There should be no illusion that despite the flare of success in repelling a division strong security forces offensive at Muhamalai in April 2008, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) is fighting a war of survival. The continuing ground and air operations of the security forces after Muhamalai debacle, and the progress they have made during this month in Mannar sector capturing Adampan and other outlying LTTE defences have further constricted the territory under active LTTE control in the Northern Province.
The fall of key LTTE defences in Mannar sector indicate that the LTTE probably pulled out some of its forces earlier to reinforce Muhamalai-Kilinochchi. This would enable the LTTE to repel future forays of security forces into the vital heartland of the LTTE from the north.
As the troops advance further in Mannar and Vavuniya sectors, and as pressure builds up in Welioya, even without a major offensive along Muhamalai, the LTTE's options would be reduced further. As the war prolongs further, the constraints of conventional warfare dictate that the LTTE has to progressively pull back its defences, and reduce its frontage to conserve its strength to offer better resistance. This would be the long term picture even if the security forces have a few debacles along one or more fronts in their offensive, as long as they do not give up half way.
There had been few pro-active LTTE operations after Muhamalai. These were limited to dropping of three bombs on the security forces in Welioya front by two Air Tiger aircraft, and sinking of A 520 (MV Invincible), a naval logistics vessel in a clever underwater suicide operation by the Sea Tigers in Trincomalee harbour during mid May. This would show the LTTE has severe limitations in its conventional operational capability.
The security forces have carried out relentless bombing of suspected LTTE assets. The LTTE has accused the security forces' deep penetration unit of killing 17 people including women and children in a claymore blast well inside the LTTE territory in Vanni. This is the third time the LTTE has accused the security forces of carrying out such clandestine attacks deep inside its territory. The security forces have routinely denied these allegations. These killings targeting civilians are probably retaliatory in nature for settling scores for the LTTE's killings of civilians elsewhere.
While they do not directly impact the current operational situation, they impose caution on movement of cadres and spread insecurity and panic among the population. These could get worse as the war makes further inroads. If the LTTE accusations are true, they show the weakening ability of the LTTE to dominate areas under its control. If it is not the security forces, who are behind these deep penetration operations in depth? Are they the handy work of one of the shadowy "para military" outfits that the LTTE accuses of colluding with the security forces? These questions are probably being debated within the LTTE and some of its attention would be diverted to prevent such attacks as the war progresses.
Recourse to unconventional war
LTTE's strong suite had always been its guerrilla capability in areas outside its direct control. Under present circumstances, to compensate its limitations in conventional operations, the LTTE appears to have stepped up its unconventional actions with a series of bomb blasts in areas outside the battle zones.
The LTTE attacks outside the theatre of operations started the day after Muhamalai attack, with the killing of 26 civilians in a bus bomb blast at Piliyandala on April 28, 2008. This was followed by the Amparai café parcel bomb blast on the eve of the eastern provincial council elections in which 11 people were killed and 29 others wounded. There was a motor cycle-borne suicide attack on a police van in Colombo on May 16, 2008 killing 10 persons including seven policemen. The latest in the series was the bomb blast carried out in a train at Dehiwela near Colombo on May 26, 2008 in which nine people were killed and 73 others were injured. Only two days before the train bombing, three time bombs were defused before they exploded - two on passenger buses near Colombo and one in the Kandy area.
Of course, there was the tragic, gangster style LTTE killing of Ms Maheswary Velayutham, while visiting her ailing mother in her Jaffna home. She was better known for years of yeoman service in the cause of human rights and Tamil refugees than for her later day role as advisor to the Eelam Peoples Democratic Party (EPDP). And how her killing makes it easier to gain Tamil Eelam is a question only the LTTE's warped logic can answer.
Essentially an insurgent force, the LTTE probably feels more comfortable in carrying out bomb blasts, suicide killings, and other such attacks targeting civilians. Such acts by themselves do not win wars. But they tend to create panic among the population and psychologically pressurise the government to ease military operations if the social and political environments encourage such developments. Whether these happen or not in the current situation in the country, the feeling of insecurity among Tamils living in Sri Lanka will be increased every time the LTTE carries out such strikes due to inherent ethnic overtones of such acts. In any case President Rajapaksa appears to be undeterred in his intention to crush the LTTE after each bomb blast. In fact, he has reiterated the same sentiment after the May 26 train blast. And after his successful election foray in the east he would have no hesitation to enlarge its scope further.
Human rights issue
The failure of Sri Lanka's bid for getting elected to the membership of the UN Human Rights Council for a second term was not unexpected. On this count the President had probably underestimated the increasing importance attached to human rights questions in many democracies regardless of their own human rights record. At present no counter insurgency operation can be carried out with utter disregard to human rights issues. And Sri Lanka had continued its war with total indifference to human rights. Moreover, it has not covered itself with glory on this count even on the eve of the UN HRC elections. The international group of eminent persons called upon to advise the commission of inquiry into killings quit in disgust after a long tussle with the bureaucracy. Strong arm tactics have continued to suppress dissonant voices of the media. Reputed international NGOs have been castigated and prevented from entering or working freely in Sri Lanka. And Sri Lanka has persisted in refusing to allow a representative of the UN HRC to be positioned to monitor its human rights performance.
Notwithstanding the rhetoric of Bruce Fein and the detailed reports of Human Rights Watch, even nations which voted against Sri Lanka are unlikely to pressurise Sri Lanka to curb the President's pursuit of war effort immediately. Such pressure is applied in small doses and often gets diffused due to diplomatic and political compulsions of different nations. Moreover, globally counter terrorism and human rights aberrations are far from being equated as a zero sum game. Perhaps, the flow of foreign aid and the vigour of foreign trade would be affected if Sri Lanka persists in errant ways on human rights. But the President retains the option of visibly improving his human rights record, and carry on with the military operations when the chips are down.
Though the LTTE propaganda machinery had been harping upon the human rights issue, its own hands are tainted with too many human rights violations to point a finger at others. In fact, its dismal human rights record has been used by Sri Lanka to ward off the flack in international forums on this count.
Sri Lanka security forces
Muhamalai was undoubtedly a debacle for the security forces in that they suffered probably double the number of casualties suffered by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. And in the operations probably 300 fighters from both the security forces and the LTTE lost their lives. Offensive troops always suffer more casualties in operations. However, the operation should be put in perspective while assessing the future capability of the security forces. The security forces had shown three weaknesses in this operation.
The first was not coordinating the Muhamalai offensive with other simulated or actual operations on other fronts. That would have prevented the LTTE from beefing up its Muhamalai defences by milking forces from other sectors on the eve of operations. Though operations have been launched in multiple fronts for some time, the security forces appear to have failed to take advantage of creating confusion in the minds of opposition by coordinating them and fine tuning them to derive maximum advantage. Despite expanding the army, this weakness to coordinate formation level operations on multiple fronts exhibited in earlier Eelam wars has persisted in the higher direction of war.
The second relates to tactical intelligence. The security forces probably went in for a silent attack, a very sound proposition if the surprise element was there. But there were enough battle indications in Jaffna peninsula for at least ten days in advance about the impending operation in this front. When surprise was neutralised the silent attack becomes a futile effort. The LTTE is a past master in deception and the offensive troops appear to have been taken by surprise when they ran into unexpected resistance from defences. This would show battlefield intelligence acquisition was not real time. Moreover, silent attack requires accurate real time tactical intelligence and probably this was lacking despite the modern battlefield surveillance equipment available to the security forces.
The third major weakness is strategic. Sri Lankan operations are slow and plodding which fails to take advantage of tactical success in conventional operations. It also gives sufficient time for the opposition to readjust, reinforce or pull out from defences. There could be non military reasons for not pushing through with the offensive for fear of suffering more casualties. According to the figures of the government, since January 3,873 LTTE cadres have been killed as against the loss of 298 soldiers in operations. While these figures might be disputed, there is no doubt the LTTE losses had been heavier. But the operation has gone into the third year, and the indications are that it would be a long haul if present strategies are continued.
While tactical weaknesses can be set right, the strategic weakness might continue to dog the Sri Lankan operations. And that could prolong the war and increase its human and material cost to the nation.
Future course
Overall, LTTE actions outside the operational zone are unlikely to discourage President Rajapaksa from his pursuit of military option. And if he stays determined and the security forces do not blink as they did in their infamous Elephant Pass disaster in 2000, the military operations are likely to gobble up further territory in Mannar sector in the coming months. The LTTE attacks on civilians are not going to put a stop to the military operations. They only show that the LTTE for all its pretensions of de facto governance has not changed its Tiger stripes. As the LTTE has little choice, one can expect more LTTE attempts at creating mayhem, chaos and killings as the war intensifies in the coming months.
The strong defences of LTTE in Muhamalai axis to Kilinochchi show that it is not going to allow easy passage through. Strategically, the security forces will have to probably consider coordinating the Jaffna offensive along A9 with offensive along A32-Pooneryn to enhance the threat to Kilinochichi and weaken the LTTE defences. Whether the security forces have the wherewithal to carry out such a complex operation is the question only the Army commander can answer best.
www.saag.org
Thursday, May 29, 2008
Tuesday, May 27, 2008
Sri Lanka: Death of Balraj and the dearth of experience
The death of Balraj (given name Balasegaran Kandiah), one of the competent and battle-scarred commanders, due to heart attack on May 20, 2008 could not have come at a worse time for the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), which is fighting a losing war with its back to the wall. His death is sure to aggravate the organisation's ever increasing problem of dwindling number of field commanders with operational experience. And that could affect future operations.
Balraj's cameo of guerrilla career eloquently presented by the TamilNet and better informed columnists like DBS Jeyaraj give a glimpse of the making of a modern guerrilla commander from an ordinary civilian. It also represents the milestones of LTTE's growth from a rag-tag outfit to a monolithic and modern insurgency outfit with multiple capabilities, with its attendant bureaucratic trappings and ponderous ways. The career growth of Balraj from an armed cadre to a loyal trustee at the time of internal crisis in the LTTE did not stop there. He went on to command the Charles Anthony Brigade, the LTTE's first conventional military outfit.
To start with Balraj had suffered from two handicaps that could have put an end to his career in the LTTE. The first was Balraj's earlier affiliation with the Peoples Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE) – an organisation Prabhakaran had sworn to eliminate. The second was his latter day association with the much maligned LTTE leader Mahattya, who was sentenced to death for his alleged disloyalty to Prabhakaran. Balraj not only overcame these handicaps but gained Prabhakaran's confidence. He proved his loyalty to Prabhakaran in the internal struggle for power and later showed his battlefield capability in 1999-2000 in the LTTE's Unceasing Waves III (Oyatha Alaikal III) operation that led to the investment and capture of Elephant Pass resulting in resounding victory for the insurgents.
When we had interacted with Balraj during the days of the Indian Peace Keeping Force, he was neither a senior leader nor a military commander of proven competency, but a green horn member of the 9th batch of LTTE cadres trained in India. He cut his military teeth in operations against the IPKF.
By 1989 Balraj quickly climbed the leadership ladder when the sub unit leaders from earlier eight batches of were almost liquidated during operations with the IPKF. In fact, when the IPKF operations engulfed the rest of the peninsula and pushed Prabhakaran to seek refuge in the steamy jungle confines of Wanni, Balraj's proximity to the leader increased. But Balraj over the years went on to become a multi-faceted guerrilla leader with conventional warfare capability. He put the two decades of war and peace to develop his competencies. The latter day entrants have neither the luxury of such a long exposure in leadership role in operation nor the time horizon to enable them to emulate Balraj.
Conventional armies have a clearly laid down succession process which comes into play automatically at times of war. However, the LTTE despite its claims of conventional capability is essentially an insurgent force. In the LTTE to fill the berth of a senior military commander like Balraj, the successor will have to fulfil twin requirements - proven operational experience, and unswerving loyalty to its supreme commander V Prabhakaran. Balraj, in his quarter century of service in the LTTE came out successful on both the counts.
Insurgent bodies which are highly paranoid crack both at the operational and leadership level when they come under severe operational pressure. So far Prabhakaran, despite the aberration in mishandling Karuna and losing him, had warded off such a development thanks to commanders like Balraj. But as the juggernaut of security forces inches forward beyond Adampan today, and probably towards Mullaitivu tomorrow, Prabhakaran needs experienced commanders who understand the nuances of conventional warfare and fight steadfast a battle of attrition. The moot point is can Prabhakaran find them?
As it is there are just a handful of experienced field commanders left alive. They are aging, and some of them like Soosai are not in good health. And as the war continues more heads will roll. The newly inducted commanders, unlike the earlier ones, are more likely to be post 1983 products who were blooded at the cadre level only in the last Eelam war between 1995 and 2000. Their active conventional operational experience at a little higher level would have been in response to the security forces offensives during the last two years.
The security forces have superior force levels and fire power than the LTTE, and as the war progresses further into the north, their superiority is likely to increase. In the face of such odds, only the commitment of LTTE commanders and their ability to inspire the cadres can compensate for LTTE's organic limitations (as it probably happened at Muahamalai in April 2008). But thanks to the LTTE's emotive but self-defeating tactics of suicide bombing both in land and sea, the LTTE gallery of martyrs is already filled with names of potential leaders who could have made the difference with their experience and motivation.
Even in the present situation, Prabhakaran's unique ability to pick the right person to lead his teams should not be under estimated. In the past he had demonstrated an uncanny ability to bounce back in the face of defeat with such commanders. It was enabled by the 1983 vintage veterans like Mahattaya, Karuna, Balraj and the like who are no more available.
Can Prabhakaran do it all over? Will the new commanders have the same level of personal loyalty, commitment and military competency? The answer will probably emerge in the battlefronts in the coming months.
Balraj's cameo of guerrilla career eloquently presented by the TamilNet and better informed columnists like DBS Jeyaraj give a glimpse of the making of a modern guerrilla commander from an ordinary civilian. It also represents the milestones of LTTE's growth from a rag-tag outfit to a monolithic and modern insurgency outfit with multiple capabilities, with its attendant bureaucratic trappings and ponderous ways. The career growth of Balraj from an armed cadre to a loyal trustee at the time of internal crisis in the LTTE did not stop there. He went on to command the Charles Anthony Brigade, the LTTE's first conventional military outfit.
To start with Balraj had suffered from two handicaps that could have put an end to his career in the LTTE. The first was Balraj's earlier affiliation with the Peoples Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE) – an organisation Prabhakaran had sworn to eliminate. The second was his latter day association with the much maligned LTTE leader Mahattya, who was sentenced to death for his alleged disloyalty to Prabhakaran. Balraj not only overcame these handicaps but gained Prabhakaran's confidence. He proved his loyalty to Prabhakaran in the internal struggle for power and later showed his battlefield capability in 1999-2000 in the LTTE's Unceasing Waves III (Oyatha Alaikal III) operation that led to the investment and capture of Elephant Pass resulting in resounding victory for the insurgents.
When we had interacted with Balraj during the days of the Indian Peace Keeping Force, he was neither a senior leader nor a military commander of proven competency, but a green horn member of the 9th batch of LTTE cadres trained in India. He cut his military teeth in operations against the IPKF.
By 1989 Balraj quickly climbed the leadership ladder when the sub unit leaders from earlier eight batches of were almost liquidated during operations with the IPKF. In fact, when the IPKF operations engulfed the rest of the peninsula and pushed Prabhakaran to seek refuge in the steamy jungle confines of Wanni, Balraj's proximity to the leader increased. But Balraj over the years went on to become a multi-faceted guerrilla leader with conventional warfare capability. He put the two decades of war and peace to develop his competencies. The latter day entrants have neither the luxury of such a long exposure in leadership role in operation nor the time horizon to enable them to emulate Balraj.
Conventional armies have a clearly laid down succession process which comes into play automatically at times of war. However, the LTTE despite its claims of conventional capability is essentially an insurgent force. In the LTTE to fill the berth of a senior military commander like Balraj, the successor will have to fulfil twin requirements - proven operational experience, and unswerving loyalty to its supreme commander V Prabhakaran. Balraj, in his quarter century of service in the LTTE came out successful on both the counts.
Insurgent bodies which are highly paranoid crack both at the operational and leadership level when they come under severe operational pressure. So far Prabhakaran, despite the aberration in mishandling Karuna and losing him, had warded off such a development thanks to commanders like Balraj. But as the juggernaut of security forces inches forward beyond Adampan today, and probably towards Mullaitivu tomorrow, Prabhakaran needs experienced commanders who understand the nuances of conventional warfare and fight steadfast a battle of attrition. The moot point is can Prabhakaran find them?
As it is there are just a handful of experienced field commanders left alive. They are aging, and some of them like Soosai are not in good health. And as the war continues more heads will roll. The newly inducted commanders, unlike the earlier ones, are more likely to be post 1983 products who were blooded at the cadre level only in the last Eelam war between 1995 and 2000. Their active conventional operational experience at a little higher level would have been in response to the security forces offensives during the last two years.
The security forces have superior force levels and fire power than the LTTE, and as the war progresses further into the north, their superiority is likely to increase. In the face of such odds, only the commitment of LTTE commanders and their ability to inspire the cadres can compensate for LTTE's organic limitations (as it probably happened at Muahamalai in April 2008). But thanks to the LTTE's emotive but self-defeating tactics of suicide bombing both in land and sea, the LTTE gallery of martyrs is already filled with names of potential leaders who could have made the difference with their experience and motivation.
Even in the present situation, Prabhakaran's unique ability to pick the right person to lead his teams should not be under estimated. In the past he had demonstrated an uncanny ability to bounce back in the face of defeat with such commanders. It was enabled by the 1983 vintage veterans like Mahattaya, Karuna, Balraj and the like who are no more available.
Can Prabhakaran do it all over? Will the new commanders have the same level of personal loyalty, commitment and military competency? The answer will probably emerge in the battlefronts in the coming months.
Saturday, May 17, 2008
Sri Lanka: Eastern Provincial Council Election & its Results
The swearing in of Sivanesathurai Chandirakanthan (better known as Pillaiyan, his nom de guerre of militancy days) as the chief minister of the newly created eastern provincial council on May 16, 2008 marks a new turn in Sri Lanka politics. It came about after a great deal of backdoor bickering, rumours and heart burning. Even as the decision to choose Pillaiyan was being debated in the high security office of President Rajapakse, not far from there the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) unwittingly greeted the event with a suicide bomber ramming his motorcycle into a police van killing ten people and injuring 95 others.
The two contrasting events illustrate the Yang and Ying of Sri Lanka politics and militancy. Pillaiyan, heads theTamil Makkal Viduthalai Puligal (TMVP) the new found ally of the ruling United Peoples Front Alliance (UPFA). It was formed out of cadres who walked out of the LTTE along with Karuna, the estranged Batticola leader. The participation of the TMVP as an ally of the ruling alliance was controversial. The TMVP cadres have gained an unsavoury reputation as armed political bullies indulging in intimidation, extortion and kidnapping of kids. And they had a record of violence against the Muslim population. To top it all, they retained the arms of their insurgency days for "their own protection"! And no political party wanted to be seen with them.
All the three major opposition parties – the United National Party (UNP), the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) and the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) - have complained of election malpractices including rigging and intimidation by the UPFA and TMVP. The election commissioner had also acknowledged these complaints. These are to be out rightly condemned. However, such aberrations have been hardy perennials of elections in Sri Lanka (as also in its South Asian neighbours) and the May 10 election has proved to be no exception. But the more significant thing was the election was conducted without any major violent incident. This is a commendable achievement considering the explosive mix of multiple ethnic, religious and linguistic character of the province, with its near-equal population of Tamils, Muslims and Sinhalas. There had been no complaints of the TMVP members overtly displaying their weapons during or after the elections. Similarly there was no conspicuous LTTE activity to interfere with the polls. These would indicate that the administration had established its firm control over the province, which is good news for the harried population.
The President took a political gamble the first time when he formed an alliance with the TMVP for the PC polls. This was unpleasant news to his Muslim allies. However, he managed to persuade MLAM Hisbullah, influential eastern Muslim leader to part ways with the SLMC and ally with the UPFA. The SLMC headed by Rauf Hakeem fought the election as an ally of the opposition UNP. The President's gamble appears to have paid off as the UPFA group won 20 out of the total 37 seats of the provincial council (including two bonus seats) as against the UNP's 15 seats and one each won by the JVP and the Tamil National Democratic Alliance (TNDA).
The President has now taken a second gamble by making Pillaiyan the chief minister of the eastern PC, disregarding the vociferous claims of Hisbullah for the post as a Muslim claimant. Though there are eight Muslims as against only six Tamil (TMVP) members among the UPFA's 20 councillors, Muslim dissent does not appear to worry the President. The President must have counted upon the internal divisions among Muslim members to work in his favour when he nominated Pillaiyan.
Pillaiyan is as yet an unknown political personality just as the TMVP is a less known political entity. So far most of the Sri Lanka watchers and analysts have tended to see him in relation to Karuna or as the Tamil troubleshooter of President's brother and advisor Basil Rajapaksa, the Military Intelligence, or the Security Forces. The TMVP has invariably been understood only in the negative glow of its highhanded conduct with the public or for its friction with the Muslims, the STF etc. In this context, TMVP's political proposals handed over to Thissa Witharana, the Chairman of All Party Representatives Committee (APRC) in May 2007 are useful. The TMVP document provides some understanding of its stand on issues connected with ethnic relations, provincial autonomy, devolution, nature of war against the LTTE, and support to Rajapaksa.
As a political entity and partner of the UPFA, the TMVP is in a position of power now to turn some of its beliefs and recommendations into reality. Some of these are as follows:
TMVP believes that devolving political, administrative and financial powers from the Centre to the peripheral units of governance (provincial councils) within an un-divided and united Sri Lanka holds the solution to the Tamil issue.
• The powers to be devolved to the provincial governments should be clearly defined and not restricted by the Central Government except under special circumstances defined in the constitution.
• The Southern Sinhala polity has to unite to defeat the LTTE terrorism. At the same time it has to be accommodative to seek and offer political solution to the Tamils. This two- pronged approach only can permanently put an end to terrorism in Sri Lanka.
• Though Tamil has been recognized as a national language in the constitution, it has not become an administrative reality. The use of Tamil by the Tamils while dealing with the government and its institutions should become a reality.
• Tamils must be chosen to serve the government and its various services based upon merit. Their services should be recognized and rewarded on their merit. No Tamil should be excluded from any of the government services because he/she is a Tamil.
• State-aided colonization schemes in the north and east should be brought to an end, while the movement of people across the island should be free and unrestricted.
• Special provisions should be made to earmark adequate financial and administrative resources to re-build the north and east and speed up development and progress.
The TMVP's views on issues like the merger of north and east are practical and realistic rather than reverting to polemics of the past:
• The TMVP recognizes the merger of the north and east brought through the Indo-Lanka agreement. The 13th amendment to the constitution as originally brought forth through this agreement, should be the starting point for further constitutional reform.
• However, the reality of de-merger has to be accepted under the present circumstances. The TMVP demands that a referendum should be held in the east on the merger of north and east after the completion of two years of provincial council elections in the north and east.
• Elections for the Northern Provincial Council in areas under government control should be held as soon as possible and the Council should be permitted to function without any let or hindrance.
• Conditions must be created in the north and east for people who are living as refugees in India and the IDPs to return and resume their normal lives in areas of their original habitation. Elections for the provincial Councils should be held only after such conditions are created.
Except for the diehard Eelamists, others would probably find the above proposals as pragmatic and having reasonable chances of success in the present circumstances. But how far Pillaiyan and the TMVP will be able to get at least a few of them implemented?
* If Pillaiyan is serious about the TMVP proposals, he should be ready to undergo a trial by fire awaiting him as a chief minister. Then only he can burn a number of ghosts that haunt the TMVP and as a corollary Pillaiyan's reputation. Much of this is a mind game on what people come to believe from experience. It cannot be always achieved by political gamesmanship or propaganda.
* The first is to get an image make over for the TMVP. The TMVP should gain more respectability. This comes not only by power but by public conduct of the party men. Pillaiyan will have to disprove the adage power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely. This is a tall order for any party. But there is little choice for Pillaiyan. He will have to rein in his petty war lords and local chieftains who might be tempted to flex their muscles more and distribute favours now that the TMVP is in power.
* Collection of money, subscription or other forms of extortion from the public for the party coffers or otherwise will have to be stopped. Public property seized, lands illegally occupied or procured under coercion, will have to be restored to original owners.
* Pillaiyan has to get rid of the anti-Muslim halo that hovers around him as a TMVP leader. He will have to curb the temptation to dish out favours for Tamils. Only free and fair conduct towards all ethnic groups, particularly Muslims, can redeem his image. If he fails to do so, the President might leave him in the cold as a political liability because his own reputation is at stake in making the eastern PC a viable entity.
Pillaiyan is often described as the point man of Basil Rajapaksa. So Pillaiyan will have to acquire his own independent identity when he embarks as the chief minister. This can come through only with impeccable performance. But the moot point is will Pillaiyan be allowed to do so by the Rajapaksa triumvirate for fear of "growing too big for his own good."
He has to create a positive political image among Tamil population who are very skeptical about his credentials and capabilities. For this he will have to shed the militant image and don the mantle of a Tamil political leader. There is reservoir of capable and forward thinking Tamils in other political parties and public entities. He should not hesitate to muster their support for the common good.
The successful conduct of the Eastern PC elections and installation of Pillaiyan at the helm as the chief minister is a victory for President Rajapaksa. However, east will require a lot of handholding and sympathetic consideration as it embarks on a new path. Though the election has given the President and his party a foothold in the east now, he has the more difficult task of establishing it in a tricky environment. He has to make the UPFA not merely as a vehicle of power but also of development. This can be done only through empowerment of the provincial council with adequate financial and administrative resources. Unless the ruling alliance is seen as a proactive participant in the development of east there will be no ownership of the people in it. And then the only winners will be bureaucracy and corruption. We have seen this happen too often in the past.
Other political parties, particularly the opposition, will have to recognize the reality of eastern province and see the political developments there in the national perspective. The UNP and SLMC will have to rethink their strategies to recoup their waning fortunes. And that means overcoming internal personality clashes, revamping the leadership styles and motivating party members.
These are the realities of the east which are far beyond cosmetic changes of power sharing. The task ahead is much bigger and more difficult and goes farther than mere power play.
The two contrasting events illustrate the Yang and Ying of Sri Lanka politics and militancy. Pillaiyan, heads theTamil Makkal Viduthalai Puligal (TMVP) the new found ally of the ruling United Peoples Front Alliance (UPFA). It was formed out of cadres who walked out of the LTTE along with Karuna, the estranged Batticola leader. The participation of the TMVP as an ally of the ruling alliance was controversial. The TMVP cadres have gained an unsavoury reputation as armed political bullies indulging in intimidation, extortion and kidnapping of kids. And they had a record of violence against the Muslim population. To top it all, they retained the arms of their insurgency days for "their own protection"! And no political party wanted to be seen with them.
All the three major opposition parties – the United National Party (UNP), the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) and the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) - have complained of election malpractices including rigging and intimidation by the UPFA and TMVP. The election commissioner had also acknowledged these complaints. These are to be out rightly condemned. However, such aberrations have been hardy perennials of elections in Sri Lanka (as also in its South Asian neighbours) and the May 10 election has proved to be no exception. But the more significant thing was the election was conducted without any major violent incident. This is a commendable achievement considering the explosive mix of multiple ethnic, religious and linguistic character of the province, with its near-equal population of Tamils, Muslims and Sinhalas. There had been no complaints of the TMVP members overtly displaying their weapons during or after the elections. Similarly there was no conspicuous LTTE activity to interfere with the polls. These would indicate that the administration had established its firm control over the province, which is good news for the harried population.
The President took a political gamble the first time when he formed an alliance with the TMVP for the PC polls. This was unpleasant news to his Muslim allies. However, he managed to persuade MLAM Hisbullah, influential eastern Muslim leader to part ways with the SLMC and ally with the UPFA. The SLMC headed by Rauf Hakeem fought the election as an ally of the opposition UNP. The President's gamble appears to have paid off as the UPFA group won 20 out of the total 37 seats of the provincial council (including two bonus seats) as against the UNP's 15 seats and one each won by the JVP and the Tamil National Democratic Alliance (TNDA).
The President has now taken a second gamble by making Pillaiyan the chief minister of the eastern PC, disregarding the vociferous claims of Hisbullah for the post as a Muslim claimant. Though there are eight Muslims as against only six Tamil (TMVP) members among the UPFA's 20 councillors, Muslim dissent does not appear to worry the President. The President must have counted upon the internal divisions among Muslim members to work in his favour when he nominated Pillaiyan.
Pillaiyan is as yet an unknown political personality just as the TMVP is a less known political entity. So far most of the Sri Lanka watchers and analysts have tended to see him in relation to Karuna or as the Tamil troubleshooter of President's brother and advisor Basil Rajapaksa, the Military Intelligence, or the Security Forces. The TMVP has invariably been understood only in the negative glow of its highhanded conduct with the public or for its friction with the Muslims, the STF etc. In this context, TMVP's political proposals handed over to Thissa Witharana, the Chairman of All Party Representatives Committee (APRC) in May 2007 are useful. The TMVP document provides some understanding of its stand on issues connected with ethnic relations, provincial autonomy, devolution, nature of war against the LTTE, and support to Rajapaksa.
As a political entity and partner of the UPFA, the TMVP is in a position of power now to turn some of its beliefs and recommendations into reality. Some of these are as follows:
TMVP believes that devolving political, administrative and financial powers from the Centre to the peripheral units of governance (provincial councils) within an un-divided and united Sri Lanka holds the solution to the Tamil issue.
• The powers to be devolved to the provincial governments should be clearly defined and not restricted by the Central Government except under special circumstances defined in the constitution.
• The Southern Sinhala polity has to unite to defeat the LTTE terrorism. At the same time it has to be accommodative to seek and offer political solution to the Tamils. This two- pronged approach only can permanently put an end to terrorism in Sri Lanka.
• Though Tamil has been recognized as a national language in the constitution, it has not become an administrative reality. The use of Tamil by the Tamils while dealing with the government and its institutions should become a reality.
• Tamils must be chosen to serve the government and its various services based upon merit. Their services should be recognized and rewarded on their merit. No Tamil should be excluded from any of the government services because he/she is a Tamil.
• State-aided colonization schemes in the north and east should be brought to an end, while the movement of people across the island should be free and unrestricted.
• Special provisions should be made to earmark adequate financial and administrative resources to re-build the north and east and speed up development and progress.
The TMVP's views on issues like the merger of north and east are practical and realistic rather than reverting to polemics of the past:
• The TMVP recognizes the merger of the north and east brought through the Indo-Lanka agreement. The 13th amendment to the constitution as originally brought forth through this agreement, should be the starting point for further constitutional reform.
• However, the reality of de-merger has to be accepted under the present circumstances. The TMVP demands that a referendum should be held in the east on the merger of north and east after the completion of two years of provincial council elections in the north and east.
• Elections for the Northern Provincial Council in areas under government control should be held as soon as possible and the Council should be permitted to function without any let or hindrance.
• Conditions must be created in the north and east for people who are living as refugees in India and the IDPs to return and resume their normal lives in areas of their original habitation. Elections for the provincial Councils should be held only after such conditions are created.
Except for the diehard Eelamists, others would probably find the above proposals as pragmatic and having reasonable chances of success in the present circumstances. But how far Pillaiyan and the TMVP will be able to get at least a few of them implemented?
* If Pillaiyan is serious about the TMVP proposals, he should be ready to undergo a trial by fire awaiting him as a chief minister. Then only he can burn a number of ghosts that haunt the TMVP and as a corollary Pillaiyan's reputation. Much of this is a mind game on what people come to believe from experience. It cannot be always achieved by political gamesmanship or propaganda.
* The first is to get an image make over for the TMVP. The TMVP should gain more respectability. This comes not only by power but by public conduct of the party men. Pillaiyan will have to disprove the adage power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely. This is a tall order for any party. But there is little choice for Pillaiyan. He will have to rein in his petty war lords and local chieftains who might be tempted to flex their muscles more and distribute favours now that the TMVP is in power.
* Collection of money, subscription or other forms of extortion from the public for the party coffers or otherwise will have to be stopped. Public property seized, lands illegally occupied or procured under coercion, will have to be restored to original owners.
* Pillaiyan has to get rid of the anti-Muslim halo that hovers around him as a TMVP leader. He will have to curb the temptation to dish out favours for Tamils. Only free and fair conduct towards all ethnic groups, particularly Muslims, can redeem his image. If he fails to do so, the President might leave him in the cold as a political liability because his own reputation is at stake in making the eastern PC a viable entity.
Pillaiyan is often described as the point man of Basil Rajapaksa. So Pillaiyan will have to acquire his own independent identity when he embarks as the chief minister. This can come through only with impeccable performance. But the moot point is will Pillaiyan be allowed to do so by the Rajapaksa triumvirate for fear of "growing too big for his own good."
He has to create a positive political image among Tamil population who are very skeptical about his credentials and capabilities. For this he will have to shed the militant image and don the mantle of a Tamil political leader. There is reservoir of capable and forward thinking Tamils in other political parties and public entities. He should not hesitate to muster their support for the common good.
The successful conduct of the Eastern PC elections and installation of Pillaiyan at the helm as the chief minister is a victory for President Rajapaksa. However, east will require a lot of handholding and sympathetic consideration as it embarks on a new path. Though the election has given the President and his party a foothold in the east now, he has the more difficult task of establishing it in a tricky environment. He has to make the UPFA not merely as a vehicle of power but also of development. This can be done only through empowerment of the provincial council with adequate financial and administrative resources. Unless the ruling alliance is seen as a proactive participant in the development of east there will be no ownership of the people in it. And then the only winners will be bureaucracy and corruption. We have seen this happen too often in the past.
Other political parties, particularly the opposition, will have to recognize the reality of eastern province and see the political developments there in the national perspective. The UNP and SLMC will have to rethink their strategies to recoup their waning fortunes. And that means overcoming internal personality clashes, revamping the leadership styles and motivating party members.
These are the realities of the east which are far beyond cosmetic changes of power sharing. The task ahead is much bigger and more difficult and goes farther than mere power play.
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