Sri Lanka: An Analysis of Military Situation

Operational situation

As expected Task Force-I of the Sri Lanka security forces captured Pooneryn on November 15 freeing A32 highway from the control of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). But the security forces used the continued spell of fine weather and the newly raised Task Force-3 to capture of Mankulam, a key junction on the A9 Kandy-Jaffna lifeline on November 17. On the eastern seaboard of Mullaitivu district, 59 Division captured Mulliyavalai village, 10 km from Mullaitivu, the key coastal town of the area.

These developments in three different axes substantively increase the strategic options available to the security forces. All of them will also add to the pressure on the LTTE already beleaguered in its last footholds in Kilinochchi-Elephant Pass on the arterial road of A9. Once, A9 road is opened up under the security forces control, the hold of the LTTE on the jugular of Jaffna’s normal life will be lost. As a corollary it will also lose its relevance to the peninsular population.

The opening of the A32 Mannar-Pooneryn route will substantively reduce the logistic burden on the security forces, easing pressure on their limited airlift capability. Task Force-I can provide flank support to 57 Divison’s thrust on Kilinochchi from the southwest. Its artillery and possibly machine guns can also interdict the escape routes of LTTE cadres through the lagoon waters when 53 Division strikes along the northern axis of Muhamalai-Elephant Pass.

The capture Mankulam provides two options for the Task Force-III to progress operations along A9 axis in support of 53 Division offensive from the north, and or support from Mankulam side the 57 Division offensive on Kilionchchi-Elephant Pass from southwest. But the more likely course of the Task Force-III will be to develop a threat to the heartland of the LTTE from Mankulam to the east along road Mankulam-Oddusuddan-Mullaitivu. This would prevent any LTTE counter stroke developing on the Kilinochchi offensive, and also tie down the LTTE when 59 Division launches offensive from area Mulliyavalai where a number of roads converge increasing offensive options.

Thus with some quick successes the security forces have built up a five division strong threat against the LTTE with adequate reserves to hold the ground freed from the control of the insurgents.

In my analysis on the failure of the security forces' half-hearted divisional offensive along axis Muhamalai-Elephant Pass in April 2008 (SAAG Note No 447 of May 29, 2008 “Sri Lanka: An analysis of military operations – Update No. 141” available at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/notes5/note447.html ), I had said

“The strong defences of LTTE in Muhamalai axis to Kilinochchi show that it is not going to allow easy passage through. Strategically, the security forces will have to probably consider coordinating the Jaffna offensive along A9 with offensive along A32-Pooneryn to enhance the threat to Kilinochichi and weaken the LTTE defences. Whether the security forces have the wherewithal to carry out such a complex operation is the question only the Army commander can answer best.”

The security forces appear to have done just that after seven months, during which three divisions have been inducted into battle to increase the force level and thrust lines. And now the security forces goal would be not merely to capture Paranthan and Kilinochchi on A9 highway but to launch multiple offensives on the Muhamalai-Elephant Pass-Kilinochchi complex to restore normal life in Northern Province. And when that materializes, President Rajapaksa may give form to media speculations of a general election.

LTTE’s limited options

As the LTTE had been fighting mainly delaying actions the security forces casualties in the operation would be maximized if only the LTTE decides on a do-or-die stand at Kilinochchi. In the past, the LTTE tactics had always been to pull back after fighting delaying actions and build up a strong counterstroke. This had kindled widespread expectations of such a LTTE strike which is yet to come.

While this had succeeded in the earlier war, this time around the security forces appear to be ready to prevent a replay of the same script. There are three reasons for this: the security forces are not carrying through the offensive with the same troops holding static positions; they have multiple axes as well as substantive strength to deflate a counter stroke and lastly, the offensive capability of the Sea Tigers who provided vital support has been substantively eliminated on both the western and eastern coasts. (In fact, the security forces have neutralized repeated efforts of the Sea Tigers to take any initiative in the sea along the eastern coast north of Mullaitivu from Champianpattu to Nayaru where the LTTE still has some freedom to operate.)

With A32 road in the hands of security forces and with 59 Division along the east coast (and probably 55 Division too from Nagarkovil southwards) and the navy denying the LTTE access to sea routes of overseas supply to sustain the war, the LTTE’s options appear very limited. Strategically the LTTE would probably be better off to consolidate its armed strength after fighting a delaying action than defend Kilinochchi strongly and further deplete its dwindling strength. But that would be a decision based on military logic and reasoning rather than on the convoluted logic of an insurgent force operating on a different plane. So strictly speaking it is difficult to read Prabhakaran’s mind. It would be overambitious to expect him to again pull a rabbit out of the hat with a masterful counter stroke at this belated stage as some of his overseas supporters expect him to do.

Political implications of military success

Undoubtedly, military successes one after the other have strengthened the hands of President Rajapaksa and the hawks in Sri Lanka politics. Thus even the consideration of any peace move would be shelved till military success is taken to its logical conclusion of making the LTTE irrelevant. This has been amply made clear by the President in his statements on a number of occasions. The military successes have also strengthened President’s resolve to pursue the war. They have also exposed the limitations of India’s ability to influence the course of events.

The delicate pulls and pressures of coalition politics on the central government and the Tamil Nadu government so close to the parliamentary elections have prevented the emergence of any substantive Indian political initiative on Sri Lanka. In Tamil Nadu there is widespread dismay at the plight of lakhs of Tamils deprived of their homes, livelihood, and shelter caught in the wilderness of battle zones. It is easy to dismiss the snowballing public protests and hunger strikes organized in Tamil Nadu asking for a ceasefire in Sri Lanka as part of Prabhakaran’s strategy or as political gimmick of local parties. However that would be ignoring the mindset of large sections of people in the state who abhor his style of mindless killings while feeling genuinely distressed over the plight of internally displaced Tamils in Sri Lanka.

The Tamil and Sinhala polity in Sri Lanka have not been able to work out a political strategy for evolving a win-win formula either among themselves or collectively to foster a feeling of security and trust among Tamil population. Some sections of them, particularly Tamil leaders, expect India and everyone other than themselves to undertake this delicate task. No external force including India on their own can generate security and trust among the population.

Ultimately Sri Lanka has to come to terms with the issues and evolve a process by which a suitable environment for lasting peace is created and this will not be helped by military victories alone. Till then the military options avidly pursued by both sides for achieving short term ends will dominate the national scene And even if the Fourth Eelam War is won by the Sri Lankan government, ultimately the loser would be the nation as a section of the people would not to trust their rulers or feel secure under them. And that might sow the seeds of the next round of war.

http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cnotes5%5Cnote482.html

First Things First in Fighting Terrorism

In spite of confronting extremism and terrorism for over three decades, the government and the administration both at the Centre and states appear to be unable to tackle the problem. This lassitude appear to have spread to the preventive, investigative and operational aspects. The macabre story of terrorist bomb blasts that started in New Delhi in 2005 has continued with increasing frequency in Mumbai, Jaipur, Ahmedabad and again at Delhi during the years that followed. These acts have only reinforced the popular impression that the administration was groping in the dark about how to tackle the terrorists. Many saw that clumsiness rather than organised follow up action as the hallmarks of administration’s response to terrorism.

The national response after every major terror attack vividly shows all that is wrong with this “Indian” response. Usually it starts with immediate visual media coverage of the scene with the public and policemen milling around the blast site. Invariably a serving or retired police officer would be called upon to comment on the blast even as the news trickled in. A senior police officer would cut in to announce the suspected involvement of one of the Jihadi terrorist groups in the blast. Police assessments would be freely given even as half baked information crawled on the news strip at the bottom of the TV screen. The Union Home Ministry not to be left out would say a warning about the impending terror attack was given to the state authorities. Usually, a prompt denial by the state government would follow the claims of New Delhi. Unfazed the Home Ministry would call for an immediate meeting of either state home ministers or heads of police in Delhi to ‘improve the system.’

The Union Home Minister or his junior partner would come on the TV to say the nation would not bow to terrorist elements and assure “all assistance” to the state to combat terrorism. The state police would triumphantly announce a series arrests of suspected terrorists . If the body count due to the attack was large, the prime minister would appeal to the nation to be calm and maintain communal harmony. Of course, the opposition and ruling parties at the Centre and states would trade accusations and allegations of failure to rein in terrorists. Everyone would talk of failure and incompetence of intelligence and security agencies and stress the need to coordinate their work. If the damage to public reputation is serious, a group of ministers would be formed to look into some perennial issues like revamping national security and intelligence agencies.

When dust settles on the event and the media focus shifts to the next non-event of a Bollywood scandal, the whole nation would go into a comatose state. And the government at the centre and state, presumably giving a silent sigh of relief, would carry on as before till the next blast hits the headlines. The whole exercise in futility must be heart breaking for serious minded civil servants and security services members. The administration is seen as pliable, helpless, and ineffective body. This makes it more difficult for them to motivate their teams. Glorification of the terrorist in public mind is a more dangerous consequence of when such attitude is firmed in. As the terrorist gains a larger than life image, witnesses are unnerved stalling progress in the case. This self defeating cycle has resulted in separatists and terrorists scoring brownie points in their ‘war’ against the state.

Though one can fault the Gujarat administration on a few issues, on tackling terrorism it has shown foresight and planning. This had enabled the police to quickly take follow up actions not only in investigating of the Ahmedabad serial blasts of July 2008 but dig deep into terrorists’ ramifications. The follow up actions were at three levels: coordinating the stakeholders, intelligence and investigative agencies at the Centre and states connected with the whole series of blasts; correlating forensic findings, and coordinating a series of arrests of local activists connected with the case in a number of states.

Terrorism is operatively different from insurgency and other forms of extremism. It corrodes the relationship between the state and its citizen to destroy the security and trust of the citizen in the government through physical violence and intimidation. Terrorism cannot be eliminated only by developmental economic tools or educating the public, though they reduce the relevancy of terrorist cause to the people. The state has to deter, discourage, dismantle and defeat the terrorists from destabilizing normal life of the people.

Terrorists are able to proactively operate because they have clarity on what they should do, how they should do and who will do them. To effectively handle terrorism, the state has to match, if not surpass, the terrorists’ clarity of purpose. Such clarity of what is required to be done, who will do it and how it will be done should percolate down to the lowest operational level.

My own experience in Sri Lanka as head of intelligence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force, which had a hazy mandate, taught me a few valuable lessons. A green field intelligence operation takes about 18 months to mature. But in the overseas turf of Sri Lanka, the time frame had to be compressed to one year. On assignment, I prepared a task table identifying as I saw ‘things to do.’ There were 223 items from the mundane to the complex. The duration of each task varied from a few hours (to get a chair and a table for my use and rustle up a telephone!) to three years. This rationalisation process enabled me to go ahead with some clarity on the what-who-how tasking. A few items were added as they appeared and the prioritisation was juggled to fit in demands of a changing operational environment.

Time is a valuable resource available to both terrorists and security administrators. Success comes to those who effectively use time as a resource. Real time response to information can come only if data base management is planned well in advance. Modern information management systems provide this advantage to the administrator. Only he has to get out his conventional mindset to leverage such tools. Unforeseen bottle necks, unclear responsibility, absence of essential competencies and external resources, and lack of problem solving methodology are some of the time wasters. Time based management by objectives, monitoring of progress to reach milestones, and evolving dynamic standard operative procedures are some of other methods that could help the administrator to keep ahead of terrorists. A project management format could help in time management.

Everyone blames the politicians for undermining the rule of law and governance. This is true to certain extent, though politicians always reinforce success because its fall out benefits them. Gujarat has shown how much can be achieved even within the existing scheme of things. Gujarat’s organised approach has also benefited the unravelling of the Mujahiddin’s tentacles in many other states also. So in fighting terrorism, security administrators need to do first things first; that is to get organised. They need clarity of thought to evolve a ‘what-who-how’ methodology. And that does not require any external inputs, but the will to win.

Oct 13, 2008
Copyright: GFiles

Sri Lanka: Operational Developments in the Eelam War

Operational fronts

The security forces put two weeks of sunny weather to good use, advancing their offensive further both along the Mannar coast and the axis Akkarayankulam-Kilinochchi, southwest of the administrative capital of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). According to the security sources Task Force-I formed out of 58 Division advancing on a broad front south east of A32 Mannar-Pooneryn axis are six km short of Pooneryn on October 10, 2008. They came under heavy LTTE resistance at Palayilkulam and Uruthirapuram on way.

The LTTE appears to be reducing its strength in Pooneryn. It is reported to have pulled out its three 130 mm How guns from Kalmunai point in the Pooneryn salient. This would indicate that the LTTE would then pull out from Pooneryn in small trickles even as it resists the advancing forces.

The LTTE have the options to infiltrate into Jaffna peninsula and the Kayts Island group, and Kilinochchi. The Kilinochchi option might not come through as the Task Force-I is moving to cut off Pooneryn - Paranthan road which joins the A9 Kandy-Jaffna highway. We can expect the navy to come into action in the last phase of Pooneryn operations both to contain and hunt down the LTTE cadres getting out through the lagoons around Pooneryn. The navy is reported to have deployed special boat squadrons to prevent such moves of LTTE.

The capture of Pooneryn would open up the A32 maintenance route to Jaffna in the coming weeks through the Sangupiddy ferry, relieving a major burden on the security forces in providing air and sea logistic support to Jaffna administration. After shifting from Kalmunai, the LTTE guns would not be able to engage Palali airfield and Jaffna forces headquarters.

57 Division advancing west of A9 captured by October 6 the well sited Akkarayankulam defence complex after three weeks of intermittent operations. It also claimed to have neutralized the long bund obstacle after fighting a few bitter battles. Its progress is slow due to strong opposition from the LTTE as well as heavy booby trapping of the route of advance. Forces of 57 Division are said to have reached Kokkavil on the A9 highway increasing the pressure on Kilinochchi. 57 Division is said to be consolidating itself 9 km southwest of Kilinochchi beyond Akkarayankulam.
In a bid to prevent any intrusion of the eastern flank of 57 Division from the LTTE, which is dominating the A9 highway from Mankulam to Kokkavil, the Army Commander Lt Gen Sarath Fonseka inducted the newly created Task force-III into this area. The task force, a weak division, operating parallel to the A9 highway on the west is said to have gained control of three km stretch of road from Mankulam northwards. This operation further increases the options available to Gen Fonseka to further progress the offensive.

LTTE's options

The increase in force levels of the security forces following the induction of Task Force-III has further reduced the options available to the LTTE to launch a counter offensive at a place of its choosing. After the fall of Pooneryn, the Sea Tiger operations also would be curtailed if not stopped along western coast from Mannar to Southern Jaffna coast.

So the LTTE will do what it knows best. Increase its guerrilla operations - the whole bouquet of sneak raids, suicide bombings, and killings - making them more deadly, catching the security forces on the back foot well away from the battlefield. The recent air strikes on Kelaniya power station and Thalladi military base in Mannar district are examples of such efforts. The air strikes succeeded because the air force elements in the rear areas were not mentally ready for taking on the wily LTTE intruder. For this purpose the LTTE is trying out novel methods to smuggle in material for suicide bombings and raids particularly in the eastern province and in Vavuniya district. Attacks on TMVP cadres and the STF, attributed to the LTTE have also increased in the east. However, so far the LTTE had not been able to disturb the government focus on war or trigger any major change in operational situation.

As pressure is building up on Kilinochchi defences, the LTTE could beef them up with cadres from Muhamalai front. Perhaps to prevent this possibility, 53 Division from Muhamalai had been keeping an offensive posture carrying out small but sharp attacks on the LTTE's forward defence lines. There is a strong possibility that the LTTE had already thinned out a major strength from Pooneryn along with the long range artillery moved out earlier. This would enable to strengthen the LTTE core strength in area Kilinochchi up to forward lines of Muhamalai front in the north. Thus the LTTE's sphere of operations is likely to be further constricted as more sunny days are predicted by weather watchers.

The recent 'reiteration' LTTE's readiness for ceasefire made by Nadesan, the political head of the LTTE, should be seen in this operational context. It is likely the LTTE would play its political strong suite with the Tamil Nadu card with emphasis on ceasefire as the core theme in Prabhakaran's Maveerar Day (Heroes Day) address in two weeks time. If the LTTE announces a unilateral ceasefire, the Tamil Nadu politicians' call for a ceasefire would get a new lease of life brushing aside the cynicism clouding the political moves in Tamil Nadu. That could create a lot of embarrassment for Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister Karunanidhi. If this is calculus is in the thoughts of Sri Lanka, we might see a large scale escalation of offensive in most of the war fronts in the coming two weeks.

Battle Casualties

According to the details given in Sri Lanka parliament, during last month the security forces suffered 171 killed and 1122 injured in operations, most of them around the Akkarayan defence complex. In comparison, during the operations in July 2008 the security forces lost 106 men and 662 were wounded. The large increase in the security forces casualties would indicate the fierce resistance put up by the LTTE. According to security sources the LTTE suffered nearly 700 killed, more than four times suffered by the security forces in the same period in October 2008.
Though these figures have not been verified by other sources, it is clear that casualties are hurting the LTTE more than the security forces as their overall strength and bank of recruits are much less. With the continuing exodus of civilians from the war affected areas, the LTTE would probably press more people of all ages into the war effort. This would further increase civilian casualties.

The morale of hardcore LTTE fighters defending the approaches to Kilinochchi is apparently still high as indicated by their ability to inflict high casualties on the troops, despite their own loss of men and territory. On the other hand, the security forces appear to be mentally prepared to press ahead with the offensive regardless of their casualties.

Lt Gen Sarath Fonseka, the Army Commander, in an interview claimed that 80 percent of the operation against the LTTE was over. Yet he estimated the LTTE strength at 12000. (In my own estimate, the LTTE strength of 12000 if accurate would probably be made up of 4000 hardcore cadres, and 2000-3000 young recruits. The rest are probably civilian auxiliaries pressed into service.) This appears to contradict the success claimed in the so called war strategy of attrition and annihilation of the LTTE. The government for the time being is probably only aiming to regain control over major parts of LTTE controlled north and open up a land based logistic route to Jaffna peninsula than carry on the war of attrition forever against the LTTE.

Veracity of information

The battle zones in the north are closed to independent media.Now international NGOs operating in the area have also vacated under the orders of the government. The only major source of information on operations is the defence spokesman and the government media. Under the new government regulatory dispensation for media, even the state TV is reported to be undergoing live censor. The LTTE, a closed organization, usually does not report the whole truth on casualties or operational details. Now the LTTE propaganda and media organs are mostly silent on the war. They are giving little additional information. So all operational assessments now suffer from a lack of verification through independent and unbiased sources of information

Despite this handicap and the asymmetry of insurgency environment, operational analysis follows inevitable military logic and reasoning on which warfare is based. By this yardstick, however much the information sources are suspect, a few home truths can be ferreted out in the present war situation in Sri Lanka. This tells us the LTTE has lost a major portion of its territory in the north and the whole of the east since January 2006.

In the course of this, the LTTE has suffered heavy casualties, many times more than the security forces tally. Overall, the LTTE is now poised to lose its vital grip on the Jaffna peninsula's logistics jugular. In times to come this would reduce LTTE's influence on Tamils, provided their grievances are attended to by the government. Only time will tell whether the government would seize the opportunity, instead of talking only in terms of attrition, because so many such opportunities in the past were frittered away.

http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cnotes5%5Cnote480.html

Fauji Bhaiyon Ko Gussa Kyon Aatha Hai?

[We need a permanent solution to this tussle over emoluments so that the armed forces need only confront the enemies of the nation, says T.R.Ramaswami, is a former banker who was with the SBI Group and DSP Merrill Lynch Ltd.]

In the continuing debate on pay scales for the armed forces, there has to be a serious and transparent effort to ensure that the country is not faced with an unnecessary civil-military confrontation. That effort will have to come from the netas, who are the real and true bosses of the armed forces and not the civil bureaucracy. A solution may lie in what follows.

This country requires the best armed forces, the best police and the best civil service. In fact that is what the British ensured.. By best one means that a person chooses which service he wants as per his desires/capabilitie s and not based on the vast differential in prospects in the various services. How much differential is there?

Take Maharashtra, one of the most parsimonious with police ranks thus still retaining some merit - the 1981 IPS batch have become 3-star generals, the 1987 are 2-star and the 1994 1-star.. In the army the corresponding years are 1972, 1975, 1979. – ie a differential of 10-15 years. While the differential is more with the IAS, the variance with the IPS is all the more glaring because both are uniformed services and the grades are " visible" on the shoulders.

First some general aspects.

Only the armed forces are a real profession – i.e. where you rise to the top only by joining at the bottom. We have had professors of economics become Finance Secretaries or even Governors of RBI. We have any number of MBBSs, engineers, MBAs, in the police force though what their qualifications lend to their jobs is a moot point. You can join at any level in the civil service, except Cabinet Secretary. A civil servant can move from Animal Husbandry to Civil Aviation to Fertilisers to Steel to yes, unfortunately, even to Defence..

But the army never asks for Brigade Commanders or a Commandant of the Army War College or even Director General Military Intelligence, even from RAW or IB. Army officers can and have moved into organizations like IB and RAW but it is never the other way round. MBBS and Law graduates are only in the Medical or JAG Corps and do nothing beyond their narrow areas. Every Army Chief - in any army - has risen from being a commander of a platoon to company to battalion to brigade to division to corps to army. In fact the professionalism is so intense that no non-armoured corps officer ever commands an armoured formation – first and possibly only exception in world military history – General K. Sunderji. Perhaps it is this outstanding professionalism that irks the civil services.

Next, one must note the rigidity and steep pyramid of the army's rank structure. In the civil services any post is fungible with any grade based on political expediency and the desires of the service. For example I know of one case where one department downgraded one post in another state and up-graded one in Mumbai just to enable someone continue in Mumbai after promotion! You can't fool around like this in the armed forces. A very good Brigadier cannot be made a Major-General and continue as brigade commander. There has to be a clear vacancy for a Major General and even then there may be others better than him. Further the top five ranks in the army comprise only 10% of the officer strength. Contrast this with the civil services where entire batches become Joint Secretaries.

Even the meaning of the word "merit" is vastly different in the army and the civil services. Some years back an officer of the Maharashtra cadre claimed that he should be the Chief Secretary as he was first in the merit list. Which merit list? At the time of entry more than 35 years before! The fact is that this is how merit is decided in the IAS and IPS. Every time a batch gets promoted the inter-se merit is still retained as at the time of entry. In other words if you are first in a batch at the time of entry, then as long as you get promoted, you continue to remain first! This is like someone in the army claiming that he should become chief because he got the Sword of Honour at the IMA. Even a Param Vir Chakra does not count for promotion, assuming that you are still alive. In the armed forces, merit is a continuous process - each time a batch is promoted the merit list is redrawn according to your performance in all the previous assignments with additional weightage given not only to the last one but also to your suitability for the next one. Thus if you are a Brigade Commander and found fit to become a Major General, you may not get a division because others have been found better to head a division. That effectively puts an end to your promotion to Lt. General.

The compensation package must therefore address all the above issues. In each service, anyone must get the same total compensation by the time he reaches the 'mode rank' of his service. " Mode " is a statistical term – the value where the maximum number of variables fall. In the IAS normally everyone reaches Director and in the IPS it is DIG. In the army, given the aforementioned rank and grade rigidities and pyramidical structure, the mode rank cannot exceed Colonel. Thus a Colonel's gross career earnings (not salary scales alone) must be at par with that of a Director. But remember that a Colonel retires at 54, but every babu from peon to Secretary at 60 regardless of performance. Further, it takes 16-18 years to become a Colonel whereas in that time an IAS officer reaches the next higher grade of Joint Secretary, which is considered equal to a Major General. These aspects and others - like postings in non-family stations - must be addressed while fixing the overall pay scales of Colonel and below. Thereafter a Brigadier will be made equal to a Joint Secretary, a Major-General to an Additional Secretary and a Lt. General to a Secretary. The Army Commanders deserve a new rank - Colonel General - and should be above a Secretary but below Cabinet Secretary. The equalization takes place at the level of Cabinet Secretary and Army Chief. If this is financially a problem I have another solution. Without increasing the armed forces' scales, reduce the scales of the IAS and IPS till they too have 20% shortage. Done? Even India 's corruption index will go down.

If the above is accepted in principle, there is a good case to review the number of posts above Colonel. Senior ranks in the armed forces have become devalued with more and more posts being created. But the same pruning exercise is necessary in the IAS and more so in the IPS, where Directors General in some states are re-writing police manuals – one is doing Volume I and another Volume II! Further the civil services have such facilities as "compulsory wait" – basically a picnic at taxpayers cost. And if you are not promoted or posted where you don't want to go they seem able to take off on leave with much ease. In the army you will be court-martialled. Also find out how many are on study leave. The country cannot afford this.

Let not someone say that the IAS and IPS exams are tougher and hence the quality of the officers better. An exam at the age of 24 has to be tougher than one at the age of 16. The taxpaying citizen is not interested in your essay/note writing capabilities or whether you know Cleopatra's grandfather. As a citizen I always see the army being called to hold the pants of the civil services and the police and never the other way round. That's enough proof as to who is really more capable.

Also recall the insensitive statements made by the IG Meerut in the Aarushi case and the Home Secretary after the blasts. Further, when the IAS and IPS hopefuls are sleeping, eating and studying, their school mates, who have joined the army, stand vigil on the borders to make it possible for them to do so.

Remember that the armed forces can only fight for above the table pay. They can never compete with the civil services and definitely not with the police for the under the table variety.

Finally, there is one supreme national necessity. The political class – not the bureaucracy - which represents the real civil supremacy better become more savvy on matters relating to the armed forces. Till then they are at the mercy of the civil service, who frequently play their own little war games. At ministerial level there are some very specialized departments – Finance, Railways, Security (Home), Foreign and Defence, where split second decisions are necessary. It is always possible to find netas savvy in finance, foreign relations and railways. Security has been addressed in getting a former IPS officer as NSA at the level of a MoS. Is it time that a professional is also brought into the Defence Ministry as MoS? The sooner the better. In fact this will be better than a CoDS because the armed forces will have someone not constrained by the Army Act or Article 33 of the Constitution. Of course the loudest howls will come from the babus. The netas must realize that a divide and rule policy cannot work where the country's security is concerned. Recall 1962?

Our army, already engaged in activities not core to their functions, including rescuing babies from borewells(!), should not have to engage in civil wars over their pay scales.

Dimensions of Democracy, Demography and National Security

Terrorist violence is on the rise in India, as a week coalition government preferred to place vote bank politics above national security concerns. The hand of Hindu extremism in the Malegaon blast is perhaps the first signs of Hindu backlash against the unchecked rise in Jihadi terrorist acts. The Kashmir issue is dragging and the armed forces are weary at the never ending situation there. The recent serial blasts in Assam believed to be controlled by the masters in Bangladesh and Pakistan has touched off strong reaction from the public. Once again the question of illegal immigrants from Bangladesh infiltrating across the borders often with the connivance of local politicians is a continuing matter of concern. I am reproducing here a paper 'Dimensions of democracy, demography and national security' presented at a seminar on ‘Relevance of Hinduism in Understanding India’ was jointly organized by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation and the Rashtriya Jagriti Sansthan, at New Delhi on Feb 4 & 5, 2005. The paper examines the dynamics of Indian social perceptions as a result of demographic changes due to illegal immigration and issues of national security concerns thereof. The situation is now worse and perhaps issues raised in this paper are more relevant than ever before.

DIMENSIONS OF DEMOCRACY, DEMOGRAPHY AND NATIONAL SECURITY

"Cheshire puss," she began rather timidly... "Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from here?" "That depends a good deal on where you want to get to," said the cat. - Lewis Carroll, Alice in Wonderland

PREAMBLE

At the face of it the appropriateness of the theme ‘dimensions of democracy, demography and national security’ to a conference on ‘Relevance of Hinduism to Understanding India’ may appear facile and far-fetched. In democracies, freedom breeds desires and articulation resulting in conflict.[1] Thus modern democracies, particularly those with multi cultural societies like India, have to manage social conflict as part of their existence. Conflicts by themselves are not bad because they bring issues that cause social friction to the fore and often help in resolving them. Civilized societies cement cracks in the social framework through the mechanism of democracy. But drastic social changes, violent or otherwise, can breed potential issues that can endanger both exercising the democratic rights as well as national security. As many countries in Europe and the U.S. are discovering, a feeling insecurity is created in societies by entry of large bodies of alien population across the frontiers, whether legally or illegally. This is due to reasons of perceived threat national identity as well as cultural traditions apart from territorial integrity. As long as the country can manage these potential conflict situations through a well-organised mechanism, it does not affect its national security.

In India, over a thousand years this mechanism has been helped by the evolution of a composite Indian culture. This has enabled the peoples of diverse religions and ethnicities to practice democracy with notable success. The partition of the country in 1947 and its aftermath brought about demographic changes as well as loss of territorial integrity, creating insecurity among communities in the sub continent. While India managed to recover from this trauma slowly and build a functional democracy, the fresh burden imposed by drastic demographic changes through illegal immigration has rekindled the feeling of insecurity. This feeling of insecurity among the population if unchecked can have a collateral impact on their democratic functioning and as a corollary on national security. In this backdrop, this paper proposes to -
a. Explore aspects of Hindu ethos that has influenced the evolution of a composite Indian culture, which in turn manifests in ‘Indian way’ of doing things.
b. Indian democracy and how it copes with confrontational issues between religions.
c. Study unnatural demographic change and how it affects the country’s democratic institutions and as a threat to national security. To explain this within the scope of the theme of this conference issues arising out of unnatural demographic changes in Assam due to illegal immigrants from Bangladesh is presented as a brief case because it has affected the social and political life of the people in Assam with serious implications for national security.

The background note to this seminar observed: “Any meaningful debate on any aspect of Hindu identity or Hinduism runs the risk of either being perceived as a rightist Hindutva propaganda or a liberal secular attempt to dilute the core values of Hinduism and its understanding.”[2] This remark is more relevant now than ever before because in India Hinduism and Islam have become political flash points from being religious and cultural identities. In an era when it is fashionable to talk of clash of civilizations, any discussion of the issues of religion (in the present political context Hinduism and Islam), and its triangular relationship to demography and national security runs the risk of being slotted into one of the two antipodes - Hindutva protagonism and its diehard opposite liberal-secularism. Objective analysis of all national issues has been a casualty due to this political polarization. As a result anyone who attempts to do so is likely to be accused of subjective criticism. The author has kept in mind this risk in the background while writing this paper.

The entire paper has been done from a contemporary post-1971 standpoint [3], with references given only in the modern idiom avoiding religious texts or their interpretations. This has been done to understand the issues from a realistic, non-religious and practical plane.

TERMS OF REFERENCE

As any paper of this nature is subject to reinterpretation, the author has to clarify the following terms of reference he has set in writing this paper:
a. The word Hindu has been interpreted in many ways. Thanks to the religious colouring politics has undergone in recent years, the author feels it necessary to explain that the word Hindu in this paper is used to mean only the followers of Hinduism as a religion. [4] Though the author is a non practising Hindu (and not very proud of it), he is conditioned by the Hindu value system, learnt in the nurseries of an extended family, the essence of which is a friendly attitude to all religions. Some sections may find this a limitation to objective analysis.
b. Similarly some may find the issues of Hindu-Muslim relations have not been treated in sufficient detail. This paper does not claim to be a study of Hindu-Muslim relations as this subject is the theme of a separate session. In order to ensure objectivity, the author as a security analyst has steered clear of religious dogma, touching upon only aspects of Hindu-Muslim relations that have impact on strategic issues of national security.
c. This paper avoids the commonly misused word ‘fundamentalism’ to describe manifestation of extreme religious beliefs in social conduct. Instead the word ‘obscurantism’ is used to indicate this behaviour, because the word ‘fundamentalism’ actually means belief in basic articles of faith of a religion. Similarly this paper also avoids the use of the description ‘Islamic terrorism’, a common media usage, to indicate the practices of terrorists of the ilk of Osama bin Laden. Instead ‘Jihadi terrorism’ is used, as it does not brand all Muslims as terrorists. [5] ‘Secularism’ is another word much misused in this country; in the context of this paper it means what the dictionary says: ‘the view or belief that society’s values and standards should not be influenced or controlled by religion or church.’[6]

PRESENTATION

This paper is presented in three parts:
• Part 1 – Dimensions of Indian composite culture and its relation to functional democracy: This part explores the evolution of the composite Indian culture that has a strong base in Hindu ethos with influences from Islam and Christianity. This has helped in evolving an ‘Indian way’ of doing things, common to all religionists in India
• Part 2 – Indian democracy and coping with social confrontations: This part studies some aspects of the complex nature of Hindu-Muslim relations and how Indian democracy copes with it.
• Part 3 – Population changes and national security concerns: This part presents an analysis of how illegal immigration from Bangladesh in states bordering eastern and northeastern India has impacted democratic governance, precipitating national security concerns.

PART 1 – DIMENSIONS OF INDIAN COMPOSITE CULTURE AND ITS RELATION TO FUNCTIONAL DEMOCRACY

Composite Indian culture

India is world’s largest multi-religious, multi-racial, multi-ethnic and multi-linguistic democracy. To the Western mind conditioned by codified Christian ethos, successful practice of democracy in India for half a century and more is a conundrum waiting to be solved. It has made false prophets of doom merchants who predicted anarchy and chaos at the time of Indian independence. It has shown that democracy is not a preserve of the rich Western societies. Despite its ponderous journey through un-chartered path of participatory democracy, at last it is poised to take its rightful place among nations on its own strength as envisaged by the father of Hindu renaissance Swami Vivekananda: “Can you adduce any reason why India should lie in the ebb-tide of the Aryan nations? Is she inferior in intellect? Is she inferior in dexterity? Can you look at her art, at her mathematics, at her philosophy, and answer ‘yes’? All that is needed is that she should de hypnotise herself and wake up from he age long sleep to her true rank in the hierarchy of nations.” [7]

Historically, others have always found India and Indians baffling and often difficult to understand. As Al-Biruni, who came to India with invading armies of Mahmud of Ghazni in the 11th century pointed out, foreigners found Indians were different from other people “in everything which other nations have in common.”[8] The reason for India’s survival and success is the evolution of a composite Indian culture in keeping with the dynamics of social change. Any social change is a painful process and the evolution of the composite Indian culture had not been a simple process. But India has been helped in this process by the ethos of Hinduism. India has been the source of two major world religions – Hinduism and Buddhism. It has also received and provided a home for not only other world religions like Christianity, Islam, and Judaism but also the less known ones like Zoroastrianism and the Bahaism. Foreigners of a wide spectrum – itinerant travellers and traders, refugees escaping religious persecution, invading armies, conquering emperors and evangelists - brought these religions from different continents to India over a thousand years.

Among the major religions, Buddhism and Jainism with their origins in this country had no problem in dealing with Hindu cultural traditions of the time. They also had some convergence with Hindu beliefs and concepts like transmigration of soul, cycle of rebirth, reincarnation, and adherence to ahimsa (non violence). They enriched the cultural scene without the type of conflicts of belief generated by Islam (7th century) and Christianity (15th century on a national scale) when they entered the sub continent. The Abrahamic religions had differed from Hinduism in key beliefs of godhead, polytheism, and allegiance to a single sacred book or a uniform code of conduct. They also differed on issues like idol worship, transmigration of souls, or cycle of birth. However, both Islam and Christianity took root in the country and absorbed part of the Hindu traditional practices to evolve their own Indian traditions. Hindu culture was also influenced by the Islamic and Christian theology and traditions, giving rise to transcendental cults like Kabirpanthis and Brahmo Samaj, and even a religion like Sikhism. All these subtle and not so subtle influences of religions and international linkages have shaped India’s composite culture. With the help of this composite Indian culture majority of Indians irrespective of their religion have been able to evolve a dynamic process of social adjustment to build a core national identity.

The composite Indian culture has certain elements shaped by the Hindu attitude – acceptance and adjustment to change and non-violence as an article of faith. In the course of history Indian people had faced a few tectonic changes – the Muslim invasion and rule, British colonization, and the partition of India to create Pakistan. It’s a tribute to the people and their composite culture that they had managed to absorb these shocks and continued to put their faith in democracy and focus, by and large, on development issues rather than dissipate their energies on religious schism. Currently India is facing the fourth tectonic shock – terrorist operation aided and abetted by Pakistan for over two decades in Jammu and Kashmir State. As a result more than 200,000 Kashmiri Hindus have been driven out of their homes. Despite these gross provocations, shrill anti-Islamic hysteria that one finds in the west after 9/11 is markedly absent in the country. Very few Indian Muslims figure in list of global terrorists though India has the second highest Muslim population in the world. [9]

It is this composite culture that has made successful immigrants of Indians in over 80 countries, contributing to the growth of the host country, while maintaining their distinct, common Indian identity. This is despite the regional, religious, linguistic, and caste differences among them. It is the strength of this culture that even fourth generation descendents of this Diaspora in a number of countries in the continents of Africa, Australasia, America have continued to maintain this identity and at the same time managed to get along with the local societies without major social conflict.

Thus to have an understanding to Hinduism in the current socio-political context, there is a need to study Indian democracy with reference to -
a. Indian democracy’s features that enables it to cope with social confrontations
b. The changes in social equation between communities, particularly Hindus and Muslims in India. This is important because the social adjustment process, evolved after the traumatic change wrought by India’s partition is under threat due to alien inspired Jihadi terrorism, now a global phenomenon. Many sections of Indian society, particularly Hindu right, have questioned the legitimacy of secularism as a national policy. Historical Hindu grievances of excesses by Muslim rulers of the past are being resurrected and made into political issues. Inevitably religious affiliation, which had not been a major issue of Indian politics, is increasingly playing an important political role. The Muslim factor has become an important aspect in the exercise and operation of Indian democracy with its inevitable consequence on national security. Thus an understanding of Hindu-Muslim linkages becomes another important factor in understanding the dimensions of democracy and national security.

PART 2 - INDIAN DEMOCRACY AND COPING WITH SOCIAL CONFRONTATIONS

Features of Indian democracy

India’s founding fathers opted for a secular Westminster model of democracy with its emphasis on centralized governance and clearly earmarked responsibilities for the states. This structure started giving way to progressive decentralization of the power structure – from the Centre to the states, and from monolithic national political parties to regional parties. The political and bureaucratic leadership dominated by the English educated, urban, upper caste and upper class elite who had a vague Fabian socialism for ideology also passed on slowly to the impatient, power-hungry ‘peoples politicians’ of lower castes from small towns and rural areas. But despite the dilution of political values due to increased caste and religious orientation instead of the ideological veneer of the 60s, the country made progress, though slowly. In spite of these aberrations, the Indian voter proved time and again that he valued his right to remove those in power who did not satisfy his basic needs.

The success of functional democracy in India has baffled many thinkers. The composite culture of India with its dominant Hindu orientation has shaped ‘Indian way’ of thought and action, even among Indians of other faiths. Excising power through democracy is no exception to this. There are three key elements for the survival of democracy in practice in India, which are its strength as well as weakness. These may be termed as the three ‘A’s – Accommodation, Adjustment and Achievement.
• Accommodation: Accommodating all viewpoints as far as possible is a common practice in the politics of governance. A positive result of such spirit of accommodation is reservation in government jobs and educational opportunities for untouchables and incorporating it in Indian constitution. The majority population who are other than untouchables accepted this. On the negative side, commitment to ideology or dogma is often sacrificed at the altar of accommodation as a part of political expediency. Thus we have the strange anachronism of leftists forming coalitions with religious parties like the Muslim League; or implementing the policies of globalisation in states where they are in power in the states, while opposing them in parliament! Over the years election manifestos of political parties, which are their ideological mission statement, ceased to have much relevance, after the Nehruvian era. Thus national parties and their electoral coalitions have become all embracing mindless and faceless beings accommodating contradictory viewpoints, agendas, and ideologies operating with the sole aim of capturing power. As a result we have collective solutions rather than collective wisdom as the basis for resolving problems resulting in wasteful expenditure, populist measures and time and cost overruns in project implementation. This has affected the quality of governance. But accommodation as a political tool prevents fissures in political framework and papers up conflicts providing some degree of stability and continuity.
• Adjustment: Socially problems are solved (or attempted to be solved) through a process of adjustment. Attempt is always made to evolve a consensus, than through structured mediation or intervention mechanism. Unfortunately, adjustment used as a process mechanism gives more importance to form than content. In a society as diverse as India, this process provides opportunities to everyone to ventilate grievances and complain endlessly though they may not receive a satisfactory remedy or solution. However, this process, which invariably starts at the local level, succeeds in areas where weak governance does not. It has also given birth to important social grievance tools like public interest petition. [10]
• Achievement: Unless those in power deliver what the citizens perceive as value addition, democracy cannot thrive. Indian voter has proved this time and again by voting out parties in power for non-performance. In South Asia itself we have examples of Pakistan and Bangladesh where when democratic regimes did not perform, it paved the way for take over by military dictatorships. Even though India as democracy might not have produced spectacular results, like China for example, it has shown steady growth and exceptional durability despite the diverse problems it faces due to its heterogeneity. This would not have been possible if there had been no achievement.
Sound democratic governance has become the hallmark of great nations. Such high quality of governance still eludes India. Is India as a nation that it wants to be, ready to address the multiple dimensions of National Security? Sadly, the answer is a loud no. A major reason for this is the way India governs itself. As a highly successful democracy it is buffeted by populism in all spheres; the voter has become the arbiter and judge of good governance. While this has worked successfully in some states, the results are not so happy in some others, as though to justify George Bernard Shaw’s statement: “Democracy substitutes selection by the incompetent many for appointment by the corrupt few. The chief defect of democracy is that only the political party out of office knows how to run the government.” [11]

As Indian democracy operates on the basis of one-man one-vote, status of Hindu-Muslim interface plays a key role in shaping not only governments but also policies at both the central and state levels. Thus an understanding of this interface and its current criticalities has become imperative for a full understanding democratic functioning. This is more so when the decentralized democratic system is getting trivialized with populist considerations and satisfying vote banks has become a preoccupation of national policymaking. Policies on international relations and national security are no exception to this.

Historical Hindu-Muslim linkages

This should not be dismissed purely as a lingering issue of the age-old problem of Hindu-Muslims relations or an extension of Hindutva polemics. Apart from the historical burden of the relationship, the partition of the country in 1947 based on religion to create Pakistan - a homeland for Indian Muslims – had created traumatic fallout due to the relocation of both Hindus and Muslims who left their homes as refugees. This process was carried out with a great deal of violence and immense loss to lives and property. It left a whole generation of both religionists bitter. And ultimately this bitterness led to the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi, the architect of Indian independence movement. A sizeable number of Indian Muslims did not opt to go to Pakistan - their newly created homeland. Their future became a big question mark.

It is a tribute to Indian people and polity that they continue to flourish as the largest community after Hindus and continue to play an important role in the growth of country. However, the successive wars with Pakistan within the first two decades of independence added to the problems of Indian Muslim, whose loyalty was often questioned. Thus the Hindu-Muslim interface became a matter of great sensitivity in socio-political life of the country.

Hindus and Muslims enjoy a love-hate relationship that is complex and often paradoxical. This has been evolved over a few hundreds of years, with one influencing the other in all aspects of daily life including religion, traditions and customs. There are holy sites of Muslim saints where Hindus pray for grant of favours. Similarly Muslim pilgrims can be seen in some of the holy shrines of Hindus. Often the entire population celebrates festivals of both the communities. In rural India, even today the two communities live side-by-side maintaining their separate identities without undue friction, unless triggered by vested interests.[12]

Swami Vivekananda writing to a Muslim friend Mohammed Sarfaraz Hussain of Nainital in 1898 described broadly the Hindu perception of this relationship thus: [13]
“We want to lead mankind to the place where there is neither the Vedas, nor the Bible, nor the Koran; yet this has to be done by harmonizing the Vedas, the Bible and the Koran. Mankind ought to be taught that religions are but the varied expressions of THE RELIGION, which is oneness, so that each may choose that path that suits him best. For our own motherland a junction of the two great systems, Hinduism and Islam – Vedanta brain and Islam body – the only hope.
I see in my mind’s eye the future perfect India rising out of this chaos and strife, glorious and invincible, with Vedanta brain and Islam body.”

As Prof P. Hardy observes Islam came to medieval India first as a religion and then as a political force.[14]. The peripheral Arab conquest of Sind under Muhammad ibn Qasim began in A.D. 711. Here it came in contact with Hindu civilization. Significantly it occurred less than 100 years after the death of Prophet Mohammed. Islam was still a religion of few assertions. According to Hardy it was still receptive to the impress of civilizations of Byzantium and Persia that the Arabs had conquered. There was as yet no orthodoxy. The Ghaznavid invasions of southern Punjab began in A.D. 1000 and progressively gained control of major territories. By 12th century, Islam had well-established codes of conduct. The Shia, Sunni divide was also complete. Sunni became absorbed in the emotional dimension of mysticism, giving birth to Sufism, which cut across not only the Shia-Sunni divide but also between the Muslim and Hindu. The Sufi mode of thought had a strong appeal to many Hindus.

But by the time Mogul Empire came to be established in 16th century in India, the Muslim orthodoxy feared the Sufi influence corroding true traditions of Islam due to its equation with Hinduism.[15] Shaikh Ahmed (1564-1624) of Sirhind and Shah Wali-Ullah (1702-1762) believed in Muslim identity exclusive of Indian influence. [16] Both tried to bring the unison in action, if not unity, between the Muslim orthodoxy and Sufism to preserve the distinct identity and avoid internal conflict with notable success. From then onwards India has two classes of Indian Muslims. The descendents of the Muslims, who had migrated to the sub-continent from outside---mainly from Afghanistan and Central and West Asia, constitute one group (now in areas which now constitute the State of Pakistan). The other is the descendents of those converted to Islam from Hinduism. They were in a majority in the Muslim communities of what constitutes the present India, including J & K, and Bangladesh. [17]

The period of Muslim rule over major parts of India for nearly three centuries often saw forced conversion of Hindus, desecration and destruction of Hindu monuments and temples. Muslim rulers of Islam as it existed in medieval India had eradication of idolatry as an article of faith. However, there were also enlightened rulers like Akbar who showed better understanding in evolving a working relationship with Hindus. They were also interested in Hindu religion, culture and ethos and contributed to the evolution of a composite culture. This culture was evolved through a natural process of social adjustment between the two communities from the grass root level. It was based on common ethos rather than religious differences and came through a natural evolutionary process and not royal edicts or fatwas. As administration was decentralized, aberrations in the relationship between the two communities, which lived side by side, were remedied through a process of respect and reconciliation.

Seeds of distrust

After the British established their control over most of the subcontinent as colonial masters, the traditional structures gave way for what they considered as a modern, streamlined and centralised administration. Laws applicable to the entire country were codified, and ‘secular’ educational and judiciary systems were introduced. However this changed the social equation between the communities of different religions in the country. During this period two developments affected Indian Muslim identity. The first was the British Indian educational system which rung a death knell to traditional Hindu system of education monopolized by Brahmins.[18] As western education took root slowly the traditional beliefs gave way and progressively younger generations were exposed to western ideas and thoughts. While it brought knowledge of modern science and technology, it disrupted the close knit rural societies of India with increase in urbanization.

The jobs were dominated by the English educated upper castes, creating ripples among Hindu and Muslim population. Sir Sayed Ahmad Khan, a Mogul scion and loyalist to British power, launched the Aligarh movement with the objective to provide modern education to Indian Muslims. He launched a unique Muslim separatist movement with a political and educational ideology and an objective to restore the lost pride of his community after the fall of Mogul Empire. “Taking inspiration from Shah Waliullah's concept of tactical moderation of Islam, Sir Ahmed Khan formulated the two-nation theory which …formed the basis for the demand for a separate Muslim land of Pakistan.” [19]

With the first seeds of separatism sowed, it grew with the British playing on the latent suspicions existing below the surface between the two communities to prop up a policy of divide, and rule to counter the demand for Indian independence. This gave birth to the ‘two-nation theory’ with a large section of Muslims led by Mohammed Ali Jinnah, demanding Pakistan - an independent homeland for Muslims of India. Till this demand gathered support, Muslim leaders including Jinnah, the founding father of Pakistan, were in the forefront of the Congress party’s freedom struggle. But the demand for Pakistan split the Muslim community, with majority supporting the creation Pakistan. When freedom came, it came with the partition of the country that created Pakistan (which later spawned Bangladesh, the breakaway wing of East Pakistan), carved out of the British India.

But Partition did not solve the problems perceived by Indian Muslims. It created new ones. In the words of Ayaz Amir, a Pakistani columnist, “The primary aim of the Pakistan movement, from where it all began, was to provide constitutional safeguards for Muslims in the Muslim-minority provinces who were afraid of being swamped by a Hindu majority. Being in a majority, the Muslims of Punjab, Sind, Balochistan and Frontier felt threatened by no one. It is an irony of history that those most in need of protection were left behind in India, while those who didn't need any protection inherited the new state.”[20] Muslims who did not migrate to Pakistan had to bear the brunt of suspicion of a large section of Hindus over their allegiance to India, despite many of their participation in the freedom struggle.

A major issue in a democracy is reconciling the Islamic concept of Umma (Muslim brotherhood) with the modern concept of national identity in multi religious and multi cultural nations. The Prophet’s spiritual message of seventh century probably had an objective to create an egalitarian society among the warring Arab tribes.[21] Though the Islamic history of thirteen centuries has shown the Muslim society as a divided house due to political and material reasons, Umma as a concept has continued to be one of the rallying factors of Muslims all over the world whenever a threat is perceived to Islam. This unique feature of Islam is one of the key reasons for a sense of notional unity among Muslims all over the world regardless of race, nationality or ethnicity. This is the reason for the popular notion largely among Hindu Right that the Muslim community in India operates as a homogeneous and united phalanx. And it has been helped by the siege mentality of the Muslim political leadership, which owes its survival after Partiiton to a religious rather than political ideology. But this is not wholly true. As Islamic historian Mohammad Yasin points out "Though the Muslim community of Hindustan presented itself to the superficial view as prima facie a solid homogeneous bloc held together by the cement of Islam, it was in reality a composite community having within its fold representatives of races from all over the Muslim world and Hindu converts from all grades of society…Islam which has already broken up into the traditional seventy-three sects, got further disintegrated in Hindustan since its introduction in this country" [22].

Well known social activist Asghar Ali Engineer puts it more emphatically: "The Muslims, needless to say, were not as often believed a homogeneous mass. Among them, like the other Indian communities, there were horizontal differences on the basis of language, culture, sects, profession etc as well as vertical differences based on castes and classes" [23]

Prior to Partition, Muslims who comprised 33 percent of the population of the sub-continent, had a pivotal position at the Centre and had their “own” governments in five states. Post-Partition, in India they were reduced to 12 percent - a weak and vulnerable minority. In the words of Rafiq Zakaria, veteran Indian politician “Its (Partition’s) aftermath was horrendous, both Hindus and Muslims went through virtual hell. But while Hindus have managed to recover and improve their lot, Muslims have been ruined in every respect – economically and socially and much more so politically.”[24] This left the Muslim community insecure. The Pakistani claim over Kashmir, a Muslim-majority state ruled by a Hindu King and its accession to India, and aggression to wrest the state created a climate of animosity between India and Pakistan in 1948. This hostile climate has continued for five decades. Four wars fought with Pakistan further polarized the two countries leading to a feeling of alienation among the Muslim community. Pakistan’s assistance to Kashmiri separatists to carry out insurgency against India for nearly two decades has been a continuous reminder of historical grievances nursed by the Hindu community from the days of Partition.

It is a tribute to the nation and its people that despite this climate of suspicion, the two communities went through a period of slow social adjustment not only to tolerate each other, but also to provide sufficient room to practice their religion and carry on their traditions. Indian democracy, which has secularism as one of the cornerstones, has exhibited sufficient maturity to elect three Muslims as Presidents of India, on their own merit. Many Muslims have risen up to general officers rank in the Army, while the Indian Air Force produced a Chief of Air Staff who was a Muslim, who led it during a war with Pakistan. Muslims have also occupied high offices like the Chief Justice of India, and state governors. India is perhaps the only country that can boast of Hindu Arabic teachers and Muslim scholars specializing in interpretation of Hindu philosophy and scriptures. This is in sharp contrast to Pakistan, where despite having a sizeable minority, discriminatory laws and rightwing extremism have reduced them to a second-class citizens’ status. [25]

Distrust between Hindus and Muslims

However, it would be trivializing the issues if the problems of distrust that continue to exist between the two communities were not recognized. A few developments have caused the hiatus between Hindus and Muslims to grow further in recent times.

The Ram Janmabhoomi agitation launched by Hindu Rightwing parties culminated in the demolition of the disputed Babar masjid in Ayodhya in December 1992. While this act might have helped the rightwing parties to secure more Hindu votes, it fractured the fragile body of Hindu-Muslim relationship deeply. It also provided an excellent opportunity for the obscurantist and fundamentalist elements to take over the leadership of Muslims, aggrieved over the incident. As retaliation a series of explosions by Islamic terrorists paralysed normal life in Mumbai touching off violent Hindu reaction. The political parties of all hues, basking in the strong public reaction to this complex chain of frenzied actions and reactions, have continued to garner ‘hate’ votes from sympathizers on both sides. Hindus seldom voted en bloc; so catching the minority Muslims votes often tilted the election results. In this skewed scenario of minority politics, courting for minority votes has become an electoral imperative in Indian politics.

Al Qaeda attack on Twin Towers of New York on September 9, 2001 and the subsequent global war on terrorism against Islamic terrorists had its fall out in Indian scene. Thanks to the promotion of the cult of Jihad across the border in Pakistan and its victory over the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, sections of Indian Muslims were attracted to the Taliban’s obscurantist ideology. After 9/11 tragedy and subsequent U.S. operations in Afghanistan and Iraq as part of a global war on terror the Muslim community appears to be divided over the issue of jihadi terrorism. Close alliance between international Islamic terrorist organizations and Kashmiri insurgent groups supported by Pakistan has been a reality for sometime now. These issues have strengthened the hands of Hindu rightwing parties.

Thus at the national level Centre-left parties are ranged against Hindu rightwing parties and their allies. Thus Muslim votes have become crucial in many constituencies in deciding the winner in elections. And political parties of the both alliances woo Muslim voters in every election. This is an unprecedented political situation in the country where politicking for Muslim votes had always remained at the local level only. Progressive lumpenisation of political leadership, particularly at the lower levels, has not helped the matter. Religion, instead of ideology is slowly taking the center-stage of politics, which is not a healthy sign for growth of democracy. Till winning the Muslim votes became the central issue, after every local confrontation the two communities have been able to readjust their relations to go back to lead a normal life maintaining their identities. Thanks to the spread of electronic media, every local incident or clash involving Hindus and Muslims now get an unhealthy national focus they do not deserve. With issues relating to Muslims constantly in the witches cauldron of national politics under the full glare of media publicity, the process of social readjustment of the past has become very difficult.

However, it is not only politics or media publicity that is responsible for this situation. Both Hindus and Muslims carry historical burden of grievances- some genuine, some others irrelevant and many based on mistrust and suspicion that vitiates the healthy growth of relationship. And no major national effort, beyond mouthing platitudes, has been made to nurture the difficult process of fostering understanding between the two communities. This has affected the democratic functioning of the government with detrimental impact on national security.

Critical issues

Unless the air of trust between the two communities is cleared, the situation is bound to get worse. This is more easily said than done due to the complexity of issues. Hindu-Muslim distrust is an explosive mixture of religious, socio-cultural, political and security issues. Analysis of the positive aspects of relationship reveals that left to themselves, members of the two communities have always been able to evolve a working relationship between them. But positive strokes to encourage such a relationship is required from different sections of society including the clergy, government, political parties, educational institutions, community leaders and economic institutions. There are critical issues that cause friction between the two communities, which have been allowed to incubate hatred between them. Some of these issues, which have implications for national security (given not in any order of priority), are as follows:

• External interference: Traditionally external social, cultural, and religious forces had influenced Indian society. This has enabled the society to handle alien influences to evolve a fairly homogenous, functional multi-ethnic and multi-religious society (though its very asymmetry baffles Western scholars like Prof. Kenneth Galbraith who described India as a ‘functional anarchy’). However, Pakistan which is a product of Partition, after it was defeated in its war against India in 1971 decided to use the opportunity offered by the Kashmir dispute, to ‘bleed to death’ India through low intensity operations in a number of fronts. In the words of a Pakistani columnist Ayaz Amir “ From 1989 onwards we looked to "jihad" as a way to bleed India and unfreeze Kashmir. India has paid a price and continues to do so. But it is no closer to quitting Kashmir now than it was when the insurgency began. In fact, the insurgency peaked long ago and "jihad" fatigue has set in” [26] The hand of Pakistani intelligence agency – Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has been identified in a number of anti-national activities in India - infiltration of agent provocateurs to create communal conflict, infiltration of armed mercenaries in Kashmir, subversive operations to local Muslim youth using the latent fear of Hindu threat to Islam, smuggling of arms and fake currency, providing shelter and succour to Indian terrorist groups etc. These activities provoked by Pakistan had created a number of violent incidents between Hindus and Muslims resulting huge loss of life and property, particularly in urban and semi-urban areas.
• Extremism: In the life of the average Hindu or Muslim, religion plays a small but important part. But it has an influence on their psyche affecting their transactions with each other. Traditional religious beliefs and practices – an amalgam of myth, mysticism and taboos – still rallies their emotions whenever they feel threatened. As seen in the case of Pakistan and Afghanistan, madrasas – religious schools – in the hands of obscurantist have been nurseries for the spread of Wahabi extremism. Wahabism an Islamic sect founded by Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab in 18th century had been preaching an extreme form of ‘pure’ Islam denouncing the traditional Sunni practices. It had been vigorously promoted by the Royal House of Saud. [27] South Asia had been a region of special focus of this form of militant Islam. This has provided the philosophical underpinning of Islamic extremism of the Al Qaeda type.[28] Despite, Pakistan’s collusion and effort, India’s renowned Islamic institutions (which incidentally had been sources of inspiration during the freedom struggle) have not come wholly under the control of such extremists.
• Unequal laws: India is perhaps one of the few countries where different religions have their own personal laws. This is a legacy of the British days, dating back to the 19th century. These laws were based mostly on the traditional religious beliefs, as they were perceived at that point of time. While extensive reforms have been carried out in laws applicable to Hindus and to certain extent Christians, Muslim Personal Law has not had the benefit of such progressive legislation. Many Muslim countries like Egypt have amended their laws to suit modern times so that the benefits of democratic equity are available to the masses. Unfortunately, such benefits have not accrued to Muslims in India. For instance under Hindu Succession Act, a women has a right to her father’s property, while under the Muslim law, even a wife has no right to her husband’s property. Any attempt to evolve a common civil code is viewed as a threat to Islamic way of life by the conservative elements that control the public opinion of Muslims. Hindu’s perceive this opposition as retarding the progress towards social equity of all religionists. In the wake of reassertion of Hindu rightwing politics at the national level, the demand for a common civil code as well as opposition to it has assumed strong political overtones.
• Lack of economic opportunities and social space: With educational and income levels below that of Hindu population in some regions, the Muslim masses feel deprived of economic opportunities for them. While this is also prevalent among the Hindus, Muslim leadership had been exploiting these grievances for political advantage just the deprived sections of Hindus are exploited. But in the case of Hindus the cause has caste colouring and not religious overtones like Muslims. More over Muslims find constrained in the predominantly Hindu society due to latent of social prejudices of Hindus, particularly in urban areas, where this feeling has given rise to Muslim ghettos and further feeling of insecurity.
• Reservation for weaker sections of Hindus: Affirmative action in the form of reservation in jobs in government, public sector organisations and educational institutions for scheduled caste Hindus (untouchables) and tribals is enshrined in the Indian constitution. The list of castes has been growing with new entries made for political convenience and now even those Hindu castes classified as socially backward have been extended such benefits. Thus members of Muslim and Christian communities who had either belonged to the same low castes prior to their conversion or who are of the same social status find these benefits beyond their reach. This social asymmetry has been a matter of heartburn among them as it is among some of the caste Hindus, who feel economic backwardness should be the criteria.
• Lack of objectivity: The divide between the Hindu rightwing and the ‘secular’ parties of center-left has reached to an extent that rewriting history to suit their claims have clouded objectivity in the society. As a result there had been lack of objectivity on both sides in these rewritten histories. On the one hand there are attempts to claim every Islamic monument as founded on the ruins of a Hindu temple or holy site. On the other hand many Indian historians, journalists and politicians, deny that there ever was a Hindu-Muslim conflict in their attempt to whitewash medieval massacres of Hindus and destruction of Hindu temples, by Muslim invaders carried out as the God-ordained duty of the times. Yet, today both rewrite history textbooks and conjure up centuries of Hindu-Muslim unmixed amity or enmity, losing objectivity in academic learning with the potential danger of sowing religious prejudice in young minds. A nation has to have the maturity to face historical truths, without carrying out retribution; otherwise it will give rise to continued animosity between the two communities due to half-truths and lies result in lack of public credibility in historical records. Rajmohan Gandhi had put it more eloquently why we should have an objective approach in studying our past: “History will not dissolve resentments and suspicions. Selective history will, in fact harden them… Yet at least a frank and non-partisan look at the past can at least tell us of the blocks to Hindu-Muslim partnerships and tell us, too, of what went wrong, and why, in the efforts to remove them. If it informs us of times when the other side, too was large-hearted, and of other times when our side also was small-minded, that awareness may make us, whoever we are, less prickly. History will then have served the cause of national, and sub-continental understanding.” [29] The same applies to many publications and statistical data of public institutions where objectivity is often sacrificed for reasons of political expediency.
• Erosion of rule of law: Both Hindus and Muslims nurse grievances of political interference in establishing rule of law in incidents or issues involving Hindus and Muslims. Inordinate judicial delay in disposing of critical cases, not punishing officials involved in religious killings by not taking action, shielding corrupt politicians and criminal elements provoking communal incidents and sensationalism and lack of objectivity in media reports further vitiate the atmosphere and aggravate the negative feelings.
• Lack of transparency in governance: Despite progress in decentralizing the administration and making it more citizen-friendly, there is not enough transparency in governance. In a nation where politics occupies central presence, lack of correct information often leads to rumours and the resultant Hindu Muslim conflict situations. The government still does not respect the citizens’ right to information. Withdrawal of the published data of Census 2001, purely for spurious political reasons by the Government of India is a recent case in point.

PART 3 – POPULATION CHANGES AND NATIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS

National security and its changing face

There appears to be a lot of semantic confusion about National Security. Often it is used in the limited sense of being the same as National Defence. Though defence ensured by armed forces as a guarantor of territorial integrity is an important and major component, the demise of the multi-polar world, increasing globalisation and integration of nations have enlarged the dimensions of National Security. According to Gen Ved Prakash Malik, former Chief of Army Staff, “Trends and statistics of the last 50 years have shown that the armed conflicts around the world have been gradually moving down the paradigm scale of intensity as well as inclusivity.” New security challenges are diverse and multi-dimensional. These include different forms of terrorism, economic under-development, trade imbalances and disputes, illegal migration of people, uncontrolled population growth, human rights abuses, drug trafficking, environmental degradation, and conflicts over access to natural resources that are key to development e.g. water and oil.[30] All these challenges are by and large interconnected. According to Gen Malik, some of the national security issues faced in India are -
• Problems of national assimilation and integration, particularly of Border States in the North and North Eastern parts of India.
• Porous borders with Nepal, Bhutan, Myanmar, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka which enable illegal trans border movements and smuggling of weapons and drugs. These days AK rifles, machine guns, rocket propelled grenades, land mines, RDX, even shoulder fired surface to air missiles are easily available from such sources.
• Exploitation of ethnic and religious minority status by unscrupulous political leaders.
• Nexus between crime, insurgency and politics.
• Weak governance including large-scale corruption, poor law and order machinery in many states.

Thus National Security is no more a concept to be left only to military brass and defence analysts. As an analyst said, “Today national security means not only immunity against foreign aggression or intervention, it also includes an absence of hunger and diseases, poverty and illiteracy. National security policy must ensure not only physical protection of the state; it must provide a framework for the growth of a healthy, progressive and democratic society. Political leaders and policy makers have to carefully balance the country’s defence and social needs.”[31] The global war on terrorism has highlighted the need for certain perquisites of National Security – sense of nationhood, a national vision, and a desire to safeguard national identity, culture, interest and its physical entity among the people. [32]

Viewed in this global scenario, the dimensions of National Security now encompass a wide spectrum - territorial integrity of the nation, securing national economy and fiscal structure from predatory operations, fostering national identity and the sense of nationhood among the people, providing social security for citizens, fostering a sense of security among the people, security of internal and international communications by all means including electronic, securing the environment from degradation and nuclear security. Illegal migration of foreigners regardless of their religion poses a threat to all these aspects of national security.

In a heterogeneous society like India, where the common ethos is the binding factor of nationhood, fostering national identity is a key element of national security. Foreigners seeking refuge in India like the Chakmas of Bangladesh, Tibetans from Tibet and Burmese students are products of situations where possibilities of their return to the home country exist. As they are recognized by their nationality, they do not threaten Indian national identity. On the other hand illegal immigration of foreign nationals covertly threatens national security as they hide their national identity and merge with the population. And this problem is in addition to citizens of Pakistan and Bangladesh, who come with legitimate travel documents, but do not return to their home country. In a counter affidavit filed in Supreme Court of India in a case filed by the All India Lawyers Forum for Civil Liberties (AIFCL), Joint Secretary, Home (Political Department), Government of West Bengal, had acknowledged “that between 1972 and 1997 a total number of 9,91,031 Bangladeshi nationals entered into Indian territory with valid travel documents but they did not return to Bangladesh and have overstayed.”[33]

Demography and illegal immigration

Though there are population changes in respect of all religionists, any discussion of demographic change in the country as related to national security brings to the fore the question of Muslim population changes. There are two reasons for this:
a. One is the issue of partition of India and creation of a homeland for Indian Muslims in Pakistan (now mutated into two homelands following the secession of the Eastern wing into Bangladesh.). Sections of Hindu population, particularly those of the Hindu right, believe that any perceived or actual abnormal growth of Muslim population in the country might lead to a partition of the country all over again. The emergence of Muslim extremist organizations like the Student Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) and years of involvement of Pakistan in Jihadi terrorism in Kashmir are pointed out as examples of Muslim ‘disloyalty’. They find center-left parties cultivating vote banks by pampering Muslim community through inequitable laws favouring Muslims and thereby compromising national security considerations.
b. The second issue is India’s fear of illegal immigrants compromising India’s security and territorial integrity. This fear is more because of nationality than religion. It has been fuelled by the large-scale illegal infiltration of Bangladeshis, predominantly Muslims, along border districts of India’s eastern and northeastern states. A number of small ethnic insurgent groups have been operating in some of the seven northeastern states of India. Prior to the creation of Bangladesh, Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) had given refuge to some these groups in East Pakistan and provided arms and resources to them to carryout operations across the borders in northeast India. Though India helped in the creation of Bangladesh, some of these groups have continued to launch their violent forays from launch pads in Bangladesh. Bangladesh has consistently denied their existence on their soil. Thus the fear of illegal immigrants compromising border security is a genuine one.[34]

Even other eminent persons like TV Rajeswar, at present the Governor of Uttar Pradesh and former Governor of West Bengal and Lt General S.K. Sinha, Governor of Assam, had voiced their fears of drastic changes in demographic make up for reasons of national security. Rajeswar had said: “There is a distinct danger of another Muslim country, speaking predominantly Bengali, emerging in the eastern part of India in the future, at a time when India might find itself weakened politically and militarily. And second that the danger is as grave even if that third Islamic State does not get carved out as a full-fledged country’. [35]

Demographic changes in India have come through natural growth of population, migration of population, refugees, and illegal infiltration of foreign nationals. Irrespective of religious belief or ethnicity, the first two of these involve only Indian nationals and have limited and manageable impact on National Security. On the other hand, illegal migration of foreign nationals poses a major threat to National Security as it makes the question of nationhood meaningless. Indian history and culture are closely intertwined with India’s neigbhours – Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan, Tibet (China), Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Maldives. Its close interactions with these nations both in war and peace over generations have given Indian population a multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-lingual makeup. Both legal and illegal demographic changes of India are often the result of these neighbouring states’ internal situations as well as their relations with India. The partition of India, the occupation of Tibet by China and the creation of Bangladesh were some of the major events in the history of the Indian subcontinent that resulted in a flood of refugees flowing into India.

As India progresses economically upward it has attracted both legal and illegal migrants who come in search of jobs. Due to special relationship status with India, some of these migrants like the Nepalese enter legally and have become part of Indian social fabric. However, not all immigrants seamlessly integrate into the national scene like the Nepalese. They upset the delicate socio-economic, religious, political and linguistic structure of traditional societies, which are largely agricultural. This results in social friction and upheaval. A very good example is the massacre of Bangladeshi Muslim immigrants in Nelli in Assam on Feb 18, 1983 by tribals costing as much as 1753 lives. The issue was alienation of tribal land and poverty.[36] In the case of illegal immigrants the problem is much bigger and multi-dimensional. The effort of illegal immigrants, to relinquish their identity and acquire Indian identity covertly causes social havoc. Their efforts lead to increased corruption, criminality, confrontation with local law and order machinery and compromises border security. If this occurs in the border states of India, as is the case of Bangladeshi immigrants, there are added dimensions of external intervention in internal security situations of the states – a euphemistic way of saying abetting terrorism and insurgency.

Illegal immigration of Bangladeshis after 1971 has been an ongoing process in many parts of India. Apart from the states of West Bengal, Assam and Tripura, which have been, seriously affected, Bangladeshi Muslims immigrants are found in Bihar and cities like New Delhi and Mumbai. As this paper is only dealing with demographic concerns in a democracy and national security, the author has not dwelt upon in detail on population issues as whole for the country but has chosen the example of Assam to explain the issues involved. This in no way should be construed as minimizing the magnitude of the problem faced in other states.
Illegal immigration in Assam

Immigration of peasant labour, most of them Bengali Muslims, had been an ongoing phenomenon in the plains of Assam even before partition. Even then this was not only an ongoing point of confrontation between Hindus and Muslims but also the Congress and Muslim League. This was a cause of concern perceived by British administration also. Sanjoy Hazarika quotes C.S. Mullen, Census Commissioner for Assam, commenting on the increase in Bengali settlers in Nowgong district going up by two thirds (from 300,000 to 500,000) between 1921and 1931 as: “the immigrant army has almost completed the conquest of Nowgong. The Barpeta sub-division of Kamrup has also fallen to their attack and Darrang is being invaded. Sibsagar has so far escaped completely but a few thousand Mymensinghias in North Lakimpur are an outpost which may, during the next decades, prove to be vulnerable for major operations.”[37]

Since then this phenomenon is continuing till date. Only the Bengali speaking Muslim immigrants come illegally because they are foreign nationals. They come because of land alienation, poverty, unemployment and lack of adequate social infrastructure in Bangladesh, which figures in the list of world’s poorest countries. They unwittingly transfer these pressures to Assam. These social pressures cause friction in communities as shown by the long spell of agitation launched by the All Assam Students Union in the eighties, which threw the ruling party out of office and paralysed normal life. But the concern is not because they are Muslims or Bengalis but for reasons of security, as eloquently brought out in 1998 by General S.K. Sinha.
In early November 1998, General S.K. Sinha had sent an official report to the President—‘Report on Illegal Migration into Assam submitted to the President of India by the Governor of Assam’. This report presents a bird’s eye view of the situation then. In this report, General Sinha drew attention to the differential decadal growth of population of Hindus and Muslims in Assam—33.7 per cent and 38.3 per cent in 1951-61, respectively; 37.2 per cent and 31 per cent, respectively, in 1961-71; and an estimated 41.9 per cent and 77.4 per cent, respectively, in 1981-91—and observed:
‘‘The Muslim population of Assam has shown a rise of 77.42 per cent in 1991 from what it was in 1971. The Hindu population has risen by nearly 41.89 per cent in this period. The Muslim population (as a percentage of total population) in Assam has risen from 24.68 per cent in 1951 to 28.42 per cent in 1991. As per the 1991 Census, four districts (Dhubri, Goalpara, Barpeta and Hailakandi) have become Muslim-majority districts. Two more districts (Naogaon and Karimganj) should have become so by 1998 and one more district (Morgaon) is fast approaching this position.
‘‘The growth of the Muslim population has been emphasised in the previous paragraph to indicate the extent of illegal migration from Bangladesh to Assam because...the illegal migrants coming into India after 1971 have been almost exclusively Muslims...Large-scale illegal migration from East Pakistan/Bangladesh over several decades has been altering the demographic complexion of this State,’’ Sinha recorded. ‘‘It poses a grave threat both to the identity of the Assamese people and to our national security. Successive governments at the Centre and in the state have not adequately met this challenge...I feel it is my bounden duty to the nation and the state I have sworn to serve to place before you this report on the dangers arising from the continuing silent demographic invasion...’’ [38].

There was no response from the government to this report as in the case of T.V. Rajasekar’s report also. Both were not right wing Hindu politicians, but former government servants of high reputation and governors appointed by the ruling Congress party!

The population growth figures in the border districts of Assam since then are as follows as per the census figures for 2001 which were published figures for 2001 [39]:
Percentage of growth of population between 1991 & 2001 in Assam districts bordering Bangladesh
District Muslims Non-Muslims Total
Dhubri 29.5 7.1 22.9
Goalpara 31.7 14.4 23.0
Hailakandi 27.2 13.3 20.9
Karimganj 29.4 14.5 21.9
Cachar 24.6 16.0 18.9

If this continues unchecked as General Sinha told the President, it ‘‘threatens to reduce the Assamese to a minority in their own state, as happened in Tripura and Sikkim.’’

‘‘The long-cherished design of Greater East Pakistan/Bangladesh, making inroads into the strategic land-link of Assam with the rest of the country,’’ he warned, ‘‘can lead to severing the entire land mass of the North-East...from the rest of the country. This will have disastrous strategic and economic consequences.’’ After tracing in detail the way the demographic balance has been overturned in district after district adjacent to Bangladesh, General Sinha concluded: ‘‘This silent and invidious demographic invasion of Assam may result in the loss of geo-strategically vital districts of Lower Assam. The influx of these illegal migrants is turning these districts into a Muslim-majority region. It will then only be a matter of time when a demand for their merger with Bangladesh may be made. The rapid growth of Islamic fundamentalism may provide the driving force for this demand. In this context, it is pertinent that Bangladesh has long discarded secularism and has chosen to become an Islamic State. Loss of Lower Assam will sever the entire land mass of the North-East from the rest of India...

In this context, an observation on the security risk posed by such unchecked illegal immigrants in a report on the same subject of illegal migration of Bangladeshi Muslims forwarded to the president by the Governor of West Bengal T. V. Rajeswar pertaining to West Benagal is significant. He says in the report: “ A study of the border belt of West Bengal yields some telling statistics: 20-40 per cent villages in the border districts are said to be predominantly Muslim. There are indications that the concentration of the minority community, including the Bangladesh immigrants, in the villages has resulted in the majority community moving to urban centres. Several towns in the border districts are now predominantly inhabited by the majority community but surrounded by villages mostly dominated by the minority community. Lin Piao’s theory of occupying the villages before overwhelming the cities comes to mind, though the context is different. However, the basic factor of security threat in both the cases is the same.” There cannot be a more ominous warning.

Handling of the illegal immigrant issue in Assam

The handling of the illegal immigrant issue in Assam is a classic example how as a nation we have been trivializing national security considerations for reasons of political expediency and parochial interests. Main aberration is inflating electoral rolls to swell the number of voters, particularly on the eve of elections. Sanjoy Hazarika quotes of an incident when Moinul Haq Chowdhury, a former Cabinet Minsiter under Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and former Muslim League activist youth leader until independence, was involved in such traffic for purposes of elections. In the 1989 general election, Chowdhury “wanted the BSF to look the other way and allow 50,000 Bangladeshis to come into the constituency, vote and return”, an Inspector General of Border Security Force (BSF) at that time recounted to Hazarika. [40].

From time to time, governments both at Delhi and at Assam have taken half-hearted and shortsighted measures to check the illegal immigrants and push them back. But the problem has grown so big, that the nation as a whole will have to get into the act. It is interesting to note that aliens in Assam are not prosecuted by the state under Foreigners Act 1946, which is applied in the rest of India. In Assam, the Foreigners Act was used only to identify and prosecute illegal immigrants who came prior to 1971. Evidently this is a direct consequence of vote bank politics. The various enactments, both past and present for handling illegal immigrants applied only in Assam are as follows:

a. Immigrants (Expulsion from Assam) Act of 1950: According to this all the Hindus were considered refugees while Muslims were aliens. This discriminatory act was repealed in 1957.
b. Prevention of Infiltration from Pakistan (PIP) Act of 1964: The PIP raised a special border police force of 1,914 men headed by a Deputy Inspector General of Police. A total of 159 watchtowers and 15 patrol posts and six passport checkpoints were set up. But following the Indo-Pak war of 1965 and the creation of BSF the border security task was handed over to them. The Assam special border police were employed in the interior to identify and deport illegal immigrants.
c. Illegal Migrants Determination by Tribunal Act of 1983 (IMDT): This was passed as a political move to thwart the growing influence of AASU, which was paralyzing Assam. Significantly it was passed by a Parliament, which had no members from Assam due to a boycott of elections on this issue. Foreigners Act 1946, which applies to the rest of India, does not apply to migrants in Assam; this Act is to be used for such a purpose.

The IMDT Act came as a result of the Assam Accord signed on Aug 15, 1985, after vigorous agitation and ‘direct action’ by the people of Assam. It has laid down elaborate procedures for the detection and deportation of post Mar 25, 1971 migrants. It is to be applied in accordance with the Foreigners Act, 1946 and Foreigners (Tribunal) Order 1964. It is a complex and curious piece of legislation. According to this an Indian citizen living within a radius of 5 km has to file a complaint about the illegal immigrants identified by him for taking action to detect and deport him. He has to pay a fee for this. The state has established special tribunals in the 16 districts, where retired judges dispose off the petitions. The results achieved are disappointing to say the least. Sanjoy Hazarika gives the following statistics for the work done under the IMDT between1983 to 1987 in Dhubri only: [41]


Total cases brought for investigation: 46,882
Cases found to have merit by police: 15,921
Dead cases by the time brought to trial: 7,940
Shifted elsewhere: 2,838
Addressee untraced: 5.143
Cases brought before tribunal: 2,314
Cases completed 2,260
Not found as foreigners: 2,233
Declared as foreigners: 908


It is clear that nobody has taken the security concerns of the problem really seriously and the IMDT Act is flawed from its inception. A number of writ petitions on the various defective aspects have been filed in the Supreme Court of India. The timeline on the progress of these cases is at Appendix attached. (The timeline also reflects on the entire process of government decision-making). The Government of India claimed that a bill to revise the enactment was to be placed before the Parliament and the Court adjourned the hearing on the cases on March 16, 2003. That is where the issue stands. The Illegal Migrants Laws (Repealing and Amending) Bill 1983 was filed on May 7, 2003 in the Rajya Sabha. It has not been taken up, evidently because the government at the Centre has changed. It appears that it is not a priority issue for any political party, which are reactively nit picking on actions taken by one another. As Arun Shourie eloquently puts it, “The executives can’t tackle the problem. The legislatures won’t tackle it. And this is how the courts tackle it.” [42] Where do we go from here is a question waiting for a long time to be answered? Meanwhile, illegal immigration continues unabated. More lives are lost by violent activities engineered by motley collection of insurgent groups ensconced in safe houses in Bangladesh. All of us stand helpless with our own priorities, which are other than a concern for national security.

ROAD AHEAD

To conclude, as the aim of this paper is analytical rather than prescriptive there are no recommendations for implementation. It will be oversimplifying a complex problem confronting national security if the author ventures to suggest a prescriptive course. It involves action by the governments at various levels, political parties, intelligentsia, bureaucracy, diplomats, security forces and the common man. And it is a conundrum waiting to be solved within the process of a democratic government in a way it does not damage the relationship between the Hindu and Muslim populations in border areas who will be bearing the brunt of any action.

However, even a cursory glance of the three inter-related issues of democracy, demography and national security will reveal certain common issues that need to be urgently addressed by the nation. The traditional Hindu method of tackling a problem through sama, beda, dhana, dhanda can guide us in evolving integrated solutions These include:

a. Long-term solution: Evolving an integrated solution to proactively solution to solve or mitigate the problem and its fallout on national security. This would involve answering the question why the illegal immigrants come and find solutions thereof. It will involve improving relations with Bangladesh to achieve a win-win situation where the abysmally poor people there will find it profitable to stay and work in Bangladesh itself. There had been a number of analytical articles on this subject, including one by the author. [43]
b. National security concerns: This should become national priority number one. All political parties need to be educated on this. Pressure groups can be created to educate the public as well. Again this requires an integrated solution to make northeast a viable region where youth will have a stake in bringing peace there, so that they give up insurgency. Bangladesh itself is facing increasing militancy from Jihadi groups operating there.[44] It will have to be persuaded that it will be in their own interest to tighten illegal border traffic.
c. Hindu-Muslim relationship concerns: It is time we evolved a national consensus on addressing Hindu-Muslim concerns speedily rather than using them as political tools to gain power. This would depend upon where and how we want to take the nation forward so that democracy graduates from creating a ‘one percent society’ to become one of the tigers of Asia. [45] Many of the issues earlier discussed can be solved if only the nation makes up its mind. If the creative mind of the Indian can contribute to the growth of modern technology, this should not be a problem.

National security is not to be treated in isolation. The citizen should perceive the nation’s security as dearer than his own life. To achieve this level of perfection, we need to make his existence more meaningful and productive than live in hunger and penury. Governance has to be more responsive. A number of things need to be addressed urgently. The list seems endless: transparency as an article of faith, rule of law and strict law enforcement, judicial reforms to ensure fair and speedy dispensation of justice, sensitisation of bureaucracy for a human approach in governance, equitable laws for all regions and religions, introducing economic rather than religious or caste criteria for affirmative action, introduction of a national identity card system, strict enforcement of uniform immigration laws, and electoral reforms, to list a few. As the cliché goes if there is a will, there is way. As Swami Chinmayanda had said: “Everyone of us may not be able to at once to achieve the infinite expansion of universal oneness, but all of us are trying. Religion’s original task was to help us in gradually achieving this elevated vision. To lift the limited and selfish human being from his passion, greed, and hatred to this loftier vision of the world was the essential ideal of religion.”[46] There cannot be a better way to practice Hinduism in its true spirit than to do that.

None of the above issues are new; there had been any number of studies, commissions and official reports on each one of them. All of them are complex, time consuming and at least some are explosive. But a mature nation has to learn to bite the bullet and handle the unpleasant and difficult issues to become a great nation. It has to accept change and undergo trials and tribulations of restructuring itself to bring the benefits of a truly democratic nation to make it meaningful to the underdog; otherwise National Security will be at peril. Seeing the past record, chances of any real time progress appears bleak. But there is hope in youth; they don’t carry the pangs of partition and the hatred it generated. As Thomas Paine said “those who expect to reap the blessings of freedom must, like men, undergo the fatigue of supporting it.”

Notes
1. In this context Margaret Mead has said: “A society which is clamoring for choice, which is filled with many articulate groups, each urging its own brand of salvations, its own variety of economic philosophy, will give each new generation no peace until all have chosen or gone under, unable to bear the conditions of choice. The stress is in our civilization.”
2. Background paper issued by the President, Rashtriya Jagriti Sansthan for this conference.
3. The author considers the year 1971-72 a watershed in the history of Indian democracy. Major events like the India-Pakistan war of 1971 that resulted in the birth of Bangladesh, imposition of a state of emergency for the first time ever by the Indian Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi, her defeat at the polls later and the emergence of the first-ever coalition Government at the Centre had their genesis in this period. Indian politics and centralized political functioning had never been the same thereafter
4. I understand the term Hindu used in this paper as explained by Dr. Frank Gaetano Morales, as “… an individual who accepts as authoritative the religious guidance of the Vedic scriptures, and who strives to live in accordance with Dharma, God’s divine laws as revealed in the Vedic scriptures. In keeping with this standard definition, all of the Hindu thinkers of the six traditional schools of Hindu philosophy (Shad-darshanas) insisted on the acceptance of the scriptural authority (shabda-pramana) of the Vedas as the primary criterion for distinguishing a Hindu from a non-Hindu, as well as distinguishing overtly Hindu philosophical positions from non-Hindu ones.” Does Hinduism teach all religions are the same? See www.dharmacentral.com..
5. The word jihad comes from an Arabic root j-h-d, with the basic meaning of striving or effort. It is often used in classical texts with the closely related meaning of struggle, and hence also of fight. The word jihadi is used here to mean who fights. See Bernard Lewis, The Crisis of Islam. Phoenix Books, 2003, page 25.
6. Chambers 21st Century Dictionary, Allied Chambers (India) Ltd, New Delhi.
7. Swami Vivekananda, Interviews, Pages 226-227, The Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda, Vol. V, Advaita Ashrama, Calcutta. 1992
8. Alberuni’s India, abridged by Ainslie T Embree, New York, Norton 1971, chapter 14.
9. This contrasts with Pakistan, which had tried to distance itself from the moorings in composite Indian culture by creating a notional Islamic culture of Turkish and Arabic origin. The author feels this as one of the reasons for the growth of Jihadi terrorism in Pakistan
10. Any citizen, who has a grievance of public interest, can file a petition in the higher courts of India including the Supreme Court. Under this dispensation first offered by Justice Bhagawati of the Supreme Court, citizens’ complaints have been admitted as legal petitions at the Supreme Court.
11. Quoted by Dr. Laurence J. Peter, Quotations – Ideas for our time, Page 153, Quill William Morrow, New York. 1992
12. Unfortunately in their interaction with Hindu society, Muslims appear to have picked up the practice of caste differences also. R.Upadhyay, South Asia Advisory Group, NOIDA, “Muslim brotherhood -A key to Communal politics in India” Paper No 1072, Aug 30, 2004 states: “Theoretically, the Muslim community is a caste-less society but in practice Indian Muslims are socially divided between the descendants of Muslim invaders, converts from upper caste Hindus and lower caste Hindu converts. Shaikh, Sayed, Pathan and Moghuls who belong to upper strata of Muslim society and popularly known as Ashraf Muslims do not maintain equality in social interaction with their co-religionists, who belong to their pre-Islamic lower caste Hindus like barber, washerman, weaver, butcher, scavenger and so on. Still carrying the mental burden of their pre-Islamic castes, they continue to suffer from inferiority complex in their social interaction with upper caste converts. Though, there is no religious binding, the inter-marriage between different groups of Indian converts is not common in Muslim society.” www.saag.org
13. Swami Vivekananda, Pages 425-416, The Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda, Vol. VI, Advaita Ashrama, Calcutta. 1992
14. This part of the paper is based upon Hardy. P’s, Sources of Indian Tradition, second edition, Vol. I, New Delhi, Penguin Books India (P) Ltd, 1991
15. For instance Moghul emperor Akbar’s great grandson Dara Shikoh (1615-1659) as a follower of Qadirir order of Sufis had studied Hindu philosophy and mystical practices. He was accused of heresy by the orthodoxy) Hardy. P. ibid p-471.
16. Shah Wali Ullah made significant contribution for the re-establishment of Islamic political authority in India. It was the political theory of Wali ullah that kept the Indian Muslims emotional social disorder and deprived them of a from forward-looking vision. Being proud of his Arab origin, he was strongly opposed to integration of Islamic culture in the cultural cauldron of the sub-continent and wanted the Muslims to ensure their distance from it. ""In his opinion, the health of Muslim society demanded that doctrines and values inculcated by Islam should be maintained in their pristine purity unsullied by extraneous influences" (The Muslim Community of Indo-Pakistan subcontinent by Istiaq Hussain Qureshi, 1985, People's Publishing House, Lahore, page 216 quoted by R Upadhyay ibid.). Waliullah did not want the Muslims to become part of the general milieu of the sub-continent. He wanted them to keep alive their relation with rest of the Muslim world so that the spring of their inspiration and ideals might ever remain located in Islam and tradition of world community developed by it". (Ibid. page 215). In the opinion of R. Upadhyay, the religious-political ideology of Wali Ullah made a permanent crack in Hindu--Muslim relation in this sub-continent, which undermined the self-pride and dignity of integrated Indian society. (R Upadhyay, Indian Muslims under siege? South Asia Advisory Group, NOIDA, Paper No. 1160, Nov 9, 2004. www.saag.org)
17. B. Raman, Minority separatism in India – The Muslim minority, paper presented at a conference on “Ethnic Minorities and Great Power Strategies in Asia” held at Honolulu from October 12 to 14,2004, under the auspices of the Asia Pacific Centre for Security Studies. (B. Raman, South Asia Advisory Group, NOIDA, Paper No. 1144, Oct 18, 2004. www.saag.org)
18. This refers to the traditional gurukul form of education, which is almost extinct now. A student lives with his guru and learns at his feet, treating him as a guide to life than mere knowledge.
19. R.Upadhyay, Indian Muslims under siege? South Asia Advisory Group, NOIDA, Paper ibid
20. Ayaz Amir, “A ‘sincere’ approach to Kashmir”, Dawn weekly, July 17, 2004. http://www.dawn.com/weekly/ayaz/20040611.htm
21. In his "Last Pilgrimage" address Prophet Mohammed said, "Oh ye people, a Muslim is another Muslim's brother and thus all Muslims are brothers among themselves”; see M.R.A.Baig, The Muslim Dilemma, Page 12, 1974 (quoted by R Upadhyay ibid).
22. Mohammad Yasin, A Social History of Islamic India, Second Edition, 1974. Pages 3 & 69 (quoted by R Upadhyay ibid).
23. Asghar Ali Engineer, Islam and Muslim, 1985, Page 127.
24. Rafiq Zakaria; Indian Muslims - Where they have gone wrong? Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Mumbai-400007. 2004
25. For a detailed analysis of minority laws in Pakistan, see Shazia Rafiq, The Plight of Minorities In Pakistan August, 2004, http://www.pakistanweekly.com/Opinion1.htm
26. Ayaz Amir, ibid, Dawn weekly, July 17, 2004
27. See Bernard Lewis, The Crisis of Islam, Phoenix, Orion Books Ltd., London, 2003, for a background on Wahabism and its growth with the patronage of the Royal House of Saud.
28. In the words of U.S. Treasury Department official and expert on financing of terrorism David Afhauser “What (Saudi-funded mosques and other Islamic institutions) taught was an unforgiving, intolerant, uncompromising and austere view of the faith that became kindling for Osama Bin Laden’s match,” as stated in a U.S. Congressional hearing. For detailed analysis of Saudi involvement see http://www.townhall.com/columnists/joelmowbray/jm20040623.shtml
29. Rajmohan Gandhi, Understanding the Muslim Mind, Penguin Books, New Delhi 1987
30. Gen. V.P. Malik, Changing Paradigms of Security: Need for Multi-Disciplinary Approach, paper published in www.ORFonline.org, June 11, 2004
31. Ishfaq Illahi Choudhry, Secret Challenges of South Asian Country in the coming Decade: An Overview, BISS Journal, Dhaka, Vol. 21, No. 1, 2000.
32. B. Raman, presentation on ‘Issues in National Security’, ORF, Chennai, September 26, 2004
33. Ccounter affidavit filed in response to writ petition(civil) No. 125 of 1998 filed in the Supreme Court of India. Quoted by Sanjoy Hazarika, Rites of passage, Penguin Books India, New Delhi, 2000, page 306
34. See Wilson John, The Roots of Extremism in Bangladesh, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi, Jan 2005, www.ORFonline.org
35. Quoted by Arun Shourie, The silent demographic invasion, part-1 to 3, http://www.indianexpress.com/full_story.php?content_id=56631#
36. Sanjoy Hazarika, ibid. Page 49-52.
37. Sanjoy Hazarika, ibid. Page 72.
38. Census of India published the population figures of Assam on its website; but these were taken off after three days evidently the ruling party found the political storm raised by the figures. Now officially the Census of India report does not carry these figures.
39. Quoted by Arun Shourie, ibid.
40. Sanjoy Hazarika, ibid. Page 57.
41. Sanjoy Hazarika, ibid. Page 135..
42. Arun Shourie, ibid.
43. Col R Hariharan, Bangladesh and India: Time to build a synergy in security, South Asia Advisory Group, NOIDA, Paper 1117, Sep 16, 2004. http://www.saag.org/papers12/paper1117.html
44. See Col R Hariharan, Banglabhai syndrome: is it vigilantism or Jejadi terrorism?, South Asia Advisory Group, NOIDA, Paper 1035 . http://www.saag.org/papers11/paper1035.html .
U.N. concern of links in Bangladesh with Al Qaeda are given in the daily New Age, Aug 30, 2004. See http://www.newagebd.com/front.html#4
45. T.E. Nainan presents an interesting cameo of India’s growth in India, the 1% society. See http://in.rediff.com/money/2004/sep/11guest.htm
46. Quoted by Swami Tejomayananda, Hindu Culture: An Introduction, Central Chinmaya Mission Trust, Mumbai-400 072, 2000
[Courtesy: Rashtriya Jagriti Sansthan, New Delhi].
(Col R Hariharan, an MI specialist in counter-insurgency intelligence, served with the IPKF as Head of Intelligence in Sri Lanka. E-mail: colhari@yahoo.com)
Appendix
THE TIMELINE OF EVENTS RELATING TO
ILLEGAL MIGRANTS IN ASSAM
November 23, 1946: The Foreigners Act 1946 enacted. This gave to the Central Government certain powers in respect of the entry of foreigners into the territory of India, their presence therein and their departure from India.
September 23, 1964: The Foreigners (Tribunals) Order 1964 put out by the Central Government. This provided that any question as to whether a particular person is or is not a foreigner was to be referred to the Tribunals that were being constituted for the purpose.
October 15, 1983: Despite the existence of the Act of 1946 and despite the fact that it applied to the whole of India, the Illegal Migrants (Determination by Tribunals) Act was enacted in 1983 by Parliament to provide for the determination of illegal migrants and their deportation. This Act was made applicable only to Assam, and more specifically only to those foreigners who had entered into India after March 25, 1971, and were not in possession of valid passports or travel documents or other legal authority to enter India.
August 15, 1985: A Memorandum of Settlement was entered into between the All Assam Students’ Union (AASU), the State of Assam and the Union of India, commonly known as the ‘Assam Accord’. Among other things, the Accord provided:
‘‘The Government will give due consideration to certain difficulties expressed by AASU/AAGSP regarding the implementation of the Illegal Migrants (Determination by Tribunals) Act, 1983.’’
December 7, 1985: In pursuance of the Accord, the Citizenship Act 1955 was amended in 1985 and a new Section 6A was inserted into the Act.
January 27, 1990: A ‘‘time frame’’ for ‘‘clause-wise implementation’’ of the Assam Accord was prepared, and signed by the Union Home Ministry and the Chief Secretary of Assam. It stated that a decision on the repeal of the Act of 1983 would be taken by February 28, 1991.
September 20, 1990: At a meeting between the Union Home Minister, Chief Minister of Assam and representatives of AASU, the Government ‘‘noted’’ the demand of the representatives of AASU that the Act of 1983 be repealed, and assured the representatives of AASU that it would initiate discussions with other political parties on the subject.
August 11, 1997: At a meeting regarding the implementation of the Accord, the Central Government stated that although necessary administrative and organisational framework in the form of setting up tribunals and providing requisite staff to them had been set up, the results achieved had been extremely poor, and that there was a need to analyse carefully why the system had failed and what needed to be done to achieve the objective of detection and deportation of foreigners. On behalf of AASU, its president stated at the meeting that the former prime minister had visited Assam in October 1996 and had informed AASU that a decision had already been taken to repeal the IMDT Act.
April 6, 1998: At a meeting between officials of the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, officials of the government of Assam and representatives of AASU, it was decided that the proposal made by the officials of the government of Assam and the representatives of AASU seeking the repeal of the Act of 1983 would be put up to the new Government for a decision.
September 23, 1998: Another meeting was held between the Government of India, government of Assam and representatives of AASU, the parties to the Assam Accord. The participants were informed that the repeal of the IMDT Act was ‘‘under the active consideration’’ of the Government.
February 1999: In his address to Parliament, the President of India stated that the repeal of the IMDT Act was ‘‘under the active consideration’’ of the Government.
March 18, 1999: At a meeting between representatives of the governments of India and Assam, and the representatives of AASU, the Government reiterated that the repeal of the IMDT Act was ‘‘under the active consideration’’ of the Government. Measures being taken to identify foreigners—for example, issue of photo identity cards—and the steps being taken to seal the border were also discussed.
July 1, 1999: At a further meeting, the representatives of AASU urged that an ordinance be issued to repeal the IMDT Act. They were again assured that the matter was ‘‘under the active consideration’’ of the Government of India.
March 2000: As nothing but nothing was happening, an erstwhile president of AASU, Sarbananda Sonowal, thought it would be a good idea to take the matter to the Supreme Court—after all, here was an institution that had been seizing the initiative on so many matters in which the Executive had not acted, or not been able to act. Accordingly, he filed a petition in the Supreme Court. He argued that the Act ought to be struck down as it so patently flew against the Constitution, and as it was patently discriminatory—laws applicable in the rest of the country made it so much easier to detect and deport foreigners than this law that had been imposed on the region of the country that was most afflicted by their invasion.
He had the greatest difficulty in finding a lawyer who would argue the case in the public interest. Mr Ashok Desai took up the case. That was in March 2000. Since then the case has come up a score of times. Several Chief Justices have come and gone. A Congress government has replaced the AGP government in Assam, which had filed an affidavit supporting the petition. This new government has filed an ‘‘additional affidavit’’—reversing the stand of the government of Assam as stated in its original affidavit! The Government at the Centre too has changed. Successive orders of the Supreme Court tell the tale. Here they are:
• April 17, 2000: Let a copy of the Writ Petition be served on the amicus in Writ Petition (c) No 125/98. To be heard along with that Petition.
• May 1, 2000: Additional Solicitor General prays for six weeks’ further time to furnish the status report. We grant the prayer.
• July 17, 2000: The delay in filing the status report is condoned. Copy of the status report has been furnished to counsel for the parties. Responses, if any, to the status report may also be filed within four weeks.
• August 28, 2000: Mr Ashok H Desai, senior counsel appearing for the writ petitioner in Writ Petition(c) 131/2000, has drawn our attention to an affidavit filed on behalf of the Union of India and, in particular, to the position detailed at page 214 of the ‘‘updated status position’’ attached to that affidavit, wherein it is stated that:
‘‘The Government is of the view that the Illegal Migrants (Determination by Tribunals) Act 1983, in its application to the State of Assam alone, is discriminatory. The proposal to repeal this Act is under active consideration of the Government.’’
Mr Desai has also drawn our attention to an affidavit filed on behalf of the State of Assam, respondent No 2, wherein it is stated on the affidavit of Shri D J Hazarika, Officer-on-Special Duty to the Government of Assam, that: ‘‘The State Government has thus been insisting upon the Central Government for repeal of the IMDT Act. Now, in the Counter Affidavit filed by the Central Government, it has been admitted that the Act is ‘discriminatory’ in nature and on such admission, the Act is liable to be struck down as unconstitutional.’’
Mr R N Trivedi, Additional Solicitor General, submits that he stands by the affidavit filed on behalf of the Union of India, but would like to seek further instructions in that behalf and prays for the matter to be adjourned and taken up in January 2001. We grant his prayer. In the meanwhile, ‘updated status reports’ may be filed by the Union of India and the concerned State Governments.
• January 8, 2001: WP(c) 125/1998 & 131/2000
Counsel for the parties submit that they have already filed counter/rejoinder. The additional document is still to be filed, let the same be filed within six weeks. The petitions shall be posted for final hearing before a three-judge Bench. To be listed after six weeks for directions.
• February 26, 2001: Issue notice in the impalement applications two other writ petitions pending. Let the parties complete pleadings in all these petitions within six weeks. Counsel for the parties shall also, within two weeks from the date of completion of the pleadings, file brief written submissions, not exceeding five pages each. They shall be at liberty to exchange written submissions between themselves. Learned counsel for the interveners are also permitted to file their response to the writ petitions as well as written submissions. To be listed for directions to fix time schedule for hearing after eight weeks.
• July 9, 2001: Counsel for the State of Assam prayer for four weeks time to file a further affidavit granted. Rejoinder, if any, to be submitted within three weeks thereafter.
• October 15, 2001: Writ Petition (c) No. 125 of 1998 .An application has been filed on behalf of the State of Assam seeking permission to file ‘‘a new counter affidavit’’. The application is supported by an affidavit of the Commissioner & Secretary, Home Department, Government of Assam. The affidavit filed along with the application treated as ‘‘an additional affidavit' and taken on record the new affidavit as an additional affidavit filed on behalf of the State of Assam. Mr Ashok Desai, learned senior counsel, prays for and is granted four weeks’ time to file his response to the additional affidavit filed by the State. Writ petitions to be after four weeks before a three-judge Bench for further proceedings.
The applicant through their learned counsel is permitted to assist the Court at the time of hearing of the case. The application for impalement is, accordingly, disposed of.
January 9, 2002: Put up this matter along with.
January 18, 2002: Reference I A No. 4 of 2001 and WP(c) No. 131/2000 on January 18, 2002. As these matters deal with the validity of the Illegal Migrants (Determination By Tribunals) Act 1983. In view of the controversy, rule was issued in all these matters. All the respondents have entered appearance and have filed their respective show cause. Put up for final disposal in the third week of April 2002.
April 15, 2002: On perusal of the prayers made in these petitions, it appears that in Writ Petition) No. 131/2000, the validity of Act 39/83 is under challenge and learned counsel for the parties pray that this matter may be heard and disposed of early. Mr Jain, learned senior counsel, also says that in Writ Petition) No. 7/2001, the same prayer has been made. In other matters, the question of implementation of the provisions of the Act and sealing of the border etc are under consideration. Therefore, the court directed that these two petitions may be delinked from this batch of cases and posted for hearing on 22nd April 2002. The counsel are requested to file written submissions in these two matters, if not already filed, in the meantime. Rest of the matter may be put up in July 2002.
• April 22, 2002: The petitioner has filed written submissions. Mr Sanghi appearing for the State of Assam is requested to file his written submissions. All other parties who want to argue asked to file their written submissions and serve copy of the same on the respective counsel for 10th of May, 2002. After hearing, the court directed that these petitions be listed on 13th of August 2002, along with WP(C) No. 581/2001, as it is submitted that the validity of Section 6A of the Citizenship Act 1955 is also under challenge.
• August 13, 2002: The matter is not listed.
• October 28, 2002: Asked to be put up on 20th November 2002.
• November 20, 2002: The matter did not reach the court.
• January 24, 2003: Matter to be list the matter in the month of April 2003 for directions.
• April 7, 2003: Matter to be listed the matter for directions in July 2003.
• July 7, 2003: Court says that a Bill has been introduced in Parliament for repeal of the Act, which is impugned in the present petitions. In that view of the matter, the hearing of the petitions was adjourned. Asks for listing of the petitions in January 2004.
• January 2004: The matter is not listed.
• March 16, 2004: Asked to call in the month of July 2004 as requested. By this time, the country was in the midst of the campaign for general election. The case was adjourned again. And that is where things remain
[Source: Arun Shourie, The silent demographic invasion, part-1 to 3, http://www.indianexpress.com/full_story.php?content_id=56631#]