going to resolve the issues. Any process to succeed now will have to be inclusive rather than exclusive or ‘home grown’ as President Rajapaksa likes to call it.
To make Sri Lanka’s path to permanent peace a smooth one, the people and rulers of Sri Lanka as well as India and the international community should address a cluster of issues that may be grouped under five heads. These are: the LTTE and its future, rise of Rajapaksa and its impact, Tamil minority politics, the India-Tamil Nadu-Sri Lanka triangular relations, and international response to Sri Lanka.
Future of LTTE
Prabhakaran was the life and soul of the LTTE. Prabhakaran had the ability to control the two vital segments of the organisation – the external resources segment and the internal operational segment. Like many other insurgent groups, LTTE was an autocracy and Prabhakaran’s writ ran the LTTE and decided the life and death of its rank and file. So the leadership hierarchy was in the form of pecking order based on a crony system. The wiping out of the entire leadership has not left a leader of proven ability or remnant of a central leadership that can marshal the cadres scurrying within Sri Lanka to save their lives from the security forces, and motivate them to continue the struggle.
On the other hand, the LTTE’s huge overseas assets, held under cover names of front men and organisations, are under the control of minutemen. Selvarasa Pathmanathan, the LTTE international affairs representative and only senior leader left alive, has sufficient experience in handling the links of LTTE’s external segment. He is a smooth and wily operator who could manage gain control of most of the overseas tentacles. However, the ambitions of some local satraps guarding the LTTE pie with their muscle power might interfere with Pahmanathan’s moves. Moreover, Pathmanathan’s financial integrity in handling party funds was suspect even in Prabhakaran’s time. So even if he controls the external segment, it is doubtful whether he can control and motivate the operational segment inside Sri Lanka. Considering these issues, it might take sometime before a new leadership with control over both the external and internal segments emerges.
President Rajapaksa’s ascendancy
President Rajapaksa has delivered what he promised the voters in the run up to the election – victory over the LTTE. LTTE has been given a body blow from which it would be difficult to regain its former glory. Thus Rajapksa has become the unchallenged leader of the country – a modern day Dutta Gamunu; if all goes well he would be victorious in his quest for presidency for a second term as well. Thus he is likely to be in power till 2028. If he could plan and eliminate LTTE from a position of political and military power in three years, he has the potential to resolve the ethnic divide between the two major communities. But can he and will he do it?
Rajapaksa’s military success has swept lot shortcomings in his style of governance under the carpet. There has been scant respect for rule of law in the high handed conduct of senior officials and ministers; well meaning measures that would improve governance (like the 17th amendment of the Constitution) have been deferred; free media has been hounded by both legal and extra legal methods; NGOs have come under pressure to toe the government line, indirect measures are being adopted to control INGOs, and many Tamils are uncertain of their security as the ‘while van’ syndrome has not vanished.
The devolution of powers to Tamils has been used as a political ploy to keep the Tamil lobbies at bay as the Tissa Vitharana commission’s recommendations have not seen the light of the day. Similarly the much heralded ushering in of 13th amendment of the Constitution to devolve powers to the provincial council still remains a cruel joke than a reality.
The President appears to be ruling the country with the assistance of a triumvirate of his two brothers Basil and Gotabaya along with the Army Commander General Sarath Fonseka. In fact he is more dependent upon them to carry out his agenda than his unwieldy cabinet of ministers. This style of personalised governance focuses on results rather than accountability and suits war situations. However, the style comes with a cost because it inevitably gives rise to many acts of omission and commission. This is what is happening in Sri Lanka.
Though the war is over, the Army Commander General Fonseka has said that armed forces strength would be increased by 50 percent to 300,000 (nearly one fourth the size of Indian armed forces’ strength of 1.13 million). This is ostensibly to eliminate the last vestige of LTTE from the Sri Lanka soil. While the intentions appear logical, the question arises whether such a huge army is required for counter insurgency after armed forces of a much smaller strength had defeated the LTTE and regained territorial control of insurgent-controlled territory.
Oversized armies tend to grow into power centres that influence political decision making either indirectly or directly for decades. Turkey and Indonesia are good examples of this phenomenon. Big armies usually find issues and rationale to justify their existence. Pakistan is a shining example of this home truth. And in counter insurgency operations they tend to cloud political judgement because military option is more easily exercised than protracted peace parleys. Though Sri Lanka armed forces have excelled in warfare, they and the civil society will have to ensure that militarism does not become part of national life.
On the current line of thinking the counter insurgency operations in the coming years in Sri Lanka would probably be based on a network of garrison towns established in major communication centres and towns in north and east. They would probably make endless forays of patrols on search and destroy missions in the interior. There are two problems with this process. Sri Lanka armed forces are manned by the Sinhala community. Unless the armed forces take pains to induct sufficient Tamil speaking recruits and employ them for operations in north and east it will not gain the trust and confidence of demoralised Tamil people. If Sri Lanka attempts to rush through the operation, without undergoing the painful process of turning the armed forces truly national in character and composition, it would only hasten the birth and growth of another Prabhakaran. Secondly, does the Sri Lanka government expect Tamil militancy as a permanent feature of Sri Lanka life?
(To be continued)
www.southasiaanalysis.org
Who will lead LTTE after Prabhakaran?
The LTTE has been left leaderless after the death of Prabhakaran.He ran it as a fief because it was the heart and soul of the organisation. My take on the subject is reproduced here kind courtesy Frontline magazine (Volume 26 - Issue 12 :: Jun. 06-19, 2009. (The article presumes the LTTE intelligence chief Pottu Amman was also killed in the operation, though his body is yet to be recovered.)
Succession Squabble
THE acknowledgement of the death of V. Prabakaran by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) on May 17 came from Selvarasa Pathmanathan, the organisation’s international representative, a week after the Sri Lankan security forces announced it. This is not surprising as the LTTE under the monolithic leadership of Prabakaran had always wished away information he found either uncomfortable or inconvenient. Pathmanathan’s signed statement to the British Broadcasting Corporation on May 24 probably sent shock waves through the acolytes of the LTTE the world over, who had been in a state of denial over the LTTE leader’s death.
Pathmanathan sowed further confusion among LTTE ranks when he said: “We have already announced that we have given up violence and agreed to enter a democratic process to achieve the rights for the Tamil (self) determination of our people.” Armed struggle to carve out an independent Tamil Eelam is the basic reason for the support the LTTE has enjoyed among many Sri Lankan Tamil expatriates.
However, the pro-LTTE website TamilNet, which carried Pathmanathan’s statement, did not include the portion relating to the decision to give up violence and enter the democratic process, which was mentioned in the BBC report. TamilNet also put out a statement from the LTTE’s Department for Diaspora Affairs (DDA) that said it did not want to acknowledge Prabakaran’s death “without explicit authorisation from the LTTE leadership”. It insisted that the LTTE leadership was safe and “it will re-emerge when the right time comes”. Other reports quoted LTTE international intelligence leader Arivazhagan as confirming that Prabakaran was still alive as late as May 22.
It was clear from the tone of the news items in pro-LTTE websites that they would maintain the fiction that the LTTE leadership was still alive as long as possible.
Pro-LTTE political leaders from Tamil Nadu also appeared to be toeing the same line. Vaiko, leader of the Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazagham (MDMK), who considers himself a personal friend of Prabakaran’s, and Nedumaran, a long-term frontman of the LTTE in Tamil Nadu, came out strongly against the veracity of Pathmanathan’s statement. Vaiko appealed to Tamils elsewhere in the world not to believe it, while Nedumaran questioned the legitimacy of Pathmanathan to issue the statement. He said: “Except the generals close to Prabakaran, none has the authority to issue official statements.”
In a way he was correct, as Pathmanathan, though he was anointed by Prabakaran as the head of the LTTE’s international affairs in January 2009, was probably not senior enough in the tightly controlled leadership hierarchy to be given the freedom to issue public statements on his own. But this was not the first time that Pathmanathan had issued statements on behalf of the organisation since he assumed office as its international representative, and the very same leaders did not question his legitimacy earlier.
The LTTE, strictly operating under the control of Prabakaran and his deputy Pottu Amman, probably did not have a contingency plan of action to handle the situation in the absence of both leaders. Given the vengeful mindset of Prabakaran, it would have been heresy in the LTTE to even think of such a contingency. When the entire top and middle level leadership was eliminated on the battle front, Pathmanathan was the only senior leader left alive with a seal of approval from Prabakaran.
The timing of his statement is also interesting. The United Nations Human Rights Council’s emergency meeting in Geneva to consider the violations of human rights by both sides in Sri Lanka was scheduled for May 26. Both the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE have taken the meeting seriously. On the eve of the meeting, the Sri Lankan government announced its intention to hold elections for the Jaffna Municipal Council and the Vavuniya Pradesiya Sabha between August 4 and 17, presumably to give the impression that the situation was more normal in the Northern Province than it appeared. Similarly, the LTTE representative’s disavowal of violence also came on the eve of the meeting. Pathmanathan, with his long international experience in handling LTTE affairs, might have thought it prudent to present the LTTE in a better light on the occasion by issuing a statement to suit it. (In any case, Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa quickly rejected the LTTE’s offer, saying that he did not believe “the LTTE can enter a democratic process after years of their violent activities”.)
ASSETS TO PROTECT
In spite of the international developments, the conflicting statements emanating in the name of the LTTE have all the indications of a serious succession squabble brewing in its top echelons both at home and abroad. Given that the LTTE is a complex organisation, totally shrouded in secrecy, and in the absence of a clearly indicated line of succession, the power struggle to it take over could be long drawn and might draw some blood.
The LTTE’s large and carefully created asset base spread over many countries is cash-rich and provides an added incentive for the power struggle to turn fierce. Jane’s Intelligence Review in August 2008 assessed the LTTE’s annual income at $200-300 million. It rated the LTTE as the second biggest income-generating terrorist organisation in the world, the first being the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), with income derived from the sale of cocaine. In the words of Jane’s Intelligence Review, the LTTE’s sources of income were both legal and illegal and probably came “from shipping to drugs and extortion by a network of professional managers – both Tamils and others – across a string of countries”. Investigation of select Tamil charities in the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada has shown that the LTTE used them as an effective and legitimate way to collect and transfer money to LTTE entities in Sri Lanka.
In his lifetime, Prabakaran was the single most powerful leader of the LTTE. He was the heart and soul of the organisation, providing it with the much needed mystique to attract and retain a loyal band of cadre. The LTTE’s elite force of suicide bombers – the Black Tigers – swore loyalty to him and not to the organisation. He did not allow a second line of leadership to evolve naturally. He came down heavily on potential contenders for power as Mahathaya (Mahendraraja), his one-time aide and lieutenant, discovered to his detriment.
Prabakaran’s death has left a big void in the LTTE leadership. His successor will find it very difficult to meet the high expectations of supporters, particularly after the organisation has been so grievously mauled. The new leader will require extraordinary skills to recoup the LTTE’s assets, marshal the scattered flock and motivate it to build up the organisation all over again. There is no single leader in sight within the LTTE who can meet this stringent requirement.
In addition to this, Prabakaran’s successor should be popular enough to attract and retain the loyalty of cadre and supporters while being strong enough to exercise his muscle power to assert his authority. He should also be able to impress the LTTE satraps presiding over the overseas tentacles of the organisation and controlling the assets. As Prabakaran did not nominate a successor, any new aspirant for the LTTE leadership will have to gain the acceptance of three constituencies of the organisation: the fighting elements, the expatriate segment and fellow travellers extending value-added support to the LTTE.
The front-line fighting segment made up of the LTTE rank and file still eluding capture in Sri Lanka is the most important constituency. The security forces have claimed that the LTTE lost around 22,000 cadre, while 9,100 of them have been apprehended. These figures might be exaggerated, and the LTTE has probably lost between 12,000 and 15,000 cadre in Eelam War IV. After suffering a crushing defeat and left leaderless in isolated pockets, many of these cadre, including the sleeper cells, are likely to be a demoralised lot. Sri Lanka has already announced that the security forces will continue to hunt them out until the last vestige of the LTTE is eradicated from Sri Lanka.
So it is not surprising that Karuna (Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan), the former LTTE leader who is now a Minister in Mahinda Rajapaksa’s government and a vice-president of the ruling Sri Lanka Freedom Party, is attracting cadre from this segment. And President Rajapaksa is likely to encourage this trend further. Under this difficult ambience, any new leader of the LTTE will find it an uphill task to retain the loyalty of such cadre and strengthen his power base within Sri Lanka.
The expatriate segment of supporters comprises a melange of identities and backgrounds. It has its own pulls and pressures based on its perceptions of the Tamil Eelam question. It is to the credit of Prabakaran that he was able to commandeer the support of such a disparate group.
DEGENERATION
On the ground, the style of operation of LTTE representatives, particularly in Canada and the U.K., progressively degenerated over the years. In spite of the LTTE’s much publicised penchant for discipline, there were complaints of LTTE operatives using of a mix of extortion, coercion, intimidation and even violence to muster support. In the absence of the strong hand of Prabakaran, this situation is likely to deteriorate further, with each group trying to outdo the other. Controlling the local chapters of the LTTE and keeping the proxies handling the LTTE’s vast overseas assets on a tight leash will be an important factor in re-establishing the authority of a new leadership. But this may not happen with the urgency the issue deserves.
Lastly, the Tamil struggle for equity attracted the support of non-governmental organisations and sections of the intellectual and political community although the LTTE had assumed its leadership role using questionable methods. Politicians, human rights activists and intellectuals in many countries including India, Canada, and the U.K. chose to support LTTE-sponsored causes and movements ignoring its negative aspects because they believed in its organisational effectiveness. Their support has been critical in indirectly building up the LTTE’s image in international fora, including the U.N., often to the embarrassment of Sri Lanka. Unless the new leadership is able to take charge and assert itself quickly, this support may dissipate.
Pathmanathan is probably making a pitch to emerge as a potential candidate to take over the LTTE leadership. Better known by his nickname KP – which stands for Kumaran Pathmanathan, he is no front-line military commander. His skill in overseas operations enabled him to organise the LTTE’s supply chain on the basis of a captive tramp shipping network that became the lifeline for the LTTE.
He was under a cloud for some time when Prabakaran suspected his financial integrity. However, he was reinstated as international representative, in the place of the late Anton Balasingham, to revamp the LTTE’s overseas operations to meet its battlefield needs.
Pathmanathan is an organisational man with a sound knowledge of clandestine international operations. Even if he musters the support of the overseas segments in his bid for leadership, his acceptance among the fighting elements of the LTTE will remain a question mark as he comes out as a poor option after Prabakaran. His behind-the-scenes skills may not be enough to create enthusiasm even among the Tamil public, particularly when Tamil politicians such as Douglas Devananda and Karuna are going to occupy an increasingly larger political space.
Considering all these aspects, the LTTE is likely to be in internal convulsions for some time over the leadership issue. It may require the collective skills of expatriate leaders to hammer out a solution acceptable to all segments. In the interim, the internal squabble might not only increase in decibels but also end in fisticuffs. To avoid such a contingency, a collective leadership may emerge. But such committee solutions would take the dynamics out of leadership just when the organisation needs it the most to survive as a viable entity.•
The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)’s acknowledgement of the death of V Prabhakaran on May 17, 2009, came from its international representative Selvarasa Pathmanathan, a week after the Sri Lanka security forces (SLSF) announced it. This is not surprising as the LTTE under the monolithic leadership of Prabhakaran had always wished away information he found either uncomfortable or inconvenient. Pathmanathan’s signed statement to the BBC on May 24 probably sent shock waves among the LTTE acolytes the world over, who had been in a state of denial over the LTTE leader’s death.
Pathmanathan sowed further confusion among the LTTE ranks when he said “We have already announced that we have given up violence and agreed to enter a democratic process to achieve the rights for the Tamil (self) determination of our people.” Armed struggle for carving out an independent Tamil Eelam had been the basic reason for the support LTTE enjoyed among many of the Sri Lanka Tamil expatriates.
However, the pro-LTTE website TamilNet which carried Pathmanathan’s statement did not include the portion relating to giving up violence and agreeing to enter the democratic process included in the BBC report. The TamilNet also put out a statement from the LTTE’s Department for Diaspora Affairs (DDA) which did not want to acknowledge Prabhakaran’s death “without explicit authorisation from the LTTE leadership.”
It insisted that the LTTE leadership was safe and “it will re-emerge when the right time comes.” Other reports quoted LTTE international intelligence leader Arivazhagan who confirmed that Prabhakaran was still alive as late as May 22.
It was clear from the tone of news items in pro-LTTE websites that they would maintain the fiction that the LTTE leadership was still alive as long as possible. Pro-LTTE political leaders from Tamil Nadu also appeared to be toeing the same line. Vaiko, leader of the Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazagham (MDMK) who considers himself as a personal friend of Prabhakaran, and Pazha Nedumaran, a long term front man of the LTTE in Tamil Nadu, came out strongly against the veracity of Pathmanathan’s statement. Vaiko appealed to Tamils elsewhere in the world not to believe it, while Pazha Nedumaran questioned the legitimacy of Pathmanathan to issue the statement. He said “Except the generals close to Prabhakaran, none has the authority to issue official statements.”
In a way he was correct as Pathmanathan, though anointed by Prabhakaran as the head of LTTE’s international affairs only in January 2009, was probably not senior enough in the tightly controlled leadership hierarchy to be given the freedom to issue public statements on his own. But this was not the first statement that Pathmanathan had issued statements on behalf of the organization since he assumed office as its international representative; and the very same leaders did not question his legitimacy earlier.
The LTTE, strictly operating under the control of Prabhakaran and his deputy Pottu Amman, probably did not have a contingency plan of action to handle the situation in the absence of both the leaders. Given the vengeful mindset of Prabhakaran even thinking of such a contingency would have been heresy in the LTTE. When the entire top and middle level leadership was eliminated in the battlefront, Pathmanathan was the only senior leader left alive with a seal of approval from dead leader.
The timing of his statement is also interesting. TheUN Human Rights Commission emergency meeting in Geneva to consider the violations of human rights by both sides in Sri Lanka was scheduled for May 26. Both the Sri government and the LTTE have taken the meeting seriously. On the eve of the meeting Sri Lanka government has announced its intention to hold elections for the Jaffna Municipal Council and Vavuniya Pradesiya Sabha between August 4 and 17, presumably to show that the situation was more normal in Northern Province than it appeared. Similarly, the LTTE representative’s disavowal of violence also comes on the eve of the meeting. Pathmanathan with his long international experience in handling LTTE affairs might have thought it prudent to present the LTTE in better light on the occasion by issuing a statement to suit the occasion. (In any case the Sri Lanka’s defence secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa had quickly rejected the LTTE’s offer saying that he did not believe “the LTTE can enter a democratic process after years of their violent activities.”)
In spite of the international developments, the conflicting statements emanating in the name of the LTTE gives all the indications of a serious succession squabble brewing in its top echelons both at home and abroad. Given the LTTE’s complex organization totally shrouded in secrecy, and the absence of a clearly indicated line of succession the power struggle to take over the body could be long drawn and might draw some blood.
The LTTE’s large, carefully created asset base spread over many countries is cash rich and provides an added incentive for the power struggle to turn fierce. The Jane’s Intelligence Review in August 2008 had assessed the LTTE’s annual income at $200-300 million. It rated the LTTE as the second biggest income generating terrorist organization in the world, the first being the Revolutionary Armed Group of Colombia, with income derived from sale of cocaine. In the words of Jane’s Intelligence Review the LTTE sources of income were both legal and illegal and probably came “from shipping to drugs and extortion by a network of professional managers – both Tamils and others – across a string of countries.” Investigation of selected Tamil charities in the UK, the US, and Canada have shown that the LTTE used them as an effective and legitimate way to collect and transfer money to the LTTE entities in Sri Lanka.
Prabhakaran in his lifetime had remained as the single most powerful leader of the LTTE. He was the heart and soul of the organisation providing it the much needed mystique to attract and retain a loyal band of cadres. The LTTE’s elite force of suicide bombers - Black Tigers – swore loyalty to him and not to the organisation. He did not allow a second line of leadership succession to evolve naturally. He came down heavily to eliminate potential contenders of power as his one-time aide and lieutenant Mahathiya (Mahedraraja) discovered to his detriment.
Prabhakaran’s death has left too big a void in LTTE leadership. His successor would find it very difficult to meet the high expectations of supporters particularly after the organisation has been mauled grievously. The new leader would require extraordinary skills to recoup LTTE’s assets, marshal the scattered flock and motivate them to build the organisation all over again. There is no single leader in sight within the LTTE who can meet this stringent requirement.
In addition to this Prabhakaran’s successor should be popular enough to attract and retain the loyalty of cadres and supporters, while being strong enough to exercise his muscle power to assert his authority. He should also be able to impress the LTTE satraps presiding over the overseas tentacles of the organisation controlling the assets. As Prabhakaran had not nominated a successor, any new aspirant for the LTTE leadership will have to gain the acceptance of three constituencies of the organisation – the fighting elements, the expatriate segment and fellow travellers extending value added support to the LTTE.
The frontline fighting segment made up of LTTE rank and file still eluding capture in Sri Lanka is the most important constituency. The security forces have claimed that the LTTE had lost around 22,000 cadres while 9,100 of them have been apprehended. Though these figures might be exaggerated, the LTTE has probably lost between 12000 and 15000 cadres in the Eelam War IV. After suffering a crushing defeat and left leaderless in isolated pockets, many of these cadres including the sleeper cells are likely to be demoralised lot. Sri Lanka has already announced that the security forces would continue to hunt them out till the last vestige of LTTE is eradicated from Sri Lanka.
So it is not surprising that the.former LTTE leader Karuna (Vinayagamoorthy Muralidharan), now a minister and a vice president of the ruling Sri Lanka Freedom party, attracting cadres from this segment of. And President Rajapaksa is likely to encourage this trend further. Under this difficult ambience any new leader of the LTTE will have an uphill task to retain the loyalty of such cadres to strengthen his power base within Sri Lanka.
The expatriate segment of supporters is a melange of identities and backgrounds. It has its own pulls and pressures based on their perceptions of the Tamil Eelam question. It is to the credit of Prabhakaran that he was able to commandeer the support of such a disparate group.
On the ground the style of operation of the LTTE representatives particularly in Canada and the UK had progressively degenerated over the years In spite of the LTTE’s much publicised penchant for discipline. There had been complaints of LTTE operatives using of a mix of extortion, coercion, intimidation and even violence to muster support. In the absence of the strong hand of Prabhakaran this situation is likely to further deteriorate with each group trying to outdo the other. Controlling the local chapters of the LTTE and keeping the proxies handling LTTE’s vast overseas assets on a tight leash would be an important factor in re-estabishing the authority of a new leadership. But this may not happen with the urgency the issue deserved.
Lastly, the Tamil struggle for equity had been attracting the support of NGOs and sections of intellectual and political community although the LTTE had assumed its leadership role using questionable methods. Politicians, human rights activists and intellectuals in many countries including India, Canada, and the UK had chosen to support LTTE sponsored causes and movements ignoring its negative aspects because they believed in the organisational effectiveness of the LTTE. Their support had been critical in indirectly building the LTTE’s image in international forums including the UN, often to the embarrassment of Sri Lanka. Unless the new leadership is able to take charge and assert itself quickly, their support may dissipate.
Pathmanathan is probably making a pitch to emerge as a potential candidate to take over the LTTE leadership. Pathmanathan better known by his nickname KP – standing for Kumaran Pathmanathan – is no frontline military commander. His skill in overseas operations enabled him to organise LTTE’s supply chain based on a captive tramp shipping network that became the lifeline of sustenance for the LTTE. He had come under a cloud for sometime when Prabhakaran suspected his financial integrity. However, he was reinstated as international representative, in the place of the late Anton Balasingham to revamp LTTE overseas operations to meet the battlefield needs. Pathmanathan is an organizational man with sound knowledge of clandestine international operations. Even if he musters the support of overseas segments in his bid for leadership, his acceptance among the fighting elements of the LTTE will remain a question mark as he comes out as a poor option after Prabhakaran. His behind the scene skills may not be enough to create enthusiasm even among Tamil public, particularly when Tamil politicians like Douglas Devananda and Karuna are going to occupy increasingly larger political space.
Considering all these aspects the LTTE is likely to be in internal convulsions for sometime over the leadership issue. It may require the collective skills of expatriate leaders to hammer out a solution acceptable to all segments. In the interim the internal squabble might not only increase in decibels, but also end in fisticuffs. To avoid such a contingency a collective leadership may emerge. But such committee solutions would take the dynamics out of leadership when the organisation needs it most to survive as a viable entity.
Copyright: Frontline
Succession Squabble
THE acknowledgement of the death of V. Prabakaran by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) on May 17 came from Selvarasa Pathmanathan, the organisation’s international representative, a week after the Sri Lankan security forces announced it. This is not surprising as the LTTE under the monolithic leadership of Prabakaran had always wished away information he found either uncomfortable or inconvenient. Pathmanathan’s signed statement to the British Broadcasting Corporation on May 24 probably sent shock waves through the acolytes of the LTTE the world over, who had been in a state of denial over the LTTE leader’s death.
Pathmanathan sowed further confusion among LTTE ranks when he said: “We have already announced that we have given up violence and agreed to enter a democratic process to achieve the rights for the Tamil (self) determination of our people.” Armed struggle to carve out an independent Tamil Eelam is the basic reason for the support the LTTE has enjoyed among many Sri Lankan Tamil expatriates.
However, the pro-LTTE website TamilNet, which carried Pathmanathan’s statement, did not include the portion relating to the decision to give up violence and enter the democratic process, which was mentioned in the BBC report. TamilNet also put out a statement from the LTTE’s Department for Diaspora Affairs (DDA) that said it did not want to acknowledge Prabakaran’s death “without explicit authorisation from the LTTE leadership”. It insisted that the LTTE leadership was safe and “it will re-emerge when the right time comes”. Other reports quoted LTTE international intelligence leader Arivazhagan as confirming that Prabakaran was still alive as late as May 22.
It was clear from the tone of the news items in pro-LTTE websites that they would maintain the fiction that the LTTE leadership was still alive as long as possible.
Pro-LTTE political leaders from Tamil Nadu also appeared to be toeing the same line. Vaiko, leader of the Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazagham (MDMK), who considers himself a personal friend of Prabakaran’s, and Nedumaran, a long-term frontman of the LTTE in Tamil Nadu, came out strongly against the veracity of Pathmanathan’s statement. Vaiko appealed to Tamils elsewhere in the world not to believe it, while Nedumaran questioned the legitimacy of Pathmanathan to issue the statement. He said: “Except the generals close to Prabakaran, none has the authority to issue official statements.”
In a way he was correct, as Pathmanathan, though he was anointed by Prabakaran as the head of the LTTE’s international affairs in January 2009, was probably not senior enough in the tightly controlled leadership hierarchy to be given the freedom to issue public statements on his own. But this was not the first time that Pathmanathan had issued statements on behalf of the organisation since he assumed office as its international representative, and the very same leaders did not question his legitimacy earlier.
The LTTE, strictly operating under the control of Prabakaran and his deputy Pottu Amman, probably did not have a contingency plan of action to handle the situation in the absence of both leaders. Given the vengeful mindset of Prabakaran, it would have been heresy in the LTTE to even think of such a contingency. When the entire top and middle level leadership was eliminated on the battle front, Pathmanathan was the only senior leader left alive with a seal of approval from Prabakaran.
The timing of his statement is also interesting. The United Nations Human Rights Council’s emergency meeting in Geneva to consider the violations of human rights by both sides in Sri Lanka was scheduled for May 26. Both the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE have taken the meeting seriously. On the eve of the meeting, the Sri Lankan government announced its intention to hold elections for the Jaffna Municipal Council and the Vavuniya Pradesiya Sabha between August 4 and 17, presumably to give the impression that the situation was more normal in the Northern Province than it appeared. Similarly, the LTTE representative’s disavowal of violence also came on the eve of the meeting. Pathmanathan, with his long international experience in handling LTTE affairs, might have thought it prudent to present the LTTE in a better light on the occasion by issuing a statement to suit it. (In any case, Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa quickly rejected the LTTE’s offer, saying that he did not believe “the LTTE can enter a democratic process after years of their violent activities”.)
ASSETS TO PROTECT
In spite of the international developments, the conflicting statements emanating in the name of the LTTE have all the indications of a serious succession squabble brewing in its top echelons both at home and abroad. Given that the LTTE is a complex organisation, totally shrouded in secrecy, and in the absence of a clearly indicated line of succession, the power struggle to it take over could be long drawn and might draw some blood.
The LTTE’s large and carefully created asset base spread over many countries is cash-rich and provides an added incentive for the power struggle to turn fierce. Jane’s Intelligence Review in August 2008 assessed the LTTE’s annual income at $200-300 million. It rated the LTTE as the second biggest income-generating terrorist organisation in the world, the first being the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), with income derived from the sale of cocaine. In the words of Jane’s Intelligence Review, the LTTE’s sources of income were both legal and illegal and probably came “from shipping to drugs and extortion by a network of professional managers – both Tamils and others – across a string of countries”. Investigation of select Tamil charities in the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada has shown that the LTTE used them as an effective and legitimate way to collect and transfer money to LTTE entities in Sri Lanka.
In his lifetime, Prabakaran was the single most powerful leader of the LTTE. He was the heart and soul of the organisation, providing it with the much needed mystique to attract and retain a loyal band of cadre. The LTTE’s elite force of suicide bombers – the Black Tigers – swore loyalty to him and not to the organisation. He did not allow a second line of leadership to evolve naturally. He came down heavily on potential contenders for power as Mahathaya (Mahendraraja), his one-time aide and lieutenant, discovered to his detriment.
Prabakaran’s death has left a big void in the LTTE leadership. His successor will find it very difficult to meet the high expectations of supporters, particularly after the organisation has been so grievously mauled. The new leader will require extraordinary skills to recoup the LTTE’s assets, marshal the scattered flock and motivate it to build up the organisation all over again. There is no single leader in sight within the LTTE who can meet this stringent requirement.
In addition to this, Prabakaran’s successor should be popular enough to attract and retain the loyalty of cadre and supporters while being strong enough to exercise his muscle power to assert his authority. He should also be able to impress the LTTE satraps presiding over the overseas tentacles of the organisation and controlling the assets. As Prabakaran did not nominate a successor, any new aspirant for the LTTE leadership will have to gain the acceptance of three constituencies of the organisation: the fighting elements, the expatriate segment and fellow travellers extending value-added support to the LTTE.
The front-line fighting segment made up of the LTTE rank and file still eluding capture in Sri Lanka is the most important constituency. The security forces have claimed that the LTTE lost around 22,000 cadre, while 9,100 of them have been apprehended. These figures might be exaggerated, and the LTTE has probably lost between 12,000 and 15,000 cadre in Eelam War IV. After suffering a crushing defeat and left leaderless in isolated pockets, many of these cadre, including the sleeper cells, are likely to be a demoralised lot. Sri Lanka has already announced that the security forces will continue to hunt them out until the last vestige of the LTTE is eradicated from Sri Lanka.
So it is not surprising that Karuna (Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan), the former LTTE leader who is now a Minister in Mahinda Rajapaksa’s government and a vice-president of the ruling Sri Lanka Freedom Party, is attracting cadre from this segment. And President Rajapaksa is likely to encourage this trend further. Under this difficult ambience, any new leader of the LTTE will find it an uphill task to retain the loyalty of such cadre and strengthen his power base within Sri Lanka.
The expatriate segment of supporters comprises a melange of identities and backgrounds. It has its own pulls and pressures based on its perceptions of the Tamil Eelam question. It is to the credit of Prabakaran that he was able to commandeer the support of such a disparate group.
DEGENERATION
On the ground, the style of operation of LTTE representatives, particularly in Canada and the U.K., progressively degenerated over the years. In spite of the LTTE’s much publicised penchant for discipline, there were complaints of LTTE operatives using of a mix of extortion, coercion, intimidation and even violence to muster support. In the absence of the strong hand of Prabakaran, this situation is likely to deteriorate further, with each group trying to outdo the other. Controlling the local chapters of the LTTE and keeping the proxies handling the LTTE’s vast overseas assets on a tight leash will be an important factor in re-establishing the authority of a new leadership. But this may not happen with the urgency the issue deserves.
Lastly, the Tamil struggle for equity attracted the support of non-governmental organisations and sections of the intellectual and political community although the LTTE had assumed its leadership role using questionable methods. Politicians, human rights activists and intellectuals in many countries including India, Canada, and the U.K. chose to support LTTE-sponsored causes and movements ignoring its negative aspects because they believed in its organisational effectiveness. Their support has been critical in indirectly building up the LTTE’s image in international fora, including the U.N., often to the embarrassment of Sri Lanka. Unless the new leadership is able to take charge and assert itself quickly, this support may dissipate.
Pathmanathan is probably making a pitch to emerge as a potential candidate to take over the LTTE leadership. Better known by his nickname KP – which stands for Kumaran Pathmanathan, he is no front-line military commander. His skill in overseas operations enabled him to organise the LTTE’s supply chain on the basis of a captive tramp shipping network that became the lifeline for the LTTE.
He was under a cloud for some time when Prabakaran suspected his financial integrity. However, he was reinstated as international representative, in the place of the late Anton Balasingham, to revamp the LTTE’s overseas operations to meet its battlefield needs.
Pathmanathan is an organisational man with a sound knowledge of clandestine international operations. Even if he musters the support of the overseas segments in his bid for leadership, his acceptance among the fighting elements of the LTTE will remain a question mark as he comes out as a poor option after Prabakaran. His behind-the-scenes skills may not be enough to create enthusiasm even among the Tamil public, particularly when Tamil politicians such as Douglas Devananda and Karuna are going to occupy an increasingly larger political space.
Considering all these aspects, the LTTE is likely to be in internal convulsions for some time over the leadership issue. It may require the collective skills of expatriate leaders to hammer out a solution acceptable to all segments. In the interim, the internal squabble might not only increase in decibels but also end in fisticuffs. To avoid such a contingency, a collective leadership may emerge. But such committee solutions would take the dynamics out of leadership just when the organisation needs it the most to survive as a viable entity.•
The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)’s acknowledgement of the death of V Prabhakaran on May 17, 2009, came from its international representative Selvarasa Pathmanathan, a week after the Sri Lanka security forces (SLSF) announced it. This is not surprising as the LTTE under the monolithic leadership of Prabhakaran had always wished away information he found either uncomfortable or inconvenient. Pathmanathan’s signed statement to the BBC on May 24 probably sent shock waves among the LTTE acolytes the world over, who had been in a state of denial over the LTTE leader’s death.
Pathmanathan sowed further confusion among the LTTE ranks when he said “We have already announced that we have given up violence and agreed to enter a democratic process to achieve the rights for the Tamil (self) determination of our people.” Armed struggle for carving out an independent Tamil Eelam had been the basic reason for the support LTTE enjoyed among many of the Sri Lanka Tamil expatriates.
However, the pro-LTTE website TamilNet which carried Pathmanathan’s statement did not include the portion relating to giving up violence and agreeing to enter the democratic process included in the BBC report. The TamilNet also put out a statement from the LTTE’s Department for Diaspora Affairs (DDA) which did not want to acknowledge Prabhakaran’s death “without explicit authorisation from the LTTE leadership.”
It insisted that the LTTE leadership was safe and “it will re-emerge when the right time comes.” Other reports quoted LTTE international intelligence leader Arivazhagan who confirmed that Prabhakaran was still alive as late as May 22.
It was clear from the tone of news items in pro-LTTE websites that they would maintain the fiction that the LTTE leadership was still alive as long as possible. Pro-LTTE political leaders from Tamil Nadu also appeared to be toeing the same line. Vaiko, leader of the Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazagham (MDMK) who considers himself as a personal friend of Prabhakaran, and Pazha Nedumaran, a long term front man of the LTTE in Tamil Nadu, came out strongly against the veracity of Pathmanathan’s statement. Vaiko appealed to Tamils elsewhere in the world not to believe it, while Pazha Nedumaran questioned the legitimacy of Pathmanathan to issue the statement. He said “Except the generals close to Prabhakaran, none has the authority to issue official statements.”
In a way he was correct as Pathmanathan, though anointed by Prabhakaran as the head of LTTE’s international affairs only in January 2009, was probably not senior enough in the tightly controlled leadership hierarchy to be given the freedom to issue public statements on his own. But this was not the first statement that Pathmanathan had issued statements on behalf of the organization since he assumed office as its international representative; and the very same leaders did not question his legitimacy earlier.
The LTTE, strictly operating under the control of Prabhakaran and his deputy Pottu Amman, probably did not have a contingency plan of action to handle the situation in the absence of both the leaders. Given the vengeful mindset of Prabhakaran even thinking of such a contingency would have been heresy in the LTTE. When the entire top and middle level leadership was eliminated in the battlefront, Pathmanathan was the only senior leader left alive with a seal of approval from dead leader.
The timing of his statement is also interesting. TheUN Human Rights Commission emergency meeting in Geneva to consider the violations of human rights by both sides in Sri Lanka was scheduled for May 26. Both the Sri government and the LTTE have taken the meeting seriously. On the eve of the meeting Sri Lanka government has announced its intention to hold elections for the Jaffna Municipal Council and Vavuniya Pradesiya Sabha between August 4 and 17, presumably to show that the situation was more normal in Northern Province than it appeared. Similarly, the LTTE representative’s disavowal of violence also comes on the eve of the meeting. Pathmanathan with his long international experience in handling LTTE affairs might have thought it prudent to present the LTTE in better light on the occasion by issuing a statement to suit the occasion. (In any case the Sri Lanka’s defence secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa had quickly rejected the LTTE’s offer saying that he did not believe “the LTTE can enter a democratic process after years of their violent activities.”)
In spite of the international developments, the conflicting statements emanating in the name of the LTTE gives all the indications of a serious succession squabble brewing in its top echelons both at home and abroad. Given the LTTE’s complex organization totally shrouded in secrecy, and the absence of a clearly indicated line of succession the power struggle to take over the body could be long drawn and might draw some blood.
The LTTE’s large, carefully created asset base spread over many countries is cash rich and provides an added incentive for the power struggle to turn fierce. The Jane’s Intelligence Review in August 2008 had assessed the LTTE’s annual income at $200-300 million. It rated the LTTE as the second biggest income generating terrorist organization in the world, the first being the Revolutionary Armed Group of Colombia, with income derived from sale of cocaine. In the words of Jane’s Intelligence Review the LTTE sources of income were both legal and illegal and probably came “from shipping to drugs and extortion by a network of professional managers – both Tamils and others – across a string of countries.” Investigation of selected Tamil charities in the UK, the US, and Canada have shown that the LTTE used them as an effective and legitimate way to collect and transfer money to the LTTE entities in Sri Lanka.
Prabhakaran in his lifetime had remained as the single most powerful leader of the LTTE. He was the heart and soul of the organisation providing it the much needed mystique to attract and retain a loyal band of cadres. The LTTE’s elite force of suicide bombers - Black Tigers – swore loyalty to him and not to the organisation. He did not allow a second line of leadership succession to evolve naturally. He came down heavily to eliminate potential contenders of power as his one-time aide and lieutenant Mahathiya (Mahedraraja) discovered to his detriment.
Prabhakaran’s death has left too big a void in LTTE leadership. His successor would find it very difficult to meet the high expectations of supporters particularly after the organisation has been mauled grievously. The new leader would require extraordinary skills to recoup LTTE’s assets, marshal the scattered flock and motivate them to build the organisation all over again. There is no single leader in sight within the LTTE who can meet this stringent requirement.
In addition to this Prabhakaran’s successor should be popular enough to attract and retain the loyalty of cadres and supporters, while being strong enough to exercise his muscle power to assert his authority. He should also be able to impress the LTTE satraps presiding over the overseas tentacles of the organisation controlling the assets. As Prabhakaran had not nominated a successor, any new aspirant for the LTTE leadership will have to gain the acceptance of three constituencies of the organisation – the fighting elements, the expatriate segment and fellow travellers extending value added support to the LTTE.
The frontline fighting segment made up of LTTE rank and file still eluding capture in Sri Lanka is the most important constituency. The security forces have claimed that the LTTE had lost around 22,000 cadres while 9,100 of them have been apprehended. Though these figures might be exaggerated, the LTTE has probably lost between 12000 and 15000 cadres in the Eelam War IV. After suffering a crushing defeat and left leaderless in isolated pockets, many of these cadres including the sleeper cells are likely to be demoralised lot. Sri Lanka has already announced that the security forces would continue to hunt them out till the last vestige of LTTE is eradicated from Sri Lanka.
So it is not surprising that the.former LTTE leader Karuna (Vinayagamoorthy Muralidharan), now a minister and a vice president of the ruling Sri Lanka Freedom party, attracting cadres from this segment of. And President Rajapaksa is likely to encourage this trend further. Under this difficult ambience any new leader of the LTTE will have an uphill task to retain the loyalty of such cadres to strengthen his power base within Sri Lanka.
The expatriate segment of supporters is a melange of identities and backgrounds. It has its own pulls and pressures based on their perceptions of the Tamil Eelam question. It is to the credit of Prabhakaran that he was able to commandeer the support of such a disparate group.
On the ground the style of operation of the LTTE representatives particularly in Canada and the UK had progressively degenerated over the years In spite of the LTTE’s much publicised penchant for discipline. There had been complaints of LTTE operatives using of a mix of extortion, coercion, intimidation and even violence to muster support. In the absence of the strong hand of Prabhakaran this situation is likely to further deteriorate with each group trying to outdo the other. Controlling the local chapters of the LTTE and keeping the proxies handling LTTE’s vast overseas assets on a tight leash would be an important factor in re-estabishing the authority of a new leadership. But this may not happen with the urgency the issue deserved.
Lastly, the Tamil struggle for equity had been attracting the support of NGOs and sections of intellectual and political community although the LTTE had assumed its leadership role using questionable methods. Politicians, human rights activists and intellectuals in many countries including India, Canada, and the UK had chosen to support LTTE sponsored causes and movements ignoring its negative aspects because they believed in the organisational effectiveness of the LTTE. Their support had been critical in indirectly building the LTTE’s image in international forums including the UN, often to the embarrassment of Sri Lanka. Unless the new leadership is able to take charge and assert itself quickly, their support may dissipate.
Pathmanathan is probably making a pitch to emerge as a potential candidate to take over the LTTE leadership. Pathmanathan better known by his nickname KP – standing for Kumaran Pathmanathan – is no frontline military commander. His skill in overseas operations enabled him to organise LTTE’s supply chain based on a captive tramp shipping network that became the lifeline of sustenance for the LTTE. He had come under a cloud for sometime when Prabhakaran suspected his financial integrity. However, he was reinstated as international representative, in the place of the late Anton Balasingham to revamp LTTE overseas operations to meet the battlefield needs. Pathmanathan is an organizational man with sound knowledge of clandestine international operations. Even if he musters the support of overseas segments in his bid for leadership, his acceptance among the fighting elements of the LTTE will remain a question mark as he comes out as a poor option after Prabhakaran. His behind the scene skills may not be enough to create enthusiasm even among Tamil public, particularly when Tamil politicians like Douglas Devananda and Karuna are going to occupy increasingly larger political space.
Considering all these aspects the LTTE is likely to be in internal convulsions for sometime over the leadership issue. It may require the collective skills of expatriate leaders to hammer out a solution acceptable to all segments. In the interim the internal squabble might not only increase in decibels, but also end in fisticuffs. To avoid such a contingency a collective leadership may emerge. But such committee solutions would take the dynamics out of leadership when the organisation needs it most to survive as a viable entity.
Copyright: Frontline
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