Wednesday, April 30, 2008

Time has come for a fresh Indian initiative in Sri Lanka

The Tamil Nadu state assembly resolution calling upon the Centre to take steps to bring peace in Sri Lanka last Wednesday, April 24, merits follow up action by all those who aspire for resolving the Sri Lanka Tamil issue peacefully. The resolution perhaps for the first time reflects the desire of Tamils everywhere for India to take a more proactive role in Sri Lanka in the interest of all stakeholders – people of India and Sri Lanka, Sri Lanka Tamil Diaspora and the international community. Its constructive tone for finding a peaceful resolution of the problem, rather than the polemical Tamil political rhetoric adopted in the past, is too good to be trivialised.

Coincidentally, the resolution was passed when the Eelam War-4 hit the hottest point of combat at Muhamalai causing heavy casualties on both sides. With over 7000 lives already lost since December 2005 in the endless conflict, civil society in India and Sri Lanka jaded by failure to be effective in the past should now renew their efforts to use the small opening provided by the TN assembly resolution to turn it into a productive opportunity.

The resolution, briefly worded perhaps for political reasons, by itself does not indicate possible outcome. However, Chief Minister Karunanidhi’s eloquent speech on the occasion gives sufficient indications for all stakeholders on the subtle changes taking place in Tamil Nadu political perceptions on the subject.

It is significant that in his speech Karunanidhi had defended India’s (Centre’s) policy on Sri Lanka. This sends a message to the Tamil protagonists of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) who had been counting on his support to the LTTE war. His pointed reference to the lack of unity among Tamils and criticism of the killing of Tamil leaders like A Amirthalingam without naming the LTTE makes it clear that he does not equate the LTTE war with the struggle of Tamils for autonomy. And as a corollary it raises a big question mark on the LTTE claims as the sole representative of Tamils.

At the same time his lament for the failure of Tamils to unite and achieve success as the Maoists in Nepal have done indicates that his heart supports the Tamil Eelam. But his head seems to have dictated that it was not pragmatic. His pragmatism in approach is relevant because he is perhaps one Tamil leader who is widely respected by Tamils (including politicians and Tamil Diaspora) everywhere and he has the potential to evolve a Tamil consensus on the subject. His speech has given adequate indications for them to take positive follow up action in three directions –persuade India for active involvement, persuade Sri Lanka and the LTTE to cease their quest for a military solution, and take measures for initiating a holistic and structured approach to find a peaceful resolution of the Tamil quest for autonomy without threatening Sri Lanka’s sovereignty.

Stakeholders’ response

Speculating on the stakeholders’ response to the resolution is risky. Many observers of the scene would be tempted to dismiss it as a political ploy of the Chief Minister to prevent the Patali Makka Katchi (PMK) leader Dr Ramadoss and Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazagham (MDMK) leader Vaiko from cashing in on the Sri Lanka Tamil issue in the local political scene. However, this issue has ceased to be a hot ‘vote catcher’ issue in Tamil Nadu for sometime now. Moreover, the war in Sri Lanka is going on too long to be ignored and any opportunity to resolve it should not be dismissed on cynical considerations. And the resolution offers one such opportunity.

Perhaps, Delhi has got its own internal dissonance on Sri Lanka within the government and the ruling coalition. At present, Tamil Nadu has a disproportionately large clout at the Centre and within the ruling and opposition coalitions. It is time for Tamil lawmakers in Delhi to close their ranks on this issue and demand a fresh Indian initiative in Sri Lanka. Otherwise Tamil public at large are unlikely to forgive them.

As far as Sri Lanka is considered, its adroit President Rajapaksa by now must have understood that the end of the tunnel was still not visible despite the huge cost of lives resources paid in the war so far. It should be equally clear that a fresh political initiative with India at the helm (rather than Norway) could possibly be a better way of resolving the issue. If nothing else, it would save a few billion dollars down the drain and a few thousand lives, while presenting a possibility of success, than pursuing a purely military option.

The international community (a.k.a. four co-chairs in Sri Lanka context) is perhaps wiser now of the limitations of Norwegian mediation and their own actions, long on rhetoric and short on results. Perhaps they should consider asking India to don the mantle for a change to give a lease of life to their well meaning efforts in Sri Lanka.

It is too tempting to dismiss the LTTE as irrelevant in any peace process. However, it will continue to be an important denominator in the issue. At the risk of being branded as the LTTE’s ‘military guru’ as some wise Sri Lanka columnist had done, I can say the LTTE has enough brains to know that the current war is reaching a point of no return. Inflicting more body counts or carrying out more suicide bombings – as the Tanil Nadu resolution was greeted – is not going to resolve the misery of millions of Tamils. It is time for the LTTE to show “Vivekam” (wisdom with discretion) in addition to its much touted “Veeram” (valour) because the war is going beyond the military domain.

The LTTE is not known to listen to external advice. I can only hope that it reads this and makes a pragmatic reassessment of the situation as the Kalaignar (Karunanidhi) has done. And that has only added to his stature. Will the LTTE do it? That is an answer its supporters and admirers should demand. There is no time to be lost anymore.

Courtesy: www.saag.org

Tuesday, April 15, 2008

Sri Lanka: Two Unhealthy Political Developments - Part II – Rise in Muslim Discontent

The political style of Sri Lanka President Mahinda Rajapaksa and his use of military option in handling the Tamil insurgency have split almost all political parties which have been compelled to make hard political choices. Starting with the United National Party (UNP), the latest episode in the "split-story" is the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP).The smaller parties did not split but joined the ruling United Peoples Freedom Alliance (UPFA) bandwagon enjoying the perks of office. Those who have resisted have generally put paid for their demeanour. But the hardest hit in this political maelstrom is the Muslim political leadership, notably the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress SLMC).

No Muslim leader has so far been able to truly fill the leadership void created after the assassination of Mohammad Hussein Muhammad Ashraff, who gave a vision to the SLMC in the national sphere. He gave a new thrust to the SLMC's emergence as a representative body of Muslims in 1986. The rise of Ashraff was in a way path breaking because for the first time the poorer and marginalised Tamil speaking Muslims of the east had a leader who created space for them in Sri Lanka politics. Till then individual Muslim leaders made their mark by toeing the Sinhala line within the two major political parties. It was Ashraff who struck his own path and developed the SLMC and the Muslim constituency as an independent entity and worked out political equations on handling the Tamils and Sinhalas. This was very important at that time as Muslims were caught between the increasingly violent confrontation between Sinhalas and Tamils - the two larger communities.

After the death of Ashraff, the SLMC lost not only its shine but its direction as well. It has been split, at least into three major entities. Rauf Hakeem a lieutenant of Ashraff took over the major chunk of SLMC considering himself political heir to Ashraff, while Ferial Ashraff, wife of the late Ashraff, joined the UPFA coalition with her faction.

With the fourth edition of the Eelam War raging in the north, the sharing of power between ethnic communities is as yet an undecided issue. With President Rajapaksa representing the larger section of Southern Sinhala viewpoint, both the Tamil and Muslim communities need strong and unified leaderships to workout an equitable solution to power sharing.

Among Muslim leaders, particularly of the SLMC, the peace process 2002 created a feeling of disappointment. The peace talks between the government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) excluded direct and separate representation to the Muslim community, who inhabit large areas in the northeast. They feared the devolution process would bypass Muslim interests by default. Efforts of Rauf Hakeem to muscle into the process through direct deal with Prabhakaran, the LTTE leader, resulted in empty words. The demand for equitable role for Muslms in the peace process on their own right was never taken seriously by other stakeholders including the international community.

Similar was the experience of the Muslim community which bore a major brunt of the devastation of the tsunami strike in December 2005. Their relief measures were slow in coming. And they were unhappy that their woes did not get the adequate attention they deserved. These experiences have glaringly showed the inadequacy of Muslim leadership to articulate their viewpoint.

These came on top of a similar experience in the past when India actively intervened in the period 1983 to 1987 in support of the Tamil cause that culminated in the India- Sri Lanka Agreement 1987. Then also the Muslim community felt their interests had been marginalised in the devolution stakes. At that time the Muslim polity had no independent articulation but had tried to find a place within the leadership of the two major national parties. And the elections taking place now in the east are only a resurgence of the very same form of provincial level devolution. So it will probably revive the old fears of alienation. And the Muslim population is politically more conscious than ever before. So the feeling of alienation could be stronger if the elections are not conducted fairly.

Muslim leadership and the PC elections

With the President talking of democratisation of the east, the time has come for Muslims to demand a share of the pie in the power structure. This would also set precedence for their share in power in the national dispensations in the future as and when the war ends (!). If the Muslim leaders fail to achieve this they are likely to be become non entities in the eyes of the people. This has created a crisis of sorts for the Muslim polity in participating in the forthcoming provincial council elections in the eastern province. The crisis has three major facets.

The first relates to handling President Rajapaksa's desire to play an assertive role in the east, so that the ruling UPFA coalition (and as a corollary Sri Lanka Freedom Party –SLFP) can gain a firm foothold cashing upon their military success against the LTTE. Rajapaksa has shown remarkable political savvy in understanding the weakness of Muslim leadership which is split and easily satisfied with political pickings. So he struck a deal with the community leaders (Jamaat) directly and that acted as a hidden persuader in working out support for the UPFA. Only Rauf Hakeem of the SLMC appears to be trying to be free of the "Rajapaksa embrace" perhaps to save his own identity as the true successor of MHM Ashraff.

Rauf Hakeem's fears are not unjustified. The President's new thrust lines of politics in the east involve coalition with the Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP), who are still armed and have a dubious record of acts of violence and intimidation against Muslims. If TMVP establishes itself in the corridors of power, life could become difficult for Muslims. Moreover, in the near term, if the President succeeds it could end the carefully nuanced Muslim leadership's tactics of "milking" maximum benefit out of the traditional antagonism between the SLFP and its bĂȘte noire the UNP. In some distant future it holds the potential to evolve a Tamil-Sinhala political coalition at the cost of Muslim interests in the power play. This unlikely happening could throw the Muslims into political wilderness.

The second facet relates to the importance the eastern provincial council elections hold for Muslim political identity. The fact that three senior Muslim members of parliament resigned their membership to participate in the provincial council poll shows this. This comes out of what they feel as justifiable claims to have an elected body of their choice with a Muslim chief minister. This is not an unrealistic thought. By most counts (though often unreliable) Muslims have emerged as the biggest population group in the east touching around 42 per cent of the total. It is this desire to capture power that has made two prominent Muslim leaders - Hizbullah and Rauf Hakeem - choose opposite political camps. Hizbullah has chosen to partner the UPFA while Hakeem is going along with the UNP agreeing to put up candidates of SLMC to contest with UNP symbol. His choice is probably driven by the fear of Rajapaksa's domination which he perceives as Southern Sinhala assertion.

Lastly, the success of the Muslim leaders in the election is going to determine the pecking order of Muslim leadership in the national sphere. But with the TMVP domination of the Batticaloa district and the uncertain dimensions of Sinhala support in what had been traditional UNP strongholds, any split in Muslim votes could result in the diminution of an independent Muslim political articulation. So far the Muslim politicians have been able to achieve much using their clout with whosoever is in power. But the moment the relevance of their support diminishes such achievements could become uncertain.

The security threat

Some of the problems faced by Sri Lanka's Muslim population are similar to those faced by Muslims in many countries where they are a minority. These are mostly related to the inherent contradictions within the Muslim Ummah in reconciling increased assertion of Islamic identity with that of national one. Thanks to the more accommodative Sufi beliefs of most of the Sri Lankan Muslims to a large extent this problem has been managed well despite periodic confrontation with the increasing spread of fundamentalist Wahabi influence.

Despite minor sectarian skirmishes between the two, so far the community has managed to keep them within manageable proportions, thanks to the pragmatic approach of Muslim population and its leaders. If there is a perceived threat to the Muslim identity the Wahabis are likely to take advantage and use it as a lever to spread their influence. And it is good to remember that unfettered spread of Wahabi influence has led to the growth of aggressive fundamentalism of the Taliban type in many countries. Similar potential exists in arming Muslim private militias which could come into being as a response to TMVP depredation if it continues after the elections. And political disillusionment is the first step to these unhealthy developments.

The observation of International Crisis Group on the subject in their report of May 29, 2007 aptly sums up the whole situation: There is no guarantee that this commitment to non-violence will continue, particularly given the frustration noticeable among younger Muslims in the Eastern province. In some areas there are Muslim armed groups but they are small and not a major security threat. Fears of armed Islamist movements emerging seem to be exaggerated, often for political ends. Small gangs have been engaged in semi-criminal activities and intra-religious disputes, but there is a danger they will take on a role in inter-communal disputes if the conflict continues to impinge upon the security of co-religionists.

Such a development should not be dismissed casually. The weakened Muslim leadership could well be swept aside if the community loses its confidence in the present scheme of things. (In this context, it is probably too early to comment on the impact of Pakistan President Musharraf's generous offer to help Sri Lanka's fight against terror. But when such an offer comes from a leader, who had unhesitatingly used the same terror weapon in neighbouring countries in the past through proxies guided by the ISI machinery it has dangerous portends.) This should be the last thing all communities in this troubled province need. To avoid such a development, the work is cut out for all stakeholders in and out of power to ensure a fair representation for all communities. Specifically the needs of the hour are as follows -

• The administration should run a free and fair election without stuffing of ballots or intimidation to keep voters away from exercising their franchise. The UPFA leadership in particular should run a tight ship avoiding the temptation to use the TMVP muscle power to ensure victory, as the opposition is already voicing their suspicion. One way of achieving this is to have international election observers present during the election process and providing unfettered media access during the run up to the elections and voting.

• Have a proactive internal security plan in place to ensure communal confrontation does not erupt even accidentally.

• Muslim leadership inside the coalitions should ensure the trade offs are not short term. It is high time the leadership united on major issues of community and national interests rather than think on personal considerations. A major weakness is the leadership's inability to think and act pro-actively. This can come through if only the work out a larger consultative coalition outside party folds to serve the common interests of the community.

Sunday, April 6, 2008

Sri Lanka: Two Unhealthy Political Developments Part I- Legitimising the TMVP

R Hariharan


Political developments in Sri Lanka have been as rapid as the abnormal deluge that has bogged down the troops in the forward lines of north. There had been some realignment of political fronts as the country approached the May 10 deadline for the first ever provincial council elections in the east since the de-merger of the north-eastern province. Ideally this should be a healthy development. But Sri Lanka, as in many other democracies in the neighbourhood, is caught in the vortex of populist politics, and disregard for scruples in the quest for power among political parties. The battle array of the two fronts reflects s this politics sans principles with focus on issues of power rather than commitment to ideals.

Specifically, two unhealthy, interconnected political developments that could become hazardous for national security are evident in this political exercise. The first and more insidious development is legitimisation of the Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Padaigal (TMVP) as a political party without disarming it and anointing it as a partner of the ruling United Peoples Freedom Alliance (UPFA). The second is the potential powder keg of growing feeling of alienation among Muslims in the east in the emerging provincial political dispensation.

Legitimising the TMVP

TMVP has a murky history that is almost wholly militant and non-political. It is a product of miscegenation of soured militancy and failed quest for power through the use of arms. It owes its origins to Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan alias Karuna (to be factually correct a.k.a Kokila Dushmantha Gunawardena), the Batticaloa leader of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) who broke up with Prabhakaran in March 2004. The LTTE’s major preoccupation in the early years of Karuna’s exit was typical – to gun him and his followers down. Karuna made a half hearted attempt at politics. This was apparently beyond his ken as surviving LTTE pistol group assassins became the top priority. Ultimately this preoccupation became a zero sum game that ended any political role for him. But it provided Karuna and the TMVP a legitimate (at least from their point of view) reason to retain the arms they had brought along when they quit the LTTE fold. In any case, the state had neither the inclination nor the determination to disarm yet another Tamil militant group in its own back yard, particularly when it was fighting the LTTE with the TMVP assisting it to effectively restricted the LTTE activity in the east.

Karuna became a war lord of sorts ruling the Tamil areas. The cadres helped the Sri Lankan military operations that intensified from 2005 onwards. Initially they operated collectively in groups and later individually. They occupied the power vacuum created amidst the Tamil population as the territory was cleared of LTTE control. Karuna had problems in visibly exercising his command mainly due to absentee landlordism and continued LTTE threat to his life. The effective leadership power was wielded by Pillayan his second in command. The security forces appear to have preferred him as he was eager, willing and available to go along with the security forces operations. Pillayan climbed up to the top of the leadership ladder after the TMVP eased out Karuna from the leadership making some accusations of financial misappropriation of party funds against him.

The TMVP activities were not endearing them to others. Their actions related to a vigilante militia than a political party. There were innumerable complaints against the behaviour of armed TMVP cadres roaming around the Tamil and at times Muslim areas from many quarters. They included Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission, the four co-chairs of the Tokyo Donors Conference, political parties of all hues, community leaders, civil society organisations, highly reputed international and local not for profit organisations, and human rights and humanitarian organs of the United Nations.

The list of TMVP misconduct included the whole range of offences in the penal code - extortion, child recruitment, ‘tax collection,’ kidnapping, intimidation, muzzling the media, and even killings. There were accusations of army colluding with TMVP in some of these actions either by ignoring or participating in the misdeeds. Demands for disarming the TMVP were as loud as the deadly silence of the government response to the demands. The Sri Lanka government had to take some action to satisfy the mounting international criticism against the TMVP and probably Karuna, now without power and following, became probably a willing fall guy.

The TMVP without Karuna but under Pillayan became an important partner of the UPFA alliance when it contested the local body polls in Batticaloa district a month ago. Of course, the elections were by and large peaceful and polling was heavy. The TMVP cadres did not display their hardware during the elections according to the government. This point has been disputed by some of the political parties and civil society bodies. That is immaterial because the TMVP still retains the weapons. TMVP won eight of the nine local bodies. The UPFA alliance won the ninth - the Batticaloa local council. The government show-cased the local body elections to the international audience as the coming of age of democracy in the east. In a way it was a coming of age, but of politicisation of extremism. This is where the genuineness and credibility of the forthcoming PC polls hang now.

The issue is not simply one of legitimising TMVP; but legitimising extrajudicial role of armed groups to operate both politically in areas of their choosing, while the rule of law is consigned to the books. Though the TMVP might be more inclined to assume a political role, it has to disarm itself to become a legitimate political party as other Tamil militant groups had done in the past. Only that would be an affirmation of their faith in the power of the ballot rather than the bullet. Even in Nepal, the Maoist arms were mothballed before they participated in the elections.

The memories of letting loose armed gangs in the east after the Indian peace Keeping Force (IPKF) left the island in 1990 provide a gruesome lesson for the state in handling the issue casually. The east was handed over to the LTTE control by a clever President Premadasa to lay the rule of law on the then Chief Minister Varadaraja Perumal who had made a misguided unilateral declaration of independence in his last hurrah. The LTTE went on a rampage and in the blood bath that followed it killed at least a thousand Tamil youth who had put their faith in the government.

The bottom line is security of ordinary people is the responsibility of the state. It can neither deputise it to warlords nor irregular vigilante militias. If the state cannot ensure personal security, how can it conduct free and fair elections in the true democratic spirit? History is replete with examples of how politics and guns in a democracy cannot coexist.. Pakistan in our own neighbourhood has been sapped of its strength due to not adhering to this simple truth. It is still reaping the bitter fruits of ignoring this basic dictum - only politics and not guns can have a place in democracy.

A second aspect is such moves set a bad precedence in future negotiations for peace with the LTTE. Ultimately the future of the armed LTTE cadres has to be decided. Even during the IPKF’s early palaver with the LTTE, the cadres’ future was discussed. If they are to retain their arms, they have to be part of a legitimate force of the state accountable to the organs of the constitution. From this count, this political move to take TMVP within the UPFA fold without satisfying the issue of disarming it could weaken state’s case in future negotiations as and when they take place. It also sends the message that as long as such extremist groups maintain their identity and remain politically useful they can get away with anything and exist outside the pale of law.

The only regime that had been practising such black tactics is Burma where the military junta has signed ceasefire agreements with a large number of ethnic insurgent groups. They have been allowed to retain their structure, put on a state retainer, and act as government proxies in their regions with detrimental results. A few powerful groups have been allowed to retain their arms and they are virtually ruling the roost. A few other groups are into profitable poppy cultivation and have become bastions of drug traffic causing concern to both China and the rest of the world. These groups have encouraged illegal arms traffic to feed insurgencies in India’s northeast and Bangladesh.

Sri Lanka is politically far more advanced than Burma to fall into such easy but risky subterfuge in handling the TMVP. A suspicion that the removal of Special Task Force (STF) personnel from 10 posts before the election was carried out at the behest of the TMVP persists in the minds of many commentators. If this is true it is an unhealthy beginning for the new “political role” of the TMVP. With Pillayan already speaking of his aspirations to be chief minister of the eastern provincial council (and why not if he wins majority seats) the credibility of the government exercise in “liberating the people of the east from LTTE control” and ushering in democracy would be low. One can only hope at least after the elections are over, the disarming of TMVP would follow. It is never too late to start what is good for the people.


Lastly, there is the global threat of small arms proliferation in which insurgent and militant groups’ contribution is at least a million weapons. In South Asia alone at least 100,000 to 200,000 are in the hands of insurgent groups, past and present. This figure does not include weapons in the hands of criminal gangs. Sri Lanka has a sizeable contribution to the stockpile of unaccounted arms that are floating in the sub continent. This encourages a host of crimes – smuggling, corruption of government officials, human traffic, and illicit arms and drug traffic. The pilot survey of the Hambantota district by the National Commission Against Illicit Proliferation of Small Arms Sri Lanka has clearly shown how the illicit weapons from north and east are contributing to crime even in a Sinhala majority district. So how can there be normal political life in the east, with illicit arms in the hands of legitimately elected representatives? Only the people of Sri Lanka can answer this question.

Sri Lanka: Fernandopulle’s Assassination Likely to Trigger Fresh Offensive

By R Hariharan

Assassination of Fernandopulle

The assassination of Sri Lanka Highways Minister and Chief Government whip Jeyaraj Fernandopulle (55) by a suicide bomb blast at Gampaha district on Sunday (April 6) morning has deprived the President Rajapaksa of his point’s man in the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP). The minister was killed along with 11 others when he was flagging off a marathon race as part of the Sinhala (and Tamil) New Year’s Day celebration at Weliweriya. Over 95 others were injured in the blast.

A voluble and assertive personality, the minister had been active in setting up things for the ruling alliance to contest the eastern provincial council elections slated for May 10. The President will be sorely missing his services during the PC election as also in handling the Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP), which is a loose canon in the political firmament, after the elections.

Fernandopulle had been high on the hit list of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) for his strong anti-LTTE stance. He minced no words against them in his speeches. So it is logical to conclude that his assassination was the handiwork of the LTTE. Even the assassination of D.M.Dasanayake, Minister of Nation Building, carried out on January 9, 2008 is believed to have been a case of mistaken identity as Jeyaraj Fernandopulle was intended to be the target. However, this time the assassin made no such mistake. .

A four-time parliament member Fernandopulle had created an indispensable niche for himself within the SLFP. He was one of the few Tamil ministers who could fluently speak Sinhala and English as well. A no-holds-barred speaker, Fernandopulle was well known for his blunt statements that caused red faces in diplomatic and political circles, and in the corridors of power.

The President is unlikely to let the LTTE get away with the assassination of his right hand man. We can expect him to unleash the security forces in full force once again on the LTTE forward defences in Mannar, Madhu church, Omanthai, Welioya and Muhamalai areas. In any case, the ground indications already point to the imminence of resumption of offensive by the security forces and the LTTE’s readiness to face them. The killing of the minister is likely to only hasten the process.

Operational picture

Abnormally heavy rains had bogged down the operations in the north so far. The troops deployed near large water bodies in Mannar, Muhamalai, Nagarkovil, Welioya areas have been affected by flooding and slush. This had impeded air and artillery support and defences were waterlogged. Mosquitoes breeding in puddles of water have spread dengue and chikungunia among troops. This is reported to have severely affected operational capability of security forces in Welioya sector along the eastern coast.
Despite the rains during the last month, the SLA had claimed some progress in their creeping offensive after inflicting heavy casualties on the LTTE. On March 21, 2008, the Media Centre for National Security spokesman has claimed killing 6,867 LTTE cadres so far in the operations that commenced in December 2005. As against this, the security forces had lost 1,501 troops in action. The casualty claim at end February 2008 stood at a total of 6,486 LTTE cadres, and 1,196 military personnel. These figures could be inflated or include civilian auxiliaries and need to be confirmed by other sources.

However, the Media Centre figures indicate a sudden escalation in the security forces casualty - 305 troops killed in the four weeks of March 2008) as against a total of 1196 troops lost in the earlier period of 24 months! Moreover, as against the security forces loss of 305 the LTTE had suffered 386 casualties in the same period. This is an alarmingly low ratio between the two, achieved never before.
This shows the combat along the front line even during the rains had really heated up. And as the operations intensify further now and all the heavy fire power is brought in, casualties on both sides are likely to mount rapidly. But despite this, the security forces are undoubtedly better placed. Considering the overall size of the security forces, their casualties are comparatively much less than that of the LTTE which has been mauled severely (though not grievously), losing at least 30 per cent of its strength.

During the last one week the rains have tapered off and the weather has improved. Thus assured air and heavy artillery support should now be available for operations. Similarly, ground conditions should have improved for the using armour without the fear of getting bogged down in slush. The trickle of civilians vacating the battle zones is growing. For the last few days the security forces were being moved forward in Jaffna Peninsula perhaps to get ready for a fresh offensive. We can expect it to start sooner than later.

The LTTE also appears to be gearing itself for the offensive to resume. Three groups including the Malathi and Charles Anthony brigades have been moved to Madhu Church area in the Mannar Sector, according to deserters. Both sides had agreed to keep the church and its vicinity a no war zone. However both sides have been trading accusations of the other side using the holy ground to launch artillery fire. And fierce fighting had been raging for sometime now within a kilometre vicinity of the church.

The Bishop of Mannar Rayappu Joseph has informed that in order to save the idol of Our Lady of Madhu from artillery fire, the church management had shifted the idol to a safe location on April 4.

It is evident that the idol has been moved to the northern most part of the LTTE held territory at the behest of the LTTE. The escalating the combat situation in the area around Madhu Church is probably operational. The church is located astride the supply routes from Mannar coast to Wanni. So it is vital for the LTTE to defend it fiercely. It is equally important for the security forces to wrest control of the area. So we can expect the LTTE to fight it out when the offensive resumes in this area.

Both sides appear to be preparing for a long haul. Media reports indicate that Sri Lanka had asked Pakistan for the immediate supply of 150,000 rounds of 60 mm mortar bombs and hand grenades. Pakistan is likely to fulfil another Sri Lankan order worth $ 25 million for the supply of 81 mm, 120 mm and 130 mm mortar bombs. The LTTE also appears to have received from some ammunition, particularly for its artillery. It is not clear which clandestine route is being used by the LTTE to import the munitions. But the Indian coastal zone continues to be the weakest link in the naval defence of Sri Lanka. We may expect the Sri Lanka navy to intensify operations in the seas around Katchativu in the coming weeks. This could trigger further tensions in both India and Sri Lanka. This is in the nature of war which always triggers tension in both winners and losers.

www.southasiaanalysis.org